TRGO Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

LE COMITÉ PERMANENT DES TRANSPORTS ET DES OPÉRATIONS GOUVERNEMENTALES

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, November 21, 2001

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[English]

The Chair (Mr. Ovid Jackson (Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, Lib.)): Ladies and gentlemen, I see a quorum.

I'd like to start on time. I'm one of those old-school teachers.

The orders of the day are that, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we're here to discuss airline safety and security. We have a number of witnesses, starting with, from the Vancouver International Airport, Larry Berg. From Group 4 Securitas we have Paul Rivenbark and Kevin Bennett. We also have Peter St. John here as well.

Welcome, gentlemen. What normally happens is we have our opening statements, so we'll hear one starting with the Vancouver International Airport, and then we'll have the Group 4 Securitas people give their presentation. Thank you.

Mr. Larry Berg (President and Chief Executive Officer, Vancouver International Airport Authority): Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, and ladies and gentlemen.

On behalf of the Vancouver International Airport Authority, otherwise known as YVR, I wish to thank the committee for inviting me to appear this afternoon. I'm here to talk to you about improving security at Canada's airports.

Let me first begin by saying aviation security in Canada is good, but we can and must make it better. We believe that more airport authority involvement in passenger screening is a critical step in improving security. I'd like to begin by telling you how security is currently handled, give some specific recommendations for improving it, and talk about the advantages of such a change.

The Canadian aviation security system has an excellent record and a very strong foundation on which to build. Canadian airports have been heavily involved in aerodrome security for years, especially since 1997 when federal RCMP transferred airport security duties over to local airport authorities.

The number one strategic objective at YVR is safety and security, and we know through our customer service surveys that the number one driver for customer satisfaction is a sense of safety and security, and our customers consistently rate us high.

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Our security department at YVR uses a combination of 140 private security guards and 31 police officers, and these are RCMP who are contracted from the City of Richmond. They help us meet regulatory standards, and as well we've instituted a number of innovations such as integrated police and security teams on patrol, state-of-the-art security systems including closed circuit televisions, and electronic access control that requires positive ID for employee entry.

The airport authority also hosts regular liaison meetings between the airport authority and all law enforcement agencies at YVR, including local and federal RCMP, CSIS, Canada Customs and Immigration, United States Secret Service, U.S. consulate security, and Transport Canada.

We practise a layered defence with redundancies and reliability built into the system, and new initiatives in passenger processing and baggage screening are being vigorously pursued.

The tragic events of September 11 have generated an intense interest in the area of passenger pre-board screening, or PBS. The current system has a committee of local airlines responsible for screening passengers and examining carry-on baggage at each airport. This system is, frankly, inadequate; the airlines themselves have recognized this and want the system changed.

I'm here today to propose that the Government of Canada take on the responsibility for pre-board screening and exercise that responsibility through airport authorities. I recommend the government do this in four ways.

First, Transport Canada should consult with the industry, airlines, airports, and other stakeholders, to develop new rigorous, uniform national standards.

Second would be through the establishment of a joint industry-government not-for-profit organization with equal board representation from airports, airlines and Transport Canada. This new entity would be responsible for the development of national standards for technology and procedures in cooperation with Transport Canada officials.

Third is by appointing airport authorities at Canada's major airports as the appointed agents to deliver pre-board screening.

Fourth is by strengthening Transport Canada's regulatory and compliance monitoring role of airports and of the new national not-for-profit organization.

This proposal addresses a number of concerns and issues that have come to light post-September 11. It clearly delineates responsibility within the system, and the government would be responsible for the standards and the regulatory oversight. It places not-for-profit entities in charge of delivering security, including passenger screening. This eliminates the conflict between cost and profit that now exists with airlines' delivery of security, and it places the accountability for delivery of the screening squarely with me and my management team in Vancouver.

There are also a number of significant operational benefits and benefits to the people hired to perform pre-board screening. Clearly the task of screening is repetitive and often boring and, when combined with low pay, accounts for the high turnover experienced at some airports. The integration plan I am proposing envisions a much more broadly trained team of personnel capable of a variety of functions, from guarding access points to conducting patrols and operating the security operations centre. This will give personnel a more productive and varied work day as well as much better career progression opportunities, and it will enable us to recruit a more qualified workforce.

It makes good sense to incorporate the pre-board screening side of security into the extensive airport security system already in place for both normal and emergency operations. Regardless of who operates the system, the future cost of security at Canadian airports will be greater than it was prior to September 11, and we need to work closely and consult on this issue. However, I don't think this should be a major concern, and it certainly shouldn't cloud the real benefits of this proposal I'm articulating today.

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The model I have presented today represents a positive change to airport security in Canada. The Vancouver International Airport Authority is willing, and I would say uniquely able, to take on this task, and to do it well at this difficult juncture for the aviation industry.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that all airports in Canada, without exception, support the proposal I have laid out. The Canadian Airports Council, of which I am vice-chair, have submitted a formal presentation to the Minister of Transport to this effect. It builds on an existing framework of airport security. It brings a wealth of experience to the issues being considered, and it's a major step in rebuilding Canadians' confidence in the security of our country's airports.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me this opportunity to appear before the committee today. I would be pleased to answer any questions the members of the committee may have.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Berg.

Basically, the committee is going to be asking each of you questions. You were a good example of how to make a quick statement, as we like to spend a lot of time on questions.

I'll go to Group 4 next, and then, as an individual, Mr. St. John after that.

Mr. Rivenbark, your opening comments, please.

Mr. Paul Rivenbark (President and Chief Executive Officer, Group 4 Securitas): Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting Group 4 Securitas Canada to make a presentation before you today.

First I'll tell you a little bit about Group 4 Securitas. Our organization employs about 4,000 people in Canada. We operate in the provinces of Alberta and Ontario. We do the passenger screening at Calgary International Airport and have done so since 1985. We handle passenger screening, access control, and air site security at Lester B. Pearson International Airport, and we have about 1,000 people employed there. For passenger screening, we do terminal 1 and terminal 3. In addition, we have a small workforce in Whitehorse, and we also do security work at the Hamilton Airport.

Group 4 Securitas is part of a large international organization. We operate in 70 countries around the world with over 130,000 employees. The organization is well financed and has professional training standards and professional management, and the results of our Canadian operation I think reinforce that.

For many years Canada has demonstrated an excellent record in ensuring airline safety while also demonstrating customer service. The airlines and Transport Canada, along with private enterprise, should be extremely proud of this benchmark achievement.

Personally, I have been involved in airport security for over 20 years. My colleague, Mr. Bennett, who is here with me, is vice-president of the Canadian operations and has been involved in airport security also for twenty years.

We believe that the tragic events on September 11 have encouraged our organization to step forward and to work in partnership with the federal government, Transport Canada, of course, and the airlines, in terms of developing new programs and new solutions to the new threats we now face. We believe that a third-party model, with a not-for-profit organization, working with private enterprise to spearhead this may in fact be the best solution. Our organization has extensive experience in hiring, training, supervising, and motivating employees to do the job. The track record in Canada has been very good, and the evidence supports the safe passage of over 40 million passengers per year in Canada without any serious single incident that would threaten life.

We also believe there should be national standards reinforced; perhaps there could be enhanced national standards, if required, but they should be national standards. Very much the interest of our organization is continuing to expand our work at airports, but to do so we make sizeable investments in the organization, in the organizational structure, and in management salaries. It simply allows us to use the very best expertise across the country, where needed, by having national standards that are consistent.

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I have submitted a brief to you. You've probably had the opportunity to look at it. It's quite extensive, and I'd be more than pleased to answer questions.

Again, thank you for inviting us here today. It is very meaningful for us to take part in the ongoing process to improve security.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. St. John.

Mr. Peter St. John (Individual Presentation): Most of you will not have read my remarks because they've not been translated for you, so I'll just leave them with you and you can look at them. You won't have as much opportunity to question me as you might otherwise have.

I want to say at the outset that I got into this field as a private individual because I lost my best student on Air India 182. One day he was alive; the next day he was dead. That was in 1985. Since that time I've waged a personal war to improve security in Canadian airports. I've waged that war simply by speaking out and by looking at the record.

I've examined the record of nearly 1,400 hijacks in writing this book, Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism. There's no substitute for looking at the facts and finding out the patterns and development, the context, in which hijacking operates. It operates in well-defined cycles over periods of time, and it has been very consistent ever since World War II.

In the same breath I want to say that the airport security community, the aviation security community, is a very closed community. They all agree with each other and they all think they're doing a fine job.

I've spent a number of years saying they don't do a fine job. Their system is inadequate, and in fact Canada needs a quite radically new airport security system. Now that the Americans, two days ago, developed government control, we're the only country that doesn't do that.

I speak for myself. I'm not for any organization.

I'd like to mention some of the highlights of what I've said. The first thing is articulating the problem. The present system of Canadian airport security does not work well. Serious violations of security occur regularly at all of Canada's international airports.

A policeman friend of mine observed a serious one in Vancouver International Airport three days ago, where a very suspicious bag was left by four security people, and the fourth one finally kicked it. Of course, if it had been a bomb, it would have been a different matter. And they didn't seem to know what to do with it when they were there.

The stories of these violations are regularly reported to this witness by mature and observant frequent travellers, many of them former employees of Transport Canada and with the airlines.

Correspondents of the Globe and Mail were not caught while flagrantly violating the rules of carry-on materials aboard aircraft.

On October 30 of this year, in a CBC national forum, the Minister of Transport replied to a question on security at northern airports by stating that the lack of airport security at such airports would be rectified when northern passengers passed through security en route to connecting flights to major airports. In fact, such security checking does not take place in the second airport, and the minister clearly does not understand this vital weakness in our airport security system.

The government has handed over the responsibility for airport security to the two agencies least qualified and least appropriate to achieve good airport security: the airlines and the airport administrations. In fact, it's arguable that there's a clear conflict of interest in this arrangement.

The purpose of both agencies is to make money, and thus the lowest possible priority is assigned to airport security, hence the term “rent-a-cop”. The philosophy of this system makes it impossible to result in good security. Inadequately trained and motivated... this kind of privatized security system is not conducive to passenger safety.

And passengers are voting with their feet. I've never been in so many empty planes as I have since September 11, including across the United States about four days after this event happened.

It is most likely, furthermore, that CSIS would be unwilling to share serious intelligence warnings with private security systems, though it might cooperate with an RCMP presence at airports. And inadequate warnings can lead to what happened in the U.S. on September 11, and in fact that's what happened: no warnings when there should have been warnings.

At present, the airlines in Canada are in deep financial and organizational trouble, which will, in turn, put greater pressure on security expenditures and preparedness. The travelling public is voting with its feet, resulting in passenger traffic being significantly reduced.

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Perhaps the most alarming indication of airport security weakness in Canada is the pattern of crisis-reaction by the Government of Canada. After the Air India disaster of 1985 the government tried to solve the problem by throwing money at it.

Every new crisis brings a government committed to “beefing up security”—a phrase that should be banished from the language of Canada—indicating its belief that pronouncements and increased expenditures will result in solutions and better security. Alas, it does not do so.

There are models of successful airport security in Europe, Israel, and particularly in Malaysia. I recommend a very close look at these models before you look at the Canadian scene. Sustained security based on well-paid professional personnel operating under government guidelines is the only way to adequately defend against the persistent problem of terrorist attacks against the west from the Islamic fundamentalist terrorists.

I'd like to illustrate the importance of this thinking by mentioning briefly the evolution of airport security. I won't spend long on this. I want to remind you that the first skin of airport security in 1973, developed by General Benjamin Davis, is the one we now work with.

It has been the basis of airport security ever since that time, January 1, 1973, on the orders of President Nixon. This was fine with Cuban hijackers, with seriously mentally disturbed people, and with Palestinians who at that stage would negotiate.

In the 1980s this system came under pressure from the Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, or Islamists, as they're called, when they developed a range of tactics around the placement of bombs on aircraft in a manner that bypassed traditional security. The culmination of this line of attack occurred with the destruction of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988. The reaction to increasing explosions aboard aircraft was to develop million-dollar machines capable of spotting bombs in passenger luggage.

In the 1990s the attackers therefore returned to exploiting the weakness of traditional airport security. In 1995 Rahmzi Ahmed Yousef, who was taken in Pakistan by the American authorities, planned to simultaneously place 11 bombs on commercial aircraft returning to the United States. Had he not been arrested, those 11 planes would have exploded on their way to or over the United States, which would have been an even greater disaster, probably, than September 11, if that's possible.

In 1999 the U.S. pilot of Egypt Air—and it's in Atlantic Monthly this month—committed suicide, murdering a planeload of passengers. This article makes it very clear that the evidence suggests and supports this.

On September 11, 2001, four planes were quite effortlessly hijacked by 19 terrorists who had sufficient training to fly them into pre-determined targets. You know about the 5,000 dead.

If there's any single conclusion from September 11 it is that airport security in North America has been completely inadequate. Until and unless it is improved, there will be endless combinations of techniques that will allow terrorists to successfully target North American civil aviation. In short, a new skin of airport security—and I use the word “skin” advisedly—is now essential, and I want to suggest very briefly what some of these elements would entail.

The Chair: Three minutes.

Mr. Peter St. John: All right. I'll do it very briefly.

First, far better intelligence has to be employed, especially with the profiling of the suicide terrorists. We're in the third generation of profiling of suicide terrorists.

Second, responsibility by the Government of Canada, preferably not Transport Canada, perhaps the justice system, as they're doing in the United States—another department that's not tied down with old shibboleths and attitudes.

Third, there has to be a well-paid professional security core ready to be circulated around the country and ready to implement the whole tone of security at an airport.

Fourth, the development of digital and particularly biometric security has huge possibilities at the moment.

The fifth element is the training and the vetting of the human airport communities that we now know are responsible for putting the drugs on the planes right across the world.

The sixth element is passenger baggage reconciliation systems.

The seventh element is the passenger profiling, computerized stand-alone screening systems tied to law enforcement and immigration databases.

Eighth, there has to be a highly trained and efficient sky marshal core.

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Nine is the checking of cabin luggage.

Ten is rethinking the cockpit—I won't go into that now.

Eleven is training pilots and cabin crew in what to do as a last resort in case there is trouble in the air.

Twelve is propaganda disinformation and warnings. By that I mean that an airport's best defence is to declare that they have very good security, that sky marshals are aboard planes, and that they're not going to talk about the details; they should express this sort of information in a way that deters terrorists from attacking that airport. In other words, terrorists take their cues from the obvious security or bad security in a particular airport. As in wartime, this whole issue of how you present yourself as an airport is vitally important.

In conclusion, a new skin or system of airport security is urgently needed in Canada. It's clear from experience that terrorists will unerringly strike at any one of a number of weak points in a national or international aviation system. In order to defend against the new breed of fundamentalist and suicide hijacker, a seamless web of security should be created to close existing gaps and to reassure the travelling public.

In conclusion, I recommend that the committee should examine the systems currently used by the three security innovators, the Israelis, the British, and the Malaysians.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: That was very well done, Mr. St. John. It was as a result of your student?

James, you have ten minutes.

Mr. James Moore (Port Moody—Coquitlam—Port Coquitlam, Canadian Alliance): I thank everybody for coming here. We've had three very substantive presentations from very different perspectives, and I think they're all very good. Can we make sure we get a written copy of Mr. Berg's and Mr. St. John's presentations?

Mr. St. John, I have ten minutes to question directly, but I'll cede to you three or four minutes if there is something specifically in the closing there you'd like to expand upon to let us know about. Was there something in particular in your closing you wanted to...

Mr. Peter St. John: I think I've put the essence of the system to you. There are just a couple of things I would mention.

If I had something to say, I would suggest that this committee in its studies have a lecture by someone to tell you about the Islamic fundamentalist mind. If you don't understand the nature of the attack against you, you're not going to understand the security to put there, and that's why I referred to the profiles of suicide terrorists. This is the most difficult set of terrorists we've ever had to deal with: intelligent, educated people absorbed into our society who decide just suddenly to destroy whole infrastructures.

Mr. James Moore: I had that thought. Actually, I was flying back on Sunday evening, and I thought to myself... I was standing at the front of the plane—I can't remember what it was, I guess it was a 767 or an A-320—waiting to go to the bathroom. I looked, and there was the door right there. If you're a suicide bomber, there are actually no security measures: just pop open the door. Somebody could have done that.

May I ask what sort of screening techniques vis-à-vis profiling are you referring to specifically? Just immigration standards, or CPIC, the Canadian Police Information system?

Mr. Peter St. John: The Americans have something called CAPPS, which is the computer-assisted passenger pre-screening system. While there might be some objection to a computer profiling system, the profiling of terrorists does change over time. There's no particular intention to discriminate against any particular group of people, although at the moment we know exactly and precisely the countries from which the suicide terrorists are coming.

Mr. James Moore: It's unfortunate that we don't have the legislation today so we can actually talk about what specifically is going to be put on the table tomorrow morning. Mr. Berg's suggestion about putting it in the hands of the airport authorities themselves may, for obvious political reasons, be the direction we're going. It could be good, sound public policy as well in the sense that the federal government has to do something. But they don't want to put it 100% in government hands because if something bad does happen again, they don't want to be associated and get blamed.

What do you think of Mr. Berg's specific proposal, as it may actually be exactly what's presented tomorrow?

Mr. Peter St. John: I'm sorry, but I was not absorbing it as well as I should have been doing, so it would be unfair to comment on it at this point.

Mr. James Moore: I was referring to the idea of taking air security out of the hands of air carriers because there's a conflict of interest, as you suggested, and putting it into the hands of the airport authorities or in the non-profit sector, as the other two witnesses have suggested.

Mr. Peter St. John: I still think government should be in charge of this.

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There's been a huge debate in the United States with a Republican regime in power, who believe in privatization as nobody else in the whole world does. For some amazing reason they've come down on the side of government control. The FAA has made such a mess of it and is so much controlled by the airlines that nobody trusts it any more. The suggestion has been made that it's going to go to the Department of Justice, which is going to impartially impose strong regulatory things.

I just don't think the airport administrations have the experience, nor do I think they have the ingenuity, to deal with the kinds of terrorists we're dealing with. Nor should they be held responsible for this. They should have a very strong role, of course, but the initiating role should be with government. Government must take responsibility, as most other governments in the world do.

Mr. James Moore: I don't mean to pit witnesses against each other, but I would ask two questions of Mr. Berg. One, could you comment on those criticisms? Number two, as to the idea of putting it into the hands of the airport authority, how would you suggest that be financed?

Mr. Larry Berg: Thank you.

I don't disagree with the objectives of my colleague, Mr. St. John. Here, in fact, as I listen to him, I find we share the same objectives. Actually, we disagree on very few points. We're of one mind that the government must take responsibility and take control of this. I agree with that. We're of one mind that in fact airlines are not the appropriate agencies to deliver this. The profit motivation gets in the way of this issue. We're of one mind on that.

We start to differ a little on how exactly it should be delivered. I would take exception to his characterization of airport authorities as being profit motivated. In fact, the Vancouver International Airport Authority, like all other airport authorities in Canada, is a not-for-profit authority. It was established to manage the airport, and we are not-for-profit. It isn't our primary motivation.

The question then becomes, who's in the best position to deliver this service? With the federal government in the appropriate role as regulator, overseer, and setter of standards, are they the best ones to deliver it? If we set up a federal crown agency and hire a cadre of civil servants, I would suggest to you that it will not deliver what you want.

I think fairly nimble, flexible airport authorities, who currently operate all air-side access security at airports—I myself have 140-odd folks engaged in that process, including 30 RCMP—can best manage that, on a contractual basis with the federal government.

It's on the question of delivery where we might differ.

Mr. James Moore: Do you have a concern at the YVR? We had the head of... was it Aeroguard, I believe, who was here a couple of weeks ago?

Mr. Larry Berg: That is the airline agent that's retained by the airline committee as a private security contractor, reporting to the airlines, to deliver the service.

Mr. James Moore: In questioning, I asked him, “How much do you pay your people?” He said the top salary their people earn is $10.05 an hour. Do you think you get premium quality for $10.05 an hour?

Mr. Larry Berg: No, frankly. With the private security folks the airport authority has, I think the average salary would be closer to $15, and the top would be far in excess of that.

Our proposal would be to integrate the “Aeroguard staff”, if you will, into our broader security force, cross-train them, professionalize them, job-rotate them, and turn them into real professional security people. The best way to deliver this service is with a broad-based security service at airports, one where there's unity of command for ordinary operating procedures, but most importantly, of course, for when you have emergencies.

Mr. James Moore: At one time it was clearly seen as a good idea to have the air carriers themselves managing airport security. What has happened to change your mind? What would you specifically do differently that the air carriers are not doing?

Mr. Larry Berg: I never regarded it as a good idea to have airlines operate pre-board screening. I never felt that was a good idea, but that happened long before airport authorities were established in the early nineties.

Airport authorities I know don't share the notion. They believe we're getting relatively poor security combined with poor customer service. We think it would be more intelligently managed with a broader base. I never did hold the view that this was the appropriate way to deliver it.

Mr. James Moore: I don't think you answered the original question—I may have interrupted you—about the question of financing.

Mr. Larry Berg: Sure, this is going to cost more money. How much is yet to be determined. It depends how deeply we get into X-ray and explosive detection device systems. That's clearly going to be quite costly. If you go to in-line baggage screening and X-ray and explosive detection on all baggage, including domestic as well as international, it's going to be fairly costly.

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I think this cost is appropriately shared to some extent by the taxpayer because this is a national issue. It's not directed particularly at airlines or passengers. But I believe at the end of the day the passengers need to bear their fair share of this cost. It could be financed by a charge in the ticket, as there used to be years ago with security costs. It could be added to airport improvement fees. There are many ways of financing this. In my mind, the travelling public is more than prepared to pay to get the adequate security system they want.

The Chair: Mr. Moore, I can give you another two minutes.

Mr. James Moore: I'll come back. I'd like to spread the time around.

The Chair: Mr. Szabo.

Mr. Paul Szabo (Mississauga South, Lib.): Mr. Berg, how important is it for Canada to have a safety and security strategy for airlines and airports all across Canada?

Mr. Larry Berg: I think it is extremely important that we have this strategy and that it be consistent and uniform across the country. It's important of course to us domestically, but it is vitally important in terms of international transiting passengers. I think countries such as the United States and others are going to be looking for us to have a system that is certainly equivalent to their own. Frankly, I would say that our system has, in some respects, been superior to that in the United States. But I think it is vitally important to our role in world trade and for the international movement of business and leisure passengers to have a system that internationally meets the highest standards and would act, as my colleague has mentioned, as a deterrent to folks.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Can you very succinctly advise the committee of the significant responsibilities that are discharged by an airport authority?

Mr. Larry Berg: With regard to security—

Mr. Paul Szabo: Not just security; I'm talking about your whole job.

Mr. Larry Berg: Generally speaking, airport authorities are responsible for the development and operation of airports under local authority, board structures, really to meet regional and national objectives. A lot of them tend to be related to economic development. Airports are huge engines of economic development, and they are seen as the link both in terms of trade and international tourism that perhaps the highways and ports, to some extent, used to be in former times. Airports really have become engines of economic development. They seem to be best managed on a local basis to meet local needs; hence the devolution of airports some ten years ago.

Beyond that, all aspects of the operation of the Vancouver International Airport rest with me, with the one exception of pre-board screening of passengers.

Mr. Paul Szabo: It's quite a business.

Mr. Larry Berg: It is quite a business, certainly.

Mr. Paul Szabo: In view of those facts, that a board has been established, a process has been established to be a regional representative dealing with regional differences, to make optimal arrangements for a healthy operating airport and a safe airport, this board and this management have significant distractions with the work. What makes you think that the authority can then also take on the central coordinating responsibilities and expertise of the safety and security of Canadians consistent with all jurisdictions right across the entire country, and still do that other job without having conflicts?

Mr. Larry Berg: I feel confident in this for the following reasons. We currently do that and have done it for some years now in several other very important areas. We run the national emergency response system, including airport fire, crash, and rescue response, across the country to extremely high standards. That is done uniquely and uniformly at every airport across this country. We all run to the same standards. All air-side access and all security at airports, other than pre-board screening, has always been with the airport authority. That is run consistently across the country to very high standards—130 or 140 people are engaged in that process. We've always managed that. It's consistent across the country. Transport Canada inspects it and audits airports relative to that performance. We have always done that.

We're well used to working in an environment where there are national standards, and we implement them and are audited regularly relative to that.

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Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. St. John, I was fascinated by your approach, because I think there's a little passion behind it and obviously a lot of experience. The conflicts of interest you referred to, real or perceived, are of concern, and obviously if Canada's security efforts, and its strategy and the implementation of its strategy, are weaker than other jurisdictions, say the United States, and we are either perceived or in fact are a weaker link, that would set us up to be in fact the most vulnerable. How do you see Canada, I think specifically with regard to the U.S., in terms of harmonizing its safety and security strategies?

Mr. Peter St. John: I think that's going to be a problem. The reason for the problem is that I think, as Larry Berg rightly said, our security system was probably working better than the American one at the time of September 11. After September 11 the Americans have gone at security like a mad demon, if I can put it that way. They are absolutely cracking down on changing their whole system because they realize how bad and how sloppy it's become, and we've all seen that happen.

I'll get around to answering your question. The Canadian system is not all that much better than the American system because we weren't under threat. It was one of the major reasons. But at heart it's paying people... and in Winnipeg we're very poor, it's $6.50 an hour for doing security. You cannot pay people $6.50 an hour to do anything good. One of my own students was one of the security people, and the Prime Minister went past him and he didn't even recognize him because he was so dulled by doing 20 minutes of this work. He's mentioned in my book.

The thing is that if we don't go quite a long way toward imitating the huge American come-to-attention over security matters, we'll be left behind. We'll be excluded from the joys and freedoms of NAFTA, and they'll demand that we develop better security before we even fly our planes there. I think the harmonizing may not be harmonious; it may be a very inharmonious harmonizing unless we react very strongly in the area of security.

Let me tell you, the Americans are talking of arming pilots; they are talking of redoing the whole sky marshal thing; they're talking about a much better balance between technology and human ability in security, which is going to mean paying the people much better. There are the people who look after the airports; there are going to be a lot of people who must be well trained. And I want to see in Canada the much better training of a whole lot of different people concerned with an airport. If we don't do it, we'll be out of the loop.

Mr. Paul Szabo: I'll grant that. I would think the point being made is that we have to be seen to be as secure, if not more secure. It doesn't matter if you're the same as long as the equivalency is at least there or better.

We're not experts on the safety and security issues and have no special training or expertise; we're here to try to get some of the principles and the guidelines, and hopefully the proposed legislation is also going to help us there. In terms of underlying principles and strategy—and, Mr. St. John, you may have some knowledge of international experience—we have had many people talk about the lineups of people to get through airports and how we check each and every one. Everybody's treated the same. We've had people say, we don't even look at baggage; it just goes. We seem to have decided somehow that the people and their carry-on luggage is more important than the checked luggage.

Then there are other things that happen. Even with the sky marshal issue in the U.S., it's pretty clear they're not going to be able to have enough trained sky marshals for all flights at all times. It just isn't going to happen. Therefore, I can only presume that the policy is going to be that the sky marshals are going to be in place and may be on any flight at any time, but not necessarily on all flights.

So in terms of strategy, or being more selective of the application resource, rather than say that all people have to be treated the same, should we be looking at principles that say there must be profiling also of people who can maybe be fast-tracked through? And without looking at undermining personal rights or getting involved in discriminatory practices, are there examples internationally of where profiling techniques and strategic or selective auditing can be as effective in terms of confidence levels because you can't get 100% at any time?

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Mr. Peter St. John: The Americans, of course, want to have 100% screening coverage, and they reckon it will take 30 months to do this. That's being optimistic. They would like to screen all baggage that's carry-on in cabins and sent by planes; they'd like to do this in 30 months.

The Israelis have used profiling very strongly, and I believe the Americans are inclining very much in that way at this moment. Profiling begins the moment you buy a ticket, and it goes into place if and as you're a frequent flyer. The Israelis make no apologies, they make no bones about profiling, because it will save lives. It has meant that there has not been an Israeli plane hijacked since 1968. So their delicate balance of technology and human security with inspiration really works; the profiling really works.

They're not going to tell you all the profiling. I'm not going to tell you a lot of what I know in the profiling. It's a process that shouldn't come out in the public. It may be discriminatory, but the point is to create good security, and that profiling system is very good for getting the huge 100% of the travelling public down to 2.5% to 3%. If you know you're dealing with the last 2.5% to 3%, or 2%, in an airport, you can get organized fairly well.

As you've suggested, there are certain people who are not risks because they're very well checked out and looked at because they're frequent flyers and so on, but you can look at those people in the process of going through an airport. And without walking you through an airport, there are at least four or five occasions in which you can check on passengers who are suspicious, and there are ways you can do it.

Mr. Paul Szabo: I have one last question, and maybe all of you can give me your input on it.

The Chair: Could we have a quick question and a quick answer, please, because I want to give everybody a chance.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Are you all in agreement, or individually in agreement, that there should be a central authority overseeing all aspects of airline airport security?

Mr. Peter St. John: The answer is yes, and may I say the reason why I say yes? The reason is because you must have uniformity of standards and behaviour in the security system of a country. We only have about 28 airports, so we can do it; the Americans have 532 airports.

But I go back to Malaysia. The Malaysian security people are very well paid. They're paid extra money for finding security infractions and they are circulated to other airports when they do a good job. And finally, they put the fear of God into the human communities in their own airports, which raises the whole level of security in an airport and around the country. I like that model.

The Chair: I will go now to Mr. Laframboise.

Mr. Larry Berg: I was going to quickly comment, if I could.

The Chair: We have to be very quick. Mr. St. John, you have to be short with your answers, because I want to give all of my members a chance to answer, and if you persist in this direction, they won't get a chance and they will be upset with me.

So have your quick answer, and then I'll move to Monsieur Laframboise.

Mr. Larry Berg: Quickly, in response to the question, yes, of course I'm in favour of a national agency to regulate and standardize this, and my suggestion is it should be jointly board representation between airlines, airports, and the federal government I think to get the standard set up.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise (Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will be making my comments in French, so I would ask you to adjust your sets, please.

• 1620

My first question is addressed to Mr. Berg, and relates to his answer to a question from Mr. Szabo. Mr. Berg, you are suggesting that we opt for a model that would involve establishing a non-profit organization to take responsibility for security. That is basically what you are proposing in your presentation. As you suggested, that organization would collect money partly from the airlines and partly from government, in all likelihood. Did I understand you correctly?

[English]

Mr. Larry Berg: It could either be funded through the airlines or some proportion of government funding would be appropriate. Also, funds could be collected by airport authorities through passenger charges, much as we do with airport improvement fees.

So there's a variety of methods. I think we'd have to get together with the government and determine the best way to fund it.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: So, I did get it right and I must say that concerns me, Mr. Berg. You know, when the recent events occurred, I did not have the feeling that anyone had been held responsible for anything that occurred, either the airport authorities, who were not singled out for blame by anyone, or Transport Canada, whose directives you have always followed. Since the directives were not tough enough, ultimately, no one is to blame.

Now you are suggesting we set up a non-profit organization that would depend on generous donors, including the airlines. But you would all be part of this organization, since you mentioned that the board of directors would have to represent the stakeholders. You also said that you currently have that responsibility and that under this model, responsibility would be transferred to such an organization. Indeed, you are not the only ones to present such a proposal.

However, I doubt that the government will move in the direction of establishing an independent, non-profit organization that would report to everyone and no one at the same time. That is the reality; there is a desire to transfer responsibility for security. Personally, I have held the same opinion ever since we first heard from witnesses, and my opinion has not changed. I honestly believe we need a tactical centre to take responsibility for security.

What is being proposed here involves a non-profit organization that would be funded partly by the airlines and partly by government. At the same time, we are being told—and you made the same point—that there is a need to make users and the general public feel more secure. I'm sorry, but I really don't think having a non-profit organization in charge of security would make the public feel more secure.

Perhaps you could comment on that, Mr. Berg.

[English]

Mr. Larry Berg: The role of the non-profit association would be to collectively, on behalf of airlines and airports, and with advisers from the federal government, interact with Transport Canada in the process of setting a regulation. Transport Canada would uniquely remain responsible for the regulatory role, for promulgating what the standards should be, and for inspecting to see that they are delivered.

So the non-profit organization would consult and liaise with them. The organization would also be involved in the purchase of baggage X-ray and explosive detection device systems and other technology. It would be a substantial investment and it would best be done in a group.

• 1625

The actual implementation to meet the federal standards will be done by each airport authority through broadening their existing security staff who are responsible for air-side access security today, expanding that to take charge of passenger pre-board screening as well. So the expansion of existing airport roles to take advantage of pre-board screening will manage that process as well.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: And that is why my next question will be for Mr. St. John. In the absence of a tactical centre with expertise in terrorism and criminal activity that would be responsible for issuing directives to the various players, I don't see how we can possibly provide appropriate security in the air transportation industry. In that respect, I fully agree with you. The government has to take some of the responsibility.

You know, I find it strange to hear it said—and all the witnesses, not just the Vancouver Airport Authority are saying this—that everything was working just fine before September 11, and even afterwards. The Americans have never said that everything worked just fine. They immediately said that significant changes were needed. Why? Because there is a new President in the United States who made the decision to assume his responsibilities after realizing that the system had not performed well and to invest the money needed to ensure that changes could occur.

Here in Canada, we have a Liberal government that has been in power since 1993. All the organizations that have been appearing here, and that includes you, have received funding from the government. You have all negotiated with that government since 1993. So no one dares blame anyone else. Nobody is responsible. Everything is fine and dandy, always has been, and things will even get a little better.

The fact is, however, that everything was not fine and dandy at all and Transport Canada wasn't doing its job. Why? Because the standards were not tough enough. Why? Because they were not developed by people with expertise in the area of terrorism and criminal activity. That is the reality.

That's why we need a tactical centre to oversee security. And the cost of this will have to be borne by the government, as is happening in the United States, where they are paying those costs and taking their responsibilities. Otherwise, the next plane will take off from Canada and crash in the United States. That's what is going to happen if we cannot keep up with improvements elsewhere.

I would be interested in hearing your reaction, Mr. St. John.

[English]

Mr. Peter St. John: There should be much more use of expertise in dealing with terrorism in this country. We are used to the Cold War. We are used to a traditional military response to the Cold War that went on for 40 years. We haven't developed ideas and security frameworks and advice panels around the notion of terrorism.

There are certain people who have trained themselves very well in terrorism, like CSIS, for instance. CSIS, and to a lesser degree the RCMP, know a lot about counter-terrorism. It's very valuable. We don't have any central training place, which I would like to see, for the training of people engaged in security work against terrorism. I would like to see a government organization of some sort spending money coordinating a central role.

I don't doubt for a moment the sentiments of Mr. Berg. I like them. I think he has good ideas. But he can only speak for Vancouver; he can't speak for the rest of the country. And each airport administrator might be feeling a little differently about this.

Most of my advice as a specialist in terrorism goes to the media. This is about the third time I've come before... I went before both Senate committees and my advice was happily ignored. So perhaps the government doesn't want to hear the best advice on terrorism these days.

I think the central thrust of your question, though, was that there should be a much better array of people involved in the generating and developing of security mechanisms throughout the country, not only in airports, but also in other facets of our national life. Isn't that really what you are saying? And if you are saying that, I think you're absolutely right. It's not a question of profit or non-profit; it's a question of getting the system in place.

• 1630

In North America we suffer from the “oh, they couldn't do this to us” syndrome. We're nice people. We're peacekeepers. We're Canadians. Nobody is going to hit us. Rubbish. As soon as they stop making money in Canada or as soon as we start hitting bin Laden with our troops, the 40 terrorist groups that are operating in Canada are going to hit us. It will be just as easy to hit us, and then how prepared will we be?

The Chair: Okay. I'll move to Mr. Cannis.

I'll give you another chance, hopefully, Mario, for the next round.

Mr. John Cannis (Scarborough Centre, Lib.): Mr. St. John, you made reference to a gentleman, Rahmzi Yousef, I think was the name, 11 planes... When did that happen?

Mr. Peter St. John: Rahmzi Yousef was one of the people behind the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the one that didn't quite succeed. Do you remember?

Mr. John Cannis: Where was he going to board from?

Mr. Peter St. John: He was a member of the organization jointly of Osama bin Laden and Abdel Rahman, the blind priest from Egypt.

Mr. John Cannis: Yes, he's now in prison.

Mr. Peter St. John: He was their major operative and he was arrested in Pakistan. He had already been behind the abortive first attempt to crash the two towers of the World Trade Center into each other and then have cyanide fumes in the middle of all that.

Mr. John Cannis: He was apprehended before he got—

Mr. Peter St. John: He was apprehended just hours before his central plan—this has been documented now—to send 11 commercial aircraft back at precisely the same time from different parts of the world with bombs in them.

They have a massive... they even have a word for it. I can't remember it at the moment.

Mr. John Cannis: You referred to other countries such as Europe, Britain, specifically Israel, Malaysia, and what they're doing, that is, of course, providing higher security levels.

I asked another witness who came before the committee sometime back when can they go back in terms of Canadian airports and perhaps give us one incident of a hijacking or a bomb that took place, and I think they said perhaps 25 to 35 years ago. Can you confirm something like that?

Mr. Peter St. John: We've had quite a lot of attacks. We've had a lot of hijackings in Canada, 40 or 50, as a matter of fact. You just don't hear about them very much. We did have a plane completely destroyed and they found the material in it.

I was just reading about it today. I can haul it out if you want the exact incident a number of years ago.

Mr. John Cannis: A minute ago you said the government must take responsibility. I agree, and I want to take that and lead into Mr. Berg.

Mr. Berg, you're saying that the airport authority can best manage security under contract. Did you just come to this realization or perhaps three or five or seven years ago when the airport was being restructured in terms of the airport authorities?

Mr. Larry Berg: For several years now the Vancouver International Airport Authority—and I'm not alone in this; the presence of other airport authorities in Canada... I point out that all the CEOs are unanimous in this view I'm presenting today, which has been presented to the Minister of Transport.

Several years ago in Vancouver we became aware of the fact that pre-board screening could be managed more appropriately. Then in 1997, when we took control of the RCMP function at the airport from the federal government, and then contracted that in turn to the Richmond RCMP to provide the service on our behalf, at that time we felt we should have pre-board screening as well and integrate it with our broader security force. As I mentioned, we have some 140 security people there, including the RCMP.

For the last year actually I've been engaged in discussions with the airline community in Canada to see if I could—and these gentlemen perhaps won't appreciate this—take over the contract at the Vancouver airport to provide the pre-board screening that was then being done by a company called Aeroguard. They're a for-profit security firm that had the contract to the airline community in Vancouver. I was attempting to see if the Vancouver International Airport Authority could take over that contract from them.

Mr. John Cannis: My point is, if you were aware of this problem years ago, did you forcefully come to the various authorities, government, whoever, and say, look, we have a problem, and it has to change?

Mr. Larry Berg: The answer to that is no. I take no credit for that. There was a completely different perception on a lot of this before September 11. It's since those events that we've become aware of our own vulnerability, and so I regard it as a problem, but a small “p” as opposed to a large “P” problem.

• 1635

Mr. John Cannis: To go back to Mr. St. John, it's a very closed group, and if there were problems there, the general public didn't know. Am I correct?

Mr. Peter St. John: Yes, I would say so.

Mr. Larry Berg: I would agree with that.

Mr. John Cannis: So your group, your authorities, have failed the country as well.

Mr. Larry Berg: Well, I think in a sense we haven't because we weren't responsible for pre-board screening. We were responsible for air-side access.

Mr. John Cannis: But we have a responsibility to Canadians to tell them if there's a problem: ladies and gentlemen, we have a problem out there. What we have found from various people who have come before committee is that there's a failure to communicate between whoever it might be—CSIS, the RCMP, your group, etc.—in this communication breakdown. God forbid, and hopefully not, we might have another September 11 event.

Mr. Larry Berg: I would certainly share your view in this perspective. It is critically important that all security functions at airports be under one command and that there be unity of command. If you have fractured responsibilities and different jurisdictions, you're going to have communications problems.

Mr. John Cannis: This is my last question, Mr. Chairman, because my time is up.

You refer to how the charges will be passed on. Will they be passenger charges, various charges, or what have you? If I understand it correctly now, there's a contracting out by the airlines to whichever organization provides security. So the airlines pay x amount of dollars to these security companies. So far I'm correct, I believe.

Mr. Larry Berg: Correct.

Mr. John Cannis: Now, as to this money the airlines are paying, if you take over in conjunction with the government, would the airlines still be paying this expenditure to this newly formed group under the airport authorities, or are they just going to be relieved of that financial responsibility?

Mr. Larry Berg: The airlines have asked to be relieved of their financial responsibility. I didn't make a particular comment on that.

I believe the system will be more costly, in large part because there's going to be a substantial capital investment in X-ray and explosive detection equipment. That's quite costly equipment. If you want to get into X-raying all hold-room baggage as opposed to what the United States is doing, there's going to be a huge bill. It's going to be costly.

It's a national concern in addition to being an aviation concern. The costs should be appropriately shared in some manner between the federal government and the aviation community. Airports are prepared to pay their part in this. Airlines should pay some of it, as they currently have been doing, and the federal government should pay some as well.

The Chair: Bev Desjarlais from the NDP, please.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais (Churchill, NDP): Thank you.

Mr. Berg, you used the term “unity of command”, and I think there's generally a feeling that there needs to be someone in charge. I'm wondering how there can be unity of command if each airport authority is operating or looking after its own security. How can we have unity of command at our airports throughout the nation?

Mr. Larry Berg: We can, just as much as we do today with regard to fire response and crash response, which is a highly regulated function. That is nationally regulated, nationally inspected, and locally delivered.

Air-side access fits the same control. The whole perimeter of the airport is done by airport authorities, with the exception of one or two little doors where the passengers go through. That airport perimeter is all secured according to national standards, locally delivered, and nationally inspected.

The problem of getting consistency among airports would not be insurmountable at all, and the role of this non-profit agency, as I pointed out, would in fact be to assist in that process.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: You've also stressed a number of times that the airport authorities are not-for-profit, and we recognize that. We also recognize that Nav Canada is not-for-profit. However, it's also recognized that the CEOs and the people on those boards are making damn fine salaries, and somebody has to pay for them.

We saw a situation where Nav Canada fees are added to the tickets for the consumers. Now we've got the fuel surcharge, but nobody's overseeing it to make sure it decreases now that the price of fuel has gone down. That's one more thing that was added. Now we're talking about a security charge to be added, yet everybody is operating on a not-for-profit basis.

We heard testimony previously—not necessarily on the security issue—before the transport committee that airport authorities use money they get as airport authorities and invest it in other, outside businesses. Those businesses are for-profit businesses; they don't operate as not-for-profit because they're not under the same realm as the airport authority. We never really delved into the nuts and bolts of that, but for myself, who was around for some of those discussions, I find it hard to look at the airport authorities as strictly not-for-profit. It just doesn't appear that way to me.

• 1640

I don't know. I'm curious. Does anybody in the airport authority make a salary?

Mr. Larry Berg: Certainly, airports are involuntary organizations, and—

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: How about people on the airport authority?

Mr. Larry Berg: It would range.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Give me a rough range. Is it the $6.50 to $15 security guard wage, or what would the wage be?

Mr. Larry Berg: I would say that the average wage of an employee at the Vancouver International Airport Authority is probably in the $40,000 area.

Most airports tend to try to pay comparable salaries within their respective local communities. For us, that may be more than in Winnipeg and less than in Toronto because you're trying to attract and recruit people in the community and compensate them proportionately to the standards of the community.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: When the airport authority came into being, what was the change in the wage category of those people?

Mr. Larry Berg: I think it was substantial. As federal civil servants, they had been under a wage freeze for a number of years. In those times—and I know at the Vancouver International Airport Authority—people certainly enjoyed wage increases that were significant. Absolutely.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Mr. Rivenbark, your company obviously does security in a number of areas. Curiously, nobody has asked you what the pay scale is for the employees within your company, doing the security at airports in Canada.

Mr. Paul Rivenbark: The pay scale in Toronto is on average $9.80 per hour. The pay scale in Calgary is probably about $8.50 per hour. May I comment a little further?

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Sure.

Mr. Paul Rivenbark: We're a firm believer that those wages have been suppressed for a lot of years. The wages have been suppressed by the contracts through the airlines because the airlines have struggled to make a profit—in fact, many of them don't make a profit, they lose money—and because the pricing pressures that have been placed on us in negotiating those contracts have kept wages far too low.

We recognize that we can deliver a better level of service if we can bring those wages up to market value, but we need a mechanism to do it. A mechanism to do it, as we see it, is to have an independent body such as a not-for-profit organization that could deliver the services through an airport authority. We're not against that at all. We would establish market values for those jobs, and there would be some research done to say the wages are too low and we need to—

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Isn't that what's been happening, though? Isn't the market value for the jobs based on the markets? How can you suggest that you're going to establish market value? That's what's been happening. Airline companies weren't making enough money. They're paying you, so this is what the wage is going to be. How can we continue to suggest that we're going to go to market value?

Mr. Paul Rivenbark: The question, as you know, is finding people to perform a function. The question is, can they effectively perform the function and—I repeat “and”—meet the new challenges—

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: That's what we're dealing with.

Mr. Paul Rivenbark: —that will come up tomorrow? We think the standards should be reviewed and enhanced. We'd like to participate in formulating the training standards, but we also believe we're facing a time right now where the turnover is going to become unacceptable in some areas. For example, in Calgary our turnover rate is well over 100%, which is unacceptable.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Well, the wage is $8.50 an hour.

Mr. Paul Rivenbark: We've gone through years of having a crisis suppressed. We need a mechanism to address getting those wages up so we can attract people who will stay in the jobs and have retention of training programs. In this process, we as suppliers have become a little frustrated in terms of delivering what we feel should be the level of security that is needed today. We need to have a change in the model.

As long as we're dealing with organizations that are under immense cost pressures and are not making profits, it's going to be a problem. That is why we recommend the not-for-profit model, which in fact would allow those wages to adjust. The cost will go up; we know that.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: The cost will go up.

Mr. Paul Rivenbark: The cost will go up.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Do I have time for a quick question?

• 1645

The Chair: A quick one.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Mr. Berg, with regard to airport authorities possibly taking over the operation of the security, how would you see the training of personnel throughout the country?

My other question for you is, is there any competition between different airport authorities? Let's take Hamilton and Toronto. Is there any competition for airlines to come in there? Does Hamilton, say, offer a cheaper rate because their costs are less as compared to Toronto?

Mr. Larry Berg: I'll speak to the latter point first. I think there is, to a very limited degree, some competition between airport authorities as they seek to attract air traffic.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: How do you compete?

Mr. Larry Berg: I'll give you an example of one thing that Vancouver will do, and I'm not sure it's competition so much as an inducement to traffic. But if an airline wants to establish a service to a point now not served out of Vancouver, to a city not now served by another carrier today, a brand-new service, then I will waive landing and terminal fees for a one-year period.

It's a small gesture, if you will, but it is to help the airline build up a market, because they're not going to fill the airplane on day one and they're not going to fill it in month one. So it's in essence to help them ramp up. It's pretty common among airports in fact around the world to do that sort of thing. And in many cases a government will throw in an aviation fuel tax, I might add, to try to build the route. So that's pretty common.

Do I think it really influences airlines decisions? Probably not. There are more fundamental reasons why one would put daily 747 service on than a few thousand dollars in airport charges. That's not really the issue.

But there is some competition between airports that are close to each other, and there are some inducements offered by airports, at times, to attract service, yes.

The Chair: We'll go to Val of the PC/DR.

Ms. Val Meredith (South Surrey—White Rock—Langley, PC/DR): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing before the committee.

I have a question to you, Mr. Berg. When you were talking about the airport authorities taking over the responsibility of the security issues, I think it came up that there are 28 airports. But there are a whole lot more than 28 airports in Canada. It may be okay for Vancouver and Toronto to take over this responsibility, but what about the little airports in Terrace, B.C., and the smaller communities who may not have the finances to take on this responsibility? Is it just the larger international airports with airport authorities that would take on the responsibility? Then who would take it on in the smaller airports that connect and have airplanes coming in from those small...

Mr. Larry Berg: That's a very good question. Well put.

I'll preface my response by saying that it's not quite correct to characterize what I'm proposing as airport authorities taking over responsibility for security. We already have responsibility for the security. It's only adding on the pre-board screening, which is a relatively small portion of a larger security issue airports control.

But in terms of the small airports, that's a very legitimate question, and this would be again the role of the not-for-profit agency that would be set up nationally. They could do one of two things. They could, on a province-wide basis, arrange for a service contract with, say, these gentlemen's firm or another firm that could deliver it on a province-wide basis. Alternatively, one could—I'm not recommending it, but hypothetically one could envision it—have a nationwide contract with several firms to deliver service for small airports that don't today have their own professional security staff.

Ms. Val Meredith: The concern has been broached on the training aspect of it. And I know Mr. St. John brought up that there needs to be a greater awareness of what these terrorists are capable of and their mindset, in order to, so to speak, second guess them.

We get into this passenger screening issue. Right now, all it is is people looking at machines to see what's inside the carry-on baggage, for the most part, and checking your boarding pass. Is that what you envision passenger screening should be at that point? Or are we talking about peace officers, more like customs agencies, who look at body language and a few other things to determine whether or not this person may be a security risk?

• 1650

Mr. Larry Berg: I think there are two roles here. Certainly the question of X-ray and inspection of carry-on luggage—I didn't get into whether we should allow that or how many pieces, and I have my own views, as Mr. St. John does on that; I think less is better—is always going to be with us, and it's a legitimate function that this would be performed.

Beyond that, I could see if it were set up at Vancouver—speaking for Vancouver, not other airports. I'd then have a senior security officer, or perhaps even RCMP, who would be available around all inspection points, and their job would be to look for the anomalies. We have to get intelligent security, not mass production. And advance passenger information is going to be coming within the next year. That's going to be critical to allowing people to selectively decide who they want to really put under the microscope, if you will. So intelligent security is the answer to this as opposed to mass production.

Ms. Val Meredith: I actually noticed this travelling through Edmonton, where they had it. They had the screeners looking through the baggage and the screening machines, but they also had RCMP officers standing off to the side. I wondered at the time what their purpose was, but I appreciate now from your comments that this is probably what it is.

I have a specific question to you, Mr. Berg, about Vancouver International Airport. I understand from constituents of mine that there was a very well-trained security group in place, many of whom were ex-RCMP or ex-police officers, and they've been replaced. My question is, why were they replaced? What was the deciding factor? And if it's not an economic decision based on salary caps and salary, the costs of it, then how do we overcome the issue that if the airport authorities take on the passenger screening as well as the airport security, it isn't going to come to a dollar and cents issue rather than qualifications and quality?

Mr. Larry Berg: I could comment on that without getting into individual specifics. At the point in time when we made some of those changes in personnel, there were some former RCMP people involved; there still are some there, but there were more then. In fact, I was senior vice-president of operations and I changed a couple of those people out, because, in my opinion, I was upgrading the level of security to the standard I wanted. So I thought it was a management change for the better. I believed that then and I believe it today.

Ms. Val Meredith: So it's not a company change as much as it's individuals who were changed?

Mr. Larry Berg: There was a manager who worked for me who I replaced with another manager.

Ms. Val Meredith: I got the impression from what I've been told, and it may be wrong information, that it was a company that's being replaced by another group, another company with different employees.

Mr. Larry Berg: No. There have been two security firms at the Vancouver airport since I've been involved and they're still both there. Their roles have changed proportionately; one now has a larger role than the other. But certainly the role that the RCMP performed has never changed; it's always been the same. The role of the security companies has not changed, but the relative roles each perform has shifted between them.

Ms. Val Meredith: Are you aware of a report that went to the Minister of Transport, I believe in 1998, indicating some very serious violations, security breaches, at the Vancouver airport, particularly with getting into secure areas through, I believe, the two access points, the south terminal where the old RCMP station was and then one on the north side by the hotel? Are you aware that there was a report that went to the transport minister?

Mr. Larry Berg: No, I'm not. I'm aware of certainly any audits that Transport Canada has performed at the airport authority, and generally speaking we performed extremely well in those audits. But if someone were to have written a letter to the minister or put in a report—

Ms. Val Meredith: You didn't get a copy.

Mr. Larry Berg: I didn't get a copy of that, no.

Ms. Val Meredith: My last question is on what you have referred to as an audit. Does Transport Canada on a regular basis check out the security at not only Vancouver International, but Toronto and all the other larger airports? Does somebody from Transport Canada check it out every now and then to see how it performs?

Mr. Larry Berg: Yes, they do that regularly and they act.

Ms. Val Meredith: Do you know about it in advance?

Mr. Larry Berg: No, they don't notify us. It's a spot check. They come out and do it. They act as a passenger, and they attempt to violate the system, if you will. I'm pleased to say they're not that often successful, but there have been some incidents at Vancouver where they have succeeded in getting through. I'm given a very stiff letter around it, told of these violations, and asked to rectify them, and of course I promptly proceed to do that.

• 1655

I would suggest, on a go-forward basis, I think more of that is needed. I think we need to see Transport Canada play a stronger role in terms of the audit and compliance at airports.

Ms. Val Meredith: But the concern is not necessarily just passengers; it's also employees. Would they also be checking the access that employees, who may not have the proper clearance, would have to secure areas? Do they do a thorough check of that?

Mr. Larry Berg: Yes, in my opinion, they do.

The Chair: Thank you, Val. I will go to Mr. Shepherd.

Mr. Alex Shepherd (Durham, Lib.): Thank you. It seems to me, as we were discussing this we were really talking about two different types of management tools or management organizations. Maybe the one Mr. St. John is talking about is a more integrated, possibly national, body in which it can actually interface with agencies like CSIS and the RCMP, and there'd be information-sharing and so forth. The second one is a hybrid, in which it gets down to the regional level, and somehow we interface with the airport authorities, who then have some kind of power of hiring and firing, and so forth, in administering a set of standards.

I have some problems with this regional approach, and some of these issues have been mentioned already. One issue is that it's maybe fine for the Vancouver airport, but I'm not so sure how it applies to other smaller airports in the country. I think you will eventually evolve a patchwork system where the hiring practices in Vancouver are different from those at Pearson, which are different from those in Halifax, which, by its own nature, will create different kinds of standards.

The other issue that's been brought up here is a non-profit organization that is sensitive to money matters. In your own presentation you have said you think the taxpayers ought to pay for some of this. This tells me that you have a specific interest, in a pecuniary way, to keep some of those costs of this system away from the airlines. Obviously if it's more expensive to fly, the airport authority eventually transfers its costs to the airlines. That's a basic, fundamental...

So if the Vancouver airport suddenly is a very expensive place to fly into, we're not going to do that any more, although it may be a security requirement that they have more security, or something... I don't know. So I don't know how you address that issue, which seems to me to be the flaw in your management tool here, the fact that we end up with this regional-based patchwork system.

Mr. Larry Berg: I think my response that some of the cost of this should be borne by the federal government is based simply on the premise that I think the terrorist attacks we're under now are attacks on the state; I don't believe they're attacks on a particular airline. I don't think they have anything against American Airlines in particular, or United Airlines for that matter. I think this is an attack on the state, and I think therefore the state needs to respond in an appropriate way; hence that's my thought relative to the cost sharing of it.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: We've had that same comment, but it's all been from people in the airline industry. It was an attack on buildings, but we're not going to allow the construction people here to say we should somehow subsidize building construction costs because they've been targets for terrorists.

Mr. Larry Berg: At the end of the day the citizens pay for it. Whether it's through the tax base or on the airline ticket, at the end of the day, let's be clear, the citizens of this country are going to pay for this. So I'm rather indifferent, and that's why I didn't make a particularly strong case on it.

To get back to your other point, I think this is exactly the role of this not-for-profit federal agency I'm discussing, which is to ensure there are consistent standards. The question becomes, how can you best deliver national standards? I would argue that you can't deliver them from Ottawa or Toronto across this country, from Corner Brook to Victoria. I think they have to be delivered locally. You plan them nationally, you set the standards, you regulate it, you deal with CSIS nationally and the federal government, but it's best delivered locally by people who know the airport and know what's going on there. I think to deliver something on a local basis in Vancouver out of Ottawa or Toronto will not be very effective.

• 1700

Mr. Alex Shepherd: But we're just talking about a management tool. We could have a director of this organization who is directly employed by the government, works in the Vancouver International Airport Authority, and is responsible for the security there. It's not the airport authority. We could attain that close-to-the-ground philosophy without going through an airport authority.

My concern is that there should be an interplay of communications within the system. If we have a problem in Vancouver, that information should also be shared with Pearson and Halifax and so forth. There should be a communal process in which everybody understands that there's a red light on in the system somewhere, because a person is travelling in the system or accessing the system. I'm concerned that a regionally based system won't do that.

Mr. Larry Berg: Again, it would be a national system, with national standards, with this national organization interfacing closely with CSIS and the federal government and the RCMP. It would be delivered locally, nationally monitored. So I think perhaps we have the same objective. That would be a more effective model, and it speaks in some ways to the reason the federal government devolved airports in the first place. They become more effective organizations, because in fact they're adaptive and flexible to local situations. To try to implement nationally across the country is a very difficult thing to do.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: What do you think, Mr. St. John?

Mr. Peter St. John: Well, I think devolution and deregulation have been unmitigated disasters in North America. I think they've destroyed standards. They've led to breaches in security. They've decimated the systems. It's worked that way in health care. The system of health care is a disaster now because of that. I think it's happened in airlines and so on.

Can I tell you a story to answer that question? Do you remember Pan Am 103 in Lockerbie? Do you remember when 271 people were killed? The Israelis gave a warning that there was going to be an attack on a Pan Am flight four weeks ahead of time. They then gave a warning in two weeks that it was going to be in London or Frankfurt. Two days beforehand they said there was going to be an attack on Pan Am 103, and a day before they said there's going to be an attack on Pan Am 103. They told security in Europe and they told Pan Am. Pan Am warned all the diplomats and civil servants not to get on that plane. Suddenly a whole lot of seats were all freed up for children, young people—our children coming back to America. They suddenly found there were seats available to go back home.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: So your point is that—

Mr. Peter St. John: You know the rest of the story.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: —you don't see any problem with a national-based system that went on to the Vancouver airport but was answerable to a larger, national force?

Mr. Peter St. John: I not only don't object, I deeply support it. I have to tell you that the RCMP and CSIS can't get on with each other. It has taken two Senate committees to tell us, as they have both mentioned this. If they can't get on with each other, they're sure not going to trust an individual airport security system.

You have to have federal representation. You have to have a complete new system of security in place, if you want to get good security. We're already a decentralized country. We're a federal country. You have too many jurisdictions—provincial, police forces. The more dispersed it gets, the more inefficient it gets. It has to have a centralized system.

It doesn't mean there will not be responsibility locally in airports. There will be very strong responsibility. But in the area of airport security, and security against the kind of attack we had on September 11, nothing less than a national system is going to do it—or else don't even bother to spend the money; just let people die.

The Chair: Thanks, Alex.

We have a number of people who want to go on. I'll have André and then Mario for a while. I'll come back to John Cannis, then over to Bev, and then over to Paul. That will be the end. For five minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to give Mr. Bennett and Mr. Rivenbark an opportunity to give us the benefit of their international experience through their Danish parent company, which operates in 70 countries around the world, as well as in Alberta and Ontario. You have been given important mandates, including being responsible for security at the Pentagon, similar duties at IBM, and so on. You really have international expertise in this area.

• 1705

You are obviously in favour of maintaining close cooperation between the private sector, airport authorities and governments. In your brief, which I read carefully, you say:

The experience in Canada, as measured by Transport Canada, indicates that the quality of service is meeting current established standards.

I imagine you are referring to international standards, are you not?

[English]

Mr. Paul Rivenbark: Now we're talking about Canadian standards?

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey: Good. Thank you. And would you say they are equivalent to or higher than international standards?

[English]

Mr. Paul Rivenbark: I'm not 100% qualified to answer that. But from my experience in terms of travelling—and I travel quite extensively into the United Kingdom, into Europe, including the Scandinavian countries—my impression is that standards at Canadian airports are very comparable to the international standards that I have personally seen. And because I've been in the business 20 years, I generally have a tendency to be very observant when I'm going through the international airports, to look at the calibre of the staff, the type of screening they do, and the process they use.

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey: In your brief, you also say this:

Since 1987, Canada has had one of the world's most extensive background and security check programs for all screeners and airside employees requiring permanent access to restricted areas. The tragic incidents of September 11, 2001 in the United States of America indicate that the hijackers used crude instruments of a type and size that were not required to be kept off aircraft prior to boarding.

And you conclude that:

No evidence to date indicates that the hijackers illegally penetrated the screening functions at various United States of America airports.

In your view, does that mean that since security has been tightened with respect to objects considered to be dangerous—such as penknives and similar articles—can we hope that security controls will be 100 per cent effective?

[English]

Mr. Paul Rivenbark: You use the words “one hundred percent”. Am I satisfied that every medical surgeon in the country would be able to perform all surgeries 100% error free? Even in the medical community, we know there are going to be errors made by doctors who have had ten years of training. We know that judges have made errors in law.

So will a passenger screening agent operate completely error free?

As long as we're dealing with people and we do not have the capacity to produce people from a manufacturing plant, people who are error free in their work, we are going to have errors because of people. But I can tell you this, since the improved standards have been brought into place, I am very comfortable as a person getting on an airplane and travelling in Canada. I believe the security is probably the best now than it's ever been in our lifetime.

Are there opportunities for improvement? Yes, I think there are, and I think there's an opportunity for the airport authorities, companies such as ourselves, the airlines, and Transport Canada to work in concert to ask what the new issues are that should be addressed in terms of a security program.

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey: What concerns Committee members and Canadians who have been following this closely are the wage disparities, for example. People are always saying that security staff are poorly paid and people tend to think that when salaries are low, productivity and service quality are equally low. I don't know whether that's true or not, but that is certainly the perception.

Do you operate in some countries where the pay scale is much more appropriate than the one that applies here in Canada?

[English]

Mr. Paul Rivenbark: The answer is yes. In Europe there's a tendency to treat security people as professionals. In fact, many people stay in security as a career.

In Canada, in general, security is a stepping stone for people to get into police work or move into another job. By and large the entire security industry in Canada is... it's above the minimum wage level, but it's still at a very low level.

• 1710

With respect to airport security, while we have had significant turnover in Calgary, Mr. Bennett's unit in Pearson has an 8.8% turnover rate. However, having said that, it's our belief that in fact the wages have been suppressed through the bidding process. It's our belief that the wages should be adjusted upwards to give significant increase, so that we could attract the calibre of people we need to stay in the job on a long-term basis. We need a mechanism to work through to accomplish that.

Mr. Kevin Bennett (Vice-President, Canadian Operations, Group 4 Securitas): I would also like to offer a comment. Since September 11, the security officers across Canada and the U.S. feel that with the changes by Transport Canada their role in fact has changed. Transport Canada in fact put in a new set of procedures, additional to what was being done up to September 11. A lot of these procedures, in the mind and perception of the people who carry out that function, create a higher degree of stress in their day-to-day work. The fear element is higher in the people conducting the job, that they may in fact open a suitcase, or someone could come by a screening point with a gun, or any other type of activity might happen. So for the pay rate that is now being paid, the perception by the employees changed on September 11.

Also, post-September 11 across the U.S., in order to deal with their situation—it was mentioned earlier that the security had been deemed to be much better since about 1987 in Canada than in certain parts of the U.S.—there has now been a major movement over the past couple of weeks to bring the wages of security screeners, which were below those in Canada, up to a higher figure. As an example, in New York City a screener who was making $7 U.S. would have been raised to $11.17. If you equate this back to what Ms. Desjarlais said, this then creates the perception in Canada that on a comparable breakdown of the U.S. dollar versus the Canadian dollar, a $10 screener in Canada, who does hopefully a better job, has been better trained, and has had more training, should be in about a $16 to $17 range.

Both of these underlying factors have come into play—the comments Mr. Rivenbark made about what the general industry condition was prior to September 11. These other factors have now become very important and have created a perception with the public and a perception by the people who carry out a very fundamental, important job on a daily basis.

Mr. Paul Rivenbark: I think the other thing, Mr. Harvey, if you look at Logan Airport, Washington, which I've flown in and out of a number of times in the last year, even if the wages of the people had been tripled, even if the training had been tripled, the problem still would have happened. Because it's not the people, it's the standards that were in place. The standards allowed people to go on to an airplane and to take instruments they could use. Cockpit doors were left unlocked. I live in a very nice neighbourhood, but I keep my doors locked. The airport doors have been left unlocked for a long period of time. If you go back to the British Airways flight in Africa last winter, where a crazed passenger entered that cockpit and tried to take the plane down, that was a signal to the airline industry at the time that there was a potential danger.

My question is, if you knew there was a potential danger, why wasn't something done? Having said that, too often we place blame upon people and not necessarily the system or the standards that have been put in place for them. By and large I think the security people in Canada are a fine group of people who do a very good job. So let's be constructive in terms of how we move forward.

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend Mr. Bennett and Mr. Rivenbark for their answers and for the quality of their short brief. They lay out the general issues clearly, as well as suggesting specific steps that can be taken to improve security. I want to thank them for that.

[English]

The Chair: We're going to go for five-minute rounds now, starting with Mario. Then I'll go to John Cannis, then to Bev, and then you have the last word, Paul.

• 1715

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Mr. Rivenbark, when you were making your comments about wage differences and the need to increase wages, etc., I understood you to say that you agreed with Mr. Berg that security measures should be funded partly by industry and partly by government. Is that still your view?

[English]

Mr. Paul Rivenbark: Yes, I do. I see a not-for-profit model being set up, which would be one-third federal government, one-third airlines, and one-third Transport Canada. I think that model could also enjoy a partnership with the airport authorities as well, and I would certainly not exclude that. I see that as being the most effective model, rather than placing the responsibility back with the airlines or with one single body.

I think there are vested interests in all parties. Certainly Mr. Berg has a very vested interest to make sure his airport in Vancouver is represented and has a very, very strong security profile. I think the federal government also has a vested interest. Certainly from a liability perspective, the airlines have a significant vested interested. Interestingly enough, organizations such as mine have a significant investment. We are not liability-free.

Mr. St. John talked about the Air India disaster. The company I was with provided the security for the Air India flight. I also know very specifically that their problem was not caused in security. It was caused by an airline ticket agent who inter-lined a bag, and she violated the rules very explicitly by inter-lining a bag, knowing there was a high chance that the passenger would not be on that plane.

So you have a problem within the airline. Then you had equipment that was owned by the airline that broke down and failed to operate. The X-ray machine, owned by the airline, was not operable. There was no service contract in place to fix it. On top of that, the equipment that was given to the security people to go around and sniff the bags for potential explosives was ineffective.

In light of all of that, I can hardly criticize the security people. I can criticize the system for having broken down.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: However, your nice little brief, as my friend André Harvey referred to it...

Mr. André Harvey: I said it was a “good” little brief, not a “nice” little brief, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mario Laframboise: A nice little brief. Pardon me, Mr. Harvey.

In reference to costs, you say in your last paragraph:

Initial research undertaken by private enterprise indicates that a "security tax" on each airline ticket would be acceptable by the travelling public...

That means that you may want to change your conclusion to specify that the federal government should pay its share, because your brief seems to suggest that ticket agents, users or the travelling public should be the ones to bear this cost.

By the way, my friend, André Harvey, obviously tends to focus on the fact that this is the greatest country in the world, even though it is no longer actually number one, but number three, Mr. Harvey, and has been since last year. It isn't number one anymore. So, I think it's important to be careful and keep things in perspective.

That is basically what we have to do. Even though American authorities had security standards that they surely considered acceptable prior to September 11... And it simply isn't true that American standards were not what they would have liked them to be; it's just that the Americans made the decision to strengthen those standards. That is the choice they made.

Over here, every single time, people try to convince us that everything is under control, that we have wonderful standards and that we may only need to change them a little bit. I come back to what Mr. St. John said earlier. What would be the risk for us in continuing to apply less and less rigourous standards in relation to those in place in the United States? What are the chances that the next strikes will be made from Canada?

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mario.

Mr. St. John, two minutes, so we can get everybody's questions in.

Mr. Peter St. John: There's always a risk that if United States security increases very greatly and gets a lot better, the terrorists automatically will head toward the weaker element, and the weaker element would then be seen as Canada.

You could also attack American targets by hijacking Canadian planes, potentially, especially the ones that are near great population centres and large American cities.

So there is a very real danger if we don't keep up with them specifically.

• 1720

I wanted to mention, if it's part of your question, and I'm not sure if it is, that if we're going to use security involving biometrics, we're going to be combining pupil imaging, fingerprinting, and even DNA identification, all of which could be combined within the passport.

I was talking to a former president of the University of Manitoba who is testifying on bioterrorism here today on that issue. What I'm saying is that in Winnipeg, and certainly elsewhere in the country, there have been tremendous complaints by security people that they don't understand the increasing sophistication of the kinds of X-ray machines that are coming out now, and they don't know how to interpret them.

They've asked for more time to be trained, and they've not had that time to be trained. They don't feel adequate to the job, and I don't think they are adequate to the job. I think you're going to have to get much better people if you're going to get good security.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Cannis.

Mr. John Cannis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rivenbark, you said that your organization, which provides security, would be more than happy to work with the airport authorities to continue providing improvements in security. Am I correct?

Mr. Paul Rivenbark: We see the national standards being developed by a non-profit organization, and those standards being monitored very strictly across Canada. However, on a contractual basis, we're not against actually having the contract with an airport authority as long as there's this oversight. We want the oversight to look at the profile of the security officers—

Mr. John Cannis: Mr. Berg, please don't leave, because it ties in here. Correct me if I'm wrong. You're saying you, the authority, are prepared to undertake the security. Is that correct?

Mr. Larry Berg: I'm saying that we already do provide all air-side access service—

Mr. John Cannis: Do you want to take over the security that these people provide?

Mr. Larry Berg: We're prepared to take over the screening process of passengers, pre-board screening. We would deliver that service through a contract with a security firm when we have those—

Mr. John Cannis: What's the difference now? You pick it up and you contract back to them. They're already being contracted by the airlines.

Mr. Larry Berg: The difference is substantial. It's that pre-board screening today is really managed by a consortium of airlines at each local airport called the Airline Operating Committee. It is a loose association of airport station managers at each airport. It's insufficiently high on their priority list. They tend to be cost driven. They contract it out to the lowest bidder, by and large. That's very much in contrast with the security service that the Vancouver airport itself provides. I think it would enhance the service remarkably.

Mr. John Cannis: Mr. St. John, you talked about the U.S. looking for us to have a system that is equivalent to theirs. I have followed some of the changes they have made. I think you'll agree with me, some of the changes they have made we have already been doing. We've already taken care of them. I think we can all be very frank about that. So they climbed up to our measurements, our standards. Do you agree with that?

Mr. Peter St. John: Not quite. They've made remarkable changes in the last two weeks—

Mr. John Cannis: They have.

Mr. Peter St. John: —and they have got very ambitious. They've been really shocked out of their eyeballs. They are implementing quite radical changes in their system. Whether they'll follow through and whether these will be fully implemented on a continuing basis is another question. They're really distancing themselves from us in a panic to produce much better security.

Mr. John Cannis: Some of the things they're implementing we have already been doing in Canada for years, like on-board luggage, for example. That's one of the things I noticed on television on one of their highlights. We don't have sidewalk luggage check-ins.

Mr. Peter St. John: Curb.

Mr. John Cannis: Curb, whatever they call it. Now they're changing it. I think we were a step ahead. But they did say one thing, that the providers of the security system, pre-board security and what have you, obviously failed, and now they're saying if we have federal security looking after Capitol Hill, etc., why not have federal people look after security at airports.

The Chair: Last question, John.

Mr. John Cannis: If they've gone that step, and you're saying we should measure up to them, do you agree that the federal government should be responsible for this security at airports?

Mr. Peter St. John: By way of answer, I have to say to you that the FAA has been intimidated by the airlines. Such fault has been found with the FAA that clearly it's no longer acceptable to act in the interests of national security in the United States. So it's being moved to Justice so there can be a fully implemented federal system. Whether this works or not, we'll see. The same thing should probably happen in Canada.

The Chair: We'll go to Bev.

• 1725

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: I have a really quick question for Mr. Rivenbark. I have a longer question for Mr. St. John, so I'd appreciate it if you could just give me a very short answer.

When you send in a security clearance for any of your employees to Transport Canada and they send it away for a check, what length of time do you usually have before you get the approval or the disapproval back from them?

Mr. Paul Rivenbark: I would like to defer the question to Mr. Michael Ramsden, who actually spends a lot of time at the airport.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Okay. As long as you do this really quickly.

Mr. Paul Rivenbark: He can give it to you in less than 30 seconds.

Mr. Ramsden, could you approach, please?

Mr. Michael Ramsden (Regional Vice-President, Group 4 Securitas): Six to ten weeks.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: Okay.

Mr. St. John, based on your knowledge and your experience, could you see a system working where, instead of—and, quite frankly, I'm surprised none of you have come out and said this because it seems so obvious to us, at least to some of us, that Transport Canada doesn't seem to have done their job. Do you see a system working such that the RCMP oversee the security system and the training? Instead of the airline or airport authorities contracting out the service, the RCMP could do this, with the costs shared by authorities, airlines, and the federal government? There seems to be some resistance to making this a solely federal employee thing, doing the security check at airports. There seems to be resistance from some forces. I think in resisting that, we might see ourselves getting nothing better by going to the airport authorities.

So, Mr. St. John, do you think it would be foreseeable that we would have a better system at least if the RCMP were overseeing the security and training, and they would do the contracting out? You'd still get your regional bases. The RCMP adapt regionally. My understanding is they're supposed to be involved in the risk assessments at the airports anyway. You then don't have to worry about this being seen as a Mickey Mouse approach, because, quite frankly, people who see it going under a not-for-profit see this as the Government of Canada's Mickey Mouse approach to this. I've heard those comments, that it's just not going to do the job and it's not going to meet the standards.

So do you think something could work where the RCMP would be overseeing it rather than Transport Canada?

Mr. Peter St. John: I think the RCMP should have a strong role in whatever system evolves. Solicitors general offices also have extensive experience in counter-terrorist exercises across this country, which have been very effective in finding weaknesses.

I want to remind you that an RCMP officer takes six months to learn to handle a gun, and sky marshals and security people are going to have to learn a lot of things in the future as the security systems become more sophisticated, both baggage and human. So the RCMP should be a very important part of that equation. But they should perhaps not have sole control of it when the Solicitor General has very important experience too. They could be the driving force in a national training institute, which would train all the various types of people who'd have to react to a terrorist crisis at an airport.

Mrs. Bev Desjarlais: The RCMP fall under the Solicitor General's auspices. That's why, I agree, I think it should be under those auspices. They oversee it. My concern is that in this fear to make everybody working in the security process federal employees, we're going to accept something far less than we need. I don't want to see that happening because it's crucially important that we return the confidence of the travelling public.

That's it.

The Chair: Paul.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. St. John, as the formality of the security arrangements changes and maybe moves towards, optically, a military or a police type of image, what impact does that have on the travelling public's perception and confidence level in travel safety?

Mr. Peter St. John: I'm sorry you've concluded that I'd want a police or a formal system.

Mr. Paul Szabo: I haven't.

Mr. Peter St. John: If I had talked about European security—

Mr. Paul Szabo: Hypothetically, if the optics move to—

Mr. Peter St. John: Good security is not about building walls; good security is a state of mind, and it's informal. That's what happens at Heathrow. Good security is when a friend of mine was having a pee, and halfway through... “Excuse me, sir, you left your baggage on the seat outside.” It shook the life out of him. Someone was watching him ten seconds away from leaving his bag on its own.

Informal, careful security that gives people a sharp message, you are being watched... no guns; no military stuff. Good security is informal, it's present, and when you test it, boom, it works. That's the kind of system you want to put in place, the sort of system where people will say, “Don't meddle with it; you'll be caught”.

• 1730

Mr. Paul Szabo: If the central umbrella authority is a Nav Canada clone of sorts in terms of that kind of a structure and arrangement, would that be acceptable?

Mr. Peter St. John: I don't know enough about Nav Canada to be able to comment on that.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Berg, perhaps you can comment.

Mr. Larry Berg: Yes, in fact that is what I'm proposing to you—that the board be made up of stakeholders, which are airlines, airports, and the federal government, but that in fact just as in Nav Canada, the air traffic control is done at the Vancouver airport by the tower, by someone in charge of it, not out of the Ottawa office. I'm suggesting the best people to deliver the security are actually airports, which are already delivering all the security except for the pre-board screening. So to me it's just a logical extension of that. But the role of the central Nav Canada would obviously be there in terms of regulatory standard-setting, liaising with government, RCMP, and so forth.

I think we're saying much of the same thing around the table here, as I see it.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Finally, if we went to something like a Nav Canada stand-alone organization, would this contemplate that the safety and security guidelines presently articulated by Transport Canada would in fact be seconded to the new organization to develop and to maintain and continue to upgrade and integrate, etc., in fact take it out of Transport Canada's hands?

Mr. Larry Berg: In my view, the role of Transport Canada is to be the overseer and the regulator. I think they could certainly take a lot of advice from this Nav Canada-like organization. But I think the ultimate responsibility for setting the standards would rest with the federal government.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Berg, Mr. Comuzzi could not be here and he asked me to ask you a question. I don't know whether or not you can answer it. He wanted to know how much Canada 3000 owed the Vancouver International Airport, and also how many other airports owe you a lot of money.

Mr. Larry Berg: Canada 3000 owed the Vancouver International Airport Authority just under $1 million in landing and terminal fees. Apart from that, I believe that all other airlines are current within what would be the normal payment period, which I think is 60 days. They're all current. It's not something we're particularly concerned about. But in the case of Canada 3000, it was somewhat under $1 million.

The Chair: Thank you very much. We really appreciate your input. It was quite enlightening, and hopefully it will help us with our work. Thank you very much for coming.

We're adjourned until tomorrow.