HRPD Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND THE STATUS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

COMITÉ PERMANENT DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DES RESSOURCES HUMAINES ET DE LA CONDITION DES PERSONNES HANDICAPÉES

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, April 21, 1998

• 0915

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Reg Alcock (Winnipeg South, Lib.)): Let us come to order. I have, for your information, just before we start, a few matters of business I want to deal with very quickly.

The first thing is just for information, Mr. Rocheleau, for Mr. Crête, if you could pass this on. We'll also communicate it to him officially. He had submitted a request that a Mr. Doyle, an Order in Council appointee, appear before the committee. Mr. Doyle has subsequently resigned. I don't think those two things are connected, but in any event we won't be proceeding with that.

The second thing is that we have a request from the Italian ambassador. On Monday, May 4 and Tuesday, May 5, members of the Italian parliament who are involved with their human resources committee are going to be in town, and they are interested in attending a meeting with this committee. May 5 is the day we have the minister coming in, and one possibility is to put those two things together—let them come and witness what goes on here in terms of how we handle it, and then either spend some time with them before or after that particular meeting, if members are interested. Are you interested in doing something jointly with Italian members?

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain (Guelph—Wellington, Lib.): I don't know.

Mr. Dale Johnston (Wetaskiwin, Ref.): What a question.

The Chairman: It's going to be one of those days. I feel it already.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Do you feel the love in the room?

The Chairman: Let me rephrase that question.

Ms. Bonnie Brown (Oakville, Lib.): Yes. I didn't hear the preamble—sorry.

The Chairman: A number of parliamentarians from Italy, elected members of the Italian government, are coming here on May 4 and 5. These are members from their equivalent of this committee. They have requested an opportunity to meet and talk with members of this committee and witness, observe, or whatever, some of the stuff that this committee does.

One possibility would simply be to invite them to come and sit as observers in the meeting with the minister on estimates. It wouldn't change the tenor of the meeting, other than that there would be some more witnesses here. The other is to do something with them, a meeting formally with them, so that they could have a chance to talk to members of this committee. All I'm asking for is if there's an expression of interest in it, then I'll do it.

Nobody's opposed?

Ms. Bonnie Brown: Sure, as long as it's not a Friday.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: No, not Friday.

The Chairman: It won't affect our operations at all. It would be over and above anything we currently have planned.

That brings me to the final item I have here. I received a phone call yesterday. As you know, Minister MacAulay is scheduled to appear before us next Tuesday, on the.... He is in for eye surgery and is having some difficulty with the recovery phase of that and is asking for a deferral of one week. That would be on May 5 also.

We have Minister Pettigrew on the afternoon of May 5, at 3.30, I believe. We would have Mr. MacAulay in the morning, if that is acceptable to everybody.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Perfect.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Yes, of course.

The Chairman: Yes, Mr. Rocheleau.

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau (Trois-Rivières, BQ): I did not understand the first point, when you mentioned Mr. Doyle and Mr. Crête. Could you repeat what you said, please?

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Crête had written a letter to me asking that a Mr. Doyle, who was an appointee to some committee—

The Clerk of the Committee: The board of referees for the district of St.-Jerome.

The Chairman: Mr. Crête had written a letter saying he'd like to have Mr. Doyle called before the committee. We can examine Order in Council appointees. When we inquired about that, it turns out that Mr. Doyle resigned yesterday. He's no longer an appointee, so we won't be proceeding with that. We'll send a note back to Paul. I just wanted him to know.

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: Okay.

The Chairman: They're having the letter translated and they'll send it all over to him.

Let us begin, then, with our meeting on Bill C-19. For the benefit of members who haven't been through this process before, let me just point out a few things. You all have copies of those amendments that were submitted by the various parties, and you have copies of an agenda that has been prepared in a way that allows us to look at the bill in order, as we move through the passage of the bill, to facilitate passage of the bill.

• 0920

What I would propose doing is to simply group articles and call the vote on articles where there is no indication of a motion. Where I have a motion indicated, I will stop at that particular clause and then call upon the mover to move and speak to their motion, and we'll deal with the amendment at that point. This is just to allow us to move expeditiously through large numbers of clauses. Rather than calling them individually and asking for their passage, I'll call them in groups.

If you wish to ask a question within any particular group, simply indicate that as I'm going through it. You have an agenda with all of the clauses laid out on it. Okay? It makes sense for me to go through this, just to make sure everybody is clear.

The clerk has prepared a copy of all proposed amendments received in her office, for members of the committee. The clerk has also prepared an agenda that indicates the order in which the amendment should be dealt with by the committee, keeping in mind that the committee must deal with the bill clause by clause.

Even though amendments have been circulated to members of the committee, an amendment is not officially before the committee until it has been moved by the member under whose name it has been circulated. If the member is not present, another member of the committee can move it. So when I call a clause, for example clause 3 or 4, you have to say, “Mr. Chairman, I move my amendment”. I'll stop too, so that we're not rushing past any of that.

We have members of the department here who are available to answer questions and offer informed comment on concerns members may raise. As well, we have our own researcher here.

I also have a note from Mr. Dubé from the Conservatives. They have a couple of amendments here. He will not be here and simply asks us not to proceed with those amendments.

Is everybody clear? Any concerns?

Now, I suppose it's worth trying. Shall we just pass the bill in one motion?

Mr. Dale Johnston: No.

The Chairman: Okay. We're going to go clause by clause.

I don't have to worry about title and all that until the end, right? Okay.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, I would reconsider. Maybe if we passed all of the amendments put forth by the Reform Party, we could pass the bill.

The Chairman: Oh, I'm sorry. I did not hear unanimous consent. It's worth a try.

(Clause 1 agreed to)

(On clause 2)

The Chairman: Now we move into clause 2, against which I have six amendments. You all have a copy of the amendments in a package here.

Mr. Johnston, do you wish to move Reform amendment 1?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I move Reform amendment 1.

The Chairman: Would you care to speak to it?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Strangely enough, I would.

Mr. Chairman, you will notice that a lot of my amendments are regarding the CIRB. I notice that we have no one from the CIRB here today, so I'm wondering as to the wisdom of proceeding without a representative from that board here.

The Chairman: Well, I think I can respond, in part, to that. Mr. McDermott is the senior member of the department responsible for this legislation and is well able to answer any questions relative to the legislation. He has a number of competent assistants at the table with him.

Mrs. Chamberlain, do you have any comment to make on that?

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: No, we're just.... We're comfortable in proceeding, we think. That's fine.

Mr. John Williams (St. Albert, Ref.): Mr. Chairman, if I may interject, I think back to the predecessor of the Canada Industrial Relations Board, the Canada Labour Relations Board, and the problems that came to light last year that were investigated by the auditor general. He pointed out some serious internal divisions within that board, and I think it would be appropriate to have at least the chairman of the board before the committee to assure us that this legislation is going to allow them to work in some kind of harmonious manner to expedite the government's policy here. Therefore, I think it would be appropriate to have a member of the board or the chairman of the board before us as we deliberate this bill.

• 0925

The Chairman: Mr. McDermott, do you want to comment on that at all?

Mr. Michael McDermott (Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of Human Resources Development): One point is that the CIRB does not exist at this time. The Canada Labour Relations Board is still there. The new board is quite different in structure from the current board in that it's a representative board and it will conduct its affairs in a different way. There are a whole series of measures in this bill that do address some of the concerns that were found to exist in the current board.

Generally speaking, it's a labour board as a quasi-judicial tribunal, which applies the law as it's adopted. It's the government that proposes the law, and the role of public servants within the department is to assist in the development of the policies. The role of a tribunal is to apply it on a day-to-day basis with the cases that come before it.

I think the issues that were identified, not just by the auditor general but prior to the auditor general's inquiries, were that there were some problems with the functioning of the board. It is the purpose of part of this bill to address those issues, and we believe they have been addressed in this bill.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. McDermott.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, while Mr. McDermott is technically correct, we don't have a CIRB until after the bill is passed, we do, however, have a chairman of something very similar to the CIRB, and I think it would be good if we could have him before this committee. I'd like to talk to him about the amendments.

In the first amendment, for instance, in the legislation that's before us, there's no indication that the chairman or vice-chairman can be replaced or dismissed for cause, which could include misconduct or abuse of public funds. I wouldn't mind having him here to ask him how he feels about that particular clause or if indeed he has other advice or other ideas for us regarding the conduct of the chairman and the legislation governing him.

Certainly I realize that, as Mr. McDermott says, this is a quasi-judicial board and they will administer whatever the act says, but I think it would be good to get the input from the current chairman, and it would be great if he could have the confidence of this body as well.

The Chairman: I'm not certain what you're suggesting, Mr. Johnston. Are you suggesting that we not proceed with the consideration of these amendments because the chairman of the board that is about to disappear is not here? If it's witness testimony that is required, we've had a period of time to have that. We have members of the department who are responsible for drafting, negotiating, and enforcing this legislation. We have the representative of the minister who is ultimately responsible for the legislation here. I think the discussion about what the legislation is intended to do can proceed.

Mr. John Williams: I appreciate your points, Mr. Chairman, but the chairman of the CLRB, I understand, will become the new chairman of the CIRB, and I think his testimony would be beneficial before the committee as we look at these individual clauses to ensure that what happened before will not be happening again.

• 0930

I think of numerous points that were pointed out by the auditor general when the committee was appraising the legislation and the Treasury Board rules. By Mr. McDermott's own admission, these problems were going on prior to the auditor general's report. We want to be able to ensure that this board and the people on this board are going to respect the legislation that's given to them to operate, and I think it would be appropriate to have these people before us.

The Chairman: Mr. Nault.

Mr. Robert D. Nault (Kenora—Rainy River, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I find it somewhat amusing that the Reform at this late date would like to have another witness, because that's what the chairman of the CLRB is: a witness. They do not speak on behalf of the government. The government passes legislation, and the department of course, as has been mentioned, puts forward suggestions and policy recommendations. If the members opposite are asking for this individual and/or the board to make a presentation, I'm surprised they wouldn't have done that months ago when we were going through witness after witness after witness. It's somewhat surprising that today they would suggest the answers cannot be given by the department.

My comment, Mr. Chairman, is that I am very confident the officials who are before us can answer the questions Mr. Johnston, Mr. Williams, Mr. Anders, or anyone else would ask as they relate to how this board would function. I think we should get on with it. The officials who are here understand the make-up of the board and its intention as it relates to their role in labour relations in Canada.

Again, it must be made very clear that the chairman of the CLRB or anybody else acts on the legislation as it's put to them on a day-to-day basis. They don't speak on behalf of the government when we're creating legislation.

Mr. Dale Johnston: I think, Mr. Chairman, that if Mr. Nault would check he'd find that we did indeed ask for the chairman of the CIRB to appear before us as a witness and we never did get him as a witness. That, however, is not what we're asking for today. We would like to see him come before the committee to answer some questions as to how he intends to conduct himself and his board and to respond to the amendments we've put in place, particularly our amendments and the legislation in general.

The Chairman: Mrs. Chamberlain.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Mr. Chairman, I think if we could proceed we will find as we work through the amendments....

I can speak to the government's position on your amendments. There will be explanations, and I think as we work through that process, this would be fairly clear. We would understand each other's points of view, but I think we do have to progress to do that. When you talk about “misconduct”, that is one of your amendments and so I'm quite prepared to speak about it. But I couldn't imagine in anybody's wildest notion that somebody would think “misconduct” wouldn't include an abuse of public funds. As we work through this, I think it will become fairly clear for people to decide whether they do want the amendment, whether they think that's beneficial to the bill or not.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Of course, that's a matter for debate, because the old legislation talks about “during good behaviour” as well, and we saw a most blatant misuse of public funds and abuse of the office that went on for a long time, until finally the auditor general raised a little more fuss about it. The auditor general brought this problem up in his reports before and nothing was done about it. I really think it's incumbent on us as a committee to make sure there's no room for this kind of thing in the future. Certainly, we believe that any public servant is and should be remunerated for his expense account, but his expense account should be within reason.

It should also include what we consider to be abuse of funds. There are people who were in some provincial governments in Canada who are now incarcerated and facing charges for the same kind of abuse of their expense accounts, and here we have someone who's chairperson of a quasi-judicial board who does this with impunity. I think this is the sort of thing we have to.... We'd be negligent if we didn't put something into this bill to prevent that from happening again.

• 0935

The Chairman: I certainly support your intention.

I believe I heard Mr. McDermott say he felt there were a number of clauses in this legislation that addressed some of those concerns.

Mr. McDermott, could you speak generally about that issue?

Mr. Michael McDermott: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

There were some examples of problems the board had before, if you may recall. The board was unable to function at one point because the chair of the board did not have the authority to assign or reassign cases and to generally conduct a logical scheduling. This has been corrected. There are measures in this bill that will deal with that kind of situation. The chair would have the authority to schedule and to reschedule if cases were not moving along satisfactorily. There is a whole proposed section in this bill that comes from a separate source.

In the last Parliament Bill C-49 dealt with administrative tribunals and with matters of how members of those tribunals could be subject to disciplinary inquiries.

There's a whole series of measures that deal with that kind of thing taken from this Bill C-49. The purpose of it being in here is that if this is passed before the success of Bill C-49 comes forward, then it is already in place. I believe it's already been adopted in a couple of cases for specific tribunals.

So there is a disciplinary process that is not in the current code that would go some way to deal with the kinds of issues that were faced by the previous board. It would enable an inquiry to take place to see if there are grounds for discipline and so on in an orderly fashion, involving the appointment of a judge with appropriate powers of inquiry.

There are a couple of examples, Mr. Chairman. There are others. As we move along through the various clauses you will see that there is a desire to make this board function well.

My understanding is that it's well clarified by Treasury Board and by the appropriate officials at Privy Council Office that the principles of the Treasury Board guidelines will be required to be observed in any future expense matters. These issues have been looked at most carefully by the appropriate authorities.

The Chairman: Mr. Williams.

Mr. John Williams: Mr. McDermott's points are well taken, but going back to the CLRB, it's a quasi-judicial body, and the CIRB is also going to be a quasi-judicial body. I'm trying to get clarified in my mind, Mr. Chairman, what kind of supervision the department has over the CIRB, because it is a quasi-judicial body.

Mr. McDermott, can you give specific direction to the board under this legislation or is the chairman able to operate, which I presume he is, on an independent basis? That's the whole concept of a quasi-judicial body, that he could operate on an independent basis. If he's operating on an independent basis, we get back to the original question by Mr. Johnson: why isn't he here today? If you as the deputy minister don't have the authority to issue specific directives to him, then it's important that the chairman be here. Do you have that kind of authority under this legislation, Mr. McDermott?

Mr. Michael McDermott: The chairman of the CLRB reports to Parliament through the minister. The deputy minister of Human Resources Development does not have any authority over the chair of the board.

There are two or three boards in which the minister is involved. Another one is the one that deals with collective bargaining for independent artists. Again, the chair of that board has the same kind of status, and that is the normal pattern for a quasi-judicial tribunal. It is at arm's length in order to preserve the judicial quality of the tribunal.

Mr. John Williams: So here we have you as the deputy minister of the department answering questions to this committee, but by your own admission you have no authority over the board. Once it's constituted and created, they are off and running and doing their own thing.

I still want to get back to Mr. Johnston's point, Mr. Chairman. We're setting up this quasi-judicial body that is independent of the department that reports directly to Parliament, yet we don't have the chairman in front of the committee.

• 0940

The Chairman: It was stated by others, but let me just restate it. The chairman is accountable for acting within the legislation that is established. The deputy minister, the minister, and the department are accountable for the legislation. The CIRB will come before this committee, as the old board is coming before this committee next week, and their estimates process is to be held to account for their spending and their operations, as is the normal process.

The legislation is clearly the responsibility of the minister, not the responsibility of the chairman of the board. The chairman of the board has no ability to amend, change, or affect the legislation. He has to function within the context of the legislation. Mr. McDermott, the minister, and Ms. Chamberlain have responsibility for that legislation, and they're all here.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, Mr. McDermott talked about Treasury Board guidelines and so forth. That is an improvement. We certainly would like to see Treasury Board guidelines applied to this board, no ifs, ands, or buts about it.

However, in the old board we had the unique situation where the board members were squabbling with each other to the extent that they racked up $200,000 worth of legal expenses simply because they couldn't agree amongst themselves. I find it ironic almost to the point of being laughable, if it wasn't so expensive. Here we have a group who's supposed to be adjudicating labour disputes who can't agree on anything amongst themselves, even to the point where they have to call in the legal people in order to try to make their points with each other. Here we have a quasi-judicial board that has to bring in legal people.

It would be most beneficial to us to have a chat with the intended chairman to see whether or not he concurs with this. He may be able to cast a lot of light on this legislation before us.

The Chairman: Mr. Johnston, I'm sympathetic to your concerns. For a long time you've raised concerns about the operations of the old board and some of the events that took place there. You and I have discussed this in the past.

The new chairman of this board has no responsibility; he has no options. He functions within the context of the legislation that is established by this government. That's what we're here to discuss, that legislation. If he doesn't function within the legislation that is established, then he will be disciplined according to the procedures that are established here and in other administrative legislation. So his presence or absence here has no bearing on this legislation.

Mr. John Williams: Mr. Chairman, looking at the proposed amendment that Mr. Johnston has put forward to clarify the removal for a clause by—

Mr. Robert Nault: Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order. We're not willing to discuss Mr. Johnston's amendments until we get to the amendment.

The Chairman: We are there.

Mr. Robert Nault: It's not on the floor yet.

The Chairman: Yes, it is.

Mr. Robert Nault: It hasn't been presented. He hasn't read it into the record or anything of that nature. We are on a point of privilege here by the members as to what they want to do.

Are we on this clause now?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Yes, we are.

Mr. Robert Nault: We didn't vote on clause 1, did we?

The Chairman: Yes, we voted on clause 1. Mr. Johnston has moved to clause 2.

Mr. Robert Nault: He didn't ask us to move clause 1.

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Robert Nault: I must be brain dead over here. I've been sitting here the whole time waiting for us to start. So we're on clause 2 then?

The Chairman: We're on clause 2 and it's been moved. I think, though, the point that—

Mr. Robert Nault: So we're debating clause 2. Is that what this is all about over here?

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: We're just moving along.

Mr. Robert Nault: God, that's the most convoluted discussion of clause 2 I've ever seen.

The Chairman: Mr. Nault, the point that you were about to make was that it might be helpful—

Mr. Robert Nault: Let's get on with it.

The Chairman: —to this discussion if we discuss the intention of clause 2. Mr. Williams was actually about to do that.

Mr. Robert Nault: Was he?

The Chairman: He was about to talk about what “counsel at any time for cause including misconduct or abuse of public funds” means.

Mr. Robert Nault: It's hard to follow the Reform. That's really quite an amazing thing.

• 0945

Mr. John Williams: We move slowly and we hope people can keep up, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Johnston's motion to clarify or amplify the removal for cause including misconduct or abuse of funds of course relates to the very bad experience we had with the previous board of the CLRB. The auditor general's report found tremendous abuse of authority. We heard you say this morning that the board has an obligation to live within the legislation it is given, yet we know the previous board did not live within the legislation and the rules provided by Treasury Board and the government. They went beyond their authority. They spent government funds hiring lawyers outside their authority. There seemed to be no end to their internal squabbling. As Mr. Johnston pointed out, they were appointed to resolve and arbitrate squabbles, but they had to spend $200,000 on legal fees to try to resolve their own internal squabbling.

Mr. Chairman, all that was going on with the knowledge of the government that the guidelines were not being adhered to, and Mr. McDermott acknowledged that again this morning. Yet it took an exposé by the newspapers before anything was done. It's to prevent this type of issue arising again, where the legislation that is written and approved by Parliament, and presumably monitored and followed by the government, is being abused with impunity by individual committees or quasi-judicial committees. We want to ensure that does not happen again.

The Chairman: Mr. Williams, given all of that...?

Mr. John Williams: Therefore, I think it's absolutely imperative that Mr. Johnston's motion on number 2 be added to the clause “including misconduct and abuse of funds”, so that there shall be no misunderstanding of what “cause” means.

The Chairman: Okay.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, it's important to note that, as Mr. McDermott has said, and as we would expect, the people of this quasi-judicial board are expected to act within the letter of the legislation. It's interesting to note that the past chairman thought he was. The past chairman defended his spending actions because he thought he was in at least the position of a judge, so he could rationalize his spending perfectly.

I certainly don't think this would be the case, but I would like to find out from the present chairman if he similarly thinks he pretty much has an open cheque book and because this is a quasi-judicial board he has roughly the same...I guess he compared himself with a cabinet minister.

Mr. John Williams: And an ambassador at times.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Of course, an ambassador.

So I think this is a very necessary clause. It should be clarified. Because of the difficulties we had with the past chairman's interpretation of what good behaviour meant, I would recommend that this clause be amended.

The Chairman: Okay.

Mr. John Williams: Mr. Chairman, I would be interested in hearing what—

Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order. We should take some action here.

Mr. John Williams: I was going to suggest that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: I appreciate your interest in this.

Go ahead, Mr. Williams.

Mr. John Williams: I was going to ask the parliamentary secretary for her opinion on the amendment made by Mr. Johnston.

• 0950

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Thank you, Mr. Williams. I appreciate that. It's very nice that you want to know how I feel about this.

As I said earlier, one of the specified grounds is misconduct. It's a term that would certainly include the abuse of public funds, there's no doubt about that. Misconduct is already listed as grounds in proposed subsection 12.14(2).

Mr. Dale Johnston: What page is that?

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Page 8. It is listed as grounds for just cause discipline or dismissal. Adding the proposed words in these subsections could have the—

Mr. John Williams: I have a point of order, Mr. Chairman. Can we just wait until I have read this section here?

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Mr. Williams, you said you were the one who went slow and we would have to keep up, but now you see.... What can I say?

Mr. John Williams: I know where you are.

Mr. Dale Johnston: I know what day it is too.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Yes, it's Tuesday.

Mr. Robert Nault: We could argue that point.

Mr. John Williams: Okay.

My apologies for the interruption, Mrs. Chamberlain.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Thank you.

Adding the proposed words in these subsections could have the unintended result of limiting the definition of misconduct in proposed subsection 12.14(2), as well as in other federal statutes. We have to be very careful when we work with legislation that we make sure it doesn't somewhat negate something else.

Mr. Chairman, I submit to you that it is clear. Misconduct is a term that would certainly include abuse of public funds. There is no doubt about it.

Mr. John Williams: A point of order, Mr. Chairman. I understand what the parliamentary secretary is saying. I am looking at the amendment put forward by Mr. Johnston, which says “cause would include misconduct and abuse of funds”. Mr. Chairman, is it possible to add to that amendment “including but not limited to”?

The Chairman: Are you saying you wish to move a subamendment to Mr. Johnston's motion?

Mr. John Williams: That's correct, Mr. Chairman, in order to recognize the point raised by the parliamentary secretary that we're not limiting the.... So it would be “including but not limited to misconduct or abuse of public funds”.

The Chairman: Mr. Williams has moved that amendment, which is listed in your documents as REF-1, be further amended by adding the four words “but not limited to” after the word “including”, and then continuing with “misconduct or abuse of public funds”.

Shall I call the question on the subamendment?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Can we have a recorded vote?

The Chairman: A recorded vote has been called, so we will proceed in alphabetical order.

(Subamendment negatived: nays 8; yeas 5)

The Chairman: Mr. Johnston, would you like a recorded vote on the amendment?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Yes, I would.

The Chairman: I call the question on the amendment, which is listed in your documents as REF-1. It is the first amendment in the package.

• 0955

(Amendment negatived: nays 10; yeas 3 [See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chairman: We move on to Reform amendment 2, which is on the second page of your package, strangely enough.

Mr. Johnston, this is your motion. Could I call upon you to move and then introduce your amendment?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Of course, Mr. Chairman.

I move that clause 2 be amended by replacing line 6 on page 3 with the following:

nor in Council at any time for cause, including misconduct or abuse of public funds.

The Chairman: Do you wish to say anything in explanation of it?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Yes.

Brenda has tried to take us up to page 8, Mr. Chairman, but of course we're not ready for that yet.

Ms. Brenda Chamberlain: You have to be quick, Dale.

Mr. Dale Johnston: The bill says:

to hold office during good behaviour for terms not exceeding three years each, subject to removal by the Governor in Council at any time for cause.

The same rationale we went through applies to this. We saw instances where board members thought they were well within the guidelines and that they had done nothing that would be considered cause for removal. They seemed shocked and ready to defend their actions, even when the auditor general pointed out their extravagant spending. And as Mr. Williams pointed out, it was only after a media campaign that the minister decided to take action here. So the same rationale applies, and I believe Mr. Williams might even consider amending this one the same way he did the last one.

Mr. John Williams: Mr. Chairman, in light of the remarks by the parliamentary secretary earlier, I would like to amend Mr. Johnston's amendment by adding the words “but not limited to” after the word “including”.

The Chairman: Okay.

Mrs. Chamberlain, could I call upon you to comment?

Ms. Brenda Chamberlain: Again, adding those words in these subsections could have unintended results. I'm sure the Reform Party wouldn't want to somehow skew other pieces of legislation and affect them. It's a very dangerous thing to put in, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. John Williams: Mr. Chairman, the parliamentary secretary says it's a very dangerous thing to add these words, but when I look back to the previous legislation, which did not include these words, dangerous things happened because these words weren't there.

As Mr. Johnston pointed out, the board members were aghast that they were operating outside their authority because “cause” was not defined. Here we have a board that was totally dysfunctional. It was unable to discharge its responsibilities because of infighting, abuse of power, abuse of public funds, and abuse of privileges, and still they were being paid to carry on as board members. They were absolutely and totally ineffective in discharging their responsibilities, but they had the gall to consider themselves public servants from the point of view of being board members, Mr. Chairman.

Think of the $200,000 in legal fees spent trying to resolve the internal disputes. They had no authority whatsoever to engage lawyers in this particular way. They had no authority to pay lawyers.

• 1000

I've never had any answer from the department as to whether they have recovered this money or how they intend to recover this money. Perhaps it might be an appropriate time to ask Mr. McDermott what steps the department has taken to recover this money. That's why we feel this clause is there.

The Chairman: I think I'll refer that question to the discussion of the estimates of that particular body when Mr. Johnston has them before him next week. Let's limit this discussion to the legislation that's going to govern the new board.

Mr. John Williams: My whole point, Mr. Chairman, is that in the absence of these words, dangerous things have happened, with the government's somewhat acquiescence. It wasn't until we had the exposé in the media that the government was inclined to move on the issue. Therefore, to add these words cannot be dangerous; the danger was in their absence, not in their inclusion.

The Chairman: I heard Mr. McDermott state that other legislative changes were made subsequent to that, which also bear on the administration of quasi-judicial bodies.

Mr. McDermott, would you like to clarify that?

Mr. Michael McDermott: Well, there's not a bill before this Parliament, Mr. Chairman. In the last Parliament Bill C-49 dealt with a whole series of measures for the way administrative tribunals operate. My understanding is that there is the intention to re-introduce that bill, although I don't know when. In any event some measures of that former bill are embodied in this bill, particularly the disciplinary measures.

There are other things in this bill, too, that give the chair a clear authority to run the managerial affairs of the board while leaving the quasi-judicial independence of the members of the board intact. The chair will have the clear authority to manage the board, as it were, and this would include seeing that there's suitable fiscal restraint.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. McDermott, I don't recall whether Bill C-49 passed the House.

Mr. Michael McDermott: No, it did not pass. Like Bill C-66, it did not get through the last Parliament.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Then any provisions in Bill C-49 would be of absolutely no use here.

I think what's important here, Mr. Chairman, is that in this amendment we're talking about committee members other than the vice-chairman or the chairman, and cabinet has the ability to appoint as many of these as it deems necessary.

I think it's important we spell this out very clearly. In the past we had a tremendous problem with interpretation by board members, the chair, the vice-chair, and so forth, and I don't know why we keep setting ourselves up for failure in this way.

The Chairman: Yes, and I think I may have added to the confusion, Mr. McDermott. Perhaps I misunderstood. There was a piece of legislation that brought into being or attempted to bring into being a number of guidelines for quasi-judicial bodies in total, and it was felt that you would legislate it separately rather than legislating in each bill where such a body was being created. That piece of legislation failed, and it may or may not come forward in this legislation. We don't know at this point. However, you're saying there are changes within this legislation that currently address some of the concerns being raised by Mr. Johnston and Mr. Williams, are you not?

Mr. Michael McDermott: Yes, Mr. Chairman. Some of the elements that were in that previous bill—and that's why I referred to it, although it wasn't passed—are in this bill. The disciplinary measures are taken directly from that bill, the idea being that if Bill C-66 passed before Bill C-49, it would be available immediately and it wouldn't have to wait for the other bill to be passed.

The Chairman: So they are there. Can I call the question on the subamendment?

Mr. John Williams: I have one final point, Mr. Chairman, before you call the question, and I think back to the challenge by Mr. Weatherill to the government when the minister decided to remove him for cause based on the auditor general's report.

• 1005

He talked about his perception that as a quasi-judicial chairman of a quasi-judicial body he was entitled to the same respect as a judge appointed under the Judges Act. That point, while it was raised in a defence by him, was never decided by the courts.

We have this type of issue unresolved and hanging over our heads while we are approving this legislation. Who knows, if we try to remove a chairman or a board member in the future, whether he will raise this type of defence and the government's hands will be tied? The point has to be addressed, and that's why we are putting forward this motion as amended.

It's common sense that we be more specific, but not limiting, and to let these people know the government and the public expect that they discharge their duties faithfully and in accordance with the law, to the best of their ability, rather than behave like a bunch of little kids in a kindergarten.

The Chairman: Certainly, we're not going to allow common sense to intrude upon legislation.

Let me call the question on the subamendment. The subamendment is to Reform motion 2, which reads “nor in Council at any time for cause, including”. The subamendment is the addition of the four words “but not limited to” after the word “including”.

Mr. Rob Anders (Calgary West, Ref.): I'd like to ask for a recorded vote.

(Subamendment negatived: nays 9; yeas 4)

The Chairman: May I call the question on the amendment?

Mr. John Williams: I call for a recorded vote.

(Amendment negatived: nays 10; yeas 3)

The Chairman: Now we move to Reform motion 3. These are all on clause 2, which is a lengthier motion.

Mr. Johnston, is this also standing in your name?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Yes.

The Chairman: Mr. Johnston, do you wish to move Reform motion 3?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I move motion 3.

The Chairman: Do you wish to speak in explanation of it, or is it on the same issue we have been discussing?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Yes, we do wish to speak to it.

The Chairman: You don't need to feel compelled to speak to it.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Well, I wish to speak to it, Mr. Chairman. I wouldn't pass up this opportunity for anything. You know how much I enjoy this committee and your illustrious company.

The Chairman: Absolutely.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Motion 3 pertains to the appointment of additional vice-presidents and board members as deemed required.

• 1010

This in effect, Mr. Chairman, as I see it, gives cabinet the opportunity to stack the board with patronage appointments. You know how we're opposed to patronage appointments, Mr. Chairman.

I think this could also have a detrimental effect on the representational component of the board, so we would like to see members who are applying for the job come before a House of Commons standing committee, which will consider the qualifications, expertise, and experience of the potential candidates.

I think this amendment gives the committee an opportunity to question those candidates and ensure they have indeed the experience and expertise required to do the job and simply aren't somebody's fund-raiser.

The Chairman: Mr. Williams.

Mr. John Williams: Mr. Chairman, I certainly endorse what Mr. Johnston has said. Earlier on today, Mr. McDermott did tell us that these quasi-judicial bodies report to Parliament and don't report to the departments. While the minister may have some discretionary authority over them, I'm not sure he has very much once they are appointed.

Since they report to Parliament, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that common sense should prevail and that we, as Parliament, should give our stamp of approval to these appointments. If we have absolutely no say whatsoever in who is appointed to these boards, if these boards are not under the authority of the department, and if the minister has to stay away from quasi-judicial bodies, they are and become a law unto themselves.

We saw that very clearly under the predecessor, Canada Labour Relations Board. They thought themselves to be a law unto themselves.

Surely, Mr. Chairman, if we as parliamentarians, speaking on behalf of our constituents, speaking on behalf of the taxpayers of this country, are going to allow someone—a minister—to appoint someone to a quasi-judicial board strictly on his own authority without being required to account as to why he is making that decision, without being required to divulge the qualifications or the capacity of that person to sit on the board, and if that board reports only to Parliament, surely we have an abuse of the process here, Mr. Chairman. I therefore think Mr. Johnston's motion is well conceived and we should consider it seriously and approve it.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mrs. Chamberlain, do you want to speak to this?

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Mr. Chairman, we believe the provisions of the bill already provide an appropriate requirement to ensure the appointment of qualified persons to the board.

Parties subject to part I of the code are best placed to identify qualified representative members. The government makes appointments and is accountable to Parliament and the electorate for those appointments. Amending the provision to give the standing committee the power to review appointments would blur the lines of accountability.

I must add, Mr. Chairman, that I find quite unusual this morning all the references the Reform Party has made about the media helping to do this when all I've heard the Reform say is the media are no good. So it's quite—

Mr. Dale Johnston: I object, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: I'm not being disrespectful. It's quite comical.

Mr. John Williams: The member is putting words in our mouth, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Oh, I'm sorry. I didn't mean to. It's comical, because so many times you've felt not happy with the media and now they are your friend on this particular thing. I've found it comical, that's all. Honestly.

Mr. Larry McCormick (Hastings—Frontenac—Lennox and Addington, Lib.): They wanted to vote yesterday.

The Chairman: We have to have a little order and decorum here, despite the comments of the parliamentary secretary.

Ms. Brown.

Ms. Bonnie Brown: Mr. Chairman, I'm highly opposed to this. I know it's something the Reform Party has been talking about and trying to sell for a number of years, this whole idea that people who are appointed have to come before a standing committee. There are various standing committees where this has been suggested, and I really oppose this.

• 1015

I think this is another step down the road to the Americanization of our system. It puts before the media opportunities for high levels of concentration such as we have observed in coverage of congressional hearings on appointments. To me, it lowers the whole tone of government and it allows for the possibility of a media circus over the appointment, in some cases, of very fine individuals who are torn apart in front of TV cameras. I really don't want anything like that entering the Canadian system.

It has been said that these people with their ability to report to Parliament, or the requirement, have become like a law unto themselves. Indeed, arm's-length bodies are supposed to be unto themselves. They're not a law unto themselves. We, the parliamentarians, pass the law under which they operate, but once they are appointed they should be unto themselves to eliminate the possibility of undue political interference.

I have to make one more comment, which will apply probably to the whole discussion today, and that is we can always pick out one bad thing that happened in the past and then try to build law around it, but most legal experts will tell you that hard cases, or exceptional cases, make bad laws, that it is not those cases that should be used.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: I should point out that Ms. Brown supported your last amendments, Mr. Williams.

Ms. Bonnie Brown: Yes.

Mr. Dale Johnston: That doesn't need pointing out, actually, Mr. Chairman. We noted that. We appreciate it.

The Chairman: Mr. Williams.

Mr. John Williams: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank Ms. Brown for supporting our amendments.

Mr. Chairman, I listened to what Ms. Brown said and the fact that she is opposed to this particular motion. Yet the parliamentary secretary said the government is accountable to Parliament on these appointments, and surely for Parliament to scrutinize the government's appointments is making the government accountable to Parliament.

The whole intent of the motion is that there be transparency, that there be openness on these appointments. If these people, who are nominated or appointed by the government, have the qualifications and the expertise, there would be no doubt in my mind that this committee would endorse the appointments. But there are situations, and I think very much about Mr. Weatherill, where the government can have the embarrassment beforehand or the embarrassment afterwards, but when there is a bad appointment made the price will have to be paid. In this particular case—I'm thinking of Mr. Weatherill—the price was paid by the government in the embarrassment of the situation, but the price was also paid by the taxpayer to the tune of several hundreds of thousands of dollars, which could have been avoided had the appointment not been made.

Another thing, again addressing the point Ms. Brown raised, is that they are a law unto themselves, and this is a point I really want to stress. These quasi-judicial bodies are independent, and, as we know, no cabinet minister can give any directive to these bodies under pain of his own career. We've seen it several times before where cabinet ministers have approached quasi-judicial bodies and they've been forced to resign their positions and the quasi-judicial chairmen continue on—and Mr. Weatherill continued on. We need to ensure that there is some methodology whereby—because government, as Mrs. Chamberlain pointed out, reports and is accountable to Parliament—these quasi-judicial bodies report directly to Parliament; that there is some methodology for Parliament to have its say on who sits on these boards and how these boards are run and how they're managed.

Therefore, again, I have to say that Mr. Johnston's motion is perfectly in order, and I would hope the government members would see the light and support it.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Williams.

Mr. Martin, and then Mr. McCormick.

Mr. Pat Martin (Winnipeg Centre, NDP): The only thing I have to add, Mr. Chairman, is that I believe the changes to the current act, or the bill, will satisfy our concerns that the consultations that should take place will be taking place, and that is with the actual stakeholders, with the actual labour relations practitioners. Whether we like to see it or not, we aren't the best people qualified to make those choices, because even if we used to be active in the labour relations field we aren't any more, and this is a very highly politicized and politically charged environment.

• 1020

I'm fully supportive of the idea that with a representative board the consultation should be with the two parties represented, which is employers or their representatives and employees and their representatives. That will give us the kind of balance we're looking for in the chair and the vice-chair.

The Chairman: Okay. Mr. McCormick.

Mr. Larry McCormick: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate and thank Mr. Martin for his views.

In this motion it says that before they are appointed they must satisfy the standing committee of the House of Commons. I wouldn't think this committee or any other—and most of us are sitting on two or three—could see into the future that any one person might make a mistake some day, be it small or large. This would not solve the problem before it happens, if there is a problem of whatever description. So, Mr. Chair, I cannot support it.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: A good point.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. McCormick.

Shall I call the question?

Mr. John Williams: No.

The Chairman: Mr. Williams.

Mr. John Williams: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate Mr. McCormick's point. Let me ask him how he sees the system working properly when a minister can appoint a member to the board and the minister does not have to divulge his rationale or his reasons to any one, where the board member, once appointed, is basically beyond the purview of the minister.

We have had Mr. McDermott tell us that he's outside the purview of the department, that this board can only report to Parliament, and that Parliament doesn't have a great deal of opportunity to inquire into the internal workings of the board. How are we as parliamentarians to express our opinion on the quality of the people who are appointed to these boards if Mr. Johnston's motion is not passed? That's my question to Mr. McCormick.

The Chairman: Mr. Anders, did you...?

Mr. Rob Anders: Yes, I'd like to speak to this whole idea of the appointments coming before the committee. In politics sometimes we'll suffer barbs from the media, but still that doesn't prevent us from taking on Voltaire's idea that you defend to the death others' ability to speak freely and the whole idea of the freedom of the press. I think it's important that they do get involved and they are able to critique these things. It's been brought up for the reasons that it benefits the taxpayer and the government, because in the long term it's the government that is spared the criticisms that eventually they wind up having to pay for it terms of some of these appointments.

I'd like to speak also to the whole idea of exotic cases and making bad law. Indeed if it was just one case, then it may not be a good idea for a law to be made for one exotic case. When you have entire administrations plagued with problems of patronage, then indeed it is not one exotic case that makes the law, Mr. Chairman. It is more than an exotic case. I don't know if the rule...it may not be a majority, but it's certainly more than an exception. As a result, therefore, the law would need to be changed, because it's more than just an exotic case.

With that, I offer that the government seriously consider both for the taxpayers and themselves the idea of putting these appointments past committees, and I support Mr. Johnston's amendment.

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. McCormick, did you wish to comment?

Mr. Larry McCormick: Mr. Chair, you may think I'm getting away from this, but I represent an area near Kingston, Ontario that has seven penitentiaries. We had a major riot in Millhaven last year. Before the debris could be swept off the floor, before the door could be bolted or opened or whatever, the Reform Party rushed in.

Mr. Chair, I have confidence in our officials here and I have confidence in our minister and in most boards and most employees. I just don't want to see a world where the Reform Party would be there every time there was a rumour or fear mongering. It would be just very disruptive. I can't accept that, Mr. Chair.

The Chairman: I thought when prison doors were opened, people rushed out.

Mr. Larry McCormick: According to the Reform Party, too many wanted to rush in.

The Chairman: May I call the question?

• 1025

Mr. John Williams: Mr. Chairman and Mr. McCormick, when there is a prison riot and problems arise, we understand that we as the official opposition have a duty and a responsibility to comment on these types of issues, but by and large quasi-judicial bodies are outside the purview of parliamentarians.

The parliamentary secretary has told us that government is responsible to Parliament. But we have also found that because they're quasi-judicial, because they are independent, we cannot get in and find out what is going on in these boards. Once they're created and appointed, they're independent of government.

We need to have some methodology, Mr. Chairman, where we can scrutinize the calibre or have the minister justify the calibre of these appointments. Not that we as parliamentarians want to make these decisions, but we want to know the minister is making qualified appointments. That is the important thing. It's not that we want to make these decisions. As one member said earlier, we may not be the persons best qualified to make these appointments, but we're not asking for the authority to make appointments; we're asking that the minister come before this committee and justify the appointments, explain why these people are qualified.

If they are, I'm sure this committee or any committee of the House of Commons would endorse that appointment. If the minister has a hard time justifying the quality and calibre of the appointments, then this committee may have critical words for the minister. This is the transparency of government working. That is what we're trying to achieve, Mr. Chairman. Surely any government in an open and democratic society such as we have in Canada would not be averse to justifying its appointments.

This motion by Mr. Johnston does not take authority away from the minister, but it does elevate the minister's requirements because he will know that his appointment will be open to the public. As a result, he will choose people of the highest calibre to serve Canadians in the capacity to which they are appointed. Again, I can only say that Mr. Johnston's motion is timely and appropriate.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, I have some comments with regard to some of the things that were said a little earlier. Ms. Brown talked about how she wanted to stay away from the Americanization—I think those were her words—of the system, as though all things American are somehow undesirable.

Ms. Bonnie Brown: That's true.

Mr. Dale Johnston: But in this case we're not advocating a total Americanization of the system, whether that's good, bad or indifferent.

She also talked about fear of political interference. That is exactly what we're trying to get away from—political interference. While we understand and in some cases concur with the governor in council having some power as regards the legislation, we do think it is necessary not only to do the right thing but to be seen to be doing the right thing.

The idea behind my amendment is to make sure we get the best qualified people for the job. Mr. Chairman, it is really nothing more than that. We want to make sure the people selected as chairman, vice-chairman, and committee members are the best people we can get for the job and have the confidence of Parliament in general.

The Chairman: All in favour?

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to point out something on the whole issue of patronage. The current House leader for the Liberal party, while the government was in opposition, endorsed, indeed authored, many of these same recommendations to have people, whether with quasi-judicial or other bodies for parliamentary approval for appointments, brought before these parliamentary committees.

• 1030

I find it strange, Mr. Chairman, that now that the government is in power and those people who were representing them in those lean years in opposition and who were critical of the Mulroney administration are not speaking out and making changes when they have the chance.

Mr. John Williams: Perhaps we could get a response from the parliamentary secretary on Mr. Anders' point that the current position being promoted by the parliamentary secretary is in direct contravention to the current government House leader when he was in opposition.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Mr. Chairman, I don't know whether or not what they're saying is right or wrong; I would have no knowledge of that. What I would say to you is that there has been a lot of discussion on this particular motion and I think it is time to put it forth and let us vote.

We've heard a very good debate. It's time now to see how people feel about it. That is democracy.

The Chairman: Okay.

Mr. John Williams: It's not transparent, but it is democracy.

(Amendment negatived: nays 9; yeas 4 [See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chairman: You almost had it that time. I see guys moving; it's coming.

Mr. John Williams: Perhaps if we go back and rehash the issue, Mr. Chairman, we could get more next time.

The Chairman: I think it was Mr. Anders' comments on Voltaire that moved the yardsticks for me.

Mr. Rob Anders: Thank you.

The Chairman: You're welcome.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Positively glacial, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: But perceptible.

We're still on clause 2. We're now on Reform motion number 4.

Mr. Johnston, it's in your name. Would you like to move it and then introduce it?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Motion number 4 is that Bill C-19 clause 2 be amended by replacing lines 14 to 17 on page 4 with the following:

12.01(1) The chairperson is the chief executive officer of the Board and has responsibility for supervision over and direction of work of the Board including

I move that motion.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Mr. Chairman, perhaps I could speak to this particular motion.

The government position on this is that it would be redundant, but we wouldn't be opposed to that. If they feel better having something that's redundant in it, we would support that.

Mr. John Williams: Why are we sensing some progress?

The Chairman: See, I told you this is not glacial. The government has now come out in favour of redundancy.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: If the Reform likes redundancy, we'll comply.

Mr. Larry McCormick: They might want to withdraw the motion.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Perhaps you could carry on, Mr. Chairman, because I think there is support for this particular motion.

The Chairman: Unaccustomed as I am to dealing with this, Mr. Johnston....

Mr. Martin, did you wish to make a comment on that?

Mr. Patrick Martin: Yes, please. I'm not used to being so high up in the order back here.

The Chairman: You feel a lot of love in this room, Mr. Martin, do you?

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: There are a lot of surprises here today.

Mr. Patrick Martin: I honestly feel a little more strongly about adding the word here. If it was just redundant, I wouldn't feel as strongly about it, although I think that sets a dangerous sort of policy too. My argument against some of the other language they wanted in is that it overstated things in a redundant way. As with any document, if you stated everything it would be as thick as a Manhattan phone book.

In this case, to add the word “responsibility”...I looked it up in the Oxford dictionary, and it can also mean being the primary cause, involving “for”. For instance, as the chair, if you were fully responsible for all of the actions of the board and all of the rulings of the board, and one of those rulings was overturned two years later on appeal, would you be ultimately responsible for damages that the parties might have incurred? Are you setting yourself up for some kind of lawsuit? Are you responsible for the court costs of the person who wanted to appeal some ruling that went poorly?

• 1035

I think the language was probably chosen quite carefully in Bill C-19. You have supervision over and direction over the work of the board. You're the boss, the CEO, but are you fully and ultimately responsible for everything the board does or says from here on in? I think it might be dangerous, and I think maybe the legal department should have a look at what the possible ramifications would be of the word if it were sneaked in there.

The Chairman: I have a number of interventions here, namely Mr. Anders, Mr. Williams, Mr. Nault, and Mr. Johnston, but do you wish to comment, Mr. McDermott? Can you shed any light on Mr. Martin's remarks?

Mr. Michael McDermott: Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Martin has made a very good point, but I think it is taken care of. In that section there is a listing of functions, detailing what is meant by supervision and direction of the work of the board. There is no intent in there to encroach upon the quasi-judicial functions of the board. It is the running of the board from a managerial point of view, the day-to-day functioning, that is being dealt with.

In looking at this proposed amendment, one of the issues that did come up is whether or not this means that, in other tribunals, the responsibility won't be there. That was a question that was raised. I guess that's always a problem, but we concluded that adding these words does not interfere with the quasi-judicial independence of the members of the board in any way. It really doesn't add a great deal to what is there. It's already implicit in what's there.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. McDermott.

Mr. Anders, then Mr. Nault and Mr. Williams.

Mr. Rob Anders: I just found it interesting, Mr. Chairman. I remember that, in the past, the NDP was supportive of making sure that chairmen and executives of corporations were responsible for environmental damage or other things that the corporation or somebody down the chain of command may have happened upon or may have caused. They didn't believe in the veil of secrecy, if you will, with regard to incorporation and corporation. Yet in this case here, where it is public money, we see them having difficulty with the whole idea of somebody's responsibility when he is chairman of a board. I don't see that this follows logically, Mr. Chairman. I think responsibility, whether it's stated someplace else or not, is implicit here. I think it's important that we state it explicitly as well, so that it's clear for all to see.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Anders.

Mr. Nault.

Mr. Robert Nault: Mr. McDermott answered my question, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Williams.

Mr. John Williams: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to congratulate the government members for seeing that Mr. Johnston's amendment is desirable, albeit with the qualification or the proviso that they think it's redundant.

I think Mr. Johnston's point of adding the responsibility in there is important. The reason for that, Mr. Chairman, is that it is fine for the chairman to have supervision over his committee, but if he doesn't have the responsibility for making these assignments.... We all know what happened to the Canada Labour Relations Board. We all know how much taxpayers' money was spent in trying to resolve these issues because the board members challenged the chair's authority to be able to assign work, for example. Can you imagine, Mr. Chairman, that a board member would challenge the chair's capacity to assign work to members of his board, that they would spend $200,000 of taxpayers' money to hire lawyers and fight this thing to the bitter end because of the infighting on a committee? Therefore, I'm glad to see that the government is supporting Mr. Johnston's amendment to include responsibility right in there.

The Chairman: Mr. Johnston, do you wish to speak in conclusion and celebrate the accomplishment that has been arrived at here?

• 1040

Mr. Dale Johnston: Talk about a backhanded compliment from the parliamentary secretary. I guess you take your compliments where you can get them, and I've noticed that you take your support where you can get it, too, in this committee.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is very desirable that accountability and responsibility be included in this. I think members of the board would applaud the opportunity to have this wording in here. I think there's also an area in the act that protects board members from suits, so I think Mr. Martin's concerns are not founded here. I certainly look forward to the government's support in this amendment.

The Chairman: Mr. Johnston, I have a request from Mr. Nault that he be allowed to put a brief question to Mr. McDermott.

Mr. Robert Nault: Mr. McDermott suggested, I suppose in a roundabout way, that it's already implicit in the clause that there is responsibility. Quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, based on Mr. Martin's comments, I don't feel very comfortable that we should vote on this bill. I'd like to stand it down and ask our legal people to give us some advice about just what responsibility would mean before we vote for this clause. Otherwise, Mr. Chairman, I'd be forced to vote against the amendment.

The Chairman: Ms. Chamberlain.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Mr. Chairman, I think we've had a really good debate, and I would bow to Mr. Martin. I think he put forth good points, but I'll be voting against it. I don't think there's any reason to stand it down at all. I think the reason for this whole process is debate. I think it was very interesting, but I think the debate is clearly won. That's the whole purpose of this.

Mr. Rob Anders: So this changes the nature of everything.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Of our relationship, Mr. Anders?

Mr. Rob Anders: Of the debate.

Mr. John Williams: Mr. Chairman, I started my comments by congratulating the government members for their wisdom in seeing the benefits of Mr. Johnston's amendment. I'll now have to withdraw that, because they seem to have had a change of heart and have decided that they can't proceed with endorsing the amendment proposed by Mr. Johnston. I find it very disappointing that they would do that, Mr. Chairman. So let's get back to continuing the debate as to the merits of Mr. Johnston's amendment.

As I said before, we had a situation in the past, in the predecessor board, in which the chairman was totally and absolutely ineffectual and spent large sums of taxpayers' money to try to bolster his position, all to no avail. That expenditure of funds was outside his own jurisdiction, outside the jurisdiction of the committee, and they continued to spend this money unabated. Because we've already defeated the amendments to give Parliament some control over these people, I am very concerned about the capacity of this board to perform its duties if it happens to be in any way, shape or form like its predecessor, in which they fight amongst themselves rather than performing their duties to the Canadian citizens.

It's very disappointing, Mr. Chairman, that the government members have done an about-face here.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Nault has suggested that we set this clause aside for a later date in order to give the legal department an opportunity to look into Mr. Martin's concerns. We did send this amendment through the legal department and no such concerns were raised by the legal department we used. If Mr. Nault would consider supporting the bill if there were no legal problems, as stated by Mr. Martin, then we would have no problem with deferring the decision on this particular amendment until a later date.

Mr. Robert Nault: Mr. Chairman, I go back to my original question to Mr. McDermott. If he is in fact clear that this does not change the bill and that the amendment proposed by Reform is in fact really redundant, then the question is about why we would support something that's redundant if it's already very clear in the bill that whoever the chair is has responsibility for the functions of the CLRB. That was my question. If he can clarify that, I'm prepared to vote right now.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. McDermott.

• 1045

Mr. Michael McDermott: It may be that “redundant” has certain connotations. We were saying it is implicit that if, as it's worded now, you will have supervision over and direction of the work, you will be clearly responsible for those functions. So we felt that was already covered, and in that sense we're saying it's redundant.

We haven't gone to the highest legal instances of the land, but we have looked at this and we don't believe it will create the kinds of problems Mr. Martin has raised. I think it is very good that he has raised those kinds of concerns, but we believe this is very clearly dealing with the day-to-day management of the board.

As I said before, there's a list of items here that do not impinge on the quasi-judicial functions of board members and will, if anything, perhaps strengthen the role of the chair as the chief executive officer, which was the subject of a lot of debate in previous times. So we feel fairly confident it will not make the difficulties that have been raised.

The Chairman: So it is the position of the department that this amendment could be supported without causing difficulties in the administration of the act.

Mr. Michael McDermott: We would not see any of the problems that were raised caused by this particular addition of the words.

The Chairman: Thank you.

(Amendment negatived: nays 10, yeas 3)

The Chairman: On Reform motion R-5, again, Mr. Johnston, this is standing in your name. Would you like to move it?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Indeed.

Mr. Chairman, did you have a break scheduled for this morning?

The Chairman: No, I didn't. In fact, I suspect if we were to deal with these two motions we could move on rather expeditiously.

Mr. Dale Johnston: I move that Bill C-19, clause 2, be amended by adding after line 36 on page 5:

(3) Where a part-time member is paid travel and living expenses by virtue of subsection (2), and those expenses are incurred in the course of carrying out duties and responsibilities under this Act in respect of a dispute heard or determined by the Board, the parties to the dispute shall reimburse Her Majesty in right of Canada in equal parts for the money paid to the part-time member for those expenses and that money, until paid, constitutes a debt recoverable by action in any court of competent jurisdiction as a debt due to Her Majesty in right of Canada.

The Chairman: Do you wish to speak in explanation of this?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

This amendment is to address the possibility that rather than limiting the number of part-time members, this would allow as many part-time members to be appointed as is necessary to clean up a backlog of cases, for instance, but all the costs would not be borne by the taxpayer. In fact, these costs would be borne by the parties involved in the dispute.

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We've heard of cases that take years and years to resolve after hours and hours of hearings, and we think it's unfair that the taxpayer should be picking up the tab. We think it's not necessary that the cases take so long to dispose of. We believe dealing with these cases would be far more expedient if there were some onus on the adjudicators by the parties involved who are actually footing the bill for this.

So we think this amendment is worth the support of the government. We know the government is very concerned about fiscal responsibility, and we've seen its attempts to balance the budget. We think this is an amendment well worthy of support and would like to hear comments from the government in regard to this.

The Chairman: Ms. Chamberlain.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: We believe the introduction of a partial cost-recovery concept with respect to the expenses of the part-time representational members of the board would limit the benefits of the new representational structure of the board to only those who can afford it. That's quite serious, in our opinion.

It would impose a financial burden on small employers and on individual employees who wish to exercise rights or seek redress for unfair labour practices. We also feel other provisions in Bill C-19 providing for single-member panels and part-time members residing in the regions will significantly help to reduce the travel expenses.

I think we have gone a long way, Dale, to try to address some of what you're talking about within the structure. But we really believe in inclusiveness. We do not want to limit anybody's ability to be able to participate.

The Chairman: Mr. Johnston.

Mr. Dale Johnston: I hear what the parliamentary secretary says about inclusiveness and her fear that someone may be excluded from the process. However, I think there have to be some checks in the legislation to make sure this doesn't grow into a bureaucracy we can't handle.

We are—and I know the government is—very strong on accountability, and the government should really be supporting this bill because this is part of a cost-recovery thing in which if you don't have the resources for the parties to pay for a decision or a rendering, you could always wait to go through the other process.

But I believe this will have the effect of speeding up the process. There is no reason why it should take four or five years to come up with a decision. We have decisions that are pending and we have decisions that will be handed from the CLRB to the CIRB that are no closer to resolution now than they were two, three or four years ago when they first started in the process.

The Chairman: Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: This whole thing gets at the whole idea of a taxpayer safeguard, and I think that makes a lot of sense. This is something that should be included in more pieces of legislation so the taxpayers aren't the people subject to the abuse of the purse. Therefore, I support Mr. Johnston's motion.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Anders.

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(Amendment negatived: nays 8; yeas 2)

The Chairman: Turning to Reform amendment REF-6, Mr. Johnston, it stands in your name. Would you like to move it?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Oddly enough, yes. So moved.

The Chairman: Would you like to give us an explanation of it?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Would you believe I lost my place?

The Chairman: It's the one after REF-5 and before REF-7.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Go slow and we'll follow.

Mr. Dale Johnston: You'll try to keep up, will you?

An hon. member: It's Tuesday, in Ottawa.

The Chairman: What goes around comes around.

Mr. Dale Johnston: No one's more aware of that than I am.

Mr. Robert Nault: I'll help you out, Dale. I know what's going on.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Oh, good, Bob. I'm looking forward to that.

The amendment proposes that Bill C-19, in clause 2, be amended by replacing lines 1 to 6 on page 6 with the following:

12.06(1) The Chairperson may request the Minister to decide whether any member of the Board should be subject to remedial or disciplinary measures for any reason set out in paragraphs 12.14(2)(a) to (d).

(2) A person, other than the Chairperson, who believes on reasonable grounds that a member of the Board should be subject to remedial or disciplinary measures for any reason set out in paragraphs 12.14(2)(a) to (d) may request the Minister to decide whether the member shall be subject to remedial or disciplinary measures and may request anonymity with respect to the request.

(3) The Minister shall keep confidential the identity of any one making a request under subsection (2) who has requested anonymity with respect to the request.

(4) No person shall dismiss, suspend, demote, discipline, remove a benefit or privilege of employment from, terminate the contract of, harass, coerce or otherwise disadvantage a person referred to in subsection (2) on the grounds that the person made a request under that subsection.

12.07 On receipt of a request referred to in subsection 12.06(1) or (2), the Minister

The idea behind this amendment, Mr. Chairman, is that it gives the people on the board an opportunity to point out the wrongdoings of their colleagues. It actually gives....

The Chairman: It's a whistle-blower.

Mr. Dale Johnston: That's what it is, Mr. Chairman. It's whistle-blower legislation. I think if we had had this in previous legislation, we wouldn't have had all the problems we did with the CLRB. We would probably have had more judicious application of the privileges and expenses of members of that board, as has been so well documented. I think it takes tremendous courage to point out wrongdoings. For those people who are actually brave enough to take the risks involved in doing this sort of thing, the law should protect them from retaliation.

There has been support expressed for this sort of legislation for a long time from a lot of different quarters, not the least of which were members of the present-day government, and I believe you will find support in a lot of quarters for this amendment, Mr. Chairman. I think it's timely. We're here in the code at the moment, so I think this is an opportune time to put in an amendment that will make it possible for members to point out wrongdoing that none of us would tolerate and that we should not ask the Canadian people to tolerate.

The Chairman: Mrs. Chamberlain, do you wish to comment?

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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The government's position is that the amendment would be redundant since nothing in this proposed section now prevents any person from requesting the minister to initiate a review of the conduct of a member of the board or prevents the minister from initiating a review on his or her own.

This amendment, we believe, could serve to encourage malicious complaints from persons who find comfort in the promise of anonymity. We just think this isn't a wise thing to add in this bill, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, I'm wondering if the government feels that this is redundant because it feels there are already provisos for people who wish to point out wrongdoing, but I wonder what kind of protection there is for the people who have the courage to actually say “this is a problem”. How is it to be done now? Do they have to slip a brown envelope under somebody's door? I just don't understand what the parliamentary secretary means when she says there are already provisions.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Mr. Chairman, clearly, the minister at any time can initiate a review on information he or she would get. That's in the bill and that's what I mean: it's already there. So to try to put this in....

There really isn't a point to it, Mr. Johnston.

Mr. Dale Johnston: What section of the bill includes that?

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Can you give me the number?

Mr. Michael McDermott: It's clear that a member of the board can be dismissed for cause. Clearly, we've seen that happen in the past. That is not being changed by this bill.

What is being put in is a series of proposed sections that have a formal and fair process for determining whether a board member should be subject to remedial or disciplinary action. It's an elaboration of what's already there. That is the main change.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Again, I would like to ask, then, how do these people who point...? You say the minister can take action and has done so in the past, but it seems to me that he did that reluctantly. He did not do this as a result of a co-worker pointing out problems. If a co-worker did decide to point out something that he thought should be investigated, what is to protect him after bringing such information to light? What is there in the act now to protect him? This amendment says he should be protected from reprisals and so forth.

Mr. Michael McDermott: If the co-worker identifies himself or herself, there is no guarantee of anonymity provided in this statute. There is, as far as I'm aware, no general whistle-blowing legislation. The prospect of it has been raised in the past but has not been proceeded with. To do it for just this one statute doesn't seem to be the appropriate thing if it's not judged useful in other areas.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Rocheleau.

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: I have a question for Mr. Johnston and one for Mr. McDermott.

Mr. Johnston, when you talk about someone other than the chairman, do you mean another member of the committee or any Canadian citizen?

Then I would ask Mr. McDermott to react to Mr. Johnston's statement that the problems within the board could have been dealt with differently if such a provision had existed.

[English]

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, I'm having trouble with my translation.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: I'm not getting translation.

The Chairman: Could you just speak for a minute and see if there is some switch that—

Mr. Dale Johnston: It's better already.

The Chairman: Maybe that'll be better.

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: I will start again from the beginning.

[English]

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, do we have a quorum at the moment?

The Chairman: A quorum has been called. Let me just have a quick look here. We have nine here and two in the smoking room. That's a quorum of sorts.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, I'll take this opportunity to leave for a minute.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Johnston.

The committee will adjourn until we have a quorum.

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The Chairman: Okay. We're back in business here. I believe that before we took that well-deserved break, Mr. Johnston was about to withdraw amendment 6.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

The Chairman: Mr. Johnston?

Mr. Dale Johnston: As a matter of fact, no, I have changed my mind.

The Chairman: Okay.

Mr. Dale Johnston: That was five minutes ago.

The Chairman: Shall we call the question on Reform amendment 6?

Mr. Dale Johnston: No, actually, we shouldn't, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Robert Nault: Mr. Chairman, we had a member in full flight here when we—

The Chairman: Oh, I'm sorry. Thank you, Mr. Nault. I appreciate that.

Mr. Rocheleau, I'm sorry. You were part-way through your question. Go ahead.

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: I have a question for Mr. Johnston and a supplementary question for Mr. McDermott.

Mr. Johnston, you talk about a person other than the chairman. Are you talking about a member of the committee or any citizen being able to use that provision?

I would then like to know if Mr. McDermott agrees with Mr. Johnston that the problems within the board could have been dealt with differently if such a provision had existed at the time. Can you respond to that?

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Johnston, do you want to respond first?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Yes, indeed I do.

Anybody on the committee or any citizen who sees that there is wrongdoing taking place...yes, I think if we had had this in the legislation, we might have averted the problem we had with the chairman of the board of the CLRB.

The Chairman: Mr. McDermott, do you wish to respond?

[Translation]

Mr. Michael McDermott: I believe that such a provision would indeed have been useful in certain circumstances, but not in all circumstances that arose, because there were other problems. There were problems between the chairman and the vice-chairmen, for example, and I do not think that that provision deals with that type of problem.

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For other problems, that provision would have been useful.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Rocheleau.

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: In any case, it's important that the minister be duly informed of any internal management problems within the board. I would therefore like to know if Mr. McDermott feels that the minister is well informed about the board's internal workings, given the way in which it is administered and the means at its disposal.

Mr. Michael McDermott: I am not sure if I understood your question correctly. I spoke of the utility of what is in the bill, which has nothing to do with what Mr. Johnston has just presented to the committee. I believe that this type of provision gave us a clear and useful means for dealing with certain problems that needed to be corrected. However, as I have said, there were other problems in the past, such as problems between the chairman and the vice-chairmen. The problem was that the chairman was not able to manage how the board carried out its work. That type of problem is dealt with in other parts of the bill. This particular provision can therefore be useful in certain circumstances, but obviously not in all circumstances that have arisen lately.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Johnston, a conclusion, please.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Well, Mr. Chairman, although I hear Mr. McDermott saying it might not help in every situation, I don't believe that should be any reason to not include this amendment in the bill. I think drawing attention to abuse is a duty of anybody who sees flagrant misuse of public funds. If there isn't some protection for people to do that, though, they may be tempted to just turn a blind eye, allowing this to take place rather than suffering the consequences.

I would like to ask Mr. McDermott what protections could be afforded to a public servant who may be aware of a problem like this under the current legislation. What would protect him from retaliatory action?

Mr. Michael McDermott: I think there is a whole series of protections for a public servant in office under the Public Service Employment Act, under various policies that are set forward by Treasury Board as the employer, enabling a public servant who genuinely believes there's something that needs to be brought to the attention of the deputy minister, the minister or whoever, to do that. Protection is available under the various policies that have been established. If a public servant is disciplined, then there is recourse. There is a whole series of measures that can be taken by an individual to challenge the reasons for that discipline. They're well established under the Public Service Staff Relations Act and under the terms of the Public Service Employment Act.

Mr. Dale Johnston: So you're saying there are methods by which to discipline a public servant for misuse of funds or misconduct or whatever, but I don't think you're answering my actual question. Say somebody in your department, Mr. McDermott, were to make allegations against you—God forbid. This could never happen, but theoretically, what is to protect the person we're referring to here, the whistle-blower, from retaliation from your department? Specifically, what is it that would apply to this legislation?

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Mr. Michael McDermott: There's nothing specific in the legislation. If that unlikely circumstance arose and I retaliated in some way, however, the individual concerned would be able to lay a complaint for harassment, for example—and there is a well-developed series of policies dealing with such matters as harassment. If I were to impose formal discipline, the individual would be able to challenge that under the terms of the Public Service Staff Relations Act. There would be these kinds of checks. I think the individual would be protected if retaliation were to take place.

Mr. Dale Johnston: I guess what I'm getting at is that this is an awfully complex scenario whereby the public servant would allege these things, and then there could be some retaliatory action. This could be a very convoluted, traumatic experience for that person to go through for simply trying to point out something he or she thought should be addressed because of misuse or misappropriation of funds or something like that. Do you see what I'm saying? There should be something up front.

I'm not suggesting we should encourage people to be skulking around looking for things. When there are problems to be pointed out, however, they should be able to do this without fear of having to go through some extended battles to defend themselves afterwards.

Mr. Michael McDermott: I think there is also some protection for the individual who's accused, and the right of the person who's being accused to be faced by the accuser is sometimes a legal principle that's discussed. It's a trade-off between the two. As I think Mrs. Chamberlain mentioned, there is the prospect here that some complaints could be malicious because there is this promise of anonymity.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. McDermott.

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: I cut Mr. Johnston off because I wanted to return to that theme. One of the things I'd like to talk about is this whole idea of not encouraging people to “skulk around and look for problems”. While I actually support Mr. Johnston's motion here, Mr. Chairman, and while I think whistle-blower protection is good, I look at some other jurisdictions that have examined the whole idea not only of whistle-blower protection but of rewards. In my own city of Calgary, we have an alderman, Jon Lord, who has put forward an idea whereby if somebody in a government department finds a way of saving taxpayer money, he or she receives 10% of that as a reward.

A classic example of that comes from the United States, where an employee complained about a situation with General Dynamics, a contractor for the U.S. government. I think the saving to the taxpayers there was to the tune of something like $30 million or, if you forgive me, maybe $300 million. As a result, that individual would have received millions of dollars. He would have become a millionaire for saving the taxpayers money. In that case, the taxpayers benefited because they were able to find a savings of around $270 million, once you subtract the commission, if you will, to the public employee.

So I think this is a perfectly good idea. Not only should we protect whistle-blowers, but I think there should actually be a reward system put in place. If by some sort of skulduggery and backroom dealing there's a way to punish this employee or their employment is somehow ended or something to that effect, I think the whistle-blower should be rewarded by the taxpayers for what they do.

So not only do I support the idea of a whistle-blower protection, but I would actually encourage this type of thing. I hope we find more of it, because it would ultimately help the government in terms of efficiency and help the taxpayers in terms of cost savings.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Anders.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, I really believe there should be support amongst the Liberal caucus on a measure such as this.

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When I look back, in 1990, in debate, Marlene Catterall, and in 1992, Don Boudria, both pledged support for very similar legislation. So I would really like to hear where...although certainly we've heard from Mr. McDermott, I would really like to hear from government members if they still support a whistle-blower type of legislation now or if they have changed their minds.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Johnston.

Having evoked the name of the Liberal House leader and the Liberal deputy whip, perhaps we could put it to the test and find out how much support there is for their positions.

Mr. Dale Johnston: I'm asking the question of the government.

The Chairman: I see. Okay. And you have the response?

Mr. Dale Johnston: No response.

Further investigation showed that Colleen Beaumier from Brampton West—Mississauga introduced a private member's bill on this subject in 1997. We have had other members of the Liberal caucus introduce amendments to the Competition Act to allow for whistle-blowers. That was in 1996. And in speaking to this legislation, one Robert Nault said we have whistle-blower legislation in other jurisdictions; for example, in different acts, in labour codes and labour protection acts, we have mechanisms whereby employers will be fined for breaking the law and helping employees—all these arguments are legitimate arguments that should be looked at.

So, Mr. Chairman, I really think the government has.... Don't they have any comment to make on this?

The Chairman: Question? All in favour of—

Mr. Rob Anders: There are other things to mention here as well. I'm shocked, Mr. Chairman, that we have all these people, members of the government, either when they were in opposition or now in government, talking about this whole idea of whistle-blower protection being a good thing.

I went so far, of course, in this committee to propose the idea of whistle-blower rewards, which I support, Mr. Chairman, and I think probably at another time some of these members may have supported that, and yet we're not seeing them toe the line on this. When push comes to shove, when they have the opportunity, they're failing the taxpayers in this, and I'm shocked that we don't have anybody on the government side who is willing to comment on this and speak to their previous positions and their previous support of whistle-blower protection or rewards.

The Chairman: Let's put it to the test.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, we're pleased to see that the government has in the past supported this type of legislation. We look forward to them supporting this amendment now.

We think the ultimate goal of this legislation is to make sure we have labour laws that are in balance, but besides that, when it comes to the board and the ministry, we have to make sure we have accountability and frugality. We need to make sure we're getting the best for the dollars invested. We have the taxpayers, who are, as everybody knows, just stretched to the maximum trying to pay their taxes, and we have an obligation to make sure we get them the best deal we can.

Mr. Chairman, we really would expect support from a government whose members have spoken so strongly in favour of this in the past, and here we now discover that they have absolutely nothing whatsoever to say on the subject after they've been given a chance to look at an amendment that speaks to their very concerns.

The Chairman: Your actions will speak loudly.

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: Mr. Chairman, on this whole subject of protection...we're only talking about whistle-blower protection here. If we were to go to this idea of whistle-blower rewards, as I've touched on.... As I say, this amendment, this change in terms of protection, goes nowhere near this, but even in this case here, it was roughly $700,000-plus of taxpayer dollars that the chairman of the Canada Labour Relations Board was alleged to have wasted. Even if we had a 10% commission for an employee in the civil service who would have reported that, it still would have saved taxpayers, in that single case alone, over $600,000, yet we don't see any serious consideration of whistle-blower protection.

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That's the money that would be saved for taxpayers if we were to approach this from the idea of a whistle-blower reward, Mr. Chairman, yet we're not even going as far as that.

The Reform Party is being a party of compromise here. We're trying to put something forward that would be in between, in the middle of the table. We're trying to be reasonable here. We could have put forward something that would have been an amendment to make this a whistle-blower reward, but instead we've opted for the middle ground. We've opted for something here that can be bartered both ways, something that's negotiable, something that's moderate, that's not extreme. We're asking for some whistle-blower protection here.

When I point out that a whistle-blower reward would have saved taxpayers over $600,000 in just this case alone, never mind the entire department, or working through all the various bodies involved with Bill C-19 and the Canada Labour Code, surely this is something the government can come to as a middle-ground position.

The Chairman: Mr. Johnston, do you wish to speak in conclusion?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, I'm pleased to have an opportunity to speak to this most important aspect of the bill. I think we have many civil servants who are aware of what is happening, and about the only way they have now to make their concerns known with any kind of immunity is to slip something to the press.

I don't really think that's the appropriate way to do this. I know the minister in this case on a limited basis, but I do know of him that he would like to do the right thing, and the right thing would be to look after the taxpayer and to make sure that throughout the department and throughout the board the right thing is done.

As we all know from political life, not only is it important and imperative to do the right thing but it's also most imperative to be seen to be doing the right thing. If it were possible for people to point out wrongdoing and extravagances in the department, I think public servants should be able to give the minister the information without fear of reprisal.

I've heard what the deputy minister has said with regard to the process they would go through if they had been harassed or formally disciplined or any of that. If a person were in possession of information that he or she thought should be brought to the minister or to the department, I think they would far rather be able to simply give that information to the department or to the minister without fear of reprisal rather than to know their only other recourse was to go through this long, drawn-out, and very traumatic legal process.

Can you imagine, Mr. Chairman, if this were to take place, that you brought charges or made allegations against your superior and then would have to work with that superior later on, having gone through all of this process Mr. McDermott has described to us? We're aware of the process of which he speaks. It might be a tolerable association, but it certainly would not be an enjoyable one.

So for that and many other reasons we would certainly like to see approval on this. We would like to have seen approval on our other amendments, too, but this one here we certainly want to see support for.

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The Chairman: Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: I'd like to move a subamendment, Mr. Chairman.

Looking at the third line of Reform amendment 6, I'd like to replace “should be subject to remedial or disciplinary measures” with “should be subject to remedial, disciplinary or rewarding measures”.

Also, on the tenth line, I would like to replace:

may request the Minister to decide whether the member shall be subject to remedial or disciplinary measures and may request anonymity with respect to the request.

—with—

may request the Minister to decide whether the member shall be subject to remedial, disciplinary or rewarding measures and may request anonymity with respect to the request.

I make those changes, Mr. Chairman, to reflect the idea of not only having this whistle-blower protection, but also possibly to include a whistle-blower reward. As I mentioned before, taxpayers in many jurisdictions would have saved great amounts of money by having some sort of whistle-blower reward structure present in legislation. As a way to make this more palatable to the government, we're willing to consider including whistle-blower rewards and not just the idea of protection. We put that on the table for debate as well, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you. You know the subamendment moved by Mr. Anders. I call the question on the subamendment. All in favour?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, I would like to speak to the subamendment.

Mr. Anders has suggested that perhaps in whistle-blower legislation there should be some incentive, for lack of a better word, for people to come forward and do the right thing. I believe this does have some merit, Mr. Chairman. We could have had in this amendment something to do with the fact that on the finding of wrongdoing or the misappropriation of funds, this would become a debt to the crown and would have to be repaid by the person who misused or misspent the funds.

I think Mr. Anders has come up with a reasonable idea here that we should at least debate. I'd be most interested, Mr. Chairman, to hear what the government members have to say in regard to this amendment.

The Chairman: Okay.

Mr. Rob Anders: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to say that this has the possibility of really setting a precedent for this government. I don't think there has been a full examination of the idea of whistle-blower rewards previous to this.

Certainly there would be classic examples in the last Parliament. For example, look at other areas of the government, such as the Department of Justice and the investigation of the former Prime Minister. If somebody had been able to highlight some of these things or catch them, as it were, before the whole mess developed, it would have saved the taxpayers huge amounts of money.

Consider if there had been some sort of whistle-blower reward in that case. Goodness knows, there are countless others in terms of rewards with contracts and what not, Mr. Chairman.

I really think the committee should be seriously examining having some sort of whistle-blower reward built in as a way to set a precedent not only for the Canada Labour Relations Board or the new configuration that may come to pass, the Canada Industrial Relations Board, and the Canada Labour Code generally, Mr. Chairman, but also for this to serve as a wonderful precedent for almost all other government departments, quasi-judicial bodies, etc., that you could possibly think of. I think we're missing a historic opportunity here.

Mr. Dale Johnston: I'd like to ask members of the department their opinion. Perhaps we could have an opinion from Mr. McDermott and maybe a legal opinion from Madame Beaupré on the aspects my colleague has just spoken about—the incentive aspect of the whistle-blower legislation.

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Mr. Michael McDermott: I'll ask Madame Beaupré to respond to any legal aspects. It just strikes me as a kind of bounty system, and I'm not sure I see the value of it. I think we've already explained we have concerns that that kind of system could encourage malicious complaints. I don't know if Madame Beaupré has anything to add.

Ms. Yvonne Beaupré (Senior Counsel, Legal Services, Department of Human Resources Development): I'm afraid I can't add anything. It's not a matter about which I've given a great deal of thought. I know there are provisions and statutes that protect people in the event of employer reprisals. We have them in part II in that type of thing. But in terms of whistle-blowing, I can't say I've considered the matter to any extent. I'm sorry.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Can you cite any instances in other legislation where there are provisions for people to point out wrongdoing—for lack of a better word, whistle-blower legislation—in which the people who come forth with the information are actually protected by anonymity? Do you know of any other instances of this in federal legislation?

Ms. Yvonne Beaupré: It's not a field I've practised in, but I think there may be something in legislation dealing with environmental protection.

Mr. Dale Johnston: I know there certainly was something in the proposed environmental protection in the Endangered Species Act that was debated in the last Parliament. I know there was certainly whistle-blower legislation there. Can you tell me if those people were protected? Could they make these allegations with anonymity or did they have to identify themselves?

Ms. Yvonne Beaupré: I'm afraid I don't know that, sir.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Could we get that question answered?

The Chairman: I'm sorry, I missed the question.

Mr. Dale Johnston: You should be paying attention. You're missing some good stuff here.

The Chairman: I'm booking a room for this afternoon.

Mr. Janko Peric: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.

The Chairman: I'm sorry. Mr. McDermott, please.

Mr. Michael McDermott: Madame Beaupré has indicated she's not aware of the details of other legislation. Generally speaking, with labour legislation the protection is against reprisals for having exercised a right, but it does not grant anonymity. We have that in part I to some degree. We have it in part II of the code as well. But anonymity is not part of the package in the labour code.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Dale Johnston: But my contention is that although I'm not positive on this, I believe, as Madame Beaupré pointed out, there is whistle-blower legislation in the Environmental Protection Act. I believe it would have been in the bill that dealt with endangered species.

Mr. Janko Peric: This is labour legislation.

Mr. Dale Johnston: I do believe the whistle-blower would have been protected with anonymity.

If this is good legislation for one area, why wouldn't it be good legislation for another area? I'd like a legal opinion on that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. McDermott.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.): Question.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman—

The Chairman: Hold on. You've made a request or asked a question of the departmental representatives. I believe Mr. McDermott wishes to respond to that, so I'll let him do that.

We are in a process of clause-by-clause examination of legislation. Members have the right to get their questions answered. They are doing so.

Mr. McDermott.

Mr. Michael McDermott: The only reply to Mr. Johnston's last comment I wish to make is I don't believe it's a legal question he was posing; it's a policy question. The policy question is that we would not be proposing the kind of anonymity that is suggested here, which would be a departure from the Canada Labour Code.

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The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. McDermott.

Mr. Rob Anders: Mr. Chairman, in light of legal counsel not being able to answer definitively the question of this whole bounty system, as Mr. McDermott prefers to call it, I would certainly consider allowing this to stand aside for us to consider other things before moving on with this, so we can get a full legal opinion before we give this any further consideration. I think there is a real opportunity here, Mr. Chairman, for precedent, for saving taxpayers' dollars, for a whole host of reasons. If we don't feel that at this meeting we can address the full legal context of this, we should wait for a full legal opinion, which I am sure many of the government members are interested in hearing.

The Chairman: Mr. Anders, if I understand what you are doing, you are asking for unanimous consent of the committee to not proceed with this clause until such time as we have a legal opinion. Is that what you are asking for? When I call the question for unanimous consent, I'll call the question on the subamendment and on the amendment itself. Is that what you are thinking?

Mr. Rob Anders: Mr. Chairman, I don't feel that would do this justice. We're dealing strictly here with the issue of whether or not we're going to get a full legal opinion on this. That's an issue separate from and above and beyond the question of the amendment or the subamendment.

The Chairman: So you do not want me to call the question. You want me to simply deal with the issue of whether we will stand this clause.

Mr. Rob Anders: Yes.

The Chairman: Will we stand this clause?

Some hon. members: No.

The Chairman: Next.

Mr. Rob Anders: Mr. Chairman, that's a shame.

Moving right along, then, you've commented here briefly with regard to the Environmental Protection Act or that it may exist in some environmental legislation. We've kind of just had a scattering of that, but I'm wondering if some more meat can be put on those bones, for my benefit and for the benefit of the government members, because I can see several who are starting to pick up interest in this, and so they should.

I'm wondering, Ms. Beaupré, if you might be able to expand upon that.

Ms. Yvonne Beaupré: As I mentioned before, I've never practised in the environmental field. I don't know the legislation in detail. I have vague recollections of there being whistle-blowing protection in it, but I don't know its exact content.

Mr. Rob Anders: Can you do anything beyond a vague recollection?

Ms. Yvonne Beaupré: I'm afraid not.

Mr. Rob Anders: You remember it being there; is there anything else beyond that?

Ms. Yvonne Beaupré: I'm afraid not.

The Chairman: Mr. Johnston.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, I can't understand what the government finds offensive in this legislation. It simply says that a person who believes on reasonable grounds that there has been wrongdoing or that any member of the board should be subject to remedial or disciplinary action should be able to go to the minister with anonymity. I think that's pretty reasonable. There are people in the department who know exactly what's going on. I guess the expression we hear so often, Mr. Chairman, is “They know where the bodies are buried”. These people know, but are they willing to risk their security, their job? This is a traumatic thing for them to have to go through. They should be able to simply turn the information over to the minister and the minister of the department can look into it. They should be able to do this without fear of reprisal or without, as Mr. McDermott pointed out, going through all the process and procedures if some sort of reprisal does take place.

Really, all we're saying is that we are encouraging people who know of inappropriate behaviour to come forward with the information. What could be wrong with that?

The Chairman: Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: The whole issue of anonymity touches on the idea of “brown paper envelopes”. I know that when you look back on the lean years for the now-governing party, brown paper envelopes and the disclosures therein to make sure the taxpayers had justice done was a big part of their ability to go after the credibility of ministers, to go after their responsibility and the accountability of their office as minister of the crown.

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I know that during my brief year in office, Mr. Chair, I've had people come forward with brown paper envelopes as well. It is not unique to the previous administration. It happens within the current Liberal administration as well. There are disgruntled civil servants who know how to save taxpayer dollars and are concerned about the welfare of their departments as well as for the taxpayers. It was going on before and it is going on currently.

In light of that, Mr. Chairman, this whole idea of anonymity of people coming forward.... Right now we have people who are willing to come forward with brown paper envelopes, which is a risk in and of itself. If they had some sort of protection in terms of anonymity, we'd have a real opportunity to do a housecleaning in various branches of the civil service and to make sure they are more fully accountable than they are now. I think this matter of anonymity is a real issue of concern here. Let's evolve past the whole idea of brown paper envelopes and move toward some sort of protection for these people so we can seriously address these problems.

The Chairman: Shall I call the question?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, I really think we have an obligation to the people of Canada, who foot the bill for this entire process, to deliver the best possible product we can. One of the ways to ensure that we are doing the best we can is to demand accountability from everybody.

Mr. Chairman, I am not inferring that we don't have accountable people. I acknowledge that the vast majority of civil servants are absolutely accountable people who are professionals and take their job very seriously. At the same time, it is not 100% of them who look at their duties in that way. To the people who do not, I think there should be some mechanism to allow people whose conscience is bothering them, where they have information they know the minister should have, knowing that if the minister could get the information any other way he would get it, to be able to act. The surest way is to at the very least protect them and, as Mr. Anders has suggested, put out some incentive for finding and addressing instances of waste and wrongdoing in the system.

We have instances from members of other parties in the House, even from the Bloc, who introduced a whistle-blower protection act in the House of Commons in 1994 and again in 1996. This is not a new idea. It is not something that fell out of the sky one day and we thought we'd maybe give it a try. This is something that has been broached many times in Parliament and is used in other democratic jurisdictions around the world. Mr. Chairman, I would certainly encourage members of the committee to support these amendments.

Mr. Rob Anders: I remember recently reading publications with regard to the morale in the civil service here in Ottawa and around the country. A lot of government money was spent investigating what the problems were in terms of the morale in the civil service—talking with all these different people, going through a kind of psychoanalysis, if you will, looking into what the problems were, what the potential solutions were, whether or not people felt as though there was a chilly climate, as it were, or whether they could speak their mind about problems they saw in their particular department, and so on.

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We have all this money being spent on these things, looking into the morale of the civil service, talking about the turnover that's coming with the demographics of the baby boom and whether or not we're going to be able to find competent people to fill those spots in the succeeding generation that will come up behind them in the civil service. We are facing all these situations. The government is putting out a lot of money, time, effort, and expenditure in these areas. Yet we have something here that is a way to address the underpinnings, the structural problems of people not being able to speak freely on some of the problems that exist. They still have to turn to a brown paper envelope approach because they can't go ahead with anonymity to approach the minister on problems they see in a given department, with all the hierarchy they have to deal with in their careers, Mr. Chairman.

Here we have a great idea to address the problem, nip it in the bud, as it were, and yet it is being passed over. I think that's a real shame. I'm going to go so far, Mr. Chairman, as to request a formal motion to ask for a legal opinion in this matter, because I think it is that important and I think it deserves that type of attention.

The Chairman: On the issue of moving a formal motion that is over and above the clause-by-clause consideration, first we have to deal with the subamendment and the amendment we have before us. If you're dealing with a procedural motion, you have to give 24 hours notice, as per our standing orders.

Mr. Rob Anders: If you will, call it a superseding motion, Mr. Chairman, but this is an important issue that needs to be dealt with. Whether you want to call it a formal motion or a superseding motion—

The Chairman: You can call it whatever you want. It's out of order. Renaming it doesn't change it. We have a subamendment to an amendment before us and procedurally we need to deal with the subamendment.

Mr. Rob Anders: A rose by any other name is just as sweet, Mr. Chairman, and justice should be served here.

Mr. Janko Peric: Send that boy back to school. He's giving you wrong advice.

Mrs. Brenda Chamberlain: Reform said they were never going to do this.

The Chairman: Let's have a modicum of order here.

Now, we do have the subamendment that was proposed by Mr. Anders to reform amendment 6.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, a point of clarification. Mr. Anders put a motion asking for a legal opinion. You called that a substantive motion, did you, or what did you call it?

The Chairman: Under the standing orders of this committee, a motion other than an amending motion in clause-by-clause requires 24 hours' written notice.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Okay. Even one, though, that asks for a legal opinion on the stuff we're debating, Mr. Chairman, the actual amendment?

The Chairman: That's the advice I have. I'm advised that what is being proposed is a substantive motion and covered by our standing orders.

Mr. Rob Anders: In that case, Mr. Chairman, I propose that the meeting be adjourned so we can address that issue and reconvene when we have it done.

The Chairman: It has been proposed or moved by Mr. Anders that we do now adjourn.

All those in favour, please—

Mr. Rob Anders: I think there should be a debate first. I think this issue needs debate.

The Chairman: There's no debate on a motion to adjourn. So all in favour—

Mr. Rob Anders: Record it.

The Chairman: Yes, we'll record it.

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(Motion negatived: nays 10; yeas 3)

(Subamendment negatived: nays 10; yeas 3)

The Chairman: Now we will go to Reform amendment 6 to clause 2.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, can we go back to debate on the main motion?

The Chairman: Right, on the amendment.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Yes, not the subamendment.

The Chairman: The subamendment is defeated. We are now on the amendment to clause 2, which is contained within Reform amendment 6.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Good.

Ms. Bonnie Brown: I have a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I think there was sufficiently full debate on the main amendment, and I wonder if you could make a ruling that if the opposition wishes to debate further, it raise only new points we have not heard in the previous debate, prior to the introduction of the subamendment.

The Chairman: I expect Mr. Johnston wishes to make a concluding remark, which I'm sure will be relevant and to the point.

Mr. Robert Nault: He'll have to use his imagination.

Mr. Dale Johnston: You know we don't have any imagination, Bob.

I think this is great. This is the best debate he's been able to come up with so far today. That's a new point. I think the member has some excellent points to raise, and if he has trouble staying awake in the committee he should just raise those good points and share them with us. I'd like to get into a debate with him.

We think confidentiality is of utmost importance here. To be able to have the assurance from the minister and the department that anonymity and confidentiality of the identity of the person making the request under proposed subsection 12.06(2) is of utmost importance, and we believe the Canadian people are worthy of this. We owe them this responsibility. This is a policing method for public servants. We think this is a good system and certainly worth the support of the government side.

We're actually quite surprised it didn't show up in the legislation itself. If it had, we would have supported it and would not have needed to come up with this amendment. We think it's absolutely necessary that we combat the fear of reprisals.

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We've heard the deputy minister talk about the steps you go through, but if a person in a department is grappling with this information about whether they should share it with the minister or not, they will take into consideration all the forms of reprisal that could take place and all the legal steps they would have to go through in order to answer the disciplinary actions that may have taken place. They will decide it isn't worth risking their career to bring those allegations forth.

What a terrible position to put those people in. They know they have information that should be shared with the minister. They know it's their duty to do it, and yet they say “Why go through all this hassle? Sure it's going to help the citizens of Canada, but it's going to have repercussions on me in my job and my working conditions.”

I think if we examine this a little more closely, we should be able to come to some kind of consensus with the government. After all, Mr. Chairman, I know consensus is something you strive for in the committee, and here's an instance where the government can show good faith toward the official opposition and support our position on this.

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Rocheleau.

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: Mr. Chairman, I would like you to ask the members of the committee if they are ready to vote on clause 2.

[English]

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: All the questions haven't been answered.

The Chairman: Just to clarify, Mr. Rocheleau, you would like to know whether the question should be called on the amendment, not on the clause.

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Rocheleau: On the clause. The amendment has been taken care of.

[English]

The Chairman: I'm sorry, Mr. Rocheleau, unlike the House, such a request is out of order in committee.

Mr. Anders.

Mr. Rob Anders: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On new points—and I have a list of questions because I think they're all important questions.

I think legislators should pay more attention to these fundamental questions when they go ahead and assess amendments and bills. I've raised these questions in the House on a number of other things. I'm going to raise them today with this amendment and with this Bill C-19, specifically speaking to the amendment we have here on whistle-blower protection.

One, who pays for it? Without whistle-blower protection, the taxpayers are the ones who pay for it, and they don't have any safeguard to make sure their interests are looked after and money is saved in their account. Who else pays for it? You pay for it in terms of having a civil service that doesn't do the job the way it should or could be doing the job, so there are missed opportunities. I know members across the way can appreciate missed opportunities, so they recognize this is important and they recognize the taxpayer pays for it.

That's the first question. Who pays for not having whistle-blower protection? The employee who has to suffer through all the subjugations and by not being able to totally fulfil themselves in their job suffer for it. Their workplace counterparts suffer for it. The entire civil service suffers for it. The taxpayer suffers for it and the government suffers for it because eventually it comes to the light of day that it was ultimately its responsibility in these things. It pays the ultimate price for not having some sort of whistle-blower protection, because when it finally boils over it is caught red-handed. So all those parties mentioned pay for it. Everybody pays for it.

The second question is, who cares? I'll tell you the taxpayers care. They believe we should have some sort of whistle-blower protection. If you put this to a vote of the people, they would support it. Often I think when we look at legislation in this House we don't consider how the people of the country would apply their good common sense to these things if they had the chance.

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Mr. Chairman, in this case I can't think of a taxpayer who wouldn't support the idea of having some sort of whistle-blower protection or whistle-blower reward to make sure their dollars were accounted for and looked after properly.

So who cares, Mr. Chairman? The taxpayers care.

I'll tell you who doesn't care, because that's the flip side of this question, Mr. Chairman. Who doesn't care? The people who are defending their own nests, Mr. Chairman, those people who would go ahead and feather their own nests, those people who would go ahead, like the Weatherills of this world, Mr. Chairman, and abuse the taxpayer and the trust put in them. They would care. You bet they would. They have a vested interest, Mr. Chairman. It's our job as parliamentarians to root out those vested interests and make sure things are done right, in the name of the taxpayer.

Mr. Larry McCormick: A point of order, Mr. Chair. Please consider this, and I ask my honourable colleague from the great town of Calgary to consider this also. We have heard these same points repeatedly. They're valid points.

An hon. member: But you disagree with them.

Mr. Larry McCormick: Do we have to repeat? I thought a gentlemen's agreement—

Mr. Rob Anders: These are new questions, Mr. Chairman.

An hon. member: It's the same point.

Mr. Larry McCormick: We are costing taxpayers money in many ways.

Mr. Janko Peric: You have wasted taxpayers' money, Rob.

Mr. Larry McCormick: Consider it, Rob.

Mr. Rob Anders: I consider examination of bills important, Mr. Chairman. I don't think that's a waste of taxpayer dollars.

Moving right along, to point number three. Question three, Mr. Chairman, is, how much will this cost? By including this amendment here, with the government coming across in good faith on this, in order to have some sort of protection for those people who see it as their duty to expose the problems in a particular government department, what does the government lose? Nothing. Because in the long term it safeguards them, Mr. Chairman.

As a result, when it comes to the question of how much it's going to cost, the cost will ultimately be that it saves the government a whole lot of heartache. In terms of the dollars and cents, right here and now, for them to come across the floor on this is a small price indeed. As a matter of fact, there's no cost for that, Mr. Chairman, for them to go ahead and vote in favour of this, which only makes sense. So there's the costing of it, Mr. Chairman.

Another question that comes up, Mr. Chairman, is this: Does it solve the problem? You bet it does. If there's a problem right now with civil servants who don't have the opportunity to come out and expose these types of problems, if they don't feel safe, if they feel a chilly climate, if they don't have the opportunity to expose problems in the civil service and come to the minister with these concerns directly, then we have a problem. If whistle-blower protection can solve that problem, then we should seriously consider this, Mr. Chairman. I notice the civil servants across the way nodding and smiling in agreement with this, because they recognize the problems in the department, Mr. Chairman. Good on them!

I wish the government members across the way would take note of that, because they would truly be serving the citizens of this country if they tried to address and solve the problem. The problem, Mr. Chairman, is that some of these people are not able to come forward. These employees, these good civil servants don't have the opportunity to come forward because they feel muzzled right now, Mr. Chairman.

So that's the problem. Let's try to solve it. This actually does address the problem and its root causes. It gets to the premises that lead to the conclusions. Let's go ahead and solve this problem.

The fifth question, and this I admit, Mr. Chairman, ties in somewhat to the second question about who cares, and that is, once again, would it pass good judgment? We've raised it before, but would it pass good judgment? You bet it would. Citizens of this country would endorse whistle-blower protection because they recognize that it serves their interest and serves everybody just fine.

Anyhow, I see that one of my colleagues would like to speak, Mr. Chairman, so I'm going to wrap it up with those five questions for now.

The Chairman: Mr. Johnston.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

To the deputy minister, in your opinion, what would be the downside to an amendment like this? If this amendment is undesirable, what, in your opinion, would make it so?

Mr. Michael McDermott: You're getting close to asking me for a personal opinion, and as a good bureaucrat, I don't have any. I think the committee has already heard the concern about anonymity being misused to make malicious or frivolous complaints. In an open society, I think the best way to do things is to have people make their views known openly.

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I mentioned before a principle one should expect in justice, that if you're being accused of something, you should know what you're being accused of and who's accusing you.

Again, those are the types of considerations an adviser would put up when this kind of question is looked at.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Thank you for that response. I recognize that it's not fair to ask for a personal opinion, and I didn't mean to do that, but I do recognize, though, that in your position you have a tremendous amount to do with the crafting of the bill in the first place.

I meant to frame my question this way. This amendment is not in the original legislation, and therefore you must have had a reason not to include it. I think perhaps you have pretty well addressed that, but if you haven't, maybe you could just add to that.

Mr. Michael McDermott: I think the type of provision this motion would amend is the material that was in the previous Bill C-49, the disciplinary and remedial measures that would apply to all administrative tribunals. It is to enable the head of the tribunal to initiate disciplinary and remedial measures in the event that the place is not working properly. It did not, within that bill, envisage that it would be all comers.

We've said before that there's nothing that prevents an individual from raising an issue with the minister. There's nothing that prevents an individual from raising a concern publicly in any forum—to write to a member of Parliament, to do all those types of things. This is something that is specific to the running of a tribunal and to making sure there is a fair way to addressing needs for remedial and disciplinary matters.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. McDermott has again referred to Bill C-49. Unfortunately, I don't have any copy of Bill C-49 here, so I'm not aware of how that would work and how that would impact on Bill C-19.

Correct me if I haven't got this right, Mr. McDermott, but are you saying that had Bill C-49 been passed, that would have had some impact on disclosure in Bill C-19? I'm not making the connection there, unfortunately.

Mr. Michael McDermott: Not on disclosure, but if Bill C-49 had passed, I think proposed sections 12.06 through to 12.14 would already have been in law. That's what I'm saying. The disciplinary procedures, the provision for inquiries into remedial and disciplinary matters, would already have been in law had Bill C-49 been adopted.

It's my understanding that there have been a couple of statutes governing a couple of tribunals. I think the Veterans Appeal Board, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, and the Immigration Act already have those kinds of measures in them. They were put into law already. They do not deal with the issue you're addressing in the amendment.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Okay.

Mr. Chairman, I don't believe there's a quorum.

The Chairman: No, there is no quorum. We're suspended.

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• 1224

The Chairman: We have a quorum. Now shall I call the question on amendment R-6?

Ms. Val Meredith (South Surrey—White Rock—Langley, Ref.): I request a recorded vote.

The Chairman: We will have a recorded vote on amendment R-6.

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(Amendment negatived: nays 9; yeas 2)

The Chairman: That takes us to the next amendment. We have amendment R-7 at clause 45. To deal with the intervening clauses...we have dealt with the amendments to clause 2. Shall the clause pass? Do you want a recorded vote on clause 2, or you are on division?

Mr. Rob Anders: We want a recorded vote on clause 2.

(Clause 2 agreed to: yeas 8; nays 2)

The Chairman: Yes, Mr. Johnston.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Do I get an opportunity to vote on...?

The Chairman: Were you back in the room in time to vote?

Mr. Dale Johnston: I wasn't here when the question was called.

The Chairman: You weren't? Then no.

As agreed when we started, the next formal amendment we have is on clause 45, amendment R-7.

Shall clauses 3 to 44 pass?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

Mr. Dale Johnston: No.

The Chairman: Shall I call—

Mr. Rob Anders: I have questions on clause 3—

The Chairman: Hold it. I have some procedural items first.

Mr. Johnston, as you are the one who said no, are you saying no to the passage? We had agreed when we started that we would deal with the ones where there were no amendments as a group. So we've called the question on clauses 3 to 44. Are you saying you wish to ask questions before there is passage of that group?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Yes.

The Chairman: Okay. So we're dealing with clauses 3 to 44 as a group.

Mr. Anders, and Mr. Nault, I believe you also had a question.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, we have some questions we'd like to raise specifically. This is clause by clause. I don't see any reason why we should pass this or deal with this entirely as a lump. I think we can deal with it individually.

The Chairman: Are you wishing to change the agreement we arrived at at the beginning of the committee meeting?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Well, we seem to have changed something. I went to the washroom and I came back and we had taken a vote, so apparently things change in mid-stream around here.

The Chairman: Nobody's preventing you from asking questions on this at all.

Mr. Dale Johnston: That's good.

The Chairman: You can ask questions on clauses 3 to 44, as we agreed. In fact, I just indicated to Mr. Anders that he can ask the questions. That was the procedure we agreed to at the start of the meeting.

Mr. Robert Nault: Mr. Chairman, the opposition members don't seem to have prepared their questions in advance for their filibuster. Maybe I could ask a serious question of the officials.

The Chairman: Sure.

Mr. Robert Nault: I want go to clause 7, proposed paragraph 18.1(4)(d). This was brought up by the airline associations and the unions that relate to them.

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Paragraph (d) deals with an amendment that's on page 13 of the bill itself, in English, in proposed paragraph 18.1(d):

(d) amend, to the extent that the Board considers necessary, the provisions of collective agreements respecting expiry dates or seniority rights, or amend other such provisions;

For clarification, what I'd like to know is the intent of that particular change.

As has been previously believed, at least by the union movement, seniority is an internal matter. It is not one that is normally dealt with by the board; it's dealt with by unions themselves. When you're putting two unions together, of course, that becomes a major issue. I grant you that. But this now becomes, in my mind, close to getting involved in internal union business.

You must also keep in mind that seniority rights, in essence, can be someone's livelihood. If you're at one particular seniority level, you are amalgamated with a union and end up at a different seniority level, you could in fact end up going from a salary of $60,000 down to $10,000 overnight. Some board would rule on that on your behalf. I think that would cause tremendous damage to the credibility of the board itself.

I guess my serious question, Mr. Chairman, is why we would want to get this put in the bill. What would be the intent of doing this, knowing the importance of seniority internally to unions themselves?

Mr. Michael McDermott: Indeed, seniority is a very important issue in collective bargaining, and it does become an issue when, for one reason or another, bargaining units are restructured and different seniority lists are merged into the same bargaining unit. It was an issue that was looked at by the Sims task force, and they heard representations from a number of people. They concluded.... Remember, on it there were two active labour board members, one from Alberta and one from Ontario, who have seen these kinds of issues come before labour boards before.

Let me explain what the current code does when there is a sale involving a merger of bargaining units, when one company buys another. Take the trucking industry as an example, where it might happen when one trucking company buys another one. Two groups come together now in the same company. They have varying seniority and they have different seniority lists. All the board can do at the moment is take into account how the parties have addressed the seniority issue and possibly order a reopening of the collective agreement, starting the whole bargaining process all over again, opening up the whole agreement.

The task force members unanimously put forward the idea that the board could, in certain circumstances, have the discretion to look at the seniority issues. The whole clause has to be looked at. There's a continuing emphasis on negotiations of problems that might arise in a merger. The parties are given every opportunity to come to their own conclusion and their own solution to the problems. Only as a last resort can the board consider the idea of doing something about the seniority problems. They may still decide that the way to do it is to reopen the collective agreement.

As I said, it leaves the board with a discretion recommended by the task force, not objected to by the parties at all. In the round table the minister has, it has become an issue, particularly in the airline industry. As you know, the committee heard representations, some in favour and some against. The intent of it is to help people through a very difficult problem in the event that they cannot solve it themselves. It is appropriate, then, that the board feels it appropriate to try to resolve the issue for them.

Mr. Robert Nault: In your opinion, then, this is meant to be for very extreme situations and used very sparingly. My biggest concern, of course, is that the board creates some jurisprudence over time to suggest that they have a right to get involved in what has historically been union internal business.

I come from the railway industry. I can tell you that if you start tinkering around with the seniority in the railway industry, you would be in big trouble. We would be, of course, as governments. It's bad enough that we legislate people to work, but then we start toying around with peoples' seniority? I would find it somewhat complicated to imagine how we would deal with that if it became common practice.

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Are you telling me then that this is intended to be sort of the last opportunity because no one can seem to deal with the issue on their own and it would only be used in very extreme circumstances and not as sort of a common practice?

If you look at the clause, it says:

(d) amend, to the extent that the Board considers necessary, the provisions of collective agreements respecting expiry dates or seniority rights, or amend other such provisions;

You basically put seniority rights right in the bill, whereas with the rest, you left that as:

or amend other such provisions;

What other such provisions would you be talking about? That's pretty-far reaching.

Mr. Michael McDermott: Well, I think the other such provisions would be those kinds of things that come in conflict when two collective agreements or two groups of people subject to different terms and conditions come together under the same bargaining unit where a merger has taken place. It's not, clearly, I think to deal with wages, for example, or premium rates, or those kinds of things.

Expiry dates are mentioned because you get two groups coming together and they've got different expiry dates, so they have to be harmonized. You've got a single bargaining unit with two individual groups with different seniority levels and so on, so they're going to be in conflict with each other. The idea of the code is to enable these kinds of conflicts to be resolved peacefully and pursuant to the objectives of the code, meaning sound industrial relations answers to issues of that nature.

We didn't hear from the groups that came to talk about the Sims task force that had great concerns with this. I think they take into account that it's a discretionary authority the board has. The board is going to be a representative board with experienced people on it who will understand the very crucial nature of seniority, which you very clearly outlined, Mr. Nault.

In some industries, it's an extremely key consideration. Airline pilots on both sides have made that abundantly clear to the committee. From your own experience in the railway industry, you know how key it is.

I think it's safe to say that it will be used sparingly. It's only one of the alternative measures the board may take when the parties themselves have been unable to resolve the problems.

Mr. Robert Nault: Mr. Chairman, my concern also relates to the fact that it's in there specifically. When you take a look in clause 7 at proposed subsection 18.1(1), which is the review of the structure of bargaining units, you go on to say:

18.1(1) On application by the employer or a bargaining agent, the Board may review the structure of the bargaining units if it is satisfied that the bargaining units are no longer appropriate for collective bargaining.

So it's obviously assumed by me, as a practitioner in this field, that you would look at seniority as well, but it certainly would not be singled out in the way you've singled it out.

I'm trying to get a sense of this. I never heard, except for the airline industry, where it wasn't worked out by the organizations themselves. I know you would put a lot of pressure on them to go find a solution, and in most cases they would. Are we putting this in because we have a particular problem with the airline industry itself, or could you give me some examples of other industrial players who are having the same kind of problem?

I guess I've been a member of Parliament too long, so maybe I'm out of the loop here, but I don't recall this being a problem in other industries.

Mr. Michael McDermott: It certainly has been a problem in the trucking industry. I think we had, over the years, amalgamations of trucking firms, and we've seen it become an issue there. We see where the issue of seniority has created rather difficult circumstances in the new bargaining unit.

As I mentioned, it's new in one sense, but in another sense it's not new. Right now, the code recognizes that one of the reasons the board can order a reopening following the merger of bargaining units is that this issue of seniority has not been properly addressed.

Again, I come back to the task force. Experienced people who were on that task force recognized this as a problem. They put it out there as a recommendation, and we did not get, at the ministerial round tables, any serious criticism of these provisions. The airline people have come up with concerns about this, but again, you've got one group that says they don't want it while another group says they do want it.

Ultimately, I think it will be a discretionary step for the board, when it judges all the circumstances of a particular case, to leave festering the problems of unresolved seniority issues. This isn't a very happy situation either for an employer or the members of the bargaining unit.

Mr. Robert Nault: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Ms. Brown.

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Ms. Bonnie Brown: This is the piece that concerns me too. It seems to give the board a lot of power. If in fact an employer has two different bargaining units within its jurisdiction, or that it has to respond to, this would give the board the right to merge them, would it not, or at least merge their seniority rights, even though they're two different units? Or it could come up with an idea that it has to deign one or the other as the bargaining unit. This is the piece of it I don't understand. Why doesn't the employer have to deal with the two different bargaining units that happen to exist within its company?

Mr. Michael McDermott: In most cases the employer will continue to deal with separate bargaining units, assuming they have separate bargaining units. In recent years there have been moves in major companies to amalgamate. Some of the trade lines have blurred. They don't have the same demarcations of trade lines and so on. We've seen this in the railways. We've seen it in broadcasting and so on, where as the structure of the company changes, the structure of the bargaining units also begins to change.

The way this particular clause addresses the issues is it brings together three elements. In the current code it is possible for the board to review bargaining units. There's some talk it can do it on its own motion. It can just start the review itself. This clarifies that it has to be an application from an interested party, an employer or a trade union, to start the process rolling. We've seen those kinds of reviews in the railways, in the post office, and in the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, where there has been a conscious application to restructure the bargaining units of a single employer. We see it also in those circumstances where there's a sale and a merger of two companies following the purchase of another company.

There's also the third one, which is the one the airline pilots are concerned about, which is where the board is seized with an application for a declaration of a single employer, where a union alleges that what in fact exists is not three or four companies but one single company, that for all practical purposes the subsidiary companies are controlled by the main company.

We've put them all together here under this review procedure and made it clear that it has to be on application, made it clear—and these words are carefully chosen—that it is if the board is satisfied that the bargaining units are no longer appropriate for bargaining. It doesn't say they have to be the most appropriate units for bargaining, which is an attitude that perhaps was creeping into board jurisprudence. They would say, it may be appropriate right now, but we think this is more appropriate. We consciously see in this provision where if people are quite satisfied they're bargaining reasonably well with the current structure, they can keep it. Only if it can be proved that it's not appropriate for bargaining can the board then intervene and start the process rolling to amalgamate and restructure and so on.

We then move on to say where that is the case, there has to be negotiation. There has to be ample opportunity for the parties to come to their own agreement. Only after all those things have taken place will the board exercise these discretionary powers. It may in fact do exactly what the code enables it to do now, which is to say, you guys can start bargaining the whole package again because we can't help you any longer.

Ms. Bonnie Brown: You made an interesting point. You said it had been creeping in to board jurisprudence. They were moving into places where they thought their intervention would improve things. It's as if there's no power being exercised. People who are appointed to such boards are inclined to flex their own ability to act. What makes you think this will stop this creeping in? This won't stop it; this will encourage it.

Mr. Michael McDermott: No, I don't think it will, because we do say the application clearly has to be there in the first instance. Secondly, the board has to be satisfied that what exists is no longer appropriate; not that there's something better, but the board has to satisfy itself that what is there doesn't work. Right now they could actually say that may work, but this one's going to work better.

Ms. Bonnie Brown: Surely the applicant, in applying to have the whole situation reviewed, will make it their business to put the proofs before the board that in fact it's inappropriate. That will be their purpose.

I had another question for you, though. You said there were situations in the past where the board ruled in. I don't want to think about a sale necessarily because that to me is a totally different kettle of fish.

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You named a few examples. Perhaps you can recall those examples and what happened when two or three bargaining units were made into one. Did the view of the bargaining unit with the most members prevail? It would seem to me that this would be the natural bias. If there were 300 people in one union and 100 in another, and the 300-member union applied and said, “We don't like this and we want to all be in one union”, it seems to me the one with the most members would probably prevail.

Is that what happened, or did they ever rule the other way?

Mr. Michael McDermott: Certainly that happened in the case of the post office. The board ordered a vote, and that was settled when the union with the slightly largest number in fact took the vote and then represented all the employees in that new bargaining unit.

Ms. Bonnie Brown: Exactly.

Mr. Michael McDermott: The CBC I'd have to look at a little more closely.

In the railways, again, I think we've seen a situation where the bargaining unit restructuring went to the union that already had the largest group. In the shopcraft unions—and Mr. Nault may know more than I do on this—what had been the carmen's union seemed to have the bulk of the membership. When the shopcrafts were amalgamated...the successful carmen's union in fact represents all the employees.

Ms. Bonnie Brown: So we already have at least two precedents where, in the coming together to form one bargaining unit, the union with the most members on a vote obviously prevailed. It's just like politics. Numbers count, no matter what level you're at.

Mr. Michael McDermott: Yes.

Ms. Bonnie Brown: This leads me to understand why one of the pilots' unions is so concerned, because they do not have the numbers. If in fact it's ruled, through a vote, that the other bargaining unit prevails and their union is no longer the bargaining unit, then this whole thing Mr. Nault raised, about the clause over here—the provisions of collective agreements respecting expiry dates or seniority rights—will then come into play, and the board can move in and change a whole bunch of rules around which certain pilots' lives have been structured.

If these two unions come together, the one with the most members will probably prevail. They're the ones who want entry into the seniority patterns of the other.

Mr. Michael McDermott: I think it may be the other way around, actually. I don't really like to talk about this case, which is currently before the board, but I think the largest union there at the moment is the one that doesn't want to have any entries into its seniority lists.

Ms. Debra Robinson (Project Director, Legislative Review, Department of Human Resources Development): That's right.

Mr. Michael McDermott: But again, the board would, I think, be looking at how fairly the issues of seniority are dealt with. That's what the code would allow at the moment, for example, following a sale.

To use the example you used, of the 100 to 300, the board would say, “How have you handled it? Has this been addressed fairly, or have the 100 just been totally trodden on?” In that case, under the current code, the board might decide to order a reopening of bargaining.

As I say, the task force looked at all these issues. They had Canada Labour Board people who had been faced with these issues before and felt that this was important enough to give their board discretionary authority. When it was taken on tours, as the labour minister of the day did, we did not get concerns expressed from either side that this would be open to abuse.

You've heard it from two parties who have differing views and concerns as to how this will be applied. This is structured for the entire jurisdiction of the code, not with a specific situation in mind. It's enabling the board to have discretion to deal with a number of situations that might arise where mergers of bargaining units are involved.

Ms. Bonnie Brown: The touring group may not have heard very much about it, but I can assure you, individual members of Parliament are besieged on this particular issue. I don't think there's anything wrong with talking about a case, because it is the case that is causing the most political activity for us.

Mr. Michael McDermott: No, I mean the details of the case. It's hard for me.... I mean, I don't know what's been going on before the board. We haven't been attending board sessions or that type of thing, and I wouldn't want to say something that might suddenly be put before the board as something that might prejudice what they're doing.

Ms. Bonnie Brown: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you, Ms. Brown.

Ms. Meredith.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

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Following up on the conversation on this proposed paragraph (d), would the jurisdiction or the powers that the board is being given supersede any binding arbitration or any decisions that had already been made on cases? If somebody didn't like the decision that was rendered, could they then make application to have it reviewed by the board? Does this prevent that from happening?

Mr. Michael McDermott: Do you mean where there had been an arbitration?

Ms. Val Meredith: I mean where an arbitration decision has been rendered and one of the parties doesn't like it, so they make an application to the board to re-open it, to reconsider it.

Mr. Michael McDermott: If it's an arbitration dealing with an interpretation of an existing collective agreement, the arbitrator's decision is final and is only reviewable on the grounds of natural justice and those kinds of things. And it would be reviewed by the courts. The labour board as such does not review arbitrators' decisions.

If the board were to render a decision under this new provision, the board itself...the board's decisions are reviewable by the Federal Court on the grounds of jurisdiction and natural justice, but the board also has an internal review system, where a panel hears a case and renders a decision. If there's dissatisfaction with it, there can be an application for review, which would then go to either what I think the board calls plenary panels of vice-chairs or full plenary sessions of the board.

Ms. Val Meredith: So where there is an arbitration decision rendered, the recourse for that is to take it before the courts if a party disagrees with it. This board would not be interfering with that process at all.

Mr. Michael McDermott: They wouldn't be interfering with it, and I will just emphasize that the arbitrator's decision is final as to the facts and the law of the case. But what can go to the courts is a judicial review to say that the arbitrator exceeded jurisdiction or did not observe natural justice.

Ms. Val Meredith: Where one of the parties refuses to accept the arbitrator's decision, that would have to go before the courts, would it not?

Mr. Michael McDermott: It would be filed, I think. It would be enforceable through the courts, but the substance of the decision would not be—

Ms. Val Meredith: Addressed at the court level, nor at the board level.

Mr. Michael McDermott: No.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Johnston.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to have unanimous consent to have my vote recorded with the yeas on the last vote since I just missed it by the skin of my teeth, so to speak.

The Chairman: Is there unanimous consent for recording Mr. Johnston's vote?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chairman: I see unanimity.

Mr. Dale Johnston: Thank you, and thank you to the committee.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask...although this section deals with the amalgamation of two unions, we could assume that the two unions in question would have different employers. They could be in similar industries but have different employers. Does the board have the discretionary power to name a common employer? If so, how is that going to work? Under what circumstances would the board actually come to a decision like that?

Mr. Michael McDermott: I tried to explain that this provision brings together three existing areas of the code. One is the standard bargaining unit review, where a single employer has several bargaining units and a review is undertaken as to whether they should be the same number and whether the bargaining units should be restructured. It also deals with sales, where you perhaps have two or even three employers but there's been merger activity going on and there's now a single employer who has the whole works, as it were, and there's a need to restructure the bargaining units there and take account of the differences in the existing agreements.

The third one, which is the one you're referring to, Mr. Johnston, is the common employer one, which is currently in the code as well. The board has the opportunity to listen to applications saying that in fact three or four employers or two or more employers are one and the same, that there is a corporate relationship that in effect creates one employer. It may be structured in such a way that you have a major employer and some subsidiaries, or it may be that you have three employers all at the same level, but the board would look at the issues of corporate control in these kinds of things and determine whether this is really one employer and one group of employees, and if so, they would restructure the bargaining units that way.

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The Chairman: Do you have any questions?

Mr. Dale Johnston: Yes. I guess this is really hypothetical. At what point does the board become involved? What would trigger an action like this? I share Mr. Nault's concern that this seems to be interfering in the negotiating process and seems to be something that should be hammered out by the employees and the employer.

At what point do they say, “Okay, we can't come to any agreement and we're going to turn it over to the board”? What triggers that? Can the employees themselves do that? Is it something that has to be agreed on by the employer and the employees? In this case, you will have at least three parties. You will have an employer and at least two unions. Does it mean you will need to have agreement by all three of these parties to turn this over to the board to render a decision? What mechanism triggers this?

Mr. Michael McDermott: There would be an application to the board in the first instance by one of the parties, and then the board would be required to allow the parties concerned an opportunity to reach agreements themselves. But the board would retain jurisdiction. The board would decide how long and how far the parties have proceeded with finding a solution. If they don't find a solution, the board would have the reserve discretion to get involved. But it's based on initial application and an opportunity to negotiate. Then the board would say, “Fine, if you didn't negotiate something satisfactory, we can intervene”.

Mr. Dale Johnston: So the board would say, “These are the time lines in which we expect you to come to some kind of a mutual agreement, and if you don't we're going to arrive at one for you”. Is that correct?

Mr. Michael McDermott: It could say that, or it could exercise any of the functions that are listed in proposed paragraphs 18.1(4)(a) through (f). That's in clause 7. It could exercise any of these things, depending on what's appropriate.

For example, in the Canada Post case that went before the existing board, it was initially an application by Canada Post, which at some point the corporation wanted to drop. One of the unions decided it was going to continue, and that's what happened there. So it's not always just one party that wants to keep something going. .Sometimes one party will start it and another party will want to continue it.

The Chairman: Thank you.

We have now reached the magic hour. The committee is adjourned to the call of the chair.