NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, April 4, 2000

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[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order the meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

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We have two witnesses, colleagues, and then we have a visit from a delegation from the Republic of Latvia, from their Parliament. It's the Saeima, which is the equivalent of our House of Parliament. Their speaker and other people will be coming at about four o'clock and sitting in on part of the meeting. When we're through with these witnesses, no later than five o'clock, and hopefully sooner, we would go to a discussion with them. They have some ideas they'd like to share and they'd like to hear our views on some things, perhaps NATO, I suspect, and other topics of interest. I just wanted to give you that outline for the meeting.

We're going to start right away with the Veterans Against Nuclear Arms. Mr. Eldon Comfort is going to present to us and he has a train he has to catch. Whenever you have to leave, sir, feel free.

Mr. Eldon Comfort (Member, Veterans Against Nuclear Arms—Toronto): Thank you, Mr. Chair, for mentioning the train, because it is rather important that I get out of here.

I want to thank the committee for this opportunity to make this presentation on behalf of the Toronto branch of the Veterans Against Nuclear Arms. As veterans of the Second World War, we are deeply opposed to Canada's becoming implicated in the intent of the United States to develop an anti-ballistic system. We fought for a stable world ruled by law, not by force. We did not fight for a continued arms race that threatens the United Nations and every treaty negotiated since the end of the war.

The proposed U.S. anti-ballistic missile system defies the ABM Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and even threatens the START and START II treaties. It destabilizes the precious and fragile agreements among nations that nuclear arms must spread no further. Its very presence on earth is more of a threat than a safeguard.

Poll after poll has shown that populations all over the world oppose nuclear weapons. Current and former military leaders have written opposing them. Physicians agree that no medical response to their destruction is possible. These treaties are all we have defending us from nuclear proliferation.

On April 19, 1999, the Government of Canada responded to the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, reaffirming that Canada's primary objectives were “to promote and support universal adherence to nuclear disarmament”. Since then, it has been decided to renew the NORAD agreement. We must not allow this decision to trap us into participating in the son of the Star Wars missile defence system. It is vital to us as veterans that Canada use all its strength to uphold international law and its treaties, or we will have fought in vain.

Coming up by train last night, I had a chance to be contemplative and to look at what seemed to be the larger picture. I was seeing the larger picture of the American initiative and putting it in perspective. I wondered what country the United States fears. What country was likely to attack? What military autocrat in his right mind—and that's an oxymoron—would take on the United States? I couldn't think of one. Can you?

Even if there were some hypothetical threat, why put one's faith in the ABM solution? It's full of holes to any concentrated attack. The Patriot was a dud in the Gulf War and is very costly. It isn't even a deterrent, because it will be perceived by other nations as a umbrella under which a first use of nuclear weapons could be launched.

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So the decision to resurrect Star Wars cannot be a calculated military strategy; it is rather a decision based on political expediency or on theology. It is a ploy to win votes from a public brainwashed by alarmist propaganda, the Pentagon, arms merchants, and the religious right.

VANA believes that for Canada to participate in such a misguided and costly venture would betray the best interests of Canadian citizens. VANA members fought for a stable civil society. We believe Canadians are willing to finance what our armed forces do best: peacekeeping, search and rescue, and disaster relief. We think war games should be left to those with a posse mentality who can afford the toys. Canadians do not fall in that category—not yet.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Comfort.

We'll hear from Dr. Hamel, from the University of Toronto, and then we'll have questions for both witnesses.

Dr. Hamel.

Dr. Paul A. Hamel (Science for Peace): Thank you for inviting me. I'm here on behalf of Science for Peace, although I'm a professor at the University of Toronto. I'd also like to introduce my partner, Tanya Zakrison, who is also a member of Science for Peace.

As you have before you the brief that I sent yesterday, which was nicely translated, what I'd like to do right now is summarize some of the salient points and emphasize the ones to which I would like you to pay attention.

Our principal position—and I hope everyone in this room will also have that position, although certainly NATO does not have that position—is that nuclear weapons can never be used. These are certainly weapons of mass murder and can lead to only one terrible outcome if they are ever used.

Canada's position in this regard generally seems reasonable, in that it supports measures that attempt to prevent the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, although its membership in NATO and NORAD clearly represents a contradiction in this policy.

With this fundamental premise in mind, I would like to point out the two major themes of our brief. Firstly, the national missile defence represents an offensive military threat to the world. It therefore decreases the overall security of Canada. Secondly, as envisioned, it is not a viable system and in no way represents a security to Canada or the United States, but rather can only represent a prelude to yet another absolutely immoral arms race.

I'd like to expand a little bit on those points in the next couple of minutes.

The stance of the U.S.-led NATO forces is clearly one of a first-strike capability—that is, the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, as I've outlined, it is clear that the United States strategy in Europe has always relied on the use of nuclear weapons. They also refuse to rule out the possibility that they will use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

As was evident in the 1980s, when the Pershing II missiles were deployed in West Germany, which had a flight time to Moscow of six minutes, with simultaneous deployment of Trident II submarine-launched missiles, it was clear that the NATO position was offensive. The world understood further that the development of the so-called Star Wars program, which was proposed by then President Ronald Reagan, was another component of this offensive capability. This system was globally opposed and was also demonstrated to be a completely non-viable system.

Based on that precedent, how can the currently proposed national missile defence system be considered a non-threatening defensive system? It clearly is part of an offensive capability.

The posture of NATO and the United States is certainly not less aggressive than it was in the 1980s. In fact, due to technological advances in delivery systems and their improved accuracy, the first-strike capability of the United States and NATO has increased since that time. As I have pointed out in our brief, even U.S. commentators have articulated that U.S. global interests are overtly supported by the U.S. military, the so-called “hidden fist”, as a quote from a prominent commentator in the New York Times during the height of the Yugoslavia bombing last year revealed.

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Thus, any system that would allow the United States to use its military and specifically nuclear capabilities without fear of retaliation must be considered a component of an offensive military posture. Regardless of its name, therefore, the national missile defence system is not a defence at all, but rather represents an offensive system.

How do we expect other nations to respond to this particular offensive position? The history of the people of the planet predicts a single outcome—a renewed arms race. Any country with nuclear capabilities below the threshold of protection afforded by our national missile defence system—and here I'm thinking of China, for example—would certainly develop and arm themselves to a level that would thwart the proposed missile system. Even a so-called rogue state, such as North Korea, would be expected to divert their limited resources for the attainment of this goal, since regardless of how we view them, they certainly feel threatened by the west, and the U.S. in particular. There is no doubt that they will try to defend themselves as best they can.

In addition, the escalation of capabilities by these countries would form the basis for the expansion of the national missile defence program that we are proposing. This is the usual response by the military to an arms increase of our adversaries. So here Science for Peace predicts that the deployment of this supposed limited system will in fact serve as the impetus to justify its own expansion.

We are further convinced of this later point due to the essential uselessness of the proposed system. As described by General Macdonald at this particular committee, it cannot be expected to protect the U.S. from a determined aggressor. As General Macdonald has pointed out, an adversary could quite easily send sufficient missiles to overcome this very limited system. As he states, if it could actually detect, track, and determine which of say 100 missiles sent in attack were actually carrying nuclear weapons and destroy them, then an attacker would be expected to develop and send, for example, 200, 300, or 1,000, or whatever was required to thwart that system. In addition, they would also be expected to develop a technology that would overcome such a limited ballistic missile system—for example, the development of cruise missiles or other technologies. This, by any other name, is an arms race.

When one considers the issue of a terrorist attack against the United States, again, as this committee has heard, the national missile defence system has no capability of stopping that. It's very unlikely that a terrorist organization would use a ballistic missile system to attack the United States, but rather a far easier, less costly, and more easily delivered system.

Finally, in the context of accidental launch, which this system is supposedly supposed to protect against, there is a very simple solution to this problem. The nuclear weapon states should perform one very simple operation that the rest of the world has asked them to do since the beginning of the nuclear age, and that is to decouple warheads from the ballistic missiles, a very simple solution. China, in fact, as you've heard, apparently has done this.

To conclude, I think you'll appreciate that Science for Peace does not believe the national missile defence system will remain limited as proposed, and we feel that it represents a significant offensive component, threatening many nations of the world.

In contrast to our folly in Yugoslavia, we recommend that Canada show leadership, as they did in their independent course fashioning the landmines abolition treaty, by not participating in any way in the national missile defence system. We also recommend that Canada strongly oppose development of the system by the United States. This can be the only course for a country that claims to be members of an international community promoting peace and security for people of this planet.

Thank you for your attention.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Hamel.

We'll go to questions from members now, starting with a first round of seven minutes. Mr. Goldring.

Mr. Peter Goldring (Edmonton East, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much for your presentation. I have a couple of questions I'd like answered.

My understanding of this missile defence system is that it is primarily against an attack by possibly rogue nations. Mr. Comfort, you had identified in your speech that no person in their right mind would launch an attack. I believe this missile defence system isn't for somebody who is in their right mind, but it's for somebody who is not in their right mind. It seems to me that with the result of the past wars we've experienced—and indeed yourself and your honourable service in World War II—to characterize the Hitlers of the earth as being in their right mind might be a bit of a stretch. In my mind, it is precisely for the people who are not in their right mind. Wouldn't you agree with that?

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Mr. Eldon Comfort: I think that somebody who would attack the United States would not be in his right mind.

I think the key to our anxiety is to turn 180 degrees from what the tendency is with regard to implementing the ABM Treaty, and that is something called prior restraint of the offence. That's where we should be putting our money, our energy, and our strategies, and not in participating in the arms race, which this ABM Treaty would precipitate because it does add another threat to so-called perceived enemies.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Mr. Hamel, I'd like to ask you an additional question. Because it's very common throughout the world of radar to pick up and detect missiles and planes that are being launched against a country, what are you going to do when you detect a missile coming at you? Isn't it a natural response to have something in your arsenal in order to be able to respond to a missile or aircraft attack?

Further to that, how are these missiles considered to be offensive when clearly the plan is to have them be used on a defensive basis? The same as the Patriot missiles and the Bomarc missiles were in the early fifties, would it not be reasonable to have a weapon in your arsenal so as to be able to defend against rogue nation attacks? Why would that be considered to be offensive if they clearly are intended for defensive purposes?

Dr. Paul Hamel: That's a lot of questions. I'll start off with the first one.

I don't actually know how other countries would perceive the one country in the world that is probably the greatest military aggressor, and that's the United States. I agree that they have no capability to defend against an attack by the United States. Yugoslavia is a classic example. They were in an illegal war that was waged by U.S. forces, and they had no capability.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Why have them if you're not going to utilize them?

Dr. Paul Hamel: So I would expect that they would want to be able to defend themselves.

Mr. Peter Goldring: You also mentioned that there are easier delivery systems. What type of delivery system other than missiles were you talking about?

Dr. Paul Hamel: In the context of very small weapons, there are cruise missiles. Also, you could send nuclear warheads into a harbour via steamship. There are lots of ways of transporting these relatively portable nuclear weapons.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Certainly there are, but in this day and age of commercial rocketry, which is common throughout the world, and sending satellites into space, is it not a logical concern to have a system to defend against somebody obtaining a commercially available one-up rocket and putting a nuclear weapon on it?

Dr. Paul Hamel: I think that technology is fairly firmly in the hands of western nations. If you think they're going to be selling that to what you consider to be rogue states, then I agree that it poses a threat. But I think there's a fair amount of security that way. Do you anticipate the United States selling that to say Iraq?

Mr. Peter Goldring: People would disagree with that, given the changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union with the virtual breakup of their war industry and the uncertainty as to where a lot of their rocketry and technology did end up. Is it not conceivable that any nation with sufficient funding could access that type of technology?

Dr. Paul Hamel: There's always a conceivable possibility of all of these different nations acquiring those technologies. I think the solution to those things, then, is to turn down the rhetoric, the pressure, and the political difficulties that are inherent on our planet. You're asking people to actually turn up the level of antagonism between states in a military manner, and that's not the solution.

Mr. Peter Goldring: So what you're professing is that we only recognize people in this world to be in their right mind.

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Dr. Paul Hamel: I think that's reasonable. I don't understand why anyone in this room would think that the leadership of North Korea is somehow not in their right mind. I have no evidence to believe they aren't in their right mind. They may have a regime that is not the best for their people and they may have a lot of very difficult problems, but I don't believe they're insane. I don't think anyone in this room has any evidence contrary to that. They have been antagonized and threatened by the western powers, primarily the United States, for a long time. I think their actions reflect that exact political and military pressure by the west. I don't think they're insane.

Mr. Eldon Comfort: I'd like to reply to one of your questions—that is, how could a defensive operation like the ABM plan be considered as offensive? I thought maybe we had made that clear. If Americans build up a strong or even a moderate ABM system, it will be perceived by others as a defence, yes, but a defence against any attack by them. In the past this mutually agreed destruction was a deterrent presumably because Russia and others had equivalent forces. They could each destroy each other. So that was a deterrent. But if they build up an ABM system that is purported to be a defence against incoming missiles, it will be perceived as an umbrella under which they can launch their first attack. The United States has never withdrawn the possibility that they would be the first to launch an attack. In fact they're the only ones that have launched a nuclear attack.

Mr. Peter Goldring: By extension, then, is the radar system—

The Chairman: Thank you very much. That's the end of Mr. Goldring's time.

I don't see Monsieur Laurin, so I'll now turn to this side. Mr. Proud will be first. Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud (Hillsborough, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, gentlemen, to our meeting today, and thank you for your testimony.

Mr. Comfort, you said that some people have been brainwashed by this stuff. Do you believe the national missile defence will serve the people of the United States? Do you think it will alleviate the fears of the people of the United States if they do come up with one?

Mr. Eldon Comfort: Excuse me, I have a hearing difficulty, so I didn't hear all of that question.

Mr. George Proud: I was just saying that you mentioned in your discussion that you felt that a lot of people have been brainwashed by the United States leading up to this NMD, national missile defence. If the United States goes forward with this, do you think that will alleviate a lot of the people's fears in the United States, in that they will feel they have some protection against rogue states and other countries that want to attack them?

Mr. Eldon Comfort: I doubt very much that it will alleviate them in any permanent way.

Mr. George Proud: Both of you talked about this creating another arms race, and you're not the only ones who have said this. Since this is a defensive system, why would it create another arms race? All it's going to be is a defensive system against incoming missiles. Why would this create another arms race? Russia, for instance, has a defensive system around the city of Moscow. That didn't create another arms race. It was part of the ABM Treaty. If the United States makes amendments to the ABM Treaty with Russia, do you think this wouldn't serve a good purpose?

Mr. Eldon Comfort: It's the beginning of the end as far as the treaty is concerned. The Russians might very well think twice about the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and that would be a pity.

Mr. George Proud: I'll address this question to both of you. Do you people not agree that there are threats out there, not only to the United States but also to us, by states such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran?

Dr. Paul Hamel: I can answer that.

If I could, I'd like to go back to your last question. The issue of the defence system around Moscow was part of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the United States as well was allowed to put in a specific system. It's quite different from the sort of system it's asking to be installed this time, which is to protect the entire United States. So the two things are not comparable whatsoever.

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If you take the defensive system that's being proposed right now and you consider it entirely in a vacuum as if nothing else is going on around it, then you're right: it's entirely a defensive system and it won't lead to anything. This committee has heard this before, so it's really an obvious question. You have to understand that this is not a defensive system without a first-strike capability. It very clearly represents a component of a first-strike capability that can resist a retaliatory attack.

The second question was with respect to Iraq and Iran. If you read the recent documents concerning Iraq, I think you'll find that their capability of mounting anything other than having their people starve to death is very clear. They don't pose any threat right now. In fact, prior to their invasion of Kuwait, the west was very happily supplying them with the technology and the chemicals to wage a war against the Kurds and wage a war against Iran. So I don't think we actually have very much concern for Iraq at all, other than the fact that occasionally they're not an ally and sometimes they are an ally.

If the world would treat Iran and North Korea in a less aggressive manner, then I would expect that they would probably not want to respond in a military manner towards what's obviously a huge military might.

Mr. George Proud: I guess we have a difference of opinion there.

You mentioned some things about NATO. You called it the illegal war in Kosovo. I guess that's what you're referring to. I believe that if NATO hadn't been around, we would have had to invent it, not only for Kosovo but for the other countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina and places like that. NATO did a job that no one else could do at the time and saved a lot of lives even though there was a lot of turmoil connected with it. They saved a lot more lives than were taken.

Dr. Paul Hamel: You think then that Canadian action should be outside the auspices of the international community, which is governed by the United Nations, and that NATO should in fact determine what is valuable and what is not valuable?

Mr. George Proud: I think the United Nations has a place but the United Nations could never have acted in time in places like that. We would have had another Rwanda on our hands if we had left it up to the United Nations. That's my own personal belief, not necessarily the belief of this committee.

Dr. Paul Hamel: So you think—

The Chairman: If I could interrupt, it's very interesting but it's not about NMD. Let's get it back. You've both exchanged your points of view. I can assure you that you're not going to convince Mr. Proud otherwise. Let's get back to NMD, please.

Any more, George?

Mr. George Proud: No.

The Chairman: Okay. Mr. Pratt on NMD specifically, please.

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to ask the witnesses today whether or not they feel that a state, as in the United States in this particular case, has the right or even the obligation to protect itself in an instance where there is a very direct perceived threat that exists out there. Presumably one of the most important rights that states reserve for themselves is to be able to protect themselves against an attacker, against a threat to their population. How do you respond to that?

Mr. Eldon Comfort: Absolutely, we have the right to defend ourselves. That's not in question. What is in question is the way in which that is done. It will not be done by increasing the risk, the threat to other countries, and escalating the arms race. It will be done by diplomacy, by justice.

I refer to it as prior restraint on the offence. That's what the expression is. That is the best defence, not to escalate the arms race and increase the threat, increase the chances of accidental firing of missiles and so on. Sure, I agree on defence; I was part of that. But in terms of how we defend ourselves, I think we need to turn around 180 degrees from this business of escalation to one of de-escalation.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Pratt. That was just the end of Mr. Proud's time, so I'll put you back on the list.

Now we go back to the other side. Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Thank you. My question is for Dr. Hamel.

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Dr. Hamel, you suggested that because of NMD's obvious limitations, it must be the first of many phases of a larger project. I'd ask you this. If this system is so obviously flawed, so obviously limited, why would foreign powers be concerned, and why would this launch an inevitable arms race?

Dr. Paul Hamel: I think foreign powers may harbour the same sort of cynical view of what this system is intended to do. At Science for Peace we believe, as I do personally, that this is simply a system that will be put in place that will help justify an increased proliferation of this system or a more robust system, a similar system that was envisioned, for example, in the Star Wars case. Regardless of what level it's supposed to protect, whenever a state feels threatened by that level of protection, it will arm itself and develop technology that will try to thwart it. That, by any criteria I can think of, is an arms race.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: We know the United States has been in touch with Great Britain. I believe that in London, England, you are going to find that they have a radar station now, but in order for them to be able to detect the missiles, they would have to do a lot of work at their radar station. I believe London, England now is looking at doing that.

I was in Brussels just a couple of weeks ago and we had lunch with some of our naval personnel there. The admiral said it would be five to ten years before you will ever see the United States in a position to even have an NMD, an anti-missile defence. He said they've already attempted to do this, and Admiral King had been part and parcel of that, watching and monitoring it. He was not opposed to us having a radar system that could detect this. That's the position he thought we should play in case this were to happen.

I'll just say this also, Mr. Chairman. We also were in St. Petersburg, Russia, for a meeting. When I was there, there were 54 countries represented. When they talked about nuclear disarmament, you had six countries that voted against it, and it was really frightening when we saw that. North Korea voted against it. Russia voted against it.

A voice: The United States.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: The United States voted against it, sir. Yes, you're absolutely correct. They did.

There were six countries, which when I was sitting there left me asking why. Why would they be voting against it? If all of them came to an agreement on this, then we wouldn't have to be discussing this today. You can see that some of those countries are moving in the other direction.

Dr. Paul Hamel: Mr. Chair, it's very clear that regardless of the antagonism between a variety of states on this planet, the one thing that has held together the nuclear weapons states has been any attempt in the world to stop the terror of nuclear war. At the height of the Cold War, the United States and Russia, or the former Soviet Union, were the best of buddies when it came to making sure that nothing was done on their nuclear arsenals. They both stand today as criminals, as indicated by international courts, as having nuclear weapons as part of their military deterrent.

We, by virtue of being in NATO, are complicit in exactly the same thing. We have, by virtue of being in NATO, a first-strike policy, and we cannot point to anybody else. We have a moral responsibility to own up to what we are able to do. We are able to say we will not participate in that.

I'm not interested in the United States; I can't do anything about that. I can direct the Canadian government and the Canadian people to say that we are not going to have any part in something that will annihilate this planet, and that's nuclear weapons. Right now, we do not stand here in that field.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, do you have any questions?

Mr. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): Mr. Chairman, I only have one question given that I missed most of the speech. I would like our two witnesses to comment.

Does Mr. Hamel understand French or do I need to wait for him to plug in his earpiece?

[English]

Mr. Hamel, do you speak French?

Dr. Paul Hamel: Not enough to answer you. I'm sorry.

Mr. René Laurin: Okay. I will wait for your organization.

Dr. Paul Hamel: Go ahead.

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[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Chairman, I would like to hear what our two witnesses have to say about the following. Given that...

[English]

Dr. Paul Hamel: It's still in French.

The Chairman: There's a dial there, sir. If you just find the English channel, you'll be connected.

Dr. Paul Hamel: Okay.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Are you on the right channel now?

[English]

Dr. Paul Hamel: Yes, thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: We know that Russia and some other countries don't necessarily share the assessment of the American threat, and that the United States would like to negotiate adjustments to the 1972 treaty with Russia. Assuming that these two countries agree to modify the treaty signed in 1972, should Canada oppose such an agreement, which would have been reached in a mutual understanding between Russia and the United States in order to implement such a system? If these two countries agree to it, should we be objecting? Would the threat be as clear as if the United States decided to implement the system unilaterally? Do you understand my question?

[English]

Dr. Paul Hamel: Yes.

If Russia and the United States could guarantee to the world that their nuclear arsenal somehow does not affect anybody else on this planet, I would be very happy for them to negotiate whatever deal they want. However, this is not a tenable possibility with nuclear weapons. Their nuclear arsenals threaten every person on this planet, so every person on this planet has a say. Any system or any agreement that does not lead to the abolition of nuclear weapons I oppose and Science for Peace opposes.

If the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty adjustments or any of the adjustments to SALT or START or any failure to ratify any of these occurs, I and Science for Peace are in fact opposed to that.

Does that answer your question?

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Does Mr. Comfort have anything to add?

[English]

Mr. Eldon Comfort: No, I think I'll leave it to my distinguished friend. He's a little better on the technical side of it than I am.

The Chairman: Thank you, Monsieur Laurin.

We are on the second round, if there are other questions from the members. I allow five minutes per member, starting with Mr. Goldring, please.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Dr. Hamel, I'm wondering if you have some idea of how many countries on earth have developed nuclear weapons. Added to that, how many more would have the technology to?

Dr. Paul Hamel: As for countries that probably have nuclear weapons, I think they're well known. That's Israel, Pakistan, India, the United States, England, France, Russia, Ukraine, presumably by association, China and South Africa, although presumably South Africa has de-armed.

Mr. Peter Goldring: That's quite a few. Would it be safe to say that this number could be doubled or trebled by the countries that have the technology? They could, but they're not?

Dr. Paul Hamel: The knowledge and the technology are out there. It can't be unknown; it can't be unlearned. So potentially any country in the world can do it, if they choose to waste their resources to acquire that.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Additionally, our experience in the Gulf War was that there were threats of anthrax and biological and chemical weapons. This too is a concern I'm sure this system could approach, particularly if we look at today's day and age of robotics. It's not just strictly missiles we're concerned about. It might also be a MiG-23 that is rigged robotically to deliver a nuclear weapon. Is that not also a concern, a high-speed aircraft that only an anti-ballistic missile system could bring down?

Dr. Paul Hamel: In the context of biological weapons, for example, there are much simpler sytems. The United States has amply demonstrated that biological warfare can be delivered from a very simple bomb that takes out a water filtration plant. That's biological warfare.

So I agree. There are lots of very simple ways to do exactly that. How would you stop such a very simple way of poisoning a population? I'm not sure how you can defend against that, certainly not in this defence system.

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Mr. Peter Goldring: So the question really gets back to what I said before. If you have a radar system that is capable of detecting, at great distances, incoming missiles or incoming high-speed aircraft, what's the next extension? Isn't the next extension then some type of a weapon in order to bring down that craft, whether it's a missile or whether it's a high-speed plane? Is that not a natural defensive weapon? Or how else would you do it?

Dr. Paul Hamel: First of all, I would expect that anybody who wants to do that wouldn't use such an incredible system. They would have somebody walk over to a water reservoir and dump poison in. The kind of capability you're talking about doesn't require this incredible high-tech solution. It's very low tech to have these capabilities, with the exception of nuclear weapons—they're obviously much more capable. For all those other things it's very simple.

The defence system we're talking about has no capability of stopping someone from another country dumping in anthrax or putting it over a country.

Cuba, for example, is a country where biological warfare has been waged on it over and over again. The documents for that have been demonstrated, and it's very simple technology. You take an airplane and you fly over a country. It doesn't require sophisticated missiles. The same thing can happen here in Canada or the United States, anywhere in the world.

Mr. Peter Goldring: How far out is this missile system intended to bring down intruding aircraft?

Dr. Paul Hamel: Sorry, I didn't understand the question.

Mr. Peter Goldring: How far outside of the boundaries of the United States is this missile system intended to bring down missiles or aircraft?

Dr. Paul Hamel: As my colleague just pointed out, depending on the direction, I assume that Canada would be a very probable place they would be exploded over, or the Pacific or Atlantic Ocean, but certainly not over the United States. I don't know where it's going to be met specifically. I can't tell you those technical details.

Certainly the way the Star Wars system was envisioned there were going to be at least three different areas in which a counter-attack was going to be mounted: very close to the initial launch, someplace in mid-flight, and then also someplace relatively close to the United States but not over the United States.

Mr. Peter Goldring: Finally, how could a state defend itself against a missile attack? How can it defend itself if it doesn't have a missile to send in retaliation or against it?

Dr. Paul Hamel: It can't, and therefore we should get rid of nuclear weapons and we should work toward social and human justice for everybody on the planet. That's the only way of preventing all of this we're talking about.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Goldring.

We come now to Mr. Pratt, if you have more questions.

Mr. David Pratt: To pick up on those last comments, it would be very nice if that were to happen. I don't think you'd find any argument around the table in terms of people wanting to have that happen.

The fact remains, and we've seen this time and time again through the history of the 20th century.... The history of the 21st century remains to be written, but the history of the 20th century is filled with a lot of bad people doing very nasty things to one another. Under those circumstances, Dr. Hamel, wouldn't you say that people have an obligation, a right to protect themselves? Isn't this in fact what the United States is trying to do?

Clearly, as a superpower in the world, they've become a target for terrorists; they've become a target for all sorts of different groups from around the world looking to do them damage for one reason or another. And to suggest that the American government cannot take the steps it deems appropriate to protect the American people seems to me to be an unreasonable position.

I would like to have your comments on how you would see an arms race ensuing from this. Right now, clearly, the United States is a global superpower. No one comes close to touching the United States in terms of the armament, the weapons, the technology it has available. Again, you can use your earlier comment, but why would anyone in their right mind attempt to take on U.S. conventional or nuclear superiority? Why would that happen?

Dr. Paul Hamel: I agree that I don't think anyone in their right mind would do it. I also don't think that leaders around the world are not in their right mind when it comes to that.

When you talk about why the United States might potentially be a target, why everyone seems to be upset about the United States, I refer you back to my comment that was very well articulated in the New York Times. The United States has very, very large global interests, and they're very clear on their ability to back those global economic interests with their military. They've done this time and time again.

• 1615

I'm not sure if you've ever travelled to places like Chiapas, Mexico; Colombia; El Salvador; Nicaragua; Guatemala—anywhere in Central or Latin America—but I think you'll find there's not a terrible liking for the policies of the United States. These are places that have under a variety of different regimes been subject to their global interests.

You might predict that some of those people are upset, that the 200,000 Guatemalans who were slaughtered during the course of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, with military technology and officers trained in the United States and with logistics supplied by the United States, might have had something to say to this.

Mr. David Pratt: Mr. Chair, I'm not sure where this is going, but it seems to me the last time I checked, Guatemala does not have nuclear weapons, nor do they have a ballistic missile capability.

Dr. Paul Hamel: But they do have the capability of mounting terrorist attacks, which is what you brought up in the first place. They're not going to mount a terrorist attack—if they were to do such a thing—with nuclear technology. They don't need nuclear technology to do that.

Mr. David Pratt: Does the United States have the right to protect itself from a terrorist attack?

Dr. Paul Hamel: Yes, but they're not going to do it with this system.

Mr. David Pratt: No, but you're conceding the right of the United States to protect itself, to defend itself from terrorist rogue-state missile attacks, then.

Dr. Paul Hamel: I'm sorry, I don't understand what you mean by “rogue”.

Mr. David Pratt: In terms of the logic of your argument, if the U.S. has the right to protect itself against a terrorist attack, then if a terrorist attack comes in the form of a cruise missile launched from a tramp steamer or biological weapons that are dumped into a water supply, by the same logic the U.S. has the right to protect itself from a ballistic missile attack from a rogue state. Is that not correct?

Dr. Paul Hamel: Yes, I suppose so. So you're proposing then that this national missile defence system, the limited version—

Mr. Eldon Comfort: My train leaves in less than 30 minutes. I would like to be excused, and I'll leave you in the good hands of my colleague here.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Comfort, for your testimony today. We appreciate your time. Thank you.

So where we were was that I think Mr. Pratt had a yes from Dr. Hamel to the question of whether the United States has a right to defend itself from a missile attack. I heard a yes.

Mr. Pratt, there's time for one more quick question, if you have one.

Mr. David Pratt: I'll pass for now.

The Chairman: Thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, do you have any other questions?

Mr. René Laurin: It's more of a comment which might give rise to other comments.

Mr. Hamel, I agree that the United States have the right to protect themselves against possible attacks, although I fear the day that the United States would feel invincible against foreign attacks, because nothing would keep them from becoming the attackers. They would be certain that they could not be attacked because they would have this shield which would protect them and make them undefeatable. It might be then that the United States would become a danger to foreign countries and they could attack them in order to impose their trade law, their philosophy or other policies. Is this what you are referring to when you say that this could lead to the proliferation of arms or to a policy of withdrawal? Is this in fact what you are referring to?

[English]

Dr. Paul Hamel: Yes, I would agree with your position. I would also add that there are plenty of places on the planet right now that think the United States is an attacker. As I pointed out, and as this editorial in the New York Times has pointed out, many people do feel that they should present a very positive or aggressive stance in their dealings with the world. So yes, I agree.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: I would like to take this reasoning further. If ever the United States ended up in this type of isolationist situation where they were so well protected that they did not need to fear anything of anyone, then at that point would their worst enemies not be certain oppressive groups, some ideological groups or sects that do not share the same opinion as the government and which could even come from within the United States? Would this threat not be internal? Could this situation not lead to these groups being able to take regrettable actions more quickly?

• 1620

[English]

Dr. Paul Hamel: Undesirable in what context?

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: It could be some individuals or religious groups that live in the United States and that do not agree with the American position. Could these people then not want to protest against the government and attack these defence systems to render the United States less invincible? In this case, would the enemy not be internal to the country?

[English]

Dr. Paul Hamel: There have been examples of that contingency already throughout history. During the Vietnam War there were people who were trying to prevent the United States from sending military supplies, for example, to Vietnam.

I was in Washington during the middle to late 1980s, and it was revealed that there were contingency plans that the protest in the United States that was aimed at preventing the United States from furthering their aggression against Nicaragua was going to be met with very severe internal repression.

So, sure, there are lots of people in the United States who do not agree with their policies. Some of them are more radical than others. So there is that threat within the United States.

I hope that addresses what you....

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Yes, thanks. I would like to ask one last question, Mr. Chairman. Assuming that there was a situation of serious public disorder in the United States, what would be the best way for Canada to protect itself, in this case against a disorder which could eventually cross the border and spill over into Canada? How could Canada prevent such a situation? Would our best defence be to ally ourselves with the United States, or rather to become a neutral country in the face of the American reaction and to possibly seek the protection of other world powers?

[English]

Dr. Paul Hamel: It's a large question. It would depend on the sort of internal conflict that is going on in the United States to which Canada would have to respond. For example, in the case of the Vietnam War, Canada was somewhat embroiled in that. Draft dodgers were here, and people were involved in the protection of those people here. That's a minor example.

I think the policy I would choose would be one of the most amount of independence politically and militarily from the United States. I do not think that seeking help, for example, from another nuclear weapon state would make this country a safer place at all.

I also think it's difficult to believe that the United States is not an economic threat to the independence of this country. So being integrated as closely with the United States as we are, the course of action would depend very much on the situation that arose.

That's a kind of non-answer, because the question is actually so broad that it's not clear there is a specific one to give.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: Do you think that the United States would accept or would tolerate that Canada adopt a neutral position?

[English]

Dr. Paul Hamel: I don't know if it's acceptable. That's what I would expect we should do. If it's not acceptable, and they retaliate or somehow pressure us into another stance, that would be unfortunate. But I think Canada should, to as great a degree as possible, forge an independent course regardless of the pressure the United States chooses to put on Canada.

If you're referring to this missile defence system, does that represent...?

Can I finish, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Yes, sure.

Dr. Paul Hamel: If you're referring to the possibility of the United States somehow inflicting some economic consequences on our failure to join that system, I personally think we should resist that, and regardless of those consequences, we should not engage in them. That's also the position of Science for Peace.

• 1625

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Laurin.

[English]

We come now to the chairman for three or four questions, Dr. Hamel, and then I don't see any other questions, but I'll ask members again.

The first thing I'd like to address really was for our other witness, Mr. Comfort, but I'll ask you whether you agree with his assessment that this is “son of Star Wars”. Isn't that a misrepresentation of what this is, given that Star Wars as proposed by President Reagan or his advisers was a space-based system where you could have offensive or defensive capabilities very easily, either/or, and that this proposed NMD is a land-based system? Is it not a misnomer to call this “son of Star Wars”? We're engaging here in an important debate about a serious topic, and I don't think by misrepresenting what this is, whether one's for it or against it or undecided, serves the debate. Do you not think that this characterization is inaccurate?

Dr. Paul Hamel: I agree that calling it “son of Star Wars” is probably not accurate. My lab actually does develop mental biology. I would probably say this is “embryo of Star Wars”. It is in a very early stage of deployment. And as I stated before, we believe this is simply a precursor to a very much larger precursor. So the “son of Star Wars” is yet to come.

The Chairman: I would submit to you that it's quite a leap down the road. It may well lead to a Star Wars type of situation, but I simply disagree that a space-based missile system, or a space-based laser system as I understand it, can be directly equated to this. To me that stretches the point pretty far. So we'll leave that. I want to go to another question. I heard your view on it.

I'd really just like a yes or no to this one if you can, a very brief response. Do you agree that Canada has been served well by our partnership in NORAD, and do you think we should continue in that partnership?

Dr. Paul Hamel: No and no.

The Chairman: Thank you. That helps me with my next question.

First of all, I can share with you that polls would show that at least 75% of Canadians would disagree with you. I for one would disagree with you as an individual Canadian and as an MP. I don't know whether we should go into this system with the United States or not, but I certainly feel that NORAD has served the country well, and I hope that Canada will continue in NORAD. Both the defence and foreign affairs ministers were before this committee recently suggesting an extension of NORAD, and the information I have is that's backed by an overwhelming majority of Canadians. But having said that, we've agreed to disagree on it.

I've put this question to other witnesses, so I'd be interested in your view. Given a choice between an NMD unilaterally controlled by the United States or an NMD under NORAD control with some, at least, Canadian participation, which would you find preferable?

Dr. Paul Hamel: Our position is that we shouldn't be engaged in this defence system at all.

The Chairman: I give you that, but of that choice, which would—

Dr. Paul Hamel: So if that is a component of NORAD we shouldn't be a part of NORAD.

The Chairman: So you don't want to answer the question.

Dr. Paul Hamel: Yes.

The Chairman: All right. So you'd prefer not to answer the question, and that's fair enough. I can certainly say that other witnesses, even those antagonistic to the idea, have said that of the choice they would obviously prefer a NORAD-controlled system over a unilaterally controlled American system.

Dr. Paul Hamel: The gentleman who just left actually is contrary to that, and the position of Pugwash is contrary to that.

The Chairman: I thought you'd want to answer the question, but that's okay. I understand Mr. Comfort's point of view; I was seeking yours. You don't want to answer it, so that's fine. I was sharing with you comments from other witnesses.

We also put this question to people at this committee, one of them being General Macdonald, a Canadian deputy commander of NORAD, who argues that a world with NMD, it could be seriously argued, would actually be a safer world than if they did not have NMD. The logic goes like this, and it relates to something Mr. Goldring raised earlier: Right now the American position is if it receives attack it has basically two choices—to do nothing or a major retaliatory response of some type. It's been argued by General Macdonald and others that an NMD would allow the possibility of a lesser response than a major nuclear attack, thereby giving them another option, thereby actually creating a safer, not a less safe, world. Do you agree or disagree?

• 1630

Dr. Paul Hamel: I think the example of the negotiations after a country has shown that they are the dominant power would indicate that there will be no equal negotiations after. There's no safety in that at all.

Can you think of an example of where a dominant power is left, for example, completely and utterly in charge of everything where they're going to negotiate on an equal footing? The end of World War II and the end of World War I—

The Chairman: That's not my question, with all due respect. Maybe I didn't explain it well.

The Americans now have nothing to respond with other than a nuclear attack. Correct? If they want to respond in an offensive way—

Dr. Paul Hamel: Respond to what? I'm sorry.

The Chairman: Respond to a missile attack, which they would have from another nation—

Dr. Paul Hamel: From whom? From a particular nation?

The Chairman: Is it not the most.... I get to ask the questions now, Doctor, with all due respect.

Dr. Paul Hamel: I just want to clarify.

The Chairman: Let me try it without interrupting me.

If the United States was attacked by another nation—I don't care what nation, pick one—by a missile attack, experts have submitted to us the most likely response, or their only possible response, would be either nothing or another missile attack. What I'm pointing out to you is that serious people, such as General Macdonald, have argued that an NMD would give them an option of a less serious response, thereby creating actually a safer world because they now have more options in their arsenal of response than a major nuclear attack. I'm just asking you if you agree with that argument.

Dr. Paul Hamel: I think that's not equal at all.

The Chairman: You don't agree. Thank you very much.

All right. Other questions from members?

I want to thank you very much, Dr. Hamel, for being here and for sharing your point of view. There's obviously some disagreement with other people, but that's the nature of the debate, and this committee's job has been to get this important topic on the floor for debate. The foreign affairs committee has held one hearing in response to ours. I think that's been useful.

One thing I do know and believe as chairman of this committee and as a Canadian is we have to have discussion around this issue. We can't develop a position while pretending that it's not something that is imminent for this country to deal with. So we will at some point make some kind of recommendation as a committee to the defence minister.

I thank you for being here and sharing your point of view with us today. Thank you very much.

What I would like to do now is welcome a delegation from the Republic of Latvia. Excuse my pronunciation if I'm incorrect with this.

I welcome the people from Latvia to come forward please.

Mr. Janis Lusis (Latvian Ambassador to Canada): Where would you like us to sit, sir?

The Chairman: Right here would be fine, Ambassador, and any open seat. You are most welcome.

First of all, Pat O'Brien is my name, and I'm a member of Parliament and chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. You're most welcome here.

Today we have members on this committee from all parties in the House of Commons and we deal with those two major issues. You heard some pretty lively discussion there a moment ago on a missile defence system.

I would like to welcome Ambassador Janis Lusis of the Republic of Latvia and His Excellency Janis Straume, who is the Chairman of the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia. Excuse my pronunciation if it's not correct. I did consult with our good friend and colleague, Ms. Sarmite Bulte, who of course is the first member of Parliament of Latvian extraction in Canada. We're very proud to have her in the House of Commons, and I know you've met with her already. So I consulted with her for a little help on the pronunciation, but I'm not sure if I was correct with that.

• 1635

With that, let me just tell you that, as I say, on this side you have members of the government party, in this case the Liberal Party, colleagues of mine, and on the other side of the table you have various members of the opposition parties. It so happens that right now we just have our friend, Monsieur Laurin, present, but you saw earlier other members of the opposition parties, who unfortunately have other things they have to try to get to.

With that, let me turn it over to you, Ambassador, and to His Excellency. We're happy to hear any remarks you'd like to make or to answer any questions for you about the work we're trying to do. You are very welcome here today.

Mr. Janis Lusis: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am Janis Lusis, Ambassador of Latvia to Canada.

I would like to take one moment to introduce the members of our party. With me is Mr. Janis Straume, who is the speaker of our parliament, or as we would say, the chairman of our parliament. Also with me are Mrs. Broka, who is our translator; Silvija Dreimane, who is a member of our parliament; Mrs. Golde, who is also a member of our parliament; Mr. Inkens, who is a member of our parliament; and then we have two members of the chancellery of the speaker of the parliament, Mr. Plesums and Mr. Ziemelis. That would be our delegation.

Thank you very much for your kind words of introduction. We may have a little problem here because Mr. Straume, our speaker of the parliament, does not speak English, so everything will have to be translated to him; and accordingly, what he says will have to be translated into English. So I hope you bear with us. This is a slight glitch, but I'm sure we will get over it.

The other problem, and I'd like to apologize to the honourable member, is that while we do understand some French, we do not speak French at a proficient level where we might answer in French. I hope that our honourable member will forgive us for this and take this into consideration.

Mr. Janis Straume (Chairman of the Saeima (Parliament), Republic of Latvia) (Interpretation): Thank you very much for this opportunity given to us to meet the members of your committee.

We have to say that this is the first official visit to Canada of our parliamentary delegation. Probably this moment is very significant in one sense, because Latvia today has already been invited to start accession negotiations to the EU. On the other hand, we are also wishing and have expressed our willingness to become members of NATO.

We have to say that movement toward the EU and NATO are our foreign policy priorities today. In the context of these foreign policy priorities, it is very important to see what are the relations of Latvia and Russia today.

I want to thank the Canadian side for the support they have rendered us in regard to the issue of our movement toward NATO. This cooperation, so far, has been along the lines of a bilateral military training assistance program and the Partnership for Peace program. We also hope that in the future Canada will continue giving its support to the Latvian movement toward NATO.

• 1640

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

I will indicate, Ambassador, that I assume you know how our system works here. We have two friends, Mr. Laurin and Monsieur Bertrand, whose first language is French. If they wish to say anything in French, it will be translated into English for you, and then the translator can go into Latvian. They'll have a chance to participate if they wish to.

Thank you very much, sir, for your opening comments.

Are there other comments from anyone before our members say a few words?

Mr. Edvins Inkens (Member of the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia) (Interpretation): Dear colleagues, I want to add a few things to what Mr. Straume has said. I especially want to stress the point of our concerns concerning the relations of Latvia with Russia.

On the whole, we can be quite satisfied with our achievements in foreign policy as well as in our domestic policy. Among these achievements, I can mention the consolidation and improvement of our economic situation and the democracy that we are trying to implement in our country. Among other things, we can certainly mention our movement toward the EU and NATO. But when we speak about our relations with Russia, it goes contrary to all logic, because our relations have become worse and worse.

It is not at all excluded that probably this very week the Russian parliament will adopt a law that will mean economic sanctions against Latvia. That means we will be the only country toward which Russia will have demonstrated this kind of attitude. This is nothing new to Latvia, because two years ago Russia also announced sanctions. They were not official, yet practically they were there.

If we look at the essence of our mutual relations, there is nothing at all to make Russia act like this. Russia and Latvia do not share the same view on how our relations should develop. We have a different view on these points. Even if we indeed do not share the same views with Russia in regard to minority issues, we have always tried to guide ourselves by the standards that have been set by international organizations on this point.

As a result of following international standards, we have changed our citizenship law a number of times. Today our citizenship law is quite open to anybody who might wish to become a citizen of Latvia, certainly following certain requirements. However, these requirements are in line with the international practice. We have improved and amended our language law in order to show more tolerance for our minorities.

• 1645

Both of these processes I have mentioned today have demonstrated very good results. More and more non-citizens of Latvia are trying to become citizens. To date, more than 40% of all Latvian ethnic Russians have become citizens. The rest of the problem lies only in their wish to become citizens and in their wish to learn the minimum requirements of the Latvian language, the state language.

At the same time, we show our tolerant attitude toward the ethnic minorities living in Latvia by the mere fact that in Latvia today there are eight minority schools, meaning that for eight different minorities, they are funded and financed by the state. I don't think you will find many examples of similar experiences in any other country.

We thought all these undertakings might become a sound basis for serious improvements in our relations with Russia. Instead of this, we get from the Russian Duma the draft law on the sanctions against Latvia. Two weeks ago, when visiting the president of the state, the Russian ambassador said that Latvian-Russian relations are at a critical point.

Summarizing the above, we can admit that Russians are quite rational in their thinking when they try to assess their relations with Latvia. At the same time, this means that their unwillingness to improve their relations with Latvia has a certain hidden basis. One of the reasons might be the feeling that Russia today is experiencing the Baltic States' gradually drifting away, beyond the reach of the sphere of influence of Russia. Practically, I think Russia today quite clearly understands that in five or six years from this moment, Latvia and the Baltic States might become members of the EU and, as we very much hope, members of NATO in the foreseeable future.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Are there other remarks? We'd welcome them. If not, Mr. Ambassador, I would propose that maybe we could exchange some questions of each other, or some opinions.

Mr. Janis Lusis: Ms. Dreimane would like to say some words.

The Chairman: Please.

Ms. Silvija Dreimane (Secretary of the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia) (Interpretation): I want to add a little bit with regard to what Mr. Inkens said concerning the minority issue.

This is not the first time Russia has tried to use this trump—that is, the minority question or minority issue—while disregarding whether it is the Russian elections, presidential elections, or the Latvian attempts to join the EU or NATO.

In Latvia today there is a very popular tradition of carrying out opinion surveys or opinion polls of the population. We have carried out such surveys with regard to our membership in the EU or membership in NATO. We think such surveys are very important, because, in regard to our joining the EU, we have to face their referendum, the popular vote. We are therefore very willing to know what the mood is in our society today.

• 1650

What may seem quite surprising today is that the trust and the positive attitude of the non-citizens of Latvia with regard to our joining the EU is growing from year to year. Here we see quite a controversy, because Russia actually says it wants to protect the rights of the Russian people who live in Latvia. However, the Russian people living in Latvia are already focused on the west. That means they are ready to become members of the EU, and they have no problems with it.

After we lifted the so-called windows for naturalization, we saw the following trend. Now the children born to non-citizens in Latvia automatically become citizens of Latvia, and we see more and more the tendency that Russian children go to Latvian schools. We have two types of schools, Latvian schools and Russian schools, and this shows integration in practice.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Janis Lusis: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to add a few words, please.

The Chairman: Sure, please do.

Mr. Janis Lusis: First of all, I would like to reiterate once again our thanks to Canada for the assistance it has given our country, Latvia, in terms of training of personnel and military personnel, and also for the hard assistance in terms of the Partnership for Peace and so on.

Like Canada, Latvia has certain problems with its defence budget. NATO has put upon us the requirement that in order to proceed toward NATO membership we have to increase our defence budget to 2% of GDP. I think Canada can appreciate what that means, so I shall speak no further on the matter. So you can see that we have common problems in certain areas.

The reason my colleagues have so eloquently spoken particularly about minorities is that, particularly in Europe, the question is always asked of us. When we reiterate at every opportunity that we would like to join NATO and the European Union, the question always asked about the Russian minority in our country. While it may have seemed to you that it was perhaps a very lengthy description on the part of my colleagues in regard to this particular question, that is the reason for it.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Ambassador.

And to all of the members here who have spoken, thank you very much.

As I say, all of us here are members of Parliament, both from the government and the opposition parties. Several people would like to ask you questions, and we're certainly interested in any questions you might have.

I'll just indicate to you that by happy circumstance, this meeting will be televised. Many Canadians will see or have an opportunity to see this meeting. Just so you know, the issues you are raising will be on the public affairs channel of Canada that we call CPAC. Since I think it's healthy that Canadians will have a chance to know more about Latvia and the issues that are important to you, that's fortunate timing.

Before I go to questions, I will say that I think our members know at least something about the courage and perseverance of Latvia and the other Baltic states in the face of great pressures for many years now, and it's a real pleasure to have you here today.

Let me just go to my colleagues. Maybe we can restrict ourselves to one question each, and we'll keep on going as long as you have time and there are questions.

I'm going to give the first question to Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: Mr. Chair, there may be other members who haven't asked a question yet, so I'm prepared to give the floor to those members.

The Chairman: No, go ahead. Everybody will get a chance.

Mr. David Pratt: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

• 1655

I would like to welcome our guests here today. I hope you have a productive and enjoyable stay in Canada.

The question I have relates to the issue of relations with Russia. In particular, it seems as though the threat of sanctions that are being imposed by the Russians relates directly to the issues concerning the Russian minority in Latvia. I'd be very interested in knowing if there are any other issues that bear on the sanctions the Russians may impose. I would also be interested in knowing the nature of the sanctions and the extent to which they may affect the Latvian economy.

Mr. Edvins Inkens (Interpretation): As I've said, the minority issue is not the main issue in the relations between Latvia and Russia. If it were the main issue, Latvia and Russia would try to maintain a constructive dialogue in order to find compromise solutions that would be acceptable to both sides.

I think the basis of this lies in the attempts of Latvia, as well as Estonia and Lithuania, to join the EU, as well as recent attempts to join NATO. These things probably are at the basis of sanctions. These sanctions go not against Latvia alone, but are also expressed vis-à-vis Estonia and Lithuania.

As we know, Russia has always objected to the expansion of NATO in an eastern direction. As regards the first three countries—meaning the latest expansion of NATO—Russia just expressed its indignation in these cases. With regard to the Baltic States, though, it clearly speaks about the red line. By this red line, Russia evidently means the former borders of the Soviet Union. The countries that formerly belonged to the Soviet Union are that territory where Russia is very unwilling to lose its sphere of influence. Certainly we don't want to see or admit to any such red lines, because we do not want to admit to and we don't want to be within this influence or sphere of influence of Russia.

Within the last six months we have witnessed the case that Russia more than ever is expressing its negative attitude toward the prospective joining of the Baltic States and the EU. The EU has worked out its own strategy with regard to its relations with Russia. In my personal opinion, it's not a very effective strategy. Russia, on the other hand, has indeed worked out or developed a very effective strategy with regard to the EU. At the basis of this strategy, Russia puts the possibility of extracting maximum benefit from the expansion of the EU in the eastern direction.

• 1700

Therefore, shortly before the Helsinki summit, Russia began to speak intensely about their market losses in the event that the Baltic States join the EU. Russia says there'll be market losses in the Baltic market, as well as in other former east European countries. Russia has begun to clearly mention and hint at receiving certain compensation for it.

It is really true that there will be market losses, because in recent years we observed gradual but steady drops in the Latvian-Russian trade relations. The year 1998 was a critical one because at that time our external trade with Russia constituted 27%, but last year our exports to Russia made up only 6.6%. Among our trade partners, our major neighbour ranked as only number five. In regard to imports from Russia, the drop was not so significant—from 17% to 10%.

We have to say that none of the drops were the result of Latvia's attempts to join the EU. They were plainly connected to the fact that in April two years ago, Russia imposed economic sanctions upon Latvia. There was a massive media campaign to boycott Latvian products. This politicized situation lasted only a few months, because soon after the real economic crisis in Russia began. Then Latvia's access to the Russian markets was lost and diminished greatly, due to economic reasons.

I'll give you one example, as concerns the sanctions. For Russia, Latvia is very significant because one of the main lines of transportation from Russia to the west goes through Latvia. Certainly this happens also through Lithuania and Estonia. However, it is only through Latvia and along Latvian railways that Russia uses most unfavourable transit tariffs.

• 1705

We have tried to estimate what will happen when Russia's sanctions really take force. Our trade relations and commercial relations have diminished to such a degree that we will not have very serious impacts on this basis. We will have to do one thing only: refocus our trade relations, turning them to the west.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

I will go to Mr. Bertrand. In our system here in Canada, each minister has a member of Parliament as his special assistant, if you will. We call them parliamentary secretaries. Monsieur Bertrand is the parliamentary secretary for the Minister of National Defence.

Mr. Bertrand has a question.

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to welcome the delegation. It's always a pleasure to meet people like yourselves, who come over and want to discuss different issues with us.

My question is a short one regarding your application to NATO. I just want to find out how that is coming along. I'd like you to maybe go into detail. I know you mentioned a while ago that NATO said you should increase spending in your military budget. I would just like you to go a little deeper into how that is coming along.

Mr. Janis Straume (Interpretation): Thank you very much for your question.

We have to admit that this 2% requirement has been very clearly stated, and it is really a requirement. The Baltic States have already organized measures in order to reach this requirement. We have started certain programs, and our target is to reach this figure in 2003.

Disregarding the consequences of the Russian crisis on Latvia, last year when making up the new budget there was only one sector in which the financing was increased compared to the previous years, and that was the defence budget, by 35%. Currently, the financing for the defence sector is 1.04% of the GDP. The government has prepared a draft law and has worked out certain measures, with the view to gradually increasing this figure to reach the required 2% in 2003.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

In our Parliament we have many parliamentary associations and organizations. One such organization is the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association. The next question will come from Mr. Proud, who is the chairman of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association.

Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, ladies and gentlemen. It's certainly a pleasure to have you here with us today.

As has been said, I'm the chairman of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association, which belongs to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, of which you are associate members. We will be going to Budapest, Hungary, in May to the spring meeting. Of course, one of the items on the agenda will be the expansion of NATO.

• 1710

I also know, as you likely know, that a policy resolution passed by the assembly some time ago recommended that Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and Slovenia will be the next countries to accede to NATO membership.

I don't know whether this is the way it will play out or not, but I know there will be great debate on this at our next assembly in Budapest, so I wish you well in your wishes to become members of NATO.

The three new countries that have come in—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—seem to be doing very well. I know in certain areas you have to meet certain criteria. One of them, as you mentioned, is 2% of GDP. I know from experience here in Canada that is not an easy problem to overcome. I just want to say that I wish you well.

How difficult will it be for you to reach 2% of GDP, if you are successful in being asked to join NATO?

Mr. Janis Straume (Interpretation): We have to admit that it certainly will not be an easy task by any means, because we have a lot of needs in other sectors, like in the social sector, educational sector, and elsewhere. But we have clearly stated our goal, and we understand that this political priority we have set is to be reached.

In the Parliament of Latvia we have six political parties represented. They reflect a very broad political spectrum, but on the issue of Latvia joining NATO there is a unanimous opinion.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

We're trying to give each member a question, and we'll be interrupted soon by a call to vote. So the next question is to Mr. Clouthier.

Mr. Hec Clouthier (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Mr. René Laurin: There are four members on the other side.

The Chairman: I have your name, Monsieur Laurin.

[Translation]

Mr. René Laurin: [Editor's note: Inaudible]

[English]

The Chairman: Do you want to defer to Monsieur Laurin?

[Translation]

Mr. Hec Clouthier: Ask your questions, go ahead, my friend.

[English]

The Chairman: We have rules, but when we have a delegation we don't use our normal rules for everyone. We go by who puts up his hand first. Mr. Clouthier has very graciously given the floor to Monsieur Laurin.

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin.

Mr. René Laurin: Thank you, Hector, for your consideration.

I don't know if the interpreter can translate my comments to your interpreter. Yes? Very well.

First of all, I would like you to explain a specific situation. What form does Russia's opposition to some of your projects take? Is it that they do not recognize your autonomy, or do they wish to preserve the mutual influence that can exist between two autonomous countries? How would you describe your relations with Russia?

[English]

Mr. Edvins Inkens (Interpretation): In our history of relations with Russia, there have been occasions when Russia has recognized Latvia's independence. It happened soon after the First World War, when Latvia's independence was officially recognized, and it also happened at the beginning of the 1990s. In at least the first case of Latvia's recognition by Russia, it didn't interfere with Russia's actual occupation of Latvia. It was not Russia; it is more correct to say the Soviet Union on that occasion.

• 1715

Officially, Russia today fully acknowledges Latvia as an independent state. Certainly today's Russia differs from the Stalinist Soviet Union. Therefore we hope that Russia indeed recognizes Latvia's independent state and that the only thing it wants is to retain the economic sphere of influence here. At the same time, our attempts and our wish to join NATO just demonstrate our thinking. We are afraid that in one generation or in two generations, Russia might again forget that it granted us independence and might again want to return into the territory of Latvia.

When Russia explains the reasons it is against the Baltic States becoming members of NATO, some of these reasons sound very strange indeed, and some of them are quite understandable. One of the strangest arguments I have heard is that when Estonia joins NATO, then from the territory of Estonia it will be easy to shoot at St. Petersburg with just cannons. We don't understand why Estonia would wish to do so.

If we speak about serious arguments, we are clearly aware of one thing: if the Baltic States join NATO, there will be problems for the Russian Baltic navy. The next very serious issue is the status of the Kaliningrad region. Here we understand that Russia has certain aims or certain intentions as to how to use the Kaliningrad region for military purposes.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

We'll go now to Mr. Clouthier.

Mr. Hec Clouthier: Welcome, ladies and gentlemen. First of all, I must admit that everybody on this side has a title. There's the deputy chair, parliamentary secretary, parliamentary secretary chair. I'm the coach of the hockey team. That's my claim to fame: I'm just the coach of the hockey team. That's it.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Hec Clouthier: I would like to ask you a question, not so much with respect to Russia but to do with your colleagues in the Baltic States. What is your relationship now with Lithuania and Estonia politically, culturally, economically?

• 1720

Mr. Janis Straume (Interpretation): As regards the political relations, I think they are very good indeed, because we have a common target and common action plans with regard to our movement toward the EU. We have also common cooperation plans with regard to our accession to NATO. We act within the so-called membership action plan. We have also other plans of military cooperation among the three states. We are also bound, all three republics together, by the common trade agreement. With a few exceptions, our economic relations indeed are very good.

At the same time, you have to admit that all three Baltic states are competitors in a way, both in their movement toward the EU and in their movement toward NATO. All three states are very well aware that our simultaneous joining of NATO is essential for that north European security.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

I have two more members here with questions and I don't know if we have time. I guess there are three now. If you have questions, we'll try to take some too. I'm going to ask the members to try to ask a brief question and maybe a succinct answer and we'll continue our discussion.

Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud: My question is very simple. What's the size of your military, all your military?

Ms. Valija Broka (Interpreter, Saeima of the Republic of Latvia): Do you mean manpower?

Mr. George Proud: Yes.

Mr. Janis Straume (Interpretation): In the regular army we have a little bit over 14,000, but in the body of our national armed forces we have also a unit that is called the national guard. This national guard is a voluntary organization. Altogether, with the armed forces, that constitutes about 40,000.

The Chairman: Thank you.

We have a number of women in our Parliament, of course, and we're lucky to have a good female member on our committee.

Mrs. Longfield, I'll give you the next question.

Mrs. Judi Longfield (Whitby—Ajax, Lib.): Thank you.

Being able to elicit a 30% increase in defence spending is a real coup, and I congratulate you. Obviously there are some people who are working very hard to accomplish that.

I'm curious. In what areas are you directing your increased spending, and where do you hope to do it in the future?

Ms. Valija Broka: Do you mean for the military budget?

Mrs. Judi Longfield: Yes.

Mr. Edvins Inkens (Interpretation): As you heard, our armed forces are not very big in size. As regards our plans in joining NATO, we don't have plans to numerically increase the manpower. Therefore, we will channel our resources into proper training systems, military training, ammunition, and other provisions. Because we have to standardize this with those requirements that are in NATO, this is very important. If we don't have trained personnel, we may have problems. We have to develop such personnel that will be able to deal correctly with classified military information, which will definitely be there when we become NATO members. Just the creation of this information system, and security of the information system, as well as institutional organizations, meaning embassies and all connected with NATO, these are the most expensive parts of the program.

• 1725

Mr. Janis Lusis: If I might add one point to that, as was indicated by our colleague here, we are not going for an offensive military system; we are going for a defensive military system. In other words, we are not putting this money to purchase interceptor fighters and ballistic missiles. We are putting this money to train our people so that our people could effectively operate in a NATO environment. And as is the foreign policy of Canada to be a defensive system and a peacekeeping system, we are also aiming our military capabilities at defence and peacekeeping.

The Chairman: Thank you.

You're generating more questions, so there's a lot of interest. That's normal with parliamentarians.

I have three more members—just brief questions each, please.

Mr. Proud.

Mr. George Proud: Mr. Pratt.

The Chairman: I'm sorry, Mr. Pratt.

Mr. David Pratt: I'm proud to be Pratt.

I have two questions. The first relates to the formal position of the Government of Latvia with respect to the European Security and Defense Initiative, ESDI, and in particular the headline goals that were announced at Helsinki to have a 60,000-member force out of Europe, sustainable for up to one year. Would you see Latvia being in a position to contribute to that force at some point in the future?

Secondly, I would be interested in getting your comments with respect to the recent election of Mr. Putin and how that is going to affect the political landscape of Europe and relations between the EU, NATO, and Russia.

Mr. Edvins Inkens (Interpretation): We are quite positive for strengthening the security pillar in Europe, and we are quite sure that in the long-term thinking or perspective, Europe needs such a security pillar.

Events in Albania proved that this policy has not been properly developed and elaborated in the EU and that Europe alone cannot cope with such problems when they arise. This means that we, together with the European Union or other countries of Europe, with the U.S.A., with Canada, would be ready to take upon ourselves this responsibility to perform this mission of human rights protection, which is very important for all the world.

• 1730

In that context, Latvia has already participated in certain measures. For instance, our people have been to Bosnia; we have been sending our people to Kosovo. That means we are already contributing in this respect.

At the same time, I want to say that European security structures, if these are established, should be by no means and in no way in contradiction or controversy with the existing NATO structures. Actually, the underlying idea is for the local use or application of NATO forces in stabilizing these.

With regard to the second question, we, the same as other parts of the world and other countries of the world, have tried to understand and to learn more about Mr. Putin. We are happy to hear that Mr. Putin promises to renew relations with NATO. But at the same time, we think in the coming few months Mr. Putin will show what he is willing to do and how much he is capable of doing with regard to clearing Russia of corruption, financial oligarchs, and the like.

Certainly all of us could express our own speculations on this topic, because we all have our observations and our reflections and we draw certain conclusions, but I think the wisest thing would be to wait a few months and see how things develop.

The Chairman: Thank you.

I know we're almost out of time and you wish to go back to your hotel before another function, but if it's okay, we'll take two really short final questions.

[Translation]

Mr. Bertrand, please.

[English]

and then Mr. Laurin.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Perhaps it's just a point for clarification. You mentioned that NATO had attributed a goal of 2% with respect to your GDP. This would be one of the conditions, which would require an increase in your budget of 30%.

[English]

Mr. Janis Straume (Interpretation): I think it was not exactly so. It was said simply that this year the budget for military purposes was increased by 35% in comparison with the previous year's military budget, but not generally.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Okay. I am convinced that in order to increase your military budget by 35% in one year, you needed to make cuts elsewhere, from the budgets of other departments. I would like to know which departments.

[English]

Mr. Janis Straume (Interpretation): Practically, this was achieved by reducing or cutting the budget in other financial sectors. I cannot give you the exact figures as to where and what was cut and by what percentage.

My colleague....

• 1735

Ms. Silvija Dreimane (Interpretation): We considerably cut public expenditure in certain areas for ministries and such. The budget part of the representations was cut as well. We felt that it was probably more important to join NATO than to attend some conferences or otherwise represent our country elsewhere. Certainly it was not an easy task. Each ministry tried to prove that its priority was where we were trying to cut something. But as you see, nothing has happened. All the ministers go on working, and they see Latvia's goal clearly. Regrettably, we must admit that the cultural and educational sectors also suffered because of this.

Mr. Janis Lusis: Mr. Chairman, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stands on the fact that their budget was cut too much.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chairman: We would be disappointed if he didn't say that.

Are there any further comments?

Ms. Silva Golde (Member of the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia) (Interpretation): I have to say that the budget for the Ministry of Education and Science did not suffer considerable cuts because actually, alongside the increase in the defence ministry budget, we managed to reach an $8.24 million increase for teachers' salaries in this year's budget. This is a very considerable increase, and our teachers' salaries needed it very much. This means that we are thinking very seriously about education.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: I'm just glad there was enough money in the budget for you to come and visit us in Canada.

Ms. Silva Golde: [Witness speaks in her native language].

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chairman: We're back to Mr. Laurin for the last question.

Mr. René Laurin: As you can see, I am a member of the opposition here and I am always the last one to ask my questions today. I am part of the minority in our Parliament, which just goes to show you that Canada does not treat its minorities any better than you do.

More seriously, you spoke earlier about a problem that you have with respect to the Russian minority living on your territory which the Russians want protected. How is this an obstacle to your adherence to the European Union or to NATO?

[English]

Ms. Silvija Dreimane (Interpretation): I want to add that I'm also a member of the opposition in the parliament. This is why we are sitting on one side of this table.

I would like to give one brief illustration that very clearly shows the minority situation in Latvia. As Mr. Straume has said, during the previous week the Secretary General of NATO visited Latvia. During this visit we founded a non-governmental organization, the Latvian Transatlantic Organization. During this visit and during this opening of the new organization, both the president of the state and the Secretary General of NATO participated. The Secretary General of NATO was very much surprised to see that among members of this new organization are Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews. This is a voluntary organization, and it so happens that practically all basic minorities are represented there.

• 1740

The task of this NGO is to explain to the population the road of Latvia toward NATO and the need for Latvia's choice of such a road. During the opening ceremony the secretary general spoke about Latvia potentially joining NATO and said that Latvia is considered by NATO to be a country whose invitation might come during the next round of expansion. These were the words we had expected to hear for a long time. It was not only Latvians who had expected to hear these words; the same attitude was demonstrated by other ethnic groups in Latvia.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

My friend was having fun. But seriously, just so you know, in our normal committee hearings we start our questioning with the opposition. And now for the chairman there is no time for questions.

Your Excellency, Mr. Ambassador, all the members of your delegation, thank you very much for joining us. It was a very interesting discussion. We wish you well with the rest of your visit and with the future progress of your country. Let's continue to build a friendship between our two nations.

Mr. Janis Straume (Interpretation): Thank you very much.

The Chairman: The meeting is adjourned.