ENSU Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, February 12, 1998

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[English]

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson (Elgin—Middlesex—London, Lib.)): My name is Gar Knutson and I'm the vice-chair of the committee. I'd like to welcome everyone to this morning's session. What I'd like to ask the panel to do is to introduce yourselves for the record.

Mr. Ian McGregor (Director General, National Programs, Environment Canada): I'm Ian McGregor, the director general of national programs at Environment Canada.

Mr. Alan Gilmore (Principal, Audit Operations Branch, Office of the Auditor General of Canada): I'm Alan Gilmore. I'm responsible for the audit of the oil spill chapter, and I'm with the auditor general's office.

Mr. Brian Emmett (Commissioner, Environment and Sustainable Development): I'm Brian Emmett, commissioner for the environment and sustainable development.

Mr. Michael Turner (Deputy Commissioner, Canadian Coast Guard, Department of Fisheries and Oceans): I'm Michael Turner, deputy commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard, with Fisheries and Oceans.

Mr. Jean Bélanger (Chairman, Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada): My name is Jean Bélanger, I'm chairman of the Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada.

Mr. John Gratwick (Member, Oil Spill Response Organization Fee Structure Investigation Panel): I'm John Gratwick, a former member of the oil spill investigation panel. The panel is defunct, of course, and I am a former member only.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Apparently Daniel Green is coming in by train from Montreal, so we'll begin with Mr. Emmett.

Mr. Brian Emmett: Thank you again for the opportunity to be here and to share some of the results of our work with you, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

In 1992, we reported on emergency preparedness in the federal government. As part of that audit, we looked at the government's ability to respond to major earthquakes, nuclear emergencies and oil and chemical spills. As our reports indicate, we have continuing concerns about the capacity of the federal government to respond to major emergencies.

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Our December 1997 Report followed up on our observations on oil and chemical spills. We examined the progress made to respond to marine oils spills, marine chemical emergencies and land-based chemical emergencies at industrial sites. We have concerns about each of the three areas.

[English]

In the late 1980s, public concerns arising from the Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster in Alaska led the government to establish the public review panel on tanker safety and marine spills response capability. The panel's 1990 report concluded that Canada did not have the capability to respond to significant spills.

Since 1992, the coast guard has put significant effort into developing a marine oil spill preparedness and response regime. This involved 1995 amendments to the Canada Shipping Act that, among other things, required oil-carrying vessels and designated oil-handling facilities to have an arrangement with a response organization that has been certified by the coast guard to respond to oil spills. There are five response organizations. These are private companies that are all owned by the major oil companies and that charge fees to maintain a response capability for spills.

In 1995, proposed fees were published in the Canada Gazette. After receiving a significant number of objections, the government appointed a panel to investigate their fairness. The panel's report concluded that the oil spill response fee structure was unworkable because it was neither fair nor equitable.

At the time of our follow-up audit, the problem surrounding the oil spill response regime fee structure remained unresolved. We are concerned that the absence of an agreement on fees threatens the viability of the oil spill response regime that is now based on arrangements with private sector companies. It should be noted that the panel's report also concluded that the coast guard had withdrawn from active control of Canada's oil spill response capability.

[Translation]

The oil spill response regime does not cover chemical spills in marine environments. Marine chemical emergencies differ from oil spills because there is a much larger variety of chemicals being transported and the consequences are more unpredictable and may be far more severe.

There has been little progress in establishing a marine chemical response capability. The limited progress is due, in part, to the difficulties that have been encountered in trying to establish the oil spill response regime. At the time of our follow- up audit, the Coast Guard was in the preliminary stage of developing a chemical emergency response regime in conjunction with industry.

The final area that I would like to comment on is chemical emergencies at industrial sites. Our 1992 chapter reported that Canada did not have a national legislative framework for chemical accidents at industrial sites. This is still the case.

Environment Canada told us it does not have the mandate to make assessments of hazardous sites and there is no legislation that requires hazardous sites to be registered or companies to report on what preventive measures they have in place.

[English]

In 1996, Environment Canada proposed amendments to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, including a section that would have given the government authority to establish regulations to report and to help prevent industrial site environmental emergencies. The bill did not reach second reading in the last Parliament.

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The amendments were consistent with the 1995 report of the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, It's About Our Health!. The report recommended that the government obtain authority from Parliament to require that hazardous sites be identified and registered. This is a first step to preventing environmental emergencies. Once sites are known, it becomes possible to assess the risk posed and to develop response plans. Such legislation would complement voluntary initiatives like those being undertaken by the Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada, known as MIACC.

MIACC has developed a list of hazardous substances and at the time of our follow-up audit was developing an inventory of hazardous sites. About 1,350 sites had been identified at that time. MIACC was also in the process of sending a survey to hazardous site operators for self-assessment of their safety management practices. The results are expected in the spring of this year. However, at this point Environment Canada and MIACC have little information on the extent to which hazardous sites are adequately prepared to deal with emergencies.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Who would like to respond first from the government—Fisheries and Oceans or Environment Canada? Fisheries and Oceans.

Mr. Michael Turner: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, allow me to just give a little bit of background to the situation that we face with respect to the present oil spill preparedness regime. As the auditor general has pointed out, this private sector regime was created through amendments to the Canada Shipping Act, and the regime was intended to significantly enhance Canada's capacity to respond to large oil spills, with the major oil companies making investments to create that infrastructure. The response organizations—or ROs, as we call them—have considerably increased Canada's preparedness capacity in that sense, and I believe the panel that looked into the fee objections also came to that conclusion.

Under the act, the investment is to be recovered from all users of the regime—whether it's ships or oil handling facilities—in the form of the fees set and collected by the ROs through arrangements, as they're called. The ships and the oil handling facilities are required by law to have such an arrangement with a certified RO. These fees were proposed in September 1995, as has been pointed out, and there were 31 objections received. One can argue whether that is a numerous quantity of objections or not—in fact, 28 objections stood at the end and 3 were withdrawn completely—by all of the users across the country. We have been working since that point to try to come to a resolution of this issue because of the difficulties imposed by the combination of the statutory framework within which we operate, the objections that have been received, and the results of the minister's appointed review panel.

Despite the unresolved issue, the combined coast guard and industry capacity, along with what we call the plan to cascade in or move equipment and resources between regions or even internationally does give Canada the ability to respond to a catastrophic spill and is a far superior capability then we had ten years ago, at the time of the Exxon Valdez. All but a small minority of the system users are in fact also paying the fees, and the system is in operation.

The auditor general has summarized correctly the principal findings of the investigations panel set up by the minister. Its recommendations are far reaching and comprehensive and they constitute a significant reworking of the existing Canada Shipping Act if they are to be followed based on a philosophy quite different from the business approach that underlies the current regime and which the previous government had directed. They could not be implemented without substantial revisions to the act. Furthermore, the eleven recommendations of the panel's report are interdependent, and we are finding that it is difficult to accept some in isolation from the others.

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[Translation]

However, in addressing the immediate issue of approving or amending proposed fees, the Minister must act within the parameters of the existing Act. The Report of the panel therefore presents him with a dilemma: whether to make significant changes to an Act that is the result of considerable industry investment and stakeholder consultation, and which has not really had a chance to develop; or to take a decision on fees, even though the Panel found the fees "unfair and inequitable" and further indicated that fair and equitable fees could not be set under the present legislation.

[English]

It is in fact a dilemma we have been wrestling with for some time. The panel's recommendations, as we have noted, fall into three categories: recommendations for greater governance, especially a strengthening of the role of the government and the coast guard in the management of the regime; recommendations on the nature, level, and collection of fees that are required to fund this regime; and recommendations on the management of risk in the marine transport of oil through a graduated fee system more closely associated with product risk.

If I may speak briefly to the coast guard's approach on this matter, within the Department of Fisheries and Oceans there is clearly agreement that there are changes required in the regime as it currently stands. This is clear both from the panel's report and from the fact that the dispute over fees has dragged on for more than two years, despite our best efforts to broker a solution.

In addressing both the panel's report and the need to stabilize the regime, the coast guard is carrying out three basic steps. We are developing detailed governance options in consultation with the stakeholders that will address some of the concerns raised by the panel, including the regional advisory committees that are appointed under the act. We are consulting with them on governance options that will better integrate all the capabilities—the coast guards' equipment, skills, and role—with those developed by the private sector under the present statutory regime.

This work is under way and we have been consulting with the advisory councils. We expect to have it completed in May of this year. It will then allow the minister to address the core finding of the investigation panel that the coast guard must re-establish its principal role through an integrated private-public sector partnership, although not necessarily exactly following the mechanism proposed by the panel. Legislative amendments may well be required in order to give effect to these changes.

Secondly, we are planning a multi-stakeholder consultation, the details of which will be announced very shortly, to develop definitions and standards that would guide future fee setting and prevent protracted disputes in the future. These standards have to be ready by November 1998 because at that time the certificates for the existing ROs expire and new fees must be proposed and gazetted when the five ROs apply for recertification, if they do choose to apply for recertification under the act.

Not only will the standards guide the response organizations in setting new fees, but they will also give the minister a basis for assessing fairness and equity in the fees under the present act, should there be further objections to them.

We have referred to this in all of our discussions with the various parties as a challenged consultation. The mechanism is to challenge the various players in the industry—both those providing the service and those paying for the service—to meet and come to some agreement on some of the fundamental concerns over definitions, standards, fee setting, and appeal processes, while the government deals with the broader governance issues.

Thirdly, it is important to stabilize the regime through a decision on the fees. However, we are advised by our justice department colleagues that this can only be done within the parameters of the present legislation. The minister is currently considering detailed options for a fee decision and we are in active discussion with the staff as well. Any decision he takes will last until a new set of fees is proposed by the ROs, which is expected to come in November 1998. This is a very complex issue and we will do our best to respond to any questions from your committee, sir.

Let me now turn to the creation of the marine chemical emergency regime, which we all agree is an important factor. This is an area in which the coast guard has been working for some time and it is, as has been pointed out already, a very difficult one.

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We believe we've made significant progress over the past year in the development of a marine chemical emergency regime. We are doing this by way of an open consultative process we've put in place that involves all of the major shareholders and stakeholders, and we have also carried out a number of technical studies.

We believe very strongly that it is neither appropriate nor affordable for the government to be the only solution to establishing an effective regime for chemical spills. There are already effective regimes in place to deal with chemical spills in the other transportation modes governed under legislation such as the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, and there are requirements under the Canada Shipping Act with respect to the transportation of dangerous goods at sea.

What we are lacking at present is a method of ensuring that we bring a focus to any spill of chemicals in the marine environment in which we bring together all of the tools, the resources, and the capabilities that are already available within this country.

So rather than attempt to reinvent, so to speak, and attempt to create within the government—the coast guard specifically—a capability to go out and deal with every chemical spill, we have been working closely with the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association and the Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada to establish a government-industry working group, which is developing plans along with us to expand to the marine environment the existing land base regime capability that already exists in this country—and we do have extensive capability in the industries in this country. In that way, we can fill in the gaps, so to speak, in the existing capability in Canada. This work is currently under way.

You have already briefly met Mr. Jean Bélanger, the president of MIACC. The committees and working groups that have been established within the coast guard, with the coast guard chairing, have been actively engaged in this process over the past year. Within the coast guard over the past four years we have already established a pilot project system of response capability to also ensure that we understood clearly exactly what was involved in terms of response to chemicals, because the situation is so different and so much more complex than is the case when responding to oil.

The lessons we have learned from that experience in establishing a pilot capability within the coast guard, as well as the consultative work we've been doing with the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association, which MIACC has been assisting us with, have formed the basis of the work we're now embarking on to examine how best to bring together the elements and capabilities in Canada and to examine what statutory amendments or new law may be required in order to give effect to such a regime and to give authority to those who have the capability to respond efficiently and quickly.

I will stop at that point, sir, and if there are comments or questions later we will of course do our best to respond.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Does Environment Canada have opening remarks?

Mr. Ian McGregor: Yes.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): We're likely going to have a vote around 10.15 a.m., and I have a request to deal with some other business at the end of the meeting, so I will ask you to be as brief as possible, please. I suggest to the committee that we then go on with five-minute opening rounds.

Mr. Ian McGregor: I'll only take a minute, Mr. Chair.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Thanks.

Mr. Ian McGregor: Environment Canada is an active player in addressing the environmental issues surrounding emergencies. The mission of Environment Canada's emergencies program is to reduce the frequency, severity, and consequences of events.

Environment Canada created the regional environmental emergencies team approach, which provides a consolidated environmental and technical approach to responders. The department participates in the review of industry, commercial, and government emergency preparedness and contingency plans and conducts workshops on spills, risk assessments, and emergency response. These activities are a valuable contribution to the prevention and management of emergencies.

The auditor general has been very helpful in highlighting areas for further development. For example, as noted by the auditor general, there is need for a legislative framework for land-based chemical accidents. Such a framework was introduced as part of Bill C-74. We would certainly hope that this framework for emergencies would be part of the renewed Canadian Environmental Protection Act.

• 0930

I'm also proud of the progress that's been made by the Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada and Environment Canada's role as federal lead in establishing and helping to direct this group.

MIACC is now working to develop an inventory of hazardous sites as well as the communities containing these facilities. Site operators are being encouraged to undertake risk assessments and to work cooperatively with their local communities in developing emergency plans.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Thank you very much.

Of our panel, is there anyone else who would like to make a statement?

Mr. Gratwick, do you have an opening statement?

Mr. John Gratwick: Yes. I think you have a copy of it in front of you.

I would just point out that the panel was appointed by the minister. It was a three-man panel, made up of Dr. Gold of Halifax, Peter Yee of Vancouver, and me. We completed our work after the changes in the terms of reference that happened as a result of a court challenge. We completed our report on August 26, 1996.

We made eleven recommendations, which are before you. Perhaps I don't need to read them. As Mr. Turner mentioned, while they were interlocking, they were primarily aimed at the main terms of reference, which were to establish whether the fees were fair and equitable. We decided that they were clearly not. All of our recommendations are aimed at addressing that issue. They do fall into the governance and mechanisms for establishing risk and fairness through the process.

I won't read them all into the record—you have a copy of them—but I am quite prepared to answer questions.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Thank you.

Mr. Bélanger.

Mr. Jean Bélanger: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am chair of MIACC. Michael Salib, who is president, unfortunately is sick. He sends his apologies. He has asked me to substitute for him today.

Just as a quick refresher, MIACC is an independent forum bringing together a number of stakeholders from the federal, provincial and municipal governments, industry, and a number of NGOs. Our work is aimed at trying to get consensus approaches to working together for preparedness, prevention, and awareness in the area of major industrial accidents.

Essentially, I would like to focus on the fact that we have taken to heart the comments made by the auditor general in his reports on a number of occasions, particularly with regard to looking at trying to focus on making communities safer. Therefore, we are concentrating all our efforts at this time on developing the safer community approach.

This is a national initiative that is just developing, bringing together all the capabilities at the local level in order to be able to deal specifically with the problems inherent in each community. Each community is, of course, very different.

A number of hazardous installations have been talked about here. Brian Emmett referred to the fact that a number of the sites that have already been identified have what we call “list 1” chemicals. We have 1,390 sites identified, of which 479 have been verified; 437 are list 1 sites. A number of associations are participating very directly at the front line in getting us the information on each of those sites.

As well, we are working at community preparedness, which is, of course, the embodiment of all these various installations within a community. We have identified 533 communities, of which about half have been verified up to now. These are throughout Canada.

• 0935

We have also identified transportation systems, and again 238 transport sites have been identified and verified. So this is the baseline work we are doing to try to define exactly what is going on within each community.

We are now focusing on trying to get action plans for each of the communities, which will bring together agents of the federal government, the provincial government, the local communities, the various fire chiefs, police chiefs, etc., the emergency response activities within each community as well as the companies that have activities and will have list 1 and list 2 sites within the communities. This is how we have been trying to make this visible.

You can see that the 1,390 are spread throughout Canada, including the Northwest Territories, the Yukon, and so on. We can also bring this focus down from a national focus to a very local focus. As an example, we do have a number of sites in the area of the Vaughan Ontario, CNR-MacMillan Yard.

Starting from these aspects, we hope to be able to bring together, in a joint coordinating committee, the various agents of response, preparedness, and awareness in each of those communities. The tools are being developed. We have just come out with the risk assessment guidelines for municipalities and industries, and these were identified in the auditor general's report as needing to come out. This has now been prepared and so on.

These activities are ongoing. It's a dynamic system. It is important that we develop these broad tools, guidelines, handbooks, workshops, and so on at the national level. This will allow us to take action; to think at the national and provincial levels but act locally.

Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Thank you very much, Mr. Bélanger.

I understand Mr. Green has arrived, but he's making photocopies of his presentation, so we'll start. Are there any objections to limiting the opening round to five minutes? No. Mr. Gilmour and then Mr. Bigras.

Mr. Bill Gilmour (Nanaimo—Alberni, Ref.): Mr. Gratwick, very briefly, what is your background?

Mr. John Gratwick: I've been in the transportation business most of my working life. I was with the railway for a number of years and eventually became vice-president of research and development, which is really related to this. I have had a fair amount of marine experience. I was president of CN Marine in the old days before it became Marine Atlantic, and in fact was part of that transition. I've been involved with the port in Halifax. I was chairman of the port commission until last year. I have taught in the area at university, and I've also had some experience with the process of policy evaluation, through membership in the National Transportation Act Review Commission some years ago.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: Thank you, sir. I value your judgment, because, for want of another term, you're not on the inside; you're more on the outside.

I'm from Vancouver Island. My riding is on the island. We have ships regularly going from Alaska to Cherry Point in Washington State. They don't touch Canadian shores, but they're only five to ten miles out. You can see them going down the coastline.

Are they treated differently from ships that would be loading and unloading right in Canadian ports? Are they accounted for in the fee structure or are they basically left alone?

Mr. John Gratwick: I would bow to Mr. Turner on this one. I'm not quite sure how close they would have to be to be included in the requirement for being registered if they went through the area of an RO.

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Mr. Michael Turner: To respond to the specific question, unless they've loaded or unloaded a cargo at a Canadian port, they would not be paying the fee. However, if they passed through an area of Canadian waters, they would be expected to have an arrangement. In fact, in the case of the situation on the west coast in the Straits of Juan de Fuca, we are in active discussions with the United States concerning the regime that the state of Washington has put in place. This is in order to try to ensure that we have no duplication or overlap, but a reciprocity system that will ensure that ships coming and going through that area are paying the necessary premium, if I could put it that way, because this is an insurance system to one side or the other. Collectively, there will therefore be an appropriate response in place if it's ever needed.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: Okay, thank you.

Mr. Gratwick, what is the feeling among the oil companies? They're basically the ones who own the response. Are they part of the solution or are they standoffish? What's the mood?

Mr. John Gratwick: I can only give you my own opinion, because I have had no active role in this process since we produced the report. My understanding is that they weren't exactly overly enthusiastic about our report. I understand, too, that in the subsequent discussions there hasn't been a great deal of change of direction, shall I say.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: So where is the middle ground? Who should run it? Should it be the coast guard? Should they be the overseers? How do you get people at the table? Is it legislation that's going to cause us to find a solution? What's the quick fix?

Mr. John Gratwick: As we recommended, I think it has to have a form of central control. It probably makes most sense to have the coast guard being responsible for making sure the regime is in place. I think it probably needs to be operated by a genuine partnership arrangement between the government, the coast guard, and the various parts of the industry that are involved. This pattern seems to work elsewhere, and I don't see why it shouldn't work here.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: Before the coast guard was taken over by DFO, I had confidence in the coast guard. I don't have that level of confidence in DFO.

Is there going to be a reduction in response or a reduction in the ability of the coast guard to handle this now that they're under DFO?

Mr. John Gratwick: I don't think there necessarily needs to be. I think this all happened at a difficult time for DFO because they in fact not only changed masters but were under the enormous pressures of downsizing. Any opportunity to offload some of the responsibilities into a private arrangement was obviously very attractive in those days. I think it was probably a bit too attractive, and we now have to back off a little bit.

It still think the system can be larger, to the extent that the government requires it. It should have some contribution coming from those at risk. There's no reason why you shouldn't tax people who are getting benefit from the resources that are being provided, but at the moment clearly only a portion of the resources are being provided under this regime with the private response organizations. I think probably less than 50% of that capability is in their hands. We still need the group of private clean-up operators who don't need to be supported when they're doing nothing but who are there and are available to act when a spill occurs. Then there are the resources of the coast guard itself.

Somehow we have to find a way to integrate this total picture and run it sensibly. I think that can only be done by a national body, and I think if we can find the best way, it's probably a genuine government-private partnership.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: Thank you, sir. I appreciate your comments.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Mr. Bigras.

[Translation]

Mr. Bernard Bigras (Rosemont, BQ): My question is especially addressed to Mr. McGregor, but I am convinced that Mr. Green will intervene afterwards. It is about the Irving Whale disaster, the spill of substances which happened near the Magdalen Islands. I would like to know what evaluation your department has made of this matter, more specifically regarding the substances presently found on the ocean floor. This is my first question.

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[English]

Mr. Ian McGregor: As you are aware, the government made a decision to raise the Irving Whale. This was a difficult operation. It took place over two years. It was raised successfully. There are now some reviews being done in terms of whether there are PCBs on the bed of the ocean near the site.

I do not have the most current information. I'm sorry about that. My understanding is that there may be some PCBs there. They're trying to assess both the extent and the concentration.

[Translation]

Mr. Bernard Bigras: So you are telling me that you are not able to evaluate the quantity of PCBs found on the ocean floor. Is that what you're telling me?

[English]

Mr. Ian McGregor: No. I'm sorry. If that's the message, then I've described it inaccurately.

We are in fact in the process of doing that, although not at the moment, because it is too cold. There is work ongoing to make that assessment. At the moment, though, I don't have the accurate information.

[Translation]

Mr. Bernard Bigras: May I know when you began to evaluate the quantity of PCBs?

[English]

Mr. Ian McGregor: The assessment was started I believe last year. It's covering a fairly broad area.

I'm sorry, I don't have details of what has been detected, but I would be prepared to get that information for you. I don't have it with me.

[Translation]

Mr. Bernard Bigras: Finally it would be important for your department to face facts and to respond to the requests made by citizen groups from the Magdalen Islands region, as well as from other regions of Canada, and to clean up the ocean floor once and for all, both for the sake of public health as well as for the regional crab industry.

[English]

Mr. Ian McGregor: Certainly our intent is that once we have an accurate assessment of what's there, we will work with others to move forward on this. At the moment, though, I'm sorry, I can't tell you what's there. I don't have the information with me.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Mr. Green, we're talking about the Irving Whale. I understand that's your issue.

Mr. Daniel Green (Director, Société pour vaincre la pollution): I have a bit of knowledge on this issue, yes.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Then maybe you can make your presentation now.

I'd like to welcome you to the committee. Unfortunately, votes in the House of Commons are out of our control. We're expecting one around 10:15 a.m. The half-hour bell will be a distraction.

Mr. Daniel Green: Excuse me, but the acoustics are extremely bad in this room. I'm having a problem hearing you.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Mrs. Kraft Sloan will show you where the earpiece is.

Mr. Daniel Green: I see. But it's all tied up. This is a plot.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): This is normal.

Mr. Daniel Green: This must be the lowest chair in the Parliament buildings, and I got it.

Mr. Chairman, I do have some notes I wrote at 4 a.m., and on the bus here. I just printed it off at your parliamentary bureau.

You will notice that I do not address the issue of the Irving Whale in my written brief. I did focus in my presentation on the whole issue of preparedness for oil spills. I think that is a very pressing issue because of the debate on tariffs and the whole issue of privatization of Canada's response to major oil spills.

If it would please the committee, I could perhaps answer the question on the Irving Whale—if there was a question—but the only comment I have on the Irving Whale issue, as it refers to chapter 34 of the auditor general's report, is that the Irving Whale issue shows very clearly that in Canada today we do not have the capacity to remove toxic chemicals once they've been lost through a sinking, especially if these chemicals go to the bottom of the ocean.

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It is very distressing to us, and I think to the communities in the maritimes, to find out that the Government of Canada has not to this date committed itself to trying to do the clean-up of the remaining PCBs at the Irving Whale site. We were promised this. We were promised this by Sheila Copps and by Sergio Marchi and we would like the government to live up to this promise. They told the people of Quebec and eastern Canada that if PCBs were lost either when the Irving Whale was on the bottom of the ocean or during the raising of the Irving Whale—and there were certain indications from DFO that there was indeed a loss of PCBs during the raising—they would go back and clean up the PCBs that had been lost. I'm expecting this government to live up to this promise this May.

Barring the promise, I think it would be a great opportunity for Canada to demonstrate on the one hand its capabilities of retrieving toxic chemicals lost in spills in deep environments. On the other hand, if they can't, at least it will show what we need to do as a country to be able to recoup these chemicals once they're lost during sea and river shipping accidents. I think it's quite important, and I think the Irving Whale is an example of Canada's technical problems in dealing with these types of spills.

Chapter 34 of the auditor general's report does not specifically talk about the technical challenge of dealing with these chemicals, but it talks about that in essence. The Irving Whale is a case in point, and I think all of Canada, especially eastern Canada and Quebec, will be looking at the federal government and its attempt to try to remove these chemicals before they start being bio-uptake in the biota of the Atlantic.

These PCBs will not go away. They'll end up in whales, in beluga whales, in cod, in crab, and in us, unless we remove them first. We must try. It's going to be expensive. I understand that the federal government is now suing Irving for costs, so you might be getting some money back. But you must try, and you must try this summer before these PCBs are moved about and become unidentifiable and unremovable.

That's my comment on the Irving Whale. Thank you very much.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Did you want to take us through your brief?

Mr. Daniel Green: Yes, if I may, Mr. Chairman. I have these notes, which are in French only.

[Translation]

So, I will carry on in French. Those who need translation will have to plug in to the CBC.

[English]

I will continue my comments specifically in French relating to the section on the

[Translation]

oil spills.

First I would like to thank the committee for having invited me as a witness this morning. Excuse me for being late. The Montreal-Ottawa buses were slow.

I believe that the Auditor General's 1992 report defined the problem well. The last report, in December 1997, confirms the failures of our country regarding the problems of oil spills on the coastal areas and in the waters of Canada.

As far as we are concerned, there was no difference between 1992 and 1998, apart from the fact that we privatized the oil spill response in Canada. I believe it is very important to state that we are not the only ones to have done so; as a matter of fact, the Auditor General's report essentially repeats the statements of the panel struck by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, to investigate the fee structure charged by response organizations.

• 0955

As a whole, we agree with the panel's analysis and the one made by the Auditor General. The private system of protecting our waterways from major oil spills is not viable.

It is not viable and if we do not change it quickly, it will be costly for the Canadian ecosystem. My expertise in oil spills is a result of my work as an environmentalist, in Quebec, and especially in the St. Lawrence River.

I'd like to remind the members of the committee that the oil tanker Braer, which was wrecked off the Shetland Islands in 1993, was on its way to Quebec. And it is at that time that the Anti- pollution Association came to the conclusion that a catastrophic major oil spill could still happen in Canada. Today I state for the record that this will certainly happen in Canada.

We really were scared when certain of these events came about, just facing the ridings of Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Martin, and Ms. Robillard. Two ships, I think within one year, were wrecked almost at the same spot, in Saint-Louis Lake, before the St. Lawrence Seaway and before Montreal. If these ships had lost their load of oil, all the drinking water of a population of 1.2 million would have been contaminated.

We saw what happened and what could have happened when Montreal had no water for three hours during the ice storm. You can imagine what would have happened to the Montreal population if the Olympic Venture and the Imperial St. Clair had lost their cargo of oil. It would have been a disaster. Not even all the soldiers of the Canadian army could have given us back our drinking water.

This is a recent event. These were modern ships, equipped to all navigational apparatus, but it happened nonetheless. After the launching of operations on the Hibernia platform and very soon that of the Terra Nova platform, the risk for a major accident will massively increase on the east coast of Canada and in the Gulf of the St. Lawrence River. According to Daniel Green's predictions, this will happen. Unfortunately, I cannot tell you when. I imagine that the Coast Guard would take notes and get ready. I am not intelligent enough for that but I know that it will happen. The probabilities are there.

The Exxon Valdez experience has two things to teach us. And incidentally, I had the opportunity to go to Alaska and to speak to the American Coast Guard and to the citizens who had responded to the spill. First, with a major spill, the quantity of equipment is not always what matters most. Sometimes, if we can mobilize enough people to respond within the minutes following the spill, we can succeed in picking up a great deal of oil and we can scare off the wildlife so it does not become contaminated.

I think that perhaps in response to the privatization of oil spill response, we should set up a volunteer sector in Canada where we could train thousands of volunteers to respond in the event of a major spill in the St. Lawrence River. The Société pour vaincre la pollution, SVP, is obviously proposing a similar program. This ideas has been systematically rejected by Environment Canada over the past five years.

I know that Charles Caccia and Clifford Lincoln have both supported my initiative. Unfortunately, their support has not spurred the bureaucrats at Fisheries and Oceans, the Coast Guard and Environment Canada interaction.

• 1000

I think that in the event of a major spill, especially in the St. Lawrence River, we won't need equipment, but people to keep the birds away and protect the shores. We will need lots of able bodied people to do that. These people will have to be trained.

This is not the first time that this kind of proposal has been made; the Brander-Smith panel recommended getting the volunteer sector in Canada involved in helping clean up in the event of a maritime disaster. That is the Brander-Smith recommendation number 4.9. So my first recommendation is that the Standing Committee recommend the setting up of a national program designed to train volunteers in various techniques for hazing and de-oiling wildlife and cleaning up habitats. Once trained, these volunteers could be mobilized in an event of an oil spill. The national program could be managed by the various environmental groups in Canada. These groups already have a large network of volunteers committed to environmental protection.

As regards privatization, I would recommend that committee members read the Oil Spill Response Organization Fee Structure Investigation Panel Report, if you have not already done so. The committee's conclusion is radical and goes straight to the point. By stripping the Coast Guard of its responsibilities and making it simply an issuer of licences, Canada's response capabilities in the event of a major spill have been undermined.

We deal with the Eastern Canada Response Corporation which is located in Quebec, on almost a weekly basis. The ECRC is essentially run by Ultramar Canada, Inc. They are secretive. They don't want to talk to us. They do not even answer our letters. We have analyzed the ECRC's capability of cleaning up a major spill in the St. Lawrence River and we were not at all impressed. These capabilities seem to be essentially an exercise on paper.

They say their response time in the event of an oil spill is one hour and half. In the St. Lawrence River, where the currents are at two or three meters per second, that is too long. We know that we cannot respond at night, because it is too dangerous for human safety. In a river system, if we do not respond at night, the oil slick will cover dozens of kilometres by morning.

Therefore, response privatization must be completely reviewed. With respect to oil spills, privatization does not guarantee our waterways will be protected.

Apart from the fee structure—I know that there is some disagreement on this final point and again I recommend that you read the panel's report—I am appalled that these corporations make on average a profit of 20 per cent before taxes. What has environmental response in Canada come to? We talk about volunteers and partnerships. Yes, we are in favour of volunteers and partnerships, but we want to make money. Is that the message that oil companies in Canada are sending out? I find that appalling.

I also find it appalling that this money, collected to prevent ecological disasters in our river communities and to protect us, is in the end making the very corporations responsible for these potential disasters richer. As the saying goes, it is like asking the fox to look after the chickens.

[English]

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): I would like to interrupt for a minute. We're short of time, but your testimony is very good, so if you could just move ahead and sort of give us a summary....

Mr. Daniel Green: Very well.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Green: Here is my second recommendation. The SVP recommends that the Parliament of Canada amend the Canada Shipping Act with a view to setting up a national oil spill response organization made up of non-profit response corporations, and I stress that point.

• 1005

It is appalling for response corporations to make money. Even in the United States, the capitalist stronghold, the Marine Spills Response Corporation is a non-profit corporation. There are private corporations, but there are also non-profit corporations.

So non-profit corporations, shipowners, oil companies, the Coast Guard, the departments of the Environment, the protection emergency preparedness services and interested environmental groups could be members. The national agency would be financed through a fair rate and it would distribute, in contract form, the amounts of money required by non-profit response corporations. We recommend the creation of a group of response volunteers. We also recommend that research and development on oil be conducted.

I will go directly to the recommendations. It says in the Auditor General's report that the coast guard is currently analyzing response plans submitted by these private corporations. The regulations stipulate that these response organizations must provide the minister with a copy of their response plans.

The Coast Guard is evaluating these response plans, in 1998. I recommend that the committee ask the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to immediately make public the response plans submitted by the response organizations. I also recommend that you ask the Minister to allow public consultations on these plans, so that all interested Canadian citizens, who enjoy the waterways near their homes, can get involved by commenting on and critiquing the plan.

There are five recommendations, and I am on the fourth. The SVP would ask the committee to undertake negotiations or rather to tell Canadian people what may happen in the event of a major spill. A myth currently exists: if there is a spill, we will be able to clean the birds. Scientific research on ecotoxicology shows that this is not true, that the survival rate of cleaned up birds is minimal.

I think it would be important to stop leading Canadians to believe that we would be able to save the snow geese in the event of a major spill in the St. Lawrence River during the time they migrate through the area.

I think that the Canadian Wildlife Service—who knows—is morally and ethically required to tell Canadian citizens that in the event of a major spill on our shores, thousands of birds would be covered in oil and die. Instead of cleaning them and having them die after that, it would be more humane to euthanise them.

The problem is that the public might well call it murder. Science has revealed that we do not currently have the means to save them. So instead of leaving them to a terrible death once we have so-called cleaned them up, it would be better to prepare the public for the disaster that would ensue, for the massive number of birds that would die despite our clean up efforts. That is why we need to invest more in technology and training volunteers to keep the birds away. Hazing is the key to preventing wildlife from dying. At present, unfortunately, there is not enough...

[English]

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Excuse me. What does “hazing” mean?

Mr. Daniel Green: “Hazing”?

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Yes. It's a term that's come up a couple of times.

Mr. Daniel Green: To “haze” means to scare the birds away so they will not come into physical contact with the slick.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Thank you.

Mr. Daniel Green: The technologies that are used are very people-dependent and people-intensive, and we need the people to do that. That's why it's important.

[Translation]

Here is the last recommendation. There is a lot of talk about oil spill response, but we forget that preparation for a response begins ahead of time and continues after. The Canadian system currently provides for very little discussion, prevention, and identification of vulnerable areas. It is included in the regulations, but we are not convinced that the response corporations are really doing it.

• 1010

Moreover, we are not convinced that the regulations are strict enough to force response corporations to ensure there is follow-up once the spill has been cleaned up. I had the opportunity to go to Prince William Sound where the Exxon Valdez ran aground. I went to the beach that Exxon had cleaned. I didn't bring them here, but I have about 20 bottles of oil that I collected on the beach that had been cleaned in Prince William Sound after the Exxon Valdez accident. That proves that the oil comes back later, after the site has been cleaned.

So in the event of a spill, companies must be forced to provide environmental follow-up, that can last up to 10 years after the spill. That must be set out clearly in the regulations.

That concludes my remarks.

[English]

I am finished, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Sorry for that.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Green: I would simply like to make one final comment. You undoubtedly notice typos and errors in my text. I tried to correct them quickly on the bus. I apologize for having massacred the French language. Rest assured that I will have the necessary corrections made, and I will send you a copy that is free of any grammatical mistake. Thank you.

[English]

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): I'd like to thank you for your testimony. I think we're now dealing with the meat of the issue.

We go to Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Caccia.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln (Lac-Saint-Louis, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I think this is a really important session. In fact there's so much here I hope we can find time to continue it some other time.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): The clerk tells me we can come back to the room after the vote.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: I'd like to deal with two subjects, if I may. I'm looking at the auditor general's report, on page 35-27, “Environment Canada—Managing the Legacy of Hazardous Wastes”, where it refers to the 1995 report saying the government didn't have adequate information on federal contaminated sites to report to Parliament on the health and environmental risks and clean-up costs. We see a familiar trend there. As soon as pressure happens, what do we do? We form two committees this time. So we have two committees looking at it.

The EAP Sub-committee has developed a draft general policy on contaminated sites, which is currently under discussion; however, it has not established any departmental deadlines, including one for the implementation of the inventory template.

The auditor general goes on to say:

We concluded that accurate and complete summary data of departmental inventories and estimated costs, both by departments and centrally, will likely not be available for some time.

He says:

The government continues to disagree with us over the need for an action plan to complete the assessment and remediation of all federal contaminated sites; ... We continue to believe that a federal government action plan is required to ensure that the job gets done....

Finally, in paragraph 35.110 it says:

Environment Canada has committed itself to providing a report to Parliament in 1997...on PCB destruction and the risks and costs associated with the remaining federal PCBs. At 30 May 1997, the report had not been drafted, nor was there a target date for its completion.

I'd like to ask the representative of Environment Canada, number one, where are we—

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Mr. Lincoln, people are starting to leave. There's a half hour bell before the vote. I don't know if that's where people are going.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: The vote hasn't been called yet.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): It hasn't been called and there's a half hour bell, so we'll just keep going. Don't leave.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: So I wanted to ask the representative of Environment Canada when the EAP subcommittee going to finish its work. If not, what is the deadline for it being finished? Why is the federal government fighting the idea of an action plan recommended by the auditor general? Finally, where is that PCB report? What is the new target date for its completion? It was supposed to be completed last year.

• 1015

Mr. Ian McGregor: Mr. Chairman, I'm afraid I must apologize to the committee. I don't have that information. I believe Mr. Lincoln is referring to contaminated sites information.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: Yes.

Mr. Ian McGregor: I'm sorry. I don't have information on contaminated sites with me. I just did not prepare for that. I understood that was for a later date.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: Have you any information on the PCB report?

Mr. Ian McGregor: I'm sorry, sir, I do not.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: Is there any way we could get somebody from Environment Canada to send us this information in order to get answers to these three questions?

Mr. Ian McGregor: My understanding, sir, is that there's a session next week on contaminated sites.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: I see. All right.

On the other issue of the oil spills, is it fair to say, as put forward by Mr. Green—and I'll ask this of Mr. Gratwick or whoever wants to respond—that these five response organizations created after 1993, when the coast guard was devoluted of its responsibilities, are creatures of the oil companies? In effect, then, is it fair to say, as Mr. Green pointed out, that the polluter actually controls the response and is in a conflict of interest and that therefore the fox really is looking after the chickens?

Mr. John Gratwick: It is true that the response organizations are wholly owned by the oil companies. They are subsidiary companies of different consortia of oil companies across the country. But I think we should be very careful here: their job under this process, their function, is to provide the capability for dealing with oil spills. They are not in charge of the oil spill response and they never will be. In fact, I think it specifies in the legislation that they are not to be the managers of a spill. They are the providers of equipment and possibly of service to whoever it is that's cleaning up the spill.

So to that extent the job they're doing is the provision of the physical equipment and facilities, and for that they are charging fees. Their fees have nothing to do with the clean-up of a specific spill. If they're called upon, they will provide the equipment and they will then charge for that use at the time of a spill. The fee structure they're asking for at the moment is purely for maintaining the facility.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: But don't you feel that there's a complete conflict of interest in having them involved at all in view of the fact that their parent companies have created the spills themselves and are the potential polluters? Don't you see that as really wrong?

Mr. John Gratwick: I think the present arrangement we have is not appropriate; I would put it that way. We should face up to the fact that the oil companies themselves were in this business of cleaning up. They've always had the capability of cleaning up. They had their own organization. What they have done is to sell their equipment to these new companies.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: Right.

Mr. John Gratwick: But in that sense, they still have the same indirect responsibility.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: Except that since 1993 the coast guard has devoluted its control to these response companies.

Mr. John Gratwick: Yes, for the part of the preparedness system that these oil companies provide through the ROs. It has not devoluted its responsibilities for its own equipment. Eventually it is the coast guard that generally manages oil spills. They then call on or draw on what resources they need for that job, whether those resources come from an RO, from a private operator, or from their own resources.

• 1020

I think I should probably leave Mr. Turner to—

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: Before that, may I ask if it is true that the legislation today provides for clean-up up to a capacity of 10,000 tonnes?

Mr. John Gratwick: The ROs, under the standards the coast guard laid down, were required to have at the tier 4 level, which they are all at, equipment that would be capable of handling spills up to 10,000 tonnes.

I think that's a very false sort of precision because no spill is neat and tidy; they may not have enough equipment for a spill in certain circumstances, even if it's only a 5,000-tonne spill. You may have plenty for a 50,000-tonne spill, depending on the way in which things happen.

That's a rough guide.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: I know. As Mr. Green pointed out, in my own area, in my own riding, there are ships travelling every day in the seaway that are many times 10,000 tonnes.

Mr. John Gratwick: Oh, yes.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: Isn't it crazy to be asking for a capacity of 10,000 tonnes when we know that 10,000 tonnes is the exception rather than the rule and that these ships are 60,000 tonnes, 70,000 tonnes, 80,000 tonnes?

Mr. John Gratwick: No, because if you have a fully integrated system you would naturally call on all the equipment, not only from Canada but in a very major spill we would be taking equipment from Southampton in Britain and so on. It's what the world does, I think. Australia is a fairly large country. They have only one place for their equipment, one central base, and they fan it out if and when it's required.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: But isn't it true that major industrial countries have control through their coast guards or their equivalents, so that we have started a regime here of complete devolution in Canada that is different from Australia and Great Britain? Is that correct?

Mr. John Gratwick: Yes, that's true.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: So what we did is to devolve, not because it was better—because the models show that these other countries have retained their control—but really because we decided we wanted to again cut costs at the expense of environmental protection.

Mr. John Gratwick: I'm not sure that's quite fair, because I think the capability we now have is up to the standard we were aiming for. We have the equipment and resources. What we are still arguing about is who pays for it and how they pay for it. I don't think we would have anything different if it were all under the coast guard's control, in terms of the amount of equipment. What we're arguing about is how in fact a portion of this response equipment is to be paid for.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: I must admit I find it curious that other countries, if our model is so great, have decided to stay with their own public control. Also, I think the auditor general pointed out that we don't have any legislation at all in regard to chemical spills yet. Is that correct?

Mr. John Gratwick: I'm not sure.

Mr. Michael Turner: Perhaps I might respond, sir, to the questions and just take the last one first. There is legislation that responds to chemical spills, but it is general in nature; it is not specific to chemicals. What we need to do is to have a much more specific regime that will address the capability of specialized equipment and techniques that are necessary and give the authorities that are necessary to the people who have that capability to be able to intervene in the case of a spill.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: What are we doing about this? The auditor general says we have to do it. Do we have this legislation ready now?

Mr. Michael Turner: We do not have enabling legislation ready to give effect to the changes we think will be needed at this stage because we are still in the process of a negotiation and discussion with the various industry components as to how best to bring this together.

A steering committee, including Environment Canada, the Department of Transport, and ourselves, working with the Canadian Petroleum Producers Association and MIACC—of which Mr. Bélanger, as the chair, has already spoken—are working together to develop a system and determine whether there are in fact legislative changes necessary to allow the capability in Canada to be brought to bear on a specific chemical spill.

Perhaps I may turn to the questions you raised on the oil pollution side, sir. I think there may be some misconception in some quarters as to the extent of devolution of the coast guard's responsibilities.

• 1025

What is absolutely correct is that the government of the day felt it was not in a position to invest heavily in additional government-owned and -held response capability and equipment and was therefore seeking a method whereby the private sector would do that. The oil companies, who are the major shareholders, took what effectively were cost centres, in the sense of their cooperative arrangements for dealing with oil spills, turned them into response organizations with a commercial mandate, as envisaged in the legislation, and significantly increased their capability, thereby making that capability available to all parties who must respond when a spill occurs. The way Canadian law provides, though, is inconsistent with the international regime, that is, the polluter who is responsible for the immediate response and organization of a response.

What normally happens in the shipping case is the ship that causes the problem must respond by calling its local organization—the response organization with which it has an arrangement or contract of some form—and bringing in other staff immediately. Failing that and failing quick action on its part, the coast guard itself automatically will intervene. In the case of oil spills, the coast guard reserves the right, and in fact has the responsibility, to oversee the response to the spill by the private sector, in other words by the shipowner's representatives.

Normally for a large spill—and I'll try to keep this very brief—experts from the Protection & Indemnity Club for the shipowners would immediately come to the scene to assist in the direction of on-site spill clean-up efforts. The coast guard would continue with the advice it obtained from Environment Canada and its own fisheries and oceans scientific people and provincial government agencies, and so on, to supervise or oversee that clean-up. It retains the authority and the capability to intervene or take over if necessary at any point.

In the event of a spill that exceeds certain thresholds in international law, which are essentially financial thresholds associated with limitation of liability, the coast guard, on behalf of the crown, essentially takes over the management directly and completely. The response organizations provide an equipment storehouse capability to assist with a response. They are perhaps somewhat misnamed; it might have been better to have termed them preparedness organizations.

As Mr. Gratwick has indicated, the issue isn't so much whether or not we've increased preparedness as whether we have it organized correctly, there are sufficient mechanisms in place that ensure the government is able to bring all of this together quickly as required, and it is a regime that is fair and equitable to the various players.

The major oil companies own the response organizations or companies that hold the equipment. They are also the major bill payers for the regime, because roughly 87% of the oil that is moved and therefore the cost of the regime falls back on the actual companies who set up and own those response organizations.

The objections essentially are from the smaller groups, the independents and some other commercial operators and so-called oil-handling facilities, who are not amongst the shareholders, as opposed to the shareholders who are themselves paying the vast majority of the costs.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: When you talk about fair and equitable to the players, I don't know whether you include the people at large and the fauna and everything. I wonder who speaks for them.

I was wondering what you would say to Mr. Green's idea that instead of companies owned by the oil companies—and I think there's a definite conflict of interest—there should be non-profit companies and a massive volunteer system to back them up.

Mr. Michael Turner: The question of whether the organizations are for profit or not for profit is certainly one we intend to examine over the next few months as part of the governance options and the consultation that will be taking place with all the parties. That is certainly an option.

The question of increased use of volunteers has always been one we support. The question really relates to how big, how much, how expensive, and how effective large groups of so-called volunteers are, because volunteers usually end up wanting to be paid for their volunteering.

We have made efforts in some regions, however, to have a community focus on shoreline clean-up and identification of sensitive sites. We are finding that to be a very effective approach with the assistance of our friends in the government, including Environment Canada.

• 1030

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Mr. Caccia.

Mr. Charles Caccia (Davenport, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I think we have to watch the time, but I will be glad to start at least. We have at the most 10 minutes to get into this thing.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): It's a half hour bell and we're not into the 15-minute part yet.

Mr. Charles Caccia: Mr. Chairman, what is emerging here this morning is rather distressing, if not appalling. The slowness of the system in coming to grips with this issue would make arthritic turtles look very fast.

I would take you to page 35-11 of the auditor general's report. From that we learn that way back in 1990 there was a report of the public review panel that was highly critical of the preparedness for oil spills. Then we learn about the regional design and the recommendation in 1990 that an investment of $150 million be made over five years.

We come to October 1991. Treasury Board approves an increase of $100 million over six years. In 1993 we have the coast guard being provided with $15.9 million, and Environment Canada provides $1.2 million towards marine oil spills. This is just under that heading. I'm still on page 35-11.

Then you move to the next page and you learn that in 1993 a decision was made between two approaches; namely, a partnership approach was chosen in order to deal with Canada's oil spills. Then we learn—and we heard it also this morning from Mr. Turner or Mr. Gratwick—that in September 1995 the fees proposed in 1995 were published in the Canada Gazette. Then in March 1996 the Minister of Fisheries announced an investigation into the fairness and equity of the proposed fees. We heard it before.

Then we have a panel submitting a report in August 1996, as Mr. Gratwick indicates in his letter today. We learn that the Canada Shipping Act requires the minister to review the capability of response organizations, but that to make an assessment of the adequacy of the current Canadian oil spills response regime, the Canadian Coast Guard would have to carry out a review to verify the oil spills response capacity. Without such a review the coast guard cannot conclude that the response capability of oil spills is satisfactory.

I suppose the number one question, Mr. Turner, is that it is a year and a half since the report was submitted to the minister. When will a decision be made on the eleven recommendations?

Mr. Michael Turner: On the eleven recommendations of the Gold report, the panel's report, the decisions will be made over the coming months as a result of the consultation process.

Mr. Charles Caccia: No, don't give us this vague bureaucratic answer. A year and a half has gone by. Can you tell this committee with precision when you will make a decision?

Mr. Michael Turner: No, sir.

Mr. Charles Caccia: Why not?

Mr. Michael Turner: Because the decision will likely require a decision with respect to legislation, which will have to be made by cabinet and of course thence by Parliament.

Mr. Charles Caccia: When are you going to cabinet?

Mr. Michael Turner: I expect within the coming months. The exact schedule will depend upon—

Mr. Charles Caccia: Which month?

Mr. Michael Turner: I cannot tell you that, sir, because—

Mr. Charles Caccia: The coming month is March.

Mr. Michael Turner: That's correct.

Mr. Charles Caccia: Would you say March?

Mr. Michael Turner: I cannot, sir.

Mr. Charles Caccia: You cannot. Did you say the coming month or coming months?

Mr. Michael Turner: Months. It will be months, sir.

Mr. Charles Caccia: Which months?

Mr. Michael Turner: It is not possible for me to say which months, sir, because the cabinet committee schedule is not within our control.

Mr. Charles Caccia: It is not within your control, but when will you submit your proposal to the minister? In which months?

Mr. Michael Turner: Our expectation is that we will be in a position to submit the proposals to the minister on the governance options in June.

Mr. Charles Caccia: How do you explain that by June it will have taken you two years to make a submission to the minister? Why two years?

• 1035

Mr. Michael Turner: First, I must point out, sir, that whether or not we make a submission to the minister on this issue has not affected the fact that the oil spill response capability is in place. This dispute has been about the fees and the overall management of the system.

Mr. Charles Caccia: Then why do you make a submission to the minister?

Mr. Michael Turner: Because we want to improve the system, and we agree—

Mr. Charles Caccia: Then it leaves something to be desired, doesn't it?

Mr. Michael Turner: That is correct.

Mr. Charles Caccia: Keep the focus on the desirability of the measure, please, will you?

Mr. Michael Turner: We do agree, it is desirable to make improvements in the system. We have been attempting, over the past year plus, to come to a resolution with respect to the various objectives and groups to see if it was possible to accommodate, to the extent possible, the issues that have been raised within the existing statutory framework without the necessity of bringing this back to Parliament.

It is clear to us, certainly, and I believe there is certainly some consensus among the objectors, if not other groups, that the scope of changes that are going to be necessary in order to give effect not only to the recommendations but also to the kinds of improvements that are generally felt to be necessary are going to, or will likely, require statutory amendments.

Mr. Charles Caccia: Of course. We know that. That is nothing new.

Mr. Michael Turner: No, that's correct, sir.

Mr. Charles Caccia: Moving on quickly, could you tell us why the coast guard does not maintain a database on incidents, as reported by the auditor general?

Mr. Michael Turner: To the extent that we are able to, within existing resources, we do maintain a database on any of the spills reported to us.

Mr. Charles Caccia: So is the auditor general wrong?

Mr. Michael Turner: The auditor general always uses words with considerable precision. We do not have a global database—

Mr. Charles Caccia: Is he right or is he wrong?

Mr. Michael Turner: He is correct that we do not have a global database for all spills.

Mr. Charles Caccia: He is correct. So why do you not maintain a database?

Mr. Michael Turner: Because, sir, we do not have either the sources to do so—

Mr. Charles Caccia: You were given $150 million six years ago.

Mr. Michael Turner: That's correct. That, however, was not on an ongoing basis. It was over a period of six years.

Mr. Charles Caccia: That is not a minor sum, is it?

Mr. Michael Turner: It certainly is not. The money was used to improve Canada's response capability, however.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Do you want to explain the database you do keep?

Mr. Michael Turner: The database we do keep, sir, is based upon those reports or incidents reported through our operation centres. We share that with Environment Canada. Any reports that are forwarded to us, or any incidents that come to our knowledge by way of either Environment's reports or through our own departments, or from provincial governments, are logged in our database. We are attempting to improve the usefulness or utility of that database to be able to better analyse information and make sense of it.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): As a point of information, I'm told we do not have the room much longer, so we have to finish up. We are now into the 15-minute version. Ms. Vautour has some questions, and there is a brief motion we need to deal with.

Mr. Caccia, perhaps I could ask for a brief question.

Mr. Charles Caccia: Mr. Chairman, I will try to be as brief as I can on this, but I regret very much not being able to continue this line of questioning.

As we have been informed, and as we all know, the CEPA legislation is going to come before Parliament again. This is legislation that requires an intense knowledge of the legislation itself, if you like, and what has happened until now. Therefore, a comparative study of the legislation, for old and new members, would be extremely helpful. By that I mean a comparative study in a schematic short form whereby you have before you a comparison of the present legislation, or CEPA 1988, the committee report's recommendations, the response of the government, and Bill C-74.

These are four separate, major documents, the knowledge of which is necessary if you want to embark, in an intelligent, knowledgeable manner, on an examination of the bill that will be introduced in Parliament in a few weeks.

Do you follow me? It seems to me it would be in our own interest, in order to conduct an intelligent review of the bill that is yet to come, to have four columns—or five, whatever it is—dealing with each of these separate documents and their main points, and how they differ from each other.

We would be comparing the 1988 legislation, the committee report's recommendations, the government response, and then Bill C-74 on the assumption that there will not be much difference between Bill C-74 and what will be introduced in the House.

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To conduct such a study, it's extremely difficult to find people who know the subject. There are two experts here in Ottawa, and I have approached them and asked them to give us an estimate. They've given us that estimate for this kind of study for the committee, and for the committee only. It would cost around $4,500 to conduct this study for us and to provide it to the members of the committee, so I'm asking whether or not the committee members would be willing to approve such an expenditure in order to secure this knowledge very soon.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): Why don't we take a motion?

Mr. Charles Caccia: Let's first hear what they have to say. We haven't had a chance to discuss it unofficially.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: Before we pass that motion, I guess we would have to know how much the government listens to the committee report on Bill C-74.

Mr. Charles Caccia: Wait to see how Parliament responds, yes.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: I would not be thrilled to spend $4,500 or whatever only to have the government ignore what we put forward in a report. Perhaps you could tell us how far our last report went, if the government listened, and if the money will be well spent?

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): The point of the simple schematic is to help us with what amendments we want to bring when we get the new CEPA. It's not so much that we would do a report, but more to give us information. Maybe there's something you really believed in when you did the original report, and you'll see that it's not there in the legislation. That report would spell it out quickly. It's a tool to help us devise our amendments. That's where I see the value of it, and not so much in terms of it going into a report per se.

Can we get a motion, say, limited to $5,000 to hire...what was the name of the company again?

Mr. Charles Caccia: With your permission, I would recommend the following motion: That the committee enter into a contract with Resources Futures International—these are the experts—for a period not exceeding seven days, in an amount not to exceed $699 a day, for the purpose of assisting the committee with an analysis of the existing CEPA legislation, the committee's report, the government response, and the Bill C-74 legislation, which died in the last Parliament; plus, an analysis also of the toxic waste policy that was announced in 1994.

(Motion agreed to)

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): I apologize. Did you want to ask a brief question?

Ms. Angela Vautour (Beauséjour—Petitcodiac, NDP): I'll make it very brief, because I certainly want to be part of that vote.

I had all kinds of questions and comments, but it is sad to see how the oil companies can create such a mess in this country and how Environment Canada has really no stand against them. As I say, there are proposals that I will be submitting to the committee, because there is so much here.

I would like to know from any one of you what your feeling is, for example, if a sub-fee for specific responses was put together—say, 5% of the oil-wildlife...of the response organizations—to be put aside specifically for wildlife response. Can somebody tell me if that's a good idea. If it's not, why? I see it as a big job creation factor in-region, because we see a lot of the response is being taken by other countries and not by Canadians.

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Mr. Michael Turner: The present legislation does not provide the authority for us to make that kind of internal allocation, in other words to require that response organizations set aside a certain percentage to be directed to an organization, for example, to deal with cleaning up wildlife. I might also just point out that one of the previous witnesses has commented on the recent studies indicating the lack of effectiveness of such interventions. You may wish to consider those comments as well.

The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Gar Knutson): It is an important issue. I feel badly that it has been interrupted by the distraction of the bells and the votes. I want to thank everyone for coming and making best efforts to work through this. Perhaps we'll revisit the issue.

The meeting is adjourned.