TRGO Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

LE COMITÉ PERMANENT DES TRANSPORTS ET DES OPÉRATIONS GOUVERNEMENTALES

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, November 22, 2001

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[English]

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Marcel Proulx, Hull—Aylmer, Lib.): Good morning.

[Translation]

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. And good morning to our witnesses.

[English]

It's a pleasure for us to have you with us this morning. We have two groups this morning. We have CAW Canada and the Canadian Labour Congress. I assume you've been informed that the way we run these meetings is you can make your pitch in about five or ten minutes. If you want more than that we can go to fifteen, but after ten minutes you're going to lose us.

Then we'll go to the other group, and then we'll go to questions. So if everybody agrees, we'll start with CAW Canada.

Mr. Bennie, et Monsieur Côté.

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Côté (National Coordinator, Health and Security, CAW Union Local 2213, International Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada): Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I would like to give the floor to the representative from the Canadian Labour Congress, after which I will speak.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Marcel Proulx): There's no problem, so long as you do not argue.

The Canadian Labour Congress is represented by Mr. Andstein and Mr. Chedore.

Mr. Cliff Andstein (Executive Assistant to the President, Canadian Labour Congress): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Cliff Andstein. I'm the executive assistance to the president of the Canadian Labour Congress. Both the president and the secretary-treasurer of the CLC wanted to be here today on this important issue, but are absent from the country on CLC business.

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The Canadian Labour Congress is an umbrella organization representing 67 unions in Canada, with approximately 2.5 million members who are working Canadians. Particularly on this issue we have been working with approximately nine unions involved in the airline sector: the Canadian Union of Public Employees, the CAW, the steelworkers, the machinists, the pilots associations, the airline dispatchers, the teamsters, the firefighters, as well as a number of other organizations.

Since September 11, we have been taking a very proactive role with respect to the airline sector. We were one of the first organizations to meet with the minister—ourselves and the unions—to deal with the issue of workforce stabilization, but also airline safety and airline security. At that meeting, over two months ago, we proposed to the minister the establishment of a joint committee on airline safety and airline security.

Our members in the eight unions represent all of the professions in the airline sector. They are the people you first meet when you go to the airport. In fact, you meet them before you even get to the airport. They are the ticketing agents, the baggage handlers, those who meet you at the curbs, and the people who check you in and screen your luggage. They take you through various parts of the airport, fly the aircraft, serve you on board, maintain the aircraft, and keep them flying. They're the ones who ensure the aircraft are properly scheduled and handled. In fact, they are a significant resource, when dealing with airline safety and airline security.

One of the points we want to make in these presentations is the fact that from our experience over the past years, Transport Canada, as well as the airport authorities and the airlines, have consistently ignored this resource in dealing with issues of safety and security on the airlines.

Many of the issues we will raise today, and that our affiliated unions have raised over the last week and will be raising over the next couple of weeks, have been raised with the airlines, the airport authorities, and Transport Canada over the past few years.

We have been consistently ignored on the issues of airline safety, airline security, the security of the travelling public, and the security and safety of the staff. We have a strong interest in this issue because it is our members who are on the aircraft. We believe this is not only an issue of safety for Canadians who travel, but also an issue of safety for the workers who fly these aircraft and service them.

The problem we face is to some extent historical. For the last two decades the government has been divesting itself of responsibility for airports and airline safety and security. Over the years we've seen firefighting capability at airports downgraded. Policing levels have been downgraded. RCMP have been replaced at various airports. While regulations have been maintained, the staff to enforce those regulations has been cut back.

Transport Canada has not done a very good job of administering the safety and security regulations, has not done a good job on its inspections, and has not done a good job on enforcement of regulations that already exist.

The system, for the last two decades, has led to one of low security and lack of enforcement. Standards for privatized operations have not been set high enough. One of the complaints you have heard, and will hear from the union that represents the majority of the airline screening personnel, is that the standards for the people who are employed are not set high enough, they are not paid well enough, and they are not trained well enough.

Canadians do not feel safe right now while flying, and we say that's for very good reason. It's not because the aircraft are not safe, it's not because the staff are not committed, and it's not because the air crews are not well trained. It's because of the lack of concern for safety and security by the airports, the airlines, and Transport Canada.

What we are very concerned about, and what the workers and the airline sector are concerned about, is the possibility of only cosmetic changes, rather than meaningful changes that get to the root of the problem.

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A significant part of the problem we face is the haphazard administration of safety and security throughout the airline sector in this country. Airports have been privatized, as you know, so we have airport authorities that run independently as profit-making institutions across the country.

The airlines are supposed to be responsible for security, and that is contracted out through the airports. There is no consistent application of training and security measures when people get to the airports throughout this country. Security and safety have been seen as low-cost functions and are currently underfunded. The most valuable resource that we have, that Canadians have, and that Transport Canada should use are the employees and their unions. However, we face a culture in this sector of non-inclusiveness. For example, each airport has a security committee, but the workers and their unions are not represented on those security committees. We have management and airlines, but we don't have the people who are responsible for the security. The people who are in the aircraft when it's in the air are not involved in those security committees. The people who have to deal with potential hijackers or terrorists are not involved in those committees. The managers, who will not be involved in any of this, are discussing these problems. Workers are being consistently excluded from any consultations by Transport Canada, the airlines, and the airports.

Let me give you an example. Here's a document that was sent out by Transport Canada on September 28 dealing with enhanced security measures. It was an advance copy. It was sent around to the carriers, the foreign carriers, the airport councils, the aerodrome operators, the freight-forwarders' associations, i.e., trucking companies, the post office, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the U.S. embassy, and the cargo operators. The unions asked for a copy and they were refused. There is no reason at all for Transport Canada to not give a document like this to the unions that represent the workers in this sector, so we can work with our members. That's the type of attitude we believe we face.

For the last few years there have been consultations, under the Canada Labour Code, on airline safety and security. Each of the unions will report to you problems they've had with the new regulations, in terms of their consultations with Transport Canada and the airlines. If we are going to make headway on this and bring in a system of airport security that is meaningful and involves the employees, there will have to be a significant attitude change on the part of the administration.

I won't go into any technical details. You've seen some of the submissions already from the pilots' associations. The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers were supposed to appear today, but were unable to. They've sent in a written submission. The Canadian Auto Workers will be making a presentation today. The Canadian Union of Public Employees and the steelworkers are scheduled for further down the road. Each of these unions has committees of workers operating in this sector.

If you are going to make meaningful changes and ensure that the aircraft and airline sector in Canada is really safe, it is necessary for there to be a new culture of inclusiveness; a culture of listening to the workers involved and building structures that involve them in the airport security committees.

The new policy committee set up under the occupational health and safety regulations with the airlines and airports should be meaningful. As I've said, many of the issues you are dealing with, which are now being raised by Canadians, have been raised over the last few years by the unions.

The other point I wish to make is we believe any new approach to airline security and safety requires a national approach—a seamless, unitary approach across the country, where there is clear responsibility and accountability by the government. Currently, the minister is supposed to be responsible, but there are so many privatized operations and so much divestiture of authority and accountability that it's like trying to nail jelly to a tree to try to figure out who's responsible when there's a problem or a lapse in security.

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We know this would mean moving backwards from the general direction of decentralization, privatization, and contracting out, which has been taking place for the last two decades, but, members of the committee, we do not contract out national defence and national security and our armed forces. Where we did so on the supply lines, it has proven to be a problem. We do not contract out immigration and border control, and we do not contract out the RCMP or CSIS.

We do not believe that airline safety and security should be left to a number of small, independent agencies throughout the country. We believe the government has to step forward and develop a national organization that will take responsibility for airline safety and security and that will involve the unions and their members in the technical details of how that will be implemented.

Thank you for your time.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Marcel Proulx): Thank you, Mr. Andstein.

Mr. Chedore, did you have something to add to that?

Mr. Bill Chedore (National Coordinator, Health and Safety, Canadian Labour Congress): No, sir, not at this time.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Marcel Proulx): Fine. Thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Côté.

Mr. Yves Côté: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ladies and gentlemen, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 in New York City turned into a nightmare for the 15,000 Canadian Auto Workers with close ties to the airline sector.

Most of our members work as sales and customer service agents for Air Canada and Air Canada Regional and therefore work directly with passengers throughout Canada's commercial airports. Their tasks are varied and include passenger and luggage registration, boarding checks and several other related functions. All are essential to ensuring the proper functioning of an airport's daily operations.

The CAW also represents ground mechanics, handling staff, air freight specialists, aircraft food and supply service personnel, reservation agents as well as air traffic controllers. The latter are employed by NAV Canada.

[English]

Airport and commercial aviation security began during the 1970s and was limited to detecting the presence of firearms, bladed weapons, and other dangerous items hidden in passengers' carry-on luggage. Following the events surrounding the disappearance of an Air India flight that had departed from Toronto, security was beefed up to ensure that international and transborder flights would benefit from increased protection from that moment on. The principle was to ensure that no baggage was carried on board without the passenger, the idea being that terrorists were not planning to embark on suicide missions.

Since September 11 we have been faced with a new reality, that of the terrorist who is ready to die to defend his extremist principles or beliefs. This time the challenge consists of boarding an aircraft and using it as a guided missile or making sure a bomb goes off at the right moment. We must consequently revise all the principles underlying our security measures since 1970. Without necessarily throwing them out the window, we must nevertheless revise the way they are applied in light of recent events.

Cockpit protection remains one of the weaknesses that we would like to see improved and corrected. Recent modifications made to cockpit doors, as requested by the FAA, have also been applied by Transport Canada. We have learned that Air Canada has already completed the implementation of its cockpit access program. But since yesterday, the Americans will undoubtedly want to beef up this measure by having the current doors replaced with armoured models.

This represents nothing more than a close control measure to ensure pilots' security and is strongly dependent upon several other factors. We therefore need to eliminate potential risk at the source, way before passengers gain access to the aircraft.

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[Translation]

Our members represent the first point of contact between passengers and airlines. Our union firmly believes that any security change or reinforcement in the air transportation field must begin on this first line of defence.

These additional measures must be implemented as quickly as possible and for the long term. The costs associated with these measures must not be made an obstacle in consideration of ensuring the safety of the industry, passengers and Canadian citizens.

[English]

The Canadian government is responsible for ensuring the protection and safety of all Canadian citizens throughout Canada. We believe the government must invest in these long-term measures by hiring the necessary personnel and issuing consistent instructions throughout Canada.

Airport operators for their part are responsible for ensuring that buildings and work environments correspond to this new operational mode. They should also benefit from a security tax or import improvement fee to make the necessary modifications.

The airlines themselves cannot be held responsible for administrating airport security. However, they should equitably participate in implementing measures and new security rules to protect their equipment, employees, and passengers. Staff members with the appropriate training can make an important contribution toward improving the effectiveness of these measures.

[Translation]

The CAW actively participates in the work of various committees recently set up by Transport Canada to identify the problems with airline security, whether in the airports or aircraft themselves.

However, we are aware that the recommendations issued by these committees must be approved, and we strongly encourage the Government of Canada to listen to what workers in the field have to say.

Every day, our members experience traumatic events that are potentially detrimental to airline security. Here are a few problems that have been identified by our members and would need to be addressed in a consistent manner:

[English]

mandatory checking of all luggage by X-ray or other methods before the passengers are authorized to present themselves at the check-in counter; mandatory verification of passenger identification at the checkpoint and upon embarking; implementation of electronic passenger and employee identification systems; improvement and validation of the system used to control access to restricted areas; RCMP presence in all schedule 1 and 2 airports in Canada; implementation of an emergency intervention plan to counter ground terrorism, which could be customized according to each category of airport; application of legislative measures to counter the ground rage of violent passengers; ground safety inspections of aircraft, which should be done by airline personnel other than flight personnel or aircraft service agents; better control of access to boarding docks or the tarmac, using a system of electronically locked doors to eliminate the need for keys; increased consultation with employees as per the terms and conditions stipulated in part II of the Canada Labour Code; appropriate training for airline personnel provided jointly by Transport Canada and the airline; and the implementation of a safety program, including procedures that can be escalated according to the level of risk. There would be a standard procedure at level 1, and that could be increased to level 2 and 3 if necessary.

Thank you for your time.

[Translation]

Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Marcel Proulx): Thank you, Mr. Côté.

[English]

Mr. Bennie, did you want to intervene at this time, sir?

Mr. Ian H. Bennie (National Health and Safety Coordinator, CAW Canada, National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada): Not right now, thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Marcel Proulx): Fine.

So we can go to the question part of this meeting. We'll start with Ms. Val Meredith of the PC/DR.

Ms. Val Meredith (South Surrey—White Rock—Langley, PC/DR): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Marcel Proulx): You have approximately ten minutes.

Ms. Val Meredith: It doesn't look as if there's a rush for time around here.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Marcel Proulx): We'll see.

Ms. Val Meredith: I want to thank you gentlemen for appearing before the committee. I apologize for the fact that there aren't more of us here to hear your brief.

Mr. Andstein, you mentioned that there's an attitude that exists between Transport Canada and the unions. I'd like to ask you if you know why it exists. What is the reason for this attitude, this apparent conflict, if you will, between the unions and Transport Canada?

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Mr. Bill Chedore: There is an historical problem, in my estimation. I'm not sure how far it goes back.

I deal on a regular basis with unions from the transportation sector. I recently went across the country teaching a course on part II of the Canada Labour Code that was passed last year. The students who were in my class from the transportation sector all had the same view of their dealings with Transport Canada as officials. In their view, they were ignored when the time came for putting forward the proposals for changes that would enhance their safety and security. It was almost a nightmare of the ultimate test of bureaucracy they were facing on a regular basis.

Now why this is, I'm not really sure; I'm not sure Transport Canada officials could explain it either, but it seems an historical issue that, as Cliff said, requires a cultural change within Transport Canada. One change would be to actually sit down with the people who perform the functions and ensure that, when these types of issues are talked about, these people are listened to, because they are the ones who actually have identified the problems from experience.

This hasn't been the case in the past. There have always been those who think of themselves as professionals, as the people with the degrees who know what's best, when they're not the ones who are actually facing the problem on a day-to-day basis like the workers are. This has to change, somehow.

Ms. Val Meredith: Are you suggesting it's arrogance? Or is the regimen of Transport Canada possibly too officious? If you're going to solve an attitude problem, you have to get your hands around what's causing it.

Why is the communication breaking down between the unions and Transport Canada officials?

Mr. Bill Chedore: I'm not sure if it's a matter of control, perhaps, that some officials believe they need to have.

It reminds me of a time in 1970 when I started to work for what was a government department at the time—the Canada Post Corporation, it's now called. The attitude I faced then...what's happening now in Transport Canada reminds me of that, even though I don't deal on a regular basis with Transport Canada, as do the unions that are here and to whom you have talked. The limited exposure I've had reminds me of that. It was almost like a militaristic management style, and if anybody here has been in the military, you know what that is; it's basically—

Ms. Val Meredith: Do what you're told.

Mr. Bill Chedore: Exactly. I found, when I first started, that my opinion on things was not valued, and this is probably one of the things for workers that makes them either want to or not want to go to work on a day—if they don't feel their contribution is valued in any way. This seems to be what I'm getting—again, not having the daily exposure these people have, but what I'm being told is that probably the attitude is the worst.

Ms. Val Meredith: Mr. Andstein, you've stated that Transport Canada came out with a list of measures or something and circulated it to everybody but the unions. You implied that the unions will have no part in any of the committees that might be set up or in any of the areas dealing with the issue of security. Yet you gave the impression, Mr. Côté, that you are an integral part of the committee that has been set up.

So I have mixed messages from the two of you as to whether or not you have any security committees and whether or not the union security committees are part of a greater security committee.

Mr. Cliff Andstein: There are different committees—and Ian commented on it as well. There are airport security committees that do not have worker representation, which I believe are probably under the Aeronautics Act. Then there are the health and safety policy committees under part II of the Canada Labour Code, where it's required to have union representation. This is what they're talking about. It wasn't just that this wasn't distributed to the unions; the unions asked for a copy and were refused one.

Do you want to add to this?

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[Translation]

Mr. Yves Côté: October 2nd was the first time employees were consulted by Air Canada. There was a Transport Canada representative at the committee, and someone asked if we could get this document. It is a source document that allows us to review work procedures and to discuss security measures. The answer was no, because it was up to our employer to provide it, they said. Afterwards, we asked if it was true that the employer had been told not to distribute the document. The answer was yes.

Even under Part II of the Labour Code, which stipulates that documents used for changing work procedures should be supplied to the steering committee or the health and safety committee by the employer, the answer was no.

In the document that was tabled here and which is entitled MESSAGE - #2001M-500, it clearly states at the bottom, and I will read it to you in English:

[English]

Disclosure of the security measures contained in this document is prohibited by subsection 4.8(1) of the Aeronautics Act, except where required by law or to give them effect.

[Translation]

After having heard these responses, we came to the conclusion that the employer and Transport Canada were not really interested in having the employees participate, but in consulting us at random.

After having brought some pressure to bear on Transport Canada and some other people, we were finally invited to join the ACAS committee, which is the Advisory Committee on Air Safety. This is a brand-new committee and it is divided in two. We intend to participate. To what extent will this work? That remains to be seen. We are starting to participate in these meetings.

[English]

Ms. Val Meredith: You raise a very good point. Employees are certainly one of the groups who are going to recognize safety concerns. I would suggest that there is another group—the people who fly a lot—who see some things when they're flying that cause them concern.

Given that you represent the employees and the employees recognize safety concerns, as I understand your explanation, Transport Canada seems to be saying to you that, because you represent the workers who work for a company, the relationship is therefore between the worker and the company, not between the union and government, Transport Canada.

Going from there, when workers see a safety hazard or an issue causing them concern, what do they do? Do they take it to the company? Do they take it to the union? How do their concerns go through the system so that at some point the company, or whomever, reports it to Transport Canada?

Mr. Ian Bennie: In theory, with part II of the code, health and safety committees are established so that when workers notice a possible hazard of some sort, or a security breach, they would bring it to the attention of the employer and also to the employee representatives on the committee. In turn, it is then ultimately the responsibility of the corporation to either act on these concerns or not.

Within the CAW and in certain corporations, our problem has been that the employers and Transport Canada have this paternalistic viewpoint. They think, yes, they can listen to the employees, but “father knows best”; they may hear what employees have to say, but they will do as they see fit. It's this type of attitude we are trying to nullify. We want to have the true opinions of the workers—the thousands of pairs of eyes out there every day noticing the problems—actually recognized and to have action taken on what the workers view to be problems.

Within let's say the Air Canada corporation we have the policy committees that are set up under part II of the code. As procedures are enacted, they are supposed to be brought up within the policy committee structure, but Yves and I, when we are sitting on these committees, see them as totally ineffective because of the fact that the corporations also have these paternalistic viewpoints.

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Ms. Val Meredith: I could suggest that this is part of society, in essence. It is how we, in opposition, often feel dealing with a government making legislation and passing it through, regardless of the concerns opposition members may raise or may have. Unfortunately, this is just part of the way things go in society; your concern will not always be considered great enough to have an impact.

How does the employee get through this structure if he or she has an emergency issue? How quickly can this safety and health committee meet, get it through the employer, and then get it through to the government? Surely there are times when something has to happen much more quickly than it can through the process you're putting on the table here.

How does the employee respond to an emergency security concern in a way that something will happen? Let's say a flight attendant is concerned about something happening on the airplane. To whom is it reported to get action?

Mr. Ian Bennie: They have to report it directly to management, and with the existing attitudes, actions do not necessarily take place based on the way the employees feel.

We field concerns from across this country in our positions. I would say a very, very high percentage of these concerns are not actioned. They get passed on—a 1-800 number has even been set up, but this is viewed as valueless because no one ever sees any results coming out of the concerns that have been brought forward.

Ms. Val Meredith: That's probably because somebody's afraid to make a decision. Is this what we have here—nobody wants to take the responsibility for making a decision?

I would suggest it probably exists in the union as well, where everybody's passing things on for somebody else to make the decision. But at some point, somebody has to make the decision to act and take the responsibility for having made that decision and having acted in an appropriate manner and be able to defend the appropriateness of the reaction.

You're telling me that doesn't happen, which makes me, as a passenger, feel very uncomfortable, if nobody's prepared to make decisions and take the responsibility for making them.

Mr. Ian Bennie: Yes. Since September 11, we have been told Transport Canada and the airlines are doing some sort of risk management, but they are doing it in a very inconsistent way, changing the name of the game every day and sometimes twice a day.

The way it's done right now, the regulations are issued by Transport Canada and they go to the different people you see on the list. From there they are interpreted in different ways, depending on the different airport authorities and everything. There's a big, big mess over there.

If you are a manager or an airport authority and you don't want to displease Transport Canada, how are you going to react? This is the problem. No one knows exactly what to do because the regulations and the legislation right now are too wide and too broad. In fact, they are interpreted in different ways, and this is the problem we have.

Every day we have reports in many places. On security screening, for example, in some places they're going to take away your car-key remote control because they say you can set off a bomb with it, but in some other airports you can go through like that.

I was at Pearson Airport the other day and when I left I mentioned that I had a digital camera with me. They never asked me if it was working or not or functioning properly. I was flying to Dorval. When I arrived there in the evening to leave from Montreal, they looked at it; they followed the procedure. We could spend a few hours discussing the inconsistencies here.

Ms. Val Meredith: With all due respect, those inconsistencies exist with union employees as well. It's not only a question of low-paid contract workers who aren't consistent. The inconsistency exists in all aspects.

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I agree that there are inconsistencies in the screening. There are inconsistencies when you check in as to whether or not you're required to show your passport or not. There are inconsistencies in your hand luggage being cleared. There are lots of inconsistencies out there, but my concern is still the reporting mechanism. If somebody goes to a ticket agent and buys a ticket with cash, to whom is that information reported? Who takes the responsibility for red-flagging this instant where somebody's buying a one-way ticket with cash?

Mr. Yves Côte: An operating agent.

Ms. Val Meredith: Who takes that authority? Where do they report that to?

Mr. Yves Côte: Buy a ticket with cash...you can do that every day; there's no problem with that. Nobody's reporting that. This is not in the procedure, but I know what you mean. The thing is that something more concrete should be done and the directives should come from an organism somewhere within the Government of Canada to say, this is what you have to do; this is the way you're going to apply it and everything.

Employees are a very important source of information. We have people who have been working in the airports for 30 years, so they've seen a lot. They've seen the beginning of the security in 1970 and up to now. They can tell you a lot, probably more than some in management can. Of course, it's all a question of balancing the powers and dealing with those issues. But I understand that the airlines want to keep their power on this, but Transport Canada wants to do the same. They're all deciding things, and then they're coming to us and saying, “That's what it is, my friend.” You ask, “Do you think we can modify that or not?” Sometimes it's too late; it's applied.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Marcel Proulx): Ms. Meredith, if you'll allow me, we'll allow Mr. Chedore to answer and then we'll go over to the Liberal side of the table, please.

Mr. Bill Chedore: I want to clarify a couple of points, that's all, very quickly.

In terms of enforcing what currently exists, whether it's part II of the Canada Labour Code or another piece of legislation, a lot of people don't understand the actual enforcement process. We have two different inspectors' organizations, or two different inspectors, who actually deal with problems that are raised by employees, or if there's a problem that is classified as an emergency or it involves a right to refuse aspect. For the airlines, marine, rail, what happens is Transport Canada has their own inspectors who enforce part II of the Canada Labour Code.

Labour Canada has a whole other group of inspectors. If you're in the airport and something happens that's actually on the ground that should involve an inspection of some kind, Labour Canada may send one in. But once you depart the airport, once you're in the air, that falls into the hands of Transport Canada inspectors. It's the same thing if you're on a train, in a train station. If it happens while the train is in the station, Labour Canada people will come in. Once the train is gone, it involves Transport Canada. For marine it's the same thing.

So there are two different inspectors who will deal with different problems, or two different inspectors who will deal with the same problem. One of the problems with that is sometimes the issue is interpreted or enforced in a different way simply because this group of people operate under Transport Canada and these people operate under Labour Canada. So my experience is you do at times have different ways of interpreting and enforcing legislation.

The other point I wanted to bring up was on this issue you raised, where you talked about how there are inconsistencies all around; there's frustration in being in opposition, about the government ramming things through and that sort of stuff. I understand that. Our view is that we should not be looked at as being the opposition, and this is what's happening actually. We are not the opposition. We are the front-line people who actually identify problems and want them resolved. There shouldn't be that opposition attitude, and that's basically what I referred to earlier as that “them against us” attitude on issues.

There will be that sort of stuff. Frankly, I've been involved for 30-some years, and negotiations are always “them against us”, but on issues that are protecting workers and the public there should not be the opposition attitude that's there, and I think this is one of the problems that has to be corrected.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Marcel Proulx): Thank you.

We'll switch sides to the Liberal side of the table now.

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey.

Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

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I'd like to thank our witnesses. I think people are paying attention to our hearings. It is obvious that even if everyone is not here, the people responsible for improving security are aware of this, and they will have an opportunity to table a report. As you have seen, there are new steps being taken regularly to improve the situation.

What is rather compelling, is that following the September 11 crisis, we can see two kinds of attitudes. There are those who want to reinvent the world completely, who want to rebuild all security measures, as if everything that was done before September 11 was completely ridiculous and did not meet professional security standards. There are also those who say that September 11 happened, and we now going through a period of adjustment.

Yesterday, one of our witnesses was from a business that has contracts in 70 countries around the world. Here, this company has contracts in Alberta and Ontario. It even has contracts with the Pentagon. This is a pretty high-profile target. And in fact, the Pentagon was targeted during these attacks.

Mr. Côté, do you believe that we must experience an adjustment period, or should we allow ourselves to be carried away and say that before September 11, everything being done was insignificant and worthless?

Mr. Yves Côté: As I was saying earlier, the context has changed because we now have to deal with a new reality, which is not necessarily new, but which we had left aside. If memory serves me well, as of 1984 or 1986, after the Air India accident, Transport Canada had set up a procedure that was to be staggered over a decade or so to enhance or increase airport security. This included screening all baggage before passengers appeared at the check-in.

Over the years, this was lessened because we told ourselves that the risk was low. Until September 11, no one noticed this. We didn't see it coming. On September 11, I was in St.John's, Newfoundland and I saw all the transatlantic flights arrive. I was stuck there for a week. I saw the results of this kind of thing.

I think that now, we have to look at long-term solutions. When I said that this had to happen as quickly as possible, I did not mean in a month or two, but there are certain things that can be done. Without going to extremes, there are some things that are being done presently in other countries and that we could very well do here as well.

We can look at some models without going to extremes. An example of extremes today, in terms of security, is probably El Al. Now, there are other security measures being practiced, for example, at Singapore Airlines. At Singapore airport, there's an area reserved for the public in general, but as soon as a client decides to check in, he has to go through a security search, and all of his baggage, including the baggage that will go into the hold, is subject to X-ray. This puts everyone on a level playing field. This solves a lot of problems for passengers on stand-by. At the moment, if you have a bag to check, don't try to go stand-by. The answer would be no. You cannot do it.

There are a lot of things like that that we have to review. There are some minor changes that can be made that won't cost a fortune. We have several ideas on this subject. I don't think we are trying to change the world by bringing these kinds of problems to light.

[English]

Mr. Cliff Andstein: I don't think it's necessarily correct to characterize it as two extremes, that either we need just a few adjustments or prior to September 11 the system was useless.

There were regulations. There were screening and security measures. But your experience, from flying a lot, is probably the same as ours, which is that they were inconsistently applied. Some days you'd get ready to board an aircraft and it was much like it is today; other times it's as though there was no security involved at all.

• 1150

You'll hear from one of the unions next week about the pressures that have been put on baggage screeners, checking passengers through the security, to hurry up, to let people through. The airlines come down and complain; the airport authorities come down and complain and say that if you don't get people through here more quickly, we're going to have to change the employees or change the contract. There were lots of pressures on employees to lower security standards. We think that's changed.

Also, for those people who fly internationally—as Yves said—there are standards in many other airports. The problem is that many of those standards, while not inconvenient, were not based on the premise of suicide attacks; they were based on the premise that somebody would not get on board an aircraft and blow themselves up. That requires an entirely new approach to aircraft security, which is more focused, some of us believe, on being able to evaluate people as well, in the same way our customs personnel are given training in evaluating. When you come up and when you come back into the country, there are a few questions just to evaluate you. None of our people in the airline industry receive that.

It's changing the culture so that every employee in the airline industry feels it's part of their responsibility to ensure the overall safety and security of the entire sector. This is particularly true with respect to those people who are on the aircraft, because I think when you speak with the representatives of the pilots and the cabin crew, they're particularly concerned because their members are also killed when these events take place.

Our concern is that drafting regulation at the top and introducing it in the House this morning—although we're in the middle of these hearings and we haven't had a chance to review the legislation yet—isn't enough. It will deal with some short-term issues, but over the longer term, for it to make it as safe as it can be, it's going to require a change in the attitude and the culture of the entire sector to make the workers themselves, and their unions, full partners in this. And that's what we see as one of the major weaknesses right now.

The other major weakness we see is the patchwork, haphazard approach through different airport authorities, contracted agencies, different airlines, rather than there being a single accountable agency where the minister is directly responsible for airline security and safety.

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey: Mr. Côte, if I understood correctly, you spoke of adopting higher international standards in the area of security. Should this new international standardization be done by the International Civil Aviation Organization or in cooperation with the different transport departments? What would be the best way to proceed?

Mr. Yves Côte: It is clear that at some point, we will all have to get on the same wavelength. This may not happen tomorrow. At the moment, Transport Canada is in fact adapting to the standards published by the FAA, which is the American security bureau. There is no doubt that airline companies wishing to do business in Canada or the United States will have to adapt to these methods. We will have to discuss these things, but once again, we're talking of a long-term plan. I believe we are all sovereign in our own country. Up until now, things have gone well. I think we have to continue along this path and keep talking to each other.

Mr. André Harvey: After September 11, we have to share this sovereignty.

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Mr. Yves Côte: In part. In any case, on security issues such as these, we have to harmonize. This doesn't necessarily mean that we will have the same methods and the same rules, because we don't have the same rules from one country to another. We must also take into account the human factor and human rights.

I think it's possible to come to an agreement if we keep talking to each other. We must do this, and I think it has already begun.

Mr. André Harvey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Marcel Proulx): Thank you.

[English]

Mrs. Meredith.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you. I'm quite willing to let the other side have a few questions.

You've mentioned, and I think there's agreement, that there has to be a single, accountable agency. There has to be one organization responsible for security in the airline industry. Some would suggest it shouldn't be in Transport Canada's hands; it should be in the hands of the Solicitor General or somebody who understands what security is all about, from profiling, to measures that would work, to enforcement, whatever. Would you share that feeling?

Mr. Cliff Andstein: We've had that discussion. We haven't had an opportunity to have it with all the unions in the room, but there has been a feeling that in terms of enforcement and oversight, Transport Canada is involved with the industry—not that there's collusion or anything, but there's a mindset. It's much like how natural resources departments get very involved with the resource sector, working with the industries.

In this case, it may be appropriate to have a separate oversight body and agency to deal with aircraft and airline sector security. We don't have a final decision. I know a number of the unions have expressed that view, that it may be more appropriate to do that, but we haven't looked at what that would mean in terms of legislative authority and some of the details.

Ms. Val Meredith: I know right now we're talking about the airline industry—security at airports and in aircraft. I assume you represent unions in other transportation modes. Would you suggest there's a need to be considering some review of other modes of transportation, i.e., passenger rail? I understand VIA goes transborder. Amtrak goes transborder. Trucks go transborder. Should there be a review, perhaps, of security concerns in the other modes of transportation?

Mr. Bill Chedore: My understanding is that there actually will be a review in all transportation sectors, and I think it's probably a good idea. Mind you, the concern many of us probably have is that you can also overreact, and I think sometimes that causes more problems than not reacting enough. But I do think the overall transportation sector—marine, rail, road, and air—requires a review of security and safety in all of the areas they operate. My understanding is we're starting with air just because of what brought this on, but there will be a push to do it in all sectors, which I think is probably a good thing.

Ms. Val Meredith: Then I would follow that up by asking whether there should be a greater communication between agencies involved in security issues. Should there be a better liaison? You're concerned about the liaison between Transport Canada and employees. Should there be a greater liaison between security issues and the people who are there to provide security, whether it's defence, the Solicitor General, or Transport Canada? Is there a need to have a greater degree of communication interdepartmentally dealing with security and safety issues?

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Mr. Cliff Andstein: The short and simple answer is yes, but the more complicated answer also deals with respect for privacy issues. I know the polls show that currently people are willing to give up privacy rights in exchange for fighting terrorism, but, again, I think we have to be careful about overreacting.

There is a need for broader sharing of information. We were discussing, in the unions, for example, the inability to share profiling of passengers from airport to airport, from airline to airline. As part of my background, in British Columbia, we, the union representatives, argued to have the right for social workers to be able to share information on some clients from one office to another, and to balance the privacy of clients, particularly clients who were identified as being aggressive. You have to balance the rights of employees with the rights of the clients. But certainly those systems are in place in other sectors, where you can share information on certain profiles.

We're very concerned about civil liberties, about privacy rights, and about racial profiling. The sharing of too much information in a crisis period becomes problematic later on. It's a question that we need more debate about, but certainly the ability to share some types of information between different agencies, between border control and the transportation sector, is probably necessary. How we balance that in terms of our other rights should be subject to debate as well.

Ms. Val Meredith: There are ways you can put names, and very little detail, into a shared data system that would not indicate why you are concerned, just that you are concerned, so more follow-up can happen after the case.

You're dealing with the safety of your employees. We've heard from almost everybody that sharing of intelligence in the new reality of terrorist attacks is probably key to preventing them.

Mr. Cliff Andstein: We support that.

Ms. Val Meredith: Part of that is this CAPPS program, and I'm getting the feeling you would support that.

Mr. Yves Côte: Again, we have to take into account who the passengers who will be identified in that system are, whether they've been sentenced somewhere in the past or there are just suspicions about them, and the way the information is going to be communicated and who is going to have access to it.

Right now, since September 11, a list of people who were wanted by the FBI was loaded into the computer. So far, I have not been able to find out if one of these people has been flagged out of Canada. I don't think so.

Just to give you an example, right now we are facing ground rage from passengers waiting in line or whatever. Even when we call airport security, if they are there in time to catch them, that's good. Two days ago, they missed a guy in Quebec City. It took 15 minutes for airport security to come to intervene with a violent passenger. The guy had the time to run away and catch a cab.

The only person we know of right now who cannot fly on a Canadian airliner is Salman Rushdie. It's been published. I bet you would probably not recognize the guy if you saw him walking in an airport, because nobody has been trained for that.

Yes, I believe we should have control of the passengers—from the moment they call to make a reservation. They could be identified at that point.

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Ms. Val Meredith: I want to follow up on air rage. As a frequent flyer, I can say there are occasions when air rage has been perhaps created by employees who are not functioning to the standard they should be and have created a situation where somebody is really ticked off—without explanation or any consideration for that passenger, who's paying the salary, indirectly, of the employee.

Is there some recourse? If the employees decide this person is causing them a problem because they're objecting to the way they're being treated, is there some recourse among the employees or within the unions in perhaps retraining employees—I see they're finally doing that with the medical personnel—for giving some lessons on how to deal with passengers, how to make sure they're not creating situations?

Mr. Ian Bennie: I think there are two issues here. If you're talking about a customer service problem, there's always a recourse to go through the employer to correct it. Ground rage and air rage are not customer service problems. They are either instigated through excessive use of alcohol from one of the passengers or—because of the long lineups—passengers have expectations that they can demand certain things that are beyond what the employees can give to them. We've got numerous situations of passengers throwing our members up against a wall because their plane is already on the runway and they couldn't understand why they didn't hold the flight for them, because they're important people.

Ninety percent of the problems where ground rage occurs are not because of a customer service problem or an attitude from one of the employees; it has to do with circumstances beyond the control of the employee and the poor attitude of the travelling public in terms of their expectations. And I think the press is the agent that changes those expectations out there.

Ms. Val Meredith: But I would still maintain that some employees lack the skills for defusing situations. There are occasions I've been aware of where it was the manner in which employees dealt with the situation that caused the person to fly off the handle. Had they been able to deal with the situation in a calmer or more sensitive manner, they probably could have defused it. I'm just asking, is there some way a passenger can suggest or bring to the attention of the union or of the company that this person might need some retraining? And what happens in that case? Are they given retraining? What's the process?

Mr. Bill Chedore: I'm actually working today; I'm supposed to be at a meeting today that deals with violence as a workplace risk and violence in the workplace. Among the people who have been having input into that is someone from the airline flight attendants' organization. I'm very familiar with this whole concept and what happens. Part of all of this is actually instituting, in the regulations, a training program that the employers have to give to their employees to deal with these types of things—how to defuse these types of things.

But frankly, there's nothing that condones or should condone a passenger or any client or customer being violent with any workers—nothing. We wouldn't condone it in any other area. We wouldn't condone it with our kids. If you talk about road rage, why is it that if somebody cuts somebody off, it's okay in some places—not in Canada, normally, thank God—to go out and shoot somebody? That's not acceptable, and neither is air rage. There are avenues: the employers are there. They can lodge complaints and basically give the whole story, and people will be dealt with accordingly.

Ms. Val Meredith: Is it only the use of violence that would prevent somebody from getting on a plane? If it's just verbal banter going back and forth, accusations, that's not considered a situation where a person would be refused?

Mr. Bill Chedore: If I was there it would be, but I wouldn't.... No, I understand what you're saying.

Ms. Val Meredith: There's a difference between somebody being really ticked off because of having been confronted and using violent means to express it.

Mr. Bill Chedore: I've seen situations, and I used to travel quite a bit, going into a boarding at the gate where somebody has just spent two hours sitting in the lounge; I know there are going to be problems with the individual when he gets on the plane. At some point I think somebody has to have the authority to say, “Maybe you should wait for the next plane”—because you know there's going to be a problem; you just know it.

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That's a hard issue to deal with. Then again, as Cliff says, there are certain rights you have to balance in all of this. You can't go over the line either, in a lot of cases, just because you think you can.

Ms. Val Meredith: Is there legislation in place now that would allow a flight attendant—not even a flight attendant, because it should happen before that—or let's say the person allowing people on to the plane, to determine that: one, they've had too much to drink and they're going to be a problem; two, there might be a security risk—that there's something about that individual such that this person at the checking agents' post feels there might be a risk? Is there some legislation that allows them to say, “Sorry, you can't get on”?

Mr. Bill Chedore: I'm not sure if there is.

Mr. Yves Côte: Well, there is something in part II of the Canada Labour Code, but there are no regulations regarding it. It's brand new. It's been in place since last year—September 30, 2000. So far what we've seen is the companies establishing policies, even though at Air Canada the policy is not very clear; it's still under discussion.

What we've done so far.... Of course, yes, if the customer comes and is angry at the departure gate or whatever, then you call the supervisor. Then if nothing is going.... Well, it depends on the degree of violence. You can call the airport security right away.

But it's left to the judgment of the agent who's there. Some people will say “Well, I won't bother, because I don't want to get involved in some bad situation.” They're going to let the guy go on board. Then the flight attendants would have the problem.

There are no standards, no regulations, really, in place—or not enforced, if there are some.

Ms. Val Meredith: That's one of the lines of security we're dealing with here.

Mr. Yves Côte: That's right.

Ms. Val Meredith: I think there are—what is it—five different lines of security in an airport? That would certainly be one of them.

Mr. Yves Côte: Yes. That's right. On the ground, we are the first line. So if you have to rethink security in airports, you have to rethink protecting the first line also. We are the ground agents who are checking the passengers at the airports.

These people have to be protected and feel safe. Those people could be identified, long before they go to the check-in counter, by trained security personnel. That's what we're saying.

Our agents right now are trained—well, let's say they're a little trained—about how to face an angry passenger. But the situation.... Let me tell you what happened two days ago.

A guy came to the counter and said “I want to go to New York”, and he was walking like that in front of the counter. One of the agents said, “Well, if you want to go to New York, you have to travel via Montreal”. I was in Québec City; I was there.

So the guy starts yelling and banging on the counter. He threw his briefcase right on the counter. The two agents who were there just ran away. They were really afraid; they ran away. The other agent called the airport security. It took 15 minutes for a commissionaire to show up. The guy said “Well, he didn't really threaten you.” And he didn't file a report for that.

What we've been doing for the past two years, if I'm made aware of situations like that, is that in certain cases the union files a complaint against customers—not the company, but the union. The company doesn't want to get involved in some problems, because most of the time these guys are very important customers—executive club members and things like that.

Ms. Val Meredith: Why would you not have filed a complaint against the security—either the airport authority, or...?

Mr. Yves Côte: Oh, we did. We did, too. This is going to be clarified through meetings with the company and airport security to be sure that in the future a thing like that does not happen. But again, if we were in a secured area this probably would not have happened.

Ms. Val Meredith: What is the average response time from the security?

Mr. Yves Côte: It depends on the airport. You don't know.

Mr. Ian Bennie: It's five minutes—ten minutes, sometimes.

Mr. Yves Côte: Five minutes, ten minutes: I would say at Toronto airport it's about that, five to ten minutes. But for smaller airports, some airports don't have any security inside the airport.

One of the pilots this morning was mentioning Sept-Îles. By the time they call the police and they get there, it's going to take 15 or 20 minutes of driving to get to the airport, and then the guy is gone.

• 1215

Mr. Ian Bennie: In terms of response time, we were explaining that there is a certain number of names out there that have been red-flagged because of September 11. The process that is in place at airports is, if an individual comes to the check-in counter with that name, the computer red-flags them. But the process that's set up is that the agent contacts a management individual in another office, who in turn must contact the RCMP to react. Because of that process, it can take five or ten minutes. We've made suggestions on how to improve that, to cut it down to a few minutes, but they're either considered not acceptable...and we don't even know if they're going any further than the people we're explaining them to.

Your question specifically asked, is there a program in place or does a ground agent have any responsibility or authority if they suspect one of the passengers could potentially be a hazard or represent a terrorist threat of some sort, and is there any training in that? No, there is no training in that. We are never taught how to identify any suspicious characters, in terms of the way you're explaining it. The agents are so busy dealing with the processing of the passenger at the gate, they don't even have a moment's time to be able to identify if someone is acting suspiciously. I think we all put our faith in the behind-the-scenes security officers, who should be observing suspicious characters and then maybe doing a spot check on them and so on. But from our position, there's nothing.

Mr. Bill Chedore: As a matter of information, I was just informed by one of my colleagues that Transport Canada has delivered to their office today a draft regulation dealing with the exact questions you're posing about unruly passengers or about problem people in the airports. So that's going to be discussed among the unions. They'll be dealing with it further in December. Maybe that's a start to dealing with some of the issues you're raising.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Marcel Proulx): Thank you.

Mr. Shepherd.

Mr. Alex Shepherd (Durham, Lib.): It's interesting, because we've sort of got onto focusing on the responsibility of the travelling public. I've always wondered why it is that we tolerate so much carry-on baggage in the first place. People are going to sit in the seat in an airplane for three hours. The same people who would go to a movie wouldn't bring this big bag of stuff with them. I've often wondered why we tolerate that in the first place.

People abuse it, and probably the biggest abusers are members of Parliament who don't want to put their luggage on because they want to get off at the other end and keep on going. On the flight from Ottawa to Toronto—I guess they're getting better—the whole thing was covered with luggage. If you were the third or fourth last one on, you sat with it on your lap. It was getting ridiculous. But it's still ridiculous.

Is there some way the government, or maybe you people, could suggest how to limit this? What's reasonable for somebody to carry on for a two-hour or three-hour trip on an airplane?

Mr. Cliff Andstein: A number of union presentations, in the details, make some recommendations up to and including no carry-on baggage at all except for a personal item. Basically, I've noticed—and I felt the same way—that the excessive amount of baggage is usually at the front of the cabin and not with the people travelling steerage or economy. It's those extra-sized garment bags, because people don't want to wait.

Certainly, it's a subject that's under discussion among the unions. From the point of view of most of the unions, the less baggage that's carried into the cabin, from their perspective, the better. So once you get beyond a personal item, such as a briefcase or a purse, what else is acceptable in a cabin? Would it be a lap-top, a small overnight bag, what? Some of the unions have had discussions. I think if you looked at their proposals, you would be down to, possibly, your purse, briefcase, and a lap-top, and that would be about it.

• 1220

It makes it easier for the screening personnel at the front when you're going through the X-ray machines. It makes it a lot easier for the cabin crews in terms of what's on the aircraft, and it would be largely inconvenient for the frequent commuter traveller, like yourselves, or a lot of us in our business who try to cut down the amount of time we spend at an airport.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Have you ever made any kind of study to show how that would reduce the amount of waiting time people spend in line-ups, if we converted to that? People might be willing to buy into this if they knew they could be cleared in, say, ten minutes. Maybe we should even promote that, have a separate walk-through thing for people who comply and a separate one for people who don't. So the people who don't will wait the two hours and the people who do can get on in 15 minutes. Is there some merit in that?

Mr. Yves Côte: Right now, there is a regulation about carry-on baggage, but it's not properly enforced, that's for sure. The airlines are responsible for hiring these agencies at the security screening point and there's always a little rule that says don't displease the customers. So it's going on and on.

I don't think a study has been done by our group on that. Maybe one of the other unions will have something to say about that, the people representing the screeners at the airport. But you can see for yourself. You're travelling very often, so you can see that the lines at the security are sometimes delayed because there's too much carry-on baggage, that's for sure.

Mr. Cliff Andstein: There are actually two elements to it. One is the screening to board the aircraft and the number of X-ray machines that are open, and how many bags have to be examined for each passenger. Some of the recommendations are also calling for searches of bags in addition to X-raying.

The other aspect though—and this is part of passenger convenience—is how long it takes to get your bags when you get off the aircraft. That's a function of the number of people who are in the machinists' union, who are the baggage handlers, and how many of them are available. Sometimes you come off the airplane in Ottawa and your bags are coming down the ramp as you are; at other times you're there for half an hour. That's a function of the number of staff available to do this, how many aircraft that may be late leaving or late arriving and so on, because a lot of the same crews load the aircraft and unload them. So there's a balance at both ends and a lot of it is targeted around passenger convenience rather than safety or security.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: You know, if I were looking at this from a financial point of view, it would be a matter of shifting resources within the existing system. If I shifted resources away from the walk-on screening thing, because I had less baggage, then maybe I'd have more resources to put people in the mechanics union, if you want, to get the things off faster and everybody would be happier.

Mr. Cliff Andstein: I'm sure Mr. Milton will be pleased to put additional resources into baggage handling.

Voices: Oh, oh!

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Marcel Proulx): Thank you very much, gentlemen, for appearing in front of this committee this morning.

[Translation]

Your testimony is very important to us. We will take into account all the points that are raised here. Thank you very much.

[English]

Thank you and have a safe return.

Mr. Cliff Andstein: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We do have one question. Of the legislation that was introduced this morning, will the committee be holding hearings on that, or will you be considering that as part of your ongoing general hearings?

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Marcel Proulx): It'll be considered when it's referred to us, I understand.

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Mr. Cliff Andstein: Okay. Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Marcel Proulx): Members, we wanted to look at a motion this morning. We haven't got quorum, so the committee is adjourned.