TRGO Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

LE COMITÉ PERMANENT DES TRANSPORTS ET DES OPÉRATIONS GOUVERNEMENTALES

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, November 20, 2001

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[English]

The Chair (Mr. Ovid Jackson (Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, Lib.)): We have a quorum, so I'm going to start the meeting.

We have Captain Bob Davis, from First Air; and David Lynch, from the Air Canada Pilots Association.

Gentlemen, you may start.

Mr. Robert (Bob) Davis (President and Chief Executive Officer, First Air): Thank you for introducing me as a captain, but I haven't quite achieved that status yet.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and honourable members of the committee, for this opportunity to share with you some of our views concerning airline industry security and economic issues resulting from the tragic events of September 11, 2001.

The safety and security of our customers and employees are and always have been the primary business obligation of First Air—indeed, of all airlines—in the conduct of flight operations. Working in collaboration with Transport Canada, the industry has historically made progressive efforts and investments to continually enhance airline security systems. However, the recent terrorist attacks have clearly created an environment in which we must carefully re-examine, evaluate, and respond to the potential security threat this new breed of bad guy may attempt to capitalize upon.

Response to this new challenge was immediate and decisive, with the unprecedented shutdown of North American airspace on September 11. Prior to the resumption of flight operations, and once again working with industry, Transport Canada promulgated enhanced new security requirements that were immediately implemented by all air carriers, including First Air. Following this, on October 11, the Minister of Transport advanced further improved security initiatives with an announcement to provide $79 million in new funding for the purchase of equipment and supporting activities at Canadian airports.

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The actions taken to date have been very effective first steps, and we congratulate the minister and his department for their tireless efforts in this regard. However, the accomplishments to date have been implemented within the reality of a host of operating, infrastructure, and economic constraints faced by all stakeholders in regard to security issues. Further improvements to security are not only necessary for safety, but are expected by all airline passengers and, for that matter, by all Canadians.

While extensive security measures existed prior to September 11, I would like to highlight a number of initiatives First Air is working on to improve further our security status.

For flight deck doors, our engineering department is developing a secondary locking mechanism to render cockpit doors more intrusion-resistant.

In consideration of demonstrated new threats, we believe extensive, new basic training material is required for flight and cabin crews, regarding the early recognition and reaction process for unruly passengers, hijacking, and other security risk situations. In order to accomplish this, First Air is an active member of our industry association committee that is investigating new thoughts and processes in this area for future implementation.

Next is employee involvement. As a key element of the security process, we have solicited advice from our flight and cabin crew unions in order to obtain their ideas and concerns. They're the first line with the customer and with the problem, and they're also our last line of defence on security issues. This has been a productive initiative in some areas, particularly with our cabin crews, who are represented by CUPE. We congratulate them for their proactive participation.

In terms of awareness, we believe the airline industry will require a cultural shift in its security considerations and actions, to ensure that we do not limit ourselves only to traditional thinking in what is a dramatically new risk environment. This is important for a diversified carrier such as First Air, as we operate many different types of aircraft going to many different airports with many different types of security classes, often carrying both passengers and cargo on the same flights. To that end, we have made every attempt to heighten the security awareness of our employees, contractors, and suppliers.

Airline and airport security is an extremely complex issue, and the time available today would not permit the lengthy debate possible on this subject. However, we do offer the following discussion points for your consideration in developing the future of our security systems.

First and foremost, the responsibility for pre-boarding passenger and baggage screening must be consolidated within a single organization. Presently, this responsibility is divided between a number of parties, including airports and airlines. In order to optimize the integrity and consistency of our security systems, all security services should be coordinated through a single organization that is financially viable and capable of administering, deploying, managing, and enhancing such services, all in a timely and efficient manner.

The logical solution to this challenge is to build and expand on an already successful Canadian institution, the Air Transport Security Corporation. With financial support from the federal government, a regulated mandate, and an expanded board of directors to include greater representation from airports and the federal government, ATSC is a natural extension for providing pre-boarding passenger screening across Canada. Given ATSC's current structure and relationship with airlines, it is effectively the only national organization that maintains the optimal potential to effectively and efficiently assume these responsibilities with the least risk of disruption to current operations.

Secondly, we must implement the use of technological advances to enhance the security of airlines and airports. While I am certainly not an expert in this area, I know many technological solutions are available to aid in the processing of baggage and screening of passengers in order to improve the identification of security threats or risks. With regard to this issue, it is also important that all technological solutions that are implemented be harmonized with those of other countries and states in order to ensure that the most extensive and accurate database is developed and shared among participants. We must ensure that a global problem has a global solution, an achievement to which technology can provide great assistance.

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Lastly, through government and with participation by all stakeholders, including consumers, we must develop a mechanism that will continue to work on defining and monitoring the long-term security landscape that we wish to establish at Canadian airlines and airports. This could be a broadly based advisory group that would assist and advise the government on present and future security issues. Many difficult security issues remain to be resolved. What level of security do Canadians expect, and what are they willing to pay for at airports? Should flight crews be provided with defensive weapons? What level of screening do we wish to have for employees accessing airside access through terminal building portals, etc.? This advisory group would provide valuable input in determining the future of security.

Moving off security and on to economic issues, the economic impact to First Air resulting from the terrorist attacks has been significant. Approximately three-quarters of First Air's $220 million in annual revenues are generated in Canada's north. While you would expect this area of the country—where air transportation is an essential service and not a luxury—to be relatively unaffected by the terrorist attacks, this has not been the case.

It is important to remember that a great deal of northern air transportation is dependent on such things as incoming tourists and local resident vacation travel, as well as mining and petroleum product exploration. Following the events of September 11, a high level of uncertainty exists within many of these market sectors, such as whether or not we can expect to see the 14,000 Japanese tourists normally booked for the aurora borealis viewing season from January through March. In addition, commodity prices are at their lowest levels in years, reducing new exploration and even resulting in the recent closure of one of Nunavut's few remaining mining operations located in Nanisivik—a closure that has been devastating to the local economy.

While these are longer-term issues, we have also seen an immediate impact to our company. As a diversified business, First Air's southern charter activity has declined correspondingly with economic output, and the decline has been dramatically accelerated by the terrorist attacks. Charter activity to support sunspot destinations or for the movement of auto parts has virtually stopped. These reduced revenues, combined with dramatically increased operating costs related to such things as NAV CANADA, security, and, more particularly, a nearly 300% increase in insurance rates, have complicated matters further.

Although we are confident in the abilities of our business to see us through this period to what we believe will be an inevitable return to normal market conditions at some future date, we believe government support for this key element of Canada's transportation system is important, and would even appear to be critical for some industry participants. While we disagree strongly with selective support programs for individual carriers, we do support industry-wide initiatives that benefit all airlines in a consistent manner. In view of this, one solution may be that the federal government should assume the incremental costs associated with all new security measures and enhancements.

In addition, as further supports for the industry, the government could consider such things as the reduction of airport rents, elimination of the excise fuel tax on aviation jet fuel, and continued support on the aviation liability insurance already in place. The government has already also shown a great deal of support for our industry with the compensation program. We once again thank the minister for the $160 million short-term relief package, which is certainly appreciated by our stakeholders.

In closing, air travel remains one of the safest modes of transportation, and Canadian air carriers are among the safest in the world. At First Air, we are confident the industry can maintain its advantages with continued partnerships—particularly on security issues—with Transport Canada.

Thanks for listening to our views. I'd be pleased to answer any questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Davis.

We'll now move to Captain Lynch, please.

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Captain David Lynch (Chair, Technical and Safety Division, Air Canada Pilots Association): Good morning, Mr. Chairman and honourable members. My name is Captain David Lynch, and I'm an Air Canada pilot. I fly the Airbus A-320. Today, I'm here to represent the Air Canada Pilots Association, for which I serve as chairman of the association's technical and safety division.

At the outset, I must apologize for being unable to provide translated documents to you this morning. With the association continually involved in things ranging from litigation to layoffs, mergers to acquisitions, and intermingling offshore assignments, we're tasked with going 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, aside from the events of September 11.

The Air Canada Pilots Association, or ACPA, is Canada's largest professional pilots' organization. We have over 3,500 members, and we serve them from our headquarters in Toronto, as well as from offices in Montreal, Winnipeg, and Vancouver. Our pilots operate Air Canada's fleet of nearly 240 jet transport aircraft, and we fly 7 different types of airplanes on domestic, transborder, and transoceanic routes. In addition to our role as the bargaining agent for Air Canada pilots, ACPA is extensively involved in the advancement of flight safety within Canada.

I'm here today to talk specifically about the issue of aviation security. The tragic events of September 11 will forever change how everyone—pilots, airline operators, government, and the public at large—must come to address the security of our air transportation industry. We're no longer protecting our aircraft and passengers against random acts of violence or hijack by distraught individuals or simple extortionists. Safeguarding against politically motivated hijackings or relatively crude terrorist attacks is no longer enough. On September 11, we witnessed the use of jet transport aircraft, along with the helpless passengers they contained, as instruments of war in a complex and meticulously planned attack on our infrastructure and the very ideology of our way of life. Since September 11, we have all come to realize that every jet transport has become a potential cruise missile available to any determined terrorist who is willing to die for his cause.

From a personal point of view, Air Canada flight crews spent many years as guests of the Marriott Vista Hotel that was formerly tucked between the World Trade Center towers, so we know the area and we know the people.

Beyond the enormous human tragedy, this attack has had grave economic consequences for the industry in which we work. It has really undermined public confidence in the safety of the entire transportation system. Frankly, this diminished confidence is justified. The airliner remains a potential weapon, and we'd be foolish to think that, as Canadians, we wouldn't be a target for any follow-on attack.

I'm here today to talk about the security measures that we feel would help to restore public confidence in the safety of the airline system and slowly repair the economic impacts on our industry. Our association wants to ensure that the Canadian air transport system is seen to meet or exceed the security standards of the United States, and to ensure that Canadian aircraft are not singled out for attack by virtue of being perceived as softer targets than aircraft based in the United States.

What we have to suggest is not new to this committee. On October 3, the pilots from Air Canada joined with the Airline Pilots Association and the First Air Pilots Association to submit to Transport Canada Security a list of 21 recommendations for change. I understand these recommendations were presented to you in some detail by ALPA's Captain Kent Hardisty on November 8, so I'll just focus on what ACPA feels are the key points that we wish to pursue. When the documents we have brought along with us are distributed, you'll find copies of the October 3 submission to Transport Canada, along with a press release in which ACPA expressed our firm support for the federal air marshal program.

Let me just boil this down to the three recommendations for change that ACPA feels are the primary issues to bring forth to this committee.

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The current cockpit doors were never designed to present a barrier to unauthorized entry. Just the opposite, they were deliberately designed to be easily breached in order to facilitate emergency egress of the crew in the case of an accident, and to allow the door panels to blow out and equalize pressure in the case of a rapid decompression.

Many airlines, including Air Canada—and, I understand, First Air—are now fitting reinforcing bars to provide additional barrier against entry into the cockpit. These reinforcing bars are only a short-term solution. In real life, if we were subjected to some sort of unauthorized attempted entry, the bars would really only give us a few seconds while we summoned help from the back. The passengers and the crew are very much a part of saving the ship as the situation stands now.

What airline cockpits require are specially reinforced cockpit doors and bulkheads that can safeguard the crew against any possible intrusion into the cockpit area. Ideally, the new door will be designed so as not to impede the equalization of cabin pressure in an emergency or not to slow down the efforts of the pilots to escape the cockpit after a crash. You must remember that once we've locked that door behind us, we've sealed ourselves in the cockpit. This makes it a hell of a lot harder to dig us out if we're a smoking wreck off the end of the runway, but the pilots have had to come to accept it as a way of doing business now.

In larger cockpits, the doors must include a remote locking mechanism that can be operated by the pilot without him having to leave his seat. We have all kinds of different anomalies in the designs of the locking mechanisms, and I would be happy to discuss those in detail later on.

New intrusion-proof designs are nearing completion; they were already being developed in response to incidents of air rage. We're asking Transport Canada to mandate their use in airline operations—that's a fully reinforced door and a bulkhead.

At ACPA, we had a lengthy internal debate as to whether or not we should seek air marshals on our aircraft. In the end, we came to the strong conviction that a federal air marshal program is necessary for three reasons. First, the events of September 11 have demonstrated the ease with which determined hijackers can achieve the unthinkable, and every possibility exists that this type of attack could be attempted again.

Secondly, in any sort of hijack, the hijackers commonly attempt to force the pilots to unlock the door by threatening to hurt or kill flight attendants—these are people we work with—or by threatening to kill the passengers—and we often have our loved ones back there. Air marshals are an important safeguard. As we lock ourselves in the cockpit, we have to recognize the fact that we're leaving those in the back to deal with the issues back there by themselves. That was something we couldn't easily reconcile.

Finally, we feel the reassurance of having federal air marshals on a flight will go a long way toward restoring the confidence of the flying public and will encourage people to continue their use of air travel. Appended to our document is a copy of a Globe and Mail article from just last week. Their poll found that 78% of the flying public felt they would be safer if air marshals were on board their flights, and that 67% were more likely to fly if they knew an air marshal was on board.

We know some movement has been made in the provision of air marshals for flights destined for Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport—and I'm pleased to add that Air Canada is the only foreign carrier allowed into Washington Reagan; when Washington Reagan first started up, only six carriers were allowed to fly into that airport at all. We feel this program should be extended to flights presenting a potential risk, with at least random coverage provided for all Canadian flights. The provision of an air marshal service provides the opportunity for the Government of Canada to provide a real and meaningful boost to the security of the travelling public.

On the issue of passenger screening, we strongly support the recommendation that efforts be made to improve the quality, training, motivation, and supervision of airport security personnel across the country. This calls for a complete rethinking of how we recruit and administer security arrangements. In our view, it is time to reconsider switching to a federally managed program, as happened yesterday in the United States.

Clearly, we can no longer rely on a poorly paid, marginally skilled, and transient workforce to ensure one of these important lines of defence. We have seen some short-term improvement under the pressures of the moment, but will this effort be sustained in the long term? We are concerned that without a substantial change to our current system, this effort will not be sustainable.

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In addition to the concerns and recommendations brought forward to Transport Canada, ACPA is concerned about the airport pass system, and about the inconsistent application of screening measures. With the devolution of airport management to the private sector, the airport pass system is no longer unified. ACPA would ask that Transport Canada reassume responsibility for airport security passes, and that it establish a federally regulated, administered, and funded national pass control system, using dedicated entry points and consistent screening requirements for all airline and airport employees accessing any secure area.

Incidentally, our pilots are increasingly frustrated with the inconsistent and arbitrary manner in which security screening is being applied to our members in the pursuit of their flying duties. At most airports, passenger agents and maintenance personnel are being allowed to bypass security screening and to use alternate security entrances, but the air crews are still forced to go through full screening, in line with the passengers. This has resulted in some embarrassing searches in front of the public, and the seizure of ridiculous items. There have been arguments, police have been called, and pilots have been threatened with jail.

Frustrations have now carried themselves into the cockpit, where the guys are still mad when they get to the airplane. I'm getting reports of guys missing the taxiway. Sometimes, when you leave home after an argument, or when you leave work after a fight with the boss, or something like that, you go through a stop sign or you go through a traffic light. That's what's going on now. That's how far these problems are extending.

I'm just going to cut some of this short. I've vented enough on the screening issues already, but we really need to address these inconsistencies. The pilots have been more than patient. These inconsistencies have been present for a long time now, and we really need to see one level of security across the country.

Thanks very much. If you have any comments or questions, I'd be very happy to address them.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Captain Lynch.

Mario Laframboise, you're on.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise (Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My first question is for Mr. Davis. In your presentation, there were two parts: the first one was about security, and the other one, about your company's financial status. For me, both are interrelated. I agree with you that if security is to be reinforced all across Canada, the supplementary financial burden which will result from it should not be borne only by the airlines.

Among the five major airlines being supported by the minister, where does your company rank?

[English]

Mr. Bob Davis: We would probably be the sixth largest in Canada, behind the five big guys.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Behind the five majors. Obviously, you see where I'm coming from. I don't have on hand the list of companies the minister had decided to support. He intended to help five companies with loan guarantees. Your company was not among them. Do I understand correctly?

[English]

Mr. Bob Davis: Our company was eligible for its share of the $160-million relief package, but I believe the minister said at one point that the government would provide loan guarantees to the five largest carriers in Canada. Is that what you're referring to?

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Yes, indeed. Were you on that list?

[English]

Mr. Bob Davis: We would not have been eligible for loan guarantees—

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: You were not eligible.

[English]

Mr. Bob Davis: —nor do we agree with them, nor do we need them.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: You don't need loan guarantees. That's what you are telling us today.

[English]

Mr. Bob Davis: That's correct.

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[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Knowing what you are recommending in terms of security, Mr. Davis, I can agree with you. You are suggesting that a single organization would supervise the whole security process, and you favour the Air Transport Security Corporation, the ATSC, for that. You would see that organization overseeing security controls all across Canada. Is that what you would like, finally?

[English]

Mr. Bob Davis: Yes, that's correct. Right now, the Air Transport Security Corporation is effectively an equipment lessor. It owns all of the walk-through screening and carry-on baggage X-ray machines that are placed in airports. That equipment was all transferred from government to ATSC three or so years ago.

I think everybody is working in the same vein, and I'm agreeing with my colleague Captain Lynch. We want one organization to look after it, and we think it should be federally funded. ATSC is there, it has all the equipment already, and it already has a relationship with the airlines and with the airports. It's ready to go, and to go fairly quickly toward consolidating the security equipment. The only other choice is to return this equipment to the government, and for the government to do it itself. ATSC is a step halfway in between, though, and it's ready to go.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Right now, it's Transport Canada who is responsible for the supervision of security measures. It is that department which oversees the whole process through different organizations, including that one. The airlines also had some responsibility in that area. In other words, part of that task would be transferred from Transport Canada to that organization. Am I understanding you correctly?

[English]

Mr. Bob Davis: That's correct. It was primarily the equipment that was transferred. Right now, the equipment is owned by ATSC, but the airlines hire or contract people to run the machines at the airports. In effect, then, the airlines are 100% responsible for the costs and the operations in terms of airline and airport security right now.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: I agree with you that we should have only one organization which would take care of security and supervise it. I fully agree with you on that. My problem, though, Mr. Davis, is that Transport Canada was doing it in part and that some other organizations... In 1987, the liberals and the conservatives made the choice to entrust civil agencies with the task of taking care of security.

I don't have a feeling that the ATSC is going to change... In any case, I am trying to be convinced. Personally, instead of a civil agency, I would rather have seen an agency more specialized in terrorism and crime to supervise security.

I want to make sure we understand each other correctly. I am not saying that the RCMP should reassume the work it used to do before 1987. On the other hand, we must realize that, before 1987, it was the RCMP which used to supervise security controls all over Canada. So, it was an agency specialized in crime. Since then, we have taken a completely different direction and entrusted civil agencies with that task, with the results we are seeing today. We all agree that it should no longer be Transport Canada which supervises that. I would rather have viewed a more tactical and specialized type of brains, still in order to secure the public and the travellers. As we have seen yesterday, the Americans have decided to integrate those 26 000 employees into the public service. Rather than giving that responsibility to a civil agency, we should have a more governmental type of organization to do the work. Of course, we would have to put the money needed and that organization would focus much on the fight against terrorism. I'm trying to understand why we should still entrust a civil agency with the responsibility of security. I would like you to enlighten me on that.

[English]

Mr. Bob Davis: Having the government reassume control over it or having the RCMP also conducting security operations are certainly options. However, the government seems to have been going more toward divesting itself of things like NAV CANADA and the airports, toward getting these out where they can be more effectively and efficiently operated—although I don't like to say it that way. Otherwise, what was the purpose in sending those out to the private sector to begin with?

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In terms of money and people, our resources are very limited and precious in both government and in business. While we certainly want to look after the security and terrorism issues, that has to be done in a manner that is as effective and as efficient as possible, so we just table that as an option. The framework and the equipment company are already there.

In this new environment, we would expect that Transport probably... it already has put out $79 million, some of which went toward more inspectors and more people. At the end of the day, Transport still has the full authority to audit and regulate that service that we are doing, so it still has quite a responsibility in making sure the service is done right and in giving guidance and advice on security issues.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Yet, you did not convince me of the validity of your option, but I agree with you that we will need an organization which will primarily take care of the supervision of security and which, I hope, will be much more specialized in terrorism and crime than those civil agencies which, incidentally, Mr. Davis, were created just to save money. The government which, until 1987, was fully assuming the cost of security simply transferred that responsibility to public and civil agencies that you, the airlines, are subsidizing. You are the ones who pay for all the security measures. Today, the government must get involved again financially to take care of security.

My next question will be for Captain Lynch.

Your first recommendation was to enhance the security system of cockpit doors. We were told that, at Air Canada, 200 such doors had been modified or rebuilt just recently, following September 11 events.

Are the repairs that were made by the airline consistent with your expectations? Were you satisfied with the systems which have been put in place on those 200 modified doors, according to what we were told, or are there any improvements that should be brought, even for those 200 airplanes which have been corrected?

[English]

The Chair: Thanks, Mario. That will be your last question. Our guests have two minutes to give you an answer.

Capt David Lynch: Thank you very much.

You asked if the improvements made to the doors thus far are satisfactory. As an interim measure, in a rapid response type of scenario, they are acceptable. In my presentation, I did mention that the reinforcing bar or door-strengthening device is a short-term solution in the real sense. If we are placed under attack, entry into the cockpit is really only going to be slowed down by maybe thirty seconds. In those thirty seconds, we will rely on the support and response from the crew and passengers in the back.

On the doors themselves, I give the industry an awful lot of credit for responding as quickly as it has. We have come across a number of individual deficiencies with regard to some of the installations. For example, we've had a couple of aircraft on which the door bar worked fine on the ground, but when the aircraft was in flight and the structures changed shape slightly, the bar could not be removed. The pilots were essentially locked in the cockpit for the duration of the flight because the bar was jammed. A number of deficiencies of that nature have been noted in both the design and installation.

As I say, as a short-term mitigation, they're not bad, but the long-term fix must see a multi-level response. We have to isolate the cockpit with a cockpit door. We have to keep the terrorists off the airplanes, and that's done through airport security. We also have to keep the terrorists out of the country, and that's done through the more broadly based level of security and intelligence sharing, passport control, and that sort of thing.

The Chair: Mr. Cannis.

Mr. John Cannis (Scarborough Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Captain Lynch, you said air marshals are necessary. If I correctly recall some previous presenters, your association was not in favour at one time. I just want to put it on the record, however, that you are now in favour of air marshals. Am I correct?

Capt David Lynch: You are quite correct. The events of September 11 required us to think about areas on which we had spent very little time. We had to—

Mr. John Cannis: Correct me if I'm wrong, but post-September 11, the association was not completely in favour of air marshals.

Capt David Lynch: At that time, we were sampling a very wide range of opinions from our pilots, from our flight attendants, and from the travelling public. What it boiled down to was the fact that we were dealing with people ranging from the hawks to the doves, those guys who wanted to start carrying Uzis in the cockpits to those people who just wanted to retire and go gardening for the rest of their lives.

Mr. John Cannis: But as government, as representatives of constituencies, when our constituents ask us, we can now say to them with no ambiguity that your association is in full support of air marshals.

Capt David Lynch: Yes, and the reason for that, if I may just finish up, is that we had to answer the question about what we can do for our pilots today, tomorrow, and next week. It's all fine and dandy to have a reinforced door next year and improved explosives detection in four years, but I need to have something today both for them and for the flight attendants. Air marshals are the answer.

Mr. John Cannis: Just to continue on air marshals, you said they're necessary, and you talked about specific routes, and so on. As a result of September 11, we've seen that a plane can take off from location A and be headed for a certain destination on its regular route, but then end up going elsewhere. Why would we not have air marshals on every flight, whether they're remaining in North America or crossing the Atlantic? Suppose you have someone on a flight originating somewhere in Europe and heading to a certain airport in the United States or Canada. What's stopping them from saying the airplane is going to go to a different airport—I don't want to use the specific name of any airport—and from causing it to divert and to do the damage elsewhere?

Capt David Lynch: Do you mean a diversion due to unlawful interference?

Mr. John Cannis: Yes.

Capt David Lynch: Certainly, nothing will stop that. The thing is, where do you get that many people to cover that many flights? It's just physically impossible.

Mr. John Cannis: Impossible.

Capt David Lynch: As you well know, it became public knowledge that the air marshal program in the United States had dwindled to about two dozen marshals. I'm aware of—but cannot divulge—how many marshals would be employed in Canada, but I can tell you it's not nearly enough.

Mr. John Cannis: This is my last question, Mr. Chair, although I don't know how much time I have.

I'll ask for a response from both of you, because we talked about airport security improvements, etc. As far as the check-ins are concerned, I do agree with you. I think what you're asking is for pilots to have a separate check-in area where you can get pre-screened and not go through the process normal passengers go through. Is that what you're saying?

Capt David Lynch: I don't object to the scrutiny being applied to us, but I would endorse a separate check-in area, yes, given the fact that we have to involve ourselves in this process sometimes six to eight times a day. Imagine that I've brought my airplane from Toronto to Saskatoon. I land in Saskatoon with that airplane. Once I step off that airplane, I'm no longer clean. I have to go back through the system, and that can be annoying.

Mr. John Cannis: I can empathize with you, and I understand that. It's a good point.

Capt David Lynch: Thank you.

Mr. John Cannis: On airport security, Mr. Davis, you talked about consolidation. We've heard that from other people, because there seems to be a lack of communication, etc. Both of you touched upon the staff. I think one term that was used was “transient”. Others were “low-paying” and “improperly trained”. The Canadian Air Traffic Control Association came before the committee some time back, an my understanding was that they pay hundreds of millions of dollars back to the airlines. Right now, the cost of airport security and pre-boarding is the responsibility of the airlines, am I correct? If that is passed on to the government, are you saying the government should pick up the tab?

Mr. Bob Davis: I think the industry is happy to keep contributing at the levels it has, but any incremental—

Mr. John Cannis: But the levels we have weren't giving us the results we're asking for, from what I hear from other people.

Mr. Bob Davis: That's what I'm saying. I think the incremental costs should be assumed by the government.

With regard to the people who are working, at the end of the day, standing there and looking at things going by on a screen is a lousy job. Some of the models we've talked about within the industry are things that will change the way these people work, in order that they are used more throughout the airports and in order that we can rotate them through jobs. We have to somehow change the model of what that job is by making it more interesting, improving the training, and whatnot.

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The airlines were already going a long way toward changing training. Within ATSC, computer-based training has been introduced at a cost $3.5 million. This was before September 11. That's why I said there were always proactive measures on it. But this is a new-risk environment for everyone, for sure, so we have to change our way of thinking.

Mr. John Cannis: We did ask other presenters if we had problems. Of course, we have experienced one of the safest environments in the world in Canada, but now we have to raise it a notch higher.

What I'm puzzled by is the fact that the equipment is in place, the airport hands it over, and the airlines then seek contractors to supply the staff. Am I correct? Four companies—but really one main company—provide the staff. In essence, the lowest bidder gets the contract.

Mr. Bob Davis: It could be that way, but I don't know. I don't presume it goes to the lowest bidder. Service issues may be associated with that. But I understand the principle you're trying to go with, yes.

Mr. John Cannis: Captain Lynch, what's your comment?

Capt David Lynch: Transport Canada sets the minimum standards in security. For those who are familiar with Transport's security bulletins of late, they allow the privatized airports to set their own hiring standards. The government says they have to put up an eight-foot fence, but if Toronto wants to put up a twelve-foot fence, Toronto is free to do that. The airlines do contract out for the personnel, but, again, the airports set the standards.

Mr. John Cannis: If the Canadian government takes over, as the government has done in the States, are the airlines prepared to forego the revenues they're getting so that we can offset the costs?

Capt David Lynch: I would have to agree with Mr. Davis that the airlines, even in these tougher times, are probably comfortable with continuing to provide supports equivalent to what they are providing now. The need for an increased ramping up of the security in terms of the new equipment, the new standards, the new training, and the new check-ins Canada-wide... the money is being spent to train these people anyway. Just give them the same book across the country. That's not too expensive.

Mr. John Cannis: That makes sense.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Val.

Ms. Val Meredith (South Surrey—White Rock—Langley, PC/DR): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Gentlemen, thank you for coming to appear before the committee.

I want to follow up on this training aspect, because you both mentioned an improved training mechanism as something that you felt was required. I think motivation was brought into it as well. What exactly do you expect from people when their job is mainly to look at the baggage going through? What is your expectation from those individuals who provide passenger screening?

Capt David Lynch: What do you expect me to do as a pilot? I spend mindless, endless hours sitting in my seat, twiddling my thumbs, and watching screens, but if something pops up in red, you expect me to see it. That's what I get paid to do, and that's what they get paid to do.

I know it's mindless. I don't care if they have to send the occasional picture of Ottawa firemen through occasionally to wake these people up. They should send more simulated weapons through. There should be more checking. Their failure rate is abysmal, in my opinion. They have some accountability to me, to you, and to the travelling public.

Ms. Val Meredith: But training isn't going to cut it—

Capt David Lynch: The training is terrible.

Ms. Val Meredith: —because training amounts to telling them what they're supposed to look at, giving them a bunch of stuff, and even sending phony weapons through. What it is, is the alertness of the individuals. If they're mindlessly watching the stuff going through, on and on, does it really matter how much training they have?

Capt David Lynch: Well, you say you will be sending test runs through, with people trying to get through the system. If they miss three times, then they're fired. I don't care what they send—

Ms. Val Meredith: They're fired after the second time, actually.

Capt David Lynch: They're fired after two?

Ms. Val Meredith: As we understand it, from what we've heard in this committee, they're given one mistake. After a second mistake, they're let go. It's not that they don't know they could lose their jobs if they let something go and they're caught at it.

• 1150

I'm struggling with this concept that you can train people better to do this particular kind of job. Do we want peace officers who are trained—like a customs officer—to assess an individual, to judge body language and eye contact, and to determine whether an individual is acting kind of strange? Is that the level we would want at passenger screening? Do we need somebody who has the ability to look at the person, look them in the eye, and determine whether that individual may cause a problem or not? It demands closer screening, so is that what we need at passenger screening?

Capt David Lynch: I think that's an excellent idea.

Mr. Bob Davis: That's what I was trying to raise. We need an advisory group. Right now, the airlines and Transport decide what kind of security we should have. We don't have consumer groups in here saying what they expect and what they are willing to pay for. What people expect and what they're willing to pay for are different things.

We should also have the unions involved, because these are the front-line people. They're the first ones with the customers, and the last line of defence. We need a proper advisory group to decide what we want the future of our security landscape to look like. Do we want to have the El Al model, in which air transportation is basically... You don't go on El Al just for fun, because it's time consuming and difficult to do. Or do we want to keep treating it as a commodity, which it is in North America?

When I was alluding to training, those were some of the things we believe in. These people should be given some type of profiling training in order to be able to read body language and things like that. So, yes, these are the things I was suggesting.

Ms. Val Meredith: If that's the level of security screening we are looking for, it raises a couple of things. One, the training is going to be more intensive and you're going to need a higher skill level. Two, you're going to have to pay them more, you're going to have to rotate them, and you'll need some measure of moving them to something better than standing at a machine and checking luggage.

You proposed the Airport Transport Security Corporation. If you don't mind, I want an explanation for why you feel that would be a better route than airport authorities taking over that control, that concern.

Mr. Bob Davis: We're suggesting ATSC because it's a national organization and it has all of the security equipment at all airports. If it's left to each airport authority, then you're going to end up with an inconsistent application of security regulations.

Ms. Val Meredith: But security regulations are guided by Transport Canada, are they not?

Mr. Bob Davis: They are, but as we see it today, the application of noise rules is different between airports. They decide what they want to do. Some are higher and some are lower.

We just think it's a more consistent approach to getting it done. You're dealing with one organization for all of the labour groups and all of the equipment. You get the buying power of all the equipment in one place, rather than having Toronto buying one type of explosives detection system and Vancouver buying a different one.

Ms. Val Meredith: Right now, the equipment is bought by this other, privatized, not-for-profit organization that owns all of the security equipment.

Mr. Bob Davis: At the present time, but—

Ms. Val Meredith: You already have a private company that has all the equipment, so now the question is who provides staffing for that equipment. Should the airport authorities not only staff the equipment, but own the equipment? Is it really the ATSC that you're talking about, that owns the equipment and is responsible for all the security?

Mr. Bob Davis: You're talking about service delivery, yes.

The model we foresee is one in which the ATSC has the equipment, has the people, and works with the airports to get the job done. That way, the approach is consistent. Right now, if an airport doesn't want to deal with ATSC, it doesn't really have to. It could buy all of its own equipment and do its own thing, and some of them are heading in that direction.

Ms. Val Meredith: So you see that organization being given the responsibility for airport security across the country.

Mr. Bob Davis: The pre-boarding screening portion, yes. For airport security for the perimeter of the airport, that would still be the airport's responsibility. We're just talking about the pre-boarding screening and baggage processing.

Ms. Val Meredith: Okay.

• 1155

Captain Lynch, I'll come over to you on cockpit doors. You used the example of the dimensions of the door with the new lock changing when the aircraft left the ground and got into the air. You said you were, for all intents and purposes, locked in the cockpit.

I may have misread the minister, but based on his presentation, my understanding was that he was mandating that all pilots lock the cockpit doors for the duration of the flight, and not unlock them and not come out of the cockpit. Is that happening, and is that your understanding of what the Transport Canada regulations now require?

Capt David Lynch: Our understanding and our procedures are quite clear. Yes, the door is to be locked. That doesn't mean I'm precluded from ever leaving the cockpit. We have procedures that would permit me to leave, even for such a mundane function as using the bathroom.

Ms. Val Meredith: What are those procedures? I'm curious, because I was on a flight on which the pilot, the captain, did leave the cockpit. I wondered at the time how he would know who is...

Capt David Lynch: I'd be careful in what I might divulge in the way of procedures, but we do verify.

Ms. Val Meredith: I noticed the peephole in the door.

Capt David Lynch: That's right. The best solution is to have a third person on the flight deck to man the bar. Absent that third person, if one of the pilots is required to leave the cockpit, he establishes communication first with the in-charge behind the door to verify nobody is there, he uses the peephole, and then he unlocks the door. A flight attendant comes in, and the pilot leaves. The flight attendant locks the door behind the pilot, using the bar. The procedure for the pilot to get back in is the same.

I might be required to be out of the cockpit for a number of reasons during the flight. I might have to inspect the wing or an engine or something of that nature, and I damned well don't want to be locked in the cockpit for whatever reason.

Ms. Val Meredith: In other words—and we heard this before from other witnesses—a pilot or co-pilot would need to leave the cockpit for certain reasons.

Capt David Lynch: Absolutely.

Ms. Val Meredith: I was just curious as to how you would make sure the cockpit was secure, and that somebody else was not able to go into the cockpit when you were otherwise occupied.

Capt David Lynch: We cover it off.

Ms. Val Meredith: Okay, I just wanted to clarify that, because I wondered how it worked.

I know the airport pass system is an inconvenience for flight crews, but it's also an inconvenience for the passengers who are asked to stay on board an aircraft during a stopover. When you look at the rationale for it, it doesn't make sense. It doesn't make sense that when you're still behind a secured area, you can't disembark from the plane, stay behind the secured area, and then get back on again. From what you have said in your testimony, I gather that once the plane has landed and you have left it, you're considered to not be clean anymore, to not have gone through a secured area.

Capt David Lynch: That's right. To re-board the—

Ms. Val Meredith: Is that Transport Canada's regulation, or is it something the airports... Who has determined that the minute you step off that aircraft, even though you're behind a secured area, you're no longer security—

Capt David Lynch: I feel the local airport authorities have taken that initiative, because a wide range of procedures are in use.

I'm a Montreal-based pilot, incidentally, but if I happened to be a Winnipeg-based pilot at Winnipeg's airport, I would be allowed to use the same bypass, the same minimal-screening door as the ground staff. In other words, I show my pass and I'm through. But if I'm a Toronto- or Montreal-based pilot, my pass will not get me through that door. I have to submit to the full screening in Winnipeg. I don't have it right in front of me, but the Vancouver pass has some numbers on the back. It has my name on it, the colour of my eyes, and all that kind of stuff. At the Vancouver airport, they stuck a magnetic card reader over the back of that, so the data is completely—

Ms. Val Meredith: Electronic.

Capt David Lynch: It's completely blocked out. It can be read electronically in Vancouver, but it can't be read in Montreal. These kind of inconsistencies are ridiculous. The pilots have to go through some pretty serious checks to get a pass.

I don't know how often my fingerprints are expected to change in my lifetime, but I'm done every five years by CSIS. I go through a background check, including a pretty severe credit check. We've had guys in the midst of a business failure or a divorce, and they have the issue of their pass hung up because CSIS wants to have a good, long talk with them about their financial liabilities. After having gone through all of that, to still have to be shaken down at security and be forced to give up one's wings is more than enough to annoy us.

• 1200

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Szabo.

Mr. Paul Szabo (Mississauga South, Lib.): Different airlines and different countries have different security arrangements. Do you believe Canada has to have a security strategy that emulates closely what other countries are doing, at the risk of us becoming the weakest link?

Capt David Lynch: I strongly feel that is the case. A passenger travelling from Toronto to La Guardia, for example, has a choice of Air Canada or United. If they know a marshal is on the United flight and they know—this is not the case—that AC has decided not to have one, obviously AC is the weaker link.

We are closely tied to events in the United States, and I'm aware of plenty of close calls in this country that were related to the events of September 11, and of incidents prior to that date that only became of note after September 11. So a lot has been happening in Canada, and still will happen.

Mr. Bob Davis: It's a global business, too, so we need to have some harmonization of rules and regulations on what's going on.

Mr. Paul Szabo: I agree with your view. We're not only concerned about the fundamental security issues, but also about trying to reassure the travelling public, because of the economic impact of consumer confidence erosion.

How many times has an aircraft had a problem as a result of something in baggage, as opposed to with passengers. What would be the relative incidence in the history of aviation?

Capt David Lynch: That's a pretty tough question.

Mr. Bob Davis: I certainly wouldn't have any statistics off the top of my head. If you look at the results of what happened with either passengers or baggage prior to September 11, though, it was certainly stuff in baggage going off—bombs and whatnot—that took airplanes out of the sky.

Again, to me, we're in a new risk environment. A lot of people are on these airplanes, so everyone has to really decide what they want the future to look like.

Mr. Paul Szabo: I raise it because I find it astounding that passenger baggage generally doesn't seem to be on the radar screen as far as security issues go. It's as though, if we deal with this one and close the loop, they look for the alternatives. Therefore, my concern would be that if we really tighten down the screws on the passenger security area, obviously they would look for the next least resistant point, and that would baggage. So if we're going to do this, would you agree that we have to have a comprehensive security strategy that includes all points, rather than simply emphasizing passengers?

Mr. Bob Davis: That is underway. There is a focus on baggage as well. A program is in place to have explosives detection systems in airports to monitor baggage. As Captain Lynch said, though, that's still a number of years down the road.

This is a really complex issue, because you're looking at $300 million or $400 million worth of equipment, and you need completely new infrastructures within the airports when you put that equipment in. You need to change the baggage processing systems so that if a bag is rejected when it goes through the machine, you have another carousel for that bag. But there is quite a focus on that area right now.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Was the ATSC set up by the airlines basically as a buying club?

Mr. Bob Davis: It was inspired a bit by Transport Canada. I don't know if you're familiar with when they divested of NAV CANADA or divested of the air traffic control system, but their next thing was airport security. Transport had all this equipment and told the airlines to look after it and to charge themselves accordingly, because Transport wanted out of it.

• 1205

Mr. Paul Szabo: The airlines, the dominant carriers, obviously realize cost efficiencies if they get together and say they're all going to have to provide the services and thus should have one-step shopping. Somebody else, some organization, could then provide that service in terms of arranging or acquiring it, and making it go. Some airlines do it themselves already.

I'm a little concerned about putting ATSC on some sort of pedestal and saying it has some security expertise. Quite frankly, I see it as a purchasing department, so it really concerns me that you would suggest that we change a purchasing department into the security force for the country in this area.

I fully understand the position you have to take on the economics of who pays for what in terms of enhanced security. The airport authorities have suggested that they could do the job for us if we give them the responsibility. Would that concern you with regard to the possible lack of standardization across the country?

Mr. Bob Davis: Yes. In fact, Captain Lynch has already highlighted it through the pass-issuing process. If we can't get it together on a simple issue like that, airport security is going to be...

Try not to get me wrong on ATSC. It has board members from the airports' council on it. Air Canada has a couple of members on it, Regional Airlines have members on it, and outside directors are on it. Yes, right now, it is structured for the purchase of equipment, but I believe the airports are even buying into this idea of working with the ATSC model. I'm not here just saying ATSC is a... We still want it to be cheap, but this industry is in trouble over security. As I said, we need a cultural shift in the industry. Yes, we are trying to get it for the lowest price while meeting the proper standards.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Is it fair to say the industry in Canada is satisfied with the NAV CANADA arrangement in terms of the services NAV CANADA provides, the costs, etc.?

Mr. Bob Davis: NAV CANADA is a good success story. In my mind, it was a home run for the government to get out of the services. They got some money for it. Things are being efficiently and effectively run right now. Some issues are still lingering, but it has been a very good structure overall, yes.

Mr. Paul Szabo: If I've taken an international flight and come back into Pearson, for example, and I have to go through customs and immigration, I feel somewhat intimidated by these people. They process a lot of people very quickly, but they certainly seem to have an aura about them, given the whole process and the whole set-up of the thing. You don't experience that in passenger screening. Do you think the experience we have when we go through passenger screening with our carry-on luggage should make the same kind of impression of authority that we would experience if we went across a border?

Capt David Lynch: I think it should have the same authority, but it can be done with a very friendly attitude. The oft-used example is the security arrangements at Heathrow. They are very strict, but the people are very professional.

Mr. Paul Szabo: The United States Army has evolved a process of quality assurance, quality control, or checking that involves statistical approaches. They can get a confidence level of 90% by looking at 4% of the things they buy, and all this other stuff. I use that as an example of an organization that is relying on a confidence level, as opposed to trying to get 100%. I have this feeling that no matter what we do, we're never going to be able to achieve 100% certainty that we aren't going to see problems somewhere.

Is anything happening that you are aware of, either domestically or internationally, in which we do in fact rely on sampling or discretion? You know, some one has to go through one line while others can just go ahead, and it's quite random. As Ms. Meredith said, if you check body language or it's somebody you're familiar with, etc., would that relieve a little bit of the pressure?

• 1210

Capt David Lynch: Passenger profiling is going on now. It begins at the check-in process when someone calls to buy a ticket. A number of checks and balances have been put into place, and they will continue.

In terms of getting face to face with a person, our first line of contact often was at the ticket counter. Those agents have now been replaced by electronic kiosks, and the only face-to-face that you may have with a person who is really interested in knowing your intentions is with the person taking your ticket at the aircraft. These people are processing hundreds of... That's now the only line of defence, and it's not really adequate. Training and recognizing things like body language...

As a policeman said to me, you can't go into court and say you had a gut feeling about a guy. Judges don't accept gut feelings. Police officers have to say they saw the guy's hands twitching, that he wouldn't look them straight in the eye, that he was shuffling his feet, that their gut feelings were composed of those things. We have to teach people to recognize those kinds of things.

Mr. Paul Szabo: The last point is on air marshals. With the U.S. move, it certainly would appear that we may be required to provide air marshals on flights in more cases, because U.S. passengers will expect foreign carriers to meet those standards. We do have this problem, though, in terms of finding and training them, and in terms of being able to service flights. That causes me some concern. How do we get there from here?

Capt David Lynch: I've been briefed on the details of the program going on right now. I'm very confident about the people they've chosen, about the training those people have been given, and about the protocols under which they'll work. If we continue to put that level of quality in place, I have no reservations. But the program is a costly one.

Mr. Paul Szabo: I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I just thought of one last thing for Captain Lynch.

I'm really interested in your comment on an assessment of the quality of work people do in current screening. It wasn't very flattering, and I suspect others have had the same opinion. Why didn't the industry say anything to anybody before?

Capt David Lynch: That's a good question.

Not many people were blowing the whistle. Not too many people were looking into the crystal ball and saying we were at risk, that we were wide open to attack on this front. People just took it for granted, and I think the airlines preferred it that way.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Thank you.

The Chair: Back to you, Mario.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Davis, let's talk about financial health. Passenger security is essential to give a boost to the airline industry, but the financial soundness of enterprises is also very important. We know that, in the case of Canada 3000's recent failure, some customers are not yet sure to get a refund for their airline tickets. So, companies' financial health is very important.

When questioned in the House about the support he was granting to the five major airlines—of which you are not part—, the minister answered that, if those five are going well, the other airlines will automatically get enough transits and flights to be well off. Was he right to think that your chances of success are linked to the success of those five companies—there are only four of them left now? Does that ensure you enough travellers? Is the minister right in saying that?

• 1215

[English]

Mr. Bob Davis: In some sense, he is correct. We have a commercial arrangement with Air Canada, so their health certainly affects us, but more in a small way than in a large way.

When we talk about the economics of the airline industry, my view is that the market should take care of itself. Far too many special deals have been made for individual carriers and whatnot. Markets will take care of themselves. I have no doubt in my mind about that. Seeing the failure of Canada 3000 and all those people losing their jobs is regrettable; however, businesses must manage their debt and their growth prudently. If they don't do that, a future is at stake.

I'm just saying to let the market take care of itself. The holes will get filled in. Where flights disappear, other people will go in to do them, or they were not worth doing in the first place.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: And you say that in spite of what happened on September 11 and of the fact that the Americans have decided to support the airline industry directly. You are saying that we should let the market take care of itself in spite of those events, and that everything is going to get fixed again. Is that what you are saying?

[English]

Mr. Bob Davis: Yes, I believe they will for sure. In the States, it was a little bit of a different situation in that a number of carriers were involved directly in the accidents. In my view, what was going on was state-to-state terrorism, and it could potentially take both American and United out of business. I'm quite certain the losses will exceed their total insured value. So the case in the United States is different, but I believe our market in Canada will take care of itself.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: We're going to go back to Val, who has some more questions.

Ms. Val Meredith: I just want to have something clarified, Mr. Davis. Do you feel a private agency or not-for-profit organization should be in charge of security, as opposed to the government?

Mr. Bob Davis: Yes.

Ms. Val Meredith: What do you think, Captain Lynch?

Capt David Lynch: The jury is still out on privatization. I'm not at all confident that this should be another venture that goes out to the lowest bidder. As a minimum, the government must certainly oversee the standards, the training, and the checking. That all has to be Canada-wide. The issuing of passes, even to the screeners, has to be overseen by the government. I'm just worried it's going to be one more level of bureaucracy that will confuse the system and apply its own standards and procedures.

Ms. Val Meredith: So although you feel government has a role to regulate, you're hesitant to say government should get back into the business of running the security at airports.

Capt David Lynch: When it gets to the physical running and manning of the checkpoints, I may not go as far as the Government of the United States has gone by federalizing all those employees, but the federal hand has to be awfully close.

Ms. Val Meredith: Probably based on the presentations made by the people who actually do the checks—CSIS and the RCMP—we understand that anybody who has access to the aircraft, or anybody who has access to the area in which the aircraft park, goes through security screening. You have indicated in your testimony that the security screening for pilots is done on a five-year basis, and that this screening is fairly intense. Do you understand that screening to be the same for anybody else who has access to the aircraft, like the cleaners, the mechanics, or the people who drive the little luggage trains?

Capt David Lynch: It has always been my assumption that this is the case, but I can't say for sure.

Ms. Val Meredith: So you're not aware of the level of screening that those individuals have.

Capt David Lynch: Do you mean the level of scrutiny insofar as the issuance of passes is concerned?

Ms. Val Meredith: Yes.

Capt David Lynch: No, I'm not aware of the specific procedures CSIS might employ with me as opposed to, say, a baggage handler.

Ms. Val Meredith: Is it the same with all pilots?

• 1220

Capt David Lynch: Do we undergo the same scrutiny?

Ms. Val Meredith: Do all pilots undergo the same level of screening?

Capt David Lynch: Yes, we do.

Ms. Val Meredith: Okay.

You made mention of the passenger profiling already going on now, and you said it starts with the purchase of the ticket. We heard from another organization—I think it was ALPA, actually—about an international high-tech profiling system or a system that tracks passengers. Do you feel having that kind of shared intelligence internationally is an essential part of the package, so that our carriers are protected by information they may get beforehand?

Capt David Lynch: As part of the multi-layered response aimed at keeping terrorists out of the country, my understanding was that, until recently, the airlines and the ticket agents were responsible for checking the passports of passengers about to get on a flight. We know many people have arrived in Canada with phony documentation. They shred it and flush it down the toilet, and they claim refugee status on arrival. Better procedures offshore might prevent these people from arriving on our shores at all. They just wouldn't board our ships and our aircraft.

Ms. Val Meredith: You may or may not want to answer this next question, but I'm going to ask it to both of you. Do you feel what happened September 11 was enough to have governments re-examine all legislation pertaining to transportation, traffic, air traffic, security measures, and immigration? Do you feel that catastrophic incident was enough for governments to say a given act was written pre-September 11 and should be looked at again?

Mr. Bob Davis: Unquestionably and unequivocably, yes. Absolutely. Security measures are what we're here about today. We're looking at all those things.

But I want to reinforce some of the issues Captain Lynch has brought forward. It's not just how much EDS equipment we have in the airport and how long the lineups are to get through the check-in. My personal view is that it's complete nonsense that someone can get on an airplane with his identification in a foreign country, destroy that identification en route, get into our country, and then stay for years and years under refugee status while he goes through our system. If someone arrives and doesn't have their documentation or they've destroyed on the way, put them on the same airplane, and back they go. This is a basic price of entry in my view.

As Captain Lynch said, we have to look at the broader issues. How are we going to keep these bad guys out of our country? To me, that is a basic element of this process.

Ms. Val Meredith: The reason for my question was that we have a bill on liability in the system somewhere—and I believe it's Bill S-33. I guess the question after September 11 is the extent to which carriers should be liable for issues that are outside of their control in some cases.

Mr. Bob Davis: It may not even require a bill, because airlines can effectively only get a maximum of about $50 million worth of coverage for aviation, war, and liability risk. Should the government decide not to backstop that, or if it doesn't become available in a commercial insurance market, that's the end of aviation. No investors are going to take that risk. Nobody's going to support NAV CANADA. The airports are not willing, and the municipalities aren't going to take the risk on things like this. So the whole insurance-and-terrorism relationship is a very big issue, for sure.

Ms. Val Meredith: This may be a little bit unrelated, but how does one follow up? I know the government has stepped in and has covered the insurance requirements for the air industry on a short-term basis, but where do we go from here? Is that something the government is always going to have to carry the insurance on?

Mr. Bob Davis: It really comes back to what the commercial market will sell. Right now, there is no commercially available insurance above the $50-million limit on war risk for airlines. Over time, it may come back. At the present time and in the foreseeable future, though, we don't see it being available. So I believe the government is going to have to stay involved.

• 1225

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you.

The Chair: Mario, you have time for one quick question.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: I would like to come back to Mr. Davis. You asked the government a reduction of fees rather than a direct relief. You hope that the fees you have to pay for NAV CANADA's or other agencies services will be lowered. If ever the government failed to do so or if you were not to get any relief or reduction of fees, would your company still survive? Would you be facing problems or would you be well off all the same?

[English]

Mr. Bob Davis: As it is with any business, you either find a way to manage through it, or you fail. Those are the two options. I believe our company will be able to manage through it somehow. Unfortunately, companies such as Canada 3000 were unable to do so.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: I would like to ask you a last question. You have much expertise. Do you believe that some other Canadian carriers are not going to survive on the short term, in the coming weeks?

[English]

Mr. Bob Davis: I don't believe any failures are imminent in the next couple of weeks. In fact, the reduction in capacity and in the market right now has probably been very beneficial to the longer-term survival of all remaining carriers. I would say it looks reasonably good at this point, but you have to remember that First Air is a small carrier operating in niche markets. Maybe the big guys can give you a better answer on that.

Capt David Lynch: I would certainly think WestJet—being a niche carrier in western Canada and having very little transborder traffic, if any—is largely unaffected. As Mr. Davis has indicated, a lot of their traffic goes up through the north, and is thus unaffected. That leaves Air Transat and its vacation market. I'm not quite sure just what situation they're in. And then you have Air Canada, with an extensive transborder network that has been seriously impacted by the events of September 11.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Keyes, for one quick question.

Mr. Stan Keyes (Hamilton West, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is just a very short question for Bob Davis.

When the Minister of Transport was before this committee a couple of weeks ago, I made a suggestion to him about conversations I've had with other smaller carriers in competition with Air Canada, in that we should give the competition bureau more teeth. In effect, through regulation, we should give the bureau the opportunity to level a substantial fine against an action by any airline if it was found to be predatory. As we know, the competition bureau just gives a slap on the back of the hand right now. Our thoughts at the beginning were that bad publicity would generate enough fear that the big guys would not undertake any predatory action.

I know WestJet's Clive Beddoe favours the idea, and others in niche markets and at smaller airlines have warmed up to the idea of the competition bureau being able to level a fine if an airline is found to be predatory. What's your opinion of that suggestion?

Mr. Bob Davis: There are a couple of things there. First, I think the new definition of “predatory” brought it a long way. The competition bureau has done a pretty good job at starting to define exactly what predatory pricing is. When I buy gasoline for my car, when the price changes at one station, the price across the street becomes the same instantaneously. Is that predatory? I don't believe so. On the issue of having the same price while dumping a whole bunch of capacity, yes, that, to me, is predatory. I think we've come a long way, but we need more refinement in terms of what exactly is or isn't predatory, and the process has to be speeded up.

• 1230

Without a doubt, it's bad for the carrier suffering damage if predatory pricing is going on. It's also bad for the industry because of all the public media stuff, all the bad press about the big guy hurting the little guy, and about how the little guy should get ahead.

So we need a better definition of it, and we need to speed up the process. Whether you do through a fine or through other repercussions, there are many avenues. But I wouldn't suggest that a fine is the best one, because there are all kinds of ways.

So, with better definitions and a speeding up of the process, yes, I believe that should happen.

The Chair: Thank you very much, gentlemen. We appreciate your input. I am going to suspend for two minutes while we clear the room, and then we'll get back to the next part of our meeting.

• 1231

• 1234

The Chair: I understand we have some motions to have some more people in, and to see when we could fit these people in. The clerk can tell us what's happening, maybe John can tell us where research is with the report, and then we can move forward from there.

The Clerk of the Committee: The motions that have been distributed to the members are related to having the Minister of Public Works and the Minister of Transport appear before the committee on the subject of the supplementary estimates.

We have witnesses scheduled this week. We have meetings today from 3:30 to 5:30 p.m., tomorrow from 3:30 to 5:30 p.m., and on Thursday from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m.

During the week of November 26, we will be in Washington on November 26 and 27. We have a meeting scheduled from 3:30 to 5:30 p.m. on Wednesday, November 28. We have a meeting that, at the moment, is probably going to be from 10 a.m. until 1 p.m. on Thursday, November 29.

For the weeks after that, we have nothing planned at the moment, but depending on whether or not the ministers do come—

The Chair: What about the report?

The Clerk: For the report, it will depend on when the committee wants to table the report, and on how much time is needed for the committee to consider the draft report.

• 1235

Mr. John Christopher (Committee Researcher): We're targeting the first week of December in terms of having the draft report ready for the committee's consideration.

The Chair: If you want to have input on the budget, which comes out on December 11, try to get it in before that as the committee's work. The minister may be monitoring us—I'm sure he is so that he's aware of what's going on—but part of what we're doing is to try to get some input and to try to have some influence on that legislation.

Ms. Val Meredith: Are you saying the report will be written and presented to the committee on Tuesday, December 4?

Mr. John Christopher: It will be ready for December 4 or 5—

Ms. June Dewetering (Committee Researcher): —or some time during that week.

The Chair: All right, so now we know where you are with that.

Mr. John Christopher: And that's the draft report.

Ms. Val Meredith: It's just that I'm leaving town the night of December 5, and I'd sure like to see it before I leave town.

Mr. John Christopher: We'll do our best.

An hon. member: We'll adjust the parliamentary schedule for you, Val.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thanks, I would appreciate that. That would be nice.

Mr. Paul Szabo: I'd like to just clarify the witnesses. We have meetings next week. Are any other witnesses are mandatory? Do we have Transport Canada officials?

Ms. Val Meredith: Yes, is Transport Canada coming in?

The Clerk: Yes, Transport Canada is actually coming in on November 29, and Louis Turpen, of the Greater Toronto Airport Authority, is also coming in. There has been some discussion about also inviting representatives of one of the companies that manufacture the scanning machines, but we're still trying to contact them.

On November 28, we have representatives from the Aéroports de Montreal—that's the authority for Montréal-Dorval Airport and Mirabel International Airport—and the United Steelworkers of America.

This week, we have people from the Passport Office and from Immigration Canada this afternoon. Tomorrow, we have Larry Berg, president of the Vancouver International Airport Authority, and Peter St. John, who is an expert on airport and aircraft security. On Thursday, we have representatives here from the Canadian Union of Public Employees, the Canadian Auto Workers, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, and the Canadian Labour Congress.

Some calls have also gone out to some other witnesses, but we're still waiting to see if they can appear in the near future.

Ms. Val Meredith: Wouldn't it be appropriate to cut off the number witnesses? If we're trying to get a report written, I think we have to say Thursday is the last day for witnesses.

The Clerk: Do you mean Thursday, November 29?

Ms. Val Meredith: Yes, Thursday, November 29. If these witnesses haven't been able to appear before now, I don't see any point in dragging this thing out too much longer.

If my motions pass, then certainly the labour minister could perhaps pay us a visit on Thursday afternoon of this week. I wouldn't think the Department of Labour is busy doing a lot of other things right about now. The transport minister may be, but the labour minister...

The Clerk: Excuse me, Ms. Meredith, but do you mean the public works minister?

Ms. Val Meredith: Yes, sorry. I apologize.

The Clerk: I put calls in to the offices of both Minister Collenette and Minister Gagliano, and I'm waiting for answers on the availability of both ministers. Those calls went in when I first received your motions.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Ms. Meredith is correct. We should try to form panels and put everybody together by November 29.

One thing I really would like to do before I see a draft report, though, is to have the committee actually meet and discuss the suggested recommendations, etc. We have had a lot of opportunity to ask questions, etc., and we have a lot of information. We may have different views on what the consensus is or what the points are that we should make, etc., and I think everybody wants to make sure we have a good report. We are also hearing from Transport Canada pretty late, at the end of the process. I understand the research consultants are working on writing parts of the report, but I think the consensus positions and key recommendations ultimately ought to be discussed to ensure that we have achieved a comfort level. Before the last button is pressed to print off the report, I would hope we could get—

• 1240

Ms. Val Meredith: Maybe we could have a pre-report meeting on November 29.

The Clerk: The problem with the ministers is that the supplementary estimates have to be reported three days before the last allotted supply day. We don't know when the last allotted supply day is. The most current rumour is that it will be during the first week in December.

Wednesday, November 28, or Thursday, November 29, might be a good time to try to get the ministers in, either for a Wednesday sitting in the evening, for example, or possibly for Thursday afternoon. That's if the committee decides it wants to hear from the ministers on the supplementary estimates.

The Chair: I think we have enough information.

Val, do you want to give us your motion?

Mr. Paul Szabo: Mr. Chairman, before we do that, if we have all our witnesses and can squeeze them in by the Thursday, and if the members are happy with that, then immediately following the last witness, maybe it would be possible to have a discussion on recommendations. We're being asked to do a little extra work, so does that mean we would see a draft by December 4?

Mr. John Christopher: Hopefully by December 4 or 5.

Mr. Paul Szabo: December 4 or 5, okay. Well, we don't want to make you tired. I'm sure everybody would rather that you had the time you felt was necessary. So we'll have a draft on December 5, and we'll at least have the final report for input on December 6, the following day. But Val isn't here on December 6, and that's a problem.

Ms. Val Meredith: Why aren't we doing it on the Monday or Tuesday of the following week, in order to give us a chance to go over this report?

Mr. Paul Szabo: They won't have the draft report to us until December 5.

Ms. Val Meredith: Oh, I see what you're talking about.

Mr. Paul Szabo: I'm getting a little concerned now, because I don't want to jeopardize this report. If we want to find a consensus on recommendations, give the staff the—

Ms. Val Meredith: As long as I have a copy of it, I can do my corrections and my recommendations through e-mail or through fax machines. It's not as though I wouldn't have any input.

The Chair: Val will let you know where she will be.

Ms. Val Meredith: Sure.

Mr. Paul Szabo: So we would target to receive the report roughly on December 5.

The Clerk: It will be at committee on December 6.

Mr. John Christopher: I think we have to have for that date, because we have to allow for translation, revisions, and the mechanics of it.

Mr. Paul Szabo: That means we're going to try to table it probably on December 10 or 11, or maybe even December 12. I wouldn't even risk going beyond the Wednesday, because of everything that's going on.

Mr. John Christopher: That's right.

Mr. Paul Szabo: This says to me that we're darn tight already. I don't think it's acceptable not to table the report before we rise. If we're tight for time already, everybody must understand that we have to be reasonable about other things. The logical extension of all of this is that we now have the estimates, and I don't...

The Chair: All right, do we agree on what Mr. Szabo is proposing so that we can come to some means of tying this thing down?

Mr. Paul Szabo: You're getting a draft report by Wednesday, December 5, and we're going to meet on December 6 so we can make some corrections, provide input, or whatever. Val will either fax her suggestions in or pass them on through a colleague. We are going to have a discussion, though. Time will be slotted in for discussion of recommendations prior to the draft being finalized. We are then going to seek to table this thing the week of Monday, December 10. The final report will be done for either December 10, 11, or 12.

The Chair: Is it agreed?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: All right, then, let's have your motions, Val.

• 1245

Ms. Val Meredith: There are two motions. One is to have Minister Collenette appear before the committee on the supplementary estimates, and the other one is to have the Minister of Public Works and Government Operations appear.

The Chair: We'll do one at a time, starting with the transport minister.

Some hon. members: Agreed.

Mr. Paul Szabo: We have asked for dates for the ministers.

The Chair: We're agreeing that the ministers appear. We'll then try to work the dates out.

An hon. member: What if you can't work the dates out?

The Chair: Well, we can discuss it. That's fine.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Are we just going to leave it at that?

Ms. Val Meredith: We could add fifty minutes to an evening meeting, like we did on a Monday night with Mr. Collenette.

The Chair: We'll deal with Minister Collenette first. Is it agreed that we try to get him here?

Mr. Paul Szabo: Okay, so we're not specifying a time or date.

(Motion agreed to)

The Chair: What was the other motion?

Ms. Val Meredith: It dealt with the Minister of Public Works.

The Chair: Ms. Meredith moves that the Minister of Public Works—

Ms. Val Meredith: Mr. Gagliano.

The Chair: —get here as soon as possible.

(Motion agreed to)

The Chair: All right. Is there anything further for the good of this committee? No? Then we're finished until—

Mr. Marcel Proulx (Hull—Aylmer, Lib.): Mr. Chair, we'll need a list of the different committee dates and hours that have been set, unless you've already sent that to us this morning.

Ms. Val Meredith: If you could put it on a calendar, it would be nice.

Mr. Marcel Proulx: Yes. We have to know where we're going.

The Chair: Thank you. We're adjourned.