NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, December 16, 1999

• 0901

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order the meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs on what will probably prove to be our last day here—but one never knows—before the Christmas break.

Just before we go to the witnesses, I will tell the colleagues on the committee that unfortunately our trip to the States has been overruled, shall we say, or not approved because of other... There's linkage here, and other considerations have caused some of the House leaders to not approve the trip. It's sad to say, but that's life in Ottawa.

So what we're going to do is this. I don't know if I mentioned to colleagues that General Baril and I spoke last Friday, and he extended a verbal invitation to the committee, which he'd intended to do when he was before us, to arrange through military flight to have us go down to Colorado Springs. The minister, I know, is very anxious that we would try to do that as well. The NORAD agreement is up for renewal, and that should be more or less automatic, but there's the whole question of missile defence and so on and possible Canadian participation in that.

So I've just spoken with the clerk, and we'll get a hold of General Baril as soon as possible and tell him we would like to pursue his offer. I told him we would hold it in reserve, and now it looks as if we'll pursue that with him. We'll try to have it in the same timeframe as the original trip was going to be. So we'll be back to you as soon as we have some more information on that.

With that, I want to welcome Colonel Sean Henry and Colonel Alain Pellerin. Mr. Henry is senior defence analyst and Mr. Pellerin is executive director of the Conference of Defence Associations.

Gentlemen, I'm sorry about the interference the other day. It seems almost inevitable at the end of any time here on the Hill before we break. In fact later today there are votes at about 10:30 or 10:45 or something like that, I think. But we should have most of your testimony and questions in by that time. So let's go right to your opening remarks, gentlemen, and then we'll have some questions. Welcome.

[Translation]

Colonel Alain Pellerin (Director General, Conference of Defence Associations): Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is a pleasure and a privilege for me to appear before you. I am here today accompanied by Colonel Sean Henry, as mentioned, who is our senior analyst on defence issues.

The Conference of Defence Associations, or CDA, which represents 600,000 members across Canada, is a non-profit organization created in 1932 to study defence and security problems and the well-being of the Canadian armed forces.

I will start by mentioning our deep frustration arising from our inability to convey to Canadians the nature of the serious problems which afflict our defence establishment - and the negative impact these afflictions have upon our national well being.

The armed forces are a fundamental component of the framework of the nation. They defend our sovereignty at home and support our economic and political interests abroad. This ought to be of more than passing interest to Canadians, given the fragility of our prosperity. The armed forces are a solid insurance policy to help avoid the serious consequences of instability. We therefore salute the recent resolution proposed by Mr. David Pratt and passed by this committee to provide adequate resources for defence.

• 0905

Over the years, CDA has studied the situation of Canadian defence in great detail. We have been particularly active since the end of the Cold War. It is our conclusion that Canada's defence establishment, including the Canadian forces, is in crisis and that there are two fundamental sources of this crisis; they are under funding and demilitarization.

[English]

Last month we testified before the Standing Committee on Finance in support of a major submission that analysed the results of underfunding of the Department of National Defence since 1989. We recommended that a minimum additional allocation of some $500 million to DND's budget base in 2000 would be necessary to avoid a major breakdown of military combat capability. I have attached a synopsis of our funding presentation to copies of my remarks distributed to you. Our detailed analysis of the DND budget shortfall is available on our website, and I have passed copies in French and English to the clerk of the committee.

In the end, the finance committee agreed with us and recommended a significant increase to the Defence budget as part of a five-year revitalization and modernization program. Copies of that recommendation are also included in my handout.

I would also like to bring to your attention an article in the National Post this morning entitled “House committee calls for increased military spending”.

This morning I intend to focus on the second great problem of defence in Canada, and that is demilitarization. I realize you are studying the nature of the procurement process for military systems and materiel. However, it is our view that procurement difficulties serve as one example of the failure to recognize the special nature and needs of a military organization.

We define the term “demilitarization” as the refusal or inability of decision-makers to recognize that DND is different from any other department and that the Canadian Forces are not analogous to other groups in uniform, such as the RCMP, the coast guard, correction officers, customs officers, and so on. In short, many portray the armed forces as just another “job market”.

In reality, members of the military take on a contract of unlimited liability in which facing death on a routine basis is part of the job description. This calls for a strong sense of responsibility and of service before self. It places them in a special category within our society. In return, the military expects the government to accept an unlimited responsibility to provide them with the means to achieve their missions. This unique nature of the armed forces has been highlighted in the recent report of the Auditor General.

Since the early 1970s, however, unique military attributes have been under siege, because DND has been forced into the mould of “just another government department”. It is thereby subjected to a waterfall of directives from different sources, such as the Charter of Rights, Treasury Board, government procurement regulations, and so on. Dr. Douglas Bland of Queen's University expands on this theme in a recent article published in the National Post of 10 December. If you want, we have a copy of that article.

Let me make it clear that we are not advocating placing the armed forces outside the rightful political control of Parliament. Rather, in simple terms, we are saying military forces are not civil servants in uniforms. Demilitarization reinforces a mistaken understanding of armed forces in government and among the public. Most dangerously, it works on the minds of those inside the military and corrodes their sense of service before self.

The decision in 1972 to merge the military and civilian components of National Defence Headquarters is often seen as the sole source of the demilitarization process. This is not entirely correct; it is simply the most visible.

Moreover, we are not criticizing the hardworking civilian members of DND who are subject to the same strains as the military. What we are referring to is the broader problem that stretches across government and involves a jungle of bureaucratic processes that do not contribute in any way to military effectiveness. In fact they often undermine it.

• 0910

Unfortunately, demilitarization and underfunding work in tandem to force inefficient short-term solutions in response to unproductive procedures. This leads to DND not being able to spend its limited resources in the best possible way.

Challenges such as downsizing and requirements of the new information age should be resolved by military staff officers who are knowledgeable of the military requirements of operational effectiveness. They do not need an overlay of regulation and procedures that bear no relation to military needs. One way to remedy the demilitarization problem as it affects procurement would be to allow DND to establish its own procurement agency. It would generally follow Treasury Board and other directives and guidelines, but would not become bogged down in the bureaucratic process that is now imposed upon it.

This would avoid inefficiencies, waste, and long lead time. We also recognize that DND has to clean its own house by streamlining an overly complex and unproductive internal defence program management system.

In terms of defence policies, CDA supports the principle of the 1994 white paper, which called for provision of combat-capable armed forces. The problem is that underfunding and demilitarization are making implementation impossible and preventing the ability to keep up with change.

In our finance committee presentation we stated that in broad terms there is a $1.5 billion gap between the policy and reality. That gap is growing. As a result, military effectiveness is in steep decline. In turn, this raises serious questions about whether the course of future armed forces development outlined in the recent DND document Strategy 2020 is capable of being carried out. This is important, as DND officials increasingly state that this plan will be the salvation of the armed forces in pulling away from the unsatisfactory present to the new world dominated by high technology and diverse stress.

Lord Robertson, the new Secretary General in NATO, in his pointed remarks to Canada in a Globe and Mail article on December 10, speaks of the need to maintain robust military capabilities beyond blue-helmet peacekeeping. In his view, they must be flexible, modern, well equipped, and able to perform a full range of tasks, from humanitarian assistance all the way to high-intensity combat.

Our position is that Canada cannot get there from here. What we mean is that the reality of the falling capabilities of the armed forces is such that there will be no firm base upon which to build the new models defined in Strategy 2020. The key reason for this is that there is no strategic direction within the government or within DND itself to deal with the two seminal problems of underfunding and demilitarization.

You will note that our recommendations today focus on this key aspect. The Honourable John Fraser makes reference to the same situation in his latest report. He notes in particular that there is no all-encompassing strategy to resolve the issues he is dealing with. Without it, the process becomes piecemeal, and ultimately ineffective, because it will not resolve the seminal problems.

To lessen the current crisis in Canadian defence, CDA recommends that the government convene a special task force to “reinvent the armed forces”. The aim would be to produce an organization that is modern, combat capable, well funded, and in which military requirements are paramount. In this respect Canada would be taking action similar to what occurred in the U.S. Armed Forces, particularly the U.S. Army, after the Vietnam War. There is a need for decisive action to break away from the present disarray and build a revitalized Canadian Forces.

To set this process in motion and supervise it to its conclusion would require strong political leadership from the very top. The fundamental point of departure would be to accept that a defence establishment is in fact different from any other human endeavour, and therefore needs to be treated in a manner that will produce the best results from the heavy investment put into it.

• 0915

A clear definition of the military requirement, followed by identification of obstacles to its achievement, would be a first priority. Once the task force had brought in its plan in a period not to exceed six months, we would see a period of up to five years needed to put the Canadian Forces back into satisfactory condition, with a path then open to full revitalization and modernization. This approach would be consistent with the recommendation of the finance committee to apply new funding over a five-year period.

We also reiterate the recommendation in our 1999 strategic assessment that a permanent national security advisory agency be created to help avoid a recurrence of the present problems of defence.

Thank you for your attention. Sean and I would be pleased to answer any questions you have on either demilitarization or underfunding.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Colonel Pellerin.

I think I can speak for the committee and thank you also for your presentation to the finance committee. It no doubt helped to convince our colleagues there. Certainly I can tell you of some of us have the scars in our government caucus from continually pushing Mr. Pratt's motion that we all, or most of us, endorsed very heartily. I think most of the parties are very sympathetic to the views you've expressed. So thank you very much. I think these will be very useful ideas for us as we go forward. We hope to have our procurement study tabled in the House very early in March, I would think.

With that, let's go to questions from members. We start with Mr. Hart for seven minutes.

Mr. Jim Hart (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Ref.): Thank you very much, gentlemen, for an interesting presentation.

I'd like to know right off the bat if in your opinion the armed forces are combat capable at this present time.

Col Alain Pellerin: Sean, would you like to address that in more detail?

Colonel Sean Henry (Senior Defence Analyst, Conference of Defence Associations): Yes, with qualifications.

The level of combat capability within the armed forces varies somewhat within the three services. As a very general statement, you could say that the navy and the air force have a reasonable capability, although it is certainly not what it ought to be. I think most people would agree that the major problem is found within the army.

Again, to jump ahead to a direct answer to your question, the combat capability of the army has probably been reduced down to the battalion level. Some might even argue with that to say it is reduced down to the company group level, because that's really the only level where training is taking place, and the troops within a company group—which of course is the lowest possible level of only about 150 people—are fully equipped. So there is combat capability, but it is certainly not at the level it should be.

Mr. Jim Hart: Is the level conducive to following the 1994 white paper?

Col Sean Henry: No. The 1994 white paper generally states—again, we're talking about the army, because that's where the main problem lies—that we are supposed to be able to field a combat-capable brigade group and certainly one, but perhaps two, independent battalion groups in addition to that.

There's no doubt that you could, by stripping the army, probably find enough people—in the order of say 4,000 to 6,000—to assemble a brigade's worth of people, but whether or not they would be equipped or trained to do their jobs is very much open to question. In my personal opinion, they wouldn't be. They would be able to slap together a brigade group by stripping the army, but I, as a commander, would certainly not take that brigade group into any sort of dangerous situation. I would want six months to a year to train them.

• 0920

As for the two battalion groups, there's more possibility of doing that, although I have to point to what has recently happened in Kosovo. We now have two battalion groups overseas, and it appears that we can't maintain those. In the end, we're looking at a country of 30 million people that is a member of the G-7 group of the most advanced industrial nations, and its entire army can only maintain and sustain one battalion group of about 1,500 people over the long term. I think that answers your question.

Col Alain Pellerin: Could I just add a comment to that?

Just to situate the comments made by Colonel Henry and the problems with the three services, probably more so in the army than in the navy and the air force, one of the reasons is that in the last few years we've reduced the armed forces by more than 30%, as you know. We're talking about 60,000 now, but in fact it's more like 57,000 and probably going down, while at the same time we're increasing the commitment.

We now have 4,500 troops abroad, and that will be reduced in the spring. The army has been reduced substantially. In fact, if you ask the Chief of Defence Staff how many bayonets he has to support these peacekeeping missions, he would say the figure is probably about 12,000. If you multiply the 4,500 by three, which you need to do to meet the commitment, you're out of bayonets within the year. I think that is the big problem we're facing: a reduction of our budget by some 25%, a reduction of personnel by some 30% or more, and an increase in operational commitments in which there is a requirement for combat-capable troops.

Again, on the peacekeeping commitments, people don't realize it, but it's not the old blue berets. We have tanks in Kosovo. We need combat-capable troops, and we don't have enough.

Mr. Jim Hart: One of the concerns I recently read—I guess this information was found through access to information—was that Colonel Howie Marsh suggested that the army could be cut to 10,000 and that we should have a refocusing on technology. I was wondering if, in your opinion, we could carry out our white paper commitments at that level, and also whether or not high technology can replace the foot soldier.

Col Sean Henry: You may have read my letter in response to that in the Ottawa Citizen. Generally speaking, in a very general sense there is a move toward replacing people with technology, but in the case of the Canadian Forces it just doesn't apply.

Let me put this in context. Back at the time of the 1987 white paper, there were some very extensive studies done to pinpoint how many people you needed to carry out the Canadian Forces' commitments. Those studies were looked at again just before the 1994 white paper. The point here is that the commitments are roughly the same, as Colonel Pellerin has pointed out. The key number they came up with showed that once the armed forces went below a total of 78,000 people, you were going to run into difficulty. They are now at 60,000, so they're in real difficulty.

The business about reducing the army to 10,000 and filling the void with high technology is just not going to fly. At this point in time, you need both troops and technology.

Mr. Jim Hart: There's one final question I have for you, and then we'll have a second round at this.

I wanted to touch a little bit on demilitarization. As we are studying procurement, one of the things we're hearing about is alternate service delivery. We have also heard testimony that DND hasn't met its goal of $200 million in savings. It's only at some $68 million. I believe that's the figure. Is alternate service delivery a concern for you when you look at the picture of demilitarization in the context of what you're talking about today?

Col Alain Pellerin: Again, it is more so if you're from an army background, because the troops you have, if they're committed to an operation, will need to leave the base and will need the support, the logistic tail. As an example, I'm told the Australian army had done away with all its cooks, when all of a sudden the Australians deployed their troops into East Timor. They didn't have the catering system to support the troops in the field, so they had to reinvent the wheel.

• 0925

It doesn't apply as much to the air force, for instance, because it has a static base that its planes must go back to because of the nature of their missions. For the navy, again the missions are different. But in our case, I think we need to look at that very closely because of the particular needs of the army.

Col Sean Henry: This is a good question, because it goes to the heart of demilitarization. Alternate service delivery was conceived as a program for application across the entire government. It fell out of the program review process and was seen as a salvation to save tons and tons of money to meet deficit reduction. Unfortunately, in DND it has been ordered to be applied to its limit. There are many people in DND whose reputations and careers depend on pushing alternate service delivery to its ultimate, and this is what we're talking about. There are no allowances made for the fact that DND is a different department. Treasury Board Secretariat and other central agencies simply say to do it, and because of the nature of armed forces, unfortunately in this case people say “Yes, sir!”, and away they go.

Certainly alternate service delivery to a certain point is a wise move, but as with many things like this, the trouble is that everybody gets enthusiastic and it goes past the point, to the extent that it starts undermining military capabilities.

Let me give you another example. Colonel Pellerin has just mentioned the problems with rotating the forces over in Kosovo and Bosnia every six months, right? You need three times the number you're dealing with: people getting ready, people there, and people sorting themselves out after they get back. That is generally a bad problem. It is almost an impossible problem with respect to the support trades, because so many support trade people have been replaced by alternate service delivery that when you come to a six-month rotation like this, there aren't enough of them. In fact, had they not pulled out of Kosovo, people in the know were saying the army would have hit the wall next April. Most of the reason for that had to do with support trades.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hart.

[Translation]

You have seven minutes, Mr. Laurin.

Mr. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): Colonel Pellerin, what's strikes me overall about your presentation is that you seem to be saying that because the armed forces are so unique, it's virtually impossible to apply the same administrative standards to them so that they can control their spending. This is one of the main problems identified by the Auditor General. The latter noted that when management objectives are set for the armed forces, every single time, or at least very often, they have a great deal of difficulty achieving these objectives.

A statement like this is cause for some concern because as I see it, the armed forces are something of a financial black hole. Should we give our armed forces money every time they request additional funding, regardless of the amount, simply because they are our armed forces and because of their unique nature and mission? Is that the message you're conveying to us today? If it's not, perhaps you would care to clarify your position.

Col Alain Pellerin: That's not exactly what we're saying. I was here Tuesday when you were questioning the Auditor General and I am well aware of your concerns about the ability of those responsible for managing DND.

In fact, we're trying to convey two messages. First of all, we want to highlight the problem of under funding. DND's budget has been slashed by 25 per cent over the past six years and its purchasing power has been reduced by 30 per cent.

The Finance Committee identified this as a problem. To my knowledge, this is the first time that the Finance Committee has focussed its attention of defence issues. Under funding is one problem. Another is the increase in responsibilities. In the past, our armed forces were not assigned to peacekeeping duties or other operational tasks.

• 0930

We need to strike a balance of some kind. I'm well aware of the department's spending problems. This is a problem experienced by all nations and by all democracies. It's a very expensive proposition for a country to maintain armed forces. For example, approximately $10 billion was spent to acquire 12 state-of-the-art frigates. Maybe these could have been acquired for less money had the political dimension not come into play. That's something we need to take into consideration.

I'm not saying that defence spending shouldn't be controlled. I made it very clear in my submission that the department must resolve its internal management problems. The need for more funding and for improved management go hand in hand, although we mustn't lose sight of the fact that DND is a department quite unlike the rest because of its unique mission.

Mr. René Laurin: To a certain extent, you're right. One could easily arrive at the conclusion that because their budget has been slashed by $2 billion, they can't make ends meet. We're talking about $2 billion, which is a substantial sum of money. However, all departments have seen their budgets reduced, and not one has admitted that services have been reduced because of these cuts. All claim to provide the same level of service with less money. At least that's what the ministers are saying.

You state in your submission that if DND has its own procurement agency, it could operate more efficiently. From an administrative standpoint, this would result in duplication because there would be one procurement system for all other departments, while DND would have its own separate agency. As I see it, this would lead to more waste. If it had its own agency, it would be easy for the department to convince itself that procedure wasn't important and to simply buy when the need arose.

Admittedly, things move along faster when purchases are made without going through the tender process. However, the armed forces could ultimately end up purchasing close to $3 billion in goods and services without tenders. That's an important consideration.

When you argue that having your own procurement agency would be much more efficient, I don't doubt that at all, but ultimately what would it cost us? Why shouldn't DND also have to subject itself to a closely regulated procurement system, one that would enable it to benefit as well from the best possible prices?

It's not as if we're facing down an enemy or in a life-and- death situation. If that were the case, cost would understandably not be a factor. If the nation was threatened, it would be different, but that's not the case. How then can you justify the establishment of a separate procurement agency?

Col Alain Pellerin: I'll let my colleague address the specifics, but in the meantime, I'd like to quote an excerpt from the Finance Committee's report which deals with reductions in various departments. The report notes the following:

The Program Review was highly effective in terms of achieving its goal of restructuring additional program expenditures. However, some departments were affected more than others. Defence spending is one such case.

The Finance Committee found that DND had been affected more than other departments. That's the message we're trying to get across.

As far as the specifics are concerned, I'll let my associate Sean answer your question.

[English]

Col Sean Henry: Mr. Chairman, this is another very good question, which helps us to illustrate the point we are trying to make here this morning. Before I get into detail, I believe this committee has been briefed on part III of the estimates, 1999-2000 Report on Plans and Priorities, and you've been briefed on Defence Planning Guidance 2000. In the first instance, then, I think the facts and figures on where the money the armed forces are getting and the money they want are in there. You can go chapter and verse. That in turn leads to part of the problem.

• 0935

To move specifically to your question, one of the big difficulties of the procurement system is that the people who are actually working within the Department of National Defence have to do it twice. There is an internal system called the Defence Program Management System, which is essentially there to decide how to spend the money between the army, navy, air force, and the other support elements.

Once the people who are looking after projects have worked through that system, they have to start all over again and do the one outside DND. This leads to a tremendous workload. It leads to waste and inefficiency. Above all, because of the long lead times involved, this is horrendous to say, but almost every year DND is not able to spend all of the small amount of money it has. This is terrible, but it's because of the terrible nature of the procurement processes, both inside and outside.

Our suggestion is for the central agencies to realize that DND is different from other departments. It's much bigger, it's more complex, it spends more money, and it's quite unique. What needs to be done is to streamline the internal DND system. We're not defending it. There are a lot of things that need to be done to improve the internal DND system, but at the same time, take the external system in and put them together so you have one procurement operation.

No one is saying we should ignore Treasury Board directives and so on. There would be oversight just as there is oversight now. In fact, this committee would provide part of that oversight.

The Chair: Thank you.

Now I have Mr. Pratt and then Mr. Proud.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to welcome our two witnesses and thank them for providing clarity to some of the questions Mr. Laurin has asked today. I know Mrs. Wayne is a big fan of clarity these days as well.

There's not a lot in your presentation I could disagree with. I stand to be corrected here, but I didn't notice any mention of human security.

Given that the Canadian Forces over the last little while have been involved in what could be described as human security operations, whether in Bosnia, Kosovo, or East Timor, I'd like to get your comments on where you think we should be going with respect to rapid reaction, highly mobile, interoperable force. I'm also a supporter of the 1994 white paper, and I think the human security requirements we have are on top of those 1994 white paper objectives as well. Could I get some comments on that?

Could I also get a comment on the issue of the role the Conference of Defence Associations plays in commenting on government policy with respect to the military? It seems to me there is a huge amount of support, which we've seen in some of the recent polling that has been done for the Canadian Forces and for the objectives of human security. I'm just wondering whether it might be time for the CDA to branch out and look beyond its current focus to capture other groups that might form a coalition of interests around Canadian foreign policy and the Canadian Forces.

Col Alain Pellerin: I'll start with the first one and I'll ask Sean to speak afterward.

When I quoted Lord Robinson in our text, I didn't mention that we needed forces that were flexible, modern, well equipped, and able to perform a full range of tasks from humanitarian assistance to high-intensity combat. We still believe that. Although the context has changed in even five years, we still believe in the principles of the white paper, which called for the need for combat-capable forces. I think that's the only way we can address both the humanitarian assistance and the high intensity.

• 0940

If we look at the recent missions of our troops, out of 4,500 troops that we have deployed now, about 300 of them are Blue Berets, the traditional peacekeepers. The rest of them are all under UN mandate but they wear Canadian uniforms and the equipment is not white UN equipment. We even have two troops of tanks in Kosovo. We've never had tanks deployed on peacekeeping missions before, except for Korea, if you call that a peacekeeping mission.

In order to address both ends of the spectrum, we need forces that are combat capable. I think it's important that we keep talking, but since the London Declaration in 1990, NATO has talked about the changing world and the need for flexible and mobile forces. All our ministers have agreed to that since that time, but they're not putting the money where their mouths are, in a sense, to make these troops highly, rapidly deployable and flexible.

We saw that in Kosovo as an example. I think Canada did very well with the F-18s, but had we had to deploy ground troops in Kosovo, both we and our European allies would have had great difficulties in getting them on time because they're heavy tank-type formations that have not been transformed into mobile and more flexible troops. That has to be addressed. Money needs to be spent, yes, but spent wisely on making our troops more mobile and flexible.

On the CDA issue, I'm fully in agreement with you that the CDA has to take a high profile on these defence issues. In fact, CDA is the only national organization whose mandate is to address defence issues and the well-being of the Canadian forces. In recent years we've taken two full new members: the Legion, with 500,000 members, and the Air Force Association, which is a very well-organized organization, with 20,000 people.

So we're moving ahead. We have 15 full associations and 14 associate members, which include the RMC Club, the anciens of RMC, and so on. We're trying hard to generate more interest across the nation.

To be honest, the difficulty we face is that it's very difficult to generate funds for the CDA, to be able to have people at the national office to fulfil our mandate. Both Sean and I work two or three days a week, sometimes four or five, and get very little money. I won't mention how much because sometimes we're embarrassed. But we believe in what we're doing. Unfortunately, there isn't enough money and it's very difficult to generate funds.

Government support has been reduced by 80% in the last few years. Unless that is changed, it becomes very difficult. You can do so much with volunteers, but at the end of the day we're very limited.

Col Sean Henry: I have just a couple of points to add to that.

First of all, I believe the white paper covers the waterfront very well. In fact, if you go back and read it, as I did for the first time in a little while, it covers the waterfront very well. The white paper is quite capable of dealing with human security. In fact, human security, as you know, needs a framework of armed forces in order for the other elements to do their humanitarian work. As Colonel Pellerin has pointed out, that framework often has to be very strong.

With respect to deployment, yes, the deployment assets of the armed forces are in need of a buildup. The navy needs some new, fast deployment ships. The air force needs a greater capability, either some C-17s or some new Hercs. Most people who know about these things say you need access to some bigger airplanes other than leasing ones from the Russians or the Americans, because they may be in use or they may not be there.

• 0945

Interoperability is extremely important in coalition operations. The navy and the air force have a reasonable capability. I don't want members of the committee to think I'm saying that the navy and the air force have no problems. They do have problems. It's just a question of degree.

The army has difficulties with interoperability because they have not yet fielded their full command and control system. It's coming on stream, but because of cuts only about one-third of the requirement is going to be put in the field in the next few years. So interoperability with allies for the army is yet one more problem.

Finally, the last point is with respect to CDA's ability to coordinate pro-defence efforts in the country. In the past, particularly at the time of the defence review in 1993-94, CDA did go out and draw in other organizations in the civilian sector. I don't want to mention them for the record because some of them might not wish to be seen as cooperating with CDA, but we did go out to business organizations and other associations that have an interest in defence. So you are dead right: we've got to do that.

Col Alain Pellerin: Also, I think we need to work more closely with committees such as yours, because I think our interests are similar. We're both pro-defence in a sense. Also, next week, for instance, we're meeting with Mr. d'Aquino at BCNI, where we're trying to see how we can work more closely, although we're not a lobby for business. Obviously we leave that to the CDA, but maybe we can work more closely with an organization such as BCNI.

The Chair: Thank you.

Now we go to Mrs. Wayne, please, for seven minutes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Colonel Henry and Colonel Pellerin, you speak of demilitarization and that the DND is not seen as any different from any other department, but certainly they should be different from any other department.

The minister suggested that when you went before the finance committee you had exaggerated your case, but the CDS stated to us that you were pretty much on target. That's what they told us.

In your opinion, how bad is the disconnect between the military commanders and the senior parliamentary officials? Is there a good working relationship there, back and forth? Is there the information, or is it just they're over here and the other group's over here and no one really is communicating back and forth and working together?

Col Sean Henry: Speaking of minefields, Mr. Chairman, let's take a positive approach. There is no way that CDA or I as an adviser to CDA are going to lay criticism at the feet of politicians of any stripe. We know people are out there trying to do the best they can for Canada and for the armed forces.

Where the problem lies is hands-on knowledge of the armed forces. Around this table I won't ask for a show of hands, but over the period of time there has been less and less hands-on knowledge of the armed forces in government, both politicians and officials. The last time I saw a figure for this Parliament, I think it was about 2%. That is a fundamental part of the problem, that people on the political side don't have the hands-on knowledge of the sorts of things we're talking about.

• 0950

It's much the same for officials, the civil servants. I don't want to be seen as criticizing civil servants; I'm not. I'm simply saying their knowledge of the reality of the military is quite limited, and they in particular often see things in a different light from people in the Department of National Defence. Their objectives are different and their perspective is different. What it boils down to—and I think it's mentioned somewhere in the presentation—is that a bureaucratic system, a fully bureaucratic system, is the antithesis of a military system. Bureaucratic systems focus on process. The military has to focus on results.

There is also, unfortunately, in a bureaucratic system a blurring of lines of responsibility. People in bureaucracies don't take responsibility, whereas that is the essence of a military system. That, I would suggest, is one of the problems that has led to situations like Somalia and all sorts of other unpleasant things that are happening in the armed forces. By becoming demilitarized, the whole system of responsibility has been under seige within the armed forces. And once you lose that, you're in trouble.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I know that General Lewis MacKenzie and Colonel Drapeau have advocated a separate military headquarters, isolated from the bureaucratic offices of the department. Can you see that being put in place?

Col Sean Henry: To a degree. I spoke earlier about the pendulum swinging, and I spoke about it in terms of ASD. There obviously has to be an interface between the military part of National Defence Headquarters and the civilian part. No one is saying that should not be the case. But mixing them all up into a hodge-podge, which certainly was the case until very recently, and unfortunately is still the case to a greater degree than it ought to be, is not productive. I would say those two gentlemen perhaps go further than what we would recommend.

I don't know how Colonel Pellerin feels about that.

Col Alain Pellerin: Again, as I mentioned in the presentation, when we talk about demilitarization, in the minds of a lot of people it's the integration of headquarters that's the sole problem, and if we split the two then we resolve the problem. We suggest there's more than that. It might be the most visible sign of demilitarization, but it's not the only one.

So that's why we suggest maybe to have a task force that would look into all these issues, and at the end of the day it's quite possible the recommendation would be we should go back to what we were before.

We should also be careful. You know, both Sean and I have worked at NDHQ for a number of years, and it's important to work together. Unification has done a lot of good in the sense that we've learned to work with the air force and the navy much more closely than in any other nation and also to work closely with civilians working at DND. There will always be civilians working in the Ministry of National Defence, so we need to learn how they work and how we can work with them. I think we have to be careful when we talk of splitting the two completely and we go our own way.

Col Sean Henry: There is another dimension to this, and that is that demilitarization is a very, very broad topic the way we define it, and we could probably spend the better part of a week here discussing it with you.

We haven't even touched on the sorts of things that fall out of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Again, that is a minefield. In an unchallenged and uncontrolled form, it has had a very bad effect on the armed forces, again contributing to an inability of the chain of command to do what chains of command have to do. There is a reluctance now to give clear and concise orders and, as they say, to kick butt, because people are very, very sensitive to being hauled up on the mat by human rights tribunals, and so on. So this is a whole aspect of demilitarization that's out there, in addition to things like mixing civilians and military in the headquarters.

Just as a final point on Colonel Pellerin's remarks, I would refine what he said about unification. It went too far. Integration—you remember back in 1964, the 1964 white paper brought in integration of the armed forces, and that's a very good concept. At the very top, you bring people together.

• 0955

Where things come unstuck is when you do go to unification, and unification implies you are not recognizing that not only are the armed forces different, but within the armed forces the navy, army, and air force are different. There are still people out there today who don't understand that.

Finally, Colonel Pellerin mentioned Dr. Doug Bland's article in the National Post a week ago in which he elaborates on the problem of giving the military untrammelled orders to get on with things the same as other government departments. This is a very good article, by the way.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

Now, colleagues, we're going to have a second round. I let this time period go on because there were very interesting questions and answers. However, we are starting a second round. It's only five minutes. We may be interrupted, so I'm going to probably need more succinct questions and answers to give everybody a fair chance.

We start with Mr. Hart.

Mr. Jim Hart: I have three areas I want to explore a little bit with you. If you'll allow me, I'll just run through them and perhaps you can answer them after I finish my comments.

First is the pressures that are facing the Canadian Forces right now. We have, as you've mentioned, increased commitments, equipment upgrading, the RMA, we have quality of life, the pay benefits and housing for military personnel.

One of the things I've been working on for the last couple of years is the idea that because of the unique career, which you mention in your briefing as well, of service personnel—that they actually have to lay down their lives if required—maybe there should be a Canadian Forces service exemption on the income tax to give them in effect a pay increase without having to adjust the budget. I've been working on that. I'd like to get your comments to see if that's something your organization would endorse, or if you've ever thought about it.

The second item is recently there was an article that was printed that talked about two army units in the United States that were deemed to be not combat ready, and I was wondering if you could tell the committee if Canadian units are also rated in such a manner. Who does it, and who is that information reported to if that's the case?

The final area is with the national security advisory agency that you mention. I would like to know what kind of advice they would give. Would it be that combat-readiness type of advice? How would that committee be made up and who would they report to? Would they report to Parliament, or do they report to the cabinet? How do you see that working?

The Chair: Gentlemen, there are three minutes for all of that.

Col Alain Pellerin: I'll take the last one first and I'll give a chance to Sean to answer.

I think that national security agency we were talking about would be a coordinating body at the highest level, at the Prime Minister's level, to coordinate all the various security and defence issues, the broad security issues. It would be at that level. It wouldn't be an inspector general or ombudsman, just purely defence. It would be to coordinate all Canadian priorities dealing with defence and security in the broad meaning.

Now, on the American formation, I think there the American system overreacted. There was an element of shell game. The reason is two brigades were sent—one to Kosovo, one to Bosnia—from one division in Germany and one at Fort Drum here in New York. Because of that they reported, the two divisions were not combat capable because they didn't have the two brigades, but the two brigades were fully combat capable and deployed. I think there was an element of shell game.

On the issue of reporting, I'll let Sean report on that.

Col Sean Henry: Many years ago, prior to about 1970, the armed forces did not pay income tax. Now, mind you, their salaries were lower. One of the demilitarization problems, and again we could speak for a week on this, was in the early 1970s: DND shall be no different from any other department and therefore the military people in DND shall be paid in the same manner and using the same procedures as civil servants, and you have pay study groups, and on and on.

So what you say has merit, but it would take very strong political direction to bring it in. You would run into terrible obstacles out in the bureaucracy, but it does have merit. And in terms of what we are recommending—that is, a task force—this would certainly be an area for them to study.

• 1000

As for the second point, regarding the two American formations and the answer to the question of who does that, it's their inspector general. In this country, for reasons that are not clear, the concept of an inspector general got all twisted out of shape. For inspector generals in most armies, the primary task is to assess the operational readiness of the troops, not to look at scams—although they do look at that—and personal deficiencies and so on. Their main aim is to assess operational readiness.

Within the Canadian Armed Forces, it is done internally. The air force have tactical evaluations. The army used to have a special part of its staff that assessed the brigades, but this has become meaningless because the brigades have not conducted any training for five years and very few of the battalions have conducted any training. In fact, the staff members who used to carry out those tests have probably... the people in those jobs have been taken away and the jobs are empty. I don't know that for sure, but I suspect that.

Finally, we think a national security advisory agency is tremendously important—and we didn't really have a chance to elaborate on it too much in our strategic assessment—because the way things sit right now there is fragmented expertise in the Privy Council Office. There is no one in the Prime Minister's Office who has a defence file—nobody. We go to the PMO and they refer us right away to PCO. In the PCO, the foreign affairs person is normally the one that does both defence and foreign policy. There is a military person over there, but in recent years his level of influence is perhaps not as high as it ought to be. Even if it were, there is a fragmented approach.

A national security advisory agency would be a full-time operation whose job would be twofold: to keep the government continuously advised of the security situation developing out in the world and its relation to Canada, and secondly, when an emergency comes along, to give advice on how Canada should meet that emergency. Right now it is very much a hand-to-mouth affair.

The Chair: Thanks, Mr. Hart.

Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I wanted to probe a little further on this national security advisory agency. How closely would you see it modelled on the current American agency that seems to be very similar? Is that the National Security Agency or the National Security Council?

Col Sean Henry: National Security Council.

Col Alain Pellerin: Yes.

Mr. David Pratt: Who would you see as being involved in staffing that agency? How large an agency would that be? Would it be, for instance, academics, career military, civilian bureaucrats, or foreign affairs experts? Who would you see as being involved in providing the advice?

Let's leave it at that for now. I may have some follow-up questions as well.

Col Alain Pellerin: I think we would need to look at the various countries and how they do it, because most countries... I know that in France, for instance, they have a similar organization that reports to the Prime Minister. There's another one to the President in the U.S.—the National Security Council.

That would be a mixture, I would think, of diplomats, military, former diplomats, former military... whoever has the required expertise in the field. They would be paid civil servants, with other people that could be brought in for special tasks. I would see that as a body working under the Prime Minister, again, to address the issues that are of interest to us, the broad security issue and defence in particular, which is not being addressed satisfactorily at the highest level.

As Sean has said, there's nobody in the PMO who has prime responsibility for defence. If you go to the PCO, well, Sean had mentioned... I think we need to elevate the coordinating body to the level of the Prime Minister, with the right expertise.

• 1005

Col Sean Henry: Just as a matter of interest, within the last two or three months, believe it or not, Israel has created one. You would think they would have had one before, but I think it's a reflection of the complexity of the modern security situation. The Cold War was easy. Security today is much more complex, and for a country like Israel to recognize that, I think, is very significant. As Colonel Pellerin has said, first and foremost an agency like this would raise the profile of national security in the armed forces to much higher than what it is now in Canadian affairs at the governmental level.

To answer your question with respect to size, keep it small, because organizations like this tend to explode once you get them up and running, and that reduces their effectiveness. I agree with Alain that you need distinguished former diplomats, distinguished military people, and academics and so on. Once you decide to have an agency, it is not difficult to decide who you're going to have there.

In the first instance, they would advise the Prime Minister and his cabinet but would certainly not be divorced from the people who are out there now in the departments, such as the Department of Foreign Affairs, DND, and so on, which you find in the PCO. These people would have that special mandate. Once they exercise that, then the other people would be brought in to action whatever is required within the various departments.

A lot of what we are talking about here today probably could have been avoided if something like this had existed in Canada 20 or 30 years ago.

Mr. David Pratt: Presumably their reports to the Prime Minister and cabinet would be secret, then, as far as threat assessments and that sort of thing is concerned.

Col Sean Henry: The modalities would certainly have to be looked at very closely. Again, this task force that we recommend would certainly be involved with that. Certainly in regard to its connection with this committee, you would probably ask for and be given in camera sessions with it. There would also be, I'm sure, some open sessions, but as you know, out there right now there's a security and intelligence—

Mr. David Pratt: Review committee.

Col Sean Henry: In the PCO there are special security and intelligence people who brief cabinet on a regular basis. That function would at least interface with what we are talking about. The national security advisory agency would use the material that's being brought together by what is in place now to add to the studies they were doing. It wouldn't replace it, but they would draw upon those types of sources. The procedures for those bodies would remain in place and to some extent it would apply to the national security advisory agency.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: Could I have one more short one on the...

The Chair: Your time is over.

Mr. David Pratt: Very briefly...

The Chair: Monsieur Laurin...

Okay.

Mr. David Pratt: Given the bureaucratic lay of the land here in Ottawa and people protecting their turf, whether it's DND, DFAIT, the Privy Council Office, or the Prime Minister's Office, what do you think the likelihood is of this suggestion seeing the light of day?

Col Alain Pellerin: I think you're probably in a better position to feel the mood as to whether that would be likely. We're only saying that there is a requirement. Now, obviously there would have to be the political will at the highest level to push that, because it would be part of...

Col Sean Henry: This is extremely important. The way things are now with defence in Canada in regard to the measures that are being taken to try to improve it, we use words like “piecemeal”, “lack of strategic direction”. There's a lack of a star, a marquee player, out there to grab it.

Certainly, ladies and gentlemen, it's in your lap—it's in the laps of the politicians—to emerge with leadership in this area. Once that firm political direction has coalesced and is given, the other people out there in the military and in the civil service have to line up. Until that strong and decisive political direction comes, I'm afraid we're not going to go very far.

• 1010

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Thank you, Monsieur Laurin, for indulging our colleague. Now it's to you,

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, for five minutes.

Mr. René Laurin: Colonel, you mentioned the $1.5 billion gap between policy and reality. That's a substantial sum. I agree in principle that the armed forces should have the necessary funding to carry out the duties assigned to them. If they are being asked to take on too much, then it's up to us, the politicians, to review our objectives and not to demand more than they can deliver with the funding they receive.

However, you're requesting an additional $1.5 billion to achieve these objectives. The AG has told us that based on the audits conducted, it's clear DND is capable of developing sound management systems, but that often, it has difficultly implementing these systems. The AG noted the following:

It is disconcerting to note an ongoing inability to comply with rules respecting contracting practices, financial management, health and safety.

This is troubling indeed. Before I would agree to granting the department an additional $1.5 billion, I would want some assurances that the armed forces make optimum use of the funds they now receive. Do you agree with the AG's statements? Do you agree that under the circumstances, the department could save money and redirect it to other areas? That's the first step it needs to take.

Once we are confident that the armed forces spend the money allocated to them wisely, then we can decide whether or not to provide additional funding or to revise our objectives. First of all, however, we must ensure that programs are managed properly. Generally speaking, do you agree with the AG's comments?

Col Alain Pellerin: In my submission, I stated that

[English]

that we also recognized that DND has to clean its own house.

[Translation]

We argue that this is critically important. Notwithstanding this, we can't forget that the armed forces are being asked to take on a great deal. They are now involved in 21 peacekeeping missions around the world, up from five missions in the late eighties to a high of 22 recently, to the current 21. At the same time, our armed forces have been downsized by more than 30 per cent.

All I'm saying is that even if the department manages to save some money, given the responsibilities that the armed forces are being asked to assume, I've no doubt whatsoever that we are going to encounter some serious problems during the 21st century. I'm talking about humanitarian problems.

Over 30 internal conflicts are raging around the world. Canada's armed forces are constantly being called upon to lend a hand. Soon they may be sent to Africa, to Sierra Leone, or some other place.

There will always be a need to have adequate troop levels to meet this demand. Although the department does have some management problems, the real problem is the shortage of military personnel. Even if the government could manage to recover $200 million somewhere in the department by using better management techniques, this still wouldn't solve the under funding problem which has resulted in ongoing personnel cuts. Even now, there's talk of 60,000 members. Our military now has 57,000 or perhaps 56,000 members and this number will continue to fall because of under funding problems.

While better management systems are needed, the armed forces' budget also needs to be increased. In fact, the Finance Committee, which has never been one to recommend substantial defence spending, is recommending this year that a five-year program be instituted to modernize Canada's armed forces. The committee has recognized that this is a serious problem. The AG also focussed on the problems associated with poor management, but we believe that under funding is the most serious problem of all.

Mr. René Laurin: You say that hiring more personnel should be the number one priority. If you were to receive an additional $1.5 billion, how would you spend it? How many new military personnel would you hire? Would you spend this entire amount on staffing, or would you direct it to other priorities?

Col Alain Pellerin: In fact, there's talk of a $500 million increase in funding in the next budget. Let's just say that we need an additional $1.5 billion and that this sum should be awarded over a period of several years. We endorse the Finance Committee's recommendation to this effect.

• 1015

Troop strength is not, however, the only issue. I mention it because the armed forces were perhaps harder hit than other sectors. Equipment is also a concern.

Take, for example, the ongoing problems with the Sea King helicopters and the Hercules. Much of our military equipment needs to be replaced. How many 30- or 35-year-old vehicles are still on the road in Canada? We're asking our military to use aging, outdated equipment, whether in Kosovo or in East Timor, in very trying conditions. We wouldn't ask that of our civilian population.

The $1.5 billion in funding requested isn't only for hiring more military personnel, but also for replacing outdated equipment.

[English]

Col Sean Henry: It's a good question in order to clarify the numbers that are floating around.

The $500 million we are recommending is simply to keep the armed forces in business at the minimum level they are at now without going to what we call a desperation option, some of which are in here, such as to get rid of airplanes or to get rid of the Snowbirds. And as the CDS mentioned to you, there are forty other real desperation options. To prevent that, they need $500 million just to keep them in business.

The $1.5 billion is what is needed to make the armed forces minimally combat capable with respect to where they are now. So $500 million is to keep them in business, and $1.5 billion is to allow them to go back and do some training and to bring their level of capability back up.

The $8 billion the Auditor General is talking about has to do pretty well strictly with the weapon systems, equipment, and so on that are going to be needed in the next few years to replace things such as the helicopters that are falling out of the sky, and so on and so forth. So we're talking about different sums of money for different purposes.

And finally, the armed forces have been pushed to the wall with respect to reductions—reductions of bases, reductions of services, and so on.

Yes, there are probably some more items out there you could address, but they are not significant.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Laurin.

[English]

Back to this side of the table, are there any questions? Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: On the issue of procurement, with respect to your recommendation on an agency within DND, I'd like to get your comments on what's happened in the U.K. in terms of their smart procurement initiative, because they seem to be going in the opposite direction. Do you have any thoughts on that?

Col Alain Pellerin: I'm not too familiar with where they're going, but for instance the French are in the opposite direction. They've always had a system within le Secrétariat général de l'armement which not only procures weapons but also sells weapons abroad, because they're in a different situation. So they've always had a system within the Ministry of Defence.

Le Secrétariat général de l'armement is the equivalent for them of a deputy minister, that high level. I'm not sure about the U.K.

Col Sean Henry: The British got going on this, as you probably know, with quite an extensive program in the Royal Navy. In fact alternate service delivery almost originated there.

Again, I'm not hands-on either, but I would tell you this. The British Armed Forces have a much larger critical mass than the Canadian Armed Forces do, and it may be that that being the case, they are able to retain their military capability intact, and at the same time do what you're speaking of. In our case, that's not true. There is not enough critical mass to go much beyond where we are now.

Concerning the procurement agency, I believe you're going to have a presentation by the Canadian Defence Industries Association in the new year, and you should really question them in detail on that. But where we're coming from is to try to avoid both the waste and the bureaucratic detail that now occurs, because you basically have two organizations, one within DND and one outside DND, and when you finish doing it inside DND, you start all over again outside DND. So it is redundancy. That's the main factor we are after.

But as far as the nuts and bolts are concerned, the Defence Industries Association has a handle on that.

• 1020

Mr. David Pratt: I have another quick question on the issue of demilitarization. One of the things we've heard over the last couple of years has been the problem with what has been described as “careerism” within the Canadian Forces. Do you see those two issues linked?

Col Sean Henry: Well, it's strange you should mention that, because I was going to hand this out, but I thought the chairman might cut me off.

On the front page of this, we have an advertisement for the Royal Military College of Canada that appeared in Maclean's magazine. As you know, Maclean's will not include RMC as one of its universities, so DND spends money on advertisements. This is page one. There are actually four pages.

I would like to ask you whether or not what you see there causes you to think that RMC is a military operation. There's one person there in a military uniform, but you will note that person doesn't have a rifle, which you would normally expect. At the bottom, you see people in sweatsuits. I know for a fact that they don't go to classes at RMC in sweatsuits. But as far as we are concerned, if there is careerism, that's where the problem starts, because RMC is supposed to be the focus of implanting the military ethic in the minds of new officer cadets. The same thing goes for Saint-Jean with the other ranks.

In our estimation, demilitarization, some of the reasons having to do with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and others, starts there. And there it is. That's demilitarization—a perfect example.

On the back, just to go off a bit, there's a report of a new program heading down the road, and you can be sure that DND is going to have its arm twisted to fully conform to this program, which probably doesn't have an awful lot of military significance. But time, effort, and money are going to have to be spent on it.

Going back to the question that was asked, careerism occurs when people in the military have virtually given up. Let's face it, let's be realistic: we're all human beings and we all have self-interest. It occurs in certain people more than others. But if you have a proper military organization, where the military ethic and the service before self has been created in people's minds, it will be far less of a problem. Over the past 30 years, because of the corrosion of the military ethic and service before self, and because of demilitarization in the armed forces, the careerism factor has become more of a problem. This is not very useful in solving it.

The Chair: Thanks, Mr. Pratt. Now we come again to Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much.

I appreciate your comments, I really do, because I have been up in the House stating that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms left something out, and that was responsibilities. What you are saying about how in the military they can't discipline and some of them are afraid to say this or make this move—the same is happening in the school system. Just take a look. I know; I have a number of relatives who are school teachers. In fact a couple of them have just stepped down because of that situation. They refused to teach any more because of it.

I feel very strongly that we're not being fair to our young people. Something has to be done, it really does. The cadet system that was in place before is still needed. When we take a look at society today and look at the number of young people who are lost, if they were in the cadets or the reserve... They used to be taught discipline. Now, as you say, they are very careful in what they do in the system and what moves they make.

I'm wondering what steps we can take to turn this around, because I have to say there is a need in our society for more young people to get involved with the armed forces, with the young people in cadets. There's no question about that. I spoke at a dinner back home at our HMCS Brunswicker. The number of cadets really are way down compared to where they used to be. That tore up my heart a little bit, because then I go out on the street and I see things that are happening that shouldn't happen. If they were in the cadets, it wouldn't be happening. And we can turn it around. What steps can we take?

• 1025

Col Sean Henry: Well, the simple answer, which is very complex, is that as far as the armed forces are concerned, the first thing you have to look at is the question of exclusions from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Now, this gets people very excited. It's been tried before twice, and it was turned down flatly. But it has to be pursued at the political level, because until... And of course people go into a knee-jerk reaction when you mention this. We're not saying to wipe out the Charter of Rights and Freedoms for the armed forces, but there are a few very specific items that need exclusions or notwithstanding clauses applied to them with respect to the armed forces.

Other nations do this. They do not enforce things in the same way in the armed forces as they do in civil society. So from the political side it is necessary to start trying to make people understand this. We're under no illusions: the minute you start talking this way all sorts of interest groups are going to come out of the woodwork.

Col Alain Pellerin: Could I just add a point here on what can be done?

You mentioned the cadets, and I agree with you. It's still going, but it needs to be revitalized. The other aspect also is the militia and the reserve. I think they have to be revitalized. One of the problems is the issue of underfunding.

If you want to attract young people, you have to make it attractive, obviously, and the reserve and the militia, as you know, have a number of problems that need to be addressed. One issue is the issue of money. There's also the training and equipment to make it attractive to them. So when we talk about the armed forces and revitalizing, we need obviously to include the militia and the reserve in the package. The same goes for the cadet corps.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I have one other statement. I've heard it today, and I've heard you speak about the Sea Kings, the helicopters. When I watched the news the other night and saw the used submarines that we were purchasing, and three of the four had a lot of problems—

Mr. David Pratt: Some problems.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, and if our people hadn't been on top of that, we would have had bigger problems. So I really am saddened by the fact that we have to go out and purchase used submarines and not build brand-new submarines right here in Canada. I think that's something we have to pursue as well.

The Chair: I think if we build some in Saint John, it would be a great place to build some.

Some hon. members: Hear, hear.

The Chair: The Okanagan Valley too.

Col. Alain Pellerin: May I comment on the last one? There is a French quote that says “On a la défense de ses moyens”.

If the population or the government is not willing to provide the funding required, obviously we end up with a lot of obsolete equipment and armed forces that are not in the right numbers and combat capable.

The Chair: Well, that's very good.

I'm going to indulge myself now and have a couple of questions, because the other members have had a lot.

Yes, that's an interesting comment, Colonel. You get the armed forces you want or deserve. That's been said about government. We think Canadians are getting good government—not everyone might agree. But you get the government you want and deserve, and you get the armed forces you want, I guess, or will pay for. That leads me to one of my questions.

The polls show, happily, that there's increased support for more spending on the armed forces. We're certainly, most of us on this committee, waging the fight to try to make that happen in the next budget—or to have it continue to happen, because we finally had some new money last time.

Do you think, though, that public support in general extends to the issues you've raised today? I mean, do you think it's that strong that it would support things like a new special task force? You called for some very interesting measures, which I probably would support, but what about the people on Sparks Street right now, would they support it, in your view?

Col Alain Pellerin: Well, it would depend on whether it were explained to them why. For the poll that you quoted, I think there's an increase from the same poll from last year that the chief used in his annual report.

• 1030

It's very rewarding to see that the population may be ahead of the government on this issue. There is a lot support out there for our armed forces, notwithstanding a lot of the negative criticism we hear sometimes in the press, but a lot of positive comments recently.

I would like to use another example where the population is maybe ahead of our governments in democratic society. It is the issue of zero casualties, commitments in operations as long as there are no casualties, Kosovo being the recent example.

In the U.S., in a major study that was conducted by three universities and reported in the Washington Post, the population was ready to accept casualties provided the mission was clear to them.

So the population understands that the armed forces is a profession that is different and that the government asks a lot to put them in harm's way, and if you put them in harm's way there are likely to be casualties. History teaches us that whenever you commit troops, there are always casualties. Therefore the Kosovo example is a poor one.

All this to say that the population might be ahead of the government on these various issues. I think the government and a committee like yours needs to look at that to see what sort of support there is and how supportive the population is of the armed forces and the commitment of armed forces.

The Chair: I hope you're right on that. As I say, we know it's increasing; I just hope it would support some of the measures you're talking about.

I want to pick up my colleague Mr. Pratt's earlier question, involving other groups. The BCNI is fine, but frankly, with respect, it's not going to play to any great audience with a lot of the public, depending on your political philosophy. It will play to some, but not others.

What about the left side of the political spectrum? Can you somehow bring in people who support the human security agenda Mr. Pratt referred to?

There are people in Canada, and some in the House of Commons, who want to go and do wonderful things and stop people from killing each other, but they don't support the military. I don't understand the logic they seem to use, but it's there; it's a reality. Can you bring in some of these groups, co-opt them somehow through the human security part of this, and have a broader base to convince government, which is sensitive to the public, that it should do what you're calling for?

Col Alain Pellerin: I think that's an excellent question.

In fact, as free publicity, our annual seminar and annual general meeting on January 27, 2000, will be on Parliament and the armed forces. Two of you have been invited to participate in this, including the chairman. Parliament will not be in session, but I hope we'll get people from Parliament and also people... You mentioned people outside. I have in mind, for instance, Ernie Regehr, of Project Plowshares, for whom I have a lot of respect, with whom I had a lot of dealings before when I was director of nuclear policy at DND. Obviously he was on the other side on the issue of nuclear policy, but on his recent comments in support of the need for troops for humanitarian missions, we can sit at the same table. We always sat at the same table, but we can agree on that. I would hope we could have groups like that, that we could coalesce in coming up with more support for defence. There's no doubt we have to work harder at that.

Within our own organization, we do have a lot of organizations that are traditionally pro-defence, but there's no reason we can't bring more inside our umbrella. There's no doubt about that.

In fact I had a similar conversation yesterday at lunch with Doug Bland, who spent the morning with Senator Rompkey and discussed all these various issues and the CDA and how we can work at them. One thing we could do, and again it's a question of education you're talking about, is to work more closely with members of Parliament and senators and have breakfasts, roundtable discussions on defence and security issues. I think we would be very willing to do that sort of thing.

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Col Sean Henry: I should point out to Mr. Chairman and the committee that I am a dues-paying member of the Canadian Peace Alliance. So we are well aware of what we have to do.

Unfortunately, on the downside, as you well know, many people on the other side of the fence are what I can only call “doctrinaire”. There's ideology in there, and they are extremely difficult to budge. On the other hand, there are some who I think understand the new realities. I would simply go back to what I said earlier in relation to Mr. Pratt's question: that they have to be convinced that human security requires a robust military framework. If that point of departure is used, I think you can bring them in.

It's quite interesting that out there among the NGOs, Médecins sans Frontières, who got the Nobel Prize, are, as far as I have found out in my own knowledge, the one NGO on the humanitarian aid side. They support the military. They have come out, and I've talked to some of them, and there's no doubt in their minds that what I said about the framework analogy is quite true. So I think that has to be exploited.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. David Pratt: Mr. Chair, could I ask a follow-up question on that?

The Chair: Sure. We'll go to whichever member has a question now.

Mr. Pratt, and then Mr. Laurin.

Mr. David Pratt: In terms of building further coalitions, Médecins sans Frontières is definitely one of the organizations that has first-hand experience in terms of dealing with the results of war.

You talked about the NGOs, but there are lots of groups in Canada—and I'm thinking of development groups here, whether it's World Vision or other groups—that I think understand very clearly that you cannot have development in third world countries without stability, and in order to have stability in some cases you have to have the application of military force to ensure that stability is there.

Again, as a follow-up, maybe it's time for the CDA not to look at formal arrangements, but an informal coalition of groups. I'm thinking here of groups like the Red Cross, for instance. Those folks are involved very deeply in dealing with the results of war and have a better appreciation of what security is all about in war zones. So that's just by way of suggestion.

Col Sean Henry: That is definitely a positive suggestion. Unfortunately, past a certain point you will run into not only doctrinaire political approaches but resources and money.

It is not by accident that when we started talking about a $1.5 billion shortfall between the 1994 white paper and what the armed forces require, you suddenly had people in the streets in Ottawa here lobbying on behalf of the homeless, who also wanted $1.5 billion. That was not accidental. There are people out there who see this as a black and white issue.

In many of the things we do, we have tried to point out that it is not a black and white issue, that armed forces are necessary to guarantee the prosperity that in turn leads to the government being able to afford social programs. A lot of people will throw you out of their office if you say that, but that's the line you have to take, that it is not a black and white issue, but many people preach it that way.

The Chair: It's not an either/or issue.

[Translation]

Do you have a question, Mr. Laurin?

Mr. René Laurin: Before I get to that, there's something I want to know. Some of the documents contain the heading “Conférence des associations de la défense”, while others refer to the “Congrès des associations de la défense”.

Col Alain Pellerin: They are one and the same organization. A few years ago, we used the word “congrès”, but we changed the designation in French to “conférence”.

Mr. René Laurin: I see.

Col Alain Pellerin: We felt that it was a more accurate reflection of the English designation.

Mr. René Laurin: My question concerns a comment made earlier by Colonel Henry.

You stated that perhaps the Charter of Rights and Freedoms should not apply to members of the military. Do you think that this might make it more difficult to recruit new members? How much might it cost the government to renounce human rights? Could this have adverse consequences? I'd be interested in finding out what you think about the subject.

[English]

Col Sean Henry: I'm now taking your general question to a specific example.

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Going back to the Royal Military College and the concern of people in DND that RMC has to put out advertisements in order to get recruits, they are concerned that this reflects the Charter of Rights. Recently there also has been a poll taken at RMC that was acquired through the Access to Information Act by the media somewhere. It indicated that the people at RMC, the cadets, are concerned about this sort of thing as well. So I believe the answer to your question is in the negative. There are enough people out there who understand what the military is going to demand of them, but when they come in and join the military, they are disappointed to find that the military is watered down.

In the United States there is a very similar situation. People have been saying the U.S. Armed Forces, and particularly the army, are having difficulty in meeting their recruiting quotas. One part of the U.S. Armed Forces is oversubscribed, and that's the U.S. Marine Corps. The U.S. Marine Corps has never deviated from its—

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: I understand what you're saying, but there's a difference between recruiting members of the military, and court martialling a person for refusing to get a vaccination. Human rights become an issue. We're talking about two extremes. If the members of our armed forces are excluded from the provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, then I think this goes beyond the example you gave involving the uniform.

Col Alain Pellerin: In my colleague's defence, I don't think he said, nor do I think the CDA suggested, that the armed forces should be excluded from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. There is no question that the armed forces are accountable to Parliament and must comply with the laws enacted by Parliament.

However, under certain circumstances, in so far as certain Charter provisions are concerned, a notwithstanding clause should apply to armed forces members. For instance, maybe we should take a closer look at the issue of women in the military. We always hear the same old arguments. You may recall that two weeks ago, a very good article on the subject appeared in the National Post.

In view of the Charter provisions, the department and the armed forces were forced to comply with the law and to allow women into all areas of the armed forces, the one exception being submarine duty.

That's not the problem, however. Not many women ask to join the combat forces. It's not a matter of reacting negatively to the Charter, but rather a question of being realistic. Women are not asking to be accepted into certain sectors of the military. This is one specific example, but undoubtedly there are others.

[English]

Col Sean Henry: I would take that a step further. It is very important that we do reinforce the point that we are not saying we take all the charter away. There are very specific little items, maybe about five, for which there should be a modification of the provisions of the charter.

The business about the women in the combat arms is hugely explosive. I think I would take it a step further and say the concern is with mixing. The definitive word is “mixing” men and women in the combat arms, especially in the infantry. If we were a larger armed force and it were required to bring women into the combat arms, we would do what other nations have done and have separate units. That has always been the case in the past when demographics have meant that you have to bring women in to actually meet your personnel quotas. In the Russian army and more recently in the Israeli army, they have separate female units.

In the Israeli army they ran into real problems in the 1967 War, with mixed men and women in places like tank turrets and so on. Their solution was rather interesting: they now have their women staffing and operating their combat arms school. In fact it wasn't so long ago that the commandant of their armour school was a female brigadier-general. That's a good solution, because you're giving women the opportunity and you're encouraging them, but you are not getting into this situation in which you have the mixing of them, and in which there are all sorts of problems. That would require a modification of the Charter of Rights, not throwing it out.

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The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Laurin.

We have lost our quorum because some of the members on our side were needed in the House. It's not a lack of interest, I can assure you.

I'm going to now give the floor to Mr. Hart to propose what I think is a very good idea.

Mr. Jim Hart: Mr. Chairman, given the time of year and the fact that this is actually the last defence committee meeting before the new year, I would just like to put on the record that the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs congratulates the men and women of the Canadian Forces for their service in Canada and abroad in 1999. The members of the committee also extend their best wishes to all members of the Canadian Forces and their families, particularly those personnel who will be away from their families this holiday season.

The Chair: Thank you.

That would reflect the sentiments of all of us, I'm sure. We want to congratulate and certainly thank them. I know that's the intention, and I'm sure we all support that. At the first chance that we get to make that official with a quorum, I think we would be intent on doing that.

Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: As you know, all five groups of the merchant navy men have come together. They have now agreed, and they have all signed off. That's hopefully a Christmas present that's going to be presented to Mr. Baker by the deputy minister today. That's because of this committee and the last recommendations. And I want to thank all my colleagues for accepting it when I said they have to do it on their own. Well, they fought it out on their own in the last 48 hours, and they got it.

The Chair: That's very good.

We all spent a lot of hours on that issue, but as chair I think I should acknowledge on behalf of all of the committee that Mrs. Wayne put a lot of extra hours in on the issue. She showed an awful lot of interest in and leadership on that file, and I think she's to be congratulated. I know the merchant mariners know her dedication to their cause. Many members share that, but she certainly has put in an awful lot of extra time. Frankly, I don't know how she's been doing it, but congratulations to you, Mrs. Wayne.

Mr. Hart, I think your proposal is excellent. I don't know if there are any more comments on it. If we had enough members here, we'd formalize it today. Certainly it reflects the desire of this committee to congratulate and thank the men and women of our Canadian Forces, with a special one to those people who are overseas in dangerous situations. Thank you for bringing that forward.

Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your very interesting, thought-provoking presentation. There's a request that we get a copy of Dr. Bland's article at some point. That would be great. I want to thank you very much for appearing here today.

Monsieur Laurin has a question.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn, there's something I'd like to know.

I believe Mr. Goldring was scheduled to table a motion. I was a little late arriving at the last committee meeting. I'd like to know what happened to this motion. Was it in fact presented?

[English]

The Chair: No. Mr. Goldring sent a notice out, but he's never been at committee to actually present it. It's still just a notice of his intention to put that forward. Just to address it, Monsieur Laurin and colleagues, I'm not sure there's much we can do with it anyway. It's the subject of a court action right now. We can receive his motion, but I don't think there's much the committee can do because that very issue is before the courts. Anyway, when he's here we'll discuss it.

As Jim said, it's the last meeting of the session, of the century, of the millennium—some people are arguing that, anyway, and it is in my opinion, sort of—so congratulations to everybody for the good work we've been doing and for trying to be as non-partisan as possible. Thank you, colleagues, for your good cooperation. Joyeux Noël, Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to you and your loved ones, and we'll see you all back here in the New Year. Thank you.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. You do a good job.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

The committee is adjourned.