TRGO Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

LE COMITÉ PERMANENT DES TRANSPORTS ET DES OPÉRATIONS GOUVERNEMENTALES

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, November 29, 2001

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[English]

The Chair (Mr. Ovid Jackson (Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, Lib.)): Good morning, colleagues. I'd like to call the meeting to order.

We're here, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), to review the safety and security of our Canadian airports.

We have Diane Brunet, William Elliott, and Jean LeCours. Welcome, ladies and gentlemen, from Transport Canada. You know the routine so you can start and proceed in whatever way you want to go.

Mr. William J.S. Elliott (Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security Group, Transport Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To make sure that you and your colleagues are aware of who we are and what we do, I'm William Elliott, I'm the assistant deputy minister for safety and security at Transport Canada. My colleague Jean LeCours is the director of preventive security, and Diane Brunet is the chief of security screening.

We're very happy to have this opportunity this morning to speak to you about the airport restricted area clearance program. We have a presentation that we'll go through and then we will be pleased to answer any questions.

I'd like to ask my colleague, Monsieur LeCours,

[Translation]

to begin our presentation.

Mr. Jean LeCours (Director, Preventive Security, Transports Canada): Thank you, Mr. Elliott.

Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the Air India affair in the 1980s, the government of the day asked the Transport Minister to introduce the screening of people circulated in the restricted areas of airports. The resulting program was called the Airport Restricted Area Access Clearance Program. This program aims to prevent people who could represent a threat to civil aviation from gaining access to restricted areas of an airport.

The program's objective is to ensure protection against terrorists, members of terrorist organizations, close associates of terrorists or of members of terrorist organizations, people who are prone to commit or prone to aid and abet terrorist acts, and people who are prone to blackmail or subornation. Lastly, applicants requesting permission to circulate in restricted areas must be at least 16 years of age, have Canadian, American or British citizenship, or be landed immigrants.

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All passengers must be searched and screened before entering restricted areas. Everyone else who wishes to circulate in a restricted area must obtain a pass. The law requires that, before issuing a pass, the airport operator must refer the application to the Minister of Transport for security clearance.

There are two types of passes. The first is the temporary pass. The holder of a temporary pass must be searched and escorted. We also issue temporary passes to the holders of permanent passes who do not have their pass with them—if they have left it at home, for example. In these cases, a one-day pass is issued.

The second type of pass is the permanent pass. As I said earlier, clearance must be obtained from the Transport Minister before a permanent pass can be issued.

In this process, it is the airport operator that decides who can obtain permanent access. The Minister of Transport must grant clearance as a precondition, and the airport operator issues the pass after the minister's clearance is obtained.

Both the clearance and the pass are valid for a maximum of five years and can be renewed after this five-year period. They can be revoked at any time on reasonable grounds.

I would like to give you an idea of the volume of applications that we process. In 1997, we processed over 24,000 applications and, this year, we estimate that we will process 42,000.

[English]

Mr. William Elliott: There are a number of checks involved in the clearance program. First of all, the employer of an individual is to identify data, including education and employment history. An application is then received by Transport Canada. We, working with other agencies, notably the RCMP and CSIS, do checks for criminal records. CSIS does national security indices and there's also a credit history verification. CSIS then will conduct a field inquiry where they believe a further investigation is warranted.

In addition to the initial granting of a clearance, a clearance may be suspended for cause. A decision not to grant a clearance, or to suspend or revoke, is subject to confirmation by a review board. I'll speak to the membership of the review board in a moment.

With respect to denials then, the matter would be reviewed by the review board. The minister would receive a recommendation, and it's the minister who has the authority to grant or deny a clearance. As my colleague has indicated, the granting of a clearance is a precondition to allow an airport operator to grant a permanent restricted-area pass.

The review board is chaired by the director general, security and emergency preparedness. The incumbent of that position, Hal Whiteman, has been before this committee recently with the minister. The vice-chair is the director of preventive security, currently Mr. LeCours, who is with us this morning. The secretary is chief of security screening, and that is my colleague Diane Brunet, who is also with us this morning. We have a representative of the Department of Justice, a legal counsel who provides advice and input; a senior security official who represents an airport authority or an air carrier; and the director of security for Transport Canada.

With respect to the basis on which a denial or a revocation decision would be made, it's basically based on an assessment of the individual's presence in a restricted area—it is counter to, or inconsistent with, the aims and objectives of the program, as referred to by my colleague.

Some of the grounds for revocation or denial are that the individual has been convicted of an indictable offence or for trafficking in drugs, weapons, or people; a breach of the Official Secrets Act; an assessment that he's likely to be suborned or coerced; that he or she has used threats or has been found to have committed a serious violent act; that he or she is affiliated with groups or individuals—as, again, Monsieur LeCours talked about—such as terrorists and terrorist organizations, for example; and that he or she has a bad credit history. This is particularly important with respect to a job that gives rise to the person requiring a clearance and a restricted pass. If that person has a bad credit history and it's proposed that they take up a position of trust, this would be a grounds for revocation or denial.

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Decisions to revoke or deny by the minister would be subject to review. Where that review would be conducted depends in part on the basis for the denial or revocation. If the denial or revocation is based on information provided for CSIS with respect to national security, then the review would be conducted by the Security Intelligence Review Committee. Otherwise, for other grounds the matter would be reviewable by the Federal Court of Canada.

I'd like to speak briefly about recent improvements that we either have made or are in the process of making with respect to our airport restricted area access clearance program.

We are in the process of a program called TCAFIS or the Transport Canada automated fingerprint identification system. This will allow the fingerprints of those applying for clearances to be provided to Transport Canada electronically and then for us to provide them to our sister agencies, and for the immediate searching for fingerprints, for example, in relation to criminal records. This will significantly speed up the processing of applications.

Another recent development about which we're very pleased is that within the last few days confirmation has been received that we will have access to the Canadian Police Information Centre and their system. We are one of the first non-police authorities to get that access. Again, this will facilitate our efficient processing of applications for clearances and specifically searches for criminal records and warrants.

The second to last slide in our presentation refers to the Identification of Criminals Act. Canada has a long-standing system approved by legislation for the fingerprinting of individuals arrested for indictable offences, for example. The act provides for the mandatory submitting of fingerprints and the ability of agencies to use those fingerprints and other information with respect to security checks.

Finally, I wanted to touch briefly on some comparisons between the system we have in Canada and the current situation in the United States of America. As Mr. LeCours indicated, our program really dates back some years following the tragic Air India incident. We have quite a well-developed and robust system. Our system was instituted in 1985; the Americans have only recently indicated that they will be moving to a system similar to ours.

I've talked a little bit about the check we conduct for criminal records. You will be aware that the Americans are doing that as well, although I think it's safe to say that they did not have and have not had as comprehensive a system as what we have in place in Canada. They do not currently conduct the kinds of checks and verifications we do with respect to credit history.

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I talked about our national security check, which is actually conducted by CSIS. The Americans are moving to something resembling that. I think what they do now is compare the names and identities of individuals against the watch list produced by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In Canada, the decision.... This indicates Transport Canada, but as I've explained, it's really a two-tiered decision with respect to the granting of passes. Actually, I guess it's a three-tiered system. The employer of an individual who requires access to restricted areas at airports decides that the person requires such access. Based on the information I touched on this morning, the minister makes a decision as to whether or not a clearance should be granted. If a clearance is granted, then the airport authority actually issues the pass. In the United States, I understand that in fact it is the employer of an individual who decides whether or not a pass will be granted.

In Canada, as we've talked about, clearances are valid for five years unless they are revoked. To my knowledge, there is not a specific period of validity specified in the United States.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our presentation. As I indicated, we will be happy to try to answer your questions.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Elliott.

We'll start with Monsieur Lebel of the Bloc Québécois.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel (Chambly, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your presentation. I am struck by the difference between the way things work in the United States and in Canada regarding credit bureau checks: these are done here, but not in the US. In other words, do you have to be rich to get a pass? Is there something wrong with being poor? Does being in debt or having a mortgage mean that a person is not entitled to a pass, do you understand my concern?

Either of you may answer the question.

[English]

Mr. William Elliott: Thank you very much. It's difficult to answer the question generally because it's fair to say that the situations are different.

It's not necessarily fair or reasonable for anyone to conclude that because an individual may have had some financial difficulty, they necessarily pose a risk to security. On the other hand, certainly if there is a long history of people not acting responsibly with respect to credit, I think that can be a concern. But overall, what we attempt to do and what the program is designed to do is to bring to bear a variety of pieces of information so that a reasoned assessment can be made, based on all the available information, as to whether or not someone is prone to commit an offence or likely to be a threat to aviation security.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: In light of the events of September 11, do you think that there are enough staff checking and inspection? If there are not enough, could you make suggestions and recommendations in this area?

[English]

Mr. William Elliott: I would answer this question by explaining a little bit about what the current situation is with respect to the verification of passes at airports. I've talked a little bit about the computerization of the system to allow us to process clearances more quickly. Passes are issued by airport authorities. Once they are issued, it is the airport authority's responsibility to maintain control over restricted areas.

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Since September 11, we have mandated a number of enhancements to airport security. One of those is to reduce the number of access points at airports to the minimum required and to require that a security person be present at access points to verify that people coming into the restricted area in fact have a restricted area pass and that they are the individual to whom the pass was issued.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: I do not think that you understood my question. You are responsible for issuing restricted area passes. The transport department makes decisions on that, investigations, and so on.

Mr. Jean LeCours: Perhaps I can clarify—

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Go ahead.

Mr. Jean LeCours: The passes themselves are issued by the airport, not by Transport Canada. It is Transport Canada that has the authority to issue a pass, but not the document itself.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: My question is as follows. If you issue passes and are in charge of security, you must ask the various airports if, given the current circumstances, they have enough personnel to provide adequate security. Is that the case? Do you ask that?

Mr. Jean LeCours: We impose standards on airports and they must comply with them. We assume that they have the resources to do so. We also have inspectors who make sure that these standards are complied with.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Have the airports complained that they do not have enough personnel or that they have had to hire more, because of the constraints that we are currently facing?

Mr. Jean LeCours: I think that there was a problem in September, but that now it has been more or less resolved.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: That answers my question. Thank you. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

[English]

Mr. Comuzzi.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi (Thunder Bay—Superior North, Lib.): I just have a correction. You said that fingerprinting was for those arrested on indictable offences. Does that go into your system immediately if and when there's a conviction, or is it activated on the conviction of the indictable offence?

Mr. William Elliott: I actually have a copy of the act here. The act does authorize the fingerprinting of people arrested for indictable offences. So fingerprints for individuals arrested but not yet convicted would in fact be processed and put into the system. There would be some time involved with respect to that.

My understanding is that if a person is subsequently acquitted or not convicted, there is not an automatic removal of the fingerprints from the system, although there is the possibility under the act for someone to apply to have their fingerprints removed.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: That's not well known.

Mr. William Elliott: I think that's a fair comment.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Okay.

Just so I have it straight, in this document you've given us today, we're talking about people who have access air-side to every aspect of the aircraft. Am I correct?

Mr. William Elliott: We're talking about people who are granted access to restricted areas of airports. It certainly is open to airports and to carriers to put additional measures in place to restrict access to aircraft, for example. But our clearance program really deals with the question of access to restricted areas in general terms.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: But does that not include access to the aircraft?

Mr. William Elliott: Not necessarily.

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Mr. Joe Comuzzi: So what you're saying is that we have restricted areas and you have to go through a comprehensive program to become entitled to go into the restricted area, but there may still be people in the restricted areas who don't have to go through that process.

Mr. William Elliott: No, that's not what I'm saying.

Let's pick WestJet for an example. WestJet's employees who are required to work in restricted areas of airports, which might include airplane mechanics, would require a restricted area pass. In order to get that, they would have to apply to the minister for a clearance. But WestJet may well put in place further measures to ensure that people who work at Dunkin' Donuts who have restricted area passes do not have access to airplanes, because there's no requirement for them to do so.

That distinction is really not one that's dealt with in the clearance process. We treat applications for anyone who requires access to restricted areas of airports in the same manner. It's then up to the airport to actually issue passes. Others in the airport, including the airport authority and carriers, implement any further measures that might be appropriate with respect to access.

There are some mandatory requirements with respect to access to aircraft and identification as well.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: So we really have a two-tiered system.

Let me give you an example; maybe that will clarify it. I work for a caterer and I'm bringing food to the airplane. I'm coming in contact and putting something on that aircraft. Do I have to go through any security in order to bring food to that airplane?

Mr. Jean LeCours: The program provides for a security clearance to be imposed on the person who performs the final inspection on any food or comestibles being brought onto the aircraft.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: I clean an aircraft. Do I have to have security?

Mr. Jean LeCours: Yes.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Who provides that security? Do they have to have this pass that you're talking about, or is it an airline function?

Mr. Jean LeCours: They have to have the clearance and then a permanent pass in order to circulate freely. If they do not have a clearance, then they can receive a temporary pass, as I indicated earlier, provided they are searched and escorted during their presence there.

Mr. William Elliott: But just because you have a restricted area pass does not necessarily mean you will be granted access to an aircraft. The carriers also have systems in place, some of them mandatory and some of them imposed by the carriers themselves, to issue company identification to people and to check the identification of people who have access to aircraft.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: So there are two tiers. There are those who are allowed by the industry to have access to what I call air-side facilities, and there are those who are granted.... This is a question; this isn't a statement of fact. Is it basically a two-tiered system? There are those who are granted airline permission and then there are those who are granted Transport Canada permission. Yes or no?

Mr. William Elliott: In part, Mr. Chairman, I would agree to that, except that an airline can't grant access to aircraft in restricted areas to anyone who does not already have a restricted area pass from the airport authority. A precondition for that is a clearance from the minister.

There may be other restrictions as well. Just to give an example, I raised the issue of a concessionaire. There may well be parts of a concessionaire's operations that are not open to the public and that are not open to all holders of restricted area passes.

So people who operate in the restricted area can and do put in their own systems with respect to restricting access to appropriate people. Just because you have a restricted area pass does not automatically mean you can go anywhere or do anything in the restricted area.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Who controls that?

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Mr. William Elliott: In part it's mandated by Transport Canada pursuant to our security measures, and in large part it's up to the individual carriers, airport authorities, and others who have business in restricted areas.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: I think I'm out of time, Mr. Chair, but I'm still not clear on that. I'm still not clear who has access to an aircraft and what kind of security they need in order to have access to the aircraft.

The Chair: We have Mr. Turpen coming. He might be able to tell you a little more about that, except that Toronto might be different from Vancouver; we'll see. I know where you're trying to go with that, Joe.

We'll go to Val.

Ms. Val Meredith (South Surrey—White Rock—Langley, PC/DR): I'm clear. My understanding is the person who is working behind the secure zone at Dunkin' Donuts still has to have a security pass. Air Canada or WestJet are not going to allow that guy who works at Dunkin' Donuts to have any access to the airplane, but he still has to get the clearance to get to Dunkin' Donuts behind the secure line.

I'm concerned about the guy from Dunkin' Donuts who gets a security pass that's good for five years and then quits, because he doesn't like working at Dunkin' Donuts, six months later. What happens to his pass?

Mr. Jean LeCours: According to the program, the actual law requires that the pass be retrieved. The duty is imposed on the airport operator to retrieve that pass.

Ms. Val Meredith: I think when we were in Toronto the number of these passes that are not retrieved was brought up. Do you, in Transport Canada, keep a record or have files on the passes that have not been retrieved and are not able to be retrieved, so that you know whose name and identity is attached to a pass that somebody else may be using?

Mr. Jean LeCours: Transport Canada does not keep an inventory of those passes, but the aerodrome operator is obliged to do so. Let me read to you from the airport measures: “Where an aerodrome operator is unable to retrieve the person's...area pass in accordance with subsection (10)”—which is the obligation to retrieve the pass—“the aerodrome operator shall take such steps as necessary to prohibit further access to restricted areas by that person”.

The way that's done in practical terms is they have a list of all passes that are unaccounted for, and they check against that list for people coming through into the restricted area.

Ms. Val Meredith: Is Transport Canada satisfied with the level of actual pass—the blue card you're wearing? Is it satisfied with the tamper-proof element of these cards that the airport authorities or aerodromes are passing out?

Mr. William Elliott: I would say the short answer to that is no, but I'd like to qualify it. We are certainly interested in working with other departments and agencies and with industry to take advantage of new and evolving technology to enhance the integrity of passes, and we are actively engaged in that effort.

Ms. Val Meredith: You're actively engaged in trying to convince airlines or airports to get into the higher high-tech cards. Or are you going to legislate it or regulate it, and do you have the money to do that? Is there money in the budget to allow the department to do it?

Mr. William Elliott: The minister recently announced that funding had been provided to us in order for us to do some testing of technology in relation to airport security. Decisions with respect to mandating the use of specific technology have not yet been made.

Ms. Val Meredith: Can I assume that's some of the regulatory stuff that probably will come through Bill C-42?

Mr. William Elliott: Certainly under the Aeronautics Act the minister has the authority to bring forward regulations that could require that, yes.

Ms. Val Meredith: Do you mean now, without the legislation that's just been introduced? Does the minister right now have the regulatory authority to do that?

Mr. William Elliott: I believe the answer to that question is yes, although I must say if I had anticipated we were going to speak about the authorities under the act and the bill, I would have brought some of my colleagues who are more knowledgeable about the current and proposed authorities than I.

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Ms. Val Meredith: Fair enough.

You said these passes are valid for five years. Does that just mean the individual doesn't go through the clearance process except every five years; that once that process is done a person has five years before the process is repeated?

Mr. Jean LeCours: That is so, unless there's a reason for us to conduct a check for cause. Often, when a person is arrested and charged within that five-year period, we are notified of that fact and suspend the clearance, which then creates a duty on the airport operator to retrieve the pass at that time.

Ms. Val Meredith: You know, the thing that came up when we were down in the States that raises concern is if somebody is absent from work for a period of time. That would be one thing that would kick in a concern, because they don't have a five-year review. Once you get the pass, that's pretty much it. The only thing that kicks in a concern is if the person is “absent from” for a period of time.

What is our response if somebody, say, takes a three-month leave of absence, or whatever? Does that trigger a concern? I think they call it an interruption of their employment.

Mr. Jean LeCours: Yes, a gap in the employment history.

Ms. Val Meredith: A gap, yes.

Mr. Jean LeCours: One of the reasons why we review, for example, the credit bureau history that was talked about earlier is that it provides us with an opportunity to corroborate the residential history and the employment history in the application form with that same information from the credit bureau. A credit bureau report would also provide previous addresses, previous employers, current employer, and so on. We're able to corroborate or to match the two and come to a decision that, yes, this person can be accounted for over the last five years; that he didn't show up from some country just last month.

Ms. Val Meredith: So it's in reference to an employment history, as opposed to a case where somebody works for WestJet, then takes a leave of absence or extended sick leave or something that may take the person out of operation for a period of three or six months. What happens to his pass or her pass?

Mr. William Elliott: Again, we have a system where the minister issues clearances, and it is airport authorities working with employers that issue passes based on that clearance. So in the situation you're describing, unless an employer or an airport authority brought it to our attention, we wouldn't deal with that issue. But the employer and/or the airport authority may very well.

Ms. Val Meredith: So really, yours is a paper trail. The name is given to you, you do the clearances, and then the word either goes back, “This is an okay employee”, or “Don't hire them.” I shouldn't say “Don't hire them”; “Don't give them the clearance.” In essence, is that what is received from the airport authority, or the aerodrome or whoever is asking for this? It's just a decision that's been made by Transport Canada that this person meets the requirements for a security clearance.

Mr. William Elliott: That's correct.

Ms. Val Meredith: Beyond that, Transport Canada has no involvement?

Okay. Thank you.

The Chair: You're finished?

Just to refresh your memory, when we were down in Washington, the one gentleman who was taking us around had the pass on, but he said on his anniversary date he had to give in that one and get another one. That's one way. That may be a suggestion how—

Ms. Val Meredith: But he also said it's an automatic thing; that on his anniversary date he gets a new pass, and there is no security clearance done again. He had been there, I believe, 33 years or something, and in that period of time they did the initial security clearance 33 years ago and that was it.

A lot can happen in 33 years. Although they renewed it every anniversary, there was not any security check done on it.

The Chair: Mr. Szabo.

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Mr. Paul Szabo (Mississauga South, Lib.): There were reports of audit performance of security screening that indicated, as I recall, something as much as a 20% incidence, in some cases. How does that stack up to a confidence level or targets that Transport Canada sets?

Mr. William Elliott: I guess our target is 100% success with respect to screening. Certainly I would agree that whenever there is performance less than that, it is reason for people to question the confidence in the screening system.

Mr. Paul Szabo: How does that 20% compare to recent history, in terms of performance?

Mr. William Elliott: I'm not in a position to answer that question. I don't know the answer to the question.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Okay. Do you think you should know? I do.

I'm sorry, it's just that you're the assistant deputy minister of the safety and security group. I thought Transport Canada was responsible for setting the guidelines and the standards and for the quality assurance—for the testing—to see whether it's 20% or 10% or 5%; if it isn't, we have to modify or do something to take corrective action. If you get 20%, the first thing I'd want to know is, how does that compare to recent history? Is it getting better? Worse? What does it tell me? I'm confused, obviously.

Mr. William Elliott: Well, again, I guess I would say I did not come this morning prepared to speak to information related to security screening, because my understanding was we were going to talk about the clearance program.

With respect to Transport Canada's responsibility, yes, we are responsible for the setting of standards and oversight of screening, and, yes, we monitor screening at airports across the country on an ongoing basis. But your question, as I took it, was asking a very precise question, and I would say the performance of screening varies from time to time and from place to place. Certainly we are actively working to make improvements to screening. I don't have the most recent information with respect to the results of infiltration testing or inspections across the country. I am not saying it's not an area that I have no knowledge of, nor that I'm uninterested in it. It is a keen interest of mine and a major preoccupation for me and all of the security staff of Transport Canada.

Mr. Paul Szabo: A major preoccupation?

I raised that measurement or statistic so I could lead to the issue you rightly stated you were here for or came prepared to talk about. We know some performance measures on the screening side. What performance measures do you have on the employee security side, for example, concerning violations? How many people have been charged with criminal offences or other indictable offences for theft, for smuggling, for all kinds of other things? What is our performance measure?

Mr. Jean LeCours: Anyone who applies for an access clearance who has a significant criminal record will be denied that clearance and will not be allowed to—

Mr. Paul Szabo: I'm sorry, you missed my question. You're responsible for issuing these things. We have to check to make sure the airports are doing their thing regarding access and all this other stuff. But then in airports we have baggage handlers who steal, baggage handlers who smuggle, who are into drugs. We read these stories in the newspapers.

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We have done clearances. The airport authority will do some. Dunkin' Donuts has people who have to have one or both. This is wonderful. Now we have a system, and we think it works. Obviously, the actual occurrence of problems will tell us whether or not our approach to security with regard to employees, etc., is adequate.

What is the actual incidence rate of problems with employees that would indicate whether or not our security processes are adequate?

Mr. William Elliott: If the measure is people with restricted area passes who are charged with indictable offences, I do not have a specific number, but I can tell you it's very few.

Mr. Paul Szabo: How many people in the past year, in 2001, have been arrested and charged out of airports for smuggling, stealing, baggage theft—the things we're concerned about?

Mr. William Elliott: I'm advised there are approximately 50 suspensions currently that arose as a result of people being charged with indictable offences.

Ms. Val Meredith: And that's out of the number—

Mr. William Elliott: No. The number would be much larger than that. The statistics that were in our presentation were the number of—

Mr. Paul Szabo: Let's assume it's 50. If 50 people are able to get through the system in terms of risk profiling, etc., would it be an acceptable standard if our safety and security system, say in screening, could allow in one year 50 terrorists to get through who shouldn't get through?

If 50 people who have access to sterile and secure areas can be a problem, is that insignificant, of no concern to you? And if you transpose that percentage or that failure rate to identify problems to the rest of the security system, is it okay?

Mr. William Elliott: I certainly would say it isn't okay, but the only tool we have available to reach a decision as to whether or not someone should be granted a security clearance is their history.

The unfortunate reality is that if someone who is a bad person does not have a history demonstrating that they are a bad person, there is no way, under our clearance program, we can make that determination.

If there are ways other than the checks I have described today for us to make accurate assessment with respect to whether someone is a bad person, I am certainly interested in making improvements to our system. But I am not aware of any other reasonable basis on which we can make determinations about whether or not people should be granted access, and in effect, therefore, whether or not they can work at an airport, in the absence of any concrete evidence indicating there's a problem.

But certainly, am I concerned about the fact that 50 people with passes have been charged? Yes.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chair, I guess the conclusion is that we do not employ any profiling techniques whatsoever in what we do. We just look at whether they have a criminal record, yes or no. If it's no, then there's clearance.

If that's our starting point, I don't know how the hell we're going to get to a security and safety system that allows us to identify risk, to focus resources on risk areas, and fast track, or get smart cards and all this other stuff.

You can't do everything 100%. We know that. The U.S. confirmed that to us. Obviously, we have to be a little smarter. My assessment is that Transport Canada is in charge. If I had to say who's in charge of safety and security at our airports and in our airlines today, I'd say Transport Canada is, because they set the rules. They monitor or check the quality control and assurance.

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So if our system today is identified as being unacceptable in terms of achieving appropriate standards of safety and security, and therefore has a failing grade, by extension it means Transport Canada has failed to do its job.

The Chair: I'll move on to Mr. Shepherd.

Mr. William Elliott: If I may, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to clarify one thing.

The Chair: A quick response.

Mr. William Elliott: I'd like to restate that our clearance program is not based simply on a criminal records check. As we have identified, there is personal data on the individual, education history, employment history, criminal records checks, national security indices, and a criminal bureau check.

I would also add that although I'm concerned about the fact that individuals with restricted area passes have been charged with offences, I am not aware of anyone with a restricted area pass significantly interfering with civil aviation in Canada.

The Chair: Mr. Shepherd.

Mr. Alex Shepherd (Durham, Lib.): You were stating that because of the information flow, once a person is issued a pass, it's dependent to some extent on the carriers to inform you when that person no longer works there. Is that correct?

Mr. William Elliott: No. I think what I stated was whether or not someone requires a pass is initially decided by the employer. Then they have the person fill out an application, and that's provided to the minister. It's on the basis of that application that we do our work with respect to clearances.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: But if Air Canada fired him for some reason or other, they presumably are supposed to inform you that the person is no longer in their employ and therefore is no longer eligible to carry a pass.

Mr. William Elliott: Well, that's not quite the case, because again there's a distinction between clearances on the one hand, which Transport Canada issues, and passes on the other, which are issued by the airport authority.

There is an obligation, which Monsieur LeCours referred to, that when a person, as in your example, leaves their job and no longer requires a pass, it's mandatory that that pass be retrieved from that individual.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Okay.

So from your perspective, it's clearances. We're talking about clearances that you're responsible for, correct?

Mr. William Elliott: Yes.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Okay.

I guess the question I want to ask is whether Air Canada says on a regular basis, say a monthly basis, these are the people they've issued passes to who are no longer in their employ, and they've requested them to return their passes.

Mr. Jean LeCours: It doesn't matter if it's Air Canada or United Cigar Stores. When a person leaves the airport environment, Transport Canada does receive notification by the airport operator that the pass is no longer required. At that time we tag the clearance file for destruction in accordance with the airport authority.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: I still don't understand what triggers this. Is it the airport authority that is saying the person no longer requires a pass?

Mr. Jean LeCours: It begins with the employer. Once the employee leaves the company, for whatever reason, as part of the clearance process—

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Let's just use an example. He works for Air Canada. He has a pass. He first of all had to go through the process of getting clearance from you people, then got a pass from Air Canada to work on the aircraft, or whatever the case may be.

He's terminated, for whatever reason. Air Canada presumably asks him for his pass back. What triggers the cancellation of his clearance pass?

Mr. William Elliott: Again, there's a distinction between passes and clearances.

In your example, the individual would have a restricted area pass issued by the airport authority, and he would have Air Canada identification issued by Air Canada. Air Canada would be obligated to tell the airport authority that the employee is no longer an employee. The airport authority would be obligated to retrieve the pass.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: But as far as that clearance or whatever you issued originally is concerned, it's irrelevant. Your records would still indicate the person is eligible for a clearance certificate of some kind.

Mr. William Elliott: We would be informed the person's pass had been cancelled, so we would have on our file an indication that the person no longer had a valid pass. But unless there was a basis on which we would revoke his clearance, we wouldn't revoke his clearance.

• 1100

Mr. Alex Shepherd: You're saying that people who have eligible clearance and presumably passes are cross-checked with criminal proceedings from time to time. In other words, you receive something from the police authority saying a certain person's been charged.

How does that happen in reality? He's convicted of an indictable offence. What triggers the relationship between the police authorities and you to say you know this guy has a pass? Do the police authorities, or whoever, have to note he has a pass before they can actually inform you that this indictable offence has been committed?

Mr. Jean LeCours: Every case is different. There are cases where an individual is arrested, and as part of the arrest procedure he's searched and found to be in possession of an airport pass. That's reported to the police force of jurisdiction at the airport. There are times when the crime has such a high profile that it's in the media, in which case the airport authorities find out about it. There are times when the individual's in custody, does not show up for work, and the employer finds out about it. There are various ways in which this comes up.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: There's no holistic system where somebody who is charged with an indictable offence is asked whether they are in receipt of a clearance from Transport Canada. So the reality is that the information you get is pretty much on some kind of an exceptional basis. Is that fair to say?

I'm saying that the information coming from police authorities and so forth is just coincidental. In other words, there's no holistic process where you're informed that somebody has been charged with an indictable offence and you revoke.

Mr. Jean LeCours: We don't do a daily monitoring of everyone in the system. I can add that under the TCAFIS program Mr. Elliott talked about, we will have the ability to go in on a person's anniversary date every year to check their fingerprints, so we will be less than a year away from being informed of any subsequent charges. That's the closest thing to what you're looking for.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Okay. It's still conceivable that somebody has been charged with an indictable offence such as stealing, theft, robbing a bank, and he's still working down at the airport. You don't know.

Mr. Jean LeCours: Yes, that's right.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: What's the rejection rate? If Air Canada or Dunkin' Donuts ask for a clearance for this person, in a normal year what percentage of those are rejected?

Mr. Jean LeCours: So far, since the 1990s, we've had over 200 denials.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: The word was “percentage”. What percentage of the population base are rejected?

Mr. Jean LeCours: We don't have a percentage per se. The quantities have increased substantially over the years. We mentioned in our presentation—

Mr. Alex Shepherd: We want to know if 99% of people get passes, or only 50%.

Mr. Jean LeCours: I would say the majority get passes. I don't know if it's 99% precisely, but it's close to that.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Is that consistent with other kinds of security organizations? Do 99% of people pass the test?

Mr. Jean LeCours: Kind of a natural selection takes place. People know they have to undergo security screening in order to work at the airport, so a lot of people who have criminal records simply don't apply for those jobs.

The Chair: Do you have a quick one, Alex? You're running out of time.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: No.

The Chair: A lot of people want to intervene, so I will go to five-minute rounds, starting with Monsieur Lebel.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Mr. LeCours, you said earlier that there are currently 50 cases where passes had been revoked. I have the impression that things are getting a bit out of hand here. I want to fully understand you. The 50 cases are not cases of terrorists that have been caught with bombs hidden in their coats. The revocation may be due to the fact that the person was drinking on the job or stole a suitcase from a cart, or something like that. Is that not the case?

Mr. Jean LeCours: First of all, we are not talking about revocation but a suspension.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Suspension or—

Mr. Jean LeCours: In other words, the pass is temporarily revoked until the case is resolved.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: So 50 out of approximately 42,000 passes issued this year have been revoked.

Mr. Jean LeCours: That is correct.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: So these 50 people are not necessarily dangerous and bin Laden's friends.

• 1105

Mr. Jean LeCours: No they are not necessarily that. But that does not include any offences like, for example, drinking and driving. But we are talking about rather serious matters.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Am I getting this wrong then? Are these cases of potential terrorism or improper behaviour?

Mr. Jean LeCours: Normally, we are not talking about improper behaviour. What I mean is that yes, the behaviour is improper. It may perhaps be a case of theft, break and entry, very often it is a case involving narcotics, or drug trafficking.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Okay, but this does not necessarily jeopardize passenger safety. I fully understand that a guy who steals or takes drugs through the Mirabel Airport, for example, is no more dangerous than the guy who does the same thing in downtown Montreal. We must agree on that.

You have been asked to come here this morning to deal with the security of passengers in airports. To do yourself justice, you have told us that there are some airports that are managed by organizations like ADM, for example. I assume that there are other airports in Canada, smaller airports nevertheless, that are not managed by organizations like ADM, but that are still under federal control. Am I mistaken?

Mr. Jean LeCours: That may be the case.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: So, we have to make a distinction between security provided by Transport Canada and security provided by organizations created to manage airports, like ADM and the local airport authorities in Toronto and Vancouver. Is that correct?

Mr. Jean LeCours: Yes, that is correct. Twenty-nine airports in Canada are managed by the ARAACP, or the Airport Restricted Area Access Clearance Program.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Yes, but they are both airports managed by independent organizations and airports managed by Transport Canada.

Mr. Jean LeCours: No. The 29 airports participating in the program are managed by private bodies, not by Transport Canada.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Are there any airports remaining in Canada that are managed by Transport Canada?

Mr. Jean LeCours: Yes, there are some, but only a very small number and they are not major airports.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: So, if the airports managed by the private sector are responsible for their own security, you give them authorization to issue the pass and they issue it.

Mr. Jean LeCours: That is right.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: It is like what happens here. If we lay off our office staff, it is the House of Commons that withdraws their pass. At least, I believe that is how it works. And I assume that, at the airports, if a person does not work for Air Canada, that person's pass will be withdrawn.

Mr. Jean LeCours: That is right.

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: Therefore, the people who would really be able to tell us whether security is truly working well at our airports are, in fact, the managers of the major airports. It is not you. They are the ones who would be able to tell us, for example, whether they have issued enough passes for a specific corridor, whether there is always an employee on duty at the entry of this corridor. That is what is important. I am not surprised that you do not agree with me, Mr. Szabo.

[English]

Mr. Paul Szabo: Airlines have screening.

[Translation]

Mr. Ghislain Lebel: What I mean, is that it is not Transport Canada that is responsible for issuing passes, for conducting investigations, for saying that Mr. John Smith is an upright citizen for whom a pass can be issued. However, once this recommendation is made and the airport manager, or the manager of the building, decides that, for example, only one man instead of four will be posted at a certain gate in order to save money, that is where security can be found lacking, in my view. Therefore, I think that we will eventually need to invite those people to appear before the committee, so that we can ask them whether they believe they are adequately meeting the security requirements at their airports.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Turpen is coming right after, so you can speak to him about it.

[Translation]

Mr. William Elliott: Mr. Chairman, I would like to clarify something. The situation is not exactly as the member described it.

[English]

It is true that the airport authorities have a very significant role to play with respect to airport security. But we don't just issue a clearance and then wash our hands of the matter. We have security inspectors on site at all major airports in Canada.

• 1110

We set standards and we verify that those standards are met, for example, with respect to the verification of passes, as people enter into the restricted area.

Certainly a number of issues and questions can helpfully be answered by witnesses who come before you from airport authorities. But I want to make it clear that Transport Canada has an ongoing rule with respect to the oversight of security at airports.

The Chair: Mr. Comuzzi.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: In the restricted area, does this include all of the air-side facilities?

Mr. William Elliott: Yes.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Let's go through this one more time. Sorry, I'm a slow learner.

You are responsible for clearance. Anyone who goes into the restricted area or the air-side facility must have whatever document you issue for clearance, eventually, from Transport Canada.

Mr. William Elliott: No. They must have a restricted area pass issued by the airport authority. Prior to the airport authority issuing them a pass, we must tell the airport authority that a clearance has been granted for the named individual. But the individual won't have a piece of paper saying they have clearance. The individual will have an airport restricted area pass issued by the airport authority.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Before that pass is issued, you must give a clearance.

Mr. William Elliott: Yes.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: So you have inspected everyone or given a clearance for everyone who is operating on the air side.

Mr. William Elliott: Everyone who has a restricted area pass has been inspected. It is possible for people without permanent passes to be granted temporary passes without clearance, but they must be accompanied by someone who has a permanent restricted area pass.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Can you give me an example of that?

Mr. William Elliott: Someone comes in to fix a coke machine in a restaurant at Pearson and they do not have a restricted area pass. They have not been granted clearance, but they need access to the restricted area for a couple of hours to fix a coke machine. They'll be granted a temporary pass, which requires them to be escorted.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Okay, that makes sense. Everyone else has to go through Transport Canada, in order to work on an aircraft or be exposed to it?

Mr. William Elliott: Well, there are two ways into restricted areas at airports. You can either go in through an access door with a restricted area pass or you can go through screening. So a person has either gone through screening and has been screened or they have gone through another access point, based on their restricted area pass.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: That includes caterers and anyone who comes close to an aircraft.

Mr. William Elliott: Yes.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: They have to go through Transport Canada before they're allowed clearance or a pass to get into the restricted area?

Mr. William Elliott: A permanent pass, yes.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Last question, Mr. Chairman.

Would it not be simpler, since Transport Canada is involved with the local airport authority, to have all the security issues administered by the local airport authorities? When we divested the airports, part of the undertaking was the security of those particular airports. That's a question, not a statement. I'm asking for your input.

Mr. William Elliott: With respect to the access to restricted areas, that's exactly what we do. It's up to the airport authorities, but the airport authorities are not in a position to do the kinds of security checks that agencies like CSIS and the RCMP can do. I think the approach is consistent with the one suggested. They issue the passes. They're responsible for control of their areas subject to our standards and oversight, but the Government of Canada is in a better position to make a determination about whether or not someone is a suitable candidate for a restricted area pass.

• 1115

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Thank you.

The Chair: Thanks, Joe.

I'll go to Val, and then Marcel has the last word.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I apologize for missing what Mr. Comuzzi was after, so you may have answered this.

Your clearances are good for five years. Do you go through the whole process when that clearance is up? At the end of five years, do you go on the premise that you haven't cleared this person before and you do the same clearance?

Mr. Jean LeCours: That's correct. From scratch. All over again.

Ms. Val Meredith: If somebody leaves—and let's take the example of Canada 3000 employees. They've received the clearance, and they no longer have the job that would require the passes, so they've given their passes up. Hopefully, they'll find employment within the industry again. If within a short period of time they find employment, do they go through that process as if they've never had it before? Is that five years still applicable?

Mr. Jean LeCours: Once we've received notification from the airport authority that a pass is no longer required, at that time we flag the file, the documentation that has the clearance on it, for destruction two years from that date in accordance with the records disposal schedule of the National Archives of Canada Act. So if a person shows up at another airport or with a different employer within those two years, we will not redo the clearance. But if it's past the two years, then the documentation is destroyed and the person must go through the entire process again.

Ms. Val Meredith: But let's say they find employment within that period of time. They pick up their clearance where they left off, basically, so that five-year term will still expire, and it may be six months after they start with the new employer.

Mr. Jean LeCours: That's correct.

Ms. Val Meredith: Then they'd go through the whole process again.

Mr. Jean LeCours: That's correct.

Ms. Val Meredith: What happens in the interim? At what point do you say this one's expiring and we have to do another clearance? They're still hired. Their clearance is still good until you finish the process.

Mr. Jean LeCours: Diane Brunet runs a computer system that issues notification to the airports I believe 90 days before the expiration of a clearance, telling the airport authority that this individual's clearance will expire in 90 days. Then the computer comes back in 60 days and 30 days, and I think at the 30th day, the final notice, if we haven't received anything in the meantime, is given and the airport is notified that the clearance is cancelled or expired.

Ms. Val Meredith: So you can't renew that clearance unless the airport authority or whomever, the airline, asks you to do the clearance.

Mr. Jean LeCours: They must resubmit the documentation.

Ms. Val Meredith: So Joe Blow's a pilot for Air Canada. Air Canada is responsible for letting you people know that this guy's still going to be employed and needs his review to be done. How quickly can you do these reviews? What's the average time it takes?

Mr. Jean LeCours: If there is no trace in the research we do, it can be done in about three days. If there is a trace, a criminal record, for example, right now it's a process that can take 45 to 60 days. This is why we are very much encouraged by the TCAFIS project, because that will take that 45 to 60 days down to 45 to 60 seconds.

Ms. Val Meredith: I understood from your testimony that CSIS is part of this process. How quick is their turnaround? If they have reason to be concerned, is it quick enough or is it quite a time-consuming matter?

Mr. Jean LeCours: Again, every case is different. If there is no trace in the CSIS computers, then we get an answer back overnight. If there is a trace, then CSIS first begins by confirming whether or not it is the same individual. From there on, every case is different. If it's a case of a Canadian citizen who's had some contact with, let's say, a terrorist organization but all in Canada, then CSIS has all the information. Sometimes the information is held by a third party in the Middle East, or the United States, or somewhere else, and they then have to go to that third party and get more information. So that sometimes can take a lot of time.

Ms. Val Meredith: So sometimes the 90 days may not be an adequate period of time to process the information.

Mr. Jean LeCours: Not at all for those cases.

• 1120

Ms. Val Meredith: You may not want to answer this, but if we're only using known information, how do we pick up the person who has been an exemplary citizen for deliberate reason? Is there anything in the processes that looks at something other than just this person's behaviour? There really isn't, is there?

Mr. Jean LeCours: The closest thing to it is the match we do with the credit bureau report, where we're able to document the person's presence in Canada and compare the information provided on the application with the information contained in the credit bureau. Other than that, clearance is not a guarantee of future performance. A clearance is an assessment made based on past performance.

Ms. Val Meredith: But it's made on a performance that could be controlled. In other words, if you had a phoney ID, you could create a persona around that information that may be squeaky clean, but that persona may not be the real person. Is there anything in the system that allows us to look beyond the paper trails?

Mr. Jean LeCours: We go back five years, so we have to find what the British call “positive vetting”. In other words, you have to have information upon which to make a determination. We have to find this person throughout the system for the past five years. So if you are planning to be a sleeper, you'd have to come in and be good for five years before you.... The odds of that are, again, further reduced.

Ms. Val Meredith: So something in the credit history, something in the employment history, would be inconsistent and that would cause a—

Mr. Jean LeCours: There would be a gap, and that's the gap I think you raised earlier that the Americans look for as well. But we simply look at more things to find those gaps.

The Chair: I have to go to Marcel to get that last five minutes in.

Mr. Marcel Proulx (Hull—Aylmer, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to make sure I communicate directly with Mr. Elliott, so I'll do this in English. With all the respect I have for the translators, I will do it in English anyway.

Mr. Elliott, you're ADM, safety and security group.

Mr. William Elliott: That's correct.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: What does that include? Is there anything else in the department that concerns safety, or safe operations of airports, or anything related to safety, that's not under you? Is there another division in the department, or is everything in terms of safety and prevention under you?

Mr. William Elliott: Everything in regard to safety and security that Transport Canada does is under the safety and security group. That includes civil aviation safety, security and emergency preparedness, rail safety, marine safety, motor vehicle certification, and road safety. We also have a group dealing with the transportation of dangerous goods. I have another directorate that runs Transport Canada's fleet of aircraft called aircraft services.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Is that all under you?

Mr. William Elliott: It is.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: So you're the safety expert, in other words. I'm not trapping you; I'm saying under the DM—

Mr. William Elliott: I am the assistant deputy minister responsible for safety and security for the Department of Transport, yes.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: I have a couple of pet peeves, and I'll come back to that. I want to understand and make sure when we're talking of a clearance, as you explained to my colleague for what he was calling the air side, that whether it be for a Dunkin' Donut employee or whether it be for a jet engine mechanic, it's all the same for your end of the bargain.

Mr. William Elliott: That's correct.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Don't you find that either the guy from Dunkin' Donut is being assessed much too seriously or the mechanic is not being assessed seriously enough? Surely the risk is not the same when you have a restaurant operator or employee as when you have somebody who has direct access to aircraft.

Mr. Jean LeCours: There's an economic reality to this, sir. People begin working in the airport environment for Dunkin' Donut and the next thing you know would end up working for some other company—sometimes a carrier as well. The clearance simply moves with the individual.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Therefore, the Dunkin' Donut employee goes through the wringer as seriously, as severely, as the mechanic. The standard is the same.

Mr. William Elliott: With respect to our clearance program, yes, but there are others involved with respect to access to aircraft.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: But I'm talking of Air Canada so it's the same thing.

In the process you've talked to us about credit checks. I believe in credit checks. Contrary to my other colleague, who feels you're trying to see if people are rich enough to be working, I don't look at it that way. I know it's preventative. I used to be in the investigation business before.

• 1125

Who does your credit checks? Are they done by Transport Canada or by private companies?

Mr. Jean LeCours: We have an electronic link with a company called Equifax that represents the credit bureaus of Canada. We see the information they have, and we make an evaluation based on that.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: That's my point. You're assessing only what one particular company has. You don't do a credit check, or you don't get a credit check done the same way that CSIS would do it for a security clearance, where CSIS takes over completely. It's economics.

Mr. Jean LeCours: I would like to think we do exactly the same check as CSIS does. To my knowledge—I could be wrong—there are only two major companies in Canada, TransUnion and Equifax, and they tend to basically parallel the same information.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: They're basically large credit bureaus from coast to coast.

When somebody applies for a clearance, whether it be for Dunkin' Donuts or as a mechanic, do you obtain their fingerprints?

Mr. Jean LeCours: We obtain fingerprints up front every time.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Thank you.

I have a last question, and this is why I was asking you if you were in charge of security. When your DM was in front of us some weeks ago, we questioned the process of the baggage screening system, the hand-carried baggage system, whatever.

Mr. Jean LeCours: Passenger screening.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Beautiful.

I was upset when she explained to us that there's a ratio of about 20% failure on sophisticated tests that are run on these screeners. Then I was appalled when she said when that happens, they pull them off the line, retrain them, and give them a second chance.

Is it still this way, now that all of the dust has fallen back down from September 11, now that we have in place—I assume and I hope—different ways of doing things? Is it still the same system, or do we have better training? Do we have any change in the screening processes, the training processes, or are we still the same as we were prior to September 11 with that?

Mr. William Elliott: The system, with respect to what happens when an individual fails a test, is the same. They are taken out of the baggage screening line, they're retrained, and they're retested.

There are a couple of things in train. As the minister announced, the government is purchasing advanced equipment, which includes X-ray and explosive detection equipment, and we are working with industry on developing new training standards. At the moment, the training and testing standards are the same as when the minister and the deputy minister were before you.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: What I understand is that there will be special training for the operation of the special equipment, but will there be changes, if there haven't been any yet, in the training given to these...let's call them screeners?

Mr. William Elliott: Yes.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: There will be better training.

Mr. William Elliott: Yes.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: So hopefully, the failure rate will drastically go down.

Mr. William Elliott: Yes.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Thank you.

The Chair: Thanks, Marcel.

When we were in Washington, one of the machines we saw actually did put in bogus things to test them, to keep them sharp. That's part, maybe, of what's going to come in with the new equipment.

I have one quick question about the person who I think was called Container Boy. He had documentation from the Montreal airport. Did you ever find out where he got those tags from?

Mr. Jean LeCours: Some of the documentation he had had been forged, but I can confirm to you, based on the information we've received from both CSIS and the RCMP, that Container Boy did not pose a threat to civil aviation security. He's not a terrorist or a member of a terrorist organization. He simply was a bad container boy.

The Chair: Thank you very much, gentlemen.

• 1130

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: For further clarification on that last question—I thought I was getting it clear—we're talking about security and whatever you do to authorize people to get air side, and my colleague was talking about screening, which would be the people who are screening, I suspect, the passengers going through the airport terminal.

The Chair: That's what Marcel was talking about.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: What do you folks have to do with that person, other than to pre-clear him?

The Chair: They check them all the time.

Mr. William Elliott: We set standards for screening, as was mentioned earlier.

Screening is the responsibility of carriers. That's been the case since screening was introduced in Canada, I believe, in 1972. But we set standards with respect to the training of screeners, what needs to be screened, and performance standards.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Okay.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: That also includes standards for training, doesn't it?

Mr. William Elliott: That's correct.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Thank you.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Could the local airport authorities, if they had a consistent pattern across the country, take that responsibility off your shoulders?

Mr. William Elliott: That certainly is a recommendation we have received from the Canadian Airports Council. It's one of a number of suggestions with respect to what might be done to reassign roles and responsibilities relating to screening that might be part of enhancements to the screening process, and the minister has indicated that he and his colleagues are considering those suggestions.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Thank you.

The Chair: Marcel.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Along that line, when he's saying take it off your shoulders, the setting of standards for the screening and for all of that safety and security would still come from Transport Canada, would it not?

Mr. William Elliott: Absolutely. The suggestion made by the Canadian Airports Council has to do with who actually conducts the screening. I think it's safe to say our minister strongly believes we should continue and in fact enhance our role with respect to the setting of standards and the oversight of screening and other security operations.

The Chair: Thank you.

Joe.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: That is whether the airlines continue to screen as they do now or whether that responsibility is turned over to the local airport authority. Is that right?

Mr. William Elliott: That's correct.

The Chair: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

We'll suspend for two minutes.

• 1133

• 1145

The Chair: I'd like to reconvene the meeting. It's kind of a working lunch. I don't know if Louis can chew gum and walk at the same time, but we'll find out.

Welcome, Louis and Mr. Gregg. We appreciate you coming here. You're going to give us a dissertation and then we have a round of questioning. It's over to you.

Mr. Louis Turpen (Representative, Greater Toronto Airport Authority): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome the opportunity to spend some time with the committee today. We had, in my view, a very productive meeting in Toronto on October 18, when the committee visited Pearson for the purposes of taking a look at some of the security mechanisms that were in place at the operating airport.

I have provided my written comments for the committee's consideration. Rather than take the committee's valuable time by going through those comments, I would prefer to share with you some current thoughts I have as events have unfolded. More importantly, I want to make myself available to the committee for questions and to direct the discussion in a way that they would find helpful.

I know you have been involved in a significant amount of activity and have heard a lot of testimony. Our time today, with the kind consent of the chairman, might be better spent in a dialogue that would address the concerns the committee might still have and want to discuss with me.

I'd like to talk about three things, Mr. Chairman, with respect to this very significant issue of aviation security and how to handle it.

The first issue is that I have always advocated unity of command when it comes to dealing with aviation security issues. We presently have a fragmented system. The airlines are responsible for a portion of aviation security and airport proprietors are responsible for another portion of airport security. I think it is imperative that all of our aviation security activities be conducted under a single umbrella. This fractured nature cannot serve our needs.

The analogy I use is trying to defend a fort. If each wall of the fort is defended by a different group, there is always the potential that a lack of effective communication and coordination could occur. When that happens, there are breakdowns in the systems. With a breakdown in the system comes an increased risk.

The second point is that I think it's imperative that in Canada we establish a national registry of security assets. We need to know how many canine teams are available in our country, how many bomb squads are available, how many X-ray machines are available. Explosive detection technology.... For rapid redeployment as the need and intelligence may suggest, a national registry that allows us to redeploy assets is critical, in my view, to our ability to respond aggressively and effectively to any potential threat.

The third point is one that has emerged in the last several days, and that is access control. At an airport, as this committee well knows, there is a defined secure perimeter. It is the perimeter that prevents unauthorized persons from going onto the airfield, into the aircraft operating areas.

Control of access is a critical portion of the aviation security program. One of the current ideas that is being put forth is that we would have a national access control program. By that I mean an access control program for all airport employees that is national in scope and administered on a local basis. A pilot in Vancouver with an identification card would have that card logged into the national system, and whether they were in Toronto, Montreal, Winnipeg, or Vancouver, that card would be active and would be able to identify that employee.

This national system could also obligate the motor vehicle department to advise if any person lost their driver's licence. As you know, we must have 75,000 to 85,000 airport employees, many of whom have access and rights to drive on the air side. We need to tighten up and control the perimeter access, and that can only be done under a national set of standards, administered on a local basis.

• 1150

For example, in Toronto, we have the ability to issue passes. We would issue and remove passes under a national authorization. But having different passes in different locales for different airports is simply a confusing situation and obligates security personnel to understand and intellectualize any number of possible pass systems. Therefore, my third point concerns this concept of access control.

I was recently involved with security activities in the United States, as I know many of the committee members have been. This is now emerging as an area of attention and concern, and I think it's one where Canada can take a leadership role.

Mr. Chairman, those are my three points in summary, in addition to the materials I've shared with the committee. Unity of command is critical, and we must go beyond talking about simply pre-flight screening and checked baggage. It must also include perimeter control. Second was a national registry of assets, and last was asset control established on a national standard and a national basis.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to present myself to you and the committee for any questions you may have.

The Chair: Thanks, Louis. I see you haven't lost your police training.

Mr. Laframboise.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise (Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What do you mean by this unity of command? Who, or what organization, would have this unity of command?

[English]

Mr. Louis Turpen: Thank you for your question.

Under no circumstances can the airlines continue to carry out a security mandate or responsibility. The airlines, by nature of their obligation to shareholder value and the bottom line, have an inherent conflict of interest when it comes to this subject.

I think there are several options and forums the committee could consider. I personally am not invested in any single one. One might be a national body created on the model of an airport authority: not for profit, non-share, operated by a board of directors that would set national standards and ensure that security and the government's mandates on security are carried forth at each individual installation.

It could be given to airport authorities to manage on a geographic and local basis. I prefer this option less, as it starts to defeat my argument for unity of command. I believe it is imperative that in Canada we have an umbrella organization that discharges the responsibility of security as its sole function. That discharge would include pre-flight screening, checked baggage, and perimeter security.

I do not imply in my comments that they should necessarily hire all the people and employ all the people. What I'm saying is that they should have the responsibility for ensuring that the standards set by the federal government are in place, and how that is accomplished is really a function of which airport is involved. For example, you may approach smaller airports one way and larger ones in another way.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Your preference would be for a not-for- profit organization, within which a number of organizations would likely be represented. Why not propose a department of the RCMP, or an authority that focuses more on policing than on civilian matters since, in the end, it is police organizations that keep up with new techniques aimed at fighting terrorism internationally? Why not give more responsibility to an organization that focuses more on law enforcement?

[English]

Mr. Louis Turpen: The answer is that you could. However, I believe the law enforcement activity is a resource for and a part of the security envelope. I personally do not believe that law enforcement talent, the highly trained men and women we have in our law enforcement organizations, are best utilized on a continuing basis at pre-flight screening, checking bags, or checking perimeter. This actually is an application of a significant amount of talent to something that doesn't require it.

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My view is that it is imperative that the law enforcement function be married to the security function as a resource and that we can adjust that resource as necessary, based on the government's understanding of threat, based on risk, based on need. In some locations we might have a significant police presence by virtue of our understanding, and in others not so much.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: I am not saying that we should substitute police officers for the people doing the work now or for airport authorities, and that you should change your management methods. We are talking about a not-for-profit organization that would supervise activities. When the RCMP and CSIS appeared before this committee, the problem that came to light was that they do not feel they have responsibility in the current structure. It is up to Transport Canada to issue directives. From time to time, they share information, but they are not the ones who have ultimate responsibility for security matters. This lies more with Transport Canada and you also have a share. If we were to create a supervisory agency that would be charged with issuing guidelines and monitoring to ensure you do your work properly and that other agencies do theirs properly, I am quite convinced that such an agency should be more of a law enforcement agency, so that it will be responsible. In the end, we are all working toward the same goal: the safety and security of users and citizens. Why should we hand over this heavy responsibility to a not-for-profit organization that would end up being a civilian agency?

Organizations like airport authorities are civilian in nature. Transport Canada is a civilian organization. Why not have an organization that is a little more like a police agency do the supervision, not the work on the ground? It would act as what I would call a tactical brain, able to keep abreast of all the newest techniques used by terrorists. Why lean more toward a civil, not- for-profit agency, rather than toward a more police-type agency?

[English]

Mr. Louis Turpen: Thank you.

Let me go back to two things. First, I think I said at the beginning of my remarks that I was offering an opinion that in great measure one could pursue it, if that is the government's policy and wish, in the manner you have suggested. Having said that, I offered my own views on why I think the integration of the policing function is another way to do it.

One of the problems that has occurred in the United States is this breakdown of communication within the government between the FBI, the CIA, and other law enforcement agencies. I'm not in a position to speak to that portion. In my view, that interaction should always be taking place. In that way, I think anyone who would suggest that there is a compartmentalization within the government between CSIS, the RCMP, and Transport is suggesting that they're not effecting the proper communication, and that's an entirely different discussion.

The Chair: Okay, Mario, one more question.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: You say that the airline companies, by their very nature, should not take care of some security services. What organization would be asked to do what they currently do, in your opinion?

[English]

Mr. Louis Turpen: In the United States I witnessed a significant debate on who should do security, and I believe that debate was inappropriate. In the U.S. they became so focused on who should do it that they lost sight in some ways of what should be done.

• 1200

It is my view that we need to set the policies in place and the mandates on what needs to be done, and in great measure I can see a number of vehicles that could deliver that product—with the exception of one.

I don't intend my moments to be negative to the airlines; it is simply a fact of life that commercial interests have historically overridden security interests, and the airlines have demonstrated over a number of years that when these two issues come into conflict there is a problem.

I therefore do not believe you can ask the airlines to, in effect, pay for and continue to provide a security system and at the same time recognize shareholder value and a bottom line. I think that needs to be withdrawn into a more objective platform. As I said, I can see a number of vehicles that could deliver the result the government would want.

The Chair: I'll move to Mr. Comuzzi now; I think you're out of time. I'll come back to you later on.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, because I'm going to have to leave after this—no reflection, Mr. Chair, but I really try to make travel arrangements so I don't have to go through the Toronto airport. Hopefully it'll better itself in the foreseeable future, and it's not your fault.

Mr. Louis Turpen: Thank you very much.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: I agree with you; I completely agree that the security issue has to be taken away from the airlines. I don't even know if it's worth talking about; it's a given.

We divested ourselves of airports some years ago, and I think basically they've been running very well—much better than the way they used to be run. But you also have an umbrella organization where all of the airport managers in the country get together on a regular basis. I don't know what you call it, but I would assume you have that organization. Is it the Canadian...?

Mr. Louis Turpen: That is correct. It's Airports Council International North America, which comprises all North American airports. Within that umbrella is the Canadian Airports Council, which focuses on primarily Canadian issues.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: I don't know what the mandate of the Canadian Air...and that's the organization I want to talk about in a question to you. If you could maintain a consistent standard of security across this country, wouldn't that be the role and the function of the Canadian Airports Council, in conjunction with each one of its members who operate local authorities? Isn't that the vehicle to use?

Mr. Louis Turpen: No, in my opinion.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: No? Tell my why.

Mr. Louis Turpen: The Canadian Airports Council is a loose association of airports, which might get together on a subject if they generally agreed. It quite frankly parallels—although it is more embryonic—ATAC, or the Air Transport Association in the United States. It is effectively a trade organization. It exchanges information and, quite frankly, takes positions on matters that are important to the group as a body.

There are significant—as I've come to appreciate—regional differences within our country, and I think each of us as airports have our own regional concerns. So I don't see the Canadian Airports Council as being the vehicle. As a matter of fact, the more I've followed the committee's activities, the more I'm becoming enamoured with this concept of an objective third party that would ensure security—and that includes the airports.

The airports have a significant piece of security that has not come under scrutiny, simply because the activities of September 11 were directed at pre-flight screening. Perimeter security is a huge, huge responsibility. I am advocating that it should also be folded under this larger umbrella and that there should be an objective third party that ensures the standards are met, that along with the federal government audits those operations.

So in response to your question, sir, I'd—

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Would that be the common opinion of most airport authorities in the country—what you just expressed?

Mr. Louis Turpen: I'm aware of the testimony of other airport proprietors, and I guess there are as many views as there are proprietors. There is some sympathy for an airport assumption of this responsibility, and clearly, if something needed to be done quickly, it could be done on a geographic basis, because the infrastructure is there. But I don't believe expanding the role of what is a trade organization into an operational role with a primary security responsibility on a national basis within the country is necessarily the appropriate assignment.

• 1205

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Okay, let's take your model. Are you satisfied there is something that could be developed through that organization insofar as consistency of security measures across the country is concerned?

Mr. Louis Turpen: Absolutely.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: And those other questions that you're asking—about central access requirements, perimeter safety, an asset list of all of our security devices, and so on.... It's something like what they use when they have forest fires: they have that; they assemble where they have a problem—that principle.

Mr. Louis Turpen: Yes.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Are you satisfied that would be workable, as long as you brought in whatever security was going to be involved—in conjunction with discussions with CSIS and the RCMP, who would be obviously very important to the process?

Mr. Louis Turpen: No, my view is they could be ex officio members of the board. As a matter of fact, they could sit on the board.

The concept is this, in a simple way. Assume there's a national security company—not for profit, non-share—and let's assume it had participation on the board, which I know this committee has discussed, with airports, airlines, government. This committee would be charged, for example, with ensuring that the best technology was in place at our airports; ensuring that the standards of training for the people operating that technology were in place; ensuring that there was an internal mechanism of audit to complement the federal government's responsibilities for audit—to make recommendations to the federal government on legislative improvements to enhance security, to specify standards for a national airport employee ID card, to require that those persons receiving the card receive the appropriate background checks through their colleagues in the appropriate arms of the government.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Make sure that everyone who goes near an airplane is scrutinized. Is that it?

Mr. Louis Turpen: That is correct.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: It's fundamental.

Mr. Louis Turpen: We talk about pre-flight screening and say, “Gee, we need to worry about passengers.” But you need to worry about employees; you need to worry about cargo; you need to worry about service deliveries; you need to worry about companies changing tires on airplanes. There is a whole gamut of activity that occurs, and right now a not uncommon situation is that it has been fractured, and it needs to be restored and integrated. The synergies that accompany that, I think, are obvious.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Thank you. I appreciate your candour on that.

I have just one other question. You're the largest airport in the country and you're into a huge expansion, which I'm sure is worrisome to you folks because you don't know what kind of facility you should have to meet the needs of the airline industry, number one—whatever the airline industry is going to be in the future. I don't know what it's going to be in Canada; I don't think anybody does.

But secondly, you're sitting there with a proposed tenant that I'm not sure is going to pay the rent, to be quite truthful with you. I'm sure you're in a certain amount of dilemma. But that's a subject for another debate.

Mr. Louis Turpen: It's a very good question. I'd be delighted to respond in some measure, if you wish.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: Sure. But how do we know what kind of security system we should be putting in place for whatever the airline business is going to be in the future? If we had done this a month ago, we would have been looking at Canada 3000. Who knows what the hell's next down the line? What are we doing?

Mr. Louis Turpen: I understand the question and I appreciate the opportunity to comment on it.

Airline security is unrelated to the colour of the airplane that serves the airport. We're talking about preventing unauthorized access into the secure area of the airport. Whether it be XYZ airline or ABC airline, the fact that there are airplanes on the ground—and this interchange of activity—is what we need to monitor and set standards for.

In the design of the new terminal in Toronto we went to extreme lengths, three and four years ago, to anticipate what might be issues for the future—in any number of ways: customer service, environmental, and security. I'm delighted to say that some of the new requirements were anticipated.

• 1210

With regard to the future of the industry, Toronto is one of a handful of unique airports in North America in that it is a terminus airport. By that I mean that 75% of our passengers are either arriving in or departing from the greater Toronto area. That market is there. There will always be a requirement to satisfy that market. And where there's a market, there is always an airline.

The situation in Denver is much more critical, because 60% to 70% of the persons who use the Denver airport aren't really going to Denver. They are simply there to facilitate an airline hubbing strategy. So in a place such as Denver, a loss of United Airlines, for example, could have a catastrophic effect on the number of passengers who would use the airport.

San Francisco, Los Angeles, JFK, Miami, and Toronto are the major terminus airports in North America. In Toronto, because we are a terminus airport, we have a degree of insulation against that variability. It has been demonstrated historically that as long as there's a demand for air travel, someone will respond to that demand.

Mr. Joe Comuzzi: That's very reassuring. Thank you very much for that information.

Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I have to bypass Toronto's airport.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: Mr. Szabo.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Thank you, Mr. Turpen, for your input. I appreciated the hospitality in showing us the very impressive security infrastructure and the personnel at Pearson. It's a big responsibility. It was helpful for us to get an idea of the dimension of the work you do. It's not just operating a business for shops and dealing with airline gate applications and a whole bunch of other multifaceted responsibilities.

I understand you're basically saying that we have to have an umbrella organization whose responsibility, business, and raison d'être is security, with no conflicts or distractions and with full authority to do the job to the standards necessary in order to satisfy all of the criteria that are set.

Looking forward, it appears that checking 100% of the baggage and 100% of the people and treating everybody as equal will be uneconomical and will probably not be achievable realistically in the short term, maybe not even in the medium term.

On top of that the people in Washington left us with the impression that two things are really important: screening and intelligence. We think the intelligence part is pretty important, because we need to assess risk and focus on our target. The best way to ensure that there is cooperation not only domestically with government agencies such as CSIS, the RCMP, Transport Canada, and Defence is to break down the silo mentality and say it's important that we have a common database, that we identify risks and we target, and that we allocate resources and say we can smart-card, etc., creating a vision of what real security looks like down the road. If that's where we want to be, is it something we should shoot for now or do you think we should have an interim plan for the short term while we work out the details? Or should we say, what we really have to do is set up the structure and the vision that this is the plan and the way we want to go so that we're going to be a model down the road and others may very well emulate us?

If you're going to do that, how much of the airport authority's responsibilities in security and safety could be shifted to permit that agency to be able to utilize that information? It's very unlikely that anybody is going to want to pass national security information to a public body.

• 1215

Mr. Louis Turpen: I find no need to have access to that information. What I need is a clear set of guidelines that are developed on a rational basis and predicated upon threat assessment. And if, to use an example, the Government of Canada determines that we should do 200% bag screening, then clearly, in my vision, this national security corporation would implement that and airports would work to do so. I personally have no need to have anyone explain to me why this is important from a national perspective. So if we look at this, I think your point is extremely valid.

From an airport proprietor perspective, we have the infrastructure in place to support such an effort. For example, we can issue the badges I talked about. We can certainly advise the registry of what we have in place. And lastly, we can transfer perimeter responsibility to the new organization, or the new organization could contract with the airport authority to provide that on their behalf according to the standards they set. I think that's the key. The key is this has to flow from a central, top-down approach and be implemented on a consistent basis across the country.

I know this committee probably has experienced this as well. I don't know how many letters I get from people every day saying, I was in Vancouver and they did this, and, I was in Toronto and they did this, and, I was in Winnipeg and they did this. Frankly, that certainly undermines public confidence in what we're doing when there's that variability.

So to respond to your point, there's nothing to stop us from making a transfer. There's nothing to stop us from acting in a support role; that is clearly our obligation. And lastly, from the standpoint of a private body, such as the Greater Toronto Airport Authority, having access to information that might be developed in terms of threat assessment, there's absolutely no need for us to have it. What we need is the conclusions of that manifested in actions that have to be taken in a geographic arena.

Mr. Paul Szabo: I'd like to have your input on two last issues.

The first has to do with screening, the current employee base for screening, and the contracting of employees through various agencies. This is a very important part of the whole security effort.

It appears that the United States has elevated that responsibility, and positioning, and training, etc., to a level whereby the compensation may virtually be double what it is today. They also require that these new screeners be citizens, etc. Do you believe the current employee base in screening can be utilized or brought up to grade to fulfill the future requirements of screening?

Mr. Louis Turpen: I believe the Canadian pre-flight screening system was superior to that which was in place in the United States pre-September 11. I believe the answer to your question is, yes, and for the following reason. When—and I'll use a specific example—the Greater Toronto Airport Authority assumed responsibility for the largest airport in Canada, it also assumed responsibility for all of the employees who were at that airport. There certainly was a lot of discussion surrounding the ability of “government employees” to make the transition to a “private sector environment”. Virtually all of them did, but some didn't.

To respond to your earlier question, which I apologize for not having answered more directly, I think the time to do it is now. We should not back into it. We should not sidestep it, because my experience has been that with time, resolve evaporates, and all of a sudden we start to lose focus because other issues clearly command the attention of all of us.

Therefore, it is my view that the contracts could be absorbed and the standards set, and those employees who were capable of meeting new standards should be retained and those employees, quite frankly, who could not meet the standards should not be retained. But that's no different from any other aspect of what we're doing.

• 1220

Mr. Paul Szabo: The last issue I want to discuss is that the FAA appears, from what we've heard, to have been significantly discredited in the assessment post-September 11. In fact, new legislation cuts them out of the loop. Has Transport Canada, being the body that was, or still is, providing standards and guidelines, been tainted at all by the performance levels that have been identified through security audit, etc.? And given whatever your answer would be, can the role of this umbrella agency meet its optimal potential under Transport Canada, either as a branch or somehow under that umbrella of Transport Canada, or is there some impairment there that would suggest that we can enhance our potential for being successful by creating this as a stand-alone, whether it be a Nav Canada or some other stand-alone model?

Mr. Louis Turpen: First of all, I don't believe it should be within Transport Canada, for one simple reason. I believe Transport Canada should be the regulator. In terms of them being both the regulator and the doer, I've typically not been an advocate of that type of relationship.

I believe Transport Canada should be the auditor. Transport Canada should set the rules. Transport Canada should interpret and collate the information the federal government has in a meaningful way.

No, I don't believe Transport Canada has been tainted at all by what's happened to the Federal Aviation Administration. As a matter of fact, I think their conduct on a personal basis throughout this has been exemplary.

However, to say a word about the Federal Aviation Administration, with which I have some fleeting association, their failure was a collective failure of government. There are an awful lot of things the FAA attempted to do and were precluded from doing because we either lacked the political will to do it or it became politically unacceptable.

In the United States the problem pre-September 11 was that the Air Transport Association and not the FAA was the advisory body to the Congress of the United States in great measure, and it was the dictates of the Air Transport Association that carried the day. That diluted in great measure what the FAA wanted to do. I think the FAA has clearly and predictably taken the fall for what was a collective failure on the part of government to follow through after Pan Am 103 and after TWA 800, and the Gore commission, and all of those activities.

Mr. Paul Szabo: I said there were only two, but I really should ask you about one other. I know you have a background in security. Other aspects of transport are important—our ports, our trains, our trucks, etc.—other modality issues. Do you have any opinion as to whether or not what we're talking about now, this agency, this umbrella, should have the opportunity down the road to assume security responsibilities with regard to other modes of transport, or should we in fact keep our focus on airlines and deal with that exclusively?

Mr. Louis Turpen: Certainly for starters, because I think clearly that's where the vulnerability exists.... Clearly that's a question for government, and I could construct a model that would envision a broader responsibility over time, and one that might, from a national perspective, make sense particularly with respect to setting standards and maintaining levels.

In a similar vein, we don't want to start to distract this effort by deflecting the attention away from security, and so this would have to be carefully considered I think by this committee and by the government as to exactly what elements of a larger scope might be incorporated under this umbrella.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Mario.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: I trust in your opinion. You said that before the events of September 11, Canada perhaps had better security than the United States. That is what you said. If US security were at some point to become better than Canada's, could that cause major problems in terms of future terrorist acts?

• 1225

[English]

Mr. Louis Turpen: A number of our beliefs about terrorist activity were challenged as a result of September 11. One belief, which I think continues to be sustained, is that weak targets are invitations. Less security is an invitation. Having said that, I personally cannot conceive of a situation where Canadian and American aviation security would be different. Obviously, because we're different countries, there would be slight nuances, but I believe the standards, the foundations, and the baseline would be the same. I think that is a very remote possibility, but having said that, I must say that it has been proven again and again that weak targets attract attention.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: In your experience, in the light of what you see currently, if we were ahead of the Americans with regard to security on September 11, how would you compare us right now, before we adopt new measures?

[English]

Mr. Louis Turpen: My experience has been that they are very similar. The issue has been and will always be the political will to carry through to a conclusion. In terms of what I'll call operational security, my personal experience has been that they are both at very high and very good levels today.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: But presently, the American will to carry through to a conclusion is felt more strongly than the Canadian will.

[English]

Mr. Louis Turpen: I firmly believe that this committee's deliberations and the deliberations of government are extremely sound with respect to putting this on a foundation for the future. I also believe that this effort can actually leapfrog ahead of the American effort. There are a number of factors that are affecting the Americans' ability to move forward. One is simply the matter of mass, the volume of activity that has to be included and encompassed. As we move forward, Canada enjoys an opportunity by virtue of its structure and its institutions to more aggressively complete this review and put into place a permanent mechanism. I think that probably could be done, if the government wishes, in advance of the United States coming to a similar point, and it's simply a function of size and activity.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: You should be in politics, you know. The Liberal Party is not the only party in Canada. The Liberals will not always be there.

The Chair: Mr. Harvey.

Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I too, like Paul five minutes ago, am very impressed by your evidence, Mr. Turpen, because we spent some time thinking about all of these problems last night. According to the comments that we heard, the irrationality that the United States is showing in dealing with this huge crisis should not prevent us from bringing forward balanced solutions.

[English]

We need a balanced solution for it.

[Translation]

One of the American senior officials told us that, in the end, we are dealing with a technical problem; he was talking about screening. I believe that here, in Canada, we are beginning to have the means to reach one hundred per cent in that regard.

He made another important point, which was that it is essential to exchange and convey information, to set up networks for this. As you know, the government is getting ready to be able... In any event, with regard to information, Bill C-42 was split so that we could try to quickly adopt the provisions that would allow information to be transmitted to all agencies: the RCMP, CIA, FBI, as well as European security agencies.

• 1230

Are you favourable to this possibility, to this right provided under legislation, that would allow information on airline passengers to be transmitted more easily, without personal details being given. In the United States, this is a technical problem, but they are dealing with a very, very serious situation. There are also political overtones in the United States. In Canada, we are doing it partly to reassure our citizens, but there is the whole technical dimension.

I would like to know whether you are favourable to this government initiative regarding transmission of information.

[English]

Mr. Louis Turpen: To clarify, this is with respect to the passenger lists?

Mr. André Harvey: Yes.

Mr. Louis Turpen: And the technical problem is with respect to the passenger lists as well?

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey: There is a legislative problem because, before the law was passed, it was impossible to transmit the passenger list with details on the passport number, the seat assigned, and so on. The airlines did not have the right to do this. Now, the Americans are asking that we do this, and I am convinced that all other countries will follow suit. Do you agree with this measure?

[English]

Mr. Louis Turpen: I believe there are a number of measures. As a matter of fact, I was told the other day that within a week or two weeks of September 11, the FAA had received 23,000 documents with suggestions on how to move forward.

Mr. Paul Szabo: It was 30,000.

Mr. Louis Turpen: Right, 30,000.

I don't believe this is a technical problem. In the early 1980s, in order to facilitate movement through congested customs facilities in San Francisco, we were receiving advance lists from airlines. That was done in order to speed the customs process because the facilities were inadequate. The technology has been there and continues to be there. I think you have correctly stated that this is more of a political issue, an intergovernmental issue, and I think that's ultimately where it will be resolved.

It does not surprise me that the Government of the United States wants this information. If we are to attack terrorism on a global basis, then clearly the ability to identify the movement of persons who would want to do harm to our society is critical. As always, there is a delicate balance between sharing this information and not sharing it, but in the current circumstance, I would support the sharing of this information because I believe the intent is a valid one.

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey: Could you give us an idea, in percentages, of the level of international standardization in security matters, for example, at airports like Charles de Gaulle, Ben Gurion or other major airports? Are you in contact with others, with a view to standardizing security measures? Is this done under the authority of the International Civil Aviation Organization?

[English]

Mr. Louis Turpen: Yes, there are ICAO recommendations in this regard. Yes, we do talk to other airports and look at other security mechanisms. I will confine my comments at this point to my American experience.

As an industry, collectively we have known what was required since Pan Am 103. What we have not done is had the political will to implement what was required. So although in Hong Kong there was 100% checked baggage screening for years, we opted to go to a voluntary, computer-assisted passenger processing system, the CAPPS system, which I know you are familiar with.

Within our collective database, I think we have all the tools we need to do our job. We simply need to start to use those tools. Those tools have been drawn from the Israelis, from Charles de Gaulle, from Hong Kong, Singapore, and airports that clearly have approached this issue in a much more serious way, in many cases because they were much closer to the problem.

• 1235

One of the tenets, one of the guiding principles that was destroyed on September 11, was that resolve varied with distance. This was viewed in America as a primarily European and Middle Eastern problem, and I think there was a view that the ocean could protect American interests. That simply hasn't been sustained.

We know what to do; as an industry we know what's out there. We now simply need to reach into the toolbox and take those things that are appropriate and use them.

Mr. André Harvey: Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you very much. Good questions, as usual.

Marcel.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Turpen, for taking the time to come to Ottawa. Don't be insulted by comments from my opposition colleague. He's insisting on something being run by police, but I guess that's because he wants to correct his bad judgment of yesterday for voting against the anti-terrorism law because they thought we were giving too much power to police officers. But that happens.

Mr. Turpen, when we're talking of screening, I would enjoy hearing you be a little bit more precise. This has been bugging me since the start. Probably the widest entrance door to terrorism is through this screening process. We've been told by Transport Canada that they have standards, and when they test the employees, they find that there's an approximate 20% rate of failure in what they tell us are sophisticated tests. How do you think we could fix that?

You answered Mr. Szabo a little while ago on his question. Can we keep the present employees, sort of recycle them? How can we do this? What do we need to do? Is it training? Is it better testing prior to employment? What's your opinion on that, Mr. Turpen? I find that it's a very important point, and probably in all of our system, this is the weakest link.

Mr. Louis Turpen: Pre-flight screening is part of the perimeter that I spoke of earlier. Historically, we have had a single line of defence. That obligates us to guarantee a high level of confidence that we can detect any attempted breach, whether it be weapons or personnel or whatever. In my view, the technology does not exist today that will allow us the luxury of a single line of defence. There certainly is a wish that we have some magic solution and can have a machine that would read your thoughts and do everything else. Sadly, that's not here.

The levels you have quoted, if those levels are achieved, are very good. The way to enhance, the function, enhance performance, is through redundancy, until such time as technology can substitute for multiple checks. There have been a lot of references to the Israeli system and the El Al system. It is predicated upon redundancy. The opportunity for multiple looks is one that cannot be minimized.

As an example, here in Canada and in the United States now, that process of multiple looks is in place. So we increase our probability that at the end of the journey, from the curb to the seat on the airplane, we have raised the confidence level to one that allows us to let the aircraft depart safely.

In answer to your question, at pre-flight I think training is important. We continue to emphasize it, we continue to test it, and we peak it at whatever level it is. But that has to be supplemented with redundant checks, which start at the ticket counter, at pre-flight, at plane side, and if necessary, depending on threat situations, can start at the front door of the terminal building.

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Interstitial checks can also be included. For example, in the new terminal building in Toronto, provision has been made to put screening devices in all of the doors before you even get into the building, which would allow the first check to occur as you enter the building, the second check at the ticket counter, the third check at pre-flight screening, the fourth check at plane-side.

Hopefully, with the collective effort of technology experts we can reduce it to a single point of contact, but at this point—in response to your question—we have to peak the pre-flight screening as we have traditionally known it and supplement it with the redundancy that will give us the confidence we want.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: How can we peak it, if I may ask you? Are you saying it's strictly training, or is it better screening—screening's not the right word—a better choice of employees in their abilities or their talents?

Mr. Louis Turpen: We once put police officers on pre-flight screening points, and they didn't do very well. If you leave somebody on long enough—over hours, days, weeks, months. It's imperative to test, to audit, to categorize the deficiencies, to train against those deficiencies. If a deficiency, for example, is due to too much time on the machine, you need to ensure the rotations occur.

We talked earlier about police officers. One of the things I advocate is having the police officer outside the process, but an observer and a monitor and a kind of on-site auditor of the process, as an independent and available resource in the event of a problem at the screening point, to make sure whatever processes and procedures we put in place are implemented. To answer your question, it isn't just training; it starts with auditing. Let's find out why the system is breaking down and then let's deal with it.

You could have the best people in the world, but if they're on for 24 hours, I promise you they're going to miss things. They can't be; I think that's one of the keys. I don't buy the low-cost argument. I'm not saying people shouldn't be paid more. What I'm saying is it wasn't just low cost; it was low cost, long hours. There was a view that it can't happen here that permeated all of our thinking. I think that's what led us to where we are.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Thank you.

The Chair: Alex.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: I recall when we were down at your airport. Your views have changed significantly, I'd say, since then.

Mr. Louis Turpen: I'm sorry; did you say they have or have not?

Mr. Alex Shepherd: I think your views about this have changed significantly since then.

Mr. Louis Turpen: If that's a question, I'd have to say no.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: No? I just didn't understand you correctly at the time, is that it?

Mr. Louis Turpen: As I said, I've had the opportunity to follow the testimony before the committee and I think I've probably refined my views a little bit. My initial reaction post-September 11 was that it had to be taken away from the airlines, and the most convenient place to put it the next day would have been at an airport. I will also say—and I think I said on that day and I am prepared to be corrected—that I don't want the responsibility, but given a choice of giving it to the airlines or giving it to the airport, I'd take it.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Okay. I heard you say that. I'm trying to build up some kind of management chart, mainly from your views and others, and I'm still having a little difficulty where we get this...the National Security Corp., or whatever it is, interfaces with the Great Toronto Airport Authority. I'm assuming you see within that connection that we're delegating, or the authority, the security corporation, is delegating to you, the power to hire and fire; the overall concept of the security requirements detailed, saying you must do X, Y, Z, and so forth. What other relationships do you see there? If somebody's just entered into a management contract—I guess I'm getting right down to that—what do you see as the responsibilities you would be empowered with?

Mr. Louis Turpen: I think the implementation can take several forms. As you have correctly stated, one might be a contract with the Greater Toronto Airport Authority to provide the service on behalf of the corporation, to a standard set by the corporation and audited by the corporation and the federal government. The corporation might very well contract directly with “XYZ Security Firm”, for example, to provide these services, as the airlines do today—another option.

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A third option is the corporation may have its own operational arm, which might operate at certain smaller airports where it's not possible, maybe, to build the mass to have a private company do it. Going back to my toolbox analogy, I think there would be several mechanisms available to the corporation.

In the case of Toronto, because of our size—the mass of Pearson—a contract with the airport authority might be a wholly appropriate way to do it. That doesn't violate my unity-of-command principle, because then the airport authority would have the entire perimeter. It would have checked baggage; it would have pre-flight; and it would have all of the access points. But I don't believe the airport authority should have one of those three and not all three. I don't believe anybody should have one of the three and not all three. I believe whatever vehicle is selected must take responsibility for all of it.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Moving up this chain of command, one of the problems—and the reason why the police have been thought of for being directly involved—is your unity-of-command problem and some of the things you've enunciated.

You mentioned CIA and FBI. Well, the RCMP and CSIS also, we have discovered, don't really talk all that well together. I don't know if you've thought your way out as to how you could solve that problem. How does National Security Corp. ensure that CSIS and the RCMP are plugged in on that end of the equation and that information is flowing through the system?

Mr. Louis Turpen: In response to an earlier question, I emphasized auditing. I see several levels.

I see Security Corp. doing auditing; I see the federal government doing auditing. Back to my point about police officers and why I want to keep them independent, I see them as another audit arm.

The key to this is eternal vigilance and audit on all of the applicable points and then reaction and response to it—whether it's an employee failure, a training failure, an equipment failure, a philosophical failure, a policy failure, or an intelligence failure.

But I think the intelligence activity has to take place at the highest levels of the corporation. I am not a fan of the need-to-know concept. I used to tell them, “I don't want to know anything; don't tell me.” Philosophically, that's why I'm here. I think at the highest levels, CSIS, the RCMP, and those institutions applicable to direct transport have to be involved. At the highest levels, the rules have to come down based on the intelligence available. There is no need to disseminate that intelligence; there is only a need to disseminate the response to the intelligence, regardless of what it may be. We can draw any number of examples.

So at the operating level, what I'm saying is, I have established a back channel—and I'm back to the police discussion we had a few moments ago. If I'm the head of Security Corp. and I give a directive that we are going to look at all fingernail files, I have independent verification not only through my own auditing arm but through the federal government's auditing arm and through the police presence that those things are being done. More importantly, through the police presence they clearly have a “need to know” on an intelligence basis. We don't need to weave that need to know into the fabric of the people who are doing the screening and the hand checking and everything else.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: One thing we haven't touched on is your national registry of assets. It's not clear to me what you're suggesting there. Is Security Corp. the owner and custodian of these assets? How do you visualize things? Is there some kind of rational sharing of them through the organization—if Vancouver doesn't need a screening machine, it's moved to Toronto? I'm not quite sure what you're getting at there.

Mr. Louis Turpen: In the late 1980s we didn't know how many bomb dogs we had in the United States. It occurred to me that maybe we ought to know that. If we knew it, then we would have a resource—I think you heard Secretary Mineta the other day say the dog is only good for an hour; it's probably only 30 minutes. If we knew it, we could re-allocate those canine teams based on the threat assessment the government has specified.

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Let's say there is a threat against Halifax, and maybe Halifax has one canine team. We might ship in five canine teams to deal with the specific concern.

If we had the Olympics, we would reallocate resources. Those resources could belong to the security corporation because they've purchased the X-ray machines, etc.; they could belong to the local airport authorities; they could belong to police organizations in various places; or they could belong to the military. It's not an ownership issue, it's knowing where they are and the ability to move them from point A to point B.

It doesn't necessarily have to be Security Corp. that moves them. It can be simply a responsibility of Security Corp. to know where they all are, and, in response to a government directive, arrange for their reallocation. Certainly, Security Corp. is not going to tell the military of Canada to do something. But Security Corp. will have all those assets available to it. The government will know what's on the list, but it would be a Security Corp. responsibility to develop that asset database for use by the government, by the RCMP, by the military, or by whoever might need the appropriate resources.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Can I have another question?

The Chair: Quickly.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: The final question would be about the oversight capacity. People here are concerned about what the oversight would be. Who would be responsible? Who would we point the finger at when things get screwed up?

How would you visualize that aspect? Would Security Corp. report directly to Parliament somehow? How would that mechanism work? Have you thought that out?

Mr. Louis Turpen: Not really. But once again, I'm back to the audit issue. We're a private, not-for-profit corporation at the Greater Toronto Airport Authority, but we are under regulatory control of the Government of Canada in so many ways, not just through Transport Canada as our landlord. I think similar mechanisms could be in place.

We're subject to audit and periodic reviews. I think that's something that can be accomplished to the satisfaction, I think, of the government, the committee, and Parliament, that they will have access to the information they need and confidence that the vehicle they created is carrying out their mandates.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: I guess the feeling is that people would like an accountability that was actually plugged right into the parliamentary system, that somebody—a minister or whoever—could stand up and say, “Why is there a screw-up in the Toronto Airport?”, and “You're responsible”.

Mr. Louis Turpen: Well, I think there are two things. I am sure the minister gets some of those letters, and I get some of those letters as well.

Clearly, within government, I wouldn't see the head of Security Corp. necessarily being a part of the government at all. I would see this as a Transport responsibility with respect to ensuring the standards put forth by the government were there, and Transport would have to answer to Parliament.

To the extent that Security Corp. functioned or didn't function, there are some obviously very severe responsibilities involved, and I'm sure that could be constructed. I just haven't, as you have correctly said, really given it a lot of thought.

The Chair: Mr. Szabo, last question.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Okay.

There's the issue of cost—how much it's going to cost to do this. The U.S. has decided they're going to have a ticket levy. I think it's $2.50 for one leg, up to $5 for a round trip. Do you have any opinion on whether or not there should be a ticket levy, given all the other things we charge to passengers, and what it's going to do to passenger confidence and satisfaction?

Do you think the airlines should pick up any more than their current financial responsibilities, or should they be less? I presume whatever isn't picked up would be left to the federal government.

What's the responsible, the right, thing to do? What's compatible with our overall strategy toward enhancing safety and security?

Mr. Louis Turpen: That's a great question. I was actually asked that question a few weeks ago, and my answer was that at the end of the day, the people pay. Whether it be through higher taxes, through surcharges, or whatever, the Canadian people will somehow or other absorb the cost of this.

However, I'm not convinced a ticket surcharge is necessarily the right way to go. I believe this is a more global problem. The attack was against the United States of America. The vehicle was the airline industry, but that doesn't mean the next vehicle can't be something else.

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There are implications to that statement with respect to budgets and federal funding, but I think if we paint this concept as an overriding umbrella that is really directed toward national security issues, and if we talk about possibly expanding the role at some point in the future, I don't know that a user-charge system is necessarily the best vehicle to get us there. It's certainly possible. They're doing it in the States. They do it elsewhere. But I think if we look at this as a national issue and if the federal government is setting the standards and defining what needs to be done, then the federal government also needs to address the cost issue.

To your point, and I think it's a valid one, I do not believe the airlines should be able to turn over security to the federal government and keep the money. I'll say the same thing for the Greater Toronto Airport Authority. We spend money on perimeter security, and if the federal government, through whatever vehicle, takes responsibility, I think that needs to be recognized as well. Having said that, I think when you wash it all through, it'll be the Canadian people at the end of the day.

Mr. Paul Szabo: I tend to agree. We want the passenger public to look at this objectively and feel it's fair and reasonable and we're doing good work, but I would have some fear of them being distracted by a $2.50 or $5 charge, or something like that. It's not big bucks, but it's an annoyance, a nuisance, and it adds another thing on the table that they may have to look at or consider. I would rather they looked at the system and said, “Boy, they're doing a better job for us than I remember them doing, and I feel better.”

Mr. Louis Turpen: I have a concern. I don't know where the federal government might derive the revenue to fund this issue. It might be from a ticket tax. It might be from some contribution from the airlines by virtue of the fact that they don't have the responsibility.

But back to the point of control—which I think was raised a few moments ago—the best control is budget. If the federal government is going to stipulate standards, then the federal government needs to understand what the cost of that mandate is. The best way to understand that is by having the cost of that mandate specified in a budget, which I believe—however the federal government decides to deal with that—is probably the best way to do it, because I think it clearly sets forth for the government what the costs and implications of the government policies are.

One of the problems we've had historically is there have been a lot of unfunded mandates in the United States. They said to go out and do 100% bag screening, but there was no money to do it so it kind of fell by the wayside. In order to avoid that, the government always has the right to put on a ticket tax or something else, but I think if we start that way, we're implying that's the amount of money Security Corp. has to do the job that needs to be done, but I think the amount of money they need is what the mandate of the federal government is.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Good.

The Chair: I have one quick question, and then I'll let you go.

In the United States the airlines tell us they had these people's names in the system, but the federal government didn't ask. How will your system pick this up? These guys were in the system and the airlines knew, but they didn't share the information.

Mr. Louis Turpen: That one mystifies me a little bit. I'm sorry. I'm not able to really respond to that.

Are you saying the airline said they knew they had these people's names in the—

The Chair: These people were in the system, but somehow—

Mr. Louis Turpen: Oh, you mean they were in the federal system and it wasn't shared with the airlines?

The Chair: I think it was the other way around. The airlines had it.

Mr. Louis Turpen: With respect then, why didn't they do something about it? You know, if they showed up on the passenger manifest and they were concerned about them.... I'm very sorry, Mr. Chairman, I've heard a similar thing, but I'm afraid I'm not qualified to answer that.

The Chair: I thought I heard that when I was in Washington, but maybe it needs to be ferreted out. Because if they didn't know, and somehow the information.... But these things happen when you look through the rearview mirror, I guess.

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Thank you very much. You did well again.

Mr. Louis Turpen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: We're going to adjourn until 3.30 p.m.