FAIT Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, October 29, 1997

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[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.): Members, I'd like to call this joint committee meeting of the standing committees on national defence and veterans affairs and foreign affairs and international trade to order.

I'm very pleased, speaking on behalf of Mr. Robert Bertrand, the chairman of the defence committee, and myself, to welcome Secretary General Solana before us today.

We're very pleased you came, sir. We're pleased to welcome you and the ambassadors from our NATO allies, as well as our own representative, Mr. David Wright. We're sure that you will find a warm welcome here in Ottawa.

NATO's role as the primary guarantor of the security of the North Atlantic area is appreciated in Canada, and Canada's participation in it is supported by a significant proportion of our population.

[Translation]

The Joint Senate and House of Commons Committee on Canada's foreign policy acknowledged this by saying that we must continue to support NATO and the role it plays.

[English]

We are also watching with great interest as your organization opens up to new members and redefines its relationship to Russia.

Your visit here is also very opportune as Canadians are, as you know, serving under NATO command in Bosnia and our Parliament will shortly be called upon to determine the advisability of retaining that presence. We hope that today's meeting may serve as the first day of consultations on that very important issue.

Again, Mr. Solana, thank you very much for coming. We appreciate your appearance before the two committees.

I would respectfully suggest, sir, as we have only one hour—I understand that you must leave at 4.15 p.m.—that perhaps you could make an introductory statement, and then the members might have some questions to address either to you or to the representatives of the various countries here.

[Translation]

His Excellency Javier Solana (Secretary General of NATO): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure for us to share with you and the members of Canada's Parliament our agenda for the future of NATO.

Before we address the various problems and the major issues that we wish to discuss with you, allow me to say how pleased we are today to be here in Canada, a loyal ally that has cooperated with NATO in many important ways, particularly in Bosnia. We are grateful for your country's involvement in Bosnia. It was greatly appreciated.

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With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I propose that we discuss three or four major issues confronting NATO today.

The first issue is the admission of new countries, that is the expansion of NATO and the impact that this will have on all of us. The second issue that I would like to discuss with you and the members of Parliament is our new relationship with Russia. The third issue, which should prove to be very interesting to you, is the situation in Bosnia.

This would be an opportunity for us to exchange views on these three issues and to take part in your deliberations.

This morning, we held a very important, interesting and rewarding meeting with administration members. We are very pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the various issues on the table which are highly important to NATO and, we hope, to Canada.

Mr. Chairman, please proceed as you see fit. I think the three issues that I raised are perhaps the most timely ones.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you very much. While it may be difficult given the large number of participants seated here around this table, I propose that I recognize those members who would like to ask questions and that we then turn the floor over to the representatives of the various countries who might like to add something. I think this would work.

I will begin with Mr. Sauvageau.

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau (Repentigny, BQ): Already?

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Yes, go ahead.

[English]

First batter.

[Translation]

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: Welcome, gentlemen.

I glanced quickly at the briefing document that you submitted. My question has to do with the internal reforms taking place at NATO, the changes on the world scene in the past several years and, something you mentioned, working in cooperation with Russia on all of these issues, as well as defence matters in relation to NATO reform. In the course of your talks, how do you intend to deal with the decision handed down a while ago by the international court on the legality of nuclear weapons use? What impact will this decision have on your discussions about NATO reforms?

Mr. Javier Solana: Thank you very much for your question. As you know, we are in the process of carrying out some extensive reforms at NATO, both internally and externally.

We have agreed to embark on new missions. Our efforts in Bosnia reflect in the clearest possible way what we are doing and what we have undertaken to do.

In terms of external reforms, I think you have touched on the most important issue, namely the relationship between NATO and Russia. As you know, in May, we signed an agreement with our Russian friends in Paris. In my view, things are working out very well and we have been able to establish a sound relationship. Since the signing of the accord in May, and up until the present, we have held very important meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Primakov, with the Russian Minister of Defence as well as with the Russian Chief of Defence Staff. We are very satisfied with the state of our relations with Russia.

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I would like to say a few brief words about the expansion of NATO. As you know, we reached a very important decision in Madrid, namely to open up our alliance to Central and Eastern European countries. We are just now concluding our discussions with a view to arriving at a final decision prior to the ministerial meetings in December.

However, that's not all. We are also working on defining the alliance's strategic concepts, although for the time being, we are merely setting out the terms of reference for initiating discussions with our 16 allies. We will complete this process when we are ready to finalize our discussions on strategic concepts.

To answer the last part of your question, I think we need to wait for the results of the talks between the 16 allies before making a final decision on strategic concepts. Talks are just now getting under way and I think it is somewhat early to know what the outcome will be.

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: While the outcome may not be known, since you are launching a negotiation and discussion process, perhaps you can tell us what impact the ruling of the International Court of Justice on the use of nuclear weapons will have on the reform process. While this is an important legal ruling, it is nevertheless not enforceable.

I would like to know what impact this ruling will have on your reform talks, in view of its importance.

Mr. Javier Solana: NATO takes the resolution of this international body very seriously. We must, however, continue to discuss this matter internally before coming to a clear decision on the impact of this court's ruling. When we get around to discussing strategic concepts, we will no doubt address all of these problems, but for the moment, it is somewhat premature to say exactly what the impact of the ruling will be.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): Thank you, Mr. Secretary General.

[English]

Mr. Hanger.

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask the secretary general a question regarding the continued involvement of troops in Bosnia.

I know he stated it would be in the best interests of Europe and certainly the assembly or the NATO forces not to withdraw or turn their backs on Bosnia, because it would be a tragic mistake. I know a timeline has been placed for withdrawal, maybe more in reference to those timelines set by the United States. Of course, it may be because the public is concerned about its troops' presence there. I'd have to say my read on the Canadian public is much the same. Just how much longer is this event going to go on?

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I'm wondering how active NATO is in coming up with some alternatives. One might deal with the removal of those troublemakers that are presently about the region and yet secreted in an area untouched. Maybe there is a possibility the country could be divided up through whatever process NATO and other countries might agree upon to bring a quicker end to this whole possibility of conflict.

If such an event broke out in another part of eastern Europe, would the NATO forces be able to meet the demand of trying to settle another conflict, and just how quickly would the affair in Bosnia actually come to an end? Some major decisions would have to be made rather quickly.

Mr. Javier Solana: Thank you very much. Let me very briefly try to answer your question.

As you know, we have now deployed on the ground the stabilization force, SFOR. SFOR has a mandate to be on the ground until June 1998 and we will comply with that commitment.

What will happen by June 1998 is very early to say, because the situation on the ground is very fluid. As you know, they had municipal elections not long ago. They're going to have parliamentary elections in the Srpska Republic on November 23, in a couple of weeks. We will have to wait until we see the evolution of this important political event in order to know what the situation will be on the ground before we take a decision about what may happen at the end of the period during which we have committed ourselves to maintain our ground troops. That goes until June 1998.

If you ask my personal opinion, and I think it is a collective opinion of the council, I would try to say two things. First, I think the international community has a commitment to Bosnia. The international community should not abandon Bosnia. I think we can say that collectively because our heads of state and your Prime Minister said that very clearly in Madrid. We have a long-term commitment to Bosnia. We cannot turn our backs on Bosnia. That commitment was very clearly stated in our communiqué at the Madrid summit.

Second, what structure or configuration will that presence in Bosnia take after June 1998? As I said before, it's a little bit too early to answer that question. Therefore, having said that the international community should have a commitment that goes beyond June 1998, it's too early to say in what manner that commitment will be realized militarily.

You have said something today with which I, very kindly and with due respect, would like to profoundly disagree. You have said that probably a solution would be to partition or divide Bosnia. With due respect, distinguished MPs, I would like to say that partition of Bosnia would be catastrophic from at least three different points of view: from a moral point of view, from a political point of view, and from an economic point of view.

I would not insist on the first—morally—because if we allow a partitioning of Bosnia, that means the international community will give a reason to those who do not have the reasons, to those who have no right and who started the war. I don't think the international community can afford to do that now.

From a political point of view, by pretending to solve the problem we would probably create a new problem. When you are concerned about other problems that potentially may arise in Europe, this will be with us if we do not face the responsibilities we have. Allowing for a partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina will not be at the level of our responsibilities.

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The third is economical. The international community has made an effort in Bosnia, and if we now let things evolve in the direction of partition we will probably have wasted our efforts, as I said, morally, politically, and economically.

So I think we should continue our course of action. We have agreed on a process, which is the process of Dayton that was signed in Paris, and that should be our aim, our goal.

Let me remind you that we have at this point not only the 16 countries, the 6 allied countries, with troops on the ground, but more than 30 countries have soldiers there, youngsters, with the same aim, with the same goal: to stabilize that part of Europe. We also have soldiers from Russia there, shoulder to shoulder, every day, to fight and battle for the same aim as we have, together with the soldiers from your country. I want to take the opportunity to praise, and to praise deeply, and from the bottom of our hearts in the North Atlantic Council, the behaviour, the generosity of your country and the soldiers represented there. They were in Bosnia from the very beginning, with UNPROFOR first, with IFOR second, with SFOR third.

I do hope that if the international community decides to continue to be there, your country will show the generosity it has shown from the very beginning, to continue battling for a noble cause, the cause of stabilizing a country that has suffered very much and whose instability will be very important for all of us, for all the countries that belong to NATO and all the countries that share the same values, the same aims, and the same goals for a century that is about to finish, the 20th century, and for the next century, which is about to be touched with the tips of our fingers.

Thank you very much.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Graham): Thank you, Your Excellency.

I believe Mr. Mevik would like to speak.

Mr. Leif Mevik (Dean of the North Atlantic Council): I have two things, very briefly. First of all, I very much agree with the secretary general on the notion of saying no to partition. That would be giving in to blind nationalism, to hatred and bigotry. That is not an option to be considered at all.

Instead of your asking us, I would like to ask this Parliament—I know you are various parties, but even so—if there is some kind of a general mood forming as to whether Canada should stay on after June next year or it should just pull out.

Secondly, if there is going to be some kind of new NATO-led presence, we hope the United States will be with us on the ground and share all the risks and responsibilities. Should that not be possible, would Canada be willing to stay on with the same kind of substantial force it has now to help cope with this important job alone? I hope it will never come to that, but we never know about the future.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Graham): Thank you, sir, for your questions.

May I suggest this to the members of our committees. Since they are used to asking the questions, they are very clever at introducing questions, and they might want to respond to you by posing a question, by giving their opinions.

I might also suggest, sir, that perhaps your question is somewhat premature. In fact, these committees will be conducting hearings at the end of this month to that specific end. To that end, eight members of our committee will be travelling to Bosnia at the beginning of November. We're still in the formative stage of examining this issue. We will report to our government, and then ultimately it will be the cabinet that will make the final decision.

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The members of this committee will be actively involved in consulting, and that's one of the reasons we're happy to have you here today. Perhaps our members can take the opportunity, if they have some personal opinions on that, to speak to it.

The next questioner was Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Svend J. Robinson (Burnaby—Douglas, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to join in welcoming Secretary General Solana and the NATO ambassadors before our joint committees.

To respond very briefly to the Norwegian ambassador on behalf of my party, the New Democratic Party, I can tell you that we are very strongly committed to an ongoing NATO presence in Bosnia. We were deeply concerned that NATO, frankly, failed in responding early on. The onus is even greater now to ensure that we do everything in our power to make the Dayton Accord succeed. Certainly from our perspective an ongoing presence is essential, whether or not the United States Congress decides to continue beyond the end of June 1998.

I have two questions. My first is to follow up on the question asked by my colleague Mr. Sauvageau, and that's with respect to modernization, if you will, of NATO.

The old enemy has disappeared. The new enemies—the new real enemies for many of the NATO countries—are, frankly, environmental destruction, devastation, growing gaps between rich and poor, homelessness, and in some cases, corruption.

I want to follow up on Mr. Sauvageau's question and ask a question—and perhaps this would be to the secretary general or the ambassadors—about this policy of first use of nuclear weapons. Many of the people I represent are saying this is archaic, it's outdated, and that NATO should recognize the reality and renounce that policy. Do you have any views on that?

My second and final question is with respect to the fundamental values of NATO itself. In many documents, in many speeches by the secretary general and others, we have heard about NATO's strong commitment to basic values of human rights and democratic rights. I'm wondering what NATO does to ensure that those fundamental human rights and democratic values are respected, both by prospective members—those who wish to join NATO—but also frankly by existing members of NATO.

I'm a parliamentarian. Just to give one example, one of your member countries, Turkey, has democratically elected parliamentarians locked up in prison simply for speaking out. I visited Leyla Zana in prison in Turkey. This is a country that imprisons writers and journalists and has been condemned by the European Parliament and many human rights organizations. Does NATO have any standards, any benchmarks to evaluate the fundamental respect of international human rights covenants in its own members and in prospective new members?

Mr. Onur Oymen (Turkish Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council): Perhaps I can say a few words about the human rights situation in Turkey. Of course we are committed to human rights issues, as much as any other NATO member. We have accepted the highest standards in the world. We have accepted international inspection systems. We have signed practically all international agreements with all sorts of inspection systems.

I believe it would be easy to accuse a country, but it would be better to learn about this country before making any such accusation. There is complete freedom in our parliament, and no parliamentarian has been accused for their statements in the parliament in Turkey. But in all countries, co-operation with terrorist organizations is prohibited, and the courts in all these countries may condemn the persons who co-operate with terrorism. This is the answer to your question.

Otherwise, many Turkish parliamentarians have expressed their views freely on the same subject, and nothing has happened to them. There is a political party that defends this same position, and they participated freely in the last elections and got only one-seventh of the votes of the so-called Kurdish origin people.

That's why I believe it would be highly advisable to be fully informed before accusing a government, a member of NATO. Thank you.

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Mr. Svend J. Robinson: Mr. Chairman, perhaps the secretary general might respond to the specific question with respect to human rights standards generally. Certainly it's not just this member who needs to be informed. This is many international human rights organizations, including the European Parliament, the Council of Europe.... Ms. Zana received the Sakharov human rights prize. So it's not just this member.

But what about standards and what about first use of nuclear weapons?

Mr. Javier Solana: Let me answer very clearly your question, which I think has a very simple answer.

The new members that are going to come into NATO, that have been invited with the possible vote of your country, are countries that respect the same standards, the same values, as your country respects. Not only that, but I think the fact that we have invited these countries and that we have created a positive momentum in central and eastern Europe has helped to show historical problems of minorities, borders, etc., in the agreements that many of these countries have achieved with their neighbours. It's something that probably would not have taken place without the opening of NATO, without the offer of NATO to be part of that.

In the same manner, I would like to say that the offer of the European Union to open their doors without any doubt has helped to create a solution of problems that come from time back, some of them from the first world war.

Therefore we should be very happy, we should be very satisfied, we think, with the trend that is taking place in central and eastern Europe as far as human rights individually and collectively are concerned.

Mr. Svend J. Robinson: And first use?

Mr. Javier Solana: Well, as I said before in answering the questions of some of your colleagues, we decided in Madrid to take a look at a strategic concept. This is a debate that is just beginning in NATO, and therefore it would be premature to give you a final answer to something that has just begun.

[Translation]

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau— Labelle, Lib.)): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. The next person to speak will be Mr. Richardson.

[English]

Mr. John Richardson (Perth—Middlesex, Lib.): Your Excellency Solana, ambassadors, and General Naumann, it's a pleasure to meet you again and to have an opportunity to ask some questions for clarification.

I agree, having met recently with the Czech Republic senators, who met with us for an hour or so for some clarification on our part. We felt that the criterion for acceptance was an excellent one, it was a democratic one, and it sent a message around the world of the type of governments that are involved in this great organization called NATO.

I would like to state that we are all from different parties here and they reflect different shades of opinion, so it will reflect itself in the questions.

I'm more interested in focusing on the Bosnia issue and seeing it to a resolution. It's a just and noble cause. It's seen so around the world. It's been an historic area of unrest, a lot of it based on nationalism, some of it maybe on religion.

What is happening is a settling down, in my opinion, of the situation. Probably allowing people to vote, as you showed in the structure, and establish democratic elected governments at the local level and/or at the regional or provincial levels would give a basis for success in that area.

I would like to reiterate that the Dayton agreement was a good plan and accepted. We support it and we support what is happening in the stabilization force that is presently there. I think, speaking on the part of the government party, our aim is still to give support to this thrust. And even if we come very close by June, that should be given a chance to reflect whether we need to be there longer and see it through and see it stabilized for a long term.

My question would be, after June 1998—and we are close—would NATO consider the thought of regrouping and seeking the advice of all its members again for an extension of that?

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Mr. Javier Solana: Do you mean NATO countries?

Mr. John Richardson: Yes.

Mr. Javier Solana: Well, of course we will be discussing that situation. We will reach an agreement, without any doubt, about what to do after June 1998.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham): What's the U.S. Senate going to do?

Mr. John Richardson: Well, I don't know about the U.S. Senate. I can't speak for the U.S. Senate, but I don't think it's unreasonable, if it was that close, that they would want to walk away from a problem that is probably 90% resolved.

I would think—and this is an opinion only—that the Americans would buy in if there were positive indications that yes, it can be resolved; we just have to stay longer.

Thank you.

Dr. Hermann Von Richthofen (German Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council): Mr. Chairman, I would like to give an additional answer on the internal adaptation of the alliance.

First of all, we are about to decide, hopefully in December, on the reform of our command structure. We will eliminate a whole level of command, going from four to three. This is really revolutionary and will make our military efficiency even higher.

Secondly, where the CJTFs are concerned, we're in the trial phase, and we will dispose of headquarter nuclei in our regional headquarters, which will be very quickly able to be deployed in crisis theatres. That's also new and that speaks for the efficiency of this alliance.

Thirdly—and this has not been mentioned here the whole day—we are about to express a European defence and security identity within NATO, enabling this alliance to lend its capabilities and command facilities to the western European Union to conduct European-led operations in peacekeeping in future. That is very revolutionary and shows that this alliance is adapting very quickly.

Where the review of the strategic concept is concerned, I may recall that it was totally renewed in 1991, after the Berlin Wall came down and after the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union were dissolved. We have given the right answer. We will review this concept to the extent necessary. The debate has not yet started, but we gave an answer to the new security environment in Europe already in 1991.

Thank you.

Mr. Giovanni Jannuzzi (Italian Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council): I want to add something about Bosnia from the point of view of a country like Italy, which is not only directly involved and I would say primarily interested in a solution in Bosnia, but also heavily committed militarily, with a full brigade and patrolling within the French division. It's a very sensitive area, Sarajevo and Pale.

I have comments on two aspects. One is a question that was very rightly raised: the question of war criminals and arresting or removing them from the political spectrum. We believe this is a moral imperative; there's a moral obligation. It's very much part of the implementation of the Dayton agreement. We'll probably be more and more part of the political solution, but it's not the solution, but rather an alternative solution.

The solution is, through the democratic process we have started to support and implement, to have emerging, especially in the Srpska Republic, democratic, representative, credible interlocutors who should be seriously committed to peace, to non-partition, and to some sort of unity of Bosnia. This is the basic process.

Part of that may be removing people like Karadzic or others, but I would remind the honourable member that NATO is engaged in a serious political fight right now in the Srpska Republic, especially banking on a larger media role in support of the democratic forces.

So to answer the question, yes, we have to eventually get rid of the war criminals, because this is a moral imperative, it's a political imperative.

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But when implementing this imperative, we should also measure it against the political impact that we want to get. We have to measure whether arresting Mr. So-and-so now, today, would have a good political effect or a bad one. We also have to keep in mind the security of our own troops, especially those who operate in that area. That's why I mentioned in the beginning that Pale is a sensitive area in which we are patrolling.

The second question concerns the future after June 1998. I think that no government in Europe is as convinced as Italy that we will eventually have to stay. I totally agree with the secretary general that it would be premature to discuss and to decide upon that now, not only because we don't know what the feeling will be in the American Congress or Senate, but because we really don't know what will happen at the end of June 1998.

Really, we will have to carefully assess whether there is a scope, a reason for our remaining there, and if we feel it is the case, we will be useful and maybe also necessary, which means two things must happen.

First of all, we should have the perspective of a normal democratic evolution of the peace process so that we might really believe that at the end of June our presence will make a difference, either because the peace process is really fully completed, which I don't believe it will be, or because it is absolutely impossible to complete. And we will have to realize that there is no peace possible in those two cases and we'll have to leave.

But the answer from a quite important European country in the area is yes, I suppose we will have to stay.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you very much.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, PC): Mr. Secretary, part of my question has just been answered, but only part of it.

First of all, how important to the future of NATO's success is the Bosnian operation? If the United States pulls out completely, obviously NATO won't get out completely, but what will remain? What form will it take? Will it be NATO or will it be some other form? You've just answered that Italy would be there.

Mr. Javier Solana: Let me answer in a very direct manner.

As I said before, it is very difficult to answer your question at this moment. The only decision we have taken is to be committed until June 1998. We have to take advantage of this time and to put as much pressure as possible on the responsible parties to really bring the evolution of the country into the agreements we signed at Dayton and in Paris.

I just don't know what is going to happen after that, but I don't think we should be thinking about what country A or country B will do. At the end of the day, it will be a decision taken collectively, like every decision is taken in NATO at 16. Therefore we will see what different countries, including yours, will say. You will have a say that is as important as the say of the American parliament.

Mr. Bruce Cleghorn (Head, Non-Proliferation Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Speaking for the U.K., a country that contributes the second largest contingent in Bosnia currently, something over 5,000 troops, and which has taken an active part, for example, in the arrest of war criminals, such as the incident that took place at Prijedor earlier this year, like my Italian colleague I think that if the alliance takes a decision to stay on, if there is an emerging decision, if you like, within the alliance to stay on beyond June, the U.K. will certainly be part of that decision.

We have invested a huge amount in securing the successes we have already achieved in Bosnia in terms of casualties among our own troops but also in terms of a very substantial financial investment in Bosnia.

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In our judgment, given that we have not yet achieved all of the aims we set for ourselves in both in the Dayton agreement and also at Sintra, there's a strong case for persevering and not throwing away those investments we've already made. But it will be important that if NATO stays on beyond June next year, the force that remains is a credible one with real military resources, able to deal effectively and swiftly with any challenge to the authority of the international community.

It is difficult to imagine a force having that, being able to deliver that conviction, that military capability, if the United States was not there and playing a leading role. I myself find it very difficult to imagine a decision to continue in Bosnia that did not have the United States playing a significant part in that force.

As I have the microphone, Mr. Chairman, perhaps I could supplement the earlier answers to the question from Mr. Robinson, and earlier from at least one other—Mr. Sauvageau—with respect to nuclear weapons. There is consensus within the alliance that nuclear weapons remain an important part of our collective arsenal, but it is a weapon of last resort. What's more, it is a weapon whose salience in the alliance's defence has been reduced in the recent past.

If one looks at what the three nuclear powers have all been doing, what one sees is a picture of reductions, whether it be in the case of the United States through bilateral negotiations with Russia or in the case of the U.K. and France by a matter of unilateral decision, but nuclear weapons remain part of the resources that the alliance has available in certain circumstances. Fortunately, looking at the present strategic situation, it's very difficult to imagine circumstances in which one would have to make use of those weapons, but that is not an argument for doing away with them.

Thank you.

[Translation]

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Mr. Turp.

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): I would like to comment briefly on what was just said. It is important to remember, as my colleague stated earlier, that the International Court of Justice called in its ruling for a substantial reduction in the use of nuclear weapons. NATO and its ambassadors should ensure that NATO policy reflects the ruling of the International Court of Justice on the use of nuclear weapons.

I have two questions for the Secretary General. The first concerns Bosnia, since we are on the subject. I would like to assure the Secretary General that my party, the Bloc Québécois, has supported from the beginning the principle that the international community, through NATO, should intervene in Bosnia to maintain peace and security in this region of the world.

Without discussing the renewal of the mandate or the decision that you will be making, do you feel that there are currently major shortcomings in the security force's mandate and more specifically, do you feel it is important for any future mandate to spell out more clearly NATO's role in prosecuting war crimes. That's my first question.

My second question concerns NATO expansion. Our party supported expansion. It even feels that more countries could have been admitted. While Quebeckers and Canadians realize that NATO has expanded, they ignore the costs associated with this process. Can you tell me what the costs of this expansion have been pegged at and how they will be shared among member states? Since he is here, perhaps we could ask the Canadian ambassador what the ramifications of expansion have been in terms of costs to Canada.

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Mr. Javier Solana: Thank you very much.

First of all, let me congratulate you for supporting our ongoing efforts in Bosnia and for underscoring the important role that your country has played and will continue to play, if required.

In response to your first question, I would say that the UN's mandate is perfectly clear. For the moment, I see no major shortcomings in the UN Security Council's mandate.

I would point out, however, that the land forces are a military force, not a police force. That must be made clear. The mandate assigned to the United Nations is a thoughtful, wise one and we can cooperate with and help this institution bring the perpetrators of war crimes to justice, as we have already done.

The representative of Great Britain gave a very good example, but we mustn't forget that responsibility for finding those guilty of war crimes has been taken on by all signatories to the Dayton Accord.

As for expanding NATO, we are currently wrapping up our study on the costs of expansion. However, I can tell you here and now that costs will be reasonable and that they will no doubt be accepted by the various countries. In any event, costs will be shared by the 19 NATO alliance countries.

Mr. Daniel Turp: Are you quite certain that the 19 countries will agree to pay their share?

Mr. Javier Solana: Yes, without a doubt. I do emphasize, however, that the costs will be reasonable and will be shared by all 19 member countries.

As far as Canada is concerned, I will turn the floor over to David Wright, as he is a far greater authority on your country than I am.

Mr. David Wright (Canadian Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council): As the Secretary General mentioned, the costs associated with expansion are still be analysed. We expect them to be reasonable and we will assume our responsibilities along with the other 18 NATO member countries.

To give you an idea of our contribution level, at present, we are the sixth largest contributor to NATO. We contribute 5.8 per cent of NATO's military budget and 5.6 per cent of its civilian budget. This gives you an idea of our contribution level compared to other NATO members.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Thank you very much. Yes, Ambassador.

Mr. Giovanni Jannuzzi: It is interesting to note that each time we meet with distinguished parliamentarians, the issue of the cost of NATO arises. However, I think that's normal since you hold the purse strings.

We must be very clear when we talk about the costs associated with expansion. Which costs are we referring to? Are we talking about costs related to the common budget, that is costs associated with infrastructures? As the Secretary General mentioned, we are currently doing a cost analysis and we hope the results will be fairly reasonable. As Ambassador Wright stated, there is a contribution scale.

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Recently, Canada reduced its level of participation in the infrastructure budget. Italy assumed a portion of the amount cut by Canada. I think that's normal. There is an established contribution scale.

The future program will most likely result in some savings, which in turn will reduce the impact of future spending associated with the admission of new members. We are talking about specifics, namely communication, control and probably air defence infrastructures. These can easily be limited and defined when calculating new costs to be assumed by NATO.

I share the Secretary General's views on this matter, namely that new members will also help cover the costs. They will be signing an agreement shortly in December and making a commitment to cover a percentage of the costs based on their gross national product. We will then know if we can expect our infrastructure or military budget to be increased by an amount equivalent to the contribution of a particular country. In short, as the Secretary General stated, the approach taken is quite moderate and reasonable.

There is a second part to my answer and I wish to avoid any confusion about this. Clearly, new member countries will need to modernize their armed forces. This is something they would have had to do in any case sometime in the next 10 to 15 years. However, this expense will come out of their national budgets and will have to be in line with their resources. No NATO allies will be called upon to contribute to this modernization process, although they may decide to extend commercial or industrial loans to these countries. However, that is another matter.

I have a third point to make. Our military people and in particular the Americans have pointed out to us that the future expansion of the Alliance to include Poland may require a greater effort on the part of current members. While this will come about, it will only be through the normal process of negotiating force objectives within NATO , which will take all the time it needs and operate by consensus.

I'm telling you this because I told Italian parliamentarians only three days ago that national parliaments shouldn't expect any nasty surprises. I think that this would be

[English]

fair on our side to say so, that there will be no major, bad surprise. Thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Javier Solana: With your permission, I would like to clarify one more thing.

Four hours ago today, we concluded our talks on admission with... I have to say that he agreed quite clearly to the contribution scale proposed for this country. In the coming days, I hope that Poland and the Czech Republic will react in a similar fashion.

[English]

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): I want to mention to my colleagues that contrary to what was written in the notice of meeting, we only have our illustrious visitors until 4.15 p.m. and not 4.30 p.m.

We have time for one very short question. Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. Ted McWhinney (Vancouver Quadra, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mine is more a statement. I was very stimulated by the Italian ambassador's comments. His situation seems close to ours.

We have been in international peacekeeping and military operations since the beginning, since 1956. Generally with the United Nations, and under chapter 6 of the charter—we have more problems with chapter 7 because you get into political missions—the government has adopted the practice of communicating with Parliament when Parliament is in session. Even when it is out of session, as happened this summer, we briefed. I was instructed to brief all the opposition parties and get their assent to enter in action. So the matter will come to Parliament.

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We have had operations in Somalia, as you know, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia. There's a definite preference in Parliament for hemispheric actions, a special relationship with Haiti.

There is also an unhappiness with the political side of military operations, particularly where we have not been directly involved in the planning. I must tell you, in the several parliamentary debates we have had on Bosnia, there were reservations expressed at political decisions in which we didn't participate, were not involved, and which many people felt were not necessarily very sound political decisions. So the matter will come to debate in the House.

The commitment to involvement in international peacekeeping or military activities in the line of peace is clear, that we will determine our own priorities and we will want to be sure, if political operations are involved, that we are fully involved in the political processes. If it's a military mission as such, we tend to prefer that it be kept to a military mission. But I was taken by the Italian ambassador's remarks because it seemed to me that you have much the same necessity of a similar process in Italy, the consultation of Parliament.

Thank you.

The Co-Chairman (Mr. Robert Bertrand): Mr. Brison, I'm sorry, we can't proceed with your questions.

This would bring to a close our session. I would mention to you, Mr. Ambassadors, as you see, there is a lot of interest in both our committees in what NATO is doing. I know you have to catch a flight to the United States.

[Translation]

In conclusion, I would like to wish you the best of luck in your future deliberations. Thank you very much and good evening.

The meeting is adjourned.