NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, November 24, 1999

• 1531

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I hereby call to order the meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. It's my pleasure to welcome the Hon. Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence, and some of his staff.

Minister, welcome, and thank you very much for coming to the committee. I think there's a wide range of issues and questions the committee would like to raise with you today.

[Translation]

Do we not have interpretation?

[English]

Mr. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): Are we going to work this afternoon without interpretation?

The Chair: There's a problem, I guess.

Okay, now we can go.

We also welcome General Baril, and other staff members, whom the minister will introduce. Of course, we welcome the minister to make some opening comments. Then I know colleagues on both sides of the table would like to explore a fair range of issues and questions with him.

Mr. Minister, thank you, and welcome.

Hon. Arthur C. Eggleton (Minister of National Defence): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Merci beaucoup. Thank you for the invite to be here today.

I'm sorry that our original plan to be together yesterday didn't materialize. I was in Toronto in the afternoon attending a funeral of one of my predecessors, as mayor of Toronto.

Today I'm here with the Chief of Defence Staff, General Baril, and Lieutenant General Caines, who is our ADM of personnel. We have some other officials here as well, who may be called upon to assist me in answering some of your questions.

In the Speech from the Throne, the government presented Canadians with an agenda for the new millennium. It's a dynamic and forward-looking vision to ensure that Canada prospers and continues to make a mark on the international stage. To do this, the government is committed to foreign and defence policies that advance Canadian interests and values, in particular to enhance human security, which got a very major section in the Speech from the Throne.

This is a relatively new term, but in essence it really describes a view that has long been held by Canadians and governments of this country. We've always been willing, after all, to help those who are victims of conflict and humanitarian strife. We want respect for the human rights of people in this world. We want a stable and peaceful world. These are the fundamental goals of the Canadian approach to peacekeeping.

[Translation]

No other element of the government contributes more to the realization of these goals than the men and women of the Canadian Forces.

[English]

Well over 100,000 Canadians in uniform have served the cause of peace and touched the lives of millions. Every Canadian who has worn a blue beret shares the Nobel Peace Prize, which was awarded to the United Nations peacekeepers in 1988, a fitting recognition for a great contribution to peace and human security.

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Of course, they're not the only participants, by any means. The development work of CIDA and the diplomacy led by our Foreign Affairs department that puts Canadian values into action are also indispensable. In the darkest moments, when human security is undone by forces beyond the influence of development programs and diplomacy, there is but one tool that is left in the box, and then we turn to the Canadian Forces.

In places like Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and now East Timor, Canadians expected their country to respond. They were concerned about crises that threatened international stability, human security, or both. They wanted the international community to take action and they wanted Canada to do its share. These expectations were met by the Canadian Forces. Without them, our response would have been limited to aid and political support.

If Canadians want this country to have an impact on human security and help promote peace and stability, Canada will continue to need capable military forces. It is vital that we strike the right balance between soft power initiatives and hard military capabilities. This is crucial if we want to deliver on our good intentions when the limits of diplomacy and aid are reached.

It's not a question of either/or; Canada must do both: soft power when suitable, stronger means when required. We must be careful not to underestimate the challenge this represents. Over the past few years, the Canadian Forces have been subject to demands that pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, they are 20% smaller than in 1994, and their budget has been reduced by 23% in that same period. On the other, two world wars and Korea aside, Canada has never asked more of them.

Between 1948 and 1989, the Canadian Forces were deployed in that 41-year period of time in 25 operations. Since 1989, in just the last decade, they have been called upon some 65 times.

The reductions in the defence budget were necessary to help respond to the national deficit—a problem threatening the future prosperity of the entire country. But now that the deficit is under control, we have some flexibility to invest in the future. The Canadian Forces are part of that future. We need to ask ourselves what we expect of them, but our expectations must also be matched by our willingness to invest in this vital Canadian institution. Important national capabilities come at a price.

The government has purchased new equipment for the Canadian Forces, like precision-guided munitions for the CF-18s, which were used in Kosovo. We have the new submarines, the Coyote, and the new armoured personnel carriers, just to name a few. I'm pleased to say that the Canadian Forces are more capable now—and this is something the CDS has also said—than they were at the beginning of the decade.

[Translation]

However, the modernization of our forces isn't finished.

[English]

To ensure the Canadian Forces remain combat capable and effective in the future, more must be done. It is clear that the Canadian Forces do not need to be capable of doing everything, nor should they be expected to be everywhere at once. But they must be capable of doing what we ask of them.

In challenging financial circumstances, the first step is to use current resources more effectively and efficiently. We have done that.

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Over and above significant reductions in personnel, headquarters, equipment, and infrastructure, the department and the Canadian Forces are doing business more efficiently.

We have also recently taken important steps to rationalize our largest military commitment in the Balkans. By concentrating on Bosnia and reducing our number of troops in Kosovo, we avoid duplicating headquarters, logistics, and combat support units. We also regain some flexibility to respond to another crisis should one occur.

No less important, this redeployment reduces strain on the men and women of the Canadian Forces. Quality of life amounts to more than just pay, benefits, and housing. Being abroad too often is as much a stress on family life as anything else.

Let me now turn to the future challenges. In the 1994 white paper, the government determined that Canada required military forces capable of a wide variety of tasks. At home, we need the ability to respond to natural disasters and search and rescue efforts. Through NORAD, we retain the capability to protect North America with our continental ally, the United States. Internationally, the Canadian Forces must be able to make contributions to NATO and to participate in UN peace support missions.

These are the enduring missions. These are the fundamentals for the Canadian Forces. However, successfully meeting these commitments in the future requires a plan; it requires a vision. In June of this year, we released a document called “Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020”. It is a strategic plan to ensure the Canadian Forces are capable of meeting our defence needs.

While the specific capabilities we may require to meet Canada's enduring defence commitments may change, certain principles stand fast. The Canadian Forces must be able, for example, to interoperate with our allies. They must be modern, task-tailored, and rapidly deployable.

These principles will guide the development of a force structure that is viable, achievable, and affordable. We also need to attract the right people and develop their leadership skills for what promises to be an increasingly demanding and ever-changing environment. While I do not pretend that building for the future will be easy, we have a strategic plan that sets a clear path.

In conclusion, all Canadians should recognize that the department and the Canadian Forces are in the middle of significant and far-reaching change. Institutional reform continues in greater numbers than ever before in the history of the Canadian Forces, and the search for internal economies and new practices is ongoing. Careful strategic planning for the future is underway.

Yet while dealing with these complex issues, the Canadian Forces are successfully meeting every operational demand placed on them.

[Translation]

Canadians have good reason to be proud of their military organization.

[English]

They are making a major contribution to Canada's role in enhancing international security. As this century closes, we should take stock of the great things Canada has achieved. We should ask ourselves what we aspire to accomplish in the next century. When we do, let us remember that many of Canada's greatest moments in this century bear the stamp of the Canadian Forces.

Our international reputation has been earned by our repeated willingness to contribute to global security, but on many occasions, our contribution has been delivered by the men and women who wear Canadian uniforms. If we seek to make the same mark in the century to come, the Canadian Forces will be no less important.

If we want to restore human security where it is most at threat and continue to contribute in the areas where Canada has made its mark over the past 50 years, we will need a strong and well-equipped Canadian Forces. Investing in them is an investment in the future of Canada.

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Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Minister.

Before we go to questions, first of all, we hear in the background the melodious tones of a Christmas choir. It's not yet a demonstration by the public for defence funding, but we do know there's tremendous public support. Both sides of the table know there's tremendous public support for reinvesting in the military, and we sincerely hope the next budget will reflect that support from the public and the Parliament.

Colleagues, General Baril is to join us tomorrow. I would indicate to you that first and foremost, the minister is here to receive our questions and comments. Obviously he will involve the staff, General Baril and the other staff, as he sees fit, but primarily tomorrow we have an opportunity with General Baril.

Just before I begin with Mr. Hart, I know you'll permit me to acknowledge the presence of a former defence minister, Mr. Jean-Jacques Blais.

Mr. Blais, welcome, sir. It's a pleasure to see you.

Voices: Hear, hear!

The Chair: Colleagues, Mr. Blais is currently, among other responsibilities, chair of the outstanding Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia. I for one think we should perhaps hear from Mr. Blais and other colleagues from that centre in the near future in our deliberations, and I think it should go on our list for a potential trip when we also visit the veterans' centre in Charlottetown.

You're very welcome, sir. It's a pleasure to see you here.

Mr. Jean-Jacques Blais (Chair, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make a clarification.

The Chair: Yes, Mrs. Wayne?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Instead of a choir, that is the group of people from Quebec who are singing with the homeless from Quebec.

The Chair: Oh, really?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: It's the homeless singing. They have beautiful voices. That's what it is.

The Chair: I appreciate that. Thank you.

I now will go to Mr. Hart for seven minutes.

Mr. Jim Hart (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Ref.): Thank you very much.

Welcome, Mr. Minister, CDS, and General. It's good to have you here.

I wish the minister well. The biggest battle of his life will be probably against his own cabinet colleagues as he tries to get more funding for the Canadian Armed Forces.

Take your flak jacket.

There have been several warnings recently in the military establishment and within the military itself about the declining, deteriorating state of the Canadian Armed Forces. The Conference of Defence Associations said last week that the Canadian Armed Forces are near collapse. You said later that was an exaggeration, but the Conference of Defence Associations told us they chose their words very, very carefully and that in fact in no way were they exaggerating when they made that statement.

The same day, an internal document revealed that 77% of the Canadian Armed Forces personnel believe the Canadian Armed Forces is not combat capable. That is a tremendous indictment of the abilities of the Canadian Armed Forces.

We all know what the problems are, in particular around this table. We know we have too few personnel and we have equipment that needs to be replaced because it's outdated. Even when it comes down to the most basic of protective clothing for our soldiers, we find we're lacking in these areas.

I would like to know today from the minister what steps he is taking to ensure that our armed forces gains back the combat capabilities it has lost since 1993.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: With respect to the first comment you made, coming from the Conference of Defence Associations, and the language “verge of collapse”, I indicated previously I do not agree with that. There isn't a fundamental difference when it comes to saying the Canadian Forces do need more resources. We don't disagree with that at all. But what I said, and what I will repeat here again, is let's be careful not to get into distortions or exaggerations. A lot of the rhetoric on this can tend to go in that direction. We're not on the verge of collapse, but yes, we're stretched financially. I've said that many times, and I say it again today.

• 1550

In spite of that, our forces have been able to accomplish what's been asked of them. They're doing very well. The combat capability, for example, as I indicated, has actually improved over this decade from what it was earlier in the decade. We played a very front-line role in the air campaign in Kosovo. We did not play that kind of role in the Gulf War. We didn't have all of the technology we needed at that time to be able to do it. But we got the technology and the ability to use the precision-guided munitions in the Kosovo conflict, and given the training and expertise of our people, they were able to play a very major front-line role—disproportionate, I might add, to the size of our contribution. In other words, we played a greater role than the size of our contribution would indicate.

So that certainly does not indicate that we are less combat capable. It indicates we are more combat capable.

I'm going to ask the CDS in a moment to further expand on that. That really is his jurisdiction more than anything in helping to ensure that.

I want to talk about the protective clothing. There's been some comment recently with respect to the Clothe the Soldier program. A notion is getting popular belief that because of some delays in the Clothe the Soldier program, somehow our soldiers are going without clothes. That's not the case at all. The basic combat outfit they wear is available. All the parts of it are available.

The Clothe the Soldier program is an effort to upgrade the kind of clothing that is taken into areas such as Kosovo or East Timor or Bosnia, to make sure they have the kinds of gloves, jackets, and coats that fit the environment and are comfortable for use.

We are actually developing 24 different items in that clothing that are state-of-the-art. I can tell you they're going to be copied by a lot of other countries. As this program develops, we're finding we are absolutely getting out in front in terms of what will be the best environmental clothing.

There have been some delays, but we're into an area here where we want to make sure we get it right. We want to make sure we are in consultation with our soldiers as to what their needs are. So it's taking a little bit more time, but it's going to produce some great results. Already quite a number of items have been provided under the program.

Mr. Jim Hart: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I'm going to ask the CDS to comment, because combat capability is very important.

Mr. Jim Hart: Well, we can explore that. The time is very short, as you know. I have seven minutes, and you're taking up just about half of it right now.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Oh, I'm sorry.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Jim Hart: So I'd like to move along.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I thought you wanted to know about combat capability.

Mr. Jim Hart: I'm sure we'll have the general here tomorrow to discuss that.

The Chair: You have about one minute left.

Mr. Jim Hart: See? I have one minute left. But I'd like to respond.

When you talk about the combat capability, if you look at the white paper, we talk about deploying a brigade group. I'm not sure we're capable of doing that. I would question that very strongly.

As for our air force in Kosovo, you know full well that our CF-18s need a major overhaul to their electronic equipment and that those CF-18s themselves are compared to a Commodore 64 in relation to the other countries around the world that are using the same type of equipment.

As for our navy capabilities, if it weren't for the British getting rid of submarines, the minister and this government would not have conducted a replacement program for the submarines as well.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Give me some time to answer.

Mr. Jim Hart: These are very important questions.

But before I leave, I want to make sure—and the minister brought it up—about the soft power versus hard power. The reason I made my first comment about Mr. Axworthy and the cabinet is that Mr. Axworthy has a completely different view. In fact he has said on several occasions now that he doesn't believe hard military assets are important when it comes to this debate about capabilities and our Canadian Armed Forces.

I want to know what the minister is going to do to make sure the message of a balanced approach, which we all agree with at this table, but obviously the minister's own colleague doesn't agree.... We need to have the military equipment to make sure we send our people out into the world to do the job with the proper equipment. What are you going to do?

The Chair: Mr. Minister, we have to give you some time for that.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I think you misinterpret what my colleague, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was saying.

Mr. Jim Hart: Not at all.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: The Minister of Foreign Affairs was very supportive of our taking the military action in Kosovo. He understands full well that there comes a time when you have to back up the diplomacy with the hard reality of sending in forces. He has totally supported our effort in that regard. He and I are quite in sync about this, in the same way as I suggested to you in my remarks.

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I'd like the CDS to be able to respond to the other parts of the question.

The Chair: I'm sorry, General; it's just that I have other colleagues. Could you be as succinct as you can? It's quite a huge question, I know.

General Maurice Baril (Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): It would take me half an hour.

The Chair: Well, I know that.

Gen Maurice Baril: Certainly when we're being told we cannot deploy a brigade, I hope we don't have to deploy a brigade, but don't forget we have two very powerful battle groups deployed right now that will have spent a year out. We did that from 1993 to 1995. We have brigade headquarters deployed in 1995 and 1996. We have troops all across the world.

If you ask me, “Can you do it in 90 days?”, maybe it will be 89, maybe 91, or maybe 100. You need to tell me what kind of mission we're going to have to deploy a brigade, what will be the task, what will be the danger, what kind of training we are going to put our people through to really meet the brigade task we have, who we are going to go with, and where it is in the world. So it's very, very difficult.

But when we say we can deploy the brigade, already a big chunk of it is out there in operation, and we could deploy much more of that if our nation's survival were at stake. At that time, all bets are off. I mean, we're not talking of a six-month rotation or twelve months back at home before we're deployed. If the nation's survival is at stake, everything we have goes on the line.

The Chair: Thank you, General, and thank you, Mr. Hart.

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, you have five minutes, please.

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Minister, in your opening statement, you said that our army should be prepared for two types of intervention: soft power initiatives and stronger action. In the conflicts raging around the world, our army should be able to take on both types of tasks, depending on the situation. However, we know that the budgets haven't been increasing. Forceful military action costs much more than soft power initiatives. Why is it so difficult for the Minister of Defence to make a choice now, and to accept, after having reached an agreement with our allies, that Canada's role in these interventions should be one of support, rather than being at the forefront? Canada could participate in these missions, but with a lesser contribution. Why is it so difficult to make these choices now? If we accept the idea of limiting ourselves to soft power initiatives, the current budget would probably be sufficient to allow Canada to fulfil its obligations towards its allies.

I'd like to have your comments on this, Mr. Minister.

[English]

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Thank you.

Soft power is the notion of being able to work matters out in a diplomatic way and to use other forms of persuasion, such as developmental assistance from organizations such as CIDA.

There was every effort to resolve the Kosovo crisis in that manner, by trying to negotiate through the Rambouillet talks and by having observers on the ground initially to try to prevent any atrocities from taking place in Kosovo. These were all parts of the ways of trying to come to a resolution in what might be called soft-power approaches to it.

But at the end of the day it wasn't enough. We had to be prepared to back up all of those talks, all of that diplomacy, by saying we would send in our forces, and we did that. We conducted an air campaign, which eventually brought the matter to a halt and provided for our troops to be able to go in on the ground.

That's what I'm saying. When it comes to the issue of human security, let's use all the soft power we possibly can, but at the end of the day, we have to be prepared to use the hard power, if necessary.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Minister, I think I must have misunderstood you. When you spoke of soft intervention, I thought that you were referring to military interventions using light equipment.

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Mr. Minister, in an article in the Ottawa Citizen, an executive director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, Mr. David Rudd, states that Canada could be using light military equipment for interventions of the type used in East Timor or in Bosnia. Military interventions such as Canada's intervention in Kosovo require much heavier equipment which requires a greater investment. The costs associated with heavy equipment or light equipment are not the same.

Mr. Rudd claims that $140 million were spent adapting the Leopard tanks in order to use them in conflicts that would be larger in scale than those of East Timor or Bosnia. He also claims that even though we increased the military intervention capabilities of these tanks at a cost of $140 million, we don't have what it takes to transport these tanks to the battleground. These tanks need to be transported by ship. In the case of a rapid intervention, there mustn't be any hesitation. We have to ask other countries, the United States in this case, to transport our tanks to the battlegrounds.

It seems to me that there is a choice that needs to be made, Mr. Minister. Why is it so difficult to make this decision now, especially given the current budget constraints?

[English]

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: The discussion over light, rapidly deployable forces is one that is going on not just here in defence in Canada, but also in all of our allied countries. The Americans, who have some of the most heavy equipment, are now talking about getting a little bit lighter.

One of the ironies of it is that the new armoured personnel carriers, of which we have 150 of the 480 we've ordered to this point in time, are very much a light vehicle for those rapidly deployable conditions in that they can in fact be shipped by air—so much so that the American army, which is now looking to become lighter, wants to borrow some of our APCs so they can test them, because they recognize that, really, they're very heavy-oriented.

The tanks are a little bit heavier, but there are also some circumstances in which they can be quite valuable. We use them now in Kosovo. It's a piece of equipment that can impress upon people our determination to have law and order and peace. It can be very effective in certain conditions. There are some conflict-type conditions, like in the Gulf War, where that kind of thing is in fact necessary.

So it depends. Not every condition is going to be the same, and of course we can't have every piece of equipment, but we have to make determinations from time to time of what makes sense to have.

Maybe the CDS can respond a little further.

[Translation]

Gen Maurice Baril: I would like to comment on the subject of tanks.

First of all, there are only two countries in the world who can transport heavy tanks in their airplanes: the United States and Russia. I don't think that Russia has any gas to put in their airplanes to transport tanks. Which leaves the United States. All the other countries are in the same situation as us. They must charter heavy airplanes or load their tanks onto ships. This is what we do. We put our tanks on ships to bring them to Kosovo.

Secondly, the improvements that were made to the tanks now give us the ability to do combat day and night, in any weather conditions. We changed the launching system and there is an improved protection, better armour. We think these tanks will be good for another ten years. These tanks allow us to fight on the battlefield and give us the direct fire that we need during heightened combat operations or peacekeeping operations, such as in Kosovo. We have five tanks there. The commanding officer there and myself are happy to have the use of these tanks. When we want tanks for use in backup, we aren't forced to ask the British, the French, or others. We have our own vehicles in place. These tanks will last another ten years. So there will be time to choose the tanks which will replace them.

You propose that we limit ourselves to light interventions. This does not necessarily mean that we would have a lighter vehicle with a smaller gun. We could have a lighter vehicle, which could be transported by plane, but with a new gun system and especially with the gun recoil, the vehicle could be even more powerful than that which we have right now in inventory.

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You can imagine that our experts who are preparing for the future foresee weapons that are lighter, more precise and have a better striking power.

[English]

The Chair: I'm sorry, your time is up, by an extra minute, actually. I have to move on, but we'll have another round.

We come to the government side, and there are four questioners. So that's seven minutes, colleagues, but we'll have another round. Mr. Wood is first, then Mr. Peric, Mr. Pratt, and Mrs. Longfield.

Mr. Wood.

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Minister, I'm sure you'll remember this, because at the NATO ministerial meetings in Toronto back in September, a lot was made of the NATO force generation goals, which ranked Canada's participation in second-last place. If my memory serves me well, we were only ahead of Luxembourg. I think this really upset a lot of people; I know it did me. Do you think this was a fair assessment of Canada's role in NATO, both today and in the future?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: These force goals are all established separately for each country, and you really can't compare one to the other. That would be like comparing apples and oranges. Most of the goals that were established for us we were able to reach either in total or in part.

At the time it was being reported, they didn't report the ones that were reached in part; they reported only the ones that were total. If there was some minor variation, it was not considered as being met at all. That is unreasonable, because in the majority of the cases, we have met those force goals. We didn't agree with all of them, and we don't have capabilities in all the cases they would like to have had, but that's the same for all the other militaries as well.

So what was done to come to the basis of saying we were second last to Luxembourg was a very simplistic calculation that doesn't give the true facts of the situation at all.

Mr. Bob Wood: Mr. Minister, I wonder if you would give us an update on the North Warning System. As the minister knows, this radar system is monitored out of a facility in my riding. I know there have been considerable delays in the renewal of the contract for the North Warning System, and I wonder if you could outline what the future plans are, particularly whether you intend to put the contract to tender or continue with the current arrangements.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: It is my intent to put the contract to tender. It has been renewed on a number of occasions since it was first approved. As per our policy, we should go to tender. We don't go every time. Sometimes we renew for a period of time, but after a while I believe we should get out and test the market again.

There are some issues about how we would do that. It will take a further period of time before we actually put it out for proposals. Meanwhile, we've extended the contract with the current provider for another year and a half, another 18 months.

Mr. Bob Wood: I have another quick question, on the quality of life. Obviously, there will be a review coming up fairly quickly. One of the things that I believe is still not addressed—maybe it has been, but not to my knowledge—is the high cost of living in certain areas. What is the Department of Defence presently doing to solve that problem?

I know it has been an ongoing problem for a long time, especially the high cost of living in specific areas, notably the west coast, for the Canadian Forces personnel who serve there. What's happening there right now?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I'll ask General Caines to take that.

Lieutenant General V.M. Caines (Assistant Deputy Minister, Human Resources, Military, Department of National Defence): One of our priority projects to advance the quality of life, to follow from the recommendations from this committee for this year's implementation from April 1, is in fact what we're now calling a post living differential. The phase we're at, at the present time, is that we now have conducted a survey across the country by an internationally known firm, and they have now given us the data we require to identify what the regional cost differences are in this country. We have taken everything into consideration: transportation, income tax levels, the cost of accommodation—a full basket of goods. We are now in the process of finalizing our analysis and engaging the necessary governmental agencies around town to be able to, hopefully, bring that in for our members as of April 1 next year.

• 1610

The Chair: Bob.

Mr. Bob Wood: That's fine. If I have any time and anybody else wants to take it, they can.

The Chair: About three minutes. Mr. Peric and then Mr. Pratt.

Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Minister, you mentioned in your speech that the budget was cut in 1994 by 22%. At the same time you said that one cannot expect everything everywhere from the Canadian Forces. But the reality is that wherever the trouble was on this planet, the Canadian Forces were there first.

In terms of the call from NATO to upgrade the equipment and the call from the soldiers to improve living standards...from my personal perspective, I can say I saw how they live because I have a son in the navy. At the same time, I don't want to be biased. As we hear that the services, land, air, and sea, should be upgraded and improved, are all those things included in the next federal budget?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: You've mentioned NATO. We continue to meet our commitments to NATO. I've talked about the force's goals particularly and I've talked about the fact that when it came to KOSOVO we actually pulled above our weight. We were involved in more of the air interdiction sorties than would normally be for a contingent our size. Those are pieces of evidence about our contribution to NATO.

On top of that, the new Secretary General George Robertson has said that Canada is a key ally, a good ally, and a reliable ally. He further said that Canada actually uses its defence budget better than most. I should point out that Canada's military is also actively participating in NATO headquarters, in operational units and exercises. We are one of six NATO members that has consistently maintained a ship in the Standing Naval Force Atlantic—one of six—and we're a major contributor to the NATO Airborne Early Warning system.

Recently one of our generals, Major General Holmes, was appointed by NATO to command the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force at a time when this particular element of NATO is transitioning into a rapid reaction force, a very important element at this time in our history. So I think when you put all of these together, it's an indication of the faith that our allies have in Canada's military leadership. Would they like us to spend more? Of course, they would.

But when George Robertson made the remarks about spending more he was saying it about our allies, and particularly the European allies. A lot of the European allies are reviewing what they're doing because of the Kosovo campaign, where the vast majority of assets used in the air campaign were those of the United States. Frankly, the United States wants to see more European involvement. So there wasn't a specific focus on saying, Canada you spend more money; they were saying, you should all spend more money and you should realize that there has to be an interoperability amongst our forces. We know that very well. We live next door to the biggest military power in the world and we have to interoperate with them.

Mr. Janko Peric: Minister—

The Chair: Mr. Peric, I'm sorry we have to go on. We'll have another round.

I want to appeal to colleagues. I know we're all enthusiastic on these topics, but we have some fairly long preludes to our questions on both sides of the table—just from your friendly chair—and then we have to leave time for our witnesses to answer. So I think if we can focus the questions a little more sharply...because otherwise we're using up a lot of our time. So I'd make that as an observation of someone who hasn't yet had a chance to ask a question but has a few on his own list.

Now we're going to Mrs. Wayne, and then we'll have a second round. Mrs. Wayne for seven minutes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much. He forgot me.

The Chair: No, I didn't forget you.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Anyway, I want to say, Mr. Minister, that a Dr. Grover came before us and made a presentation. At that time, Dr. Grover stated that we should have 157,000 troops, and he said we have about 60,000. At that time they were saying, he and the other gentlemen, that we are ranked 22 out of 23 NATO allies, and so on. This was stated also by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. William Cohen, in his report on allied contributions. We are at the bottom level.

• 1615

I really feel very strongly that somehow all of us have to support you to make sure you get enough money in the budget to do what has to be done. But when I look out here today at these young men who are here in their uniforms...if we had 157,000 of them, we'd take an awful lot of these young people who are lost out there...and with the training they are given and the respect they are taught, I have to tell you, it would be the best thing that could happen in Canada.

I would like to know where you feel we're standing when it comes to the 157,000 versus 60,000 Dr. Grover, in his report to us, said you need.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: First of all, in terms of this business about 21 out of 23, there are only 19 in NATO. Okay, we're down towards the end, but it depends on how you measure it.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Right.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: If you measure as a percentage of GDP, it is true that we are down near the end of the pack in that regard. But we have a big GDP. We're in the G-7, remember, so we have a big economy. If you look at the amount we spend, the $10.3 billion we're now spending a year in defence, we actually come out sixth or seventh in the total ranking. So it depends on how you look at it as to whether we're down near the bottom or in the middle of the pack.

In terms of the 60,000 versus 157,000, it depends on what priority the people of Canada want to place in terms of how much they want to spend on defence expenditures, as to how many we want and how much we need. We have a lot of things in this country that we want to improve upon, and there's a lot of desire for tax cuts and for expenditures, investments in health care and education, etc. So there are a lot of competing desires of Canadians in terms of how we spend our money.

What I want to make sure we do at this point in time is ensure that the 60,000 we do have get the best possible training, the best possible leadership, and the tools and the equipment they need to do the job. I want to make sure we have a quality product in and out of the whole system, to ensure that we do the absolute best we can and that we do the best we can for them as well, that we ensure their quality of life is good.

That's my first priority, and if I can get more money and do that, then we can talk about numbers beyond that.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I have major concerns about one thing. I'm sure you're aware now that today another military plane with seven people on board was forced to make an emergency landing in Sydney, Nova Scotia. The Hercules was forced to touch down after it developed a fuel leak in an engine, and they had to evacuate the elementary school that was nearby and so on. I know the military are investigating it. What we were told, and what has been stated, which is in the Hansard, is, Mr. Minister, that you were saying you likely won't be having the new helicopter before the year 2008, but the Sea Kings and the rest of them are going to be grounded by the year 2005. I pray to God they're going to be grounded before that. What are we going to do in that interim? There will be nothing.

We're here to help you. We know these men in uniform cannot go and stand out in front with placards and scream and holler. So we're hear to scream and holler for them, and I'm going to scream and holler. You know me well enough for that. But we do not want to do politics when it comes to our armed forces—not politics. We're here to do what's right to help you, Mr. Minister, and the general and the rest, to do what's right for our armed forces. I'm sincere about that, because I'll tell you, when I look out here today...and when I get a document like that telling me another one is down, we have.... I'll do a little bit of politics. God, I wish we had the EH-101, but anyway, we don't.

• 1620

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: You're slipping already.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: But between the year 2005 and 2008, what are we going to be doing?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Our aim is to have the new helicopters in place and operating by 2005. Meanwhile, we're going through an upgrading program for the Sea King so that it will function quite well until 2005. Obviously, it's getting older and it gets more costly to maintain, and because we have such a high standard of maintenance and safety requirements—we just will not compromise on safety—it sometimes doesn't fly; in fact quite a number of times it doesn't. That gets into the question of efficiency then.

Our effort is to replace the helicopter just as soon as we can. We'll upgrade it and operate as best we can until we have a replacement. Our aim is to have the replacement by 2005. It is the number one procurement priority I have.

The Chair: Last brief question, Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'll make this last statement.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Non-political.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Diefenbaker once said, when he was talking about older people with grey hair, “There's snow on the top, but there's a hell of a lot of fire in the furnace below”. I want to say that, in terms of those Sea Kings, Diefenbaker was referring to people like me. I don't want any fire in the furnace below, Arthur. Let's make sure those guys are safe and sound, okay?

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne, I appreciate that.

That's the first round, colleagues. Now we'll go to a second round. I'll refresh our memory on our rules for the second round. It's an opposition member and a government member, and so on down the line, back and forth, and it's five minutes now, please. Again, I would encourage you to make your questions succinct, because I remind you it's five minutes, questions and answers.

We'll start with Mr. Hart again.

Mr. Jim Hart: Before I start my questioning, Mr. Chairman, may I make a suggestion that our staff members for the committee have prepared some excellent questions and I have a feeling we might not get to all them. Could we therefore submit those written questions to the minister for the minister to respond to the committee?

The Chair: Is that agreeable?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Send them to me and we'll respond.

The Chair: Thank you for your suggestion. The minister has indicated that's great.

Mr. Jim Hart: Thank you very much.

The Chair: Jim, just before you start, again, we'll have General Baril tomorrow, so you may want to focus for the minister.

So five minutes, Mr. Hart.

Mr. Jim Hart: Mr. Minister, I wanted to explore this contradiction between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and yourself on soft and hard power again. I'd like to read you a quote from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He says, and I quote:

A country's image is key to the use of soft power. An attractive set of values and an image as a trustworthy partner encourage other countries to consider and weigh our views. ... [Soft power] blurs, even counters, the perception of traditional power assets, such as military force....

Mr. Minister, you yourself, in the response to the throne speech, have said in the House that we need the military capabilities, the hard assets in our military forces. We need the numbers, we need the equipment, we need the people, we need the training. This is a critical issue, Mr. Minister, and for you to sit here and tell us today that you're going to go to cabinet and fight for more money when we have the senior Minister of Foreign Affairs saying we don't even need the military assets, it's very difficult for this committee to believe.

So I'd like to ask you directly, Mr. Minister, what amount of money are you asking for? Are you asking for an additional $1 billion or $2 billion? What exactly are you asking the Government of Canada to provide to the Canadian Armed Forces?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I'm asking for the resources I need to be able to do the kind of job that is outlined in the 1994 white paper and has in fact been updated with respect to our Strategy 2020, which takes us well into the future. The precise numbers on that are a matter presently before the cabinet; they are presently a matter under discussion.

Mr. Jim Hart: Give us a ballpark figure.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: No, I'm not going to get into those numbers today. But the aim is to get the resources we need to do the job. We have two ways of getting the resources. One is to do what we're doing now in the most efficient way we possibly can. We should always ensure we're getting the best value for the taxpayers' dollar. I think it's incumbent upon us to do that, as it is any other part of government, and beyond that to get the additional resources we need. One of the aims that we quite clearly indicated in Strategy 2020 was to get our capital budget up to 23% from the current 18%.

• 1625

I want to also say that there is no contradiction between myself and Mr. Axworthy. Mr. Axworthy has clearly said, and I think we would all agree, that we prefer diplomacy or soft power to be the primary way of achieving our aims in terms of human security in a peaceful and secure world. I don't think we disagree with that at all. At the end of the day, if the military power is necessary, then it is there.

He certainly had no difficulty in agreeing to that with respect to Kosovo. And he has certainly indicated to me, on many occasions, his support for our being able to get the resources we need to ensure that the Canadian Forces can meet their capabilities.

Mr. Jim Hart: Mr. Minister, I'm not trying to be partisan here. I'm trying to help you with what you're saying. I just can't believe that what's happening in cabinet is what you're telling us today.

A perfect example is the replacement of the ship-borne helicopter. That is for a combat-capable platform. It's been required for several years now. We have the Sea Kings that are half the age of the Canadian Air Force. They're 36 years old. The air force is 75 years old. And they still haven't been replaced.

You've been minister for two years. Why do we not have a replacement for that helicopter? Why is there not something to make sure that this platform, the frigate, has all of the capabilities it was designed to perform? Because you don't have the proper helicopter, because you don't have a replacement helicopter, that frigate is not the combat-capable piece of equipment it was designed to be, and you know it.

So give us the date today then. Specifically when are the ship-borne helicopters going to be ordered, Mr. Minister? Has Mr. Axworthy won the battle already and are we not going to get ship-borne helicopters?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Your continuing efforts to drive a wedge between myself and the foreign minister are just wrongly placed. Mr. Axworthy is totally supportive of my effort to replace the ship-borne helicopter. As I've indicated, we are working towards a projected retirement of the current Sea King in 2005. So we are moving on that schedule now. This is also the period of time that we will be upgrading the Sea King so they continue to function for us. We do have state-of-the-art frigates and this is an important part of it.

You point out that, yes, we haven't replaced this one yet, but how about talking about the ones we have replaced, the ones in the white paper that we said we needed: the new submarines, the frigates, the new armoured personnel carriers, the new military satellite communication system that we're now entering into an agreement with the United States on. There are many different procurements that have been made of new equipment. On top of that, we have modernization going on with respect to the CF-18s, the Hercules, the Auroras. Every major piece of equipment we have is either in the process of being replaced or it is being upgraded and modernized.

The Chair: Thank you, Minister. Thank you, Mr. Hart.

Now we will go to Mr. Pratt and Mrs. Longfield for five minutes.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): It's encouraging, quite frankly, to hear some of the discussion around the table from Mrs. Wayne and Mr. Hart with respect to the non-partisan aspect of this committee. We've seen quite a bit of that over the last little while.

In that spirit, Mr. Chair, I have a motion that perhaps the committee might want to consider after we're through with the question-and-answer period here. It's in both official languages. Perhaps we could get the clerk's assistance in distributing this at some point soon so that members can have a look at it.

The Chair: Mr. Pratt, you're certainly welcome to distribute it. I recall for you the committee rule. It will take a 24-hour notice. So we would consider it today as a notice of motion and then at the next meeting we'd entertain it.

Mr. David Pratt: On that point, Mr. Chair, I understand that if the committee were to give unanimous consent, we could waive that notice requirement.

The Chair: That's right. We'll have it distributed and then I'll seek unanimous consent. If we get that, it will be entertained, and if not, it will be a notice of motion to be entertained at the next meeting.

Mr. David Pratt: Okay, thank you.

• 1630

With respect to my questions, a number of years ago Canada made a proposal to the United Nations, I believe, in connection with a rapid reaction force. Over the course of the last year, in Kosovo, in East Timor, and in places like Sierra Leone, we've seen where a rapid reaction force might have prevented a tremendous amount of loss of human life, property destruction, and very brutal atrocities in some cases, and certainly in the case with which I'm most familiar, with respect to Sierra Leone. I'm wondering if the Department of National Defence has given much thought to that whole issue lately, and also whether or not that is being considered in terms of the whole issue of interoperability, because I think the two are very closely linked.

If the minister has an opportunity, I'd also like to ask him about the extent to which he feels human security and the white paper come together. Clearly, the human security agenda wasn't being talked about when the white paper was released in 1994.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: On that latter point, Dave, I think they're really quite consistent. Our mission is to defend Canada, Canadians and Canadian values, and to contribute to international peace and security. Certainly what contributing to international peace and security has meant is trying to preserve the human rights and the human security of people around the world, so I think it's a very consistent position for us to take. It's one that I feel very comfortable with, and I think well relates to the peacekeeping history of Canada.

With respect to rapid deployment and the United Nations specifically, we've been quite active in two areas of endeavour: rapidly deployable headquarters efforts, of which we've been one of the initiators, as well as the SHIRBRIG, a rapidly deployable brigade that has been supported by us but has been led to a great extent by Denmark. We continue to work on that.

I think the CDS can offer you a little bit more.

Gen Maurice Baril: If I may make two points, Canada was the country that made the proposal at the General Assembly in 1995 to give the United Nations the rapid capability to deploy command and control and communications that would be permanent at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York. Based on the stand-by arrangement that has been put in place, and based on the agreement of the country, that would allow the UN to have a rapid reaction command and control to go in and intake the troops that come in. It never went through the UN. The credits were not made available. For two or three years we had staff who were on stand-by to go join the secretariat, but it unfortunately didn't happen.

Denmark has put together the rapid reaction brigade, which is multinational. Canada has committed to it. We have committed the equivalent, depending on what the mission is and what the government decides, but it will probably be a major unit or some specialized unit. The chief of staff of that brigade in Denmark is Colonel Romses, who has been there since this summer, plus there are one or two other staff officers. So, yes, Canada is committed to the rapid reaction brigade that has been put together.

We're also concerned about the interoperability, as you mentioned, of anyone who provides troops to that brigade. We're working hard, and the working group is meeting regularly in the countries that have agreed to provide troops. When it's put together and when it's agreed that it is to be deployed on a mission, it has to be able to work together, and I think it will.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you.

The Chair: Colleagues, Mr. Pratt's motion has been distributed to you in both official languages. If we're to entertain it now—and I'm quite prepared...is that what you wanted, Mr. Pratt?

Mr. David Pratt: Mr. Chair, in deference to our guests, I think we should deal with the Q and A and get them out of the way, and then perhaps consider the motion.

The Chair: Well, we've provided copies to the minister, the general, and the staff anyway. We'll continue with the questioning. Then, following the questioning to the minister and the other witnesses, we'll entertain this now if it's the committee's wish. If not, it'll be considered a notice of motion and be entertained at the next meeting.

• 1635

That leaves about 30 seconds for you, Mrs. Longfield, or else we'll come back to you in the next round.

Mrs. Judi Longfield (Whitby—Ajax, Lib.): That's fine, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Mr. Pratt, do you want to use your 30 seconds or save it for the next round?

Mr. David Pratt: I'll throw it open to the floor.

The Chair: That's generous of you.

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, you have five minutes please.

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Chairman, I found three examples.

During our last trip with veterans in Italy, we met with groups of soldiers who had fought in Kosovo and in Bosnia. They asked us to ask the Canadian government to increase the work force so that they would be posted on missions less frequently, or so that they would have more time between missions.

Young people who are 22, 25 and 28 years old who are in the army are posted on missions for six months, they come back to Canada for four months, and then they return immediately for a second mission, which was not the case before. The reason they are required to do this is because there are simply not enough troops. If there were more troops, they might be able to spend more time in Canada between two missions. In any case, that's the way I interpret it. I hope you won't tell me I'm wrong because I spoke with them myself and that's how they explained it to me. So currently there is a lack of troops for the number of missions Canada is accepting.

Also, the National Post published yesterday a document that it obtained through the Access to Information Act. This is a document that you signed. Mr. Minister, which states that Canada only fulfils 48 of the 129 tasks conferred on it by NATO. So, Canada is not currently fulfilling its obligations towards its allies. If we are not able to do this, it's because we don't have the necessary equipment or the necessary budgets.

Mr. Minister, once again, given these facts and others, do you not think that it's time that we establish priorities and that we make real choices in order to increase our international credibility among our allies?

[English]

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: First of all, with respect to the high operational tempo, yes, we have had a very high tempo. We have about 4,400 troops abroad right now. That's one of the highest levels since the Korean War. We are pulling it back, though, to about 3,000 by late next spring. That is a more manageable, more sustainable number.

When we went to East Timor and to Kosovo with the second contingent of troops, we did say we would not be able to sustain them there for a long period of time for the very reasons you point out—i.e., having to put them into a theatre of operation and very quickly put them back into another theatre.

So we are cutting back to a level that is more manageable. Each request we get we have to tailor according to what we have available, bearing in mind the issues of operational tempo and quality of life for our troops. Our basic policy is that if they're six months out, they should be a year back in Canada, at a minimum.

Some of the veterans I've talked to mentioned the early peacekeeping years, when they went for a year. They didn't get the chance to return home and get all of the leaves and the contacts with back home that they get today.

Nevertheless, it still is a strain if they go frequently into these theatres of operation. For some areas, such as our armoured corps or infantry, it's not perhaps as much of a problem as it is for some of the support elements—for instance, the logistic groups, the medical people, or the communications people. Certain elements are a little more stressed than others.

That's why, when it comes to East Timor, we were able to send in an infantry group that operates to a great extent with a New Zealand battalion and that gets a lot of support elements from the New Zealanders. We were able to send a ship. But there are certain elements of our forces that are more stretched than others, and we tried to stay away from them in terms of the East Timor operations.

• 1640

So we are carefully examining and managing this flow of people in each case. While we can get up to numbers like 4,400 on a surge basis, we cannot do it for a lengthy period of time. We do have to draw it down to a more manageable level, and that's exactly what we're doing at the moment.

You mentioned the National Post, and the 48 out of the 129. As I indicated earlier, that's 48 totally completed, word for word. There are numerous others that would bring it up into the majority, at more than half of 129, and which we would be doing in part. There might be a very small difference in regard to the actual statement by NATO, the force goal of NATO, and what it is we're doing—I'm sorry I don't have examples here right now, but I would be happy to provide you with some—but if you look at the picture overall, we are doing most of those things that NATO has asked of us. Every military in NATO is facing the same thing, including the United States. There are some things they don't completely adhere to as well, or meet as well.

As I indicated earlier, George Robertson said Canada is a key ally, a good ally, and a reliable ally, and that when it came to actually having to put our troops out there on the line.... Never mind the pieces of paper, never mind the goals laid out in a document, when we actually had to go out there with our troops, as we did in Kosovo, Canada was there when Canada was called upon. That's the proof.

The Chair: Thanks, Mr. Minister.

[Translation]

Thank you, Mr. Laurin.

[English]

We now go to Mrs. Longfield, and then Mr. Clouthier, for five minutes.

Mrs. Judi Longfield: Minister, I have questions in five areas. I'm going to put them all out as quickly as possible, and then I'll ask for a response.

Quickly, I'd like to know the status of the ITAR, the export permit regulations, and requirements with the United States. I know there have been some changes there.

I want to ask about where we are in renegotiating the NORAD agreement, and if there are going to be problems there.

Another one has to do with the procurement process. A number of defence industry people came in and said that part of the problem was in the statement of requirements. They said it was far too restrictive and that things could be streamlined. They said we'd get better equipment faster and at a better cost if we just indicated we were prepared to look at capability requirements without restrictive details, and then let the industry come up with the appropriate piece of equipment.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Is that in general or for the helicopters?

Mrs. Judi Longfield: No, it's in general.

Can you give me some idea of how we set priorities when we're looking at equipment requirements. Is it done land, air, sea? Is it done in an overall, general area?

Finally, on quality of life issues, on the 89 recommendations, I'd like some idea of what percentage are done, what is in progress, and which ones are being studied. I'm particularly interested in the housing issue, because I know that's been a particularly difficult one. Do we feel we're going to meet the deadlines for the COLA, the cost of living allowance?

The Chair: Mr. Minister, Mrs. Longfield has done a smart thing in asking all her questions, but I have to ask you to somehow answer in about four minutes.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Well, let me get into this very fast.

The ITAR discussions are still going on with the United States. There was an agreement in principle reached between President Clinton and Prime Minister Chrétien during the President's visit here. If everything goes according to that agreement in principle, if all the i's are dotted and the t's are crossed in that direction, it should be good news, but it's not completed yet. It's not under the aegis of my department either, I might add. It's Foreign Affairs and International Trade, of course.

With respect to NORAD, we are getting ready for a renewal of the NORAD agreement, and that should be going to cabinet before long. I think the current NORAD agreement expires in May 2001. We have to give them a year's advance notice, so by May of next year we would have to have this matter done, and I think we would want to get that matter completed very very soon. It could well be along the same lines as it is today. However, there eventually will be, or there could be, discussions on the whole question of a national missile defence system. That is something there are still a lot of question marks about. It's further on down the road, but I would hope we would be able to proceed very shortly with a NORAD agreement.

• 1645

On equipment priorities, I guess the fastest thing I can say is that the different elements do in fact indicate what their priorities are. We then have this purple operation in which we all pull it together to in fact determine what the overall needs are—and I guess purple is what you get if you put a green army uniform, a dark blue navy one, and a light blue air force one together.

On quality of life, we've completed 24 of the 89 recommendations. We do have a number of them done in part, but we have major efforts going on with respect to the regional cost of living allowance, which General Caines referred to as the post living differential. Hopefully there'll be developments sometime early in the new year.

We did put another $40 million into upgrading the housing this year, but we still need more there, and we need to empower the Canadian Forces Housing Authority to be able to do more. I believe that was also part of your recommendations.

The third major initiative is to establish a pension for reservists.

We're working on all those major initiatives. I'd love to spend time going over how much of the 24 we've done, but I want to give Mr. Burton just a minute to talk about our streamlining and procurement.

The Chair: Could you introduce him for the record, please, sir?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Yes, Mr. Burton is from ADM Materiel, Operations, so he's going to talk about procurement.

The Chair: Thank you.

Welcome, sir.

Mr. Richard Burton (Acting Assistant Deputy Minister, Materiel, Department of National Defence): Thank you very much.

You mentioned the notion of moving away from detailed specifications to defining what it is we want in terms of performance. That is one of many initiatives that we have underway to reform our procurement process. We've been in regular consultation with many of the industry representatives who have briefed this committee in looking at defence procurement. In fact, our initiatives are completely lined up with the suggestions industry has made.

In terms of that specific one, we have a number of projects now that are being based on that principle. We're reducing that stack of detailed specs into a very small statement of performance requirements. I could point to examples, but time probably doesn't permit.

There are many other initiatives underway, and I'm fairly confident and satisfied that we're making pretty good progress, certainly in comparison with our allies' key initiatives.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Longfield.

Minister, we're scheduled to go to 5.30 p.m. I know there are a lot of other questions, but I don't know how much more time you have. Are you still okay for time?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Yes, I'm okay.

The Chair: Thank you.

I'm going to continue to go back and forth, as our rules call for. Right on cue, our colleague and friend Mrs. Wayne is back.

Mrs. Wayne, it's your turn for five minutes if you have any questions.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, I do have a question—and I'll be good to you, Art—but I have to leave at five o'clock because I have to drive to Quebec tonight, to Westmount.

The Chair: We'll excuse you, no problem.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: As you know, Lieutenant General George Macdonald is a Canadian and the deputy commander of the North American Aerospace Defence Command. He has indicated that Canada must participate in some way in the proposed U.S. anti-missile defence system if it wishes to continue with the NORAD alliance. My question, Mr. Minister, is whether or not you agree with the general when he says we're pretty much at the minimal commitment to maintain our NORAD membership. What is your opinion of Canada's role with regard to the future of NORAD? Lastly, what is the Department of National Defence's position on the U.S. anti-missile defence system?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Those are excellent questions.

First of all, we play a very important role in NORAD, but there's no doubt the United States has the vast majority of the equipment. There's no doubt about that. But when you go down to Cheyenne Mountain and you go into NORAD's headquarters, you'll see a lot of Canadians right in control central. The deputy commander of NORAD, the deputy commander for all of these programs and assets of the United States and Canada, is a Canadian. So we play a very significant role in that organization. It is in fact monitoring the airspace over our continent and continues to play a valuable role in that connection. And as I said, we will be coming up on the renewal of that NORAD agreement very soon.

• 1650

With respect to ballistic missile defence, this is an issue that will be of some controversy over the next few months, and perhaps few years. It does involve us at this point in time inasmuch as in our 1994 white paper it is referenced. It's referenced in terms of our being involved from a consultation and research standpoint, but it does not involve us from a standpoint of any agreement to deployment of these missiles or being involved in the management, which could be done by NORAD. That's a decision to be made.

At this point in time, Canada is not in a position to take a definitive position on the matter, first of all, because the United States hasn't done that. The United States is still testing the equipment. They had a recent successful test, after some test failures. So whether or not this system will work and be able to function the way they hope it will has yet to be finally determined.

They are also at the same time trying to bring about an amendment to the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States and what was then the Soviet Union but is now its successor, Russia. So the ABM Treaty is part of this. Now the ABM Treaty doesn't provide for the degree of ballistic missile defence that the United States would like to deploy. So if the ABM Treaty is still being adhered to, it would have to be amended.

But there is one other aspect of the ABM Treaty, and that is that it doesn't allow for participation of a third party, i.e. Canada. So at this point in time, there aren't the provisions in the treaty that would allow for this.

And then there has to be a final decision. If these things are all worked out in one fashion or another, the United States would then have to make the decision to actually proceed with deployment. Then Canada would have to assess the situation and decide what we want to do. But that is still some time off. I might add that there is a move in the United States to try to make that decision perhaps next summer.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Could I just ask a follow-up question?

The Chair: Yes, you have one last brief question.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Okay. I was out in Vancouver and I visited some of the sites where some of our armed forces men are living. I would ask you today to please make sure that we are able to upgrade that quality of life, and that we will turn things around so that none of our armed forces people have to go to the food banks. I beg you to do that, because I have to say, when they showed me where they were living and the food bank that they went to for their families and children, there is no way we should ever allow that to happen in Canada. I'm asking that you, Mr. Minister, really make that a priority to turn this around so that no member of the armed forces in uniform ever has to go to the food bank.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I agree with you entirely, and that will certainly be my continuing effort. Let me point out that one of the things this committee said in its very first recommendation was that to help resolve that very problem, we need to pay our troops more. And you suggested—I can't remember the exact wording—that it should be at least 10%. Well, for privates—those in the lower ranks—the increase last April 1 was 14%. For some other ranks, it was even higher.

But that point is absolutely important. It is important that we also give them decent housing, and we've put $40 million more into the housing. We have some plans to do even more to make sure they have decent accommodation, that they have the quality of life they deserve, because they put their lives on the line for us, and we should be supporting them.

The Chair: Thank you, Minister. Thank you, Mrs. Wayne. Thank you very much.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I support it. When you're doing the vote, I support it. Okay, Dave?

The Chair: Okay, thank you very much.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: No problem.

• 1655

The Chair: We'll come to that in a few moments. Thank you very much. I'm glad to have your indication of support, though. That's great.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I am the coach for the opposition team. Don't you fellows forget that.

The Chair: Now we go to this side of the table for five minutes. I have two speakers so far, Mr. Clouthier and Monsieur Bertrand.

Mr. Hec Clouthier (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Minister, I would ask that the CDS respond to this, if possible. Regarding our troops, I know we have between 4,500 and 5,000 troops in theatre around the world. I know we're continually talking about them being stretched. Would you know, General, what the percentage of our troops of the total force is—I know it's around 7% or 8%—comparatively speaking, to others, say our NATO allies or other UN nations? Would you know that offhand?

Gen Maurice Baril: No, I don't, because they use different rotation systems. They might leave them at home for a lesser period of time than we do. So I never did compare them, but Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark also feel stretched, because they were not expecting to be committed so much in the Balkans. We're in the process of rationalizing our presence in the Balkans, and it's not only Canada. We're together with Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic at this moment with a team in Belgium to work out how we're going to do the work in Bosnia with those who are staying, and to coordinate our efforts for those who are leaving.

Everybody is rationalizing, trying to reduce the cost both in personnel and resources of our involvement in the Balkans.

Mr. Hec Clouthier: Would we be one of the more active countries in the world as far as peacekeeping duties throughout the world are concerned?

Gen Maurice Baril: I don't have that data in my mind. We probably have it somewhere. But in the 4,400 we have now, we're counting our ships that are in operation both in the Gulf and in the NATO standing force.

Mr. Hec Clouthier: Okay.

The Chair: General, could I, on behalf of my colleague and the committee, request at some time some sort of comparative chart along the lines of the members' questions, when someone of your staff has an opportunity? That would be useful for us to have.

Gen Maurice Baril: We certainly will. It will be a good exercise for us if we don't have it. I must warn you that the way they count might not be the same as we do, but we'll try to find something that is comparable.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: Bearing in mind the caveat that the general gives, I've seen some statistics. I can't tell you what it is offhand, but my impression from looking at it was that just like in the Kosovo campaign, we are doing a quite substantial amount. In fact, it is more than our fair share in many cases, if you compare it with some of the others.

The Chair: Mr. Clouthier.

Mr. Hec Clouthier: Don't worry, I was getting to you, Mr. Minister. I wanted you to answer this next question, if you could.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: More from Petawawa.

Mr. Hec Clouthier: You know that I, and I believe other committee members, have advocated that as far as trying alleviate some of the stretches we have on resources in DND is concerned, if the DND were to sell some property or divest itself of machinery—or, in my case at Petawawa base, I know they sell a lot of the timber off the base—that money should be designated to go into DND instead of the general revenue fund. Has there been any movement made on that? Are you aware of anything, Mr. Minister?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: There is some. Our contact with this is the Treasury Board. This is where we have to argue the case. I can tell you that I'm arguing the case frequently in terms of getting more of those resources back to us. It helps us to be able to get that additional equipment we need, or the modernization program we need.

Mr. Hec Clouthier: Okay, thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Bertrand, there's a minute on this round, but I could come back to you again. There's still a minute in this round.

We go back to Mr. Hart for five minutes.

Mr. Jim Hart: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Minister, you said we could surge, and we have, to 4,400 troops overseas, but the fact remains we can't sustain that level forever, and you know that. We can't sustain it for a very long period of time at all. In fact, the white paper actually says we could commit and send and sustain a brigade group plus a battalion group, which would require more than 6,000 personnel. So how can you say we can meet our white paper of 1994? How can you say we can meet those levels?

• 1700

I'd like to give you another example. In contrast to that, you look at the Australian Armed Forces. With only two months of increased operational tempo they have made a commitment to increase the army by 3,000 and their air force by 555. The reason the minister of defence in Australia gave for that was so they could maintain their flexibility and be able to meet other commitments they may have.

Why has the minister not made an attempt to increase the size of the Canadian Armed Forces to match the commitments he's talked about, the increased tempo we've faced for over six years now? Why hasn't he gone to cabinet and said we need more troops?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: We can meet the commitments of the white paper. The white paper is our guide. We can meet those commitments and we do. In addition to meeting those commitments, which involve NORAD and NATO and such agreements, we also have some 4,400 that are involved in international peacekeeping, which is one of the highest levels we've had.

You mentioned the Australians. The Australians have a lot in East Timor, but East Timor is their northern border. It's very close to home. They've got a particular interest in putting a lot of resources into that one theatre of operation.

We are in some 22 countries in the world. We are in fact doing our fair share in terms of international peacekeeping, but at the same time we can meet all of the commitments and the obligations of the white paper.

Do you want to add anything further?

Gen Maurice Baril: Yes, one clarification. The white paper is calling for a brigade group plus a battle group but not to be sustained. It would be a one-shot effort that would go into operation.

The other thing I'd like to mention is in 1995 the land forces—the army—in Canada was also increased by 3,000 to be able to sustain the operations that were involved in both Bosnia and Croatia at that time. But I must add it was increased at the expense of the other two services somewhat and also at the expense of the combat service support that we have.

So what we did is we increased the infantry armour and artillery by 3,000 at the expense of other resources we have. It was a difficult exercise. Now we're in a situation where the combat support that we have especially for the land forces and the Canadian Forces makes it very difficult because we're back into having two full battle groups deployed for a given time.

Mr. Jim Hart: It would seem to me that the white paper would be flawed if we're saying we'd send our troops but we couldn't sustain them. We all know we don't even have the proper airlift and sealift capability to get them out quickly if we needed to. So there seems to be a contradiction there. Now, I don't have any doubt that our Canadian Armed Forces personnel have risen to this challenge that the government has given them constantly over the past six years and before.

However, I asked an earlier question regarding the access to information documents from a survey that came from the Department of National Defence that showed 77% of the armed forces personnel themselves don't believe the Canadian Armed Forces is combat capable. That is very serious. Whether or not you want to sit there today and argue we are combat capable, the fact is the people you're sending out to do the job of the government feel we are not. How are you addressing that?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I think it's important to show some balance in terms of the survey that was done. For example, in that same survey, 84% were proud of DND's involvement in international peacekeeping. Eighty percent say the workplace is concerned with client satisfaction, 78% were personally able to deal with the changes happening in the workplace, 74% said they had opportunities to learn new skills, 69% said they were proud to tell people they're CF members, on and on in terms of satisfaction levels.

Yes, there are some areas they're concerned about, and we are developing action plans to deal with them. I'll ask the CDS to further respond.

Gen Maurice Baril: I guess if you ask every member of the forces if we think we're combat capable enough, the answer would be no. If you ask the troop commander of a Leopard tank troop with the new added armour who is deployed in Kosovo if we are combat capable, he would tell you, you bet we are.

• 1705

So we've got to be a little careful what we ask or what the question is, because you're going to have a very precise question coming from our people.

If you ask our F-18 pilot if we are combat capable, he'll say, you bet we are, because we've done it. We hadn't done that for a long time. Are we enough? No, we're not enough because we had to upgrade the airplane. There are better widgets and better capability and better weapon control systems that go on the airplane. But it doesn't mean we're not combat capable.

If you ask a Sea King pilot whether we are combat capable with the Sea King, he'll say yes. It has limitations, again, but the Sea King is a weapon platform. Let me tell you, when they drop one of those guided torpedoes they carry, it would make a mess on a submarine that was around. It's still a capable weapon platform.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hart.

Now to Mr. Bertrand for five minutes.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): I would like to talk about Canada's participation in NATO.

It's been in the newspapers on several occasions, and my colleague Mr. Wood mentioned it, that we were just ahead of Luxembourg with respect to our contribution to NATO in relation to our GDP. In fact, we all know full well that this is not at all the case. Canada, if I remember well, is the sixth or seventh largest contributor to NATO.

How do you explain that newspapers are distorting this fact? They say that Canada is not pulling its weight, while everyone knows that among the 19 active members of NATO, Canada is the sixth or seventh largest contributor.

Reporters are always asking if Canada's position is weakened because of its small contribution. We need to set the record straight. Canada is highly respected in NATO. As I mentioned earlier, we are, if I remember well, the sixth or seventh largest contributor. Am I wrong, Mr. Minister, with these figures?

[English]

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: No, that's quite true; we are in the top half in terms of our expenditure on defence. But it's equally true to say we are definitely toward the bottom when it comes to taking it as a percentage of GDP. Both sets of figures are valid.

I think it's fair to say that because of our larger GDP—we are one of the major economies of the world and we're part of the G-7, so at least notionally, we're the seventh largest economy in the world—it creates a situation, since we are not perhaps as big in terms of spending as other countries are.

As I said, you can take either set of statistics, but I think the proof comes in what we're able to do. As George Robertson, the new Secretary General, said, we are a key ally, a good ally, a reliable ally. When Canada was called upon, it was there. We did more than our share, for example, in the Kosovo situation. So I think that's really where it comes out as being the proof that's needed that we are pulling our weight in NATO.

But there's no doubt that he said—he didn't just say it about us; he said it about all the other countries—he'd like them to spend more. I know it's an issue particularly for the European countries, and the Americans are as much after them for spending more money as they would be after us.

• 1710

What is very key in all this is that we are able to interoperate. That's a very key word. We have to be able to work together, because it is a collective defence organization. We have to be able to mesh our different systems. There needs to be a seamless operation. I think we are in a good position to meet that because we do have a lot of new equipment, a lot of top equipment that can interoperate well with our allies in the United States, who are the benchmark.

For example, they put together every year a fleet of ships headed by an American aircraft carrier. Since we have the frigates in operation and since our frigates are state-of-the-art, they now invite us all the time, because they know we can interoperate with them quite well. They're really happy to see us as part of their battle group of ships. That's an indication of interoperability that works well. It's also an indication that we are bringing about state-of-the-art equipment to operate with our allies.

The Chair: Thank you, Minister, and thank you, Monsieur Bertrand.

I'm going to go to Monsieur Laurin and then finish with myself. I have a couple of questions. Then we'll thank the witnesses, and we'll look at whether the committee wants to agree unanimously to entertain Mr. Pratt's motion.

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, you have five minutes please.

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Minister, there is one fundamental question that you need to ask yourself. What do we want our army to do? What will be the role of the army?

You often speak of the 1994 White Paper, but given the events that have occurred in the world since 1994, maybe it would be wise to rethink the role of the army. We at the Bloc Québécois agree that we should be purchasing new equipment for the army, but never at the expense of budgets which would improve the quality of life for our troops. For us the quality of life of the troops is a priority. However, we also recognize that both go hand in hand.

At some point in time we will be hearing about the budgets. There are not many ways of going about it: either we accept fewer missions, which will cost less money, and free funds up to improve the quality of life of our troops, or else we have to increase the budgets. However, before we increase the army's budget, Mr. Minister, there are other choices to make. There are needs to be met in education, in health, and in social assistance. I'm not sure that the taxpayers of Quebec and the rest of Canada would accept that we increase military budgets without providing some sort of relief for the compelling and urgent needs in health, in education and in social assistance.

This is my question. Do we have the flexibility we need that would allow us to reduce our commitments overseas to these interventions? Do we or do we not have this flexibility? If we don't have this flexibility, then I'd like you to explain why that is the case.

[English]

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: We certainly do have leeway. That's why we're cutting back to 3,000 by next spring, which is a more manageable number for us.

Hot spots occur from time to time in the world. We're asked to contribute, and we do our best to find the troops to be able to make a contribution in those areas. But some day we may have to say no; we may not have the numbers to be able to do that or we're going to have to take them from one place to another.

We're drawing down in Kosovo, and as I indicated, this will help to reduce the operation tempo, but it also means we have troops available on a surge basis for other operations should that become necessary. So we want to maintain as much flexibility as we can in terms of that.

You're quite right. There are other areas of need for the government to meet, whether it's health care, tax cuts, educational expenditures, or whatever. But I think Canadians also want to know that the troops are there for problems that might occur here at home—the ice storm, the floods, and the forest fires out west. There have been many natural disasters in which we've really appreciated them being there. I know from talking to the people in Quebec and Ontario at the time of the ice storm that they certainly would want to see the kind of support that is necessary to be sure these troops are there and available for a natural disaster, and of course for search and rescue. They're literally saving hundreds of lives every year in that regard.

• 1715

I'm very happy to hear what you say about quality of life. Quality of life, whether it's for the military or for the people of our country in general, is vitally important and was a major theme in terms of the Speech from the Throne.

In terms of the white paper itself, I don't look on it as a static document, but as one that needs to be changed and updated.

I think the fundamentals are still sound. All the fundamentals in there about defending Canada, being part of a collective defence with NATO and NORAD, contributing to international peace and security, are basically sound. But a lot of things are changing in the world. A lot of things are changing in terms of the military—new technology, which is also evolving into new ways of operation or new military doctrine, and so on. That's why we came out with this strategy document for 2020, because this takes the white paper into the future.

I think a very key visionary statement in here, and one I subscribe to so completely, is when it says:

The Defence Team will generate, employ and sustain high-quality, combat-capable, interoperable and rapidly deployable task-tailored forces. We will exploit leading-edge doctrine and technologies to accomplish our domestic and international roles in the battlespace of the 21st century and be recognized, both at home and abound, as an innovative, relevant knowledge-based institution. With transformational leadership and coherent management, we will build upon our proud heritage in pursuit of clear strategic objectives.

I think that's a very important statement about the vision of where we see it going. But in terms of the fundamental question you asked, what do we want our troops to do, what do we want our Canadian Forces to do, that's a question we all need to answer, and not just in this document that comes from us, but you and all parliamentarians need to be part of a process of determining what we want our military to do in the future.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Laurin.

[English]

Minister, I'll have the last couple of questions.

My colleague Mr. Laurin leads into my question, and your comments do, too, sir. That is, as we speak about the white paper, do you consider a strategy for 2020 to be an update of the white paper, or are you entertaining in any way as minister perhaps a need to have after five years a review or an update of the white paper as it stands today?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: It's not just for me to answer; it's for this committee and Parliament and the government to answer overall.

My feeling is that the fundamentals of the white paper are still correct but that we should not look upon it as a static document. We should talk about how we can update it.

For example, your committee is dealing with the matter of the revolution in military affairs that deals with leading-edge technology and doctrine, and so on. I think we need to do that constantly.

Should we have an overall review? At some point, we should. I don't propose that it be done now, but I think some time in the not-too-distant future it would make sense to do that as a natural process to undertake every number of years.

The Chair: Thank you.

Minister, I know you met with the Australian Minister of Defence recently here in Ottawa. I had the chance to meet with him and found it quite interesting.

The first point he made to me was to express his gratitude to Canada, to our Canadian Forces, in being involved in East Timor. In relation to Mr. Hart's earlier question, as he pointed out to me, for the first time they're leading a mission. It was the one for them to lead, being right on their back door, but he mentioned that our presence was vital. The Germans mentioned this to us when some of the committee was there last January, and different people.

Even if we're in a mission with a small number, why do you, as minister, think they consider our presence so vital?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: I think it's because our troops are well trained and highly professional. They know how to do the work, they have a terrific reputation, and they do the job that is expected of them.

The Australian Minister of Defence told me he was delighted with our contribution. It was a very major contribution.

• 1720

I mentioned today in the House, in answering a question about the Hercules—and some of the opposition want to make much of the problems they had—that yes, they had some problems. I suggest that has to be put in some context, though. They were minor problems compared to what they were able to deliver subsequently in terms of service. When they were in Australia and East Timor, shuttling back and forth, taking numerous troops and two million pounds of goods, some of it humanitarian aid, this represented between 35% and 40% of the air transport missions, the air lift. That's quite substantial for us to do. We again pulled above our weight in that respect.

Our infantry is in there with the New Zealanders in some of the more difficult parts of East Timor because they are good. They are professional, dedicated, well trained, and well equipped.

It's the same with our navy, the supply ship, which is in the area. All three elements are playing an important role, and it's well appreciated by the Australians.

The Chair: Thank you, Minister.

The last brief question from me and from the committee is the matter of ITARs. As you know, a lot of defence business is done in my riding at a place called GM Diesel, but a lot of the members here around the table and in the House have suppliers or considerable business done in their ridings on the defence side, and a lot of jobs are at stake.

I think you gave an assurance to my colleague Mrs. Longfield about that, but I wonder if you could help us out a little more in terms of when the i's might be dotted and the t's crossed so that that issue is behind us once and for all. Is there any sort of best-case scenario that you or your staff might have on ITARs and finally putting it to rest?

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: As I indicated earlier, we're not the lead department in that regard—

The Chair: Right.

Mr. Arthur Eggleton: —so I'm not as up-to-date as they might be over at the Pearson Building, at DFAIT. But I do know the efforts are ongoing.

There were actually a couple of other components to the discussions that were going on. One involved the RADARSAT II and the other involved NATO flying training. I think the NATO flying training is pretty well finalized now, and we're working furiously to get the rest of it done as well, just as quickly as we possibly can.

The Chair: Minister, on behalf of the committee, thank you very much.

Thank you, General Baril. We look forward to our meeting with you tomorrow morning.

To the other staff, thank you very much, and in thanking the minister and his staff, I'll just remind members that we need another minute or two on Mr. Pratt's motion.

Colleagues, you have in front of you a motion from Mr. Pratt. With unanimous consent of the committee, we can entertain that now. Does Mr. Pratt have unanimous consent?

We can't have debate on it. The process I have to have is a yes or no as to whether he has unanimous consent to entertain it now. If not, we will deal with it tomorrow. Does he have unanimous consent to deal with it now?

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, yes or no, please. There is no debate.

Mr. René Laurin: It doesn't bother me to begin debate today, however I'm not ready to vote on this question today. We could begin debate today on the condition that we continue it tomorrow and deal with the motion only tomorrow.

[English]

The Chair: Fair enough. We can do it that way. But my question now has to be, does the member have unanimous consent to put this motion on the floor today and begin debate today?

[Translation]

Yes?

[English]

Does he have unanimous consent? He does.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry. Does this mean that...

[English]

The Chair: Monsieur Laurin, I'm sorry—

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Then it's no.

The Chair: Okay, it's no.

[English]

We can't debate it. It's a yes or no. It's non-debatable.

Mr. René Laurin: Okay, it's no.

The Chair: So it's no, and we know the rules.

It's no, Mr. Pratt, so this is then considered a notice of motion, and we'll deal with it tomorrow.

Mr. René Laurin: I can't take a chance, so I say no.

The Chair: I understand, but we can't debate it, though.

Mr. Jim Hart: Mr. Chairman, I have a question regarding procedure. If there are some friendly amendments to the motion, how do we put those? Just deal with them tomorrow?

The Chair: We'll deal with them tomorrow.

The committee is adjourned until tomorrow morning, at 9 a.m. sharp, please, colleagues, in the East Block. Thank you.