NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, February 24, 2000

• 0903

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I would like to call to order this meeting of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

Colleagues, just before we welcome our witnesses, on behalf of all of us, I'm sure, I would like to congratulate Mr. Proud on yesterday being elected president of our NATO parliamentary association.

Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

The Chair: Mr. Hanger was elected one of the VPs for the opposition. Mr. Hart was elected as councillor—I think that's right, George—as were Mr. Pratt and Mr. Price.

So we're well represented on that NATO organization.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): There was a meeting yesterday?

An hon. member: Yesterday at noon.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I would have liked...as one of the directors for the United Kingdom parliamentary group.

The Chair: Hear, hear! Congratulations, Mrs. Wayne. I didn't know about that.

We congratulate everyone on their new positions.

Let's begin. I'd like to welcome our witnesses. I'm going to ask Mr. Bon to introduce the people with him.

Mr. Daniel Bon (Acting Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy, Department of National Defence): Chairman, my name is Daniel Bon, and I am here as the acting assistant deputy minister for policy at National Defence.

I have with me Colonel Randy Price, our director of western hemisphere policy, and Mr. George Betts, the acting director for policy development.

• 0905

[Translation]

I will begin my presentation in French. I am here to talk to you about the American anti-missile defence system. As far as I know, this is the first time the subject has been discussed more or less officially in Canada. This subject obviously has many important ramifications for Canada and the future of co-operative defence efforts between Canada and the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I know that our members of parliament do not like to use abbreviations, but I would like to use two this morning during my presentation. The first is NMD, which stands for national missile defence, and is translated by “défense nationale antimissiles” in French. The other abbreviation, ABM, means anti-ballistic missile, or “systèmes antimissiles balistiques” in French.

I would like to begin the presentation by briefly speaking about the anti-ballistic missile treaty, which is very important and is at the heart of NMD discussions.

The ABM Treaty dates back to 1972. Two countries signed this treaty: the United States and the former Soviet Union, that is, modern-day Russia. It was reviewed in 1974 and clarified in 1997. Russia and the United States had agreed at first to protect their capitals or an anti-missile missile site, but not their entire countries.

In order to discourage a nuclear attack, part of each country's territory had to remain exposed so as to allow the other the opportunity to retaliate for a nuclear strike. Obviously, this agreement was partially based on the fact no technology existed at the time that could efficiently protect an entire nation.

That being said, I will now continue with the main topic of this presentation. What is NMD? We could probably define the term more easily by saying what it is not. First, it has nothing to do with the famous star wars strategic defence initiative announced by President Reagan in 1983. Second, the United States no longer seeks to implement an impenetrable shield comprised of futuristic technologies in order to protect itself from a massive Russian attack. Third, NMD will not be as exorbitantly expensive as the famous shield described by Mr. Reagan, which would have cost hundreds of billions of dollars.

Why do the United States feel the need to implement a national anti-missile defence system? The United States primarily wish to adapt their defence capabilities to what they perceive to be the post-Cold War reality. For them, this reality consists, among others, of the limited threat posed by such proliferating countries as North Korea, Iran or Irak. Although these countries represent at best an embryonic menace, the danger appears very real to American eyes. Please note that neither Russia nor China are mentioned, except to state that NMD would protect American territory against an accidental missile launch or a launch not authorized by the government of either country .

There is an issue that affects us as Canadians. Given our geographical location, we find ourselves in an area that could be defended by NMD. But it must be said that we would not be automatically protected because the number of American interceptors is limited.

• 0910

The desire to protect oneself against an accidental or non- authorized launch is readily understandable. However, the desire to protect oneself against relatively weak countries is less evident.

I freely admit that even the most irrational leader would not announce on television world-wide that he is about to launch missiles at Washington, Rome or Paris. I do not believe that he would call Larry King to make such an announcement. This is very important.

Imagine Irak being armed with intercontinental missiles and weapons capable of large-scale destruction, then invading Kuwait. Suppose that the international community wishes to repel this invasion, like it did in 1991. If Saddam, with his back to the wall, feels that his regime is defeated, his cause lost, could we not bet that he would launch every missile at his disposal against as many enemies as possible? And if this possibility existed and the members of an eventual coalition, starting with the United States, could not protect their troops or their people, would they not be dissuaded from intervening in the attack on Kuwait? This is exactly the type of situation that the United States seeks to avoid. For them, it is important that a proliferating and blackmailing leader with a handful of ballistic missiles and a few nuclear warheads could force the United States and their allies from intervening in a conflict.

Is NMD really necessary? South of the border, the answer is becoming more evident. It is true that some American experts remain skeptical both with regard to the technology as well as to the threat, the fact remains that more and more Americans are convinced that NMD is necessary.

Among the four presidential candidates, Bush and McCain have both declared themselves favorable to rapidly implementing such a system. Although Gore is more cautious, he plans to implement the NMD if doing so is technically, financially and politically feasible.

As far as the average American is concerned, when asked to think about the issue, his answer is fairly straightforward. He believes that the United States are already capable of deploying anti-missile defence systems in a military theatre to protect their troops in a sensitive zone. Furthermore, this capacity was demonstrated in 1991 when the United States used Patriot missiles to help protect Israel. And they are now engaged in negotiations with Japan and Taiwan to protect these countries.

Given these conditions, how could our average American possibly admit that his country would choose to remain at the mercy of a ballistic missile launch? Personally, and this is truly my own opinion, I conclude that, based on everything I have just said, NMD will be implemented sooner rather than later.

• 0915

What will NMD be comprised of? A final version of the project has not yet been released, but preliminary plans indicate that it will consist of two phases. Phase 1 will involve a system that would be capable of intercepting a few dozen nuclear warheads. This phase of the project would be operational five years after the decision would be made to implement NMD; 100 interceptors will be employed as a line of defence and a radar will be installed in Alaska, with another five anti-ballistic missile radars being used as well, two of which would be in Great Britain and Greenland. Phase 2, which would be implemented in 2010, would involve improving the defence system so as to allow the United States to protect themselves from sophisticated missiles, such as warheads accompanied by decoys, although these improvements would not increase the number of missiles they could protect themselves against. More interceptors would be added, a second radar site would be constructed in addition to the one in Alaska, and further radars would be employed too.

If we try to look beyond these two phases, everything is pretty vague. The United States are making preparations to protect themselves against missiles that could be developed over the next twenty years by the year 2020. The exact characteristics of these missiles are unknown.

The improvements made to the defence system will be rather limited, and would undoubtedly involve increasing the number of interceptors and one or two additional defence sites. However, new technology could also be used, such as lasers that could destroy missiles when they are launched.

Please note that none of these steps are designed to allow the United States to protect themselves against a full-scale attack from Russia. None of these steps weaken the foundation of a strategic equilibrium. In principle, Russia has no need to worry, insofar as its strategic relationship with the United States is concerned.

[English]

I will now switch to English.

President Clinton is slated to make his decision about deployment this summer or next fall. In fact, given potential political, technical, and strategic realities, he may well choose to leave the decision to his successor.

Be that as it may, the President has stated that four considerations will determine whether the United States decides to deploy or not: (a) technology—will it work; (b) the persistence of the threat—is it real; (c) cost—is it affordable; and (d) national security considerations—is NMD a solution or more of a problem? In other words, could the potential impact of NMD on international arms control, in relations with Russia and China and with NATO allies, outweigh the benefits of NMD? I will deal with each of these considerations in turn.

First, will it work? The technology for NMD is based on existing technology. Even so, it remains largely unproven. Tests of hit-to-kill missiles, the famous bullet against bullet, have had some success, but questions continue to be asked. The first interceptor test took place on October 2, 1999, and it was successful. It was successful, but I'm sure you have heard that the reliability of the test has been questioned.

The second test missed by a hair on January 18, 2000. It was to a degree a failure, but it is a failure that has also been described as a success.

The third test is tentatively scheduled for April or early May, and 17 more tests, different types of tests, are to follow. Since the integration of various high-tech elements in a coordinated system able to detect, track, and destroy incoming missiles in a very limited time is a colossal challenge, the debate is likely to last a while longer.

• 0920

This debate can be quite easy to follow at times. People are fairly blunt. Last year the U.S. Department of Defense panel that was created for that purpose warned that NMD suffers from inadequate testing, spare parts shortages, and project management lapses. A year earlier the same panel had already given warning that we were rushing to failure. More recently, in mid-February, the very brave director of testing and evaluation in the U.S. Department of Defense also called for more time in the NMD testing schedule, saying “Undue pressure has been placed on the program to meet an artificial decision point”.

Let us bear in mind that time is usually on the side of technology. Such questions really have more to do with the pace of development than with long-term doubts that the technology will eventually work. In fact, tests have shown that it can work; it just isn't known yet how well and how soon.

What about the reality of the threat? Until recently, conventional wisdom was that no threat to North America would emerge in the coming decade or even longer. This was challenged by former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in his 1998 report to Congress. Rumsfeld argued that proliferators could have missiles with intercontinental range within as little as five years if they were able to buy weapons rather than having to develop them on their own. The report was widely accepted in the United States, including eventually—because it was not at first—by the Clinton administration after a series of events that occurred later that year and that appeared to give credence to the Rumsfeld report.

First you will recall that India and Pakistan each conducted nuclear tests. You also know that North Korea test fired a new Taepo Dong missile. These developments cast very serious doubts about intelligence assessments of the international spread of missiles and nuclear materials and expertise. Today, official U.S. intelligence estimates are that within 15 years, the United States, in their own words, will most likely face a long-range missile threat from North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq. The U.S. is especially concerned that proliferating states will be able to threaten North America by mating missiles with nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads.

Now to the matter of costs. To tell you the truth, it is not entirely clear how much the NMD will cost. For one thing, development is not complete. For another, the number of agencies and programs that are involved is fairly large. What I think I know is that $3.9 billion was originally allocated to the NMD for the period 1999-2005 and an additional $6.6 billion in new funding was later allocated for deployment if the decision is to deploy. In total, General Macdonald tells me that the funding total currently is $12.7 billion.

You have to remember also that the United States invested fairly heavily—several billion dollars—in ballistic missile defence between 1983 and 1996. In fact, some estimates put that figure at between $40 billion and $60 billion.

• 0925

The fourth of the Clinton criteria brings into focus national security considerations. In effect, the question is whether NMD really is a solution or one of those concepts pregnant with larger problems. Specific issues in this context are the potential impact of NMD on international arms control regimes, relations with China and Russia, and relations with NATO allies. Implications for arms control lead to another set of issues that I will discuss separately.

The Russians are deeply suspicious of national missile defence. They see it as a U.S. attempt to gain strategic superiority over them. China also opposes the U.S. plans for NMD. It opposes even more strenuously prospects of U.S. cooperation with Japan and Taiwan to defend those countries. In effect, China sees both approaches as part of a single, coordinated U.S. plan to counter the full range of its nuclear capabilities. As for NATO allies, they would all prefer that NMD deployment take place in a cooperative international political environment that would be conducive to arms control and non-proliferation.

In addition, the NATO allies have specific reasons for opposing NMD in some instances that are specifically their own. France is worried about the impact on its nuclear deterrent. Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway have all expressed concerns about the decoupling of North America and Europe. And the U.K. shares these concerns even though it is working to avoid NMD becoming the source of discord within the alliance.

Does Canada share the view of the U.S. about the need for NMD? It depends on who you mean by Canada. Certainly what I have noticed is that the intensity of belief in NMD seems to drop somewhat the further you get from National Defence Headquarters. But on the whole, I would say that people who, like me, think a lot about the defence of this country and understand U.S. concerns, even when they are not quite as worried about the threat as our colleagues in Washington or Colorado Springs may be, are perhaps also a little skeptical about the technology and the costs involved.

For Canada, though, these ultimately may be the wrong questions to ponder. The real issue for Canada may be a very different one. Canada must ask itself two questions in fact. First, what about the potential impact on arms control and our international image as a strong advocate of security through international agreements? Second, what impact would leaving the U.S. to go at it alone have on our defence relationship with our most important ally? Not least, what about the impact on the North American Air Defence Agreement, NORAD? If, or rather when, the United States goes ahead with national missile defence, we may be faced with a very difficult dilemma.

I should make clear at this point that, in the broader sense, Canada has not been opposed in principle to a national missile defence system provided it was deployed in a cooperative international political environment, complementary to arms control and non-proliferation regimes. The 1994 white paper noted Canada's interest in the evolution of the U.S. plans for ballistic missile defence including:

...a strong commitment on the part of the United States to developing a missile defence posture that enhances global stability and is consistent with existing arms control agreements.

That is at page 26 of the English text.

• 0930

On the same page, the white paper continues by saying:

...Canada is interested in gaining a better understanding of missile defence through research and in consultation with like-minded nations.

On pages 26 and 27, it goes on to say:

Canadian involvement in ballistic missile defence would also have to be cost-effective and affordable, make an unambiguous contribution to Canada's defence needs, and build on missions the Forces already perform, such as surveillance and communications.

Finally, at pages 27 and 28, the white paper indicated that if Canada were to participate in the NMD—actually, at the time it was called ballistic missile defence, or BMD—it would probably prefer to do so under the aegis of NORAD.

Of course, to this day the Government of Canada has neither been formally asked, nor has it made any decision to participate in national missile defence. You know that very well. What may come perhaps as more of a surprise to you is that in fact we may never be asked. After all, national missile defence plans require neither Canadian territory, our technology, our money—we don't have any—nor our personnel. Some important American officials have said they would prefer Canada to be involved, and Washington would certainly appreciate having our political support in this matter, as well as to maintain our partnership in North America. But there are also a number of important Americans who would just as happily do without us.

All that said, even if we were asked to participate tomorrow, the government would need to know much more before it could make a decision. It would need to know in particular the answer to questions such as: What would the system do for us? Could we influence the design of the system? What role would we play in the operations of the system? And what would participation cost? Most important of all, Canada would need to know what the impact of NMD would be on arms control, and particularly the ABM treaty, the anti-ballistic missile treaty.

The ABM treaty seems to be the single greatest obstacle in the way of NMD. Why? Firstly, it is considered the foundation of strategic stability upon which nuclear arms reduction agreements such as the strategic arms reduction treaties, the START treaties, are built. Secondly, it is considered a cornerstone of international arms control efforts against nuclear proliferation, along with the comprehensive test ban treaty and the overarching nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The obligation of non-nuclear states to respect their commitments with regard to nuclear non-proliferation is based on a parallel pledge from the nuclear powers with regard to nuclear disarmament. Given the recent nuclear tests in India and Pakistan, given Russia's failure to ratify the 1993 START II treaty, and given the U.S. Senate's refusal last October to ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty, international arms control and non-proliferation regimes are already under severe strain. There could be further damage if the U.S. decided to unilaterally abrogate the ABM treaty. And thirdly, the ABM treaty is a touchstone of U.S. relations with Russia and is highly significant to China. They have both warned of the potential for a new strategic arms race if the U.S. were to deploy national missile defence.

The U.S. is keenly aware that the NMD system would go beyond the limitation of the ABM treaty as it exists today. As I mentioned at the start of my presentation, the treaty simply does not allow for protection of the whole country, and that is precisely what NMD would be intended to achieve. But the treaty is not immutable. The U.S. would like Russia to agree to a way of making NMD and the ABM treaty compatible. In fact, negotiations began in September 1999 to allow for protection of national territory, not against all attacks but against limited strikes. The U.S. still believes—or at least it hopes—that Russia will agree to changes in the ABM treaty that will make deployment of NMD protection possible.

• 0935

Where does all that leave us? It is hard to say, and it is certainly not for me to say. Speaking for Defence officials, we recognize that a threat is developing, and even if it isn't quite as clear and present a danger as some NMD advocates claim, it is likely only a matter of a couple of decades before it becomes one.

All the technologies in the area of defence take a long time to develop. Anti-missile technology is maturing, and even though there are still problems, they will probably be worked out. That said, salvation is not only to be found in weapons; arms control regimes are no less important to our security. We are therefore urging the U.S. and Russia to come to terms with regard to the ABM treaty. They have revised and added to it before, and they should be able to do it again.

We also recognize that everything points to the U.S. proceeding with NMD. At a minimum, it is highly unlikely that it won't. Defence cooperation between Canada and the United States remains central to our security, and ultimately perhaps to our sovereignty. We are therefore following with great interest the progress of national missile defence in the U.S. I am sure the government will want to address this issue in all its dimensions.

I will end my presentation here and do my best to deal with your questions. On a note of caution, if you have technical questions about national missile defence, as a policy officer I'm really not well equipped to address them. So you may want to hold them until next Tuesday when you will have General Macdonald here. He has all the answers to that type of question.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Mr. Bon, thank you very much.

I just wonder if either you or one of your colleagues would like to make any introductory remarks about the revolution in military affairs, other than national missile defence. If not, that's fine. We'll pursue that further on.

With this meeting today, we're beginning a series of meetings on the revolution and military affairs. Of course the most immediate topic therein is what you've just spoken about—national missile defence. I don't know whether any of you have some introductory comments for us on where we're headed in RMA in more general terms, just briefly. If you do, we'll be glad to hear them.

Mr. Daniel Bon: I think we will leave that aside, as we're not really the right people to talk about it. I would just note that NMD is certainly an area where there is a whole lot of technology, but the link between RMA and NMD is not a direct one, in the sense that NMD really traces its rootes back to the Reagan initiative in 1983 and the efforts that had taken place before that.

The Chair: Very good. Thank you very much.

I'll just indicate then, colleagues, before we go to questions, that we will be having subsequent briefings on the RMA in more general terms.

Mr. Koerner, one of our researchers, has provided for you—you should have received it—a brief overview on RMA and some questions for us to consider as committee members. We'll look at those at another meeting, and have appropriate officials at another meeting to give us that RMA overview.

With General Macdonald visiting next Tuesday, as has been noted, we felt it was very important to have this briefing on NMD before he arrived.

So let's go right to questions with the first round, seven minutes, Mr. Hanger.

• 0940

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Bon, I had the opportunity last week to attend a meeting in Calgary. It was addressed by Dr. Hamre, who I believe is the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the United States. His message was fairly simple. He said that North American national missile defence will take place in the United States, one way or the other. He had concerns about Canada's position overall, in the general alliance with them.

I posed the following question to him. Canada had, and still does have, a considerable amount of influence south of the border in some military circles. I understand there are two Canadian generals in NORAD who decide, along with an American general, on missile launches anywhere in the world, as to direction, threat, etc., and can call certain shots on what to do, as far as a response to those missile launches.

I also understand that Canada may lose that position in NORAD and the Brits are attempting to—I don't know if you want to call it—usurp, or maybe the Americans want someone there besides Canada. If Canada were to bow out of this missile defence that the Americans are speaking of right now, how much further would it jeopardize Canada's position in NORAD and other alliances?

Mr. Daniel Bon: Mr. Hanger, you are correct in saying there are Canadian generals in the chain of command in this part of NORAD. They do play a role in terms of the detection of missile launches, and so on and so forth. I don't think, however, they play a role in terms of anything that would be a response to those launches, besides a warning.

To come to your real question, which is in terms of our influence, certainly if the United States goes ahead with NMD and decides to locate the command for NMD at NORAD—and it's not a done deal, as other U.S. commands are quite interested in having that as part of their responsibility—and if Canada says “We don't want to be involved in NMD”, it will stress the NORAD relationship.

It is not impossible, however, to conceive of a sort of split of activities within NORAD where there would continue to be an American-Canadian chain for airplanes that might come in or detection of missiles, but there would be a different one for NMD with strictly Americans or something else. It's something that has been mooted, I think, by the generals at NORAD.

As far as Britain being involved, I don't know anything about that.

Mr. Art Hanger: Dr. Hamre also mentioned that Europe is now softening their position toward the missile defence. They are coming more to realize that if North Korea is capable of launching a missile, say within five years, that could target somewhere in North America, they could also be in a position to target somewhere in Europe.

Is it your perspective that Europe will be more agreeable, if you will, to this defence system in the near future?

Mr. Daniel Bon: I have not detected any signs that the Europeans feel terribly comfortable with it. There was an article in Jane's Defence Weekly, I think a few weeks back, that suggested Mr. Hoon had indicated to Bill Cohen that they might be interested in being protected too. But General Macdonald was misquoted in Jane's Defence Weekly recently, so it's not a given that Mr. Hoon actually said that.

• 0945

On top of it, we have had other indications from the British side that seem to go in the other direction.

I think there is unease amongst the Europeans, in the sense that a number of them, including the French minister who was here last Monday, realize there is a threat, or at least there will be a threat, and perhaps they will be in danger. The question in their minds is they are not entirely sure NMD is the best way of dealing with it, and certainly in terms of NMD proper, which is a defence of North America, it makes a number of them uneasy because they would not be protected. So I think we will have very interesting debates in NATO for quite some time.

Mr. Art Hanger: I find it rather remarkable that when you compare the level of debate in the United States and the knowledge of the average person, it seems to be significantly more focused on missile defence or any kind of national security issue, but definitely NMD, whereas in Canada the average person on the street knows little or nothing about this defence system, or even the threat for that matter.

What do you think should happen here? I think there should be a significant debate in the country, not just in the military or within the confines of a few politicians. It should be more focused on input from people, overall. What do you think should happen, beyond what we're doing right now?

Mr. Daniel Bon: I'm not sure what should happen, but I think you are right in your analysis, and there are good reasons for that. The United States is a superpower—in fact it is the superpower. It has interests the world over; therefore it has enemies the world over.

Canada does not have the same profile, and it certainly has a different approach to the world, which I think leads Canadians to not perceive as many threats out there. I think you are right that it's always a good idea to have debates. I expect this meeting today may be the beginning of something a bit more visible in terms of a discussion in Canada.

The Chair: That's exactly the point of these hearings: to begin a debate at the parliamentary level on the pros and cons of such a system and whether or not, when asked, Canada should participate.

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin.

Mr. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): Mr. Chairman, I am not sure where I should begin because I have so many questions.

I will begin to address the issue as follows. Mr. Bon, despite the fact the Americans are our friends, can we be certain that they are being sincere when they talk about installing an NMD system? Will they not take advantage of the system once it is installed to develop it further? I think this is what worries Russia, who does not want to allow the treaty to be modified.

Canada finds itself in an awkward position. The United States may be threatened, but the greatest threat to Canada, I believe, is being the United States' neighbour.

If our neighbouring country was not at risk of being attacked, we would be safe. Even though the United States has friends around the world, they also have enemies around the world. They may be attacked, and we will be caught in the crossfire.

Canada has to adopt a position. Will Canada wait until the United States have made a decision before giving its opinion, or should it—and I think we should—state our position first so that we may influence the United States? Personally, I have the impression that the Americans will pursue their program and implement the system anyway.

• 0950

I recently attended a meeting in Washington where 14 NATO countries were represented. The people from those countries, even if they did not wish to appear to give their consent to the implementation of such a system, accepted almost as a foregone conclusion that the United States would install this system, regardless of the opinion of their allies.

These are my comments; I would like to hear what you have to say about them.

Mr. Daniel Bon: I believe that your analysis of the situation is similar to my own. In fact, it is very likely that the United States will implement an NMD system. They have the means to do so, they don't need anyone's permission and they think that it is in their best interests to install such a system. Therefore, they will do so, without a doubt.

Now, as for Canada being endangered since it is a neighbouring country to the United States is a danger many countries envy. The United States are an exceptional neighbour. Many countries would like to be neighbours to the United States.

Now, with regard to the issue being discussed, if the United States feel the need to implement an anti-missile defence system, it is because they think they are at risk of being attacked by missiles.

I am tempted to agree a bit with you because I cannot imagine North Korea attacking Canada. But I believe that the information I presented during my presentation would hold true even if Canada was not a neighbour of the United States.

Imagine Irak invading Kuwait in the future and the international community—I did not say the United States—would wish to do something. If Irak had nuclear weapons and found itself with its back to the wall, it is possible that, since it would have nothing to lose, it could launch its missiles. At that time, the desire of the international community to take action would be compromised.

Thus, I believe there is truth in what you have said, but the issue has far greater repercussions.

Mr. René Laurin: What would change if the United States stationed a hundred more interceptors in Alaska or in North Dakota, and what good would they be against the thousands of anti-ballistic missiles that Russia already has at its disposal? We can believe that the first missiles would be intercepted by those bases. However, there would be not hundreds but thousands of missiles, and in the end, some would get through since we would have no more interceptors while there would still be ballistic missiles waiting to be launched.

Isn't this all a bit unrealistic? How effective would all this be? But maybe the goal is to further develop a strategic position in five years.

Mr. Daniel Bon: It must be said that the United States wishes to use NMD as a defence against a small number of missiles, such as an attack from North Korea, a country that would never have more than a handful of missiles, or maybe an attack from Iran or Irak in the long term, but not an attack from Russia.

The basis of NMD is to not use the system as a defence against Russia or China, but against a tiny country with a few nuclear weapons and, eventually, against an accidental launch or the firing of a small number of Russian or Chinese missiles by a commander with bizarre ideas, acting without the authorization of his government.

It is not, and I mean absolutely not, an attempt to implement a shield against a Russian or Chinese attack.

Mr. René Laurin: As for that last point, since Russia and the United States signed a treaty in 1972 with regard to such a defence system, do you believe that the United States can violate this treaty without their allies' approval. If the Americans did violate the treaty, their allies would not retaliate by imposing sanctions, because it is difficult to imagine imposing sanctions against the United States, but would react in some other way?

• 0955

Mr. Daniel Bon: The ABM treaty is a treaty signed exclusively between the former Soviet Union and the United States. American allies have a right to have points of view about the treaty, but they do not have any say about the future of the treaty. It is a matter between the Americans and Russians. I think that the United States have no intention whatsoever to violate the treaty. What they would like to do is renegotiate the treaty with the Russians insofar as to allow a limited form of defence.

The Americans have also indicated that if they could not renegotiate the treaty, they would apply the clause of the treaty that would allow them to declare the treaty null and void within a certain period of time, such as after a year. They are well within their rights and it is perfectly legal for them to do so.

Mr. René Laurin: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Laurin.

[English]

Coming now to this side of the table, I have three speakers: Mr. Pratt, Mr. Wood, and Mr. Proud. We'll come back for round two.

Mr. Pratt, do you want to start?

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair. Do I have seven minutes?

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. David Pratt: I'm going to try to keep my questions very short so that we can have long answers on this.

Thank you for being here, Mr. Bon, and for sharing with us your comments on this very important issue.

It seems to me that the crux of the issue, based on what I've seen, is the issue of whether or not the United States has the right to defend itself against threats it perceives. I think most people around this table would say yes, it does. However, the Government of Canada, along with other members of the international community, seems to have some very serious reservations, which is understandable, in terms of the effect on the ABM treaty.

A lot of my questions really relate to our relationship with the U.S., to the impact of our relationship with the U.S. First of all, some people have said that if we're not on side with the NMD, not only is it going to affect our relationship with NORAD, but it has a potential to send serious shock waves throughout our entire relationship with the U.S., whether that be military or even economic.

The second question I have is in relation to the threat, in your view, posed by cruise missile technology versus ballistic missile technology.

My third question relates to the ABM treaty. Some congressmen in the United States are saying these days that the ABM treaty was made with the former Soviet Union, that the former Soviet Union doesn't exist any more, and therefore they don't feel bound to respect agreements with a party that is, for all intents and purposes, deceased.

The fourth question relates to the issue of European allies, Britain and Denmark in particular, who have suggested that they feel vulnerable in regard to the NMD in the sense that their radar warning sites would probably be the initial targets—the ones at Filingdales and Thule in Greenland—for any attempted use of a ballistic missile against the United States, that they would in fact be the first targets of that sort of an attack.

Finally, I'd be interested in your view on what seems to be developing in NATO with respect to the problem of Europe going in one direction and the U.S. going in another, and when I say Europe, I'm thinking of the ESDI—the European security and defence initiative—and what's happening with the NMD issue. It seems that the potential exists for Europe and North America to go in two different directions in terms of their security needs and requirements.

Thank you.

The Chair: For all of that, you have about four or five minutes.

Mr. Daniel Bon: We'll try to go real fast.

Relations with the United States: it's hard to say how a decision by Canada not to participate in NMD would be perceived in Washington. Certainly the more negatives you have in a relationship, the more rocky the relationship gets, but speaking personally, I think there is as much of a risk of the United States sort of dismissing Canada's decision not to participate as yet another sign that Canada is really soft on defence and is not interested.

• 1000

As to whether it would affect the broader relationship to any significant degree, I think perhaps our colleagues in Foreign Affairs would be better judges of that. I'm not convinced on that one.

In terms of cruise missiles versus ballistic missiles as a threat, there I think it's a question you will want to discuss with General Macdonald, but I will say this. Just because there might be a threat from cruise missiles or from nuclear weapons that come in a suitcase, it doesn't mean that if there is a potential for a threat from ballistic missiles you should not address it. I think that at least theoretically all the threats have to be considered and addressed in one way or another.

In terms of the argument that is made by some extremists in Washington that since the Soviet Union disappeared the ABM treaty is worthless, I think even the Russians are more serious than that. The American administration certainly doesn't take that line at all, and I can't see the U.S. ever taking that line.

In terms of the United Kingdom and Denmark and their radar being the first target, I think if you were looking at an attack from Russia, you probably would be right. But this is not what we're talking about, what we're considering, when they're talking about NMD. NMD is a limited attack from one of those states that may have a handful of missiles and/or an accidental launch. I think the radars are fairly safe. I think they're all the safer because, frankly, even if North Korea develops ICBMs, we have not said that they would develop accurate ICBMs. In fact, that may be the greatest threat to Canada: that when they aim at Colorado Springs, they'll hit Toronto.

I think it's an interesting concept, and in an all out war with Russia, yes, those radars would be in danger. I don't think they are now.

As for the potential for Europe and the U.S. to drift in very different directions, again, theoretically it is there and there are some stresses in the alliance at present, but Canada is working very hard—and not just Canada—to make sure the transatlantic link is going to remain strong and that the Europeans understand that.

Frankly, I was in on the meeting with the French minister and our minister on Monday, and I thought the signs were quite positive, even from the French, who are the most extreme proponents of autonomy for Europe in terms of defence.

I hope I have addressed—quickly—your question.

The Chair: You did very well.

You have about 15 seconds, Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: Very quickly, then, has research been done with respect to the possible fallout and environmental effects of intercepted ballistic missiles carrying nuclear, biological, or chemical agents?

Mr. Daniel Bon: Again, that's a question that I will ask you to ask General Macdonald. What I will say is that what we're talking about here are interceptions that would take place outside of the atmosphere, very high. Therefore, given what happens to meteors when they go through the atmosphere, I think the risks there may not be as significant as perhaps it might seem at first glance—

Mr. David Pratt: In the atmosphere, you mean.

Mr. Daniel Bon: Yes, but that's something where I don't feel competent at all to give you a solid answer.

Mr. David Pratt: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Earle, seven minutes.

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

This topic, I must confess, is quite a new one for me, so if some of the questions I ask seem rather elementary, you'll have to bear with me.

This system, as I understand it, would be primarily a defence system to intercept missiles coming towards the United States. Would it also entail an aspect of being offensive, so that it could also direct missiles towards the countries it's aimed at?

Mr. Daniel Bon: The answer is very simple: no.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Okay.

Mr. Daniel Bon: Categorically.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Okay.

You also mention the amount of money that is spent by the U.S. on this system currently. Over the longer period of time, I think it was estimated at somewhere between $40 billion to $60 billion. I guess my question here is, has Canada spent any money—even though this is a U.S. system—collaborating with or discussing this issue with the Americans over that period of time, and how much?

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Secondly, in connection with that, is it not, in your opinion, more advisable that this kind of money—$40 billion to $60 billion over the long haul—perhaps could have been spent more advantageously toward peacekeeping and diplomatic efforts as opposed to building this elaborate system?

Mr. Daniel Bon: If we were in Canada, I might have an opinion on how the money should have been spent, but we're talking about American money, so I will not touch that one, if you don't mind.

In terms of our own involvement, there has been some very modest investment. I think we are spending currently in the neighbourhood of $1 million a year, and that involves consultations and a little bit of research. It is not directly linked to NMD, but it is linked to a number of technologies that are, in their own right, of interest to us and could conceivably relate and mesh with some NMD.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Now, from your presentation you went into some of the questions that would have to be satisfied in order for Canada to arrive at a decision on this, but I find it a little difficult to get exactly what the prevailing opinion might be at DND with respect to whether or not we should support this. I realize there are questions that have to be answered, but there must be some leaning one way or the other.

At the outset you indicated that you could appreciate the need for defence, but is the prevailing opinion that Canada's military should be supporting this effort, or is it the other, that we should not be? In connection with that, you mentioned on the last page of your presentation that defence cooperation with the United States remains central to our security, and you also added “and ultimately, perhaps, to our sovereignty”. Could you please elaborate a bit on what you mean by “our sovereignty”?

Mr. Daniel Bon: In terms of your first question, the official thinking at DND is the thinking of the minister, and we don't know his thinking on NMD so we have no official views.

We all have private views, and given where we work, I think we tend to be fairly sympathetic to the requirement. But it doesn't mean we are as gung ho as some of our colleagues south of the border.

What happens is that we are extremely mindful of the significance from Canada's viewpoint of the defence relationship with the United States and we are concerned by the prospect that it might be hurt if we do not participate. It's something on which there are probably a lot of varied opinions at DND.

In terms of what I meant by sovereignty, an interesting dimension of NMD is that the United States will be able to protect us. I'm fairly convinced that the United States, being the good neighbour it is, if they had enough interceptors to look after what was coming, even if some of it was about to hit Canada, they would take care of it. It would put us, I think, in an interesting situation, because we would be defended despite ourselves. I think that is where I see a potential for sovereignty.

In fact, frankly, knowing Mr. Hamre a little bit and how much he likes this country, I think his insistence that Canada get involved is in part because they're sensitive to the fact that we are a sovereign nation, and since we might be protected, we should be involved. We should have a say of some kind. But we can have a say only if we become involved. That's the way I read it. It's a purely personal view.

Mr. Gordon Earle: As we talk about this anti-missile defence system and about such states as Iran and Iraq, these rogue states, we know that a lot of the problems we see being experienced there have come about through various arms, various biological and chemical weapons, being sold to these countries, quite often by the United States and others. How do we reconcile that with this great concern about defence? Would it not be advisable that we should be putting efforts toward curtailing the arms sales and the various things that we see taking place, either outwardly or otherwise? Should we not be putting some effort in that direction, as opposed to spending a lot of time and effort building up this defence system?

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The Chair: I think that's irrelevant. If you want to answer, that's fine. But I think we're straying into American foreign policy now. They're here to talk to us about NMD from the Canadian perspective. But if they wish to answer.... I understand your question, but I'm just not sure these are the right witnesses to answer it. If they wish to, I'll let them have a chance.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Well, let me just make the tie-in. I think we are partners with NATO. We are a part of that grouping, and we can influence the policy of others by either speaking up against it or silently going along with it.

I'm just asking what the witness' perspective of that is.

Mr. Daniel Bon: It's been a long time since the United States or any of the western allies has sold anything to Iraq, Iran, or any of these countries. If anything has been sold, it's been sold by companies that were doing it against the will of their governments. I can assure you that all the countries you mentioned are indeed making great efforts to try to curtail the leakage of technology and that sort of weaponry to the countries in question. They are making those efforts.

The Chair: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Earle.

We go to Mrs. Wayne, please.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your presentation today because I had a presentation made to me just last week from Lou Cuppens, who was the deputy commander-in-chief of NORAD. He is a next-door neighbour of mine, so he keeps in very close contact with me on this issue. Basically, what you said today is what he was telling me.

Having been in St. Petersburg, Russia, last year at the OSCE meetings, I have to tell my colleagues here today that there was a vote on nuclear disarmament. If you could have seen the six countries that voted against it.... I was sitting there saying to myself “Boy, we'd better work with the United States very closely, and we'd better go hand in hand in order to make sure Canada is protected”. I tell you, all those countries around the world are not doing nuclear disarmament; they're going in the other direction.

When it came to missile defence as well, I have to tell you right now that Russia was not happy with their relationship to the U.S. You could see that, Mr. Chairman, when I was there.

I've listened to the Minister of Foreign Affairs just recently, and I know probably you can't answer this—I should ask Mr. Macdonald when he comes—but the opinion I got from that, sir, was that his view was a little different from the one that.... I'm certainly in favour of what you're proposing today. I have to tell you that. I think there's a need for us to work with the United States very closely.

But I got the feeling that the Department of Foreign Affairs really hadn't been on board yet. So we have to bring defence and foreign affairs together, or the United States is going to start asking us what we're doing. Is that not correct?

Mr. Daniel Bon: The United States may ask us, yes. I think the fact that there might be different views in different departments and among different ministers is entirely possible. I think until cabinet has actually addressed the issue, we won't know exactly what Canada's position is.

But there are certainly differences of view, and it's fairly understandable. I think if you switched the ministers, you would still have the same views coming from Foreign Affairs, which is naturally concerned about the diplomatic impact of things. It's their job. And you would still have the same views at National Defence, where our concern and our job is to focus primarily on the defence issues.

So I don't think it's necessarily a question of the individuals involved. It's more a question of their role within the Government of Canada. They are doing their proper roles by putting forward the concerns in their specific areas.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I have just one other.

If we were to enter into an agreement with the United States and support them, do you feel they would come to ask us for a certain amount—billions—of dollars to support this at this time?

• 1015

Mr. Daniel Bon: I think the United States, again, has been very generous with us in terms of good defence cooperation. If they get a sign that we're interested in participating, I think they would probably come forward and ask us, well, what is it you are doing that meshes with NMD? Let's take advantage of all the possible synergies.

So I have an idea that we might not necessarily have to put in any new money. It might just be a better meshing of what we are doing with what they are doing.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Is that it, Mrs. Wayne?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's fine.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We'll start a second round. We may get a bell, obviously, and if we do, I think we should continue right up to the five-minute three-bell warning. That would give us time to go and cast our votes.

We'll start a second round.

Mr. Hanger, five minutes.

Mr. Art Hanger: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As a follow-up to Mrs. Wayne's first question, there seems to be this curious disconnect between what the Department of National Defence is proposing and what is coming out of our foreign affairs office when it comes to both this particular issue and defence issues in general. To me, we're seeing the results of this disconnect. We're seeing that Canada's favoured status when it comes to bidding on defence contracts south of the border has all of a sudden fallen on rough ground on the American side.

All of us in this committee have sat here and listened to defence industry people putting out a view of what has happened to their industry and their thoughts of pulling out of Canada because of the impact of American policy due to this loss of favoured status. I assume it all circles around security issues, but I'm not sure—the U.S. looking at Canada as not holding up their end of an alliance, or just holding up a reasonable security level within the country and, given the proximity, jeopardizing theirs.

It seems to be something relating to the fact that defence in this country is not a priority in the government. As Dr. Hamre puts it clearly, we're heading in this country to an area where our military is more like a glorified police department. As he puts it, we don't have the boots on the ground to go and contribute a lot in certain circles and to support our allies in certain circles, whether it be NATO or maybe even now NORAD, which seems to be coming onto the table.

I guess I'm very uneasy, then, with this distinction that, well, ministers are going to have a difference of opinion. Yes, they may have a difference of opinion, but things will continue on the same way. I think something has to change, personally, and if it doesn't, where are we going to sit with our relationship to the United States? I guess that's the bottom line.

From your position, do you see more stresses coming down the pike?

Mr. Daniel Bon: I think you may be taking me into an area in which I'm out of my depth, to a large extent.

Do I see more stresses? No, I think everybody's working on resolving some of the issues that have been of concern. I'm optimistic. That's a personal view.

If you look, for example, at the ITAR problems and the access to technology, my understanding of the issue is that we have Canadians who, for one reason or another, happen to have a second nationality. The United States sees this as a problem and we are saying we don't. I think that is quite independent from the defence relationship.

I don't think the Americans are hitting us with ITAR because they don't like what we're doing with defence. I don't think the two are related. That's my personal view.

• 1020

Mr. Art Hanger: But this is a real problem with our defence industry. Obviously there are some very significant reasons for decisions to be made south of the border. Do you know specifically which reasons would jeopardize our industry here?

Mr. Daniel Bon: You know, that's an interesting question. I worked in Washington in the seventies, and I followed the work of the Subcommittee on NATO Standardization, Interoperability and Readiness. One thing that was very clear to me was that Congress makes its decision with regard to industrial cooperation with allies not on the basis of how well the allies are contributing to collective defence but on the basis of what's good for U.S. industry.

I don't know if in this particular case it is also a factor, but I would think our effort in defence and the ITAR issues are not related.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hanger.

I'd like to add some brief context, because we're going to spend many meetings on this. One, the U.S. hasn't decided to engage in this, or to proceed. Canada hasn't been asked. Obviously there are different views in the government. There are different views in Canada. There are different views in cabinet.

Cabinet will make the decision, and we're starting these hearings to move the timeline along toward that decision. I don't see anything unusual here.

I want to go to Mr. Wood for five minutes.

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a question that's probably best directed to you, Colonel Price. Let's assume for a moment that the national missile defence system is set up. According to Mr. Bon this morning, it's going to go ahead regardless. As we've seen in our briefing material, some of the necessary infrastructure is going to be in Canada.

Where is that infrastructure located, would it need to be expanded, and would it create some substantial new jobs to implement?

Colonel Randy Price (Director, Western Hemisphere Policy, Department of National Defence): I'm afraid I did not take from Mr. Bon's words any mention of infrastructure in Canada. In fact, at this point the NMD, as envisioned by the United States, does not involve Canadian personnel, air space, dollars, or contribution.

They are developing it as a national missile defence. If they did decide to ask us, then obviously at that point the Government of Canada would have to make a decision.

Mr. Daniel Bon: Can I expand on this? Even if the Canadian government decided, nothing would be located in Canada.

Mr. Bob Wood: Is it going to be operated out of Cheyenne Mountain? Is that their idea?

Mr. Daniel Bon: It is not clear who will command the NMD when it is deployed. It could be NORAD. It could be the navy. It could be the army. It could be any of the commands. In fact, there is a little bit of pushing and shoving in the background to have this responsibility in one's particular bailiwick.

Cheyenne Mountain? Maybe, but not necessarily.

The Chair: I think you'll find, Bob, that when you ask General Macdonald, they are proceeding at Cheyenne Mountain—and some of us have just returned—on the assumption that they will be asked, but it's not firm.

Mr. Bob Wood: That's one of the reasons I asked the question. I know you and Mr. O'Reilly and other people have been there and have said that's what they're looking at.

As a quick other question, if the U.S. does adopt the NMD—and I know Mr. Hanger touched on this earlier in his comments—is this going to lessen their commitment to NORAD? What are your thoughts on that?

Mr. Daniel Bon: I don't think they can possibly be less committed to NORAD in the sense that NORAD provides a very useful defence. They would not keep NORAD around now if they didn't feel it was a useful command to have around. So I don't think they will be less committed.

If you're really asking me whether they will be less committed to a bilateral command with Canada if Canada is not participating, that's possible but not a given. It's not a given. It's possible. I think General Macdonald may have some views on that.

What do you think, Randy?

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Col Randy Price: That covers it, basically, in that obviously when factors change in a relationship you may have to review it, and decisions may have to be made. But nothing is preordained here. NORAD's primary role is detection, and the roles of NORAD as they currently are will obviously continue.

As to whether or not NORAD would continue as is, that decision would have to be made by the Government of Canada.

Mr. Bob Wood: If I have any time left, Mr. Pratt will take it.

The Chair: Let me share with you, Bob, because I think the colleagues who were there would want me to.

We were told by our people, from General Macdonald on down—he can speak for himself next week, though—that they are beginning to feel at Cheyenne Mountain quite marginalized. They're beginning to be left out of briefings. They're beginning to have to sign all kinds of papers to be included in briefings. Unfortunately, there's beginning to be an assumption in the American military that we're not interested, which is one of the reasons, when we returned from this trip, we spoke to the minister and told him the mood we heard there and how important we felt it was that this committee be seized with this issue. He fully agreed, and that's why we're having this meeting today.

Do you want the rest of his time, David?

An hon. member: Hey, hey, hey....

The Chair: Well, he said David, but I have you.

You're going to get your own five minutes in a minute.

Let's go to Monsieur Laurin and then Mr. Proud.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Bon, we know that the United States have not invited us to participate in the execution of their plan, but if ever they did so, how should we consider their offer? How would it further their interests if they invited us to participate?

Mr. Daniel Bon: That is a difficult question, and I have asked myself the same thing, Mr. Laurin.

I believe they will do so because of the tradition of Canadian-American co-operation. Canada and the United States have collaborated to protect North America since 1940, thus for the last 60 years. Some habits have developed over time. The United States knows that Canada is a foreign country, but they do not consider us a foreign country like all the others. Canada is a foreign country that is not completely foreign.

Therefore, I believe that, for a large part, they would prefer that Canada participate, as Mr. Hamre said in Calgary last week and as we heard in other forums, since doing so arises from the manner in which Americans perceive Canada.

I think they have trouble seeing themselves defending North America all alone because they do not have the habit of doing so. They are used to having Canada participate in their discussions. As I mentioned earlier, I believe that their point of view in the matter is: since they are going to defend Canadian territory or they could do so if they wished, it would be normal that Canadians be involved in the issue.

Mr. René Laurin: What would happen if they did not invite us? They haven't done so as yet, but maybe Canada is waiting to be invited one day. If the United States does not invite us, should we be saddened or insulted?

Mr. Daniel Bon: I believe that if the United States do not invite us to participate in their national anti-missile defence system, it would be because Canada had not indicated to them that it would want to take part in this project. I am fairly certain that if Canada offers the slightest sign that it is interested in participating, they would invite us.

Mr. René Laurin: In my opinion, Canada's only interest in the matter would be for financial reasons. I do not see any others. If this is the case, should Canada not modify its technological research objectives?

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We spoke earlier about compatibility. If we must participate in these things with the United States, our technology must be compatible with American technology, even if we cannot attain their level of technological advancement, at least in the short term. Would Canada alter its technological development to compensate?

Mr. Daniel Bon: I am not the person best qualified to answer your question, but I believe that it is always a good idea to develop one's technology. As I mentioned earlier, I believe that the question of complementary technologies for NMD would be raised. Canada is a world leader in many technological sectors, such as surveillance and communications, and I think that our contribution to this project would be related to our fields of expertise.

Randy.

[English]

Col Randy Price: That's pretty much it. You have to remember that the technology.... Obviously this is national missile defence, the American system, that you're talking about. At the same time, we have an interest in keeping a view on the American theatre missile defence, which has some basic technologies that are the same. It's surveillance technology. It's military technology.

We try to complement areas with our research projects so that we make a contribution to our allies and their operability.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Laurin.

[English]

Mr. Proud for five minutes, please.

Mr. George Proud (Hillsborough, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, gentlemen. I have been listening to the questions and answers going around the table this morning and I want to follow up on what Mr. Laurin was talking about.

Mr. Bon, you said early on that Canada hasn't been asked and probably wouldn't be asked. Would it not be in Canada's best interest if she invited herself to become involved in this national missile defence program? I believe Mr. Laurin said if we get into it we'd probably only get into it for economic reasons, but I think we'd also get into it for other reasons, for our protection. There's no doubt that the capability of North Korea striking at a United States area is a realistic thing. The opportunity for them striking, either intentionally or accidentally, an area in Canada is also a realistic thing.

I would think we should be really proactive in this and ask that we become involved in it. The Department of National Defence probably thinks there's going to have to be a lot of debate around the cabinet table before this becomes a reality, but that's my own opinion on it.

Mr. Daniel Bon: You're right to the extent that there are real risks of accidental firings or very crude and imprecise technology from North Korea. There could be a risk to Canada.

One thing I would amend a little bit in what you have said is that I think the United States will not need Canada to come and knock on the door very loudly and say we want to be part of this. I think if there were any kind of indication that we were interested, they probably would invite us.

Mr. George Proud: As far as the NATO alliance is concerned, I know there is a lot of debate going on right now about this national missile defence program the United States is talking about. Given the fact that the United States is the main player in NATO—it has the expertise, it has the numbers, it has the machinery, it has all the things that NATO uses and needs and they always call on it—the United States will likely go ahead anyway. If this test in April proves to be fruitful, they'll probably decide they're going to go ahead with it.

I know Mr. Pratt was in Brussels on the weekend and it was a topic of debate over there at that time. We're going to Budapest in May, and it will likely be one of the topics of debate there. But I believe this thing will go ahead anyway. Is that not your own opinion of it, whether the NATO alliance really, firmly gets behind them and pushes this? I think it's a fait accompli if they decide anyway.

• 1035

Mr. Daniel Bon: It's maybe not a fait accompli, but I agree with you that it's very unlikely that it would not go ahead. The United States has pretty much made up its mind. But there's still a question mark. Who knows?

In terms of NATO, you're right that the United States is the main player in NATO, but there have been times when others have been willing to do things the United States was not willing to do. It's true that the Americans bring most of the machines and the most sophisticated machines and weapons and so on and so forth, but sometimes the other allies are more willing to put people on the ground. I think that has to be counted too.

In terms of what you have said and getting back to what Mr. Pratt was saying, for the United States to go ahead without at least pacifying its allies in NATO would be very detrimental to the alliance. In fact, I think one of the reasons the decision of President Clinton may be postponed is that just as the Americans would prefer to go ahead with this in agreement with Russia in terms of the ABM treaty, I think they would prefer to go ahead, if they decide to go ahead, with at least the consent if not the approval of their allies.

Mr. George Proud: It would give those in Europe who would like to see Europe play the main role in NATO a leg up on the situation if the United States did go ahead without the agreement of the NATO countries. It would show those people. There are countries there that would like to see Europe take a stronger role and probably a dominant role in NATO. The United States will probably be very careful, and as you say, President Clinton will go all out to try to find a compromise there before he goes ahead any further.

Mr. Daniel Bon: I agree.

Mr. George Proud: Thank you.

The Chair: I think this hearing today breaks the silence on this in Ottawa. It begins to show in a very real way that there's a committee of the House of Commons that sees this issue and is seriously looking at the possibility of our participation. I know there was a concern when we were in Cheyenne Mountain that there was too much silence. That has stopped today, and I don't think it will be too long until we'll have to make our recommendation as a committee to the appropriate persons.

Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud: Do we have other people coming before the committee on this specific topic?

The Chair: Oh yes. Next Tuesday we will have Deputy CINC of NORAD. Of course we will have General George Macdonald, who interestingly enough, in the absence of General Myers, was in charge of Cheyenne Mountain when we were there. I was very proud as a Canadian, I have to tell you, if I can share that experience before I continue. I think we were all proud as Canadians to have American officers, top officers, top trained people, answering that day to General Macdonald and asking him.... He had to report at all times where he was. We'll have him here next Tuesday. I can assure you he will have a lot of good information to share.

I want to go now to Mr. Earle.

[Translation]

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You said in your conclusion that we should be able to defend ourselves, but controlling weapons is also very important for our safety.

[English]

I would just like to pursue that point a bit.

When we look at the kinds of conflicts that have recently taken place, such as the Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict, we see that the types of arms that were used have left behind a lot of devastation and some question around toxic substances, depleted uranium, and so forth. If we look at Iraq, for example, we see a large increase in stillbirths and all kinds of environmental effects that have taken place, not to mention the effects, allegedly, on our troops that have returned. We look at the devastation in Kosovo around the bombing of factories and pollution and toxic substances getting into the water system and so forth.

When we talk about controlling arms regimes, what is our military doing to try to control the use of those types of armaments as a weapons system in warfare? Are we doing anything about that at all?

• 1040

Mr. Daniel Bon: We are involved. It's not just our military. It's also, and mainly, the Department of Foreign Affairs. But we are involved in all the international regimes that are intended to control armaments. We are involved in all the negotiations that are designed to address issues that arise from the use of weaponry.

But I think I'm really not the best person to address that question for you today.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Pratt): Anything further, Mr. Earle? No?

Monsieur Bertrand.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Mr. Bon, I would like some further information.

In the notes that were prepared for us, the ABM treaty, signed in 1972 by the United States and the Soviet Union, is briefly discussed. I will read you a sentence that I found surprising:

Each of them could not be equipped with more than 100 anti- ballistic missile systems.

These strategic points were located in North Dakota in the United States, and around Moscow in the Soviet Union. What is the difference between the anti-ballistic missile system mentioned in the treaty and the one we are discussing today, the NMD?

Mr. Daniel Bon: This is a technical question I request you ask general Macdonald. I can tell you that the technology at the time was so unreliable that the two countries felt they could not rely on it to adequately defend themselves. George Betts can no doubt provide you with additional information.

[English]

Mr. George Betts (Acting Director, Policy Development, Department of National Defence): Yes, in terms of the technology that was there in 1972, it was, compared to what we have today, really quite primitive, although in what we're looking at now with the hit-to-kill technology, we're not taking a whole step in terms of the nature of the technology.

Hit-to-kill is still a very straightforward, conventionally understood technology. It is not what would be called in the ABM treaty technology based on “other physical principles”. In 1972 there was a desire to prevent the technology from going to things that weren't then current at the time, things like lasers, things like particle beams and that sort of thing.

So what the United States is doing even now is not the kind of technology that wasn't available then. In other words, it's still very much within the envelope of the kinds of things that would have been done at that time. The question, which came up so regularly after 1983, was, are you allowed to go to these other things like particle beams and lasers and so on? The treaty says, no, you're not. These are things that are based on what are called “other physical principles”.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Mr. Bon, when this kind of treaty is signed, is it set in stone or can we, after 10 or 15 years, begin to discuss other technologies that have appeared on the market since the treaty was signed?

Mr. Daniel Bon: I am happy that you have asked a question that I can answer. The treaty is not set in stone. The best proof of this is the fact that the treaty, signed in 1972, allowed the two countries the opportunity to have two defence sites: one in Dakota to protect their missiles, and another around their capital.

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It was two years later, in 1974, that the two countries decided to only have one site each. The United States chose to defend their missiles, while the Russians opted to protect their capital. This proves that the treaty can be amended.

Furthermore, a treaty, like all other documents, is open to interpretation. Recently, in 1997 I believe, the Russians and Americans decided to interpret the treaty so as to make a distinction between an anti-missile defence system used in a theatre of war and an anti-intercontinental missile defence system. Thus, if the United States and Russia both wanted to, they could find a solution to allow the NMD to be deployed.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Do the people who discuss this treaty meet regularly, or do they meet only when the Americans want to discuss one point and the Russians another? I do not know if you understand what I mean by asking this question.

Mr. Daniel Bon: Absolutely. Since the month of September, the Americans and Russians have been meeting very, very frequently. The problem remains that neither is listening to the other. The Americans keep trying to explain to the Russians how they would both benefit from amending the treaty, while the Russians keep telling them that amending the treaty is out of the question.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Bertrand. That's a half-hour bell, colleagues, so we have lots of time here.

Mrs. Wayne, did you have any final questions?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, I do.

I have great respect for you, Mr. Bon. You stated that you're not sure of the Minister of National Defence's thinking on this, but being the deputy minister, I think you might have some input. But I'll direct my question to Randy.

Mr. Daniel Bon: May I correct you? I'm not the deputy.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: You're not the deputy minister.

Mr. Daniel Bon: No. I'm here as the acting assistant deputy minister of policy.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'm sorry. You're just the acting. So he doesn't dialogue with you like he does with his deputy. Okay.

What I'd like to know is, are our armed forces right now, the army, navy, and air force, being trained and equipped in a manner consistent with the imperatives of the RMA? Are we doing that now? Are we getting ready?

Col Randy Price: Once again, I'm afraid I'm probably not the right person to speak to this. Perhaps you would be better suited.

Mr. Daniel Bon: I'm not the right person either, but I'll try to at least begin to answer your question. Are we thinking about it and are we preparing for it? Most definitely. Recently the department issued a document called “Strategy 2020”, which starts from the existing policy and projects. Assuming this policy continues to remain valid, how do we get to 2020 and where we should be in 2020? And we're fairly precise in that.

So RMA is something the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff has under his responsibility, something about which he cares a great deal, and something about which he has organized I think two successive conferences to bring in not only the military but outside specialists, including Americans. And it is something that is very actively being addressed in the department.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you.

The Chair: Mrs. Wayne, thank you.

If there are any final questions, colleagues, we can maybe take one each before we.... Mr. Hanger, do you have a final question?

Mr. Art Hanger: Mr. Bon, you're with the policy development division. Is that correct?

Mr. Daniel Bon: Yes, you can say that.

Mr. Art Hanger: As noted in the biographical note that was handed to us, it's charged with developing new policy directions and options on the basis of ongoing assessments of international domestic scenes and in confirming that defence program implementation proposals conform to existing policy.

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Looking at policy coming out of Defence, it appears that on this issue you're presenting a reasonable view of cautious acceptance of this program south of the border. Would that be a fair assessment?

Mr. Daniel Bon: Certainly an open mind, sir.

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes. On the other hand, obviously something is seriously wrong in light of the statement offered by the chairman when he was talking to Canadian personnel at Cheyenne Mountain about the almost restrictions on Canadians being appointed—I gather defence personnel. I'm having a hard time understanding how policy is being drafted and directed, how reality is taking place in places like Cheyenne Mountain south of the border, and where all this information is going as far as policy is concerned when the minister hasn't offered an opinion on anything.

The Chair: I'm going to interrupt, if I can, Mr. Bon. The minister is seized of the issue. I can assure you of that. He supports the fact that SCONDVA has begun to break the silence that our people in Cheyenne Mountain and the Americans are concerned about. We heard it from both groups, Mr. Hanger. This hearing begins the process of our formal consideration of this important issue. The minister fully supports it. The reality is that there are probably differences of opinion in cabinet, just as there are in Canada. But the cabinet and the government are going to have to make a decision, and probably fairly soon, on this issue.

So we're playing a very important role by opening these hearings today. The American and Canadian people in Cheyenne Mountain and the political people in Ottawa know that as a Parliament we are now actively involved with this issue, and I think that's very important.

Mr. Art Hanger: Okay.

Given that point, then, where does this breakdown or barrier, if you want to call it that, exist? Is it in the foreign affairs department and in some of the statements and comments made by our foreign affairs minister that are alienating Canadians in an American setting, or what? I'm a bit confused here on how this is all unfolding.

Mr. Daniel Bon: I think in Cheyenne Mountain there are indeed some things for which the Americans don't bring in the Canadians at present because we have not said we want to participate. We have not said, we want to be participants in your NMD thinking, planning, and developing.

But I think we should not see the fault lying necessarily or only on this side of the border. Our American friends sometimes take decisions and change tack very suddenly and without warning their allies, so that their allies need some time to come to a conclusion as to whether or not they want to go in a specific direction. In the case of ballistic missile defence, the United States was going clearly in one direction where it was not in a hurry, and it suddenly decided that it was in a hurry to do things. So we had to catch up.

I think that is something that is going to be addressed in Canada. The fact that right now the Canadians are kept out of certain meetings is unfortunate, but it's not the end of the world. I think it will take care of itself.

The Chair: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Hanger.

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, one last question.

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Bon, I would like to return to a question I asked you earlier. I find that you did not provide me with enough information. When I asked you whether Canada should feel saddened or insulted if it was not invited to participate in the deployment of anti-ballistic systems, you replied that, if Canada expressed a desire to participate, the United States would probably invite us.

If we ask the United States for permission to participate, wouldn't we look like we would be bowing down before them by asking them to allow us to join their group? Would we be showing that we depend too much on the United States? On the other hand, Canada could tell the United States that since it was not invited, it will consider that it has more freedom to speak its own mind, that it can express its own opinions with more liberty and that, eventually, these opinions could differ from those held by the United States. What do you consider to be the best position to adopt?

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Mr. Daniel Bon: I do not know which is the best position to adopt, but I can tell you that Canada considers itself free to say what it likes, and not only does it consider itself free to say what it likes, but it does so as well.

Second, if we finally indicate to Washington that we are interested in participating in the NMD, we would not bow down to anyone. We would simply tell them that after having thought the problem through and weighed the pros and cons, we have decided that the project is of interest to us and we would like to reach an agreement.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bon.

[English]

Mr. Earle, do you have any further questions?

Mr. Gordon Earle: No.

The Chair: Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Have there been any standing orders with regard to NMD that have come forward in Defence at the present time?

Mr. Daniel Bon: No, I don't think there has been anything. We are still covered by the provisions of the 1994 white paper, which says that we can consult with allies and do research in areas that are relevant.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you, sir.

The Chair: Thanks, Mrs. Wayne.

On this side, colleagues, are there any final short questions? No. Okay.

Then Mr. Bon, Colonel Price, and Mr. Betts, thank you very much for being with us today to kick off our consideration of this very important topic. As I think we've indicated, this begins to engage us more actively in this important matter. So thank you very much. We appreciate your help.

Mr. Daniel Bon: Thank you.

The Chair: The meeting is adjourned.