TRGO Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

LE COMITÉ PERMANENT DES TRANSPORTS ET DES OPÉRATIONS GOUVERNEMENTALES

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, November 8, 2001

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[English]

The Chair (Mr. Ovid Jackson (Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, Lib.)): Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'd like to call the meeting to order.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we're here to study the airline industry with regard to safety and security.

We have guests here from the Airline Pilots Association: Kent Hardisty and Jim Stewart.

Stephen Markey, maybe you could introduce the rest of your gang.

Mr. Stephen Markey (Vice-President, Government Relations and Regulatory Affairs, Air Canada): Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Welcome. I'm not sure if you have worked out who's going to make your comments before we get into questioning.

Mr. Stephen Markey: All right.

Kent, how do you want to proceed? Do you want to both make comments and then we can open it up to general questions?

Captain Kent Hardisty (Vice-President, Canada Board, Air Line Pilots Association (International): I'd prefer to do it that way.

Mr. Stephen Markey: That's fine with us, Mr. Chairman, if that's okay with you.

[Translation]

Good morning, everyone.

[English]

With me this morning is Captain Rob Giguere. Rob is the executive vice-president, operations, at Air Canada. Rob is responsible for the safe and efficient operation of the airline at all times. Also with me is Yves Duguay. Yves is the director of security for Air Canada. Yves has joined Air Canada after a distinguished career in the RCMP. Yves presides over our security portfolio in the company—a very important person in the company, and obviously a man who has been extremely busy in recent weeks. We have two of our other colleagues in the audience who have particular expertise in certain areas, Brian Racine, on a lot of immigration issues—if there's a need, Brian would be happy to join us—and Fred Gaspar, who is known to many of you.

We're delighted to be with your this morning. And with that, I'll turn it over to Rob. And then Kent I guess would follow Rob.

Mr. Rob Giguere (Executive Vice-President, Operations, Air Canada): Thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Chairman, honourable members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of Air Canada, I thank you for giving me this opportunity to appear before the committee.

[English]

On the morning of September 11, Air Canada was called upon by the Government of Canada to assist in a series of extraordinary measures, including the safe and orderly shutdown of airports across Canada. Our response was immediate, efficient, collaborative, and without reservation. Since September 11, many things have changed. One thing that has not changed is Air Canada's focus on running a safe and secure airline.

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I want to emphasize to the committee and to all Canadians that our first priority is and always has been the safe operation of every flight. Air Canada has taken timely and concrete actions on the issues of security. Some of our recent actions may have been overshadowed by our financial difficulties, but the fact is safety and security, not dollars and cents, remain first and foremost. We share the concerns of Canadians, and that's why we've wasted no time in implementing a number of security initiatives across the board.

Air Canada has revised its carry-on baggage allowance on flights within North America. New Transport Canada rules regarding the carriage of electronic devices, sharp objects, and other items have been implemented and communicated to our passengers. All passengers are now required to produce a valid photo ID for travel to all destinations prior to boarding their plane.

Air Canada has expressed a strong belief to Minister Collenette, which is in the interest of the travelling public as well as Canada's airlines, that security screening at airports should be conducted by a federal agency in full coordination with the government's policing, national defence, and intelligence resources. This process should be managed by a federal agency but scheduled and tactically deployed by the airlines to best serve the needs of our customers. We're ready to assist this transition as soon as possible.

Our express check-in kiosks currently available across Canada have been upgraded to reflect new heightened security requirements, and to date over 200 of our aircraft have been retrofitted with cockpit doors with specially designed reinforcement bars. Our entire fleet will be completed by November 15.

Air Canada has recognized the proven effectiveness and need for on-board RCMP presence and has formally requested that the government implement a Canadian program beyond the minimum requirements for the resumption of flights to Washington's Reagan National Airport. We're ready to make this happen quickly and efficiently.

And last but not least, Air Canada is recommending to the government that an air travel security advisory group be comprised of public and private members and involving all stakeholders. This group would advise the government on the viability of all security initiatives, and foster an integrated and seamless approach to security based on the best demonstrated practices identified across this country and around the world.

From an airline perspective we see a number of specific challenges and opportunities. I'd like to briefly share those with you today and put them on the table for your comments and input.

First, as an airline, there is a challenge of integrating any new safety and security measures into the operation of the airline. While passengers are extremely accepting and patient when it comes to delays resulting from security procedures, excessive inconvenience over the long term cannot help but dampen the demand for air travel and further erode business. For that reason it's important for us to work together as regulators and operators to ensure that new security measures are practical and viable in the long term.

Second, we must establish, measure, and audit the effectiveness of what we're doing and what we intend to do. Let us engage in this vitally important goal of safety and security by finding the right level of resources, which will provide the optimum margin of safety and security. That means we need to target specific areas and allocate our precious resources to the tools that bring the most effective results—whether it's training for security staff or passenger screening or on-board RCMP presence.

Third, I believe that technology offers major opportunities. Transport Canada is already working with the industry on the deployment of explosives detection equipment and tracing technology. At Air Canada we recognize the value of this technology in advanced passenger information and baggage screening equipment. We're moving ahead on these fronts, but a government-led investment in this area could be the catalyst for providing the industry with a real edge in identifying today's global network.

Fortunately, Canada's responding has taken an important first step. Two weeks ago the federal government announced a $79 million investment toward security and a variety of initiatives. We recognize and applaud the government on moving quickly to back its commitments on safety and security. We recognize there are still some question marks about funding for other aspects: a decision from the federal government on funding of on-board security measures remains outstanding, as does the decision on a federal RCMP presence program and a federal airport security program.

I want to conclude by acknowledging the leadership that Canada has shown in dealing with this crisis. The level of cooperation and dialogue among key government agencies, airport authorities, law enforcement agencies, and regulators has been outstanding. In particular, I want to single out Transport Canada for dealing professionally and effectively with the September crisis. In addition, there has been an extraordinary level of team work among our front-line employees to adopt new measures and make them work.

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Air Canada will continue to take the lead in implementing enhanced safety and security measures, will continue to enshrine safety and security as a principal focus of our operation, and will continue to work with all stakeholders in a cooperative manner.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'll turn it over to Captain Hardisty, and we will be prepared to answer questions.

The Chair: Thank you, Rob.

Captain Kent Hardisty: Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

My name is Kent Hardisty. I'm an executive vice-president of the Air Line Pilots Association. ALPA represents 67,000 professional pilots who fly for 47 airlines in Canada and the United States. With me today is Mr. Jim Stewart, of our engineering and air safety department.

We'd like to thank you for the opportunity to speak to the committee today on aviation security, a critical issue of nationwide importance. We have submitted a written brief, to which I will provide an overview in our opening remarks.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, after commercial jets crashed into the World Trade Center towers in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and a field in southwestern Pennsylvania, the world as we know it was forever altered. Our sense of innocence was lost, and our sense of security was snatched away.

Although the terrorist attacks occurred in the United States, their implications transcend national borders. For obvious reasons, these horrific acts should be of especially high concern to the countries that share borders with the United States.

After September 11, we have collectively shared the grief of our American friends. We now need to work together to evolve to the next level, a state of determined and focused action to ensure that Canada, and particularly our airline industry, are forever safeguarded against nightmarish acts like those that occurred almost two months ago in the United States.

One of the lessons reinforced by these tragedies is that aviation forms the wings of the Canadian economy. Without a strong and vibrant airline industry, our economy is in serious peril, in our view. Aviation is an extremely valuable resource in Canada, as it is the most reliable and cost-effective means, sometimes the only means, to move goods and people throughout our vast country, especially in the remote northern territories. Aviation is a resource that we may have taken for granted before but cannot afford to do so again. After the events of September 11, ALPA contends that our nation's economy is dependent on and inextricably linked to our air travel and transport system.

I am proud to report that ALPA pilots demonstrated their professionalism and dedication to the industry in their return to work as soon as the shutdown of the aviation system was repealed. ALPA pilots did what was necessary to get the industry back in the air and the economy back on its feet.

It is now time for the government to do its part. The government must commit itself to getting the airline industry back in the air safely, for today and tomorrow. Indeed, some steps have been made to make air travel and transport in Canada safer and more secure through the involvement of the government, in cooperation with ALPA, other aviation labour unions, the airlines, and airline manufacturers. However, these are only the first steps on a much longer path to filling the holes in the existing security system for the long term.

I cannot overstate the importance of filling these holes immediately. Doing so will bolster the security of the air transport system tremendously and will help improve travellers' confidence in air travel, thereby improving the financial outlook of the airline industry, with a ripple effect on the entire national economy.

Prior to the events of September 11, the aviation security community was generally opposed to the concept of adopting a fortress mentality to protect our aviation system in the air and on the ground. Highly visible armed police officers stationed in airport terminals, extensive hand searches of carry-on bags and additional enhanced screening procedures, and other such measures were thought to be incompatible with commercial aviation in a free society. We now know that enhanced security is not only compatible, but a necessity for commercial aviation to thrive in this heightened security-conscious environment.

It is safe to say that the entire aviation industry, the government, the travelling public, and perhaps even pilots and other crew members enjoyed a false sense of security before September 11. Canada is not immune to terrorism. No nation is immune. Canada must immediately establish the proper safeguards to protect its citizens from experiencing any horrors similar to those of September 11, and the government must take the lead role in instituting an advanced civil aviation security system. Action must be taken now.

The security improvements that I'm here to recommend to the committee today range from quick fixes for the short term, to more difficult and expensive solutions for the long term. Some of these recommendations are costly, but can we put a price tag on aviation security? ALPA calls upon the government to ensure that the funding necessary to fortify our airlines and airports be made available promptly so we can boost the public's confidence in returning to the skies and, in our own way, win the war against terrorism at home.

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ALPA recommends the adoption of a new aviation security blueprint that reaches much further in scope and depth than what was in place pre-September 11. In fact, this blueprint calls for a complete overhaul of the aviation security system to fill all the aforementioned holes and to enclose the system with an iron fence so that it is rendered impenetrable by potential terrorists and is safe.

In ALPA's written statement, the association outlined 21 recommendations for change to current security requirements, for which we request your support and assistance. Because aviation safety is an issue for all airline pilots, we would like to state for the record that the Air Canada Pilots Association and the First Air Pilots Association also endorse these recommendations.

Because of time restraints in my comments to you this morning, I would like to highlight only five of these recommendations, which are contained within three main categories for change.

First of all, ALPA believes we must develop and maintain effective systems to restrict access to aircraft from any individuals with hostile intent. One of the most basic functions of a satisfactory security system is to positively identify all individuals who are authorized access to secure areas in airports. Today the failure to require airlines and airports to verify employee identities is a cause of serious concerns about the security of flight. There have been reports on the possibility that terrorists are or may have posed as airline employees. We need to put to an immediate end to the inconsistencies in the screening of various airport personnel and put in place a solid access control system. As such, and since the mid-1980s, ALPA has called for the institution of electronic means of positively identifying each and every employee who has authorization to enter secured areas.

ALPA firmly holds that Transport Canada must introduce and use to its fullest extent programs that will prevent passengers from accessing airline aircraft with hostile intent. As one of our near-term actions to improve aviation security, the association recommends the adoption of a computer-assisted passenger profile system, or CAPPS, as soon as realistically possible. CAPPS is designed to use passenger information databases to determine whether an individual poses a security risk.

A major gap in the airline security at airports is in the area of carry-on baggage screening. The status quo, whereby airlines contract with the lowest bidder to perform security screening, has been a complete validation of the concept that you get what you pay for. Screeners have the utmost responsibility bearing on their shoulders. They serve an important line of defence against terrorism on the ground, yet are generally improperly trained and poorly paid. Transport Canada should ensure that all screening personnel are properly trained, motivated, and supervised to operate at a consistently high standard across the country. If deemed necessary to accomplish this goal, ALPA believes a federal program should be used to ensure a national level of performance.

Secondly, we must do all we can to prevent unauthorized access to the flight deck in the event the first line of defence is breached. This goal can be accomplished in part by strengthening cockpit doors. Current cockpit doors are weak and flimsy and can be easily compromised by a determined adult. We need stronger cockpit doors that can secure the flight crew against attacks by would-be cockpit intruders, armed or otherwise. These doors would ultimately serve as one of the last lines of defence against a terrorist attack in flight. The design of the reinforced doors on all flight decks should ensure that the doors cannot be breached in flight or on the ground when closed and locked. In addition, it should be required that the door be locked at all times unless the safety of flight requires it to be unlocked. The technology exists and must be utilized in as prompt a manner as possible.

Thirdly, we must train and equip flight crews to deal with a threat, should that threat occur. The form of terrorism that manifested itself on September 11 is entirely different from what can be referred to as “traditional” terrorist acts of the past, those involving extortion-type hijackings. After the association's experts performed a thorough review of current anti-hijacking policies and procedures, including the issue of compliance or non-compliance with terrorist demands, ALPA has determined that all airlines should be required to change their policies for dealing with hijackers to one of non-compliance. This change is necessary to deal effectively with the new threat of suicidal hijackers or other such extreme hazards on airliners. Additionally, appropriate and enhanced training for crew members on this new paradigm should be mandatory.

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the committee this morning to outline ALPA's recommendations for reinforcing and improving the security of Canada's air transport system. The association looks forward to working with Parliament, Transport Canada, the airline industry, aircraft manufacturers, other aviation labour unions, and other interested parties in implementing our list of 21 recommendations in a timely manner.

ALPA pilots also look forward to continuing to do their part in ensuring that air travel remains the safest form of transportation in the world, urging our citizens to return to the skies, and assisting our economy to soar again.

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We will be pleased to respond to any questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Kent.

We'll start with Monsieur Mario Laframboise of the Bloc Québécois.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise (Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to begin by saying that no one can remain indifferent to what you are telling us. I would just like to ask you for some more details. You are suggesting—I am referring to Air Canada—in your presentation that, in the end, security screening should be conducted by a federal agency. Prior to this, an air travel security advisory group would have been set up, bringing all stakeholders to the table. It is time this happened. I am going to agree fully with you; it was wrong that this—

We must get this right. Transport Canada was showered with praise. It was reacting after the crisis. The minister reacted well after the crisis; we have to give him that. Transport Canada was responsible for security. It is clear that, with the measures it had adopted in the last few years, there was a lack of knowledge about terrorism and other things. Consequently, although there was a good reaction after the crisis, I cannot say to you today that Transport Canada did well. That would not be true; the department did not take the right steps.

I have a great deal of difficulty with the idea of giving responsibility for security to a civilian organization, especially since things are already underway. This is the first disaster, but the Americans have been warning us about terrorism and warning us to be careful for a number of years.

Therefore, I agree with you that it is high time that we set up an advisory group, and that there be a federal agency in charge. Before I give you my opinion, I would like you to go into greater detail concerning the federal agency. In your view, what would be the nature of this federal agency responsible for safety and security?

[English]

Mr. Rob Giguere: The agency could be structured in a somewhat similar fashion to NAV CANADA, with joint governance by those responsible—the government, the regulator, the industry, and the unions. They would establish the standards, procedures, training, and audit, and have a uniform standard across the country. The staff from this organization would be deployed by the airlines on a tactical basis to meet the supplies, needs, and demands of the customers, in terms of actual traffic flows. There would be a national policy across the country with a national standard run by an organization that has a consistent approach to it, under the auspices of the government.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Once again, you refer to an advisory group on security and you refer to an agency. I, for my part, have no problem with the setting up of an advisory group for the organizations that you just mentioned. I am with you. I agree that there should be a federal agency. I would even be prepared to agree that supervision, that tactical leadership on security, be entrusted to the RCMP. If we want to reassure the public, there has to be a responsible body. There has to be a tactical control centre that has responsibility for establishing security standards and the organizations that will enforce them.

I would like to make myself clear: this tactical control centre would not replace anyone. Everyone would continue to do his or her job. The standards would be made tighter, but the people responsible would be experts in the areas of crime and terrorism and they would decide on security standards. The associated costs, I think, should in large part be paid by the government. It is not a responsibility that belongs just to industry. I get the feeling that all of the witnesses who testify before us are afraid that the bill for security—

I believe that the government is partly responsible for safety and security matters. It should pay its share, and security standards should be developed by experts in the field of crime and terrorism, on the recommendation of an advisory group. However, we absolutely need a federal agency. I, for one, would see the RCMP in this role. Many people would claim that this would lead to disputes between police forces. Air transportation is a federal responsibility. It would make sense that there be a tactical control centre at the federal level that assumes responsibility because, in the end, the problem we have now is that there is no responsible body. It is not you, because you followed the standards set by Transport Canada. Well, just try to find out who to blame at Transport Canada. The minister defends himself well and says that he took the right steps. In the end, we have security problems and we do not yet know who is responsible.

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Once we have finished, I hope that we will know which body will be responsible, and that people will be aware that there are security and criminal experts taking care of safety and security. A public organization like Transport Canada, I'm sorry, was not able... Well, I don't want to place the blame on it. Let's not blame Transport Canada, but in the future, you recommend—

When we talk about a federal agency, I agree with you that we need a tactical control centre to be responsible for everything. We should not think of security in terms of dollars and cents. You were right, Captain, when you said that we cannot put a price on safety and security. In the end, there is always a price to pay, and it is up to the government to pay it.

[English]

Mr. Stephen Markey: There are two fundamental suggestions we've made today. One, of course, is the federal agency you spoke of, which we see as an organization that can, with a stronger mandate and more direction, better govern security at airports.

The pre-screening process at airports is perceived to be weak. We think a federal agency can deal with that in a very effective way to restore confidence in our system.

We have also suggested to the Minister of Transport that under his direction and leadership he bring together the various components of the new world in which we live—the RCMP, the Solicitor General and all of the federal agencies—in a consultative mechanism that would allow the airlines and all of the other stakeholders in the process to do exactly what you're suggesting, which is to be on top of these issues and to anticipate them.

We can't at this point tell you what his response will be to that suggestion, but we can tell you he has been extremely open and extremely interested in discussing all of these new ideas with us. So we're searching for new ways of doing things after September 11, and the minister has been very open to many of these suggestions.

There are some significant cost issues, and they continue to be a major preoccupation as we go forward. But there are two central recommendations we're making. One is this federalized agency to deal with airport security, which we think would enhance confidence—to your point. The other is better control and planning under some kind of consultative group, sponsored by the Minister of Transport, which would allow all the stakeholders in this process to be more involved and to deliver more effective security to the travelling public.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: That's fine. That still does not give me my lead agency, but I am able to follow you.

My second line of questioning concerns in-flight security. You have suggested sky marshals. I will tell you right away that I oppose the idea of introducing weapons. There are two different reactions to weapons: some people feel safer, others feel less safe. The solution would probably be to ensure that the cockpit is completely isolated, with a separate door and everything. You do not make this suggestion. Why not? Because it would be too expensive, because completely new airplanes would be needed?

[English]

Mr. Rob Giguere: No, the issue of security on board the airplane is one we have dealt with already. We have hardened our cockpit doors by adding security devices in the cockpit door areas—by strengthening the door that prevents unauthorized access.

There is a belief by some parties, as I've heard before, that perhaps the cockpit should be completely isolated and separated from the cabin. But this, in itself, has safety risks associated with it. There are times and provisions when it's completely appropriate for a pilot to leave the flight deck to examine the surfaces of the wing before departure. In-flight there may be an issue that must be dealt with to visually examine the control surfaces of the aircraft, and so on.

So to prevent, in every case, the pilot from having access to the cabin is a very large safety risk, in terms of the operation of the aircraft. That's why, generally speaking across the industry, people have accepted that this is not necessarily the right solution.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: That's one argument. However, I would like to hear what the captain has to say about this.

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[English]

The Chair: That will be your last question. I'll allow the answer for Mario. Thanks.

Captain Kent Hardisty: The technology exists today for the implementation and adaptation of the hardened door. The interesting part, from the association's perspective, is that in the U.S., following the events of September 11, a task force was struck to identify immediate quick-fix issues. As a result of that, certain actions were taken.

In the U.S., virtually all aircraft have now been modified to provide a barrier, on an interim basis, for the door and access to the cockpit. In Canada that's been a voluntary undertaking by several airlines, but at this time there's no federal mandate for that.

The door itself obviously needs to be viewed in a longer timeline, but the technology is there and the work is being done. It's our suggestion that we need to fast-track and move quickly on these issues, to ensure we can put these doors in place and have an adequate means to ensure the safety of the crew and protect the cockpit accordingly.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Would that be the solution? Rather than having a completely isolated cockpit, would that be the way to go?

[English]

Captain Kent Hardisty: Yes. We support the comments of Captain Giguere. There are times when access to the cabin will have to be provided for flight crew. So we have to work carefully on the issue of the door itself and the access matters.

We're talking about making sure there is no access from the outside. We're talking about making sure the door is locked and bolted and the pilots can unlock it from a remote location—in other words, when they're at their stations—when necessary. But there can be no entry through that door without the pilots themselves opening it through those remote means.

The Chair: Okay.

I'll give you another round later on, Mario.

Mr. Szabo.

Mr. Paul Szabo (Mississauga South, Lib.): Thank you to all the witnesses. I think you've made a very clear statement about the linkages between achieving safety and security, restoration of public confidence, and therefore translating that into restoration of the marketplace, which has contracted significantly and exacerbated a whole bunch of other problems.

I think the statement about safety and security is not a dollar and cents issue. Without safety and security you have nothing.

There are two issue areas. One has to do with the screening. Some audits in the past have shown as much as a 20% failure rate. Today's Globe and Mail has the Jan Wong story where investigative reporters—I don't know if they did it by stealth or whatever—apparently got through. I don't know all the details. Chicago's just had a serious incident.

I'm very curious. Even though I think everybody's satisfied that the screeners, who are contracted by the dominant carrier, are meeting the standards Transport Canada has laid out, they appear to be doing an unsatisfactory job.

The question is, since the dominant carrier is responsible for that contracting, why has it been acceptable that they've met the standards of Transport Canada, but you have not said that the standards weren't good enough? Why has it taken until now?

Mr. Rob Giguere: That's a good point. At this point we have to accept the fact that since September 11 the world has changed, so the standards that were established in the past have to be reviewed. It is one of our thrusts that we need an organization that reviews these intensively, looks at them, and determines what's best as we go forward.

We have to remember that standards are set by Transport Canada for security and safety. The training, the audit process, and so on are all established in that pattern, with the thought of life before September 11.

Our belief is that if we pull all the responsible bodies together in the group we've indicated to be desirable, we'll end up with the most focused solution for what we need to go forward. It will allow the body that will be responsible for setting those regulations, which should be Transport Canada security, to revise the regulations to reflect the new reality of life, as we move forward.

In the past, as you know, at the security screening points they were looking for much different things from what they're looking for today. As a consequence of that and the change we've seen, we need new revised rules. We need uniform standards across the country, uniform training, uniform tools and devices for measuring—and the most advanced of devices—and auditing.

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What the airline is asking for, in terms of this, is an organization that would establish what is the best, the government to be responsible for establishing and revising those standards as needed on an ongoing basis, and then a government agency that is uniform across the country along with all these various components to be responsible for applying the new standards—the new reality we face today.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Okay. Thank you.

The security elements within an airport community are pretty diverse. There's catering, cargo, customs and immigration, airport property. The dominant carrier has the screening, ticket sales, flight check-in, boarding, and in-flight responsibility. All have touched security one way or another. And I'm sure there's more that I've missed.

Last weekend the Globe and Mail had a feature story on this. I may even have it here. It said don't mix security and profit. It's an interesting, let's say, presumption.

Airlines have a responsibility to their shareholders. You need customer satisfaction. You need to be kind to them. You want to make sure they don't get in lines that are too long. You want to make sure they're treated kindly—they get the right wine that they want and all those things that you can do to be a classy airline and to attract customers. So that being an essential part of your existence and your raison d'être, having your involvement in security seems to be.... Maybe it shouldn't be as great a role.

The airport authorities, both Ottawa and GTAA, have said to us they think everything should be under an umbrella, some sort of a uniform main control, but the authority wanted to do it. But the airline is on the hook. Not only are you in business, but you are also on the hook, because if something goes wrong you're the one that is going to be the first line of.... If there's an incident, you're in trouble.

So I'm not sure whether it's going to be easy to integrate all of the vested interests. The only way, I think, we can do it, and unfortunately it appears to be the way we're doing it now, is that the standards, the rules, and the regulations are established. But I'm not sure it should be Transport Canada, as it's set up now. I think it probably—and maybe it's where you're going—has to be like a NAV CANADA, where there is somewhat of an arm's-length operation where there is an accountability and a reportability and where we respond to audit difficulties, etc., so that we can make reports to the public and say that safety and security has established a 90% confidence factor or something like that.

So I'd be curious or interested in your views about whether or not the airport authorities should be given any special consideration with regard to being that blanket control over safety and security in the airport environment or whether there are compelling reasons why we should look toward the independent agency.

Mr. Rob Giguere: Yes, there are. I believe there are compelling reasons.

When you suggest that obviously an airline has a responsibility to economics, they do, and they have a responsibility to safety. In my business it's very clear, safety is our first priority. Our airline is about safety. We've lived that since its inception. And we make that clear. In the case of the cockpit doors, for example, we have—without any funding—gone ahead and equipped over 200 of our aircraft with cockpit door hardening devices and gone ahead to push that issue and make sure that we have the very best of safety on board our aircraft and are continuing to investigate ways.

In terms of the airports controlling the process surrounding screening, we have an opinion much different from that. We believe that a uniform standard is absolutely required across this country. We have a very wide country whose economy is fuelled by this economic engine of airline travel. As Captain Hardisty pointed out, there are many regions of this country that in fact are only served by aircraft.

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It's important to recognize that to have a standard we can all hold our head high on, in light of the new reality from September 11, each and every airport must meet that standard to keep the system secure. So the security at Toronto's Pearson International Airport must be exactly the same as the security at Yellowknife. The standards must be the same—the audit, the training, and so on. If each airport is independently reviewing these processes, we believe we won't have that standard. We won't have consistency across the nation, and as a consequence we won't have a secure system, because the passengers and travellers who move to the secure side of a screening point travel all across this nation and all across the various skies of Canada. This is what is going to make it safe, having that uniform standard with the uniform policy, training, and audit throughout the country at each and every one of our airports that is served by commercial scheduled traffic.

Mr. Stephen Markey: To your point, Mr. Szabo, NAV CAN does present a viable model. The industry pays for the use of NAV CAN's facilities, but participates in developing NAV CAN procedures by its role in the board and in other ways. But NAV CAN has fiduciary responsibility for many things, which comes first and foremost in their lives. We think it gives a very high level of both efficiency and air traffic control security. We think the same model could be applied to airport security.

Mr. Paul Szabo: Thank you.

The Chair: That's a good point.

Thanks, Paul. You may want to come back later on.

We'll go to Val.

Ms. Val Meredith (South Surrey—White Rock—Langley, PC/DR): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing. I've found your brief very interesting, and it's interesting to hear new ideas as to how we can handle this. This one of a NAV CAN type of model is an interesting concept.

The question I have regarding that—and it's just one small part of my concern or my inquisitiveness—is how do you provide the same level of security that you would have in Toronto's Pearson International Airport to Grande Prairie, Alberta, or Terrace, British Columbia? It's not really conceivable that you would have the same level of security at those two different airports. Number one is cost. Number two is risk assessment. In my other testimony I have asked that question. How do you secure Toronto's Pearson International Airport or Vancouver International Airport when you have all of these smaller planes coming from all over God's creation?

I think there's a concern there. I don't think the answer is to have a unified security system that would be the same in Toronto and Vancouver as it would be in Terrace. But I think there has to be a standard set in all those smaller airports that is consistent with the risk and with the size that protects Vancouver and Toronto.

Specifically to Air Canada, in your brief you mentioned that you have upgraded your kiosks to reflect the heightened security. How have you done that? When people walk into the airport and check into your kiosk program, how do you...?

Mr. Rob Giguere: The check-in process is done through the kiosk and identifies passengers who have checked in through a kiosk. There is a passenger name match to the high-risk names that have been associated with the business. All the standards that are being met with our agents are being met through an automated process with the kiosk. Then as a—

Ms. Val Meredith: How does a person show picture ID to a kiosk?

Mr. Rob Giguere: I was just going to go on. That's a very good point, because a kiosk doesn't accept a picture ID, but it does identify who the person is. We then highlight that on the boarding pass, and, as I've said in my brief, the actual boarding process at the aircraft requires the photo ID right at the aircraft door onto the bridge. So there's a match between the kiosk boarding pass—in fact, all of our boarding passes—and photo ID for the customer to confirm we have the appropriate passenger on board.

Ms. Val Meredith: So basically what you're telling me, and I think it's a great idea, is your kiosks are giving you almost a pre-clearance. They're giving you an ability to run that person's name through the system before they even get near the door. So is the same thing done for me who uses a ticket? Is there still a scan as to whether this person is considered to be a risk?

Mr. Rob Giguere: Yes. We have taken an approach in our security department to say one of the key focuses that we should have going forward is also to know your customer—so an effective customer database of knowing who your customers are and how you're dealing with them. To your point, yes, specifically, when our passengers check in with one of our customer service agents the same process goes on and there is a computer search. We do the same searches when the passengers are booked on our aircraft now. Passengers who book through the airline are required to give their full legal name. They can refuse to give their full legal name, but that then highlights them in a special flag that requires further investigation at the time of arrival at the airport.

• 1210

Ms. Val Meredith: Is this the CAPPS program, Captain Hardisty, that you mention in your brief? Is this the CAPPS program that you'd be using? Is it a similar kind of thing?

Captain Kent Hardisty: I think it resembles the CAPPS program. There are many elements to the CAPPS program, but it is a type of profiling, and certainly we would support the measures that Rob has identified today.

Ms. Val Meredith: Wouldn't it make sense that all airlines are using the same program? And then my follow-up question to this is after you've identified somebody, who does this information go to? Who gets the information, and then what happens if there's a person who might be of risk?

That's a two-pronged question. Doesn't it make sense that all airlines are using the same program so the databank is the same? And secondly, what do you do with that information once you gather it?

Captain Kent Hardisty: The short answer is yes, it does make sense. The Airline Pilots Association certainly advocates that the CAPPS program be brought into being in Canada. There's certainly anecdotal evidence we've been privy to that would suggest the events of September 11 may have been mitigated if that program had have been properly up and running. It's there. It's technology we have today that we can and should implement. And it should apply to all airlines. Once the triggers have been hit, there are a number of parts that go into play. Most of the individuals who are involved still want to keep to a certain degree of confidentiality to ensure that it's effective.

Ms. Val Meredith: Yes, it's great to have these data collection systems, and it's great to identify a problem, but who gets that information? Who would respond? A guy's name is flagged—the RCMP or the CIA have a concern about him. Then what?

Captain Kent Hardisty: They don't get on the airplane.

Mr. Rob Giguere: We believe that the processes we've established at Air Canada, and right now in our processes through the automation that's available.... And obviously automation is key to this in terms of information technology. There are worldwide databases available that have to be assimilated and collected at one clearing house. The International Air Transport Association or ICAO are bodies that would be obviously a key to this approach. The governments of the world are going to have to synchronize their policies and procedures.

In Canada we have some policies and regulations in place now in terms of the Privacy Act, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, and so on that actually preclude some of this, and we need to work together as a global community to establish with all nations of the world one clearing house.

As you are aware, there are central computer reservation systems that the airlines use, and in fact there are not very many of those systems that don't talk to each other. So as a consequence of that, if there was a secure clearing house for all the reservations, a scan with information provided from all the security agencies of all the organizations in the world and governments of the world, then each airline would have that information and be able to process it properly and efficiently.

Ms. Val Meredith: You still haven't answered my question. The question is, you know that this guy who's getting on flight 403 is potentially a risk, so what are you going to do with that information? To whom do you respond? Who do you give that information to so something happens whereby this high-risk individual doesn't get on flight 403 because it didn't in real time get to the people who needed to know?

Mr. Yves Duguay: Since September 11, we've been working very closely with the FBI and the RCMP. We've been supplied information. We've been looking for that kind of record and we've been supplying information to the police forces. They have to respond, and they have to do the final determination as to whether this person constitutes a risk or not. So the police are making the final determination in each case.

Ms. Val Meredith: So if somebody walks into Toronto airport, purchases a ticket for a flight that leaves in two and a half or three hours from that time, and his name goes into a system and it's flagged, how quickly can everybody respond to that information in the system? How quickly does it get to the RCMP, who can then analyse it? And are they then going to get to that person before flight 403 leaves?

Mr. Yves Duguay (Director of Security, Air Canada): Yes.

There's an important point I think we have to make, and we were making it this morning, which is that this is based on the sharing of information. It has to be bilateral. We need also information from the government agencies. I know, for example, that now in the anti-terrorist act that's being passed by the legislators in the United States there will be provisions for the FBI to share information with the carriers. If we are not provided with any information, we're not going to be able to give any information back. That's a very important point. Thus far we've been very fortunate in getting that kind of information from U.S. authorities, but there are some impediments in our judicial system in Canada precluding the sharing of information.

• 1215

To come back to your original question, we have been doing it, and we have been able to respond immediately by bringing in police action to the check-in area.

Ms. Val Meredith: This will be my last question. You're concerned about staff screening, screening of people who have access to secure areas. And it's not only the screening, but whether these people are who they say they are, and when they get the screening, how do you control where they go and how they come out? There's also the screening of the flight crew in hiring practices, which I would suggest is not part of your package.

I could be mistaken, but I think it was an Egyptian airline or a Turkish airline where it was the pilot who drove it into the ground, flew it into the ocean. It was a suicide mission, whatever. I don't know that they've labelled that one in cold, hard terms. What kind of security, what kinds of checks are there, when you're hiring people, whether it's flight crews or pilots? Is there some kind of mechanism you have as a company, or the companies that you represent, that check the mental stability of the people who are controlling the aircraft to make sure they're not somebody's who's going to fly it into the ground or decide to take it into a building?

Mr. Rob Giguere: Yes, we do have a process, and we do a very careful screening, both a security screening and a psychological and physical assessment before hiring. There are also standards set by Transport Canada on all of these issues and recurrent medicals that happen each year. So in terms of the security risk with our flight crews in Canada, in fact many of our pilots have been in the business a very long time in the mainline of Air Canada and in our regional carriers. They are known to us throughout the industry. Many of them are former military officers, and the process is complete through the hiring practice when they come into the company and ongoing continual monitoring in terms of the medical profiles of those people.

Ms. Val Meredith: You don't have to answer this one, but if fellow crew members or fellow pilots had a concern, would they be raising this concern? Not all medical doctors are going to pick up some of the problems that might be there. Is there some kind of mechanism whereby the staff are allowed to raise concerns they might have about individuals they are sharing not necessarily just the cockpit with but the cabin as well? Is there some mechanism companies have whereby an individual can, without fear of losing their job or it being reported, raise a concern that somebody may have a problem that needs to be addressed?

Mr. Rob Giguere: On the issue of safety in the airline, I think the airlines have been extremely responsible in establishing processes around all the aspects of safety in terms of risks, and that includes any risks, such as the ones you've mentioned, and any other risks in the business. In fact, there's a clear policy and agreements between the companies, the branches in the organizations that are responsible for the operations groups, the CEOs and the regulator, in terms of even anonymous reporting.

So there is a very well-developed process, and it is used, and regularly the aspects of it are reviewed and taken into current context in view of the September 11 incident. We're very comfortable to say that, safety being our first priority, this was something that was established a long time ago. And the airline industry, in particular in Canada, is proud to say that we've had these programs in place for a long time.

Ms. Val Meredith: Thank you.

Captain Ken Hardisty: Val, I wonder if I may add to that.

Ms. Val Meredith: Sure.

Captain Ken Hardisty: I want to address perhaps one misconception, and that is with the case of Egypt Air. That case is ongoing. It's still under active investigation. In fact, the investigation to date has no evidence that would suggest this was a pilot's psychological issue. Events of this magnitude that would involve psychological events with aircrew are so rare as to be unknown. There's very little evidence to suggest that. That's not where the problem is here.

We're saying there are identifiable problems now, there are holes in the system. We must be able to plug those holes. We have existing programs that deal with issues such as the scrutiny of aircrew when hiring, and things of that nature. There are other more important immediate issues that we think we need to get to you today. So I just want to assure you that the psychological health of the aircrew fraternity is well in hand, and we believe it has been well documented that we're safe and sound for your travelling comfort and safety.

• 1220

Ms. Val Meredith: I have just one small question, then. It may have been in both briefs or maybe only in one, but I notice that you talk about these secure doors, having access to opening them from your seat in the cockpit. I understand the government did bring up regulations or an order that the cockpit doors were to be locked on these flights. I guess the question is, what should be the recourse if the people in the flight crew determine that they don't want these doors locked and they're not going to keep them locked? What should be the response to that kind of responsibility?

Yes, you can secure the cockpit doors and they can be really heavily secured, but if they're not closed and the pilots and the co-pilots don't want them closed and don't want them locked, how should the government be following up on that?

Mr. Rob Giguere: This industry has demonstrated that it is in fact, by a large measure, the safest way to travel. That is largely in credit to the industry itself, the policies, procedures, and the diligence of the crew members and the professionals working around and with the airplanes.

The policy is clear now in terms of having a locked cockpit door. One of the issues surrounding the locked cockpit door was the integrity of the actual locks on the door, which were in fact not necessarily intended to keep out someone who was going to use brute strength, perhaps, to get through that door. As a consequence, the doors have been hardened in Air Canada and continue to be hardened throughout the industry. As we move forward, we believe there are probably better ways to do that, and the manufacturers are working with the airlines and the various associations themselves in the industry with the security professionals to ensure that as we move forward, we further enhance those cockpit doors.

To speak to specifics of whether the flight crews involved will be keeping the cockpit doors locked, I think I can say confidently, yes. As they have demonstrated in the past, they are very compliant in terms of following procedures that are in the interests of a safe operation, that make sure we're doing the right things, because the airlines have absolute clarity on what the first priority is, and that's safety.

Having said that, since September 11 the world has changed. We have had the privilege in this business of exposing our customers and young children to the flight deck for the first time. I think each and every one of us can remember the first time we were in a flight deck, and probably many pilots found their career that way. It's one of the sad parts of this event that that reality has changed for us, and we're now offering our flight deck to youngsters and people who would like to see it, before and after flights, when there's no risk.

Having said that, the crews understand the issue and are dealing with the new reality in keeping their cockpit doors locked and secured, and the industry as a whole—that means the airlines, the manufactures, and the professionals within the industry—are continually moving forward on enhancing the procedures and policies associated with that and, of course, the various reminders. As things change, human beings are sometimes forgetful about change and sometimes deal with it in different ways, but clearly we are very compliant in that area, and I think we can say that the entire industry as a whole is moving in the right direction and making sure that issue is very clearly dealt with.

The Chair: We'll go to Mr. Shepherd. Then Mario wants to come back in, and Monsieur Harvey too.

Alex.

Mr. Alex Shepherd (Durham, Lib.): I guess flying is on my mind, because last night I flew back and forth to Toronto and had to go through all this. But one thing that occurs to me is what is the obligation of the public toward some of this? Some of the things that people are taking on, their carry-on baggage, are delaying procedures tremendously. I really question whether we shouldn't put some kind of regulatory environment in there that would ease everybody's life to some extent. I guess there's an issue about how far you're going. I don't know how you put that in there, but for some of these short-haul flights, it's ridiculous the delays that are created by that. Do you have any kind of perception on that?

Mr. Rob Giguere: I think, Mr. Shepherd, your point is very well taken. There's a fine balance in terms of the commercial needs of what our customers expect in terms of carrying on goods, and some people are perhaps having a difficult time reacting to that reality.

• 1225

It's clear that if you go to the airport with a lot fewer things, that were formerly necessary but you've now determined are unnecessary, it expedites your clearance through security, and that's a good thing. As an airline, we have limited the amount of carry-on baggage since September 11 for exactly that reason, to ensure that we get people through security in an efficient fashion and still maintain all the standards.

Mr. Stephen Markey: That's a company-wide, new official policy, to limit the amount of carry-on baggage, because we could not contend with the kind of congestion that you're talking about.

Sorry, Rob, I didn't mean to intervene.

Mr. Rob Giguere: No, that's fair.

To that point, we've reduced the number of carry-on pieces from three to two, one bag plus a handbag, and so on, of a certain size, which is helping quite a bit.

Having said that, again it goes back to the point of having a standard, and that standard should not only include the training and the audit and the security standards, but also the performance standards. I think we all want to know that we can have people deployed at the airport so that we can move traffic efficiently, because this industry is the engine behind the economy of Canada in particular. We have to make sure it's vibrant. We have to make sure the passengers have confidence in the industry. They also have to have the comfort that we're serving the customers well in terms of processing them and moving them, because it's exactly the point you raised; no one wants to be faced with this challenge each time one goes to get on board a flight. We have to work together to do a better job of expediting that process.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: I wonder if we can't go further in some ways, because it's not the issue about what you bring to the airports. What you put either in the cargo hull or you carry it on with you...that judgment call seems to be still pretty much on the consumer side, really.

Getting back to cockpit doors, I don't really understand this concept of hardening the doors, and so forth. I don't know what the state of the art is today. We hear British Airways has put, I thought they said, cast-iron doors on, therefore they're impenetrable by firearms, and so forth, but we're not doing that.

Mr. Rob Giguere: As to what we've done to date, as I say, I'll open this by saying the entire industry is studying what's best. The regulators would normally require a lengthy process before you could change anything on board an aircraft, by the engineering orders and regulations associated with those orders.

As a consequence of this event, the regulators have said there will be a special rule granted that will allow you to do what you need to as an airline to secure your doors. In Air Canada's case, we have secured the doors with what we have described as hardening devices, which are bars across the cockpit doors, installed from the inside, that actually prevent any easy access and would prevent someone using brute strength or force from coming through that door.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: They're not bulletproof, though.

Mr. Rob Giguere: At this point, they're not. Although they are hard doors in the sense that there is an expectation that they will stop a lot of things, they are not specifically designed to be impenetrable by bullets.

There are discussions going on in the industry as to how to do the doors in a fashion that would make them impermeable to that type of an attack. But he real approach has to go back to where the perimeter is, to say that type of device should never be on board one of our aircraft, and we go back to the national screening program to ensure that no one is on board our airplane who shouldn't be there so you don't have to deal with that. The cockpit door is the last line of defence against this type of activity, not the first line. The first line occurs by knowing your customer, the international databases, the international agencies, the screening at the airports, and so on.

Captain Kent Hardisty: Mr. Shepherd, if we may, we would also like to address some of your questions. We think they're very valid.

The association views security—and we would like this committee to view security in this fashion—as layered. When you talked about what the public perception is or what the public's responsibility is, everybody has to take an active role now. Everybody is a partner in security. That includes the people who are coming from home with their baggage.

In layers of security, one of the potential areas that we had advocated in several fora was that a level of education to the travelling public must also be undertaken by the federal government, the oversight body, to ensure that the travelling public understands their obligations as well with respect to security.

On the issue of the cockpit doors, I want to remind the committee again, if I may take the liberty, that Air Canada has voluntarily undertaken this program of providing barriers. These are not hardened doors per se at this point. These are barriers to entry; this is a temporary fix.

Virtually every aircraft in the U.S. airline fleet has those barriers in place. It has been federally mandated at this point. In Canada there's a perception that these may not be necessary. Air Canada believes it to be necessary. I don't want to speak on their behalf—Rob's very capable of doing that—but they've voluntarily undertaken this action.

• 1230

We need to see the government also involve themselves and take responsibility and say that these are the things we need to do when we're talking about having people screened at the counter with the kiosks and so on. Concerning identification, as we understand the federal regulations today, the regulations in the domestic sense do not contemplate having the identification made available. It has again been the industry and the associations that worked together to implement these procedures. We ask the government to also please bring everyone into the layers of security.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: Just to finish that argument, you were saying we should never get to the point where we have to be concerned about these things being penetrable by firearms. That flies in the face of the idea of air marshals; therefore, we must not have any air marshals on our aircraft.

Mr. Rob Giguere: As Captain Hardisty said, we believe too there are layers of defence in any mechanism that prevents acts like this. We need to rebuild this industry. We need to have the customers' confidence in terms of their belief that the entire process is secure. Having an RCMP presence on aircraft has been viewed as a positive event. I realize some people take exception to that and believe it may not be the case, but the indications from our sources are it provides a good comfort level to our passengers to know there is a presence available where it's required.

That doesn't necessarily mean we believe there should be an RCMP presence on every flight, but there may be on random flights, or on specific routes, or where there are identified risks. It's something that adds confidence to this industry of ours that fuels our economy. It's important that the travelling public believe the federal government is fully supportive and that it adds a halo effect giving an air of responsibility to security, so that the public of Canada, and in fact the world, who view Air Canada as clearly one of the best and safest airlines in the world, are able to view that effect as showing we are advantaged—not disadvantaged because of not having the full support of everything available.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: I guess I married those two concepts. If you're going to have armed marshals, therefore you must have cockpit doors that are impenetrable by firearms. That doesn't seem far off from what you were saying.

Mr. Rob Giguere: Yes, I'm sorry. That's a good point. At some point there may be doors that are impenetrable. Right now the industry is studying it. At this point it's clear that to build something impenetrable is going to be very difficult to do in a short timeframe. The initial design is going to probably change several times and is going to require prototypes. It will be very expensive in the industry. It's something that's being investigated now so we can get to that point. It doesn't necessarily preclude or include a sky marshal in the equation.

The Chair: Okay. Are you done?

Mr. Alex Shepherd: May I ask another one?

The Chair: Ask one quick one.

Mr. Alex Shepherd: I was very interested in the CAPPS system. How well developed is the profiling of people who are going to use the airlines? Is it a well-developed thing? We're all going to have to have pre-clearance before we get on the airplane.

Mr. Jim Stewart (Engineering and Air Safety, Airline Pilots Association): No. CAPPS is in use in the United States—not to its fullest extent—and I don't want to go into the details, obviously, of what triggers a CAPPS identification. Basically CAPPS is a profiling system that allows the airline to identify people who may be trying to board the aircraft with a hostile intent. I don't know the details of the Air Canada system Captain Giguere mentioned earlier. I suspect it's slightly different from CAPPS. CAPPS is a very complex system.

In answer to an earlier question, the reaction to CAPPS is very quick. It can be done right inside the secure area.

The Chair: Before we move back to Monsieur Laframboise, I don't know if I have this right. Speaking on behalf of the researchers, and probably Alex as well, it seems to me the pilots talked about the Privacy Act. Is there something in the Privacy Act that impedes the pre-screening, which is one of these layers you were talking about that you think we should change in order to make sure the process is a little more intrusive?

Mr. Rob Giguere: I believe it was mine, Mr. Chairman. I indicated that some of the sharing of information that's required, as with Ms. Meredith's comments about an international database, is precluded. The sharing of information from our company database, such as taking the reservations and profiling our passengers in terms of credit card numbers and residence and so on, involves things that currently can't be shared outside our own database. It requires some tuning among the governments of the world and the establishment of an international database so that all these pieces can come together. And it would require some adjustment to the current policies and regulations in place.

• 1235

The Chair: Thank you.

Mario.

[Translation]

Mr. Mario Laframboise: I would like to come back to what I said at the start, regarding the federal agency that you referred to in your presentations. I'm sorry, but you do not make me feel safer, and I think that you are making a serious mistake.

NAV CANADA is doing a good job, but it's a not-for-profit organization. In a not-for-profit organization, no one is responsible, not even those who support it financially. In the first place, if we have an independent, not-for-profit organization, that means that we have to fund it. If we do not fund it in the beginning, it goes without saying that the government will ensure that we have an obligation to fund it in the long term.

I'm sorry, but I must come back to the question of security, to the fact that there should be a government agency having expertise in the area of crime and terrorism that is responsible for security matters and is responsible for overseeing safety and security. This does not mean that various organizations would have to give up their responsibilities or that there would not be an advisory group, as you suggested, but this would have the effect of enhancing public security.

Together, we have all come to realize that the system failed us. We can keep on saying that Transport Canada acted correctly, but we all want to see an independent agency—you are not the only ones. What that means is that the image of Transport Canada, as far as safety and security are concerned, has been tarnished, if indeed it ever did shine brightly.

So, there is a desire for an independent agency. I think that the greatest security that you could offer, in the end, to all your users, your clients and the Canadian people, would be to give responsibility for security to an organization with expertise in the fields of crime and terrorism. I think that this would be the finest message you could send.

If this mandate were to be given to a not-for-profit, independent agency that does not have any responsibility... I will give you another good example. In my riding of Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, we have an independent body called the ADM, which could not even manage to hold a press conference on September 11. A press conference was announced and then cancelled. In the end, the ADM was not responsible for anything. The problem is that our fellow citizens want to be reassured. I'm sorry, but the only way we can convince the public that we are doing something about safety and security is by giving responsibility for security to an organization that can effectively fight crime and terrorism.

I would like to hear what you have to say on this issue, Mr. Duguay, given that you are a former member of the RCMP. I would like to know what you think about it, Mr. Duguay.

Mr. Yves Duguay: Thank you for your question. The approach that has been put forward here, this morning, is an approach which is integrated rather than piecemeal. Unfortunately, we are still dealing with individual departments, government agencies and jurisdictions. What we are saying this morning is that we must have an integrated approach to address this problem. In terms of who should lead and monitor this project, it is our view that public protection is the responsibility of the government. Therefore, it is up to the government to show leadership on this issue.

It is very important for us to adopt this approach so that we can not only react, as we have done since the 11th of September, but also take preventive action.

Mr. Mario Laframboise: Had you suggested the creation of a federal security office to get to grips with the issue of security, this type of office would require government involvement and a commitment of money by the government to security issues.

You used the example of NAV CANADA. In my opinion, this is yet another example of the burden being placed on industry, through fiscal restrictions. We are all aware that security should not be built into profits, but security should not break the bank either. People have to understand that if there is a problem, the government must dip into its reserves—which it will probably do anyway—to ensure continuity.

This is why I believe that putting security in the hands of an arm's length organization like NAV CANADA... This is a not-for- profit organization—at least it is presented as such—but you account for a large part of funding for this organization. Air Canada is required to pay a major proportion of costs associated with NAV CANADA. I hope that this organization will be recognized, in the same way that the RCMP is. I would have hoped that it would be an organization of this type that would be responsible for this issue.

• 1240

We need to set up a federal office or some type of organization which involves the government, so that when a new catastrophe occurs, we can point a finger. Undoubtedly, this organization will ensure that new catastrophes do not occur and will take the necessary steps or make the necessary recommendations to obtain available funding.

If this issue is placed in the hands of a not-for-profit organization funded by industry, we would have a situation whereby when a crisis arises, there would be no one accountable body, because, at the end of the day, the not-for-profit organization would be completely independent. This is what the government has tended to do. Transport Canada was accountable to the government. Now that they feel that they are on the hot seat, they want to create a not-for-profit organization and off-load some of their responsibility. They want to off-load some of their responsibility on to you, because you are going to fund or participate in the decision-making process.

Here again, the real solution for Canadians, for your customers, and for your users is to guarantee enhanced security throughout Canada at all times. To do this, I think we need one organization. I would have hoped that it would be the RCMP who would have been in charge of monitoring security or that a federal body directly accountable to the government and responsible for security in conjunction with the Canadian Transportation Safety Board, be created. At least then we would be able to say to Canadians that the government is dealing with the situation and that it is making the necessary funding available, even if a proportion of this funding comes from industry. However, what we should avoid is once again creating a not-for-profit organization solely funded by industry.

This is what is going to happen. You gave the example of NAV CANADA. Well, perhaps the government will provide short-term assistance, but in the medium term, it is you who is going to have to provide funding for this organization.

I am interested to hear what you have to say, Mr. Markey, please.

[English]

Mr. Rob Giguere: Our view concerning NAV CANADA and the NAV CANADA model was one more of governance and national importance than of funding.

The comments you have made I understand with regard to who is responsible. The security regulations and standards, audit and so on, even the establishment of all the operating rules and principles of NAV CANADA, are the responsibility of Transport Canada.

The same would be true for an agency established with the purpose of security. Our belief is the funding for the security agency should come clearly from the federal government, with a responsibility back to.... And your point is taken, that the RCMP or a national security agency should have involvement in it. We have Transport Canada security today, who perhaps require more involvement by the RCMP and other intelligence agencies.

As we step forward on this, the thought is to ensure that the government have the national oversight of the program and the national financial responsibility—because that will ensure consistent standards throughout the country—but the responsibility would in fact roll back to the government through the transport security department—as you pointed out, perhaps with a responsibility through to the RCMP in terms of their specialized knowledge.

The Chair: We have to go to André Harvey now. Thanks, Mario.

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by thanking our witnesses for appearing before the committee.

I know that we face huge security and financial challenges. Terrorism has changed the world. Everything is being questioned. But I think that life is like that. That's my feeling. I don't see things the way Mario does. I'm not as pessimistic. I feel that Canada does not necessarily have a bad track record, but we are all trying to find ways to make the system even better.

Would the national advisory council you are proposing be permanent?

[English]

Mr. Rob Giguere: Yes, and thank you for the question. I shared some time yesterday with Mr. Trudeau from the CEGEP in Chicoutimi, so I'm pleased to chat to you.

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey: Before Paris, there was Chicoutimi.

[English]

Mr. Rob Giguere: Thank you.

An advisory group for any organization that has a responsibility clearly, when established, would have a much more visible role.

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We believe it's something that, as the landscape changes, should continue to have a format with a review process. There would be ongoing reviews of the process, the establishment, and security—much as we have in terms of air regulations. We have an advisory process—the CARAC process, where there's a formal structure that allows each group that has an interest in the field to consult and advise on what the regulations and rules should be, going forward. The same should apply in a case like this.

[Translation]

Mr. Yves Duguay: For instance, there is a national advisory council in the United States. It is called the Overseas Security Advisory Council. This advisory council has representatives from the private and public sectors. They meet on a regular basis. They prepare briefs for companies doing business abroad and provide advice on safety measures. This system has worked very well in the United States. As I said earlier, there is joint participation involving both the public and private sectors. Of course, the people sitting on this council represent the biggest experts in terms of public and private security. That model served as a basis for our approach.

Mr. André Harvey: You had good things to say about Transport Canada. You highlighted this in your brief. Does this mean that the current cooperation, the role of coordinator given to Transport Canada, represents a serious management gap on behalf of Transport Canada in its relationship with industry players?

Mr. Yves Duguay: First, we are working very closely with Transport Canada these days. My department works with that department on a daily basis, even more so since September 11. Things are working well, but I think that the system can be improved. There's no question, since September 11, it's no longer business as usual. We have to start thinking outside the box and review the way we will plan our operations.

Generally speaking, we have always reacted to events in terms of security measures. What we are proposing is the creation of an advisory council which will, through long-term planning, act on a preventative or proactive basis. It's very difficult for the industry to deal with additional security measures when we have not even had the opportunity to discuss these with government authorities.

Mr. André Harvey: In your view, Transport Canada cannot play the role of this advisory council. Is that correct?

Mr. Yves Duguay: I feel that Transport Canada and other government authorities should sit on this advisory council, as should indeed airport, union and airline representatives. I think we must consolidate our means and ideas and also find... Let's not reinvent the wheel. Other places have excellent practices which we can copy and adapt to the Canadian model. That's part of the idea behind this council.

Mr. André Harvey: You are in daily contact with international security agencies, as you said earlier. Are the technical measures and security criteria which are applied at, for instance, the Charles de Gaulle airport, at Heathrow or elsewhere, basically the same as the ones we have here? I want to understand why the International Civil Aviation Organization designated Canada's security system as being beyond compare? In so many words, I believe they said our system was in a league of its own. So we can't be that bad after all.

Mr. Yves Duguay: With regard to this council and security measures, I feel that what we should review are standards. Today, when you compare the Canadian system with others, I must say that since September 11, there has been a very real harmonization of security measures across the globe. Our security measures are much closer to the ones taken in Europe than before September 11. As for risk assessment, as you rightly said, Canada's risk assessment was very different from the American one. Indeed, I feel that this concept was taken into account by Transport Canada.

Mr. André Harvey: Since ICAO rated Canada fairly highly, were we superior, equal or inferior to European measures in terms of application criteria?

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Mr. Yves Duguay: The approach we discussed today is also based on a very important security concept, namely risk assessment. It is very difficult to compare the North American system with the European one, or even with the one which exists in Israel, for instance. I think it's a question of risk assessment. Canada is a low-risk country. It is not a target to the same degree that other countries are. So these factors were taken into consideration by Transport Canada, and by ourselves as well, in the application of our own internal measures.

Mr. André Harvey: Thank you, Mr. Duguay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Val, do you have any more words of wisdom?

Ms. Val Meredith: I sure do.

Maybe I'm unlike my colleague, but I don't have any problem. I think security in Canadian airports has been good in the past, and is just reinforced because of what happened September 11. I've had experiences when I first came here in 1993 when they took a letter opener away from me going through security, and that was long before. I had to take the wrapping off a champagne bottle to prove to the people that it was in fact an unopened bottle of champagne. So I think we had fairly decent security before.

I don't even have a problem with the high turnover of security people who are watching baggage going through, because I think when you get newly trained, gung ho, new employees, they're probably more likely to be overreacting and checking things. When customs were hiring summer students, there were instances when the summer students had a much higher rate of finding contraband than people who had been at it for years. So I don't even have a problem with that.

I want to go back to your CAPPS, because if we're going to be up front and be able to provide the kind of security we need now, we need sharing of information. The concept of there being a privacy concern was introduced, so I want to put a couple of things on the table.

First, when you share information, largely what you're sharing is the information you gather when I book a flight. That's my name, the address I've given you, the phone number I've given you, and if I've used a credit card, it's the credit card. If I haven't used a credit card, then I've paid by some other means, probably cash.

Is that the information you would be putting into the system: phone numbers, addresses, how I paid for the transaction, that sort of thing? If that's the case, then the only information there that probably is a privacy concern would be credit card number, and potentially telephone number or address.

So then it's a question of what you do with that information. In your parameters of clearance, I'd be considered a low risk. If my name goes into this computer, do you trash that information, or do you keep it online to see whether my travel patterns are realistic, whether I'm doing what I should be doing, and not having an erratic of travel pattern that may cause concern? Do you dump my name when I'm not profiled as a high risk, or do you keep it on to continue tracking my travel patterns?

Captain Kent Hardisty: I'll have Jim assist me on the answer.

My understanding of CAPPS is that it is a very sophisticated program that tracks information and provides triggers. If you fall under certain categories, then I understand the information will be retained for the period of time necessary to ensure a proper profile can be developed. When those triggers are met, it will continue to evolve throughout the system. Some of that, of course, is kept confidential because of the nature of the system itself. But yes, there is a profile that would look at you and your travel habits and determine whether or not those habits would be consistent with what would be presumed to be the normal, safe travel habits of an individual. If that trigger is hit, it would take it to another level, and there are various other elements within that.

Jim, do you want to add to that at all?

Ms. Val Meredith: Actually, that's pretty much all I need to know. Basically, it's a triggering device. If I'm doing a lot of international travel and I'm travelling to places that might ring a bell, then I would go to another level of concern. But somebody who travels from Vancouver to Ottawa, God knows how many times a year, would probably be seen as a consistent traveller, and that information would be dumped in order not to clutter the system.

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So I want to bring that system into the concept of having a data bank that doesn't share that kind of information. All it shares is the name, any aliases, birthdate, address, and phone number with this name collector. This data bank is connected to the FBI, the CIA, CSIS, and whoever else might be involved—customs, immigration. All you're giving to this data bank is information that for the most part is not highly invasive.

Could you see that working if you had access to that data bank, so you could plug in the name of somebody you might be concerned about to see if red flags were triggered by the FBI, CIA, CSIS, RCMP, whatever? Can you see yourself tying in to that kind of data bank?

Mr. Jim Stewart: I think that would be a good idea. It would be a worthwhile objective to have all the airlines—Air Canada, Canada 3000, whatever airlines are carrying the travelling public—have access to that data base, to allow them to check the stages you've mentioned. And a number of them, by the way, are in CAPPS, but I don't want to go into too much more detail. It could be checked against the people who are booking tickets and planning to board an aircraft. That would allow all the airlines to have a consistent standard of intelligence on the demographic of the travelling public.

Ms. Val Meredith: What I'm envisioning is that this data bank, for which you are a contributor, would have the name. If there were a reason for concern around the table over that name—you would feed a name into it—that concern would be flagged, so you could go through a process.

Or if you found an erratic pattern of travel and you flagged the name, then when a person came in through one of the ports with immigration, and the name was run through, you would have flagged it because of an erratic.... It's just one more way to share data that can keep these people off the planes, out of the country, off the ships, whatever.

I think this is the key to securing not only our country, but our world, this kind of sharing of information. My question is, can you see yourself playing a part, being a player in this kind of data collection system?

Captain Kent Hardisty: Before that, if I may, I also want to point out.... I see where you are going with the objective of the CAPPS program being to provide a data base of known travel. In this case, we're suggesting that CAPPS is able to identify threats even if these individuals may have never travelled before. In fact, our anecdotal information supports that had CAPPS been properly implemented and working, it may have mitigated the issue of September 11. These people may even be travelling under an alias. How do we defend against that within CAPPS? However, there are sophisticated patterns and types of travel within domestic and international flying that CAPPS will highlight and trigger.

Ms. Val Meredith: Just to clarify what I'm talking about, that information of the travel pattern would not be in this data bank. All that would be there is the name and aliases that you are aware of, and the pattern of travel would flag that person and their alias. That's what would go into this data bank, so that at another point in time, when somebody else checked on that person, they would contact CAPPS, or whoever is running it, and say, “You've flagged this person. Why have you flagged them?” That would be the only time there might be an extension where privacy might be an issue.

Mr. Yves Duguay: If I understand your question properly—and if I don't, let me know—there are two issues in computer-assisted risk assessment of passengers.

As you rightly pointed out, there are the known and the unknown people. For the known suspects, we should be provided with that information, and this is what we're seeking actually. We can already do the verifications that are required for the police forces right now. What you're talking about is CAPPS, which is a system that is based in the States. It's also a system that Transport Canada was studying at one point, and it's for the unknown travellers. In terms of our privacy legislation right now, the only thing we can share is basically business card information.

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If we are to make this an intelligent system—which CAPPS is, tapping into the database of personal information concerning a traveller's travel profile—there are limitations right now with the present legislation.

Ms. Val Meredith: But what I'm suggesting is a way to get around this legislation. One thing we have proposed is that this central data collection be controlled by—in the case we referred to—a binational or a trinational agency in which both the United States and Canada are players. This agency has representatives from all the different organizations that.... CAPPS would have their representation there.

The information doesn't come from CAPPS to the rest of the world—only the name, only the business card information. Only if a concern was raised, would CAPPS be approached because this person was flagged, this name was flagged as a cause for concern? Only if this name came up on a passenger list or coming across the border or whatever would somebody go to CAPPS to ask why this person was flagged.

There would certainly have to be legislation in place, but they're not sharing the information. The RCMP are not sharing the information they have on the individual; they're merely saying, with the business card information, that they have further interest in this person.

Mr. Yves Duguay: I'm sure I can speak on behalf of Air Canada. We would participate in a system like this if there were no legal impediments stopping us from doing it.

From a practical approach, however, I would say that if you don't have enough information to confirm the known versus the unknown and if you're relying only on the business card information, for example, you need to know that when we run certain names into our system we can get as many as 4,000 hits, which we must then clear with the personnel we have.

So if there's a way to remove the legal impediments, a way to do what Mr. Giguere has been proposing this morning—that is, to know our customer better, to voluntarily get more information from our customer—it will certainly streamline the search process and reduce the number of potential suspects we need to investigate afterwards.

Ms. Val Meredith: I hope you're not telling me what I think you're telling me.

Let's say the RCMP has a flag on an individual's name and it becomes part of this program and is put into CAPPS. If they see the RCMP have a red flag and go to the RCMP, could the RCMP give them the reason why they had flagged the name?

Mr. Yves Duguay: I don't understand your question.

Ms. Val Meredith: Okay.

The RCMP has a record as long as your arm of why they're concerned about Joe Blow. Joe Blow's name is in here with a red flag on it. The CAPP system says this guy is getting on a plane travelling to three different points in the world, and they see where the RCMP have a red flag on this guy's name—Joe Blow—when they put his name in. They go to the RCMP to see whether it's safe to put him on a plane. Are you telling me the RCMP can't tell them why?

Mr. Yves Duguay: Thus far, the RCMP have dealt with the matter themselves. It is sufficient for us to rely on their grounds. They have grounds to believe a person may pose a risk. We act on this. We give them the information back for them to clear it. It's clearly a police matter.

Ms. Val Meredith: Okay. What happens if this person is flying into New York, where the RCMP have no jurisdiction? What happens then? If that information has to go from the RCMP to the FBI in order for them to.... How do you keep the guy off the plane?

Mr. Rob Giguere: Right now we're still talking about a hypothetical case, and CAPPS is in a very early stage of development associated with this.

You've highlighted that we need bilateral sharing of information with countries, with agencies, with the airlines, while still building a system that respects all the interests of the travelling public in terms of privacy but also respects their interests in terms of safety. As this system is built—and we need the assistance of the governments, not only the Government of Canada, but of all the governments of the globe, to be synchronized on this issue—we need to establish something that works with the airlines, with the governments, and with the security agencies, and respects the needs of each individual constituent while maintaining and minimizing security risks.

Right now, really, the situation is hypothetical. What's going on now are quite rudimentary scans and analyses based on the information we have. CAPPS is about enhancing the program through the bilateral sharing of information in a global sense and developing a system we can all be satisfied is the best allowed by everything else.

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Ms. Val Meredith: Its success is going to depend on inter-agency sharing of information—

Mr. Stephen Markey: Absolutely, yes.

Mr. Rob Giguere: Yes, for sure.

Ms. Val Meredith: —and the ability for this to happen in real time.

Mr. Stephen Markey: Ultimately, yes.

Mr. Rob Giguere: Yes, you are absolutely right.

Ms. Val Meredith: Okay.

The Chair: Thank you very much, gentlemen. That was great. You've helped us with our work plan. We hope that those of you who travelled here have a safe trip back home.

It's always good to see you, Mr. Markey.

Mr. Stephen Markey: Always with Air Canada, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Mr. Markey is always glad to be here.

We're adjourned.