NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, February 29, 2000

• 0901

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs and welcome witnesses from Project Ploughshares this morning.

Before we begin and I introduce those witnesses, I just want to recall for colleagues that we are barely starting the topic of RMA, revolution in military affairs, one sub-theme of which is a missile defence system, the possibility of Canada participating in such a system when the Americans make the more or less inevitable decision, it would seem, to go ahead with that.

We will be hearing from a broad spectrum of witnesses, people who will speak in favour and others who will speak against. That is the way we conduct our business. We're very diligent at this committee about hearing all points of view and conducting our business in as non-partisan a way as possible.

I want to thank the members who have come here. Gentlemen, there may be other members joining us. You can appreciate that yesterday was budget day in Ottawa, the busiest day in the year for pretty well any member of Parliament. This is not our normal meeting time. This is a special meeting I've called.

I understand originally you had requested to appear before the foreign affairs committee and they were unable to accommodate you. Then we had a request from the foreign affairs clerk through our clerk here, Mr. Morawski, to accommodate you, because you're here for a limited time. We're very happy to make that special effort to accommodate you, to hear your point of view on this, because it's exactly our intention to hear all points of view on this very important topic, which will no doubt engender some debate in the government and in the country. So welcome, gentlemen.

We have with us today Dr. John Steinbruner, Dr. Pavel Podvig, Bill Robinson, and Ernie Regehr. After opening statements, then we will have questions from the members.

Who'd like to begin?

Mr. Ernie Regehr (Director, Policy and Public Affairs, Project Ploughshares): Just by way of introduction, I'll say Dr. Steinbruner and Dr. Podvig will each make opening statements, and then Bill and I will be happy to participate in the discussion as appropriate. I thank you very much for your kindness in calling this special meeting and hearing from our guests, who we're also very pleased were able to come. I think we're ready for their opening statements if you are.

The Chair: Very good. Thank you. We are, and you're welcome, gentlemen.

Dr. John Steinbruner (Director, Centre for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland): Thank you.

Let me note in advance that I acknowledge this is—in Washington at any rate, where I come from—an exceedingly emotional subject. In fact in Washington street talk, it's also often referred to as a branch of theology, with all the attendant emotion and articles of faith associated with that. I will attempt, at any rate, to be practical about it. I don't claim I'm entirely immune from the context of emotion and belief that surrounds this.

I'm sure you're all aware of the July 1999 legislation in the United States that proclaimed the deployment of missile defence as soon as technically possible to be national policy. That was passed by a large majority in Congress and signed by the President.

• 0905

Let me give you the perspective of this from somebody who watches Washington politics and global security very carefully, though I'm not a participant. But I will not give you the standard line; I will give you the interpretation that goes on from this point of view.

This July decision was seen quite frankly as a political decision, not a strategic or technical or substantive one. It was believed to be a typical exercise in what we call political triangulation, with the President basically trying to neutralize this issue as a potential campaign topic for the current presidential election.

The reason this is universally considered to be essentially political is it's quite obvious that the system in question is only partially designed, is not actually ready for a deployment decision, and will not be ready by July for such a decision under normal rules. So the schedule is widely assumed to be politically inspired, even though it's always argued in substantive terms.

The reason the President would be interested in neutralizing the question as a potential campaign topic is due to the intense devotion of a fairly small but very powerful minority within the American political system for promoting a national defence deployment on almost any terms. This is intense-minority politics, and the intense minority is getting recognition here.

Let me just note that the people who are promoting this do not support the ABM Treaty and in fact are very interested in removing the ABM Treaty as a restraint on U.S. weapons development. They also have in mind a much more robust system than is currently being presented, and that is widely understood. The true advocates of national missile defence do not propose to limit themselves to the currently limited system, nor are they willing to compensate for a robust missile defence deployment with drastic restrictions on United States offence.

What they are promoting is a formula for something like decisive superiority. Even though that is not explicitly acknowledged, it is widely understood that that is the driving impetus behind the program. The intense advocates for it definitely have this in mind.

They are not a majority. The majority of the United States actually is skeptical about this system and does adhere to the ABM Treaty, but as is frequently the case, majority opinion is weakly held and diffuse and very distracted. We're dealing here with a very, very intense minority that does have a very extensive program in mind.

In political terms, within the United States a major battle is therefore looming, not over deployment of this system really, but over the ABM Treaty. In the wake of the CTBT vote last fall, the guess is that within the United States political system, the treaty is in very serious difficulty and in fact will require quite assertive international support if it is to be rescued. That is the core, underlying issue.

That creates a very odd situation. People who are not parties to the treaty but have a very strong interest in its continuation are going to be forced to defend it, even though they do not normally have legal standing to do so.

But I would say fundamentally, from the point of view of any outside government participating in any of the arms control agreements effecting limitations on nuclear weapons, there is very strong reason to be actively concerned. Without a general international defence of this treaty, it is reasonably likely to fail. That's not a certainty, but it's reasonably likely to fail.

• 0910

Let me comment briefly on the situation with regard to the national missile program that's being currently presented. There's a lot of technical complexity here, but let me just give you what I think is a fair presentation of the general judgment about it.

It is accepted that what's called the hit-to-kill mechanism, the device that intercepts an incoming warhead in space, will eventually be made to work on the test range—in other words, it can do the equivalent of killing a tethered goat—even though in fact there have been two tests so far. One was an accidental success, you can say, and the other was a near miss, due to a last-minute technical failure. They really haven't demonstrated this capability decisively, but they probably eventually will.

However, there is virtually no prospect, virtually no prospect, that the current system as being projected could hunt in the wild, if you will—could actually cope with a realistic scenario. It is easily penetrated. I don't know how much technical detail you want to get into with that. My colleague can comment on this as well. We can expand on that. It is very easy to penetrate this system. It is easily bypassed with cruise missile technology or other forms of clandestine delivery of weapons, and if it comes to that, it can be directly attacked. It cannot defend its own sensors.

So the system is extremely vulnerable to countermeasures, bypassing, and direct attack. It is basically not credible unless it is dramatically expanded. So if it is limited, which is the current argument, then it is simply not capable of doing its supposed mission. If it is to do an interesting mission at all, it will have to be dramatically expanded, not just in terms of number but probably in terms of the basics of the design. So this is in reality an entering wedge for a much larger program, or it makes no sense whatsoever.

For this reason it is a major, and I mean major, provocation to both Russia and China. Although we claim that it is sufficiently limited that it should not bother them, in reality it must bother them if they're being responsible about their own security position.

Any plausible projection of the defence program being advanced by the advocates would put both the Russian and the Chinese deterrent forces in grave jeopardy over a period of time. This would be through a combination of continued elaboration of United States offensive capabilities and the projected elaboration of the defensive system to make it sensible. Down the line, first with China and ultimately with Russia as well, the United States would put itself on the course to acquire the kind of decisive first-strike capability that has always been considered extremely dangerous.

It therefore virtually compels some kind of reaction both from Russia and from China if it is not contained by agreement. Neither country can afford, in terms of its own security interest, simply to tolerate the deployment of this system as if it had nothing to do with them.

In considering what their reactions might be, all this is speculative, because they will not themselves have decided this matter. We can nonetheless see the major paths that are open. It involves first of all a commitment to initiating an attack on the system under any circumstance of danger so as to preserve the core deterrent capability.

• 0915

For the Chinese in particular, it implies an extensive expansion of their deployed deterrent forces. At the moment the Chinese are maintaining only about 20 missiles capable of reaching the United States, and none of them are in ready condition. All of them would take hours to prepare.

They have deliberately tolerated the theoretical threat of a first attack in that configuration in order to avoid the very dangerous complications that arise between the interaction of active forces. That judgment on the part of the Chinese will be overridden if the United States proceeds with deployment. The Chinese will be virtually forced probably to add multiple warheads to their systems, probably to add a larger number of systems, probably to bring them into alert posture for the first time. That is inherently a far more dangerous configuration than the Chinese currently have, and that is nonetheless a predictable consequence of proceeding with this.

But far more dangerous or troublesome, actually, is what I would consider to be the most likely reaction by China, Russia, or anyone else who feel themselves threatened by that system, and that is to contest the assets that it would place in space. And here, I'm afraid, we're being extremely blind to our own interests.

Space, as you know, over the last two decades has gradually and increasingly become a matter for economic and commercial development rather than the military preserve that it was in the early years of the Cold War. The rules of engagement in space have not been very precisely defined. I will elaborate on this thought, but let me point out that it's perfectly obvious for basic physical reasons: you cannot have normal commercial development and weaponization in space at the same time. These things are incompatible, and early on they will be incompatible.

The high-leverage reaction for a small force, or a country with a small capability relative to ours, is to react to the United States national missile program by contesting space assets to threaten them. And once that begins, it is going to be monumental problem.

The bottom line of all this, just to end, is that we currently are on a very dangerous path that cannot be sustained all the way to the end. The issue between the United States and Russia, and the United States and China, on this question is not headed currently for resolution, it's headed for confrontation. The course of that confrontation, very predictably, will create a crisis in arms control arrangements and in general international security arrangements. Something is going to have to change here. We are not going to be able to deploy such a limited system without reaction, and the reactions are capable of causing a major crisis of international security.

We're in serious trouble here. It requires a great deal of thought. Everybody involved, and that would include the Canadian government, needs to pay very careful attention.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Steinbruner.

Just before I invite Dr. Podvig, colleagues, we may be interrupted as early as 10.30. I'm not sure about a possible vote. But we hope to get to lots of questions before that, and I'm going to welcome Professor Podvig now to make some statements.

Dr. Pavel Podvig (Research Associate, Centre for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology): Thank you.

I would like to tell you a little bit about how this whole issue of the missile defence looks from the Russian perspective. The views I would talk about here are not necessarily mine. I'll try to convey to you the sense of what's going on in Russia.

Apparently the choice that Russia is facing on how to react to the U.S. development and the proposed deployment of the missile defence is a very difficult one because it's certainly linked to a number of issues, one of which is the nuclear disarmament process, the START I and START II treaties. Another is that the question of whether the ABM Treaty survives is in fact the question of whether the whole model of the bilateral disarmament as we knew it from the Cold War survives and whether Russia will be taken as an equal power to the United States, at least in the matter of nuclear weapons. All of this certainly makes the debate on missile defence in Russia very complex.

• 0920

So the official Russian position on this is that Russia insists the ABM Treaty should be preserved, that there should be no development of any missile defences; and Russian insists that any nuclear disarmament, namely the START I and START II process, could not exist if there was no ABM Treaty. This is the official point of view, and I would say this point of view was reiterated several times during the last few years.

However, there are subtleties and various shades of this position, and in fact if you look closely you will see variations of that. In fact, if you look at what exactly the administration, the government, did in the past, you'll see that in fact it operates on the presumption that the missile defence development in the United States just won't happen. It's hard to understand why, but the Russian government sincerely believes that the United States is not going to deploy missile defences, and it operates on that presumption. This in fact, I would say, is rather dangerous, because Russia actually doesn't have any fallback plan and doesn't have any serious plan of what to do in case the United States really does abrogate the ABM Treaty.

So far the talk, the more hard-line position, was that if the United States pulls out of the ABM Treaty then Russia could withdraw from the START I treaty. In fact, people were talking about stopping the START II ratification, but the START II treaty's dead anyway as far as I'm concerned. So the START I is the only real possibility, and Russia could actually invoke its right to pull out of the START I. However, if you look at the real possibilities, pulling out of START I would not change very much in the Russian capability or its nuclear weapon development programs. However, this position again that START I is at stake in fact is, I would say, rather popular with the military, although it's probably not that popular in the civilian part of the government.

Recently you may have heard a change of the very strong official line, and you would hear various officials making statements on the fact that Russia could indeed either react or agree to the ABM Treaty modification. The most recent example is the statement made by Sergei Ivanov, the head of the Security Council, who said that we could possibly talk about moving the ABM site from North Dakota to Alaska. He didn't say we will talk, but he said that this is something we could talk about. And that's the head of the Security Council, unfortunately I should say.

Another point of view, which is more tolerant toward the possible ABM Treaty changes, is that Russia should accept the U.S. pulling out of the ABM Treaty, but Russia should ask to have some sort of a deal. And the kind of deal people are talking about more often is having multiple warheads on this new SS-27 TOPOL M2 ballistic missile, which Russia is developing right now. We can talk about it later, but I think that's probably one of the worst deals you could ever imagine.

• 0925

In my view, what will actually happen, given the current political environment in Russia, is that Russia will eventually agree on some modifications of the ABM Treaty. It's hard to tell exactly what kind of modifications, but it's quite possible, in my view, that Russia would give in.

However, that would not be a good thing, because in a few years' time there will be a very strong feeling or movement that we got a very bad deal. If you look at what happened with the START II treaty, this is exactly the pattern that I think will repeat itself with the ABM Treaty. The Russian government will agree on some changes and then it will realize that it made a mistake. Unfortunately, this is the pattern of Russian politics in recent years.

That's probably it. I could talk about the link between the START II and the ABM Treaty, if there are questions. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Podvig.

I understand those are the two opening submissions. Thank you, both.

Now we will go to questions from our members. We do that this way: we go with the opposition parties and then we come to the government side, and everybody gets a fair turn to have their say. So I'm going to start with Mr. Hanger, for seven minutes. Mr. Hangar.

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Ref.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Professor Podvig, you mentioned something in your statement that I found rather remarkable. In speaking on behalf of Russia and the Russian politicians, and the Russian military, you said that the U.S. is not going to deploy missile defences. In your view, this is what Russia has told you?

Dr. Pavel Podvig: My feeling, my view and my understanding, is that if you look at the actions of the Russian government and the plans and talk in the military and in the civilian part of the government, it is, in my view, very clear that all the actions are planned with this understanding in mind, that eventually the United States will not withdraw from the ABM Treaty and it will not deploy missile defences. Whether this view is justified or not is another question, and I believe this is a mistake. In my view, the United States will eventually withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

Mr. Art Hanger: In essence, my question is this. I don't believe that we, as allies to the United States, or the U.S. should believe what the Russians might think about missile defence. I think it would be naive on our part to believe that the Americans won't protect their soil and their interests, not only at home but worldwide. And I believe that as allies we should be a part of all of that and that whole defence program. To do otherwise.... I don't think the Russians could be trusted in that regard at all.

Dr. Pavel Podvig: I don't know. You're free not to trust Russia if you don't want to. What I'm trying to convey to you is the sense of what's going on in Moscow, and what I'm saying is that there is a certain misperception of the U.S. motives and U.S. actions in the Russian government. In my view, it's dangerous for Russia, first of all, but it is dangerous for the U.S. and the U.S. allies as well, because if Russia miscalculates the situation it may react in a way that would be dangerous for everybody involved. That's my point.

• 0930

Dr. John Steinbruner: The Russian assessment he refers to is not unreasonable in the sense that although it looks very much like the United States will attempt to deploy this system, and it will attack the treaty in doing so, practical judgment would be that we cannot complete the deployment.

The reason is that it will not do what you say. It will not protect the United States or Canada. Technically it is not capable of doing that. It will trigger reactions that are far worse. Also, the contentiousness, the reaction will eventually contain the system. That's a reasonable judgment. That's very likely what's going to happen here. We're going to attempt to deploy, and it will be overwhelmed by the technical vulnerability of it and the reaction it triggers.

The Russian government can be forgiven for thinking, “Why should we bear the burden of stopping it early? Let the rest of the world carry the burden and we'll just go along for the ride.” Again, we're headed for grief on this, and they can be forgiven, I suppose, if they say “Let's just keep our head below the hedge and let it happen.”

Mr. Art Hanger: Perhaps we're looking in the wrong place too when it comes to the Russians. Certainly they may object to changing or modifying the treaty, but there are those in our world who couldn't care less about any treaties, who have usurped a lot of power over others.

North Korea is on its way up when it comes to technology and the testing of their missiles. They have the capability not only of using weapons of mass destruction but also of going far beyond that when they develop their missile technology a little further. Who's going to control them? Perhaps Russia can be negotiated with, but obviously these other rogue states cannot. They may pose a greater threat than Russia or China.

Dr. John Steinbruner: It's worth noting that in the North Korean case, this is the primary independent program that North Korea is attempting to negotiate. They've sat down with the United States. There are active negotiations about terminating the North Korean missile program. They have not been completed, but North Korea has imposed a testing moratorium and the missile has been tested twice. It is not a serious development program as yet, and North Korea is talking about terminating it.

You could also say the United States has not put terms on the table that would test their intentions as yet. If they're serious about that, you make an offer that they would have to accept if they were serious and see if they accept it. That hasn't yet happened, but at least there's a possibility that North Korea will bargain away its missile program. At least they've said that's what they want to do.

The Chair: Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Goldring, Mr. Hanger has left you half a minute.

Mr. Peter Goldring (Edmonton East, Ref.): I'll get a quick question in.

Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your presentation.

My question is with one of the materials that seems to have been proliferated about the world. It's been used in cruise missiles. It'll be undoubtedly used in these missiles. It's been used in some 500 747s. It's depleted uranium.

I understand your organization has concerns on that material being proliferated throughout the world. Perhaps you could relate some of your authority, some of your scientific understanding on the hazards this material causes to people, not only on the battlefield but also in other conditions where the testing of these missiles will be involved, where there can also be a potential for fires and where that material could be a health hazard. Would any of you have some information on that?

• 0935

Mr. Bill Robinson (Program Associate, Project Ploughshares): Depleted uranium is not an issue that we work on a lot. Briefly, while it's a health concern about use on the battlefield, it's not a weapon of mass destruction and it does not really belong in this kind of discussion.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Is it used in the building of these?

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Laurin, seven minutes, please.

Mr. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): I would like you to make the following assessment. It seems that the basic debate revolves around the American assessment of the threat against the United States and the assessment done by Russia of the threat against it.

Would it be possible to have an international panel of independent experts do an objective assessment of the threat for both the United States and Russia? If this objective international panel were to conclude that the threat was indeed real, could we conclude that it is real for both the United States and Russia. If this were the case, both countries would probably agree to amend the ABM Treaty.

Is it too idealistic to think that an international panel could exist and that both the United States and Russia would submit to it?

[English]

Dr. John Steinbruner: I actually think that's quite a constructive thought. It makes the point that this is a broad international issue, not simply a bilateral concern between these two countries.

An international commission making this assessment would look at the threat to everyone, not just these two countries, and it would also be inclined to support the critical principle here, that is, national missile defence cannot and should not be done by a single country on its own behalf. By its very character, because of the interaction involved, it has to be done under international rules. So if there is to be deployment, it has to be done under agreed rules and not by a national program.

I would imagine that the rules, of course, would involve security to everyone, not just to these two countries, and that's the proper context for considering this issue. So I think that's a good idea. It would broaden the perspective. It would bring the other security interests into play, which is part of what has to happen.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Why wouldn't the United States and Russia agree to abide by the conclusions of such an international panel? For instance, if the panel were to conclude that North Korea did constitute a potential threat to the United States, Russia could, in turn, conclude that South Korea constituted the same threat to it. It seems to me that this assessment can only be subjective as long as each country continues analysing the threat that foreign countries represent to it. These countries will never be able to do an objective assessment of the real threat. Unless these countries have hidden reasons or military or economic strategies that they do not wish to disclose, why would they refuse to submit to an international panel whose experts would not come from Russia, the United States or any other threatened country?

[English]

Dr. Pavel Podvig: There is one problem we should understand, as Mr. Steinbruner said. The missile defence issue is a theological issue in the United States. It's not as close to that in Russia, but still it's very emotional in Russia as well.

Your idea of assessing the threat is indeed very reasonable. As far as I can tell, the problem is that the answer has in fact been known for a while. The answer is that even if there is a threat, missile defence is the wrong answer. It is the wrong way to counter that threat, whatever it is, from North Korea, Iran, or Iraq. That's the key point here.

• 0940

Of course, it would be better if we could discuss various threats in the post-Cold War world, because certainly there is something we should talk about here. Again, as far as missile defences are concerned, the answer is very clear here.

Dr. John Steinbruner: Let me just add that the advocates of missile defence in the United States, to put it mildly, would not welcome an international committee involving itself. They want to do this on a national, unilateral basis, and they're very intensely committed to that. So the commission would be resisted by those promoting the program.

Dr. Pavel Podvig: In fact the military was active in the Russian debate. They were repeatedly saying that the kind of threat assessment that the United States has done in this regard is totally unsatisfactory. Basically, the main argument the Russian military made is that they just don't believe the system was built to counter North Korea, so it must be built to counter Russia in fact, and this argument is very hard to counterattack.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: This is a good occasion to consider that Canada is probably in a fairly good position to play a role in internationalizing this debate on both the threat assessment and the response to the threat. As Professor Steinbruner has said, the United States domestic authorities are unlikely to be very keen on internationalizing it, but Canada has a very immediate and direct stake in this. It has implications for Canadian security as well as international security.

Our whole approach to international security tends to be to understand our own security in terms of international peace and stability. So the spin and response that Canadians need to make to it is to bring in precisely that perspective. It would be brought in by the kind of international commission that you're talking about.

The Chair: Merci, Monsieur Laurin.

Before going to Mr. Proud, I must say that I indicated that at about 10.10 there will be bells for a vote at about 10.40. Unfortunately, gentlemen, it looks as if we will be interrupted, but it's fairly predictable on the day after the budget. Let's try to get in as many questions as we can.

Mr. Proud, please.

Mr. George Proud (Hillsborough, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, gentlemen, to this committee this morning. I listened to you very intently, and there are two or three questions I would like you to answer for me, if that's possible.

The report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States concluded that there were concerted efforts by potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological and nuclear warheads, payloads, and this presents a growing threat to the United States, to its deployed forces, to its friends and allies. This is of great concern to me, as it is to you, I'm sure.

I haven't heard you say this threat isn't real. If the threat is real, what do you recommend the United States do? And you've said that the technology they have in this missile defence system they're talking about is not sufficient to stop the ICBMs, for want of a better name for them. Why then would they be entertaining the thoughts of doing this if they can't intercept them?

Dr. John Steinbruner: With regard to biological or chemical warheads, this system is adequate in principle, because the preferred way to deliver those warheads is to put them into small canisters and disperse the canisters immediately after boost phase. That completely defeats this system.

Why would people claim that they are responding to that? The only way you can explain this is to say that they have much more in mind than they're currently saying. The current system would not even work against a nuclear warhead, where you can at least make the argument that you can play the game of intercepting in space. Even the most primitive penetration techniques will clearly work against it.

• 0945

Why are people claiming that this system is protection against the kinds of threats you're referring to? The answer is that either they're being disingenuous entirely or they believe that eventually they will evolve a much more robust system, probably much less limited and using different techniques. This is just a start, and they don't want to admit that at the start it has almost no meaningful capability, because they intend to evolve a much more robust capability. That points out that the argument that this is a limited system is not credible. It's either much more robust or it's not effective.

Mr. George Proud: Are you suggesting that this will probably become Star Wars II?

Dr. John Steinbruner: It's clear that's what the advocates have in mind. They have in mind developing a much more extensive system, in the end probably based upon different physical principles, although they're not admitting that at the moment. If they don't have that in mind, then it doesn't make any sense at all. This system offers no responsible protection against whatever threat is there.

I would go on to say that the preferred method of dealing with these threats is by pursuing agreements not to deploy them. There's a great deal we can do in this regard, particularly with regard to the North Koreans. It would be wildly irresponsible to deploy a system before you have exhausted or at least fully developed the methods of inducing restraint, and we have powerful mechanisms for doing that.

Mr. George Proud: I'm going to add something. I understand that Russia has a missile defence system. Does it have a missile defence system?

Dr. Pavel Podvig: Yes, Russia does have a missile defence system in Moscow, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. However, there are various opinions on whether this system is operational or not. My best knowledge is that the actual interceptors, which are supposed to intercept the incoming missiles, are not deployed on a day-to-day basis. They are not kept on full alert on a day-to-day basis. I may be wrong.

Mr. George Proud: They do have a system?

Dr. Pavel Podvig: Yes, that's right. Again, this is similar to what the United States has in North Dakota. The main element of this system is in fact the radar, the PARCS radar in the case of the United States and the Pill Box radar in the case of the Moscow system.

I have just one short note on what Dr. Steinbruner has said about the scaleability of the system and whether the advocates of the system have a more robust system in mind. I would add that in fact upgrading the system and making it sort of a Stars War II won't solve the problem. Technically, the problem of intercepting a ballistic missile is extremely difficult. I would say it is impossible in fact, especially if you work against an adversary who is determined to beat your system.

On the question of how to respond to that threat, just go back 50 years and look at what the question was before the United States when the Soviet Union tested its nuclear weapons. It wasn't a very comfortable situation, of course, but eventually we learned to live together and we didn't have a nuclear war for 50 years. That's probably not what we want to have, but if we look at the real world and the real technical capabilities of various things, then we'll realize that this the only way to go. We just have to build relations with each other.

The Chair: Mr. Proud.

• 0950

Mr. George Proud: I'll change this question a bit. Given the European allies' questions about the U.S. plans for possible missile defence, do you people see a trend in which increasingly the United States, Europe, and NATO are going their separate ways? Do you think any of these stress points weaken those alliances for peace?

Dr. John Steinbruner: Yes, I think we're on a track that leads to severe difficulty within our own alliance. The project we have going here, which is the attempt to create a national missile defence in the face of the technical difficulty and the strategic reactions, is going to split our alliance if we go down very far. The early signs of this are already very clear. We're again headed for a pretty severe issue, not only with our potential adversaries but with our allies. This is going to be exceedingly divisive.

That's the main message I'm trying to say: Pay attention here; we're on a course that leads to a train wreck within our own alliance. We can choose to let it go until metal is bent, but it's much more sensible to head this off by changing course. There will have to be a course change if there's not to be a train wreck. That's the situation. Ultimately it will be a problem, a major problem within our own alliance.

Mr. George Proud: You say you see these things happening. Can you give an example of some of the stresses you see already?

The Chair: Just briefly.

Dr. John Steinbruner: I read what President Chirac is saying as a clue. He's issuing an early warning: this is trouble. He's very concerned. I would listen to him.

Mr. George Proud: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Proud.

Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I just want to follow up a bit on the point that was raised by Mr. Laurin about internationalizing this whole issue and doing an assessment from the international perspective. I agree with Mr. Regehr that Canada is probably in a good position to be a leader in doing that.

Has this issue ever been raised or is it being raised at the level of the United Nations, through any of its committees or anything? Is there any discussion along those lines?

Dr. John Steinbruner: Just in the last few weeks, there have been two speeches before the committee on disarmament in Geneva that I urge you to look at. One is by the U.S. representative, who I regret to say is basically trying to fend off international concern with this issue. The other, to be fairminded about it, is a very forceful and very eloquent speech by the Chinese representative, who said this is an international issue and the United States cannot plausibly keep it out of international forums. That's a sharp warning. This will become an international issue.

The United States, I regret to say, is currently resisting the internationalization of the issue. The U.S. representative at the committee on disarmament just a couple of weeks ago gave a speech to that effect. My own view of the matter is that it is inevitable that it will be internationalized, because the stakes are very large for everyone and the issue is not headed for resolution in a bilateral context.

Mr. Gordon Earle: My question relates to the whole nature of the defensive versus the offensive. We talk about this as a national missile defence system, which implies it is defending against an attack. Dr. Podvig mentioned that there may be one deal in Russia that would accept the U.S. pulling out of the ABM Treaty but having a deal in return whereby multiple warheads may be used on a missile that's currently being developed. When I think about multiple warheads on a missile being developed, it sounds pretty offensive to me, rather than defensive.

I'm just wondering if part of the problem of this whole issue is with what's being called a defence system. Maybe there's concern on the part of others that this is really a guise for an offensive system that would in effect have the capability of launching nuclear attacks. Is this part of what the concern may be with respect to Russia and China and some of the other countries that may have concerns about it?

Dr. Pavel Podvig: First of all, if you take the offensive potential of the kind of system the U.S. is going to build, in my view it's not that great. It's rather limited. However, this issue certainly has the potential to destroy, quite literally in fact, the nuclear disarmament process that started with START I in the beginning of the 1990s.

• 0955

I mentioned already that this is something that Russia could probably.... Russia could exercise its right to withdraw from START I. START II is already in danger because of these issues not being resolved. I think the chances that a START II will be ratified are actually zero.

Then if you look at China, for example, apparently if the United States builds even a limited missile defence system, China will feel threatened. It will feel that it doesn't have adequate force to maintain its relationship with the United States as it used to. China will feel that it has to build up its force.

That would certainly.... It may or may not, but it probably will trigger a reaction from Russia, which now may accept that its force will go to much lower levels than that of the U.S. We are ready to accept that we don't have parity with the United States any more, but it will be really hard for Russia to accept that we don't have superiority over China. That would trigger a China-Russia arms race in addition to U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China races. Potentially this issue is really dangerous.

Mr. Gordon Earle: I guess I'm having a little trouble understanding this. A lot of this is quite new to me. I'm having trouble understanding how a defence system would cause someone to want to move back from disarming themselves in a nuclear way.

For example, if I build a bomb shelter to protect myself against bombs, let's say that's a defensive move, but it doesn't stop anybody from still getting rid of their bombs. I wonder if there's some concern on the part of the countries involved that maybe this defence system is really more or can evolve into more than just a defence system, that it will ultimately become an offensive system.

Dr. John Steinbruner: I think the valid part of that concern is not so much that the system itself will evolve into an offensive system but that it is being deployed in the context of extremely robust U.S. offensive capabilities. It is not as if we're talking about deploying this system in substitution for our offence. We're not talking about that. We're talking about deploying it in addition to an offensive capability that is already all but overwhelming against both Russia and China.

Quite frankly, if the United States decided to conduct a first strike on any given day, it could do a very good job against both those countries. This system is the final element to clean up the mess, the small residual that they might have left over.

It is one thing to say, well, the United States is not going to do this, and it's quite another to see the United States adding the final missing element to the capability to do that. That is, I think, inherently very frightening to both Russia and China and very predictably will force a reaction, because of the context in which it occurs—not just the system itself, but the overall context.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Earle.

Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): I had an opportunity to be in St. Petersburg, Russia, at the OSCE meetings. There were 54 countries represented. This was brought up on the floor, and there was a vote on nuclear disarmament. Six countries voted against that.

I have major concerns because I think we have to make sure, somehow, that when it comes to missile defence we are in a position to protect our countries here as well as Russia. Where are the guarantees here that other countries, like North Korea, China, or Russia, are not continuing to develop, if you like, missiles that can come over here, right to Canada and to the United States?

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If we're saying, well, we have no defence at all, we're not even looking at this, and we don't think we should be part of it, how are we going to protect our people and our country? How can we and how can you guarantee that none of those other countries are continuing to advance in this field, looking down the road, just like back in the 1940s when they came over and bombed us in the United States and started the Second World War? Where are the guarantees that this isn't going to happen again?

Dr. John Steinbruner: That's a very comprehensive question, obviously. Let me begin with the very practical point. You cannot protect the United States and Canada responsibly by imagining that you're going to hit a ballistic missile out of the air after it has been fired. Responsible defence of both countries requires policies upstream to be sure it never is fired. That's the only way of doing it.

It is, quite frankly, technically and strategically irresponsible to say to our countries that we can protect them by waiting until the missile is fired and then hitting it before it lands. You can't do that. It's not a reasonable prospect. Anybody basing national defence on this basis should be indicted for malfeasance.

What you do have to do is impose rules and restrictions of the sort you're talking about: we want to scale back on deployment; we want to make it less active; we don't want to have additional missiles deployed by anyone; and we will bear down hard on that. There is very good prospect of succeeding, actually, if we attempt to do that.

Ironically, if we attempt to deploy a missile defence, we're going to prejudice that much more important prospect. We're going to be hurting our defence, not helping it. That's the perversity of this issue. Talking as if we could literally do this and protect the country is not technically feasible, and it hurts the things that would protect us.

So get the story straight, do the things that will really help, and do not engage in fantasies about things that won't.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: You're saying that there is no technology whatsoever that could be put in place to intercept a missile, whether it comes from Russia or North Korea or wherever, before it hits us or the United States.

Dr. John Steinbruner: What I am saying is that there is no meaningful prospect for deploying such a technology without restraining the offence.

Yes, we can arrange to be able to hit a dumb missile coming at us in a predictable way. We can do that on a test range. That doesn't, however, give us any reasonable prospect for expecting that we can do this against an offence that is unrestrained.

The key to this is restraining the offence in the first place. If you don't do that, you lose the ball game. It's that simple, okay? The image that we're going to come up with some technology that's going to avoid that mess and just allow us to pick things out of the air after they're fired is irresponsible. It is not realistic. In the end, people trying to base national security on that basis are going to be disciplined by voters who understand that it's a scam and that it has perverse effects.

I cannot tell you why people persist, despite the technical details, in telling you that they can do this. That's why I call it a theological subject. The technology says that we cannot defend in this manner against an unrestrained offence any time soon—I'm talking decades. Therefore, we have to defend ourselves in a different way: by restraint on the offence.

The Chair: Thank you.

Now for our second round. It's five minutes, so shorter questions and shorter answers might work.

Mr. Goldring.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to ask a question leading with this last topic. That's to do with whether it is feasible, whether it is possible. Also, is this missile system not a natural progression, a natural extension, of the defence systems we have? It would certainly appear to me and to others that with, for example, the U-2 incident and the Bomarcs of the fifties and sixties, an awful lot of attention was put into anti-missile missiles and missiles that would bring down aircraft and had the potential—or we thought had the potential—to bring down missiles too. It certainly occurs to us that an awful lot of effort was put into this in the past, with the belief that it was possible.

• 1005

With the proliferation of independent commercial missiles throughout the world, is it not possible that rogue nations, rogue governments, or anybody might be able to utilize one of these commercial missiles? You can have all the agreements you want between two major nations, but what about all the other nations of the world?

What about the potential and possibility of one redirected commercial missile with a warhead on it being sent? Isn't that the purpose of this American defence system? The threat is no longer Moscow; the threat really is the rest of the world. The threat today is not mass missile input, but small numbers of potentially directed missiles. This system could be effective.

Dr. John Steinbruner: Again, this system has no chance against that kind of threat. Any small country or rogue organization wanting to deliver a damaging warhead of any sort against the United States or Canada would not choose to do it with a ballistic missile that can be intercepted. They would probably choose to do it with a cruise missile or a truck. If they did choose to do it with a ballistic missile...if you can make a ballistic missile, you can also make it penetrate this system.

The premise of your question is that the system will work as advertised. The technical fact is that the system has no serious hope of working as advertised.

Mr. Peter Goldring: But did we not have a system with the Bomarcs, and did we not have the Patriot anti-missile missiles of the Gulf War? Were they not somewhat effective, and is not this extension of that a little more sophisticated?

Dr. John Steinbruner: Patriot did not achieve a single interceptor in the Gulf War. You can argue about one case—but not a single one. The impression on television was that they were going up and blowing up things, but they were not blowing up the incoming warheads. They were not intercepting the incoming warheads.

Patriot operates within the atmosphere. There is a somewhat greater technical prospect, I will concede, for intercepting ballistic missile trajectories within the atmosphere. It's still a very complicated question and hasn't been totally solved.

But again my point is—and this will be true for the rest of your life and probably your children's lives—we do not have the technical capability to intercept an unrestrained offence, just as you can say we do not have the technical capability to mount an antibiotic that will defeat all evolutionary strains. If you use antibiotics in an unrestrained fashion, you guarantee drug-resistant strains. It's the same thing here.

Outside the context of offensive restraint, the attempt to deploy these systems guarantees penetrating offence. The premise of your question is that we can do something unilaterally that, regardless of what the rest of the world does, will protect us. That is not true.

Mr. Peter Goldring: So your contention really is that even in the fifties, although it may be questionable, the Bomarc was a wasted effort that killed the Avro Arrow, and even with today's sophistication and advances it is equally ineffective.

Dr. John Steinbruner: I'm not saying there is no meaningful air defence or even any meaningful ballistic missile defence that can be done absolutely; I'm saying it depends upon prior restraint on the offence. Therefore it is inherently limited in what it can accomplish, and it depends upon international restraint. Outside of international restraint it has no chance, and that was true of those systems, as well.

Mr. Peter Goldring: If there are a lot of fingers close to buttons on the other side and around the world, is it not an alternative?

Dr. John Steinbruner: No. It offers no protection. That's the point.

The Chair: Time is up. If someone wants an extremely brief comment, okay, but I have other members waiting.

Mr. Bill Robinson: On the foreign missile developments and the ballistic missile threats to the United States through 2015, which is the U.S. national intelligence assessment estimate, there's an unclassified version on the CIA website you can download. It's worth a very careful read.

• 1010

One of the things it says is that if you can develop an ICBM, you can develop countermeasures to a missile defence system by the time you flight-test your missile. It says it right in there.

It also says there are alternative means. If you feel you're not confident of getting through that, you use alternative delivery means. It lists a whole series of them, and it lists six advantages to using those systems over ballistic missiles. The fact is, the offence will penetrate.

The Chair: Thank you.

Colleagues, it's five minutes for questions and answers. I don't like to cut off the witnesses, but if you have very long questions, it doesn't leave them time.

Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd also like to thank our witnesses for being here today.

I think this national missile defence issue goes right to the heart of a lot of issues that affect nations, their territory, and their populations. It strikes me that some of the comments you've made here today seem to be infused with some of the logic of the Cold War, and that we're not looking at the situation as a changed international environment after 1989-90.

Obviously the situation between the United States and the former Soviet Union has changed dramatically over the last number of years. A number of international agreements have been signed, and there is much more interaction between the two countries. The same could be said of China as well, although I think there's a lot of concern in terms of what China has been doing most recently with Taiwan and the threats that have come from the Chinese mainland that way.

But going to the heart of the matter, perhaps you could answer for me the question, does a country like the United States have the right—to use the American phrase, “the unalienable right”—to protect itself from a real or perceived threat?

The other question I have relates to the practicalities of the NORAD arrangement we have with the United States. It seems to me that if Canada were to make a decision on NMD that placed it outside of supporting the United States in this endeavour, for all intents and purposes the NORAD arrangement would be scrapped; effectively there would be nothing left of it. How do you think the Canadian public would react to that after 40 years of participation in NORAD, which, I think most of us would agree, has been a very successful defence arrangement?

Dr. John Steinbruner: These are profound questions, and it's not easy to give brief answers. Let me just say, yes, a country does have a right and obligation to defend itself, but to do so in a responsible manner. “Responsible” means that it provides real defence, and not the opposite, and does not do it at the price of other countries, and that's what the issue is here.

Let me note also that although the Cold War is over in many ways, and certainly the confrontation of conventional forces in central Europe is entirely gone, with regard to nuclear deterrent operations, the Cold War is still with us; there is no essential change.

As we speak today, the United States and Russia are operating thousands of nuclear weapons on rapid reaction alert, prepared to respond with mass retaliation. That is essentially no different from what was going on in the Cold War. In this respect, we have not transcended the Cold War, and that's why we're talking about it.

As a matter of fact, that is the single greatest physical danger to Canada and the United States, and there is nothing in current policy that is going to remove that danger. This feature of current policy promises to seriously exacerbate it.

Let me leave you with this thought: do you think the Russian government, with the tremendous burdens it is carrying, is capable of operating its deterrent force safely indefinitely?

My own view is, no, it is not, and a lot rides on mutually backing out of this Cold War arrangement whereby we are massively threatening each other on a daily basis, and putting these weapons much more in the background. National missile defence is completely incompatible with that program. So my objection to it is that it is preventing us from doing what we most need to do.

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As a final point, the NORAD arrangements are exceedingly important to the United States as well as to Canada, and although people who are advocates of this program might suggest to Canada that they must participate or they will be somehow banished from that, that is not going to be the judgment of the majority of the United States. We need Canada's participation just as much as you need us, actually, and most people in the United States do not want to see a crisis in U.S.-Canadian relations over this. You're not about to be kicked out of NORAD if you have qualms about national missile defence. Don't think you are.

The Chair: Mr. Regehr.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I'm going to add briefly on the Canadian response on the issue of NORAD, while they've agreed that it has been a long-term basis of a stable security relationship with the United States, if Canadians understand that introducing into that context a ballistic missile defence system that is seriously destabilizing internationally, as our witnesses have said, then the enthusiasm for NORAD would wane quite quickly.

If NORAD is perceived to be a way of enhancing stability, it's going to get Canadian support. If it becomes an instrument for destabilizing the international order and accelerating the development of offensive capability in other countries, then I think they'll have pause.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Pratt.

I think maybe the concern of some of us is that we wouldn't be kicked out of NORAD but would we become marginalized and irrelevant? General Macdonald will be here this afternoon, so we could....

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, five minutes, please.

Mr. René Laurin: I would like to go back to the suggestion I made earlier. Mr. Regehr said that Canada could promote this initiative to strike an international monitoring panel to assess to what extent the threat is real. In your opinion, do you think that Canada would have any credibility if it were to play this role given that it is a partner of the United States in this project to set up an antimissile base? Do you think that Canada could work both sides of the fence in a credible fashion?

We know that it would be difficult for Canada to tell the United States that, after working together for 40 years, it was now going to withdraw and no longer participate in the development of the NMD, while at the same time trying to establish some international credibility by saying that the real solution lay first of all in establishing whether or not the threat was real? Can Canada, in your opinion, credibly play both sides of the fence? In my opinion, we would be playing both ends against the middle or trying to do two things at once. I'd like to hear what you have to say on the matter.

[English]

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I will give a brief response, and then others can respond.

What we need to understand here is that Canada is not facing a decision of whether or not to withdraw from ballistic missile defence. Canada is not part of the ballistic missile defence system and has not been asked by the United States to be part of it. We're sitting beside the United States, and it has grave implications for us. We understand the security implications for Canada to be not just a bilateral issue but an international one, the kind of arms control and disarmament environment that obtains internationally.

So I think in the present climate, before we're asked to make any decision and before we're part of anything, we need to meet our responsibility to address the international arms control and disarmament and the security implications of the system. There are multiple forums in which that can be done, the CD being only one of them, but also the NATO alliance and other forums are available for Canada to raise these issues.

Dr. John Steinbruner: Let me respond briefly now, again attempting to be practical.

You will hear from advocates of the national missile defence system impassioned arguments about how important and how inevitable it is, trying to convince you that you'd better get on board because this is going to go. We don't really know what's going to happen, but those arguments are pretty much contained among the advocates at the moment. At high levels of the American government, there's a lot of ambivalence because there is a beginning recognition of some of the broader implications. Note what I said: this decision was made in the context of a very narrow domestic political consideration and it had very little to do with its strategic implications.

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As the President of the United States—the current one and the prospective one—begins to feel international reaction, zealotry on this subject is going to get complicated. I think it's fair to say the commitment to it is much less entrenched at high levels of the American government than it is down among the program officers, if you will.

As the international reaction begins to occur, and it will occur, there will be differing judgments in the United States about this. At the moment there is a solid majority that would like to have ballistic missile defence if it doesn't cost very much and if it doesn't have any implications. Nobody is willing to pay a large price, in economic terms, for a system that actually doesn't work and triggers the kind of international reactions we're talking about. When those reactions become apparent, the United States itself is going to have different views about this matter.

So don't listen just to what the advocates are telling you. Look down the line and see how this is going to evolve. I think, quite frankly, it would be quite unwise to get too entrenched with the advocates right now, because they're not going to make it. Eventually, there's going to have to be a corrective reaction.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Do you believe that Canada's allies in NATO, of which the United States is a member, could put sufficient pressure on the United States to convince them to drop this project? We clearly have the impression that the United States is going to go ahead with this project with or without the approval of their allies.

[English]

The Chair: Basically, yes or no, please.

Dr. John Steinbruner: Yes.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Laurin.

Mr. René Laurin: Is the answer yes?

A voice: It's yes.

[English]

M. René Laurin: Very short answer.

The Chair: George.

Mr. George Proud: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, we have much information to dissect, absorb, and try to comprehend as we go through this exercise, and we'll be hearing from all sides.

I just want to quote from General Ronald R. Fogleman, one-time chief of the air staff. He said “The United States must field a defensive system capable of protecting America against such a threat”—the threat being North Korea, Iraq, or any of these rogue states—“when it arises”. He suggests that the Minuteman NMD can provide that capability. Now, if it can't provide that capability, as you say it can't, why would a man in his position say that it could?

Dr. John Steinbruner: General Fogleman will have to speak for himself. I'm not asking you to take this statement upon my authority; I have no personal authority whatsoever. Let me just assure you that if you do your homework on this question and you look at the technical considerations involved with that system, this is not a close call. This is not a difficult judgment. It is bloody obvious that the system as currently designed will not work. Anybody who looks fairly at the technology of it.... You ask why it's happening. I'm saying there's a deeper game going on.

If you're talking about the limited system to operate as advertised, it won't, and there's not much question about that. If you don't believe me, there are many people who can talk about it.

Mr. George Proud: If that were the case, what type of system would work? If in fact this happens—and the likelihood of it happening is out there, I suppose—what do the countries do for defence? If there is an attack by one of these countries, as they say, from China, North Korea, Iraq, or any of these places, what do they do?

Dr. John Steinbruner: At the moment North Korea does not have a system capable of reaching the United States.

Mr. George Proud: China?

Dr. John Steinbruner: China does and has for many years, and so does Russia. We cannot prevent China from reaching the United States with a missile by shooting it out of the sky after it has been fired. That's the fact. Okay? We have to prevent that from happening by other methods. This has been true for 50 years.

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Mr. George Proud: Again, I have a problem with Russia being so against this when they have their own missile defence system.

Dr. Pavel Podvig: If you look at the history of the missile defence development and Soviet missile defence, this system is just left over from the time before the ABM Treaty. It's there because of the institutional inertia.

The United States was much more prudent in shooting down the safeguard system, saying this system was not worth the money they were paying for it. The same is true for the current Russian system.

The point here is that when the United States and the Soviet Union signed the ABM Treaty in 1972, they agreed, they understood, that you cannot have a missile defence against a determined adversary. There is just no way you can do that. This is what Dr. Steinbruner said, that you can not have missile defence without any limits on offence. The only way to go is to make your adversary less determined to attack you.

Just talk to North Korea, China, or Russia. It's not that Russia has any interest in attacking the United States or Canada, and there is nothing that would force North Korea to attack the United States. It's not something that has to happen, so there are ways to deal with this threat other than missile defence. In fact missile defence is not the way to deal with that threat at all.

Dr. John Steinbruner: Let me comment just briefly.

There is reasonable prospect of eliminating ballistic missiles from active deployment. That is a demanding exercise, but it is not unfeasible. That's what we ought to be trying to do.

The Chair: You have a last quick question, Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud: I have one quick question on the bill that's still in Congress, Bill H.R. 4. Have you people studied that bill? It's not a large bill, I believe. Do you know anything about it?

Dr. John Steinbruner: I'm not aware of it by its number. Is this the bill—

Mr. George Proud: It sets up this missile defence system.

Dr. John Steinbruner: Well, there was a bill that was passed in July.

Mr. George Proud: Yes.

Dr. John Steinbruner: Yes, I've read that. I'm aware of it.

Mr. George Proud: Does it commit the United States to this?

Dr. John Steinbruner: It says that it is the policy of the United States to do it as soon as it is technically feasible. It does not provide authorization for deployment, nor does it provide appropriations, and it admits that the judgment will have to be made upon the threat, the cost assessment, the strategic implications.... There are four criteria, none of which can currently be met. So all it is is a declaration of “wish”, if you will. It does not settle the issue.

The Chair: Just to clarify it for my colleagues, was it signed by President Clinton?

Dr. John Steinbruner: It was signed by President Clinton.

The Chair: I don't have a question right now, but I may later on that.

Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

It was mentioned earlier during the discussion that defence must be done in a responsible manner and that this system is not in a responsible manner. I would tend to agree with that.

I think one of the most responsible ways of defending countries is through working for peace. I really think if we have a number of countries that are of like mind in that regard, then you have a much greater defence against the rogue nation, because we see how people's like minds will come together to support each other when a real crisis develops. If we have a lot of large countries vying with each other for superiority, whether it's through a defence system of this type or not, then they're less likely to be protecting themselves against a rogue nation.

When we talk about a deeper game in mind, I think we have to be realistic there too. I think there is a deeper game. We know the defence industry is big business and that there are a lot of economics in developing missile systems, defence systems, and so forth, and I would tend to think that probably those who are advocating it are quite often geared by that economic factor.

Would it not be more advisable for us to be putting our money and our collective efforts, as various nations, into diplomatic efforts and working toward disarmament and peaceful means? Would that not create a better climate than putting money into this national missile defence system?

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Dr. John Steinbruner: Absolutely. If you're talking about where the marginal dollar or marginal bit of effort should go for defence of the United States and Canada together, just in hard practical terms it should definitely go on the diplomatic side, and, in the first instance, to North Korea.

Let me tell you, if you've been doing your homework on what the North Koreans are saying, they're saying they're willing to bring their whole missile program—everything—on the table, and let's talk about terms. They've suggested the price tag is on the order of a billion dollars, which is, to put it mildly, cheap. Well, they may be sincere, or they may not be. The way to test that is to give them an offer that they would have to accept if they are sincere, and we have not yet done that. That's clearly the first thing to do, and if they reject it then we can consider what else to do. But we have not yet done the most obvious thing. Why? Well, we prefer to demonize them, actually.

Similarly, we need to make a serious effort to talk to the Russians about what it takes to back them off of the very strenuous, difficult active deployment that they're currently engaged in. The answer is that we have to back off too.

If you project a world in which there are no ballistic missiles on active alert, all of them are internationally monitored, and none of them could be brought to active alert without alerting the rest of the world that it was happening, that's a much safer world. Let me say it's fairly urgent that we get there. If we don't, we're running an unacceptable risk of accident over the next couple of decades. That's the main agenda. Keep your eye on the ball. That's the main ball, and it's a big one. That's where the effort ought to go.

The Chair: Mr. Earle, is that it?

Mr. Gordon Earle: That's it.

The Chair: Okay, thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Bertrand, please.

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Mr. Steinbruner, you said that the current president, Mr. Clinton, should be deciding whether or not to go ahead with this project between now and the month of July. Should the president decide to axe the project in July, do you think that that would put an end to the research with respect to the system?

[English]

Dr. John Steinbruner: No, I don't think there's any prospect whatsoever that the President will decide in July never to deploy. He might postpone the decision on the grounds that the system is not ready for deployment because its technical test phase has not been completed, but he's certainly not going to decide against deployment.

There will be continued research and development efforts, and I would not object to them. I don't think anybody would object to them. Clearly one attempts to work on the problem and figure out what the technical difficulty is. The issue does not have to do with technical development efforts so much as with commitment to deployment, and under what terms.

If at any point we want to deploy a system responsibly, there are many conditions that come with that. It has to be agreed by the Russians, by the Chinese, and probably by the rest of the world as well, that the terms are reasonable and equitable from everybody's point of view. This is something that has to be done by mutual agreement or not at all. That means the terms of deployment have to be subjected to international agreement.

I personally have no problem whatsoever with pursuing the program under those terms, but those are not the terms that are currently being offered. The issue now is whether or not we will do it on a unilateral basis. Of course, the advocates want it on a unilateral basis.

In July, the President will make one of two decisions. He will either actually commit to a limited deployment, even provisionally setting up a violation of the treaty in the spring of 2001, or he will delay the decision. Most people in Washington think he will commit to deployment in order to cover himself politically. I would not bet large sums on that, because none of the four criteria actually can be met: the threat actually is not there; the system performance is highly questionable; the relative cost of cost-benefit calculation, if done in a fair-minded way, would be negative; and the diplomatic constraints having to do with Russian and Chinese agreement will not be in place by July for sure.

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So if he says he will decide based upon these four criteria, he will have to delay, because he's not going to be able to make a decision otherwise. However, the betting is that since this is really political and not substantive, he will figure out a way to suggest that he is deploying, and that's where the trouble comes.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Don't you think that it would better to keep the process open? I agree with what you said, namely, that the president should say that he will proceed, because if he said that he had decided to axe it... We all know how this study is going to unfold at any rate. If everything is concealed, that really will not promote the cause of peace. If we manage to keep everything open, not only the Americans but also people from every other country, including Canada and Russia, could keep an eye on things. Do you not think that it would be better to keep the process open rather than saying no, given that we all know that it's going to go ahead regardless?

[English]

Dr. John Steinbruner: Yes, I agree that it's very important to keep it open, transparent, and subject to international scrutiny and influence. I've never advocated killing it. It's not realistic to actually terminate the program. But the issue is not research and development, the issue is deployment under what conditions.

I know everybody's telling you it's going to happen anyway, it's inevitable, but those are the advocates telling you that. You haven't heard from the American system as a whole on this as yet, or from the alliance as a whole.

Let's suppose they're correct and there will be a deployment decision made. I guarantee you it will not be completed. This system as currently designed has no chance of completing it. It will take ten years to complete it, and the reaction will overwhelm it before it gets anywhere near completion. That's why people are looking at this situation and saying that to say we are committed, that deployment is going to happen, is to say we're committed to a train wreck.

There is no serious chance that a deployment decision will be executed and completed without triggering countervailing reactions that will overwhelm the program. The question is whether we're going to see this in advance and get more sensible, or whether we're going to see it after there's bent metal and a big mess and we have to clean up the mess. That's the issue. I assure you of that.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: You also mentioned that there are thousands and thousands of missiles out there in America and Russia. The information we have for phase one of the missile defence system is that roughly twenty of them would be deployed. Just coming back to what you were saying, that being that they could be used as an offensive weapon—somebody mentioned that this morning—I find that a little hard to believe, given that there are so many other kinds of missiles deployed out there.

Dr. Pavel Podvig: The possibility of using those interceptors as passive weapons is not really a serious possibility, although I think maybe your question is that the actual.... Actually, the current plan is to have this limited system, with twenty...well, now it's a hundred interceptors, as compared to hundreds and thousands of ballistic missiles that are deployed. That's really a small capability.

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So why should we care about that? Why should we be concerned? The answer is that in fact it's really a system that is scaleable. More than that, it is supposed to be scaleable upwards. So if there are 100 or 120 interceptors deployed, that means you have to build the whole infrastructure for this system, including sensors, radars, and software, and you have to test it and everything. When you've done that, it's not really difficult to build another 1,000 interceptors, for example, making this system more robust and more capable, which would be comparable with the number of offensive missiles Russia, for example, would have, and Russia would be rightly, I would say, concerned about this capability.

Dr. John Steinbruner: Let me just add to that. Even at 100 interceptors, four on one, they're basically talking about the ability to intercept 25 incoming missiles. If the Russian general staff asks itself how many operating systems they could count on having available if the Americans were to execute a carefully planned first strike from normal day-to-day circumstances, if they do a bad case assessment, they couldn't be confident of having more than a few tens of weapons in the wake of a United States first strike. That means that even though it's of very limited character, this system already has meaningful capability, because it could potentially clean up their residual. So they're immediately worried.

I think Pavel is right, though, that they're more seriously worried because of the projected evolution of the system. They have a right to be worried, because the system certainly would evolve beyond the limited notion being presented here.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bertrand.

We'll turn next to Mrs. Wayne, and then the chairman gets a turn.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: My colleague said that perhaps it's better to have dialogue between Russia and the United States than to proceed in the manner the U.S. is looking at at the present time. If Russia and the United States were to engage in a dialogue, what likelihood do you see of their coming to some form of agreement? Can you see that being worked out?

Dr. Pavel Podvig: Do you mean on missile defence?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes.

Dr. Pavel Podvig: As I said, there is a possibility. However, whether or not it's a good thing depends very much on exactly what this agreement would be and what that would mean for a broader nuclear disarmament process. As the situation is now, there is the danger of the United States actually pushing Russia into accepting some ABM Treaty modifications, and that would be a very unfortunate development, I would say. However, with regard to whether Russia could agree on some treaty modifications, the answer is probably yes.

At the same time, we should understand very clearly that when we talk about modifying the ABM Treaty to allow this limited defence, that means that once we modify the treaty, there will be no ABM Treaty as we knew it because it's really fundamental change. So basically it's not a question of modifying the treaty. It's more like an agreement between Russia and the United States that the United States will be free to deploy its missile defence. What Russia could get is another issue.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I think the dialogue and diplomacy that was being advocated was that the diplomatic energy ought now not to be going into modifications to the ABM Treaty but into agreements to constrain offensive capabilities in Russia and, in particular, places like North Korea. That's where the prospects for dialogue are great, and where there hasn't been sufficient attention paid.

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The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

Gentlemen, the chairman is allowed some questions after two full rounds, so I have three or four things I'd like pursue with you briefly.

A good number of the members of this committee have recently been to Colorado Springs and Cheyenne Mountain. Speaking for myself, my perception of the Canadian military concern there is that the Canadians are being marginalized as we speak. They are being left out of briefings.

There's an assumption that this will go ahead in the American military. At Cheyenne Mountain, I perceived an assumption that the Americans will go forward with this system in the near future, depending on whether the April test is successful. If it's successful, probably Clinton will go ahead. If not, he'll probably kick it past the next election, in which case the new president will probably go ahead with it. That's the perception I had.

The concern I heard from the Canadian military is that they are already being significantly marginalized, left out of work that they are normally involved in. That concerns me as a Canadian who thinks the NORAD relationship is valuable, and it leads me to my questions.

Do you think Canada does risk being marginalized or made irrelevant in NORAD if the U.S. is to go ahead and we don't say yes? Do you think that could have a deleterious effect on our bilateral relations with the United States in the totality of those relations? There's a very real concern among Canadians that those are possibilities.

I would be interested in the reaction of whoever would like to share it.

Dr. John Steinbruner: I can appreciate the concern, and I will just accept that what you say is true about a sense of being marginalized.

I would say that if this is true, it's reprehensible behaviour on our part. Let me say that the behaviour would not come from the top of the system or from the American political system as a whole. This would be inside baseball on the part of zealous advocates who I think are concentrated in—

The Chair: But the larger question though, Dr. Steinbruner, is the “if”. On the assumption that the U.S. goes ahead, hypothetically, and we say no, would there be any point in our staying in NORAD?

Dr. John Steinbruner: Let me just say that this is not going to be the end of the matter or the limitation of the matter. The issue for Canada is going to be much broader than the technical details of participation in NORAD. It's inevitably going to be much broader. U.S.-Canadian relations will be deeply affected by this, but because of the broad context we're talking about.

This is an issue headed for collision, and headed for the tops of governments because of the collision. When that happens, it's going to have a different context that will overwhelm the details of immediate conditions at NORAD. It is overwhelmingly in the interests of the United States to have Canada integrated into NORAD. If the American political system begins to understand that there is a problem in this regard because of the advocates of this system discriminating, they aren't going to like it, to put it mildly.

The Chair: I understand that they want us in. I agree with you there. My primary interest is Canada's interest as a nation, and that was the reason for those questions.

Mr. Robinson, you wanted to comment.

Mr. Bill Robinson: I would like to add a bit to that.

I was down in Colorado Springs last week myself, and I heard the same concerns expressed by Canadian Forces down there. I'm surprised they're somewhat ignorant of the history in this respect. In fact the United States had deployed a system. They made the Sentinel deployment decision in 1967, and it became Safeguard. It was actually operational in 1975 and Canada was not involved. We continue to be part of NORAD. There was a separate U.S. role vis-à-vis the Safeguard ABM system, and then there was Canada, and NORAD continued. This kind of thing would continue in the present, frankly.

The fundamental relationship of cooperative monitoring and control of airspace will survive as long as both countries conclude that it is in their interests to continue that relationship. There's no reason to believe it would not continue. In fact missile defence would actually increase the U.S. interests in air defence and other aspects of homeland defence, because it's instantly going to make people start thinking about other ways to penetrate defences.

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The Chair: So you think in practical terms we could say to the U.S., “No, we won't go into this system”, and maintain a full and active role in and have a meaningful relationship with NORAD?

Mr. Bill Robinson: Certainly. We'd have a meaningful relationship in NORAD on air defence. We wouldn't be part of missile defence.

The Chair: No, I understand. Thank you very much.

Mr. Bill Robinson: Please, just one—

The Chair: We have people waiting, and I have other questions.

The other question I want to make sure I get a chance to ask is about the control for such a system. Of the two choices—having the U.S. unilaterally embark on this system or having this system under NORAD control—of those two choices, would anyone like to comment on which would be preferable?

Dr. John Steinbruner: Other things being equal, it would be preferable to have it under joint control, but other things aren't equal here.

Let me just say I appreciate the dilemma you have, as you describe. It well may be that in the play-out of this issue, you will experience some turbulence, let us call it, in your relationship with NORAD. Look down the line and look at a stable outcome. It is overwhelmingly not in the interests of the United States to disrupt this relationship, particularly with regard to air defence, and in the end we will not do it. That doesn't preclude the possibility that there will be some difficult moments. Look beyond them.

The Chair: Thank you very much. I appreciate that.

I want to get in one more question; we have another group waiting.

It has been argued to me and others on this committee that the deployment of this system does not increase the risk of war, if you will, or nuclear exchange; it decreases it. I don't say I subscribe or don't subscribe to it, but it has been argued to me by people who are, in my opinion, of high calibre that this would actually decrease the risk of a nuclear war; it would give the United States another option short of a more major retaliatory response. Do you agree with that or disagree?

Dr. Pavel Podvig: I would disagree rather strongly. For example, if you look at the Russian forces, which are deteriorating in a way, the Russian general staff will be met with this choice of riding out an attack. For example, if there is a serious crisis, the Russian general staff would be left with this choice of absorbing a U.S. first strike and then trying to strike.

The Chair: I'm sorry, I didn't explain myself. I'm sorry to interject. As soon as you were on that track, I realized I didn't go a good job of asking my question.

This is a defensive missile system, and somewhat limited, as has been described to us. We're not talking about a U.S. first strike. We're talking about a situation where the United States is attacked, and now, if it has this system, whatever its limitations technologically, it has another option short of a major retaliatory response.

Dr. Pavel Podvig: I understood you.

The Chair: Oh, sorry.

Dr. Pavel Podvig: What I'm saying is if the United States deployed this system, it would increase the probability of the United States being attacked.

The Chair: It would increase?

Dr. Pavel Podvig: It would increase rather strongly.

The Chair: Can you explain why?

Dr. Pavel Podvig: For example, Russia would be forced to keep its forces on high alert because of this particular—

The Chair: Because of a defensive system?

Dr. Pavel Podvig: Yes, exactly. That's the logic of these things. Unfortunately that's the way it is, because if it doesn't keep its forces on high alert, then it will have to rely on what we call second strike, and that would be weak enough for a U.S. system to absorb, to counter it.

The Chair: I understand. I appreciate your answer. I'm sorry to have jumped in. I just wanted to make sure I was explaining myself correctly.

We'll have a last quick question from Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud: A theory of some of the proponents of NMD is that the ABM Treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and the United States, and therefore, since the Soviet Union no longer exists, the ABM Treaty no longer exists. What kind of influence do these proponents have? How much influence do they have on the administration?

Dr. John Steinbruner: Nobody is going to accept that argument. It's argued, but that's nonsense. But the people who wish to abrogate the ABM Treaty have serious standing within the American political system, and they may succeed. They're a small minority, but they're an intense minority, and the majority is asleep on this question at the moment.

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That creates a situation in which we could potentially violate the treaty. I assure you if that happens, there is going to be a reaction, internationally and within the United States. That will not be the end of the matter. “If it were done when 'tis done,” said Lady Macbeth, “then 'twere well it were done quickly.” But it's not done when it's done. This is going to trigger massive reactions if we do this. That's the point.

Mr. George Proud: From Russia and from others.

Dr. John Steinbruner: From Russia, from China, from the United States, from allies, from everyone.

Dr. Pavel Podvig: I'd like to respond on this issue of the reaction.

In response to the U.S. pulling out of the ABM Treaty, Russia could possibly invoke its right to pull out of START I. The argument people are making is it won't change actually the real composition of the Russian forces, but on the other hand the United States and other countries will lose the ability to monitor and inspect the Russian forces and Russian nuclear facilities. That's a very strong argument for staying in the START I regime and staying within the ABM Treaty.

The Chair: Mr. Regehr.

Mr. Ernie Regehr: I just want to comment briefly on the response that a defensive system would make the Soviets more.... It's not the defensive system that increases incentive to attack; it's the offensive systems to which the defensive system is coupled.

The Chair: I understand the connection of those two.

I said the last question would be George's, but I'll give myself one. Does anybody have hard data on the public opinion in Canada about the potential of entering such a system with the United States? No? Okay. Thank you very much.

We appreciate all of you gentlemen for being here and sharing your expertise. You've given us a very important perspective to consider. I suspect we will hear some very different views from other witnesses, but we appreciate very much your attendance. We're now out of time. I want to thank you all very much.

I adjourn the committee.