MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

Meeting No. 14

Wednesday, December 4, 2002

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met at 3:31 p.m. this day, in Room 269, West Block, the Chair, Bernard Patry, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Sarkis Assadourian, Aileen Carroll, John Duncan, Mark Eyking, John Harvard, Francine Lalonde, Deepak Obhrai, Bernard Patry, Svend Robinson.

Acting Member present: Robert Bertrand for Pat O’Brien, Jason Kenney for Stockwell Day; Brent St-Denis for Hon. Diane Marleau, Rodger Cuzner for Marlene Jennings, Alexa McDonough for Svend Robinson, Steve Mahoney for Hon. Art Eggleton.

Other Member present: Yvon Charbonneau.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Research Branch of the Library of Parliament: Peter Berg, James Lee, Gerald Schmitz, Jay Sinha, Research Officers

Witnesses:  From the "Université du Québec à Montréal": Charles-Philippe David, Holder of the Raoul-Dandurand Research Chair in Strategic and Diplomatic Studies.  As Individual: Ronald Cleminson, Member of the College of Commisioners of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).

Svend Robinson moved, --That the motion adopted on November 27, 2002 which is as follows:

“That the Committee invite the House of Commons to recognize the genocide of the Armenians, which began at the turn of the last century, by the Ottoman Turks, during the First World War”

be adopted as a Report of the Committee and that the Chair report it to the House.

After debate, the question was put on the motion and it was negatived on the following recorded division:

YEAS

NAYS

At 3:45 p.m., the Committee proceeded to sit in camera.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the Committee resumed its study of North American Integration and Canada's Role in the Light of New Security Challenges (See Minutes of Proceedings of October 28, 2002, Meeting No. 2).

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft report.

At 5:02 p.m., the sitting was suspended.

At 5:05 p.m., the sitting was resumed in public.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the Committee resumed consideration of the situation of Iraq. (See Minutes of Proceedings, Monday, October 28, 2002, Meeting No. 2).

The witnesses made opening statements and answered questions.

At 5:58 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Stephen Knowles

Clerk of the Committee

APPENDIX-1

MARCHING ON BAGHDAD: THE RISKS OF WAR

By Charles-Philippe David

Statement before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (FAIT),
House of Commons, Ottawa, December 4^th, 2002.

Charles-Philippe David is currentlySenior Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor of Political Science at Duke University in North Carolina. Dr David is, since 1996, Professor of Political Science and Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies at the University of Québec at Montréal.  He was, in 2001, elected member of the Royal Society of Canada. He was Professor of Strategic Studies at former Canadian Military College, Saint‑Jean sur Richelieu, from 1985 to 1995. Professor David is a specialist of strategy, defense, conflict and peace missions. He has published a dozen books, including Foreign Policy Failure in the White House (University Press of America, 1993) and The Future of NATO (McGill‑Queen's University Press, 1999). He has also published in Security Dialogue, The Journal of Crisis Management, International Journal, Diplomacy & Statecraft, The American Journal of Canadian Studies, European Security and in Contemporary Security among other journals.

For further contact :

David.charles-philippe@uqam.ca

MARCHING ON BAGHDAD: THE RISKS OF WAR

By Charles-Philippe David

How should we deal with a totalitarian regime that has been stockpiling weapons of mass destruction for years, including the fissile material needed to build a nuclear bomb?  How can we disarm a country that is developing medium- and long-range missiles and illegally exporting them to rogue states?  How can we enforce a system of mandatory field inspections when we cannot trust the country’s regime?  How can we prevent this regime from engaging in acts of aggression against other countries, near and far?

No, I’m not talking about Iraq, despite its well-documented history of defying UN resolutions; the country I have in mind is North Korea, with which the US is preparing to strike a deal.  An American envoy will be leaving soon to convince Kim Jong Il’s regime to accept US and international demands.  Kim appears to be amenable to an agreement and an armed conflict between North Korea and the US seems relatively unlikely at this stage. 

The Iraqi situation is quite different.  The US is determined to replace Saddam Hussein’s regime, by force if need be, and war appears imminent.  The Bush White House and the majority in Congress are out of patience.  They believe that diplomatic avenues have been exhausted, the inspections are untrustworthy, and the threat posed by Saddam Hussein cannot be contained indefinitely. 

Their efforts to convince the world of the Iraqi peril have beared fruit.  The US administration gradually and with difficulty won over the UN Security Council, the US Congress (which passed a resolution supporting George W. by a majority far more overwhelming than prior to the Gulf War eleven years ago), and some of its friends (its staunch ally Great Britain worked doggedly to get Europe on side). 

Bush believes no good can be expected of Iraq and now is the time to mop up the unfinished business.  The pundits are busy laying odds and many are betting on a remake of the Gulf War, an Iraq II even more spectacular than Iraq I.  Bush Jr. is determined to lead the march on Baghdad from which Bush Sr. shied away in 1991.

If Saddam thought he was out of the clutches of the Americans after 1998, he was sadly mistaken.  Since September 11, 2001, the US has taken a tougher line on the Iraqi dictator’s sins and the threat he represents, now considered unacceptable in Washington. 

Pity the Iraqis: their suffering under Saddam’s brutal regime and the harsh international embargo is now compounded by the prospect of a US ground invasion.  The policymakers who support an invasion are promising a happy romp: Baghdad will be liberated in a sort of (better) replay of the landing on the beaches of Normandy.  No, it will not be a long, grinding war with heavy loss of life, like Vietnam.  This time, the conditions favour a sunny outcome: the Americans have the cause and they have the plan.  The Bush administration will prove, yet again, how things have changed, and Iraq II will be a glorious victory, just like Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia and Iraq I before it. 

Perhaps the optimists have reason to hope for a short, bloodless war, but cooler heads point to the risks and question the justifications that have been advanced for this war foretold.

The Iraq II campaign would be the first major US-led invasion and occupation since Vietnam.  It  cannot be compared with the policing actions in Grenada in 1983 or Panama in 1989, and still less with other US military interventions in the interim. 

The questions must be asked: do the Americans face serious risks with Iraq?  And is there no other way out?

Based on what we know at this time, there is cause for scepticism.  Bush’s campaign to win hearts and minds is unconvincing.  Regime change in Iraq entails chilling dangers and daunting challenges, not to mention the questionable legitimacy of the doctrine of preemption on which US intervention would be based.  There is no sanction for preemption in the UN Charter, which allows for armed action only in cases of self-defence.  Seeking political legitimation from the UN Security Council will not be enough to make the US action legal under international law.  If the US claims the right to replace a government it considers to be a dangerous terrorist regime, what is to prevent India from using the same logic to attack Pakistan one day, or China from invading Taiwan?

Dubious legitimacy

The Bush administration’s central argument is that Saddam Hussein allegedly still possesses significant quantities of weapons of mass destruction.  There can be no question that the situation has deteriorated since 1998 and in the absence of the inspectors.  That conclusion is supported by independent research institutes (such as the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies), governments (see the damning report tabled by the Blair government) and inspectors who previously worked in Iraq (in testimony before a special session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).

Saddam certainly has biological and chemical weapons, and could probably acquire the fissile material needed to build a nuclear bomb.  The worst-case scenario, in which such weapons are used against a country in the region, such as Israel, or a more distant country, such as the US, is terrifying and, in the wake of September 11, it seems more plausible than it once did.  However, any such move could be expected to prompt massive – perhaps nuclear – retaliation by Israel or the US.  Would Saddam be that irrational? 

In fact, American policymakers are more concerned that the “mad dictator” might supply Al Qaeda with chemical or biological weapons with which to launch a murderous sneak attack on the US.  A Bin Laden/Saddam Hussein alliance is certainly a frightening prospect.  But is it credible? 

Probably not, notwithstanding tenuous intelligence about meetings between Al Qaeda members and Iraqis, or the alleged presence of Al Qaeda cells on the Iran-Iraq border.  The fact is that Saddam holds fundamentalists and extremists in low regard.  He has little in common with the Al Qaeda leadership; on the contrary, his general practice has been to imprison and/or execute members of Islamic Jihad, as Iraq’s Shiites can attest.

Saddam is obsessed with his regime’s survival and maintaining his exclusive hold on power, which he exercises with megalomaniacal zeal, but strictly within Iraq’s borders (at least since his withdrawal from Kuwait).  The notion that he would be in cahoots with international terrorism appears farfetched at this stage.  If there is evidence to support it, it would have been helpful for President Bush to lay it out in his speech at the UN, or failing that to the US Congress.  It might have been reasonable to expect a Cuba-style proof, such as Kennedy provided in 1962. 

There was nothing of the sort.  The argument that the evil Iraqi regime must be toppled now, immediately, without delay, rings hollow.  The threat is not so much greater today than it was four years ago, certainly not enough to justify the imminent war. 

Before military action is contemplated, an effort should be made to assess the threat and then to contain it and eliminate it.  This could be done by means of new-style mandatory inspections with teeth throughout 2003, supported by multinational military contingents and enjoying totally unfettered access.  It would be imperative that these inspections be conducted with an iron hand and backed by the constant threat of military force, something which has never been done since 1991.  Then, if and only if it still proves impossible to carry out the inspections effectively, war would be justified.  It would have to be authorized by a new, clearly worded Security Council resolution.  (At that point, there would be only a few months remaining until the 2004 Presidential elections in the US.)

At this stage, only unwavering and unconditional cooperation by Saddam, tenacious opposition by the President of France or a cynical calculation by the Bush Administration could alter the course of the Iraq II scenario which the US administration is readying for this winter.

Dubious War Plan

The American war plan to attack Iraq is patterned after the military intervention in Afghanistan in some ways, including reliance on air superiority (which the US has long enjoyed over Iraqi skies), the use of joint CIA-Army special operations units (apparently already in the Gulf), and coordination with a small allied force on the ground (probably the Kurds, who for once are united against the Iraqi army instead of being mired in internecine fighting). 

But that is where the similarity ends.  The Kurds are not the Northern Alliance and air strikes and special operations may prove woefully inadequate to dislodge Saddam Hussein.  A ground invasion appears unavoidable.  And this time, the terrain isn’t open desert.  The invasion force would have to take Baghdad, with its 5 million inhabitants, not to mention Basra, Karbala, An Najaf, Ramadi, and the Tigris and Euphrates valleys.

None of the military options looks reassuring.  There are two possibilities: that the intervention will aim to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime and his Republican Guard, or to occupy Iraq and gradually close the noose around the Iraqi capital.

In the first case, the operation will require 75,000 troops; in the second, at least 250,000.  The advantages of option 1 are that it would target Saddam and Baghdad exclusively, and the Americans could exploit the element of surprise.  However, the dangers are many and substantial.  What will happen if Saddam goes underground, as Bin Laden did?  Who would control the rest of the country if communications were cut off between Saddam’s command centre and the regular Iraqi army, only too eager to defect?  Most importantly, what would happen in the south if the Shiite majority, thirsty for revenge after years of oppression, were to rise up and exterminate the wielders and the symbols of Sunni power in a bloodbath that leaves a state of anarchy in its wake?  How will the primarily Sunni population of Baghdad greet its American liberators, who have not always been received as heroes (one need only think of the ill-fated US expeditions in Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in 1992-93)?

And if, horror of horrors, a cornered Saddam, holed up in one of his presidential palaces along the Tigris, ordered his Republican Guard to use biological or chemical weapons against US troops or against civilian populations, what response would be possible and what would be the cost in human lives?  As terrifying and unrealistic as it may seem, this is a risk that must be reckoned with.  Like many other dictators throughout history, Saddam is prepared to commit the most barbaric deeds to stay in power.

Option 2, a large-scale, months-long military offensive logistically modeled on the Gulf War, would entail all the risks outlined above plus several additional dangers.  This would no longer be a limited, airborne operation but an invasion pure and simple.  It would have to be launched from the south (through Kuwait), the north (through Turkey and Kurdish territory) and ideally also from the west (through Jordan).  This double (or triple) long march on Baghdad would aim to secure all of Iraqi territory.

This scenario assumes that the Shiites and the Sunnis will welcome the Americans with open arms.  Moreover, all the countries bordering on Iraq would have to let the US operate from bases on their territory.  So far, only Kuwait has agreed, while Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran have refused.  These countries would have to justify such a decision to their own people.  The Arab street tends to see the American plan as a plot driven by the US desire to lay its hands on Iraq’s enormous oil reserves and at the same time to divert attention from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, serving the interests of Israel.

The US plan is to finish the job in two months, time enough to tighten the stranglehold on Baghdad.  But the imponderables remain.  How will the Iraqi leader respond?  In the best-case scenario, he will surrender as Manuel Noriega did in 1989.  In the worst case, he will commit desperate deeds and crimes, take refuge in the bosom of his clan in Tikrit and fight to the last man.  One possible alternative is that he might hand over power to one of his sons, Uday or Qusay, before hostilities break out, not necessarily a cheering prospect given the sons’ reputation for ruthlessness.  On the whole, a military campaign is an uncertain venture and the outlook is rife with doubts and uncertainties.

Dubious consequences

It would not be enough to invade Iraq; the country would then have to be occupied.  That would be no small feat and certainly not an in-and-out operation for the Americans.  There is reason for scepticism about the prospects for democratization and for the creation of a multi-ethnic Sunni-Shiite-Kurd federation in Iraq. 

The US plan to make Iraq a “beacon of freedom” in a complex and volatile region may well prove a pipe dream.  Freed from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein and the Baath party, could Iraq emulate post-war Germany and Japan, or would it go the way of Afghanistan, Somalia and, to some extent, Bosnia, where the results have frequently been disappointing and hopes have often been dashed? 

The latter course is a strong possibility.  To successfully “democratize” Iraq, deep ethnic and clan divisions would have to be bridged (as in Afghanistan, and unlike Germany and Japan).  A massive American military presence would be necessary for at least a decade (as in Bosnia) in order to prevent a resurgence of violence in a chronically weak state (as in Afghanistan).  But nothing is less certain than the United States’ commitment to a long-term overseas presence.  The US – and the Bush administration in particular – has little taste for peace enforcement and peacebuilding (as Afghanistan has shown). 

Winning the war is one thing, winning the peace quite another.  It is well and good to contemplate a democratic transition in Iraq, but it must be borne in mind that democracy has never existed in that country or anywhere in the Persian Gulf.  These states have traditionally been ruled by autocratic, military, monarchical or fundamentalist regimes. 

There are two particularly large stumbling blocks on the road to democracy in Iraq.  Getting past them will require careful analysis and advance planning. However, they have received scant attention thus far.

The first is finding an Iraqi Hamid Karzai.  Within Iraq, opposition has been crushed and is virtually non-existent.  Outside Iraq, the opposition movement is fractured into a slew of nationalist factions (including the Iraqi National Congress and the Constitutional Monarchist Movement,  both based in London) and military cliques made up of small groups of officers (two have representatives in Washington, including the American favourite, General Al Salhi).

The second stumbling block will be maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and the viability of the Iraqi state.  The country is divided, geographically and ethnically, into three fairly distinct components: Sunni, Shiite and Kurd.  The Kurds already have a quasi-state (really a de facto state under American protection).  It is predictable that they will want at least to preserve their autonomy (which is comparable to that of Kosovo) if not to gain full independence.  Iran, which is sheltering the Iraqi Shiite religious leaders, will also want to make sure that Iraq’s Shiites have a say in shaping the country’s new political landscape.  However, the Sunnis will take a dim view of increased Shiite and Kurdish representation in any new federal arrangement. 

This would be a colossal nation-building undertaking, comparable in scope to the pacification efforts in South Vietnam and Lyndon Johnson’s plan to “turn the Mekong Delta [read the Tigris and Euphrates?] into the Tennessee Valley.” The United States would have to pour resources into Iraq, and Arab states would have to pitch in and support democracy-building in Iraq (and accept the consequences for their own countries).  For now, there is no indication any of this is likely to happen.

George W. Bush’s ideologues and advisors promise that Iraq II will be a triumph, a grand victory in the war against terrorism.  However, the US administration’s haste to effect “regime change” in Baghdad may well prove reckless.  I believe beefed-up inspections – accompanied by the prospect of a lifting of the embargo – would be a more sensible strategy than rushing into a war of doubtful planning and uncertain outcome.