FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, June 2, 1998

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[English]

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.)): I call to order the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We are just finishing up our report on Canada's policy on nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

We have heard from some of you gentlemen before, but we are quite delighted to have you here in light of the events of the last couple of weeks. There are a number of questions we would like to pose or pose again to you to get some assurances.

Ralph Lysyshyn is the director general of the international security bureau. Ross Glasgow is the deputy director, export control, non-proliferation, nuclear section. From Atomic Energy Control Board, Dr. Kenneth Wagstaff, Dr. John Hodgkinson and Dr. André Guilboud. From the International Atomic Energy Agency, Neil Harms.

Are you going to be doing presentations prior to questioning today?

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn (Director General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Madam Chairman, I will make a short presentation. Also, Mr. Harms will give a bit of an oral description of how safeguards work and are implemented. Then we will be prepared to answer questions.

We also have a rather good video on how the safeguards work. It will be available to you through the clerk and we can leave it with you. It shows the physical operation of safeguards, the surveillance cameras, the locks and those technical aspects that will enable you to understand why we feel confident the safeguard system works. We will leave that with you and members can look at it at their leisure.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): We're delighted to have you here. If we could just have a moment, Mr. Grewal wants to introduce a motion.

Mr. Gurmant Grewal (Surrey Central, Ref.): Thank you, Madam Chairman. I don't mean to interrupt, but I wish to serve notice of a motion to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. I will leave a copy with you. For the record, my motion reads:

Pursuant to Standing Order 81(7) and 81(8), the foreign affairs committee shall consider and report to the House the expenditure plans and priorities in future fiscal years of the Department of Foreign Affairs with regard to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and its assistance programs to India and Pakistan in light of the recent nuclear testing performed by both countries.

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Colleen Beaumier): Thank you.

Mr. Lysyshyn, you are going to start.

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: Madam Chairman and members of this committee, this briefing is the direct result of the meeting you had with our minister last week when we started a bit of a discussion about safeguards, how the safeguards worked and how our nuclear co-operation agreements work. We thought it would be useful to come back and go over this ground again with you, explain how the safeguards work.

Today I would like to brief you on our current policy which establishes the conditions under which Canada is prepared to consider undertaking nuclear co-operation with selected partner countries. The terms of this policy were established by cabinet in 1974 and 1976.

I would also like to take a little time to go over the conditions under which Canada entered into nuclear co-operation with India and Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s in order to make a comparison between the situation that existed then and the situation that exists now.

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Finally, I would like to look ahead at an interesting evolution in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the implications this evolution could have for Canada and for the degree of confidence we can have in the commitment of our international nuclear partners.

I am pleased that Dr. Wagstaff from the Atomic Energy Control Board and his colleagues are here today. The board plays a crucial role in the implementation of Canada's international co-operation. They will participate in this briefing and will be here to answer questions.

I am also particularly pleased that Mr. Harms, who is the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Toronto regional office is present for today's briefing. The government is grateful to the agency for allowing one of its officials to appear before the committee today.

If I may, Madam Chairman, I would like to underline that Mr. Harms is an international civil servant. He has been authorized by the IAEA to answer technical questions about the generic activities of safeguards inspectors and safeguards activities. I would repeat that he can answer generic questions; he has not been permitted to address the policy matters, nor to answer questions about any specific countries. The rest of us, of course, are prepared to answer any questions that you may have.

[Translation]

Canadian nuclear non-proliferation has two objectives. The first is to ensure that Canadian nuclear exports are used only for peaceful, non-explosive end-uses and that they do not contribute in any way to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The second is to promote the emergence of an effective and comprehensive international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The government of Canada tightly regulates the export of nuclear items in order to ensure that such items are exported only to countries that Ministers have determined would be suitable nuclear partners.

Each export of a nuclear item requires the issuance of an export permit by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade pursuant to the provisions of the Export and Import Permits Act, and a license by the Atomic Energy Control Board pursuant to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Control Act. A permit and licenses are issued only when the responsible officials are satisfied that the proposed export meets all of Canada's stringent nuclear non-proliferation requirements.

The requirement for a permit and license applies to the export of uranium, or any other nuclear material, heavy water and nuclear technology, including obviously CANDU reactors and associated technology.

[English]

Canada's modern nuclear non-proliferation policy is the result of decisions made by cabinet in 1974 and 1976 following a review of the policy that was undertaken after India detonated a nuclear device in 1974.

Before Canada will consider entering into nuclear co-operation with any non-nuclear weapons state, i.e., any country other than the U.S.A, the U.K., France, Russia and China, that state must: make a legally binding commitment to nuclear non-proliferation by becoming a party to the treaty on non-proliferation, the NPT, or an equivalent internationally legally binding agreement; and thereby accept full-scope safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency on all of its current and future nuclear activities.

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In addition, any countries wishing to enter into nuclear co-operation with Canada must conclude a legally binding bilateral agreement, a nuclear co-operation agreement, with Canada which includes among other things certain nuclear non-proliferation commitments. Canada has 22 such agreements covering 36 countries. One agreement covers the 15 countries that are part of the European atomic energy community.

The commitments in these agreements include: assurances that Canadian nuclear exports will be used only for peaceful non-explosive end uses; Canadian control over the re-transfer to a third party of any Canadian items subject to the nuclear co-operation agreement; Canadian control over the reprocessing of any Canadian spent nuclear fuel and over the storage and subsequent use of any separated plutonium; Canadian control over the high enrichment of Canadian uranium and the subsequent storage and use of the highly enriched uranium; agreement that, in the event the IAEA is unable to apply safeguards in the partner country, that Canada will be permitted to carry out bilateral safeguards; and assurances that adequate physical protection measures will be taken with respect to Canadian nuclear items so as to ensure that they will not be stolen or otherwise misused.

The requirements of Canada's policy, and in particular the commitments set out in the bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements, apply to items exported directly or indirectly from Canada. They also apply to non-Canadian equipment or nuclear material used in conjunction with Canadian nuclear items and also to equipment manufactured on the basis of technology provided by Canada or through what is known as reverse engineering.

As part of our ongoing nuclear relationship, Canadian officials carry on periodic bilateral nuclear consultations with our partner countries. These provide an opportunity among other things to reconcile the detailed records of transfers of nuclear items subject to the agreement and to ensure that Canada's partners remain fully conscious of Canada's high priority to ensuring that nuclear co-operation is used only for peaceful and non-explosive end uses.

An important point that I would like to point out is that while Canada has the right to establish the conditions under which it will permit international nuclear co-operation, Canada has also given a commitment to facilitate such co-operation. This commitment reflects a compromise that is fundamental to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT.

In that agreement, the non-nuclear weapons states agreed not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons states made a commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations. However, part of the treaty also sets out the right of non-nuclear weapons states to enjoy the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the commitment of states with this expertise to assist them in this endeavour. In this regard, at least 12 supplier countries have played an active role in supplying the more than 440 nuclear power reactors that are in operation today in more than 32 countries, and the close to 300 nuclear research reactors that have also been constructed.

With respect to nuclear material, compliance with the peaceful non-explosive end uses commitment in Canada's bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements is verified through the implementation by the IAEA of what is called full-scope safeguards.

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The founding statute of the IAEA, which was established in 1956, authorized the agency to carry out these safeguards activities to ensure that items under its supervision were not used in such a way as to further any military purpose and to apply the safeguards at the request of any parties to a bilateral or multilateral agreement.

In 1966 the IAEA created the system of facility specific safeguards arrangements for the application of safeguards at specific nuclear facilities. These arrangements continue to be used in the four non-nuclear weapons states that have not signed the NPT, that have not accepted full-scope safeguards, i.e., India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba. A system of facility specific safeguards that still exists in those countries.

Following the entry into force of the NPT in 1970, the IAEA developed the system of full-scope safeguards that are intended to cover the current and future nuclear activities of non-nuclear weapons states. Those countries that have signed the NPT accept full-scope safeguards.

The IAEA safeguards activities include on-site inspections, examination of records and reports, and the taking and analysis of samples, complemented by on-site containment and surveillance techniques such as the use of cameras and seals. As I indicated at the beginning, how these techniques work is all laid out in the video we will be leaving with the clerk. Mr. Harms will give a short overview of this as well, and he will be pleased to respond to questions on how these work.

The verification of the implementation of the re-transfer, reprocessing and high enrichment controls that are in the nuclear co-operation agreements is achieved through the day to day implementation of these agreements. There is an agreed body of procedures known as the administrative arrangements that are implemented by the Atomic Energy Control Board on behalf of the Government of Canada. Dr. Wagstaff will be able to provide more information about these administrative arrangements and the important role they play in ensuring that Canadian nuclear exports are not used except as agreed to by Canada and the nuclear partner.

Turning to the situation that existed in India and Canada's co-operation with India, Canada agreed in 1956 to provide a nuclear research reactor known as CIRUS to India as part of the Colombo plan. India gave Canada assurances that the reactor would be used only for peaceful purposes.

Canada also agreed to provide a 220 megawatt CANDU power reactor to India in 1963, known as RAPS 1, and a second, RAPS 2, in 1966. As with CIRUS, India gave Canada assurances that these reactors would be used only for peaceful purposes.

By 1971 it was clear that India would not become a party to the treaty on non-proliferation and would not accept IAEA full-scope safeguards. Therefore India, the IAEA and Canada agreed that the agency would apply facility specific safeguards to these two reactors. You will recall I mentioned a little earlier the existence of these facility specific safeguards. However, India would not agree to the implementation of safeguards at the CIRUS reactor.

In the early seventies Canada became concerned at certain activities at the CIRUS reactor. These concerns were raised by Canadian representatives, including at the highest political level, with Indian representatives.

India chose to totally disregard its commitments to Canada, and in 1974 detonated a nuclear device using plutonium reprocessed from spent fuel in the CIRUS reactor. Canada had not provided the reprocessing technology to India; they got that elsewhere.

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Canada immediately suspended all nuclear co-operation with India. Following a review of Canada's policy, as I mentioned earlier, co-operation was terminated in May 1976 when it became clear that India would not agree with the strengthened policy requirements. Canada has had no bilateral nuclear co-operation with India since 1974.

The IAEA continues to apply the facility specific safeguards agreements to RAPS 1 and 2. Based on these activities, the IAEA tells us that it is confident that the spent fuel from these reactors and any separated plutonium from the spent fuel has not been used in explosive devices.

In retrospect, as the minister indicated last week, it is now clear that the type of assurances and mechanisms we had in place at the time of those sales were not adequate. Even at that time, Canada's approach to international nuclear co-operation was more stringent than the then accepted international norms. Canada unfortunately was taught a stern lesson. I think it's true however that this was a lesson we learned well and our current stringent non-nuclear policy is a reflection of this experience and the lessons drawn from it.

On our co-operation with Pakistan, Canada agreed in 1965 to provide a 137 MW CANDU-type power reactor to Pakistan, called KANUPP. It also gave Canada assurances that the reactor would be used only for peaceful purposes.

In 1969 Pakistan, the International Atomic Energy Agency and Canada agreed that the IAEA would apply facility specific safeguards to KANUPP.

In 1976 all nuclear co-operation with Pakistan was terminated when it became clear Pakistan would not agree to the requirements of Canada's strengthened nuclear non-proliferation policy.

The IAEA continues to apply facility specific safeguards to KANUPP and based on these activities is confident that the spent fuel and any separated plutonium from the spent fuel have not been used in an explosive device.

Canada has had no bilateral nuclear co-operation with Pakistan since 1976.

On the safety front and on the multilateral side, I think a few words are necessary.

In 1989 in response to growing international concern about nuclear safety following the Chernobyl accident in 1986, Canada agreed that Pakistan and India could participate in the information sharing program of the CANDU owners group with respect to the sharing of public domain non-proprietary safety related information.

In 1990 in the face of continued safety concerns and at the urging of the IAEA, Canada authorized the provision of limited safety assistance under international auspices, i.e., under the IAEA, to address serious and urgent safety concerns at the Canadian supplied safeguarded reactor in Pakistan and at the two Canadian supplied safeguarded reactors in India.

India rejected this offer. However, Pakistan accepted and a carefully managed program of limited nuclear safety assistance under the auspices of the IAEA was authorized. This assistance is largely diagnostic in nature and is aimed at identifying any serious and urgent safety concerns.

[Translation]

Canada, and the international community, is confident that the IAEA's current safeguards regime allows it to verify that declared nuclear material is not being diverted for explosive purposes which, in practice, is the task given to it by member states.

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However, Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, uncovered in the Gulf War, and concerns about North Korea's nuclear program illustrated the need to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA's safeguards, particularly its ability to detect clandestine nuclear material or nuclear activities.

Following a number of years of discussions, field trials and negotiation (Programme 93+2), in which Canada took a leading role, the member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency agreed in May 1997 on measures aimed at strengthening the IAEA's safeguards regime, particularly in those states under full scope safeguards. The new measures will enhance the provision by member states of information to the Agency and enhance access in member states by Agency inspectors. Implementation of the new measures will greatly improve the Agency's understanding of member states' nuclear programme and thereby strengthen the Agency's ability to detect the diversion of declared nuclear material and the presence of clandestine nuclear material and activities.

[English]

The new measures are set out in a model additional protocol to existing bilateral safeguards agreements. Canada expects to sign its additional protocol in the fall and is encouraging all other members of the IAEA to sign their protocol as soon as possible.

That is a broad outline, Mr. Chairman, of how we apply safeguards. Perhaps Mr. Harms might just say a few words about how the IAEA goes about its work and then we will be pleased to respond to questions.

Mr. Neil Harms (Head, Regional Office, International Atomic Energy Agency): Mr. Chairman, the IAEA inspectorate depends primarily on material accountancy and control procedures and uses techniques primarily in non-destructive assay complemented by sampling when appropriate and analysis by analytical laboratories under the control of the IAEA.

In addition to non-destructive analysis, we have containment and surveillance techniques which complement the non-destructive analysis measures.

Non-destructive analysis essentially is primarily aimed at nuclear material, both fresh and spent. The fresh fuel would be involved in measuring the uranium 235 isotope and enrichment, in the case of uranium; in the case of plutonium it would be the isotopes plutonium 238, 239, 240, 241 and 242. In the case of the spent fuel, we are talking about the cesium 137 fission isotope.

Essentially, some examples of measuring fresh nuclear material would be in fuel fabrication facilities, in research and development laboratories and in a variety of enrichment facilities, and perhaps at the front end of other kinds of development facilities.

For spent fuel we are talking about the material that comes out of a reactor and that which is stored in a spent fuel storage facility. The material that is input into a reprocessing facility would come in as spent fuel. The techniques that we use for some of these measurements are in general portable. They are detectors that have to do with gamma ray spectrometry or measuring neutrons or, as I said, fission products.

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We have a large array of special equipment that we take with us. These equipment materials are smart, I guess you would say. They have firmware such that you can get the same kind of standardization and calibration statistics irrespective of inspector proficiency. It has a menu in which you can set up the variety of conditions. In the case of a flask of enriched uranium, it would already take into consideration the thickness of the flask, that sort of thing.

That is a little bit about measurement of nuclear material.

I brought three examples of seals that the agency uses. Once you measure the material, then you want to make sure that the continuity of knowledge remains and that the measurement has not been tampered with.

This is an electronic type of seal. It can be detached and attached. The detachment and attachment is recorded. An operator may have a reason to detach this for some particular reason. Then upon reattachment the IAEA can know remotely when this detachment and attachment was made.

This type of seal is a fibre optic seal.

The Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): By remotely you mean from wherever you are. You detect that immediately when it happens through some satellite or communication—

Mr. Neil Harms: It can be through ISDN telephone lines. It also can be through satellite. We have one example of a satellite proving this.

The Chairman: You know when it happens.

Mr. Neil Harms: That's right. We know when it happens.

The type of seal that I have here is a less expensive seal. It's a fibre optic seal. It hasn't been fixed. This is the fibre optic cable. If I were to fix it, I have a special tool. I would go in and I would cut this cable and force these screws through so that it's not able to be tampered with.

It has a unique signature on the fibre optic which can be read. We have a reader. Essentially it is a digital camera that takes a picture of the fibre optic. It's a unique, not to be reproduced picture. Then that can be read again. This is something that can be serviced in the field and you get immediately the analysis of whether the seal is still valid, whether it's that same picture.

The third type we have is a type-E seal. It's a metal container. I apologize for your not being able to see the details of this. In here is a unique engraving that's been done at headquarters and photographed. Then this seal is attached with wire on a variety of materials which have been previously verified and then replaced at some particular frequency, depending on the significance of the material, and then sent back to headquarters and read again for the identification of the same signature.

Depending on what the material that's under seal is, the timeliness of this reading is significant. If it's plutonium, it could be that the timing would be one month. If it has to do with spent fuel in a tile hole in a storage facility, it might be three months.

In addition to non-destructive assay and the analysis of samples at the analytical laboratories and containment and surveillance, there are a variety of new techniques under way.

Environmental sampling is gaining prominence. It establishes a baseline at a particular facility to show what has happened in that facility in the past as far as nuclear activity is concerned and then at what frequency it could take place in the future. This is a very non-intrusive type of analysis.

That's a summary, a very short, brief summarization of what an inspector does to make measurements. In addition to that, there is the checking of the material accounts at a particular facility.

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The facility goes through a particular regime of inspection. Depending again on the significance of this facility, we have an annual physical inventory verification in which all the material is physically verified.

The verification takes on levels of significance. In some cases we are looking for a gross defect; we are looking for the absence of one item. That has a particular significance and a sampling significance to it. In another case we may get a little more detail, and we look for a partial defect. That means there's some part of that particular item that we are intending to detect as missing.

In the most severe case, we are looking for bias defects. That has to do with the more significant material, plutonium, for example, plutonium oxide, in which case we would apply a lot more techniques to measure. We would weigh it, we would do a sampling, we would do a thorough analysis and a variety of other measurement techniques.

That gives you some idea of what an inspector does in his everyday job. I would be happy to answer any questions about the techniques or the methods that the inspectorate goes through.

The Chairman: Before we go to general questions I just want to ask a rather technical question arising out of Mr. Lysyshyn's description of the difference between full-scope and facility specific safeguards regimes. If you are conducting an inspection of a plant under the facility specific regime, is that any less rigorous in terms of detecting what has gone in or come out of that plant than would be conducted under the full-scope regime?

Mr. Neil Harms: No, in many cases it's even a little more rigorous in the fact that equipment under some agreements have to do with specific material. INFCIRC/66 agreements would have to do with certain facilities. They would have to do with the equipment in that facility and they might have to do with certain materials that are not covered under full-scope safeguards, for example, heavy water.

The Chairman: I don't know whether this goes beyond the scope of what you're able to answer in terms of policy vis-à-vis specific, but obviously this committee is most interested in knowing about Mr. Lysyshyn's conclusion that of the two specific, or I guess the three facility specific safeguards arrangements prevalent in the Indian subcontinent, two would have been prevalent in Pakistan and one would have been prevalent in India. If my memory is correct, it is two in India and one in Pakistan.

You subscribe to the conclusion that you're confident none of the materials would have come out of those plants. You can say from the facility safeguards regimes the International Atomic Energy Agency is involved with, that none of the materials that have possibly ended up in the explosive devices which we've seen in recent weeks came out of those facilities. That is what we're interested in.

Mr. Neil Harms: You're getting into policy which is not my charter actually.

The Chairman: I thought it was a technical question. You can give it to me in terms of isotopes if you like and we'll try and decide—

Mr. Neil Harms: We apply the same equipment and the same stringent measurement techniques all over the world.

The Chairman: This is not helpful because you're leaving us the impression that if you're not sure about those two, you might not be sure about anything else in the world, which hardly leaves us with a great—

Mr. Neil Harms: I didn't say that.

The Chairman: It doesn't leave me with a great deal of confidence.

Mr. Neil Harms: I didn't say that.

The Chairman: If I were you I think I'd maybe go the other way and give us the answer because the non-answer is a very dangerous one.

Mr. Neil Harms: All I can do is I can read to you the director general's statement with regard to this subject:

The director general deeply regrets the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. Such tests could lead to a dangerous nuclear arms race and call into question the basic principles of non-proliferation developed over the last three decades and reflected in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, adhered to by 186 states, namely to freeze the number of weapons states and move towards nuclear disarmament.

The director general expresses the hope that both states will exercise the utmost restraint and commit themselves to the course of action supported by the international community of no nuclear tests, no additional weapons states, and a concrete program to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons, with universal adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CTBT, and a treaty prohibiting the production of nuclear material for weapons purposes as an indispensable and urgent first step.

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The director general firmly believes that global and regional accommodation and detente rather than the acquisition of nuclear weapons is the way to attain and enhance peace and security. The IAEA board of governors is to consider the matter at its meeting commencing on 8 June.

This was released by Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, on May 29.

The Chairman: Mr. Lysyshyn, we will go to general questions, since you made the statement. Obviously it is extraordinarily important for us to get a handle on this because it relates to the future as well as the past. We're interested in both those.

You have the full safeguard regime which a country in the future might enter into and then there are the specific safeguards regimes. We have come here today to tell the committee to what extent can the members of the committee be confident that the regime is telling us exactly what's going in and exactly what's going out. You've told us you're confident that nothing came out of the three reactors we spoke of that could have been used to make weapons. That's what we're interested in.

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: The agency issues a safeguards implementation report that cites incidents in which there are anomalies and material is missing. They have not cited these reactors in that way.

The Chairman: Canada monitors those.

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: That's right.

Dr. Kenneth Wagstaff (Head of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Section, Non-Proliferation, Safeguards and Security Division): I'll just add to that exchange. Recognizing that neither India nor Pakistan are under full-scope safeguards—that's well understood—it would not make sense, I would suggest, that either of those countries would attempt to abrogate its safeguards agreements with the IAEA when it has access to a wide variety of nuclear material that is not under international inspection. I would suggest that it would not make sense to abrogate those facility specific safeguards for the end uses that we're discussing here today.

The Chairman: Thank you, that's helpful. Let me press you one step further. What's the sanction on them if they do abrogate? What are you going to do about it to get the genie back in the bottle?

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): We can call the high commission.

The Chairman: I understand what you're saying and it makes logical sense to me. Pushing it one step further, suppose a country accepted full-scope and they do cheat, what does Vienna or Canada do about it?

Dr. Kenneth Wagstaff: If the agency detects or is unable to provide a positive statement to the member states on whether it has been able to account for everything or whether it has detected a diversion, there is an undertaking in the agency's constitution that it will report to the member states. This is exactly what was done in the case of Iraq. From there on it also has the capacity to bring these such developments to the attention of the UN Security Council.

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Lysyshyn.

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: Mr. Chairman, we have had two cases now of where there have been problems. Dr. Wagstaff has mentioned Iraq and there is also North Korea.

The IAEA mandate is simply to report to the international community that there is a problem. It is then up to the international community in whatever way it can to exert pressure on these states.

In the case of Iraq we have the presence of inspectors that are monitoring the entire system with threats to go to war with Iraq if it doesn't work. We also had a similar situation with North Korea. Pressure was put on North Korea and North Korea backed down from where it was going. Indeed the current basis of co-operation between North Korea and South Korea is a result of international pressure that started very much on that issue.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Mr. Mills, sorry to interrupt. I tried to clear away the underbrush, but I am not sure that I did.

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Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Ref.): The first thing is, I believe and I think a lot of Canadians believe that Canada's fingerprints are on this current nuclear crisis that we have. I see quite a bit of rose-coloured glasses, white picket fences and little puppy dogs in your comments. Either you are awfully naive or you think we are awfully stupid, or maybe some of both.

It seems to me that if you have problems with democracy, like India, I can't imagine going through this other list of potential countries that we might trade with or are thinking of putting nuclear reactors in and be so naive as to think we might not have problems with some of them. Then comes the question, as the chairman asked, of what you do about that when you have the sovereignty issue and so on. I guess fortunately a place like Iraq had a crazy, and it was easy to get him on a number of issues, so we were able to control that nuclear problem.

It seems to me as well that in 1994 we had an agreement with China not to sell, use, or in any way transfer our technology beyond Chinese borders. A CIA report tabled in congress a couple of weeks ago in the states says that U.S. and Canadian technology was used—and this report is dated 1996—as the base for rocket and nuclear program development in Pakistan. Maybe the CIA doesn't know what it's doing either, but that's what their report says.

It seems to me that now we sell nuclear reactors to countries that potentially could fall into fundamentalist hands, become a rogue state, a dictatorship, whatever. I sure don't feel very confident that we really have a handle on this whole nuclear genie, as the chairman says. I guess I don't feel very secure with your safeguards.

Rather than simply posturing and saying we're against nuclear weapons and aren't they terrible but we sure want to sell lots to whoever wants to buy them with dollars, if we're that desperate for these sales, then let's just say it and say we're going to put in the best safeguards we can, that we can't really control this but we need the money. I get most annoyed when we are so good and righteous and our halo is so pure yet we really don't want to deal with some of the realities that are there. We just brush them aside. I find that attitude offensive. Let's just be honest about it. Where are we going?

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: I think we all share your concern. We acknowledge that the CIRUS reactor was used by India for their first explosion. It is also true that 25 years of development undertaken by some extremely capable engineers in India and Pakistan suggests that the state of their current nuclear programs is not dependent on what we provided them 25 years ago. They are fully capable of doing that on their own.

We believe on the whole we have had a problem, as I have indicated. We have toughened our regime since then. The regime works.

The other aspect I would go back to is this compromise in the NPT. Non-nuclear states have agreed not to pursue nuclear weapons on the condition that they not be denied the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology under appropriate safeguards.

We keep talking about the trade-off in the NPT, the trade-off between the nuclear weapons states having committed to pursue disarmament in return for the fact that the other states will not pursue nuclear weapons. There was a second trade-off in the NPT that said that these states, if appropriate safeguards were applied, would not be denied the benefits of nuclear technology.

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Mr. Bob Mills: But the reality is that the Pakistani tests were 50 miles from the Iranian border. If I were an Iranian, why wouldn't I say...? It's reported that they are one of these fringe countries that have the technology. Of course if they did that, then why wouldn't Israel simply make sure that everybody knows what they've got? Then who's next?

This is all of our concern. I don't feel that confident that we've got a handle on this whole thing. That's the political bottom line.

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: On the broader concern, I think we share your concern. We do. There is the danger that India's and Pakistan's actions have opened up a much broader concern. Indeed, that is our concern. But I'm not sure that the solution is to stop selling nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes. The solution is in the international security regime. That is where we need to pursue the solution.

The Chairman: Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Lysyshyn and Mr. Harms, for appearing before this committee. Your evidence will be very useful in our final proceedings. We are almost through with our consideration of this matter. We will hold two more meetings before getting down to work on our recommendations to the government and the Foreign Affairs minister.

I must say that, unlike my friend from the Reform Party, I happen to think that you cannot have peace by norms. Some people think that this is impossible, that it is unfeasible, that peace can be achieved by putting in place good safeguards, that peace may be attainable by trusting others and by being confident it will work.

This approach that appeals essentially to power and to a relationship of power within the international community may be the preferred approach for some now that India and Pakistan have detonated nuclear bombs, but I believe that this is being very shortsighted. In essence, I share the way most western industrialized countries, including Canada, view the future in that respect.

I must say that one thing does worry me. I am concerned about the effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. According to the notes you have distributed, one of the objectives of the Canadian policy is to promote an effective international nuclear non-proliferation regime. I think that the recent experience has shown us that the regime is not as effective as it should be. It is not effective for states that are outside the regime. Therefore, it does not have as much influence as you wished it had on those states outside of the regime, the ones that have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Here is my first question. I would like to know what must be done to improve the effectiveness of the regime. I'm asking you because, even though the international community has appealed to India and Pakistan to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, I understand that these two countries are still resolutely opposed to signing it. Thus, how can we make the regime more effective in light of these recent events?

I have a second question. Could you give us an illustration of how you operate? It is typical of the government with its co- operation agreements and the International Atomic Energy Agency. I would like to know whether it is the same in the specific case of Romania and I would also like to know how you operate. Some of the members sitting here now have expressed concerns about Romania. I think that the Canadian prime minister has also expressed concerns about Romania.

• 1630

These are my two questions, Mr. Lysyshyn.

[English]

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: It is true that the international non-proliferation regime has been badly damaged by the Indian and Pakistani tests. We had been down to the situation in which there were just four countries outside the regime.

Two years ago, when the regime was renewed indefinitely, there were only 170 signatures. We had 16 new signatures to the regime just in the last two or three years. Countries like South Africa came on. Argentina and Brazil, who people were concerned may have been interested in pursuing nuclear weapons or who had refused to sign the NPT for various political reasons, had come on board. The regime was actually doing very well. It has suffered a serious blow.

The nature of our reaction, the strength of our reaction, including putting pressure on the countries through sanctions indicates our concern. I don't know where exactly the magic formula is in order to solve the problem, to manage the problem, to make sure it doesn't get any larger, but there are indeed a number of key points that we have to address.

We need to make sure other nations don't follow and then we also have to try to convince these two countries to move back. The minister has indicated that he has welcomed the call for a meeting of the G-8 to address these issues. I think we need to ensure that effective measures are taken. What those measures should be, the minister is in fact looking at this issue himself at this time as to what he thinks are the most effective issues. He will certainly go to the G-8 meeting with some specific ideas in mind. I am not able to go beyond that at this time, except to sort of agree with you that we recognize we need to find some measures to address this, to try to persuade India and Pakistan to change their policies.

With regard to the specific case of Romania, we do have a nuclear co-operation agreement with Romania. The kinds of terms that are outlined in my statement do apply in the case of Romania. Romania is a member of the non-proliferation regime. Full-scope safeguards are applied to the nuclear reactors there. I don't know if Dr. Wagstaff could say anything specific about how they operate but we are not aware of any problems in the implementation of the regime with regard to Romania.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: How do you explain that because of the two explosions in India and Pakistan, the public opinion is now very worried about Romania and that so many of the people sitting at this table when the Romanian president visited last week wanted to know whether the safeguards would be complied with. Are you not concerned with the fact that the public is worried about this, as reflected by my honourable friend from the Reform Party? What do we have to do to ensure that people do not become overly concerned?

[English]

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: We are very much aware of Romania's desire to join NATO. Canada has been one of the nations that has strongly supported Romania's membership within NATO. I think we have a very active program through NATO in partnership for peace with Romania.

• 1635

I think in the past there probably was, under the communist regime, under the Ceausescu regime, some possibility or more of a basis of concern with regard to Romania. But at this time we are quite taken by the progress Romania has made towards creating a functioning and effective democracy.

One of the largest fears we had as the Warsaw Pact came apart was the potential for difficulty between Romania and Hungary particularly because Romania has a large Hungarian minority. One of the real successes in building a more secure central and eastern Europe has been the manner in which those two countries have through a number of bilateral confidence-building measures and other steps actually addressed their largest security concern, which was each other.

On the whole, as somebody who works in the field, I am quite confident that Romania is on the right track. I certainly don't share that concern about Romanian politics leading to a proliferation stance.

The Chairman: And NATO membership by Romania would be a positive step in locking that into place.

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: Very much. I think Romania understands that if there were concerns about their proliferation intentions, NATO membership would not be on the table.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Thanks again for coming to this meeting and explaining your position as far as CANDU reactors are concerned in light of the Pakistan and India explosions.

Some of our colleagues and myself expressed deep concern with sales to Turkey coming up. Next month I think the bid will be closed and we'll know who the winner is.

Put yourself in the leadership of the Turkish government. You look at the map and see that Turkey is surrounded by Russia through the Black Sea, Bulgaria and Greece, and both of them are not friendly countries, Syria from the south, Iraq and Iran. You can't have more friends than what you have now, basically because you're surrounded by hostile neighbours. Armenia is on the other side too. Add to this chemistry the local politics with fundamentalists and the Kurds.

If I have my hands on a CANDU reactor I will do everything I can to convert that to a nuclear bomb to defend my own country. As was mentioned, defence of sovereignty is a fundamental thing for a country.

Can you 100% and maybe 1,000% make it airtight, not bulletproof, and guarantee to me and this committee, the Government of Canada, Parliament and the people of Canada that the CANDU reactor sale that might take place with Turkey is totally, absolutely safe?

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: Nobody can give you a 100% guarantee of anything.

Turkey is a member of NATO. It has a security guarantee as a member of NATO which is something its neighbours do not have. Yes it lives in a dangerous neighbourhood. It has problems on its borders but I think very few people would argue that a nuclear weapon would in any significant way help them address the problem of the Kurds or any of those issues. I think the assurances they have from NATO are what they need and are adequate in that regard.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: You also mentioned that if they comply with the international agreement and the bilateral agreement with Canada, you're basically prepared to sell CANDU reactors to anybody who signs on the dotted line that they're going to agree. Am I right?

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: No. I said that those are the minimum requirements. We also make other political judgments that ministers must make on occasion. Simply meeting a certain minimum requirement does not guarantee a sale.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: My final question is technical. Do you have a control of spent fuel anywhere we sell a CANDU reactor, or do we take their word on how it is controlled?

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: Spent fuel is safeguarded.

• 1640

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Well, maybe only CANDU is safeguarded, not international, am I right?

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: No, IAEA safeguards them.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Because a month or two months ago there was a report in Georgia about left-over spent fuel from the time of the U.S.S.R. They had to take it to England for—

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: But don't forget full-scope safeguards do not apply—

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Internationally.

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: —in the U.S.S.R., in the former U.S.S.R. Russia is a nuclear weapons state and therefore some of its facilities are not safeguarded. Its weapons facilities, its research facilities are not safeguarded.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Nobody knew about the Georgia situation. Are there any other situations similar to Georgia in the former U.S.S.R. we should be concerned with?

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: We have been over the years and there has been a G-8 group working and looking at the issues. We are very much concerned with the safeguarding of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union, in Russia. We have examined ways. There has even been development assistance. Money has gone into assisting them in making sure that their material is as safe as possible.

We have even moved to the area of co-operation among intelligence agencies, among police forces, to help try to address just that kind of danger of leakage from the former Soviet Union. That is a serious concern. It is one that has been addressed by the G-8 acting collectively.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Russia and Georgia are problems. Is that what you're saying?

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: What I have indicated is that we have over the years had concern with Russia's ability to maintain and protect its nuclear facilities. As I indicated, a number of nations.... The United States had a special legislated aid budget to protect and assist Russia in its facilities on the physical securities side. We have been trying to monitor the situation through a whole series of measures, yes.

The Chairman: When we did our Arctic study, all of Murmansk was sitting there with a bunch of submarines full of this stuff.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: It was very serious.

The Chairman: Yes, very serious. There's very serious concern about Russia. When we've talked to our American colleagues they are concerned about it. It's a bit out of the scope of this, but it is a concern.

I think you have to bear in mind Mr. Lysyshyn's point that Russia is not controlled or controllable the way that other signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the ones that are inspected by the international agency are controlled, any more than the United States is, or Britain or France.

Mr. Daniel Turp: But is Georgia a problem?

Dr. Kenneth Wagstaff: Perhaps I could add to this discussion.

Georgia is one of a number of newly independent states arising out of the break-up of the Soviet Union. That's understood. Russia is the only remaining country that has the right to its former nuclear weapons. Georgia is moving towards a full-scope safeguards agreement with the agency as a non-nuclear-weapons state.

The particular material the member of this committee referred to was weapons-usable material that was located in Georgia. For health and safety reasons it was determined by those countries involved in the movement to the U.K. that it would be better to take that material out of Georgia and to the United Kingdom for treatment rather than having to perhaps reprocess that material in Georgia. The U.K. is better equipped to deal with this kind of material.

The Chairman: We had some in a hospital in downtown Toronto a few years ago.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: What concerns me the most is that Georgia went through a very difficult civil war, and that could have been taken.

I asked members of the committee a while ago if there is anything we should be concerned with, with the U.S.S.R. or the former U.S.S.R., nuclear bombs or facilities or whatever, and they said no, everything is okay, we're looking after it. Now you're telling me the same thing.

Is there any other area in the former U.S.S.R., outside the Russian federation, where there are similar problems to what Georgia had that we don't know of now, that we won't find out six months down the road?

• 1645

A voice: If they don't know about it—

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: No, no. They knew.

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: Kazakhstan. I guess the Americans took some material from there. There were nuclear weapons outside of Russia at the end of the Cold War that had been moved back to Russia from Kazakhstan, from Ukraine, and I think also from Belarus. I'm afraid I can't answer the question whether there is something out there we don't know about.

The Chairman: We have that in Parliament every day.

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: We hope there isn't, but we have to be vigilant. What has happened in terms of Russia, the politics of the situation have changed so radically that it's going to take time to apply full-scope safeguards and to have the level of confidence that we need in a whole variety of those countries. Yes, there is potential for concern there. As I say, it is being addressed, but are we 100% sure? No.

The Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills: Just a brief question. I come back to the question of if you sign this deal or don't sign it and you break your agreement. If I were looking on in terms of should I sign the NPT as another government politician, you mentioned that sanctions have been placed on that and the G-8 are going to talk about this. Remember that the G-8 did talk about it, and came out of that meeting basically agreeing to nothing. The sanctions the U.S. and Canada have followed and put on these countries have resulted in both France and Germany being very pleased with the option now of taking over the business the Americans and Canadians are pulling away from.

If I were looking on and I saw that, I would say that these rules these guys are trying to force me to have, I am not really going to suffer much from it. In fact I might even benefit, because now I can have France and Germany fighting over new contracts, because the old contracts are gone because the Americans are gone, and they are kind of hard to deal with anyway.

I don't really see a lot of punishment coming from this. Of course as a politician within those countries, I now have a 90% rating in the polls because I just did what I did. There's a lot of upside for Iran or for whoever else to simply say that's a pretty good deal.

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: Basically, Mr. Mills, you have given us our argument back, which is why we are continuing to press countries like France and Germany and others to be tougher in their sanctions. We would argue that short-term gain should not get in the way of what their long-term interests are.

Mr. Bob Mills: I didn't see any movement out of that G-8 meeting to indicate that they are buying into this at all. In fact I see a great deal of excitement on the other side of things saying if we don't do it, someone else will, so let's move in there. What I'm asking is will it really work. There's no punishment you can bring on these countries.

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: There is a certain amount of punishment that we have brought on, and we would like to see it strengthened. You are articulating very strongly the importance of collective action of nations running, and we continue to persuade.

When the minister was here last week he talked to you about his fear of what he called the new nuclear realpolitik and how we may end up in a very difficult situation. The argument you have given is our argument for activism.

Mr. Bob Mills: I guess I'm just having trouble between the ideal world and the real world. The real world seems to me to be winning, and that's not necessarily what we'd like to see happen. But we don't live in that other world.

The Chairman: You are not asking a member of the department to respond to that, are you?

A voice: It has been a long day.

The Chairman: He could do much, but he can't do that.

Mr. Cannis.

Mr. John Cannis (Scarborough Centre, Lib.): Thank you, gentlemen, for coming to this committee on a topic that quite some time ago I was able to talk about and defend very well. But with the most recent events, it's been a horrible experience taking calls and being back at the riding. Some of the things I heard today, I'll tell you, you certainly haven't put me at ease.

• 1650

Almost every day I see articles in the paper, as I'm sure you have seen, “Canada key to nuclear build-up”. I refer to some of the comments that were made earlier. I think it was Dr. Wagstaff who said that countries have access to a wide variety of nuclear material that's available. I'm not sure if it was you, Doctor, who mentioned it.

Dr. Kenneth Wagstaff: That's correct. I did say that, but in connection with India and Pakistan—only India and Pakistan.

Mr. John Cannis: I will quote from the paper, and unless they're misleading us, I've been misleading you and we've all been misled. The paper states:

Any country determined to build nuclear weapons and willing to spend the money to do so is unlikely to be stopped.

So says Stephen Cohen, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, who I'm sure you're familiar with. That's one great area of concern.

You talked about bringing all these revelations to the attention of the UN.

My colleague Sarkis Assadourian spoke earlier about the potential sale to Turkey. I am concerned because I've been speaking to the Kurdish community, the Armenian community, the Greek community, the Cypriot community, basically all the neighbours around there. They're saying “How can you guarantee us?” I've been putting the position forth, as you said earlier, Mr. Lysyshyn, that we now put in safeguards. We are doing this and there is auditing, as you outlined. However, your rebuttal to Mr. Assadourian was nobody can give a 100% guarantee.

I have concern in this potential sale to Turkey. We had meetings sometime back with the gentleman who is now with the UN and was formerly with Atomic Energy. You brought up Iraq. They met all the prerequisites, as he said, but we had made a decision not to sell to them and today we are saying we made a wise decision.

Assuming Turkey meets all the prerequisites, and it looks like they will, given their past history of non-compliance with UN resolutions with respect to human rights, with respect to Cyprus, with respect to Kurds, and the list goes on and on, that concerns me. Who's telling me five years or ten years down the road they're going to comply with whatever safeguards we are putting in or whatever gadgets we are using, etc.? That's the biggest concern.

I find myself today defending this decision, or this possible decision, that three months ago I had no problem defending. Today I'm having difficulty defending it. Unless you equip me with some information on how this potential sale to Turkey is indeed going to safeguard that area, I can't defend it.

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: Mr. Cannis, all I can undertake at this stage is to report your concern to our minister.

Going back to the initial point of the article, if somebody is determined to, it would be pretty hard to stop them.

India and Pakistan are the examples. These were nations who were determined to do it and we were not able to stop them. These are nations with talented people who unfortunately have used the talent in that area.

That is probably right. The point is proven by what has happened in India and Pakistan. As I said, I'll convey your concern on Turkey to the minister. The only point I would come back to is their membership in NATO, which I think is a strong constraint on this.

Mr. John Cannis: I believe their needs today are legitimate needs, given their energy requirements and their growth. Today I think their proposal to purchase a reactor is indeed genuine. My concern is what's going to happen maybe 15 years or 20 years down the road. I've seen the statistics and the data. Their proposal is, as I said earlier, a genuine one. Their needs are there. It's clearly stated that they want to use it for peaceful and only peaceful purposes.

• 1655

But as my colleague said earlier, and I think Mr. Mills pointed out as well, we have a changing world. There might be a change in government. There might be a dictator. We might have the fundamentalists, as you mentioned, one day. Today I noticed that there's another clash in Turkey, as an example. We don't know what's going to happen in 10 or 15 years. That's the concern I think we are all expressing here today.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Cannis.

[Translation]

Madam Debien.

Ms. Maud Debien (Laval East, BQ): Good afternoon, gentlemen.

Mr. Lysyshyn, you told us earlier that the technological progress made by Pakistan and India to explode bombs has absolutely nothing to do with the technology Canada first gave then sold to India and Pakistan between 1956 and 1964. Of course, Canada is thereby denying any moral responsibility for these nuclear tests. That is what the minister told us when he met with this committee last week.

I have a very specific question. It is also very technical. I don't know whether you will be able to give me an answer, but I hope you will. Some people are telling us that tritium is produced from heavy water and that only the CANDU reactor can produce tritium from heavy water. We also know that tritium is used to make the hydrogen bomb, the most destructive bomb there is. We also know that when India and Pakistan made their nuclear tests, H-bombs were also detonated and that the CANDU is the only reactor that produces tritium. Are these information correct?

[English]

The Chairman: It's a leak over in this corner. It's not nuclear.

Dr. Kenneth Wagstaff: It's absolutely correct that tritium is produced in the heavy-water systems in CANDU reactors. There is no question about that. There is some uncertainty as to the nature of the nuclear explosive devices that were triggered in India and Pakistan. You should also be aware that tritium can be produced through other techniques not involving the use of CANDU reactors.

These countries may very well have that capability and capacity. I think it's not possible to say that tritium was separated from those CANDU reactors that Canada supplied to India; nor is it possible to say that tritium was separated from the KANUPP reactor in Pakistan.

As a matter of fact, the Pakistan authorities, in informal discussions before these events occurred, had approached Canada for assistance in separating tritium for health and safety reasons. Tritium is removed from Canadian reactor systems for health and safety reasons. It builds up in the moderator and this presents a radiation hazard to operators.

It's not clear to me that tritium in those reactors that Canada supplied was used at all in the devices that India and Pakistan triggered.

The Chairman: Mr. Reed.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: But will we know some day?

[English]

Will we know it one day? No?

• 1700

Mr. Julian Reed (Halton, Lib.): Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm trying to put some perspective on this thing.

Wouldn't the CANDU be one of the last technologies you would want to use if you're going to build a bomb? Wouldn't you build a breeder reactor or use those experimental reactors that they had, do anything but build a CANDU in order to build a bomb, because it's so difficult to extract the plutonium necessary?

There is another thing I should ask, and correct me again if I'm wrong, but weren't the Indian nuclear scientists that developed atomic weapons educated in the same university as the Canadian nuclear scientists at about the same time?

I'm just trying to put a handle on it. I think Canada is getting a bad rap here for selling CANDUs to India. It's not that CANDUs are any of my favourite electric power technology by any means, but the reality is that if I were a nuclear scientist in another country and I wanted to build a bomb, I'd sure as heck use something else that was cheaper, faster, easier.

Mr. Bob Mills: Put your hands on it.

Mr. Julian Reed: I don't think the formula is quite on the Internet yet, but the fact is that you can buy light-water reactors, breeder reactors, from all over the world.

Dr. Kenneth Wagstaff: There are two routes to weapons. One is to enrich uranium to weapons' grade high-enriched uranium. The other is to produce plutonium and separate that plutonium and configure that into a weapon.

If a proliferant were choosing to go the plutonium route, I'd be inclined to agree with you. Why would a proliferant acquire commercial power reactors that are designed for commercial power production and all of the economics that go with that, and use that as a source of material for weapons? Certainly research reactors or production reactors are a more efficient way of getting to the material. It is recognized that the spent fuel or the plutonium in the spent fuel in reactors of whatever nature, CANDUs, light-water reactors, fast breeders, is a material that ultimately could be used. That is why international agency safeguards are applied to those facilities. There's no question.

I think the points you made are very cogent and well taken.

Mr. Julian Reed: Thank you.

Mr. Daniel Turp: He is the parliamentary secretary to the Minister for International Trade.

Mr. Julian Reed: Wait for one year until I'm out of this game, and I'll say the same thing.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Then you'll become a minister.

Mr. Julian Reed: I won't be perceived as having any conflict of interest.

The Chairman: We all live within the rules of cogency, which are relative in nature in the world.

Mr. Lysyshyn, may I try to sum up for myself a little bit of what I understand you're telling us about the sale of reactors generally, as opposed to the India and Pakistan issue itself?

I understood from our discussion that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty contains obligations on parties, the signatories to it. One of the carrots to get other states to sign on was the promise that if they need energy we're not going to deny them the right to get energy and we'll in fact collaborate with them. Is that correct?

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: Yes, that's correct.

The Chairman: There's an international obligation of some nature on the nuclear states, such as Canada, the United States, Russia and others, to provide if not the energy, at least the means for production of energy to other states on condition that they sign on to the safeguards to guarantee that this will not become a security issue. Those conditions are largely enforced through our own bilateral organization on the one hand, but through the emphasis on the international agency, which we heard from, on the other.

• 1705

That is as reliable as modern means make it, but we are trying to upgrade it. The 93 plus two is one way of upgrading it. And as in all human endeavours, we continue to ensure that the system is perfected over time.

That system is only one that enables us to identify a problem. It doesn't enable us to stop it. When we want to stop it, we must then move to another sphere, which you described as the international security sphere. It's the G-8, it's the Security Council. That is the way in which we must enforce if there's a rogue state that seeks to cheat. The IAEA cannot perform that role; that's the role of the international policeman, which is the UN, etc.

Finally, I understood you to tell us that Canada, in its policy of deciding whether or not to sell a reactor to another country, makes its decision first. Of course it would never sell a reactor in a situation where the minimum, all the safeguards we've just discussed, would not be met. But that in and of itself does not determine it. There's a decision that goes beyond that, in which there's an analysis of the geopolitical nature of the potential purchaser, which would determine whether that purchaser is or is not likely to adhere to the safeguards and be a proper player in the system.

Is that a fair summation?

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: That's an excellent summary.

The Chairman: That was what I was getting at.

Monsieur Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: What can the Security Council do? If there is now a peacekeeping and international security problem because of explosions in India and Pakistan, what can the Security Council do? Could it force India and Pakistan to comply with the system?

[English]

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: To see the degree of the Security Council capabilities, should the Security Council decide to use them, you need only look at the regime that was put in place for Iraq.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Yes, that's it.

[English]

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: If the Security Council were willing, it could impose a similar regime under certain circumstances. At present it is not willing to do that.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: Is that what the minister will tell the G-8?

[English]

Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn: We have urged the Security Council to take greater measures. Up until now the Security Council has only issued a presidential statement condemning each of the explosions. We're rather pleased with the fact that the Security Council is now actually examining a resolution that will up the ante. How much further they will go over time will be interesting to see.

I do not believe we are at the end of the international pressure on this issue. The G-8 last time didn't do anything; this time it may be more. When the Security Council first started making a call on India and Pakistan to do something, they didn't raise the NPT. The first texts of the presidential statement didn't include the NPT. That has now gone in. The G-8, when it first raised what should be done, called for them to sign the CTBT. But some of those same nations, when NATO made a statement with the Russians, included the NPT in it.

I don't think we are at the end of the process. The G-8 didn't act well last time. We hope next time, in a week and a half.... And we're not looking just at sanctions in a week and a half; we're looking way beyond sanctions. There is a problem that needs to be managed.

The Chairman: Thank you. We appreciate it. This was very important evidence for this committee to hear.

I want to remind the members we are having a drafting meeting on the committee report on Wednesday, June 3—that's tomorrow—at 3.30 p.m. That will be our first meeting to have a look at that. Researchers have distributed an options paper, which I highly recommend we have a look at beforehand. It's a useful paper. If any member doesn't have a copy of the options paper, make sure you get in touch with us.

Thank you very much. We're adjourned until 3.30 p.m. tomorrow.