NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Monday, May 8, 2000

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[English]

The Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I would like to call to order this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs and to welcome Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch, High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Welcome to you today, sir. I'm not sure if you're going to speak to us in English. We have translation available, of course.

We're very pleased to welcome you here today, and invite you to make some opening remarks, if you wish. Then we'd be happy to exchange information and see what questions we can discuss.

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch (High Representative, Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate very much the opportunity to be here with you today in order to give you an update on current events in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as our plans and ideas for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the future of peace implementation by the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

• 1525

It is now four and a half years after the Dayton Accord. We are moving now from the phase of reconstruction of the infrastructure into the plans of reforming the economy, of building the state institutions, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

When I arrived in Sarajevo this past August, I pretty soon became aware of the fact that the citizens of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina do not really identify with their state. The courts at the time—they've changed in the interim—were basically oriented toward Zagreb, and the Serbs basically toward Belgrade. The Bosniacs in many ways were over-identifying. They were actually seeing themselves as the actual group that is in charge of Bosnia.

At the time, then, I proposed the idea of what I called the “concept of ownership”, basically meaning that we need to get the citizens of this country to take on the problems and the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is at the core of every civil society, of course, and this is what in many ways we are trying to achieve there.

We need to move the people, the citizens of this country, to accept that they are first and foremost citizens of the state and of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then, at the same time, they can be good Bosniacs, good Croats, or good Serbs.

It was also necessary to point out that they are the ones who own the country. They are the ones who are in charge, or supposed to be in charge, of the country. The international community is there merely to help and assist them to come out of this very difficult situation that the war brought them into.

All in all, the progress in Bosnia-Herzegovina is very slow indeed, but there is progress. There is movement.

A clear indication of this is the fact that the local elections that took place on April 8 for the municipalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina were conducted, first of all, in a peaceful and orderly manner, and the landscape changed, by Bosnian standards, quite considerably. There is a definitive move away from the ethnic nationalist parties toward the more moderate parties.

This is particularly visible in the Bosniac-Croat Federation, where in the Bosniac community the shifts were most significant away from Izetbegovic as the “A” party towards the decisively non-nationalist, multi-ethnic party, the Social Democratic Party.

Now, in fact, in the municipalities of the federation, the SDP is the largest party. This is not mirrored to such a degree in the Croat municipality, but what is interesting in the Croat community is the fact that although the traditional HDZ Party won the most votes, the participation at these elections dropped, and the Croats went to the polls to a significantly far less degree than in the rest of the country. So the vote of participation in the Croat communities is down to 40% as compared with around 70% in the other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Well, this basically means that without an attractive political alternative, the Croats simply did not go to the polls. This is an indication that they are dissatisfied with the nationalist policies of the HDZ, and they're looking for alternatives. However, there are none around yet, or at least they're not attractive enough that they would vote for them.

• 1530

This is true in general, but there are even pockets, such as in central Bosnia or in the northeastern part, in the so-called Posavina, where the HDZ vote is even further down.

Now, when it comes to the Republika Srpska, there we need to keep in mind that the first two years of peace implementation were basically lost in the Republika Srpska due to the obstruction that went on when people like Momcilo Krajisnik were in power. He was recently, as you might know, arrested on suspicion of war crimes.

Due to this fact, the international community has basically lost the first two years. It's also a fact that in the first two years only 3% of international aid went into the Republika Srpska as opposed to 30% now. So there we're still lagging behind this welcome development, as I described.

But even in the Republika Srpska changes are visible. Since September of last year we have a new party in the Republika Srpska. It's actually the only party that does not have “Serb” in its party name. It's the Democratic Progress Party, led by an esteemed economist, a professor at the University of Banja Luka. Banja Luka is the capital of the Republika Srpska.

He got more than 10% of the votes, which is a very strong indication that the people, even in the Republika Srpska, are looking for alternatives to the traditional extremist, nationalist parties in the Republika Srpska. Even the SDS, the former party of Karadzic, which still is the strongest party in the country, sees its support dwindling. I'm pretty sure we'll see over the next two years or so even further inroads into the nationalist party in the Republika Srpska.

All in all, the trends point in the right direction, although progress is still far too slow. We need to accelerate whatever we can in order to get things moving in the direction I just described. It needs to be faster.

The international community is right now in the run-up to the annual Peace Implementation conference, the ministerial conference that will take place this time in Brussels on May 23 and 24, where we will assess progress in Bosnia-Herzegovina and peace implementation and where I will present my program for the next 18 months or so.

This is also the time horizon we should keep in mind. Within the next one and a half to two years, major changes could happen if we get things right and if the trends that I just described continue.

We will concentrate over the next 18 months in three priority areas. First and foremost is economic reform, which should be the engine of change for things in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We need to accelerate refugee return. This year and next year are, in my opinion, the last two years for mass return. Again, the figures are pointing in the right direction.

When we talk about refugee return or return in general, what we're basically talking about and counting—and this is the measure, actually, the yardstick that is so important—is the return of refugees into areas where they constitute a minority. In short, we are speaking of the so-called minority return.

Two years ago minority return was at the level of about 40,000. We were able to accelerate it to 80,000 last year, in spite of the Kosovo intervention, in spite of many issues that actually blocked return for a time. This year I am counting on an even better result. Results of the first two months, in fact, point in this direction. I expect there to be a doubling of the minority return.

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Now, why is this happening? The acceleration of the return is due, to a large degree, to the fact that we have put into place legislation that facilitates the return, particularly when it comes to property repossession. We have organized the refugee and reconstruction task force in such a way that we have put about a quarter of our budget of the Office of the High Representative into the refugee return, because we are convinced that what we can achieve this year and next year will constitute the bulk of the return into minority areas.

After the year 2002 it will basically mark ten years since the first mass expulsions took place. After ten years, realistically speaking, we cannot count on a mass return any longer, but it is important to keep up the principle of the right to return and the right to his or her own property.

In terms of the strengthening of the institutions, this is one of the basic issues we need to address in a more forceful manner. This is to create the basics for a viable sovereign state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state that is self-sustainable in its political, judicial, and economic structures. Therefore, we are devoting a lot of time and effort toward creating the necessary elements for a viable state—an independent judiciary as well as state institutions—when it comes to issues like defence.

We're still confronted with the sorry fact that we have basically three armies in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We're trying to get at least the top ones, meaning the defence ministers and the chiefs of staff, to meet regularly under the auspices of the state presidency of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to harmonize the defence and the security needs. But overall, of course, security is being provided by the international forces. Now, after the latest drawdown from 30,000 to 20,000, SFOR is down from the 60,000 originally. So we are now at 20,000.

Just the other day I was reporting to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels about the state of affairs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I was pointing out how important is the maintenance of the security forces there.

You need to keep in mind that with regard to internal security, internal safety, we are still working on the reduction of the local police. Originally at 40,000, they need to be brought down to 20,000. They need to be professionalized. They need to be vetted. Every single policeman in the end will have been scrutinized by the international community experts in order to get in place a local police force that lives up to the standards of a modern state.

I had mentioned the arrest of Krajisnik. The so-called PIFWCs, accused war criminals, still pose a big problem in the country. However, over the past couple of months SFOR has done an excellent job of going after accused war criminals. The success is palpable and visible, so to speak.

• 1540

What is even more important is the fact that the local population accepts this as a necessity, as something that is necessary and something that needs to be done. So there again, the presence and active participation of SFOR plays a very important role.

SFOR's role, of course, is also important in all the other issues we are trying to tackle. Be it the establishment of a viable public broadcasting system or be it the establishment of a viable economy, we still are confronted by the sorry fact that many years after the collapse of the communist system in Bosnia-Herzegovina we still have the so-called payment bureaus from the communist times. We do not yet have a viable banking system in place.

This will happen in the course of this year, which will add to what needs to be done in order to create a conducive environment for investment, because both foreign and domestic investment will be—needs to be—the driving force behind economic reform.

There we are confronted with the vested interests of many of the nationalist politicians there. We are now in the process of dividing political influence and positions from business influences. We need to come up with a system that gets the cash cows for the nationalist political parties, which are some of the bigger companies there—for instance, telecommunication, or energy producers—away from the influence of the nationalistic parties.

I believe I have basically said what I wanted to say. I would be happy to now answer your questions.

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We'll just open it up. We have normal rules, and we might as well just follow those rules with our guest today.

We'll start with Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, sir, for your presentation.

It's actually been, I believe, three years since the defence committee I was serving on at that time attended Bosnia. We covered the area from Zagreb all the way over to Sarajevo.

I personally had an opportunity to talk with a number of people—for instance, the NATO forces operating amongst the people on a security basis. I managed to talk with some Canadian police officers who were designated to help instruct members of the various regions into another form of policing. There were interesting comments from both.

I understand, though, from your comments here, that elected politicians cannot travel freely throughout the country right now without fear of something happening to them. Is that correct?

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: No, actually not. It has improved greatly. The freedom of movement is basically there. There are a few pockets where a local politician from another ethnic community maybe would not want to go, but basically we were successful in restoring the freedom of movement through such measures as the introduction of neutral licence plates. That way, you cannot really see from which part of the country somebody is coming by car. That has enhanced the freedom of movement enormously.

All in all, I believe the fear has receded. The presence of SFOR also gives a certain guarantee that such things that used to happen in the first two years are actually not problems any longer.

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Mr. Art Hanger: But do the different factions or different forces, if you will, come into play with the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Do they recognize civil authority?

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: In general, yes, they do, but again, the monitoring of the international community, the presence of the international community, is important for this.

Mr. Art Hanger: That sort of fits, I guess, with the comments I heard in speaking to different members of police departments who went there, that policing, as we might understand it, to be effective requires the agreement, if you will, of the people in the country to obey the law. That agreement really isn't established in Bosnia-Herzegovina yet, I would assume, and the only reason there's a semblance of peace would be because of international forces.

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: Again, the trend is moving away from this. You're describing a status that prevailed until, let's say, one and a half or two years ago. It has changed over time, and I would say that right now there is tacit acceptance, so to speak, of the established institutions. However, it is very strongly influenced by the ethnic factor. So a policeman from the same ethnicity has a greater chance to get his job done than somebody from a different ethnicity.

Mr. Art Hanger: In Sarajevo in 1997, 2,000 Muslim women protested in front of Government House. The protest went on for several days, actually. They were concerned about why the government was not moving and the international community was not moving on investigations pertaining to the losses of their husbands and their sons—the male population, basically, in the region.

Yes, a number of designated gravesites were alleged to contain the bodies of possibly thousands of young men and others, but I don't know; to my way of thinking, if issues such as that are not resolved and some sort of justice rendered, whether it be by the international community or the government of the day, you're not going to have any semblance of order except by force or occupation by other forces outside the region.

Have they been resolved?

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: You're probably referring to the Women of Srebrenica and to the massacre that took place in mid-July of 1995 in Srebrenica, where more than 7,000 civilians were killed by Serb forces.

Mr. Art Hanger: That's right.

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: There is still the movement of the Women of Srebrenica and others from the area still going on, but the protest is now going on in a more regulated form. My office, I myself and my collaborators, are in regular contact with the leaders of the Women of Srebrenica. Just the other week I visited the morgue in Tuzla. We have put in a new building that is handling the forensic evidence of the ones who were killed at the time. We are now talking about the graveyards, the sites. We're talking about a memorial for this.

So this huge protest has actually subsided. The people from there, the widows and other relatives, have realized that the international community—more so than the local authorities, I must admit—is trying to do what needs to be done.

You might be aware of the UN report on the massacre of Srebrenica, which, in a very self-critical way, describes the role of the UNPROFOR at the time. This also helped a lot to help settle the situation there, but it is still a big problem because of the sheer size of the issue.

• 1550

We still have not identified all of the ones who were killed. Many of the issues are still outstanding. But the people, the relatives affected by this, realize that we are taking this seriously, and it is indeed a very serious matter that needs to be taken seriously.

I am quite confident that over time—and time, of course, is of relevance in this context—we will be able to achieve.... I mean, just in view of this tragedy you cannot say “positive results”, of course, but at least we will be able to accommodate the relatives and come up with a solution to this by identifying as many as possible and putting to rest this terrible tragedy for the people who were directly affected by it.

What is of great importance in this context, of course, is that the international community continues to go after the suspected war criminals. We know quite well who did it, who was in command. Right now there is a process under way in The Hague against one of the commanding officers of Srebrenica. This will give the first clear indication of how far the Serb side was involved in this respect.

The main culprits of this massacre are of course still at large. This is General Mladic, who is most likely somewhere in hiding in Serbia proper, and of course Mr. Karadzic.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hanger.

[Translation]

Madam Debien, you have seven minutes, please.

Ms. Maud Debien (Laval East, BQ): Good afternoon, Mr. Petritsch. In your presentation, you told us that you had gone from the phase of reconstruction of the infrastructure into the plans of reforming the economy and of building the state institutions.

You also told us that the process was moving much too slowly and then you indicated a certain number of problems relating to this reconstruction and the slow process. You mentioned a certain number of difficulties such as, ethnic issues, in other words the issue of citizens identifying with the state. You mentioned problems with the police and corruption. You didn't say the word corruption per say, but that is understood. You spoke of a certain number of obstacles. I'm perhaps less familiar with the issue than my colleagues of the National Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee, because I don't attend their meetings regularly.

Then, you also mentioned another aspect: the issue of refugees. It has been some time since I've looked at this issue, but I think there seem to be very many and very serious problems associated with the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I would like you to tell us, in decreasing order, which in your opinion are the main obstacles and which are those that you must focus on in order to have the process move forward a little more quickly. Does everything have to be done at the same time? That's perhaps what you'll be able to tell me.

[English]

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: Thank you, Madam. By mentioning corruption, which I did not do, I believe you have pointed at something that is a reality in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it is in practically all of the so-called transition countries in eastern and southeastern Europe.

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Corruption takes place in societies where the state is not very strong, where the state institutions are not being appreciated, where the centre, so to speak, is rather weak. This is of course the classic description of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to Dayton, two entities, the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska, yield the most power and influence. Therefore, the central institutions, the tri-presidency, the council of ministers, the state parliament, is rather weak. This favours corruption.

But the Office of the High Representative and the international community have been involved in anti-corruption activities for quite some time. In my office I have an anti-corruption force. Last year we put in force a comprehensive anti-corruption plan. We are basically concentrating on the support for the local enforcement agencies and the judiciary there to fight corruption. There, I must say, the local authorities in some of the areas are quite successful and have produced some quite positive results.

On the other hand, we're trying in a systemic way to support the necessary legislation that needs to be put in place. We need to keep in mind that this country of Bosnia-Herzegovina in many ways is still an old communist country. It has many features of the old communist system simply because of the fact that the war between 1992 and 1995 basically stopped all the reform and transition efforts that took place in other eastern European countries in the first half of the nineties. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, because of the war, it could not take place.

Immediately after the war, we were concerned with the mere survival of the population and, as I have pointed out, with the reconstruction of the infrastructure. We are only now moving into the more difficult parts and more complex issues of building a state and establishing state structures that indeed are modern and live up to the expectations of our time.

When it comes to refugees, the refugees are in many ways a problem, if I can put it that way, that affects the whole structure of our efforts there, because more than 800,000 people are still away from their homes. They are simply not capable of concentrating on the future, of rebuilding their lives, because they're still waiting to be able to come home.

Therefore, we need to accelerate the refugee return in order to provide for a population that is ready to tackle the issues that are more important than ethnic division. Of course, these are questions of economic issues—jobs, housing, a better education for the children, and so on.

When it comes to economic reform, over the past couple of months we have concentrated on coordinating the efforts of the international community, in particular of the international financial institutions that are active in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to get a privatization program under way in a way that would invite foreign investment into the country.

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I've already mentioned the banking system. I still need to mention the reform of the fiscal system. Taxation is far, far too high. It really prevents many potential investors from investing their money in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This is some of what I referred to previously as the communist features that are still in place and that need to be done away with. I believe we then will be successful in attracting foreign investment. It's the safety and security of the environment, a safe environment, that is important, not just for the people but also for potential investors.

It's also of course important to have an environment that is conducive in terms of the legal framework, which is important for privatization, and a banking system that will provide the necessary service for foreign companies.

The Chair: Merci, Madam Debien.

Now we come to Mr. Peric, please, for seven minutes.

Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.): Thank you.

Welcome, sir. Prior to your arrival in Sarajevo, I was honoured to spend one week with mostly Canadian police officers, but on different occasions I met with other police officers.

I believe there are 41 countries participating with the police force in Bosnia. Is that correct?

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: I would not be able to tell you the precise number, but I would guess it's even higher than 41, recruited by the UN.

Mr. Janko Peric: Okay. Publicly they wouldn't complain against the decisions that were coming from New York, but one on one they were admitting that only 15 countries sent over their highly trained police officers. According to them, they were spending a lot of time training international police officers in Bosnia.

For instance, some police officers from some countries came to Sarajevo when they couldn't even drive a car. We know that before Yugoslavia fell apart, Yugoslavia was called a police state, so-called, which you know very well; you're a next-door neighbour. They had a highly trained police force.

You mentioned that you're planning to reduce the police force from 40,000 to 20,000 in Bosnia. Is that as a result of the domestic police officers working together or is that the result of the training and supervision provided by international community?

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: It is the United Nations, the so-called IPTF, international police task force, which is doing the supervising and the training for the local police. The drawdown of originally 40,000 police to now about 20,000 is basically completed. What needs to be done now is that each and every one of the local policemen are being vetted. They have to undergo a certain procedure. The IPTF is of course also trying to improve the quality of the schooling and the training of the policemen.

Of the 20,000, about 8,000 have already been vetted and thus are qualified. We expect that to happen for the rest of the 12,000. This will happen over the next two years, approximately.

When it comes to the one-on-one encounters you had, as you referred to them, well, I guess one has to keep in mind that since the United Nations as the world organization is providing for these IPTF officers and they come from different countries from around the world, it's pretty safe to say that the quality is not the same everywhere. I mean, this is of course the problem that we are confronted with in any of these UN operations.

• 1605

When it comes to my office, I must tell you, we have collaborators from many nations, from many countries, but they are all part of the Peace Implementation Council. Close to 50 governments and international organizations are members of the Peace Implementation Council. There I'm looking as much as possible to get the best quality, but this, as in the case you just mentioned, is not always possible. We are aware of this fact, and we're trying to handle this as much as possible.

Mr. Janko Peric: Would you agree that in future, before the international community sends a police force anywhere else, they should go through specific training? We shouldn't be stuck on this political correctness; we should enforce the professionalism instead of what the United Nations is pushing now.

Because according to what I heard in Sarajevo a year ago, some countries had a lot of problems, and they were drawn back because of this unprofessionalism. I don't want to name the countries specifically—

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: I think one would have to think about it in the framework of the United Nations. One would have to think about a method of attacking this issue. But we also need to keep in mind that many of the first-world countries, if I can put it this way, are simply not able to provide enough qualified personnel, as well, so that is a question that has many aspects to it.

In the case of Canada, you have, as far as I know, 100 police now in Kosovo. Then there is Bosnia. I mean, it is a difficult task to get enough people. As you know, in the case of Kosovo, a year ago they were promised 5,600 police. Mr. Kouchner now has 2,700 in place because countries cannot provide enough qualified people.

So this is a wider problem, and it needs to be tackled probably in a more principled way.

Mr. Janko Peric: As a last question, what recommendation would you send to New York, from your personal experience?

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: With regard to IPTF, to the police force?

Mr. Janko Peric: Yes.

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: Well, I think it's very important to get a certain standard in place. I think it would be a necessity for a group to look into this, to establish standards, and to come up with ways and means to enforce these standards.

Mr. Janko Peric: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Peric.

That concludes our first round. We have time to have a second round of questions.

We'll start again with Mr. Hanger, for five minutes.

Mr. Art Hanger: Sir, you mentioned that something like 800,000 refugees were yet to be repatriated. Is that correct?

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: Yes.

Mr. Art Hanger: How many of those 800,000 would be Serbs? Would it be one-third?

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: Probably more. The number of Serbs in refugee camps in Serbia proper is up to 500,000. They're not all from Bosnia, but there are at least 200,000 to 300,000, as far as I am concerned, from Bosnia.

• 1610

Mr. Art Hanger: When you talk about repatriation and the acceleration process, are you referring to that acceleration as being inhibited by the international community or are you making reference to it in terms of it not being at the pace you would like to see because of the reluctance to go back?

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: Several factors come into play here. The main factor still is that all three nationalist parties are not really interested in the return of refugees. That is the main problem. What they were not successful at in the war, they now try, with bureaucratic means, to achieve. That is the main problem, really. If there would be a real and positive political will, we, the international community, could be much faster and much more successful.

Another reason that the return is difficult is the time factor. As I've pointed out, many refugees have been away now for quite some time. They are not living in refugee camps but in somebody else's home, for example, displaced inside Bosnia-Herzegovina. There the problem is that maybe their home is destroyed and they are occupying a house that does not belong to them, and thus are blocking the return into the house where they are staying of the other group.

So it's actually this vicious circle that we need to cut through, and this is why I came up with new legislation in October of last year in order to facilitate the ability to cut through this vicious circle and establish a system where people who are in homes and apartments that do not belong to them need to move out.

This is, of course, a complicated administrative issue, apart from the human side, so to speak. It's an administrative issue that sometimes is being blocked by the housing officers who are established in every community.

So there are many, many things that need to be taken into consideration, but as a matter of principle, it is important to reiterate that we cannot take into consideration all the different aspects and viewpoints and so on. We need to move on. But again, we have to be realistic about the success rate. Because of the circumstances that are described, it is in fact very difficult to get things moving as quickly as we would like.

The Chair: Thanks, Mr. Hanger.

I'm informed that because Mr. Petritsch's flight times have changed, he has only another five minutes. I want to give Mr. O'Reilly a chance, and then we'll keep on going until our witness has to leave.

Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much for your information. It's quite....

I wonder if you could elaborate on the economic rebuilding in terms of the payment bureau versus banking. I wonder, how many foreign international banks are bidding, or how many want to come in? I think it would be vital to the reconstruction of the country to get your financial house in order and to have some form of being able to deal with the stock exchange, for example, or with the financial community, commodities, and that type of thing. To my mind, that would be one of the vital aspects of rebuilding your economy.

Perhaps you could comment on that.

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: To give you a brief rundown of the situation in the banking sector, we have a central bank in place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is one of the success stories. We have the so-called “convertible mark”, which is currency pegged to the German mark, one to one. At the head of the central bank is a gentleman from New Zealand, but under him, so to speak, there are local experts already working, and working quite well. So for the currency, at least, quite a security has now been established.

• 1615

When it comes to the banks, the payment bureaus siphon off most of the money that is being circulated in the country. Apart from this, there are around 50 private banks, but they are not all really viable. Banking reform will basically do away with most of them.

As a third factor, we have foreign banks who are interested in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I know in my own country, Austria, at least two major banks are in the process of establishing themselves in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In this way, I'm quite confident that once we have these foreign banks there things will start to move. We have already a Turkish bank established there, and several others from Germany and France have shown a clear interest. They are still waiting for certain legislation to be put in place, but they are actually on the move into Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Petritsch. I think it's about the time you wanted to leave to catch your plane.

I want to thank you very much, on behalf of my colleagues on this committee, for sharing your time with us today and giving us a very interesting update on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I assure you that you have, I think I can say, the full support of Canadians in the important task you're involved with.

So thank you very much, and safe trip home.

Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch: Thank you so much.

I would just like to use this opportunity to thank you also for the support that Canada is providing for the peace implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is of the greatest importance to the international community there, and to my office in particular. I have several excellent experts from your ministries working in my office, and of course the military plays a very important role there.

I believe, and am convinced, that with your help we are going to be successful, but it needs some time. We need to keep in mind that it is much easier to reconstruct a bridge than to really get the minds and hearts of people to refocus on what peace is all about in a democratic country.

Thank you so much.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Colleagues, there's one other item of business.

Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Mr. Chairman, I wanted to give notice of motion to the committee. I'm sorry that it's not in both official languages. I'll read it into the record so that it can be in both official languages, and then we'll circulate it afterwards:

SCONDVA affirms its unqualified support for the continued evolution of an effective office of the Ombudsman DND/CF, that is secured by regulations to the National Defence Act which remove impediments to the proper functioning of the office and ensure the co-operation of all sectors of DND/CF so that the Office of the Ombudsman DND/CF can enhance the welfare and quality of life of all members of DND/CF within an open, transparent and accountable institutional that respects individual rights and fundamental fairness. The Ombudsman should report regularly to SCONDVA on the experience and continued evolution of the Office.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. O'Reilly.

He's just given notice of motion. With everyone's agreement, it will be dealt with tomorrow.

I'll recall for you that at tomorrow's meeting at 3.30 p.m. the witness will be Monsieur Marin, who in fact is the ombudsman. Mr. Pratt will be in the chair, as I have to be in Montreal on other parliamentary business. I've forewarned him that Mr. O'Reilly is going to make this motion.

Without editorializing from the chair, it's a motion to support the Office of the Ombudsman to make sure that it continues to play a meaningful role and make whatever changes are necessary so that it can play that meaningful role. I might just anticipate that there will probably be pretty good, if not unanimous, support from this committee.

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At any rate, thank you for your notice of motion. I'll tell Mr. Pratt that you'll be moving that tomorrow, okay?

Mr. John O'Reilly: I'll have it circulated in both official languages.

The Chair: Right.

Mr. Art Hanger: What brought all this on?

Mr. John O'Reilly: Well, there's an expiry date on the office, and I think we should reinforce our support for it.

Mr. Art Hanger: I want to hear what they've done.

The Chair: He's coming tomorrow. You'll have a good chance then.

Committee adjourned.