ENSU Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, October 22, 1998

• 0905

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Charles Caccia (Davenport, Lib.)): Order.

Proceeding with a timely subject, namely the preparatory work leading to the Buenos Aires meeting on climate change, I wonder whether the commissioner for environment and sustainable development, Mr. Emmett, would like to introduce himself, his group, and other colleagues who are at the head table here this morning. Then you may indicate in which sequence you would like to proceed.

Welcome to the committee.

Mr. Brian Emmett (Commissioner of Environment and Sustainable Development, Office of the Auditor General of Canada): Mr. Chairman, I'm here today with Ellen Shillabeer, Wayne Cluskey, and other members of the Auditor General's office.

• 0910

Mr. David Oulton (Head, Federal Climate Change Secretariat): Perhaps we could just go along, Mr. Chairman, if you don't mind. I'm David Oulton and I'm with the federal climate change secretariat. I'll let each of the individuals from other departments represent themselves. But I should mention that Ann Marie Smart, who is director general of climate change with Environment Canada, is with me.

Mr. Jim Wall (Director General, International Relations, Environment Canada): Good morning, Mr. Chairman. My name is Jim Wall. I'm the director general for international relations at Environment Canada. I'll be joined in a few minutes by some other experts from our department. Thank you.

Ms. Sue Kirby (Director General, Energy Policy Branch, Energy Sector, Natural Resources Canada): I'm Sue Kirby. I'm director general of energy policy at Natural Resources Canada, and the colleague I have with me is Mr. Nick Marty, who is from our office of energy efficiency.

Mr. John Sargent (Senior Adviser to the Deputy Minister, Department of Finance): I'm John Sargent, Department of Finance, deputy minister's office.

Mr. Robert Hornung (Director, Climate Change, Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development): Good morning, Mr. Chairman. My name is Robert Hornung. I'm the climate change program director at the Pembina Institute.

Mr. Richard D. Ballhorn (Director General, International Environmental Affairs Branch, Foreign Affairs and International Trade): I am Richard Ballhorn. I'm director general of environment at Foreign Affairs and International Trade. And I have with me my experts, Sushma Geram and David Drake, the new director of our climate change division.

The Chairman: Fine, thank you.

Who would like to start? Mr. Emmett, please go ahead.

Mr. Brian Emmett: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity of being here today to sequel climate change, which was one of the key chapters of the report I tabled in May of this year.

I'll speak quite briefly to the contents of that report. We took as our starting point the federal government's own assessment of the consequences of climate change, which indicates they will be potentially severe for Canada. According to the government's own projections, every region of the country and every sector will be affected, especially agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.

The environment and the health of Canadians may be seriously impacted. The government has therefore concluded the problem is real and serious and warrants immediate precautionary action.

[Translation]

The focus of our chapter in May was on Canada's domestic commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. We noted that Canada was not on track to meet these commitments. We wanted to examine why.

[English]

Our work showed that in attempting to act on its commitments, the federal government had not applied sound management principles. Of the 19 elements we described as key to effective management, our review found only three had been fully completed. I've provided a table with the written opening statement to the clerk for further reference.

It's little wonder the government itself was estimating in May of this year that Canada would miss its year 2000 target by roughly 11%.

In reviewing these management principles, we found no clear assignment of roles and responsibilities, no national communications plan, no implementation plan, limited provision for regular monitoring of results, and no summary level reporting to Parliament.

There were no written agreements with other levels of government or with other partners on the contributions they would make. In essence, no real partnership was ever set up to deliver on the promises made to Canadians and to the international community.

The federal government had failed to devise an acceptable means by which it could be held responsible for its leadership in responding to climate change. Establishing responsibility was further complicated by the absence of a clearly designated party to take the federal lead.

[Translation]

Canada's problem does not appear to be a lack of ideas about what should be done, but a lack of agreement on a broad national portfolio of practical measures designed to achieve specific targets.

Our recommendations call for a fundamental rethinking of the federal government's approach to climate change, one that places as much emphasis on implementation and sound management as it does on innovative and visionary policy. Failure to meet its goal of stabilizing emissions in the year 2000 has put Canada in a difficult position to meet the more challenging goal agreed to at Kyoto. An effective management structure is badly needed.

• 0915

[English]

These are very big challenges, and I'm very much aware of how hard the government and its officials are working on these issues. It does trouble me that the departments did not provide specific responses to each of the 11 recommendations we made. Thus, there is still no clear commitment to rectify the deficiencies we identified. This gives the impression that the environment does not warrant the same attention to management fundamentals and due diligence that would be expected of any business partnership.

Climate change has continued to be the subject of intense activity, both in Canada and internationally. There have been many developments that my colleagues are better aware of than I. For example, Canada assigned the Kyoto Protocol, committing us to reduce emissions to 6% below 1990 levels in the period 2008 to 2012. As recently as this week, federal, provincial and territorial ministers of the environment and energy met to coordinate their efforts.

Nevertheless, the underlying realities remain unchanged. Canada's greenhouse emissions are continuing to increase. By the year 2000, Canadians will be facing a formidable challenge in trying to meet their new goals. Unless significant progress is made in responding to the problems we identified in May, Canada will not have the tools to meet its commitments.

[Translation]

There have been many promises to respond to climate change, but promises are not enough to get the job done. Now is the time for concrete and meaningful action to close the implementation gap. The federal government has a responsibility to protect the interests of all Canadians.

[English]

Our work on climate change is a continuing effort. We began with the chapter on energy efficiency initiatives in Natural Resources Canada, published in April 1997. Work to be presented in my own May 2000 report is well under way, where we are examining the extent to which energy sources in Canada have a level playing field. We are also working on a major report on air pollution and smog. In the year 2000 we will begin to revisit climate change on a normal cycle, including an examination of the proposed national implementation strategy when it is ready.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We would be pleased to answer any questions you or the committee may have.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Emmett.

It is important that members of the Environment and Sustainable Development Committee have a clear understanding of the problems associated with meeting the target set by the Government of Canada for reducing greenhouse gas emission. I hope that in his presentation, Mr. Oulton can provide us with some details about the actions he intends to take with a view to meeting this target.

Please proceed, Mr. Oulton.

[English]

Mr. David Oulton: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If I could, I'd ask everyone if they would turn to the deck. The front page is titled “The National Process: Working Together Toward a National Implementation Strategy”. I would like to quickly walk through that. I'll wait until everyone has their copies.

Mr. Chairman, I would also note that, as I will mention in the deck, ministers of energy and environment met in Halifax on Monday and Tuesday. A package of materials on the outcome of those meetings has been provided to the committee, as well as the announcement of the climate change action fund, which was done in Halifax on Monday.

Please turn to page one of the deck and look at the slide “What is the Climate Change Secretariat?”. It speaks very succinctly to the mandate that we have as a national climate change secretariat, and that is to put together a national implementation strategy with the provinces and territories, including stakeholder consultation, by the fall of 1999.

We're not, as a secretariat, duplicating the work of other federal departments. We're acting as a focal point for putting together the federal input into the national implementation strategy, and indeed we're trying to ensure that the federal government is able to take a consistent and coordinated approach to climate change in its contribution to the national implementation strategy.

The secretariat, as a result, reports to the deputy ministers of the two departments whose ministers have the lead responsibilities—that is, Natural Resources and Environment Canada. Our focus is primarily on the domestic implementation strategy, but we also look to see that our international negotiations are well informed by the progress we're making on our domestic strategy.

• 0920

If we could turn to slide two, the commissioner alluded to the challenge that we're facing because of Canada having negotiated a minus six during the Kyoto discussions last December. This just characterizes the nature of that challenge. In the 1990 baseline year we had total emissions of 599 megatons of greenhouse gas emissions, and that's CO₂ equivalent.

If you look at the target, minus six, that would be equivalent to 563 megatons. If you recall, relatively recently in the last two months, there was a report indicating our inventories of greenhouse gases for 1996 and that put them at 671 megatons or approximately a 12% increase over the 1990 baseline.

And if you look at the business as usual projections that have been made—in other words, with no other policy changes—that would take us to emissions in 2010, the mid-year of the commitment period, of between 700 and 750 megatons, and current forecasts are closer to the high end of that range. In other words, the national implementation strategy will need to put together options that would allow us to reduce our potential emissions by as much as 185 megatons or roughly 25%. So that's the nature of the challenge we have in putting together a strategy.

Moving to slide three, when the Kyoto was negotiated, you will recall that there was concern raised by some provinces as a result of the negotiations. It happened that first ministers were meeting at the time, and what came out of that was a discussion on climate change where there was clear direction and it really forms the basis for the national secretariat's work.

In essence, it allowed the federal government, with the provinces, to say yes, we are going to take concerted action to put together a national implementation strategy. It also laid down some markers about the quality or characteristics of that strategy. It said it needs to be a strategy that does not put unusual or unreasonable burdens on any particular region of the country.

It needs to be based on a full understanding of the options that are available to Canada and their full costs and benefits, and we need to do this during the process that we are doing the evaluation for our ratification of the protocol, and the process must provide for the full participation of provinces and territories in a joint management of the process.

The energy and environment ministers have been entrusted with managing this process and reporting back to first ministers at the end of 1999.

If we turn to page 4, it's a quick sketch of the national climate change process. It is very much a joint venture between the federal government and the provinces. It was set up in April 1998 when energy and environment ministers met to respond to the first ministers' charge.

In essence, what they did was establish an overall process that was going to engage both governments and stakeholders in an examination jointly over the next year and a half from April forward of both the costs and benefits of options that could be used in order to meet our climate change obligations coming out of Kyoto.

The principal instrument that ministers decided to use was a concept called “issue tables”, which I'll elaborate more on later. They also indicated that they want to keep close tabs on the process and meet periodically to evaluate its progress, and therefore they just held a meeting in October in Halifax to review our status. And I'll talk more about that in a minute.

The fifth page of the deck talks about why are we in an inclusive process. Basically, it lays down the essential points that when you're dealing with climate change the nature of the problem is very much one that is going to require us to use tools by all levels of government, federal, provincial and municipal-regional. It's going to engage, if you will, all jurisdictions and their powers.

It clearly is an issue that will affect all Canadians in its solution and action is going to be required not only by governments, not only by the private sector, but also of individual Canadians to follow through if we are going to meet our obligations. Therefore, the premise we were basing this on was that if we are going to come up with an implementation strategy, it should be one that has benefited from a thorough review by provinces, territories, other levels of government, and Canadians, before we put it to ministers.

• 0925

Turning to page 6, I mentioned that the core concept of the process was using issue tables. It's based on having groups of experts.

[Translation]

They are generally groups of 25 to 35 people with expertise in a given horizontal or sectoral subject area. Participation on each Table reflects a cross-section of perspectives.

Their role is to provide advice to the federal, provincial and territorial governments. Their main tasks are to scope out the issue area and to work through the various options available for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Almost as a by-product of this work, they have also been asked to identify early action opportunities and innovative ideas for public outreach.

Finally, the Tables themselves have a responsibility to share their work with a broader constituency of experts and with other Canadians.

[English]

The issue tables that we've set-up are provided in slide seven. We basically used two concepts. One is vertical, if you will, dividing the economy up into key sectors and focusing particularly on those areas where we needed to develop solutions to climate change issues. You can see that they run the gamut from agriculture and agrifood through to transportation and the electricity sector, along with a broad industry sector that covers all of the other areas of the economy. Similarly we looked at horizontal mechanisms that would develop tools that would cut across these industry sectors. They range from public education and outreach, to analysis and modelling, to technology and international flexibility mechanisms. All told, there are about fifteen tables, and we're currently in the process of looking at a sixteenth which could possibly look at domestic emissions trading as a possible mechanism.

Turning to slide eight, some would argue that climate change has been around as a government issue at least since 1988. One of the things we've tried to address is what's new about this process and what's going to make this process successful. As you might have concluded from the commissioner's report, previous processes were not successful.

First of all, we have given very clear mandates by using issue tables. Also included are very specific deliverables on a very clear timeline. In other words, we've assigned clear responsibility to those tables for preparing analyses on options, and those timelines will be met.

Secondly, we've tried to engage not only representatives in the tables, but also experts. The tables could therefore have expert discussion and benefit from expert perspectives in the analysis that they brought forward.

We've also said that while we wish to know what options there is a consensus around, we would also want to see all options developed. We've said that because we've found in previous experiences that consensus meant you got lowest-common-denominator work. What we wanted to see was all work.

Finally, we've also said we want to look at all benefits and costs. People are aware that one criticism of previous analyses has been that work had been done on cost, but relatively little work had been done on the benefits of taking action. We've therefore asked that the tables look at the benefits. We've also said that when analysis is being done, the focus should not only be on the economic parts—those have indeed been a focus in the past—but should also be on environmental, social and health benefits and costs of the options being put forward.

We also said to the tables that work should not be confined just to the 25 or 35 people around the table. Instead, peer groups should be engaged and consulted so that what is brought forward to the process is going to have a fuller review from the outside public than just the members around the table.

Finally, these tables have been well resourced in terms of ensuring that they can hire the expertise and support they need in order to be able to do the work they're going to do between now and May of next year.

I mentioned that the process is very much a joint venture between the federal government and the provinces. We've set up a national secretariat that is both co-managed and co-resourced by the federal government and the provinces. Provincial people and federal people are working side by side on this endeavour. All told, we now have about 450 people in the tables who are directly engaged in doing the work of preparing the analysis.

• 0930

On page 10 it outlines briefly what the tables have been asked to produce. The first product is due at the end of this month. It's something that we've called a foundation paper. It's really a tool that tries to have the tables pull together the key analysis that was available in their area, and to ensure that the table was operating as a team before we get to what is the real chef-d'oeuvre of the table, which is the options paper.

For the options paper, we've given them from November through to the end of May to prepare options after looking at the benefits and costs and the full range of options from environmental, health and economic perspectives, as I mentioned before. We've also asked them to ensure that they do a good evaluation of the emissions potential of all of the options they're looking at, and that they look at the overall competitiveness and other economic implications of the options that we should put in, both from a positive perspective as well as a negative. They should also indicate where options need further study. We've asked them to do a full work-up, and to then take the time in the latter part of next winter to do some further peer review and possible consultations on the options that they're going to bring forward.

Finally, I mentioned that the ministers had met in Halifax. We have provided you with some materials on the outcome of that meeting. The purpose of that meeting essentially was to provide a checkpoint. It allowed the ministers to first of all assess the process that had been put in place as it was conceived and approved by them in April. Secondly, it allowed them to start putting in motion early actions. The federal government therefore announced some early actions, particularly in the area of climate science, adaptation, public education and outreach. It also allowed ministers to basically set the course for the work that will be done over the next year.

Finally, on slide 12, “Where to next?”, we anticipate that the ministers will get together again early in the spring of next year to do another process check-up to look particularly at credit for early action, because it has been clear that one of the areas we need to start looking at is where sectors of Canada are taking actions now. We want to see how we can ensure that there are no disincentives to them taking action, and that they're getting credit for action that they are planning on taking. One of the tables is looking at that in particular, and its recommendations will be coming forward in January. We hope to have those recommendations brought to the ministers by the March and April period.

We also want to take to ministers the design of what we call the end-game in the process. The final stage is how you take the work from the tables, boil it together into a sensible strategy, and allow for provinces and territories to make sensible decisions about this strategy. We're starting on that design work now, and it will be brought to the ministers early in the new year.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Oulton. Go ahead, Mr. Wall.

[English]

Mr. Jim Wall: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to make this presentation before the standing committee.

The positions being set out here are being developed by the Departments of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Environment, Natural Resources, Finance, Industry, and Agriculture and Agri-Food, as well as by the Canadian International Development Agency. I'm going to be assisted in the presentation of this submission by Dick Ballhorn, from Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

At the meeting in Kyoto, developed countries, plus eastern Europe, Russia and Ukraine, agreed to set legally binding net emission reduction targets that will reduce their aggregate greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2% from 1990 levels for the period 2008-12. Canada and Japan committed to reducing their emissions by 6%, the United States by 7%, and the European Union by 8%. Russia and Ukraine agreed to stabilize emissions at their 1990 levels.

To date, some 50 countries have signed the protocol. The U.S. has not yet signed it, but expects to sign it before March 1999. However, Fiji is the only country that has ratified it to date. The protocol does not enter into force until it has been ratified by 55 countries, representing 55% of the carbon dioxide emissions in 1990 in developed countries and those with economies in transition. It is important to keep in mind that the targets were negotiated as a package, with other elements of the protocol particularly covering how countries can achieve their emission reduction obligations. Also, there was a tight link between targets that countries could accept and the flexibility provisions in the protocol.

One flexibility provision relates to the fact that the emission reduction targets must be achieved, on average, over the period 2008-12. Countries therefore have opportunities with respect to timing and phase-in actions.

Secondly, emission reduction targets cover six greenhouse gases—carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, methane, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride—sources of these gases, as well as limited sink activities. This means countries have flexibility on which gases to target for reductions, and by what amounts.

• 0935

Third, along with taking actions domestically, emission reduction targets through the use of cooperative implementation or flexibility mechanisms, including international emissions trading and emission reduction projects in other developed countries, which is usually referred to as joint implementation, or in developing countries, which is referred as the clean development mechanism, or CDM.

While the three flexibility mechanisms and sinks are clearly recognized and enshrined in the protocol, the details and rules for their implementation remain to be negotiated. That's the major task before COP-4.

Finally, the Kyoto Protocol does not, nor was it expected to, address specific emission limitation obligations for developing countries. Since emissions from developing countries are rising and may account for the majority of global emissions in the early part of the next century, the engagement of developing countries will be crucial to meeting the ultimate objectives of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol.

Canada has two overriding interests in the ongoing post-Kyoto discussions and negotiations. First, we want to develop the flexibility mechanisms in a way that ensures their credibility and effectiveness and maximizes the cost-effective emission reduction opportunities for Canadian business and industry. Second, we want the broadest possible participation of developed countries in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. We want key developing countries to become engaged in global efforts to address climate change.

We will seek to maximize the cost-effectiveness of our emission reduction opportunities by continuing to press for early clarity on the flexibility mechanisms and timely decisions on sinks.

Kyoto provided the framework for starting down the long path to global reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Buenos Aires, where the next conference of the parties will be held, will begin to provide the detailed design. It may take several years to complete all the construction mandated by the protocol. We will work hard to ensure that Buenos Aires provides a workplan with firm timetables. This approach should ensure the groundwork can be completed well before the Kyoto target period takes effect, beginning in 2008.

Developing a plan for moving these issues forward may sound rather modest. It is, however, reality. Intersessional negotiations held in Bonn in June this year did not make much progress. Informal intersessional activities, such as the CDM ministerial in Ottawa in September, a Japanese restricted ministerial in September, a G-8 senior officials meeting in July and another one in October, and the meeting of the conference's expanded bureau in Buenos Aires in October, have been key to developing an international understanding of these complex issues.

The meeting on the CDM hosted by Minister Christine Stewart in Ottawa a few weeks ago was particularly helpful because it brought the senior representation of some developing countries and developed countries together in an exploratory, non-negotiating session to deal with a mechanism that is specifically designed to address the needs of both groups.

From the Canadian perspective, we expect that Buenos Aires will primarily focus on developing a workplan with timelines for resolving outstanding issues on the flexibility mechanisms over the next two to three years. We will seek to have issue development discussions focus first on the most practical issues, such as monitoring and verification. We will be pressing for early agreement on the flexibility mechanisms, as they will help us to meet our obligations cost-effectively. For these mechanisms to meet their objectives, they must be flexible, market-based, and attractive to the private sector.

At this stage, I'd like to turn to Dick Ballhorn to complete our presentation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Wall. I believe our next speaker is Mr. Ballhorn.

[English]

Mr. Richard Ballhorn: Yes. Basically, I'll be picking up more on the international negotiations aspects.

I'll just point out that there were basically three main blocs in the negotiations in Kyoto, and we'll again be encountering them in Buenos Aires next month. First, there are the developing countries, which is the so-called G-77 and China. Second, there's the European Union, which is 15 countries of western Europe, and in some cases the so-called wannabe countries. These are the ones that are on the list to join. Sometimes we'll make common cause with them. Third, there's the so-called umbrella group, which is Canada, United States, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Russia, and I think Norway and Iceland. There may be one or two I've missed.

These are basically the three negotiating blocs, and each brings its own issues and perspectives to the negotiating table.

• 0940

The developing countries believe basically—I'll maybe simplify a bit—that too much emphasis on elaborating the Kyoto Protocol means that their traditional concerns will not be addressed. They want action on addressing the impacts on them of developed countries, combating climate change, addressing the effects of climate change in developing countries, and on technology transfer. In particular, climate change means such impacts as desertification, particularly in Africa, and sea level rise in the small island states. They are quite cautious, even suspicious, of international emissions trading, because these kinds of market-based instruments are relatively new even to the developed countries and have never been implemented on the scale being considered in the current climate change discussions.

That being said, there are a number of developing countries, particularly in Latin America, who view the so-called clean development mechanism in a very positive light.

The European Union has some concerns about international emissions trading. They are essentially worried that the United States will somehow buy its way out of the issue and basically satisfy its target in a less costly manner than they are planning to do. Therefore, they would instead prefer that actions that focus strongly on domestic policies and measures to provide them with a more level playing field would basically be mandated by the negotiations.

The EU is especially concerned that international emissions trading and other so-called flexibility mechanisms should not be used as a way for the U.S.A. and others to gain a competitive advantage. They would include Canada in this group, since our position is in many ways very close to that of the United States.

There are some cross-cutting issues that affect all the flexibility mechanisms.

To continue on with the EU position—I think this is very key for the Canadian response—the EU has proposed an internationally determined so-called quantitative cap on the use of flexibility mechanisms, which would formally limit the extent to which these mechanisms could be used by individual parties.

It's Canada's current intention that the majority of our reductions should take place at home for both economic and environmental reasons. However, Canada is not in a position to agree to an internationally established cap, since it is expected that limiting the use of the flexibility mechanisms will increase the costs of implementing the protocol and constrain the mitigation options of Canada and other countries. In addition, the U.S. administration and the Congress have clearly stated that such a limit would jeopardize prospects for U.S. ratification.

At COP-4, the so-called Conference of the Parties, which will take place in Buenos Aires starting in early November, in the interests of moving the negotiations forward Canada will stress the need for pragmatism and focus on what is achievable on the more practical technical issues. We would be open to discussing with the European Union and the developing countries qualitative alternatives to a quantitative cap, such as regular reporting of domestic actions that would not restrict Canada's overall flexibility to implement.

Second, the European Union and some G-77 countries have stated that some reductions should not be counted in the mechanisms themselves. They argue that since reductions in Russia and eastern Europe were largely the result of economic collapse since the transfer into a market-based system, rather than discrete actions intended to address climate change, these are not genuine.

Canada has rejected this position. We have argued that this is tantamount to reopening the Kyoto targets, which would unravel the underlying agreement. What is important to us is the overall target agreed at Kyoto, and not the modalities of how it is being achieved.

Another cross-cutting issue is whether the accountability features of the three flexibility mechanisms should be linked to the development of the protocol's broader compliance regime. The European Union is suggesting such a linkage, which in our view would delay the mechanism from becoming operational.

We have a particular Canadian interest in the idea of carbon sinks. Canada's position continues to be one of endorsing an approach that fosters the enhancement of anthropogenic, or man-made, sinks and the reduction in sources. It is also important that any legally binding protocol be consistent in its treatment of sources and sinks.

As such, it is our view that there should be no limit on activities that are included in the protocol as anthropogenic sinks and that countries should get credit for enhancing their sink capacity according to the intent of the protocol and the rules already set out for limited sinks.

• 0945

Canada will continue to lobby for the inclusion of all anthropogenic sinks, particularly agricultural soils, as part of global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

In parallel with the international negotiations, we will continue to promote the need for improvement in methodologies and verification procedures of forestry sinks subject to the appropriate treatment of natural disturbances and guidelines reflecting Canada's concerns about forest products.

We will also continue to encourage the participation of developing countries in addressing the threats of climate change. Their participation is crucial both to ensure ratification and to acknowledge the problems of industries in developed countries that are put at a comparative disadvantage with respect to their developing country competitors.

Our encouragement of developing country participation will continue along three concurrent and mutually reinforcing tracks. First of all, we'll lobby them on issues of concern to us, negotiate with them, and engage in partnership activities. Our objective in following these tracks will be to enlist commitments from all countries having both the responsibility for emissions and the corresponding economic capacity in the second commitment period. That's the period after 2008 and 2012.

We must be realistic, however, about the prospects for immediate progress in obtaining commitments from developing countries. The present potential for commitments is poor. These are actually formal commitments, as opposed to other sorts of actual activity. And aggressive actions will likely be counterproductive, in our view.

The fulfilment of our objective will only be achieved over time by sensitively addressing the concerns of developing countries, particularly their focus on sustainable development and their requirements for clean technology. Canada will look for opportunities to address these concerns of developing countries by building trust and cooperating on climate change action projects that will reduce net greenhouse gas emissions globally at the same time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Ballhorn.

Mr. Hornung, please.

Mr. Robert Hornung: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When the commissioner of the environment and sustainable development released his report earlier this year, I thought it was quite an excellent document. I completely agreed with its conclusion that the failure to meet Canada's climate change commitments was primarily the result of poor planning and ineffective management. I think one area that the commissioner did not mention was also important, and this was the lack of political will and leadership to address the issue.

Now that we've given up on meeting the Rio commitment of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions, we've got to figure out what we're going to do in terms of Kyoto. It's worth looking to see how what we've done since Kyoto addresses some of the concerns that were raised by the commissioner in his report.

There's no doubt that the federal government has taken steps to get its own house in order with respect to the management of the climate change file. I think the creation of the climate change secretariat, headed by David Oulton, is a step in the right direction in that regard. I think we haven't yet seen, however, any real evidence or demonstration of federal leadership on this file. The federal government has not yet come out and implemented an initial set of specific and meaningful actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Federal leadership is critical, frankly, because if the federal government fails to demonstrate that it's willing to take action on this issue, it's unlikely that provinces are going to follow or that industry will take initiative. Frankly, even individual Canadians aren't likely to act without some strong signal from the federal government.

Now it's true that at the recent joint ministers meeting the federal government did announce what it planned to do with the $150 million announced in the last budget for the climate change action fund. A significant portion of that is going to support the process and the analytical work that's now under way. I'll talk about that later. Some is going to support climate change education. Of course it's impossible to argue with efforts—we should be strongly supporting this—to increase awareness and public understanding of climate change, but that's not going to directly lead to emission reductions. We have to recognize that individuals who will be targeted by that education campaign are directly responsible for about only a quarter of greenhouse gas emissions.

It's not very long before people start running into barriers in terms of trying to take actions to reduce emissions. For example, we can tell people that they should get out of their cars and take the bus, but that only works actually if there's an effective public transit system. We can tell people that they should be trying to purchase green power in their electricity supply, but that only works if somebody's actually offering that in the marketplace.

So if you're going to move forward with an education initiative, the only way it's going to be effective is if it's implemented in conjunction with complementary policies that actually remove barriers and help people take action to reduce emissions.

• 0950

There is some funding for climate change science, and again that's very good. It's important. There are uncertainties we have to continue to work on. But where was the specific funding for initiatives that will reduce emissions? A portion of the fund has been set aside to support new technology initiatives. No specifics have been provided yet at this time, but I would point out that's approximately $17 million a year over the next three years. It's not an insignificant commitment, but hardly a major first step in addressing climate change.

At the joint ministers' meeting, the summary of decisions indicated that the ministers reaffirmed a two-track approach to addressing climate change by taking early actions that have clear net benefits now, while at the same time systematically assessing options for measures for sustained reductions. I would submit that on this two-track approach we've only been moving on one track. We've set up a process and we're engaged in an effort to try to do analysis, but we haven't been taking those early actions.

The record of decisions from the joint ministers' meeting talks about some early actions related primarily to public education. There was discussion of the voluntary challenge and registry program—enhancing that program and making it more effective. Frankly, that program has been in existence since 1995. Every joint ministers' meeting since 1995 has said we need to strengthen and enhance the voluntary challenge, and saying it isn't going to do it. The only way we will do it is by actually implementing some complementary measures that provide some incentives for people to take voluntary action.

We at the Pembina Institute have conducted an annual review of corporate participation in the program, and I can say with a very high degree of confidence that only a very small minority of companies—perhaps you could count them on one hand—are seriously taking new incremental action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as a result of the voluntary challenge. There need to be complementary incentives. People aren't just going to do this out of the goodness of their hearts.

The other initiative that was announced at the joint ministers' meeting was a commitment to implement a system of credit for early action in the spring of next year. Credit for early action is an important initiative and could be the first significant incentive we provide to encourage companies to take action. Unfortunately, for that to be a real incentive companies have to know what they can use the credit for. If they take an action right now to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and they say “You have a credit and you can apply that against some unknown future commitment”, that doesn't actually provide a very strong incentive for action.

We already have a couple of pilot programs in Canada. There's the greenhouse gas emission reduction trading program in British Columbia and the pilot emission reduction trading program in Ontario. They demonstrate quite clearly that companies will not come forward and voluntarily take action unless they have a clear sense of what a credit is worth. They will not do it to get a piece of paper when they don't know what it's really worth.

At this point ministers have given no signal and in fact have stated quite clearly that by the time we get to next spring they will not have taken any decisions as to what that credit will be worth. They won't know what future regulatory or other steps they will be taking that you could apply a credit against. Therefore this incentive, which is being trumpeted as the thing that will kick-start us and get us going, will fall flat. Ministers have to recognize that talking about credit isn't enough; you have to actually provide some sense of what a credit is, what it's worth, and why it's a real incentive.

All of this is quite frustrating from my perspective, having worked on this issue, like many of the people around this table, for a number of years. We've started on this two-track approach with our emphasis on the one track—the process. We have to really think about what value we will get from the process.

It's not as if we don't know what to do to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. There was an 18-month process set up in 1993-94 that looked at what we could do to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It came up with over 80 measures for consideration by governments. There have been numerous studies and analyses done of actions that could be taken. In fact, this committee has produced reports in the past outlining actions that could be taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Canada.

The process that has been set up will go over a lot of old ground, I fear. I fear at the end of the day we will have another nice big collection of studies and new information that will tell us essentially a lot of things we already knew.

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What's missing again, and it was also missing the first time around with Rio, is political will. And there's no guarantee in my mind that by the time we come to this process at the end of the day we're going to see any willingness on the part of governments, federal or provincial, to actually move ahead and implement these initiatives.

Early action and starting with action now is important, and it's important for several reasons. The longer we delay, the longer we wait to get started, the more costly this is going to be for Canadians. If we say we're going to meet the Kyoto commitment and we're going to take all the actions to do it in the next five years as opposed to over a ten-year period, that's going to impose significant costs on Canada. We can get started now. There are cost-effective opportunities to reduce emissions now.

It's also important to act now, because addressing climate change does not only deal with that problem. Taking steps to improve the efficiency with which we use fossil fuels to increase the use of renewable energy sources will also help us to address a range of other environmental problems, some of which are actually quite high on political agendas in some regions of the country, such as urban air quality and urban smog.

We already see significant health and economic costs as a result of these other pollutants, and we can address that problem essentially for free as an additional add-on by taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions now in terms of pursuing initiatives in the area of energy efficiency, for example, is also a job creator. Study after study has shown if you invest $1 million in energy efficiency, you're going to create more jobs than if you invest $1 million in a new energy supply. Energy efficiency also puts money back into people's pockets, into the pockets of Canadian homeowners and into the pockets of small businesses, and it also helps to improve the competitiveness of Canadian industry.

Action is also important now, because all of us sitting around this table recognize that ultimately, if we're going to deal with the climate change issue, countries all around the world are going to have to take part. I can tell you developing countries are not going to come on board to take firm commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions until they see some clear evidence industrialized countries, such as Canada, have taken some first steps. Look at what has happened in terms of the Rio commitments. Most of the industrialized countries in the world are going to miss that target, stabilization. Most of them will do better than Canada, but most of them are going to miss it, and that hasn't sent a very good signal to developing countries. The type of action we've seen here in Canada since Kyoto, in terms of moving towards a process and not actually implementing some initiatives that will actually have a direct impact on emissions, also sends the wrong signal.

I think there is a role for a two-track process. If we are actually moving ahead and taking some action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, I think it doesn't hurt—in fact it will be helpful—to pursue some analysis and some more work on climate change. Unfortunately, the process as it has been established runs a very high risk of failure.

There are very different views as to what this process is meant to accomplish. If you talk to officials from the federal government, they'll tell you this process is aiming to find the most cost-effective way to implement the Kyoto Protocol. If you talk to officials from some provincial governments, they'll tell you this process is going to tell us whether or not we should implement the Kyoto Protocol.

That difference is important when you actually try to operate the process. For example, should the process be looking at a suite of actions that will allow Canada to reduce its emissions by 6% below 1990 levels? If you're just trying to figure out whether or not the Kyoto Protocol is doable, you might not need to do that. You might just say no, it looks too expensive, we won't worry about it, and there certainly are people with that view within the process.

The issue tables Mr. Oulton talked about are very large and unmanageable, and I think they are having a very difficult time functioning effectively in terms of trying to come up with proposals for action. There is as yet no clear mechanism for taking the work of individual issue tables and integrating it into a package that could be an action plan. A lot of stakeholders, industry and environmentalists alike, are waiting and wondering how that will happen and whether they will be involved.

Finally, it's not clear in the end the process is going to look at all the options. For example, there is discussion now—and Mr. Oulton raised the possibility—that the process will look at emissions trading. That's great, but frankly that should have been on the table since day one. Many people and many studies will say that emissions trading is one of the most cost-effective ways to address this problem. Why wasn't it on the table at the beginning?

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I think there are a lot of difficulties that this process is going to have to go through. And as I said, it's not clear to me whether at the end of the day we really do end up any further ahead. We're going to end up with a whole new bunch of numbers. Frankly, those numbers are all based on economic models. They're all going to be questioned. They're all based on a series of assumptions that people can argue about. Will we come up with a consensus that everybody feels comfortable with at the end of the day? I doubt it.

Will the numbers we come up with give us a more accurate reflection of the cost and benefits of implementing the Kyoto Protocol? In the end, probably not, because past analyses have tended to ignore a couple of things. They've tended to ignore the multiple benefits of taking action. So what happens when you reduce emissions of other urban pollutants? What is the impact on health cost and things like that? It's not clear to me at all that this process is going to consider that. And the process is unlikely and I would say almost certain not to consider the cost of inaction. What would the cost to Canada be of not taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions?

Those other elements of analysis are things we've been talking about for ten years. We've been saying we have to get a handle on those numbers. Frankly, there has never been a serious effort to try to get a handle on those numbers, and we're not going to be able to do it in this process. So once again, at the end of the day, when we're going to be asking what the real cost and benefits are of taking action to implement the Kyoto Protocol, we're only going to have part of the story.

I want to offer a few brief comments as well on Canada's preparations for Buenos Aires and the international elements.

I think previous speakers have done a good job of describing what the key issues will be in terms of discussion at Buenos Aires. Clearly, one of the key ones is the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, initiatives like emissions trading, joint implementation, and the clean development mechanism. At this point, these mechanisms remain very poorly defined. It's not clear how they are going to work, and negotiations are ongoing to deal with that.

The point I would like to make is if these things are designed poorly they could serve as huge loopholes for countries in terms of meeting their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. One example that was mentioned was the issue of what is called “hot air” and the fact that you have some countries like Russia that were given a very generous target under the Kyoto Protocol, frankly, a target they have absolutely no hope of not meeting, which means that they're going to have a lot of emission allowances or emission credits they can sell to the world without actually having done anything to reduce emissions.

I think Canada should be at the forefront of efforts to make sure that any initiatives that take place through emissions trading, any transfer of emission allowances, are accompanied by clear evidence that specific actions have been taken to reduce emissions. We have to make sure that these emission reductions are not only pieces of paper being traded around.

We also have to make sure that emission reductions that are accomplished through initiatives like the clean development mechanism in developing countries are additional. What I mean by that is we have to make sure they wouldn't just have happened anyway. That's important, because developing countries don't yet have binding commitments under the protocol, and if Canada invests in a project through the clean development mechanism in a developing country and it reduces emissions by 100 tonnes, that means Canada will be allowed to increase its emissions by 100 tonnes.

If that reduction in the developing country is not real, if it would have happened anyway, the environment isn't further ahead, but actually loses. Canada has been allowed to increase its emissions more, and the developing country hasn't actually done anything new to reduce emissions. That's a real problem that has to be addressed.

Mr. Ballhorn also spoke quite a bit on the issue of sinks within the Kyoto Protocol, and Canada's interest in ensuring that sinks are a key part of the Kyoto Protocol and that they're an important part of the strategy for moving forward. Right now, sinks are mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol, but it's unclear what the definitions are. Some sinks, like soils, agricultural soils, are specifically not included in the protocol.

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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is working on a specific report to identify these definitional and methodological issues. Until those issues are resolved, Canada should oppose any efforts to obtain credits from sink-related activities in the Kyoto Protocol. Once they're resolved and we have an international consensus on how to move forward, fine, let's move forward.

Finally, on the issue of developing country commitments, I'll close by saying, once again, if we want developing countries to step up to bat and take action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the single most important thing we can do is demonstrate that we're taking action at home. We haven't done that yet.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Hornung.

I would like to signal the presence in our midst today of a distinguished colleague of ours, the chairperson of the Standing Committee on Natural Resources and Government Operations, Mr. Brent St. Denis, who has kindly accepted our invitation to be here and to listen to the witnesses.

Members of the committee, the picture you heard or that is emerging here is a mixture of sweet and bitter. Mr. Hornung has certainly performed a fine service for us by reminding us that this issue is not new. Actually, as I'm sure all of you will recall, the process started in Toronto in 1988, when the first conference took place on climate change. The process then travelled and re-emerged internationally in Geneva in 1991, then it re-emerged in Berlin in 1995, and then of course in Kyoto. Therefore, the human mind has applied his and her skills quite intensively on a variety of fronts related to climate change, and therefore it is not a new issue, and therefore it is not an issue that can be treated as one that requires further reflection.

Having said that, it seems to me that we should now have a good, full round of questions and answers. As is customary, we'll start with Mr. Gilmour, if he's ready to go, followed by Mr. Godin, Madam Kraft Sloan, Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Herron, Madame Girard-Bujold and Monsieur Charbonneau. There are no further presentations.

Mr. Gilmour.

Mr. Bill Gilmour (Nanaimo—Alberni, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to begin by congratulating Mr. Emmett on his excellent report, which very candidly stated how poorly planned the government was when it went to Kyoto. We didn't have a plan. We had no idea how we were going to meet the targets we signed on to. In fact, Mr. Oulton has stated today that we still don't know that, and we won't know that until the middle of next year.

In my mind, other countries who had done their homework, for example Australia, which has similar circumstances to Canada—namely a large country with small population—came out with a significant difference in targets, compared to Canada. I believe that is largely due to us not doing our homework, going to Kyoto with a plan that represented Canada.

In three weeks we're going to be in Buenos Aires. My concern is that we're going to Buenos Aires in a similar position to the one we were in when we went to Kyoto, not having our homework done.

I'd like to ask Mr. Ballhorn, in Kyoto—I was there—cabinet had given guidelines to the negotiators that they could not go beyond. To go beyond that position was political, and that was done. Going into the Buenos Aires talks, do you have direction from cabinet or direction from the ministers as to what position Canada will take, and particularly on the issue of sinks, which very much influence Canada in the forestry and agriculture sectors? Are we prepared? Do you have guidelines and limits to negotiations in Buenos Aires?

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Mr. Richard Ballhorn: In fact we are in the process of getting that, basically our negotiating mandate, confirmed. We should have it by the time we get to Buenos Aires. It's the usual process of putting together an interdepartmental position, putting it into the cabinet and the cabinet approving it, and then we go with our orders from the cabinet.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: That makes me highly uncomfortable. The way you state it is that you'll be reading your marching orders on the plane.

Mr. Richard Ballhorn: No. Unless something untoward happens, we have a pretty good idea what they will be. But the actual formal confirmation will be taking place between now and when the meeting starts.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: On the issue of sinks, how firm are we going to be to withhold the Canadian position so that we aren't put at a further disadvantage to Kyoto?

Mr. Richard Ballhorn: I think just to understand what we're facing at Buenos Aires, it's going to be very much a meeting where we're looking at basically the issues that need further elaboration and we're going to be starting a process of discussion. As much as that may not be music to your ears, it's another process of discussing these issues and actually getting a timeframe in which we will come to an end and we will resolve the outstanding issues.

It was mentioned by Mr. Hornung that there is already a study in this intergovernmental panel on climate change on the sinks issue, which is going to be a key element to that. It's something that's basically with the scientists and they're looking at it and will come back. But I think the conventional wisdom is that at Buenos Aires we'll mainly be deciding on work programs over the next year or two to basically resolve the sinks issue, rules for the clean development mechanisms, joint implementation and emissions trading.

If we make more progress we'll be happy, but at this point on the basis of the kinds of meetings we've had to date, it doesn't look like we'll probably be doing much more than that unless there are some surprising breakthroughs.

So we're not actually negotiating on the sinks per se in the sense of the percentages of this or that; it's basically sitting down and agreeing that we have to sit down and organize a program of discussion, work to get it done by a certain date, hopefully by the year 2000 at the so-called COP-6, the meeting after the next one.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: Mr. Oulton, that must make you highly uncomfortable when you're trying to draw up a plan that tells us where we're going. And to put it in perspective, a 25% reduction in emissions means for example taking all the cars and light trucks off the road in Canada. This is a significant change that Canadians have to make, and as Mr. Hornung has said, in many cases there are no alternatives to making some of these changes.

Mr. Ballhorn is saying that sinks and emission tradings will be negotiated over the next couple of years and yet you're mandated to set up a plan of how we're going to get there. Again, we seem to be having lots of dialogue but we're not getting down.... We have eleven years to meet this target, and from what I hear we have two more years of negotiating on key issues that make the framework of our plan.

I again echo Mr. Hornung's point that there doesn't seem to be the political will, or the will in the departments, to get to the answer. We talk a lot about it, but how are we going to get there and when are we going to get there to be actually doing some concrete action?

Mr. David Oulton: Mr. Chairman, I think there is no doubt, and a number of people have commented on the target being challenging. Frankly, one of the reasons we have this process is that we've had the benefit of looking at what didn't work in the past, and the benefit of whether it was the commissioner's report or other pieces of work, and it is quite clear that what we have before us in terms of putting together good, sensible policy in Canada—and it's federal government policy, but it's also policy that has to engage other government levels if it's going to be a successful strategy—is quite an endeavour.

Frankly, the reason for taking a year and a half is because even though there had been some baseline analytical work done, the climate change issue is not a one-year issue. It's not even a one-decade issue. If we're putting together a successful strategy that will get us to 2010, it had damn well get beyond 2010 as well, because there is an ongoing international process. And what Dick spoke to was the fact that the climate change is not a static issue.

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When I talk about putting into place a strategy—and I agree we have two tracks—we should be taking action now, not action that biases the outcome of our discussion, but sensible actions now. Our intention is to have actions coming out from both the federal government and I hope provincial governments as we roll through the next year now that we have our action fund in place, and as well to lay down the tracks for a strategy that allows you to get a good start in 1999-2000 for where you're going, and then to continue taking action. It's not going to be a one-shot deal. We're going to be taking action on climate change, in my view, in a business plan process every year on an ongoing basis.

The international process is set up to recognize the nature of that issue. So this is not a one-shot endeavour. This is an ongoing endeavour. We are, if you will, racing to catch up. Since 1988 there's been a lot of history here. But it's our intent in the process to catch up, give us a good starting point for a strategy, and a strategy that's going to allow us to continue to work at the issue on an ongoing basis, not just on one year.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: It's my understanding that the federal-provincial ministers have called for, or are doing, an economic analysis of the impact of various options. Is that independent of what you are doing or is it in conjunction with it? What I'm getting at is it was said that no area in Canada would get hit harder than another, and I'm curious to see what stage that cost-benefit analysis is at, and if in fact it's a study that's independent of what you're doing.

Mr. David Oulton: Mr. Chairman, I will answer the first part of the question and say it is part of our process, so it is very much linked in. It's not independent of it. But if I could, Sue Kirby, who is also at the table here as a witness, is engaged in doing that modelling and analysis work and could provide a more complete answer, Mr. Chairman, with your agreement.

The Chairman: Could we have a short answer, please? It's either yes or no, really.

Ms. Sue Kirby: Yes, it is completely integrated into the process. It's taking place in a number of steps. As Mr. Oulton said, we're expecting the first step of that to be the so-called foundation work, which is making sure that we have a common basis of understanding. From there we'll be pursuing a number of analytical steps through which each table has been asked to ensure that it looks at the full suite of options to get to minus six and beyond, and we'll be integrating that into a complete suite of economic analysis that will be part of the full federal-provincial process. It's being done both by government officials and through full stakeholder participation. So it's part of the process. It will have openness and transparency through a vehicle that we're looking to create called the climate change economic analysis forum, where we will ensure that we're bringing to bear a variety of economic tools and modelling tools to address these issues. It is fully integrated into the process.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Gilmour.

[Translation]

Mr. Godin, followed by Ms. Kraft Sloan.

Mr. Yvon Godin (Acadie—Bathurst, NDP): It is a pleasure for me to take part in the committee's proceedings today. I'm not a permanent member of this committee. I sit, though, on the Natural Resources and Government Operations committees. It is interesting to see how environmental and natural resources issues come together. More importantly, the issue here is the kind of environment that we want to leave to our children. It is critical that we find ways of preserving our environment and our natural resources.

[English]

My question is to Mr. David Oulton. You mentioned the continuity analysis and consultation to identify the options for climate change action with an answer in 1999. Consultation has been going on for the past ten years, and Canada's greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase and not to decrease. Other countries around the globe are acting now. With the United States' one million solar roof, for example, there is concern that the secretariat is limiting immediate action for Canada to meet the Kyoto commitment.

I have two questions I'd like to raise right away, and then you could answer. My first question is the province insists on the secretariat being for analysis purposes, not an implementation program before the official options are identified next year. Is this secretariat for consultation and analysis and not for the engagement of immediate implementation of current technology initiatives?

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My second question—

The Chairman: May we have the answer to the first question?

Mr. David Oulton: The answer is that the secretariat, both national and federal, is also looking at early action.

You mentioned technology. Technology is one of the areas in which we're going to be active. Indeed, $56 million of the $150 million is for technology development and deployment. From the federal government's perspective, we are also encouraging provinces, as part of the process, to themselves become engaged in this. Therefore, every time ministers meet, one of the focuses we have is who is taking further early action? Frankly, we've just started at this part of it, and as was alluded to earlier, this is a part of the endeavour we're going to have to pay more attention to.

Mr. Yvon Godin: My other question is a very short one. Can the provinces participate in this area of federal funding for immediate action plans before 1999 and the next federal budget?

Mr. David Oulton: If I understand correctly, the provinces are participating in funding. What they're doing is joint-funding the costs of the national secretariat according to the formula the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment used for federal-provincial sharing. They're also sharing in the costs of, if you will, the analytical work on the issue tables. So that's a shared endeavour, although the largest portion of that is federal dollars that are supporting that analysis.

In terms of early actions in the area of technology or public education or science, all of those are individual initiatives. So the initiatives we announced in Halifax were individual federal initiatives, but often we partnered with both the provinces and the private sector. So the province and the federal government, as well as often a private sector or non-government entity, would work together and jointly fund an initiative. But each of them will be different: some of them may be uniquely federal, some of them may be uniquely provincial, and some of them jointly funded.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Godin.

[English]

Let me now welcome again Mr. Brent St. Denis, the chairman of the Standing Committee on Natural Resources and Government Operations, and thank him for having found the time to join us today in participating in this rather important exercise.

Mr. Brent St. Denis (Algoma—Manitoulin, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I apologize, I was hijacked for a few minutes there.

The Chairman: Next is Madam Kraft Sloan, followed by Mr. Lincoln.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North, Lib.): Thank you very much.

I look at page 3 of the brief presented by the foreign affairs department, and it says that the EU has proposed an internationally determined quantitative cap on the use of flexibility mechanisms. My concern here is that Canada is currently not very supportive of this, by the EU, and one of the reasons cited was that the cost of implementing the protocol would increase. But I'm not sure that all of the costs are included.

If we are in a situation where, it seems to me, a lot of these things that are being talked about have more to do with accounting and paper reduction as opposed to real reductions that could be measured in nature's account balance—for example, the hot air issue with Russia and things like that—and if some of these flexibility mechanisms aren't clearly laid out, as has been suggested, there may be some loopholes allowed.

If the reductions are not truly measured in nature's account balance, we're still going to be increasing our greenhouse gas emissions, and we are still going to feel the impact of climate change on health.

I spoke with a friend of mine who is a medical doctor. He made a presentation here in Ottawa on this particular issue. He was talking about 600 deaths a year related to heat, problems for individuals in this country, issues around dengue fever, economic issues, loss of property, and a whole pile of things that have been clearly laid out in the Canada country studies.

When we're talking about costs, we're not just talking about a certain kind of cost, but we have to consider all other costs as well and be broader here. So I would like to have some response to this issue of Canada's current non-support of the EU cap on the flexibility mechanisms.

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Mr. Jim Wall: Mr. Chairman, we just don't think it would be a useful way to spend time in Buenos Aires or in the next little while to debate the philosophy underlying the cap. There's so much work to do with respect to fleshing out the flexibility mechanisms to make sure they can work. And I think there's a broad recognition of this, even within the European Union. Therefore, rather than divert energies from a very narrow timeframe in Buenos Aires to spending a lot of time discussing caps, their pros and cons, and how you would implement it if you did have a cap, etc., we simply want to spend our time, in our view, more productively.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Well, it would seem to me that a cap would be part of clarifying the use of a flexibility mechanism, so it's not a waste of time. There's a lack of clarity as to how some of these mechanisms would work. And in a lot of respects, from the different people I have spoken to on things like emissions trading and this sort of thing, this is useful for a transitionary period. It's not something you can continue doing, because we have to make real reductions.

As part of the clarification process, it would seem to me there should be some discussion as to an overall cap and how much of the flexibility mechanism you are going to use in terms of meeting your Kyoto requirements. So I'm not so sure it's a waste of time. I think it puts the whole issue of what these flexibility mechanisms are actually going to do right on the table.

Mr. Jim Wall: Should I respond, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: That's why you're here.

Mr. Jim Wall: I was taking the narrow-term view of the actual conference in Buenos Aires. There's no doubt it's part of the clarification of the flexibility mechanisms and the work program we hope to develop in Buenos Aires. The issue of the extent to which you can or should use flexibility mechanisms will be part of a work plan.

With respect to, for instance, the clean development mechanism, it's up to the conference of the parties to define what “part of” means. And with respect to two of the other flexibility mechanisms, emissions trading and joint implementation, the Kyoto Protocol states that they are supposed to be supplemental.

So there's no doubt that between the European Union and developing countries there will be discussion of this, and ways to approach it and its relative importance.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Is there someone who can outline how sinks might be used, or the kind of position you're working toward on sinks?

The Chairman: Mr. Oulton, you might want to answer that.

Mr. David Oulton: Mr. Wall has said to me he has an expert here who's probably better than I am in dealing with it.

The Chairman: Would you please give us your name?

Mr. Art Jaques (Head, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventories, Environment Canada): Yes, my name is Art Jakes. I'm with Environment Canada.

How sinks might be used is the question, if I heard that correctly. Currently the protocol limits the way in which sinks can be used to three activities: reforestation, afforestation, and deforestation activities occurring after 1990. The way in which they would be used would be that the stock change due to those activities in the commitment period, which would be from 2008 to 2012, could be added or subtracted, depending on whether they're a sink or source—deforestation obviously is a source—to your assigned amount.

For Canada, we're looking at that right now, and.... Because reforestation is a term that still is under interpretation, there are several definitions out there. One limits reforestation to basically land use change activities, which would mean in effect it's really reafforestation, which would not be a forestry activity and would obviously limit the sink potential for Canada. You would not get credit for anything reforested in the current forest. The other definition for reforestation is a little broader and would include both of those.

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So in effect, for Canada the real benefits would be in reducing deforestation, and the number for that is highly uncertain. It depends on the land area that we're estimating it to be and the types of trees that are on that land, in terms of the quantity of carbon that might be in them.

The current deforestation estimates we have are in the range of somewhere between two megatons and nineteen megatons. That's part of what the sinks table would be looking at, further refining those estimates in conjunction with the forest sector table.

In terms of potential afforestation, current afforestation efforts are pretty minimal. They're around one megaton to two megatons. Those are current estimates.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: What is afforestation?

Mr. Art Jaques: Afforestation would be planting trees on land that currently did not have trees, a land-use change.

The estimates are derived from Tree Canada, which has had a program in place for a number of years for planting trees in urban centres. The remaining current afforestation number is basically from land undergoing natural changes—for example, marginal agricultural land.

Currently, as defined, we may be not a sink but a source. If, however, we start a major afforestation—

The Chairman: Could you explain why we could be a source, rather than a sink?

Mr. Art Jaques: If the higher deforestation number turns out to be the correct number, nineteen megatons, for example, and we have a limited reforestation estimate that may be only around two megatons—and again, we only have a sink from afforestation of around two megatons—you can do the math and you'll see that we're a source, nineteen megatons minus about four megatons.

If we get a broader reforestation number, those two estimates for natural regeneration and reforestation by planting and seeding after harvest, that estimate is around twelve megatons in total.

So given the range, we're not sure what we are, and that's what we're trying to do, get a better handle on that. However, if we start a major afforestation program, we have a potential land mass of about eight million hectares, equivalent to about the size of New Brunswick and P.E.I. That's the current estimate of the land mass available for afforestation. It's mainly in the prairie provinces, agricultural land currently not under agricultural use.

Those are hypothetical. If you started a ten-year program of planting 10% of that land each year, we might end up with a thirty-megaton sink in the commitment period. That sink would grow, just because of the way trees grow. You would have more of a sink in future commitment periods.

The cost of that would still need to be worked out. That could be more expensive than doing some emission reduction.

The Chairman: Thank you.

We'll move now to Mr. Lincoln, followed by Madame Girard-Bujold.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln (Lac-Saint-Louis, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, in listening to the presentations today, what is striking is the contrast between those of Mr. Emmett and Mr. Hornung on one side and those of the officials on the other side. I think both Mr. Emmett and Mr. Hornung have clearly pointed out that perhaps what we need is leadership and vision to first of all start doing things. It seems to me, on the side of the officials, all the presentations are geared very heavily to more analysis, more studies, more documents and finding out.

I was really struck by a few things I saw in Mr. Oulton's presentation, that we're going to start a process to examine consequences of Kyoto in advance of ratification, as if we wouldn't ratify. I hope we are going to ratify regardless, because it seems to me we have made a commitment to the world. What happens if the consequences show that they are very heavy for our country? Do we not ratify?

I hope we don't waste too much time in more analysis of things that are, as pointed out, so well known.

• 1035

What strikes me is that if we look at the acid rain battle in the 1980s, we took a leadership role and Canada had a program of its own. In fact, we provoked the United States into action. We gave a leadership that helped Senators Mitchell and Stafford and Congressman Waxman and others to produce legislation in Congress, and eventually they got the Republican administration, of all administrations, to move on the Clean Air Act. I think we were very instrumental in pushing the yardsticks forward in very clear and precise ways where we took action.

Here, it seems to me we're so worried about what the United States will do that we say, well, if we go too close to the Europeans on caps, then the United States will be very unhappy; they may not ratify. I would like to point out that they haven't ratified the biodiversity convention, and if we waited for them to ratify it, we would be waiting until doomsday, and they may not ratify ever, because of their own internal politics.

I get the sense that I'm very happy with the advent of the secretariat. At least it's a coordinating mechanism. But I wonder, and I would like to ask Mr. Emmett, if we haven't built up such a multi-headed monster where we have three ministries....

The Ministry of the Environment is number two or number three in the shuffle now. It's supposed to be responsible for the international leadership, and the natural resources ministry for the domestic leadership. Don't ask me what sense that makes; to my way of thinking, the two are completely interrelated. But more and more the Ministry of the Environment has become the sort of also-ran in the tandem, and the leadership has shifted so that nobody is leader.

Perhaps that's where our problem is. I was thinking, listening to the presentations, that maybe the simplest thing would be to turn the whole program over to Robert Hornung and the Pembina Institute, and I'm sure we'd see things happening right away. I'm convinced of it. Instead of that, we're going to spin wheels for I don't know how long, looking at how we can be flexible.

Mr. Wall talked about flexibility mechanisms, that we look for flexible and market-based things so that we can shuffle around and take credit for this, and then we can show that. If we are so geared to looking at loopholes and looking at flexibility mechanisms and carbon sinks—and I heard our expert tell us how difficult it is to even find out what that means, because we're talking in deforestation estimates that vary between two megatons and nineteen megatons—I wonder how we sort it out in time to find loopholes that will be able to tell us that we have equated 25% we have to catch up with, and 25% in sinks and flexibility options, and emissions trading, so that we look okay to the world.

Mr. Emmett, I wonder if you can tell us whether you agree with Mr. Hornung that we have enough data, enough information on the table, to start some programs to put part of that $150 million in things that are going to produce an example so that Canadians are going to be energized by it. It will be an education in the process and also send an example to the world that we really mean to reduce these emissions actually, not just in credits.

Mr. Brian Emmett: Thank you, Mr. Lincoln. I'll try to answer that if I can. The introduction to your question was extremely interesting and extremely wide-ranging.

With respect to the work that David Oulton and his colleagues are doing, I'd proceed on the basis that it's a good-faith effort to achieve the targets Canada has agreed to.

Secondly, I believe the partnership approach is the one that is probably the right one for an issue of this sort—partnerships globally, partnerships domestically.

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Thirdly, from my perspective as commissioner I think it's way too early to tell if this will actually work. At the end of the day, from my point of view, it's a very pragmatic issue—that is, is this an arrangement that is going to work.

One of the things that troubles me a little bit is I haven't heard much discussion of the kinds of points I was making in my May report. We have a partnership here to address possibly the most complicated environmental problem we have ever dealt with, and I compare that to the kind of partnership I would have in my own mind if I were thinking about opening a corner store with my next-door neighbour, such things as the level of documentation, the level of detail on the expectations of the partners, whether there are deadlines, and whether there are back-up plans. All that kind of stuff is just missing. I haven't seen an indication that is prominent in the work program of the secretariat at this point in time. I think that's an area that really needs to be filled in. We need business-like arrangements so that we can hold all the partners accountable for their deliverables and have a clear day of reckoning, if you like, for everyone involved in the process.

So we've taken the committee's suggestion that we examine the plan the secretariat will produce in two years' time, and in that time we'll try to come up with as authoritative a review as we can. But as of this moment I think it's a bit premature to pass judgment. A lot of things are encouraging, and some things strike me as gaps.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: I'd like to ask one question of Mr. Hornung before closing. Mr. Hornung, you said we've already had a lot of information on the table for the last 10 years and that we could start early action plans. If you had $17 million in your hands, or better still, $150 million for three years, where would you start? What priorities would you start with?

Mr. Robert Hornung: That's a good question. Thank you.

I should mention—and most committee members will have seen this—last Friday we released a report with the David Suzuki Foundation called Canadian Solutions, which outlined a series of measures that would allow Canada to meet the Kyoto commitment, measures using existing technologies and often implementing specific initiatives that have already been taken in other countries. The point we were trying to make with that is that addressing climate change at the level of a first step in terms of meeting the Kyoto commitment is not a technology problem. We have the technologies to do this.

The issue is much more a political will problem and an issue of removing barriers that exist. For example, I would say if we were going to look for first-step initiatives, we would want to find ways to capture energy efficiency potential in buildings. There are tremendous opportunities both in the residential sector and in the commercial sector. The way we've done it in the past is we've tried to encourage that sort of thing through information programs and things like this.

I would suggest if I had a chunk of money, I'd put some towards that, but it would be a small chunk. I would focus more on providing incentives for people to take actions that reduce their energy use and improve energy efficiency, to encourage them to overcome, for example, initial barriers. Many people who want to invest in an energy efficiency retrofit in their home are hesitant to do so because the initial cost of identifying energy efficiency opportunities seems too expensive for them. But once they've actually had the opportunities analysed, you'll find they actually make all kinds of investments. There's a program in Ontario called the green communities initiative. It costs $150 to do a residential home energy audit. They find a lot of homeowners are put off by that, but the ones who have actually invested the $150 to find out what opportunities are there invest on average $1,300 in energy retrofits, because they find it makes sense and that they can save a lot of money.

It's a matter of removing barriers and taking initiatives that help to provide incentives for people to identify those opportunities and then to proceed with implementation. If someone can demonstrate in conjunction with their utility that they have invested in energy efficiency and it has actually had an impact on their energy bill, why can't we provide a tax credit to cover that investment or to offset some of that investment?

• 1045

To this point we've focused almost exclusively on a voluntary and educational approach. I think that's going to have a role to play in terms of implementing the Kyoto Protocol, but it can only be part of a broader solution. You need to set minimum standards that allow you to move forward, and you need fiscal incentives.

So, again, if I were picking one area in each sector, I would say on the demand side for energy you want to find incentives for energy efficiency investments. In transportation you want to put some funding into public transit and alternative modes of transportation. You want to move forward in some areas of regulation. You want to require that landfill methane be recovered. You want to require homes to be built to something like the R-2000 standard we've known about for almost 20 years.

So there's a whole range of initiatives. I can't sit here and cost it out and say this is what it would be. But once again, there's no shortage, and I think we would have to look at a mix of regulatory, fiscal, and information programs in order to move forward.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Lincoln. Ms. Girard-Bujold, followed by Mr. Charbonneau.

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold (Jonquière, BQ): Mr. Emmett, you noted in your report that the federal government needed to rethink much of its approach to climate change in order to develop a strategic national action plan.

In your opinion, what significant effort does the government need to make today in order to confront the challenges of climate change, bearing in mind that the goals agreed to by Canada at Kyoto seem out of reach? Is an infusion of $150 million enough to meet these challenges?

Mr. Brian Emmett: That's a very difficult question to answer. In focusing on climate change in our report, we emphasized the importance of sound management. One of the most effective things we can do, in my opinion, is to apply sound management principles to climate change initiatives.

As for meeting the target agreed to by Canada, I have to accept that premise. I need to look at the approach the government intends to take to achieve this target.

You mentioned an injection of $150 million. In my May report, I did not mention any specific dollar amounts, but rather emphasized sound management principles and the need for action in certain areas.

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: I'd like to put that same question to the Environment Department witnesses. In your opinion, is an infusion of $150 million enough to achieve the target identified on page 2 of your presentation? You point out that in order to meet the targets agreed to under the Kyoto protocol, Canada needs to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 25% by the year 2010. Is an expenditure of $150 million adequate in terms of meeting that target, given that a significant portion of that amount would be earmarked for studies?

Are you planning more concrete initiatives? Will that be enough? We know that billions of dollars have already been invested in major initiatives, whereas the government is planning to invest only $150 million over the next three years. I believe this amount had already been projected in the 1997-1998 budget.

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These projects seem to have stalled, even though you have told us that they are on the table. If the government wants to meet its target of a 25% reduction in emission levels, do you think it is planning to spend enough money on that task? It seems like a mere drop in the bucket.

Mr. David Oulton: When the government announced its plans to allocate $150 million to an action fund, it said that this was merely to carry out the initial phase, that is an analysis and first initiatives. In two years' time, when our strategy has been fully developed, we will know whether or not we need further funding, regulations or measures. Certainly we will have to identify at this time what actions are required.

The Chairman: Thank you.

[English]

We'll now hear from Mr. Charbonneau, followed by Mr. Herron, Mr. Jordan, Mr. Casson, Madam Torsney, and the chair.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Charbonneau (Anjou—Rivière-des-Prairies, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I have a question for the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development.

The Commissioner indicated to us in his presentation today that the federal government had not applied sound management principles in attempting to act on its commitments. He further noted that the there was no clear assignment of roles and responsibilities when it came to dealing with the problem of climate change. He found no communication program, no implementation plan, no real partnership and no real response on the part of departments.

Commissioner, is this an accurate assessment of the current situation or merely a summary of the report that you submitted in May, a report which was based on observations going back several months? This is an important consideration because it could affect the perception people have of the message that you are delivering. Are you describing the current situation or that which prevailed eight or ten months ago?

Mr. Brian Emmett: Thank you for your question, Mr. Charbonneau.

Our observations are based on a review conducted a year or so ago. There is nothing to indicate that the situation has changed in any way. This being said, I'm not exactly clear on what the Secretariat is up to today.

Mr. Yvon Charbonneau: I'd like to ask the Commissioner if he's aware of the division of responsibilities between Natural Resources Canada and the Department of the Environment and of who is responsible for specific areas. Does this division of responsibilities seem clearer to him than it was ten months ago? Has the establishment of the Climate Change Secretariat helped to put in place and advance studies, initiatives, consultations and partnerships? Doesn't this signal some progress which the Commissioner should have acknowledged prior to his appearance before the committee today, in October?

[English]

Mr. Brian Emmett: Mr. Chairman, I think the bottom line from my point of view is it's too early for me to say, and I do not want to comment on something I have not examined in detail. When we asked several months ago what are the arrangements between the departments and where are they written down, we found there was no satisfactory answer. There was no written record.

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Is there a written record today? I don't know. We haven't looked. We will look within the next two years. We will come back and report to the committee, as the committee has asked us to.

The one thing that I guess I would say is that looking at the projections produced by the secretariat, there are these details of relationships, and I would very much like to see them detailed. I would like to see them be transparent. I would like to see them regularly reported to parliamentarians and other Canadians.

The bottom line underlying all this is the physical reality out there in the world. It reminds me a bit of a quote from Mark Twain: “The first thing to do when you find yourself in a hole is to stop digging”. Look at the projections on page 2 of the report from the secretariat: we're still digging. To me, in some ways, that's the bottom line.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Charbonneau: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask a second question. Judging from the Commissioner's response, it is clear that the problems brought to light eight or ten months ago have been resolved in part. It remains to be seen whether the solutions found will be satisfactory. I guess the Commissioner will pass judgment on these initiatives at some point in the future.

I'd like to get back to the issue of emissions trading. It seems that this concept has garnered a great deal of attention and that considerable effort is being made to find implementation mechanisms. I can understand this, given that this is a new and rather vague concept, one that will take on unprecedented scope if implemented on an international scale. Clearly, these issues must be examined.

I'd like you to provide me with some assurances at this time that we are not trying to find ways to shirk our domestic responsibilities by resorting to this international emissions trading mechanism. Canadians are of course mindful of the international situation, but they won't be satisfied merely with knowing that pollution levels have been reduced in Nigeria or China. They want assurances that pollution levels will be reduced here in Canada, in their own city and region.

I'd like some assurances from you that you are devoting as much energy to finding domestic implementation mechanisms as you are to developing an international emissions trading system.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Oulton.

Mr. David Oulton: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm talking from the point of the view of putting together the domestic strategy for implementation. We are certainly working under very clear guidance from ministers that Canada intends to take the majority of its reductions through its own domestic endeavours. Therefore, the plan that we will put in place is going to take that very much into account.

Indeed, there will be a place for the international flexibility mechanisms when they're negotiated and when we know more about how they're going to work. They'll have a role in our plan, as in the Australian plan and the plans of the other countries.

But the clear guidance we have now from the two ministers I report to is that we should have a plan in place that allows Canada to take the majority of its reductions domestically. This is for the variety of reasons that have been pointed out earlier. These are partly the reasons Mr. Hornung pointed to in terms of the way to bring developing countries on board, which is to demonstrate that those countries that have the technology and the resources also have the will to apply them in dealing with this issue. As well, there's the fact that we expect that there are going to be many collateral benefits to taking action on climate change in Canada, which was pointed out in some of the other reports on health and in other areas.

So those are clearly the guidelines I'm working to in terms of trying to put together a domestic strategy. I could ask Jim Wall to talk more to the international element on the negotiation side.

• 1100

Mr. Jim Wall: Yes, I can do that.

The fact is that under the Kyoto Protocol, while the protocol specifies that there are these flexibility mechanisms, they were not developed in any detail in Kyoto, and it was left to subsequent discussions and negotiations to flesh them out.

The principles we are bringing to the table with respect to those discussions are that the flexibility mechanisms should be environmentally credible as well as economically efficient. In order to work properly, the transaction costs should be low, but weighed in that balance is a very important criterion, which is that they shouldn't constitute loopholes to the evasion of national responsibilities.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Charbonneau: I have one final question, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: By all means.

Mr. Yvon Charbonneau: On three occasions this morning, when mention was made of the scope of emissions trading versus domestic efforts here in Canada, we were told that pursuant to ministerial directives, the majority of the reductions must be realized through domestic endeavours. As you know, some people argue that a majority is 50% plus one. I want some assurances that we're talking about a significant majority. In recent months, I've heard some people argue that anywhere from 15 to 20% of emissions could be subject to emissions trading, whereas 80% could be targeted for domestic endeavours. That would be considered a majority as well. This morning, is the word "majority" being used to describe 50% or slightly more, or something in the order of 80 or 85 per cent? It might reassure us to hear you confirm that you are talking more about the 80% range rather than a figure of 50% or slightly more.

[English]

Mr. David Oulton: As officials, here is what we would want to put before ministers. Remember, as I mentioned earlier, in the end, the decision-making mechanism we have here is that ministers of energy and ministers of the environment provide advice to first ministers on Canada's plan. I would want to give them a menu of options that would allow them a choice that ranges all the way from 50% to 100%. We should do our homework such that, if you are going to take 100% in Canada, then here are the measures you would need to take and these are what the implications are in terms of costs and benefits. If you're going to take 75% or 50%, then here are those implications.

So my intention is that when we put together a strategy, we'll give ministers a full sense of what the cost curve is and a full range of choices. In the end, ministers are going to have to choose what the right mix is of measures, which includes international flexibility mechanisms.

I can tell you that my guidance is to make sure ministers have that full choice. In the end, it will be ministers who will make the choice as to what the optimum mix and percentage is, if you will, of options. I could not, as an official, give you that commitment now, other than to say that we will do the work that will allow ministers to be able to make those choices.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Charbonneau: Mr. Ballhorne, what instructions have you been given as a negotiator leading up to the November conference in Argentina? Are we targeting 50% domestically and perhaps 50% internationally, or a minimum of 80% domestically?

[English]

Mr. Richard Ballhorn: I wait to see what instructions I get. I somehow feel that probably that issue is not the crucial one that we will deal with right now. As I said before, it would be very much on more technical issues, getting the work under way, and engaging developing countries. I think that the kind of point you are making is probably one that is going to be much more featured at subsequent meetings.

The Chairman: Mr. Charbonneau and Mr. Herron, followed by Mr. Jordan, please.

Mr. John Herron (Fundy—Royal, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Chair, is it your impression that we'll have a second round in terms of time?

The Chairman: If you and the others following you are short on time, then we might.

Mr. John Herron: It has been said a number of times that the intent is to have the majority of our reductions within a domestic regime. But on page 3 of the foreign affairs and international trade department's document, it said quite clearly that Canada cannot agree to an internationally established cap.

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I'm under the impression that this would have been discussed in Halifax this past week. The provinces would have been made aware that was the position we'd be taking to Buenos Aires, so any kind of change from that position would clearly not have provincial approval.

I address that to Mr. Oulton or Mr. Wall.

Mr. Richard Ballhorn: First of all, the presentation you received from me and Mr. Wall is basically a unified presentation. You said it's from foreign affairs. I'd like to take the credit for it, but I really can't. As it says in the opening paragraph, it's everybody's. It's a unified one.

I wasn't at the JMM for the whole time. I would be surprised if this issue was not somehow discussed. At this point, as Mr. Wall has already mentioned, we don't think it's useful to take time at Buenos Aires to deal with this issue. First of all, we've already had informal meetings at the ministerial level, and we've wasted virtually all our time on this issue, to the point where people say “Please, let's agree to disagree and move on to something where we might make some progress”. We're all praying the meetings at Buenos Aires will not consist of two weeks of discussions between the EU and the umbrella group on the idea of the merits or otherwise of a cap. We just hope we can move on and do some real work.

Mr. John Herron: The origin of my question comes from this standpoint. Last year in Regina the provinces agreed to a specific target with regard to the federal government, and I believe the next day or two days later it was announced there could be a change. I know it's a point some of our provincial partners are concerned about. I don't want Halifax to turn into the Regina debacle we had last year.

Mr. Hornung pointed out we spend way too much time on process, as opposed to talking about how we can get the job done and providing some tangible incentives for individuals in terms of aggressive tax incentives and an incentive-based, marked-driven approach. These are things I believe we could fast-track and do in very short order.

There was also a comment made that we've allocated $17 million to actually get tangible results, and it was said that would be a significant amount of money but not all that significant. I would say it pales in comparison to what the Americans are doing. From an incentive-based perspective, I think it's something we should do on an immediate basis.

My question is to Mr. Emmett with regard to early action. We've spent a fair amount of time on the presentation of Mr. Oulton, and I believe the government is sincere about wanting to do something about early action. But industry and the public really need to see some kind of tangible sign. Why would we have to wait until maybe the fall of 1999 to actually see some of this implemented?

Mr. Brian Emmett: I'm not sure you'll have to wait till the fall of 1999 to see some of this implemented. From my point of view, the fall of 1999 or the spring of 2000 is the point at which the committee has asked me to have a look at the plans David will ultimately produce and to give the committee an opinion on them based on our experience in examining Canada's record with regard to its Rio commitments. So I don't see any reason not to expect progress by the fall of 1999. It's just that it takes us a while to examine things and to bring those reports back to the committee. But there's no reason you shouldn't learn about that directly from the department and the secretariat.

Mr. David Oulton: Mr. Chairman, I might also contribute to the response to that question.

In terms of the early action measures, including the ones you are alluding to with the $17 million per year, or what I called $56 million over three years, those should be coming out continuously over the next three years. So there should be no waiting for actions in those areas. In other words, for those things that can be funded through the $150 million, there should be the capacity now for taking continuous action.

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Indeed, in the materials that were provided to the committee we indicated that there are business plans now that are up and publicly available for how the funds are going to used, the criteria that will be used for assessment, and how people can put forward ideas to the government in the technology area and the public education outreach area, as well as science and adaptation. Those are available and they are available on a public web site. So there should be a capacity for taking early action on a continuing basis from now forward.

Mr. John Herron: One comment I would like to make is that just a couple weeks ago we had an event where we celebrated a hybrid vehicle, a car that was partly fueled by traditional gasoline and partly fueled by electricity. The thing is if we really want to start showing some optics that we're very sincere about early actions.... I think there was a comment made by Mr. Hornung that we need to eliminate the barriers that exist, and I think a comment made by Mr. Oulton was that we want to make sure we eliminate those disincentives.

We have a company in Bombardier that actually has a market-ready product today that is an electric vehicle—it's not even a hybrid—which could be used as a commuter vehicle. And essentially because of the regulatory rules we have in the country it could take up to two years for Bombardier to actually have this vehicle licensed in the country. So if we're really serious about implementing rewarding of early actions, here is a classic case where we have a Canadian-made product that we could be celebrating here in the House of Commons instead of celebrating a product that's made elsewhere. It's approved for use in the United States.

So that's the kind of signal I think we need to send if we're serious about eliminating barriers that exist and disincentives. Why do we have to wait two years for a regulatory thing instead of rewarding technology that actually is a made-in-Canada application on climate change? So for Minister Collenette, Minister Goodale, and Minister Stewart, I think this would something it would be worth pursuing so we don't have to wait the two years for that made-in-Canada product.

The Chairman: Can we have a brief answer please?

Mr. David Oulton: I wasn't aware of the specific situation that was being raised. Apart from meeting the normal safety and other standards that the public would expect any vehicle to go through, indeed I agree with the suggestion that where there is a possibility of getting those things on the market we should be endeavouring to do that. So I appreciate the advice.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Herron; you're down for a second round.

Mr. Jordan, Mr. Casson, Madam Torsney, Mr. St. Denis, and the chair.

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds—Grenville, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have three comments and then a brief question.

The first comment is directed at my honourable colleagues from the Reform Party. I'll say this with utmost respect, because I do respect them both. I found it rather ironic that they found it necessary to criticize the government strategy going into Kyoto when I found myself in an all-night debate on climate change fully prepared to talk about tax credits, about lifetime product stewardship, about solar power and wind power, and I ended up having to argue whether or not climate change was even a problem.

I'm not going to pass judgment on the government's strategy, but I would suggest that there is enough need for strategy to go around for everybody at the table. And I think if we can agree on the seriousness of the problem then we go a long way to solving or developing some of the solution strategies. But having to preoccupy my time arguing whether climate change was even an issue I think detracted valuable time away that should have been used to develop strategy.

Mr. Herron, I share your concern about immediate action and the need for that, and I also will throw in there a belated happy birthday. I would suggest that if you talk about barriers, if we learn nothing from our history I think we can learn that if we start talking about jurisdictional issues between federal and provincial relations we are throwing up a barrier we'll never get over. If you're prepared to show me proof that people in different provinces have different requirements for oxygen and water, I think then we can make an argument that it belongs in the debate. But I don't think it even needs to be talked about, because I think it gives a reason for people to stall.

My final comment is trade-offs. I think that when we talk about emissions trading, it's a very short-term strategy in the sense that what we're proposing is that we are substituting our unsustainable practices for more unsustainable practices in other countries. I think that problem is just delaying what's going to be inevitable.

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There is value domestically in putting money into solar power and wind power, and measures of well-being that include non-economic factors, because I think if we can demonstrate through full cost accounting and other principles that our economy, our society, and our environment are better off, then we can show other countries how to do it, and we're not simply delaying the inevitable by passing our unsustainable technologies to them.

So when we talk about things like emissions trading, I think we need to put them into a little bit of perspective.

My question for Mr. Hornung has to deal with the issues that have been identified here. I get a little nervous when we talk about cost-benefit analysis. I don't want to give people the impression that I am naive enough to believe that economics doesn't factor in here, but it seems to me that by taking two years to come to act on this, our strategy seems to be grounded in the notion that what we want to do here is the least amount we can, with the least amount of economic interruption.

I fundamentally disagree with that. I think the direction we're going is not sustainable, and tinkering on the edges is not the way to approach this, and we're going to set ourselves up to be put in the ridiculous situation where we may win at the negotiating table and lose on the ground, in the air, and in the water.

So I look at this issues table, and I agree that those are sound things, but I would say at best they're half the equation. If that's the entire equation, then I have a very uncomfortable feeling, because I know how that story is going to end. It's going to end with the environment and future generations being the losers.

So my question to Mr. Hornung is, what do you see as missing there? What jumps out at me is that there's simply no value on inaction, no costing of doing nothing, and there's no recognition of the inherent value of an asset like a tree, what it provides in terms of the ecosystem. It provides nests for birds and a way to keep runoff from entering streams. Could you maybe spend a couple of minutes talking about what you see as the downside to that approach and what we might want to put in there to give this thing a chance?

Mr. Robert Hornung: Thank you.

It seems to me that with the process we are putting a tremendous amount of faith in this analysis and the numbers that will come out of it. The only thing we really know for sure about the numbers that are going to come out of this process is that they'll be wrong. They're going to be wrong for several reasons. First off, as you pointed out correctly, we're very unlikely to consider the costs of doing nothing. I should point out that those costs are not simply the impacts of climate change on ecosystems and things, but also the costs of adapting to those changes in the future. Everyone assumes that adaptation is perhaps cost-free, but in fact adaptation will carry heavy costs.

I also mentioned earlier in my presentation the fact that we've done a very poor job of including in our analysis the multiple benefits of action. So when we reduce greenhouse gas emissions, we're also reducing emissions of other pollutants, and those have impacts on both the economy and the health system, and on others that are beneficial, and we need to take account of that.

The other thing that's a problem is that we actually don't have very good tools to do this. We do the best we can with these economic models, but frankly, the one thing they absolutely do very poorly is model technological innovation. You can see, time and time again, when using these models to address environmental issues, the costs always look extreme. Then, in the real world, when people actually start designing solutions, they find that there are ways to do it more cheaply and effectively.

We look at examples dealing with the ozone layer—the Montreal Protocol. That was supposed to wipe out the chemical industry. Now they've found out that they could develop new alternatives, sell them at a higher rate, and actually benefit from the whole thing.

So I think this reliance on the numbers is a real problem. In fact, what would be much more useful—and this comes back to an earlier question—is at least at the same time, instigating some specific initiatives, pilot programs that give you real world numbers so that you can actually see what happens and you're not just dealing with a model.

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At the end of the day, numbers are going to come out of this process. I might stand up and say I don't believe this part, and somebody else is going to stand up and say they don't believe that part, and the fact is, we just know it's wrong. It's a tool. If we want to really find out what this is going to cost, we have to start doing something, doing it on a small, pilot scale, perhaps, to get some understanding of the costs and benefits, and find ways to move forward in the most cost-effective manner possible.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Casson, now is your chance to prove that there are progressive Reformers.

Mr. Rick Casson (Lethbridge, Ref.): Well, there you go.

I appreciate Mr. Jordan's opening comments. As this process goes on and on, Mr. Jordan, we'll have lots of opportunity to debate the merits of climate changes.

We talked a lot about strategy and emissions trading, sinks, targets, process, the whole issue, and getting back to what Mr. Hornung is getting to, lots of talk and no action.

One of the areas in which we can do some really concrete things and do it quickly—and I'd like to hear where we're going with this—is in developing alternative means of energy. The area that I'm particularly interested in is wind energy. What are we doing with things like wind energy and solar energy? What are we doing right now to help this industry develop?

My second question is in regard to the developing countries. Now we have a really direct relationship with Mexico as one of our trading partners. Have we implemented any direct talks with them? What are we doing to bring them on side? To get past the fact that we're talking about developing countries, here's one specifically: Have we done anything directly with Mexico as far as helping them move along this road?

Mr. Richard Ballhorn: On the Mexico front, though Mexico is an OECD member, it became one too late to be on the list of Annex 1 countries, which Canada is on. That is, Mexico doesn't have any obligations on emission reduction at this point.

Nonetheless, the so-called three NAFTA countries are actually talking about what we could do collectively on climate change. It's actually a current subject of discussion, and we're trying to find out something that would be truly incremental and truly additional.

Mexico is a little bit reluctant because they have a large oil and gas sector, and they just don't know what the implications are of buying into anything in the way of even voluntary commitments. They certainly are looking for projects, though, down the road, once we get some of these rules worked out for these mechanisms. But there is actually an active discussion now with Mexico at the foreign minister level, looking at what might be doable.

Mr. Rick Casson: On the other issue, about alternative energy...?

Mr. David Oulton: I can start, and then I think Sue Kirby can talk about current programs.

I should reassure you that alternate energy is indeed part of the discussion and part of the analysis that's going on at the various tables, whether it's in the context of transportation and the transportation table work, or whether it's in the context of generation of electricity and the work of the electricity table. So in terms of the analysis and the policy development for new measures in those areas, that is part of the ongoing work.

In terms of what exists now in existing programming and what's being done now, I should turn to Sue Kirby of the Department of Natural Resources.

Ms. Sue Kirby: On the wind and solar question, the Department of Natural Resources does have a new renewable energy strategy, as well as a renewable energy development incentive program that is new over the last couple of years. It is focused very much at the area that has been raised around the table today, at overcoming barriers. It's intended to really address the market penetration end of the renewable wind and other alternative forms of energy, and that's in place now.

We've had a couple of questions that go to some of the early actions that we might see. I'd like to elaborate a little bit that we've talked in some measure about the early actions. In the action fund, the $56 million over three years that is devoted to technology early action measures will also deal with some of the elements that have been raised here today.

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We do have a hundred projects that are under active commercial negotiation and consideration right now. Many of those will be at the pilot or project demonstration scale that we've talked about, and those also are intended to deal with overcoming barriers as much as they are with the development of technology.

Thank you.

Mr. Rick Casson: Mr. Chairman, I have one short question.

Are municipalities involved in the tables? Are they involved in the solutions?

Mr. David Oulton: Yes, indeed. As members are probably aware, municipalities are one of the areas where there's some fairly active work going on with regard to climate change.

As a result of that, we do have a municipalities table that is looking at measures that municipalities can take. As well, there are linkages between their table and other relevant tables, like transportation. They're focusing on a number of areas, such as landfill gas and particular projects that might develop in that vicinity. Indeed, it's an area of focus under the process.

Mr. Rick Casson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Madam Torsney is next, followed by Mr. St. Denis and then by the chair.

Ms. Paddy Torsney (Burlington, Lib.): Thank you.

I feel compelled as a business major, Mr. Emmett, to make just one comment; that is, while I certainly appreciate that governments need to set better targets and measure themselves against them, I certainly wouldn't want anyone to have the impression that governments could become completely like business, because the reality is we never get to choose our marketplace. We don't get to niche market. We have to deal with the provinces, territories, municipal governments, or individuals who don't want to buy in to our national strategies and goals. We have to negotiate among a number of players, and sometimes that's not such a nice way to go.

Business never has that obligation. It sometimes has it in terms of trying to get into a new market, but it does get to define itself by its own goals.

So there are things we have to do as a federation in this country that sometimes slow up the process, but bringing people along should always be part of that goal.

There has been a lot of discussion about some of the things that we should be doing and that we could be more active on, and I want to hear more from Natural Resources about some of the things that are being done.

Certainly Mr. Hornung has identified in his documents, including this document, Canadian Solutions, a number of the activities that could be taking place. Some of those, of course, landfill and things, would be under provincial and municipal debate. In an answer to a question from Mr. Caccia, you identified four or five things that would get us to about 19% reduction. I wonder how Natural Resources Canada is working on some of these very issues.

Ms. Sue Kirby: Thank you very much. I can give a brief answer. If there's time, I do have a colleague with me who could elaborate further.

To give you a very brief overview, in terms of the spending that supports energy, the bulk of our spending, apart from the nuclear area, at this time is devoted to energy efficiency—$60 million a year of our budget, and our largest single area is energy efficiency. That deals with information programs, as we've discussed.

I think we've understated how much of that is devoted to regulation. A lot of that develops standards that are sound technically and scientifically, to regulate the energy efficiency of appliances, of products, of lighting. We've introduced recently new lighting standards.

To deal with the automotive area, we have a number of programs that are aimed at educating drivers in terms of their driving behaviour on the road.

We have a number of alternative energy programs that are devoted largely at the research and development end to make sure that we do have the technologies for new and renewable resources.

We have a number of technology programs that are aimed also at working in partnership with our energy efficiency programs to reinforce those.

So we have a regulatory suite of programs, an information suite of programs, and a technology suite of programs, which are all integrated within the department to work together both to get rid of inefficient products now to bring on new ones, and to enable consumers to make more informed choices about those.

I've also mentioned the renewables area as being a new area of emphasis. We currently spend about $14.5 million a year on renewables, a lot of that to ensure both that we have the technologies and that they're able to overcome the market barriers that are preventing them from taking a larger chunk of the market.

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We have about $10 million a year devoted to alternative transportation fuels, to making sure that in the transportation area, which is one of the particularly thorny ones, we are both developing the new fuels and providing the incentives for them to move into the market.

I agree with many of the points that Mr. Hornung has made about areas where we could move further, if there were additional resources available. But that, in a nutshell, is many of the things that we're doing now. If the committee has a few moments, I do have a colleague here from the Office of Energy Efficiency who could elaborate a bit on some of the areas in which we're working now.

The Chairman: I don't know whether we want to have that. Perhaps on a second round. Would you mind, Ms. Torsney?

Ms. Paddy Torsney: I have a second question, and that would be to Mr. Hornung.

I certainly hear you on some of the analysis that needs to be done on other benefits from the choices we make. Wouldn't some of that analysis also be done when we're faced with choices, whether we go this way or that way?

At this point, I gather, trying to identify what those choices might be is an important exercise as well, getting it all down and then choosing from among the pool of things, where we're going to get the greatest greenhouse gas reductions, where we're going to have spin-off benefits, whether it's trees or changes in fuel, and health implications for some of these things. Wouldn't you see that more being the analysis on the second part of it?

Mr. Robert Hornung: To respond to that—and thank you for the question—I would say that in any of these issues there are going to be some trade-offs. It seems to me, however, as David Oulton in fact mentioned earlier, you're not going to implement measures overnight that will accomplish the Kyoto Protocol. It is a process that's going to be happening over time.

What I've been talking about here is the fact that I don't think we've actually taken the first step, in terms of implementing the first step of measures to get the ball rolling. It seems to me, also, that there are a number of measures and areas, opportunity areas, where it's absolutely clear that if we're going to address the Kyoto Protocol, we have to do something.

We have to improve the fuel economy of vehicles. The situation is not as bleak as Mr. Gilmour pointed out earlier, where he said we would have to take 25% of cars off the road. We could achieve the same thing by making cars 25% more fuel efficient.

So there are a number of areas—building codes, capturing landfill methane, improving energy efficiency generally—where it's very obvious that this is what we're going to have to do, and we can start taking initial steps in that regard. I think we will find that many of those initiatives are going to be win-win initiatives, where trade-offs, in a sense, are not going to be an issue because we're going to find that we'll get both economic benefits and multiple environmental benefits from implementing those initiatives, as first steps.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Okay, but I sense a certain frustration in your presentation, and I'm not sure exactly where it's directed. As a representative of the federal government, I think it's partly directed at us, and I gather, even from some of the things you've identified, that those are under someone else's jurisdiction, so I would hope that you're spreading your frustration.

I'm not sure.... Again, in the things that you identified with Mr. Caccia, I looked through your table and I added those up and I came up with 19%, and getting the emissions trading thing down is worth 18%, according to your table.

Secondly, on the one about tax credit for energy efficiency as demonstrated by savings on your energy bill, on the cost of administering the program—and I've been on finance committee where the Auditor General gets a little upset about some of these things—I'm not sure the analysis has been done on that side, and I'd be interested in seeing them do some pre-analysis as a public function on some of the ideas you have, so that we can get the benefit before they attack us afterwards, because they kind of have a habit of doing that from time to time.

Mr. Robert Hornung: As a brief response, I'd say you're absolutely right that in the suite of measures that we've proposed in Canadian Solutions, there are both measures that are within the realm of the federal government and measures that are within the realm of the provincial government, and to address this issue, everybody is going to have to contribute. My point is, I think the federal government needs to demonstrate leadership if the provinces are going to come on board and follow along on this.

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I think there are a number of initiatives in which more work needs to be defined in terms of specifying exactly what a tax credit would look like and how it might work. I think there are also other initiatives that should be looked at. For example, we've talked about district energy systems and the possibility of a federal fund to support pilot projects for district energy systems. A federal fund to support public transport infrastructure is another one. The federal government in Canada is the only national-level government in the OECD that contributes nothing to public transit.

There are also a range of initiatives that you could move forward on now, and for which I don't think that level of analysis is required. There are some first steps we can take, but I agree that there are also initiatives for which some analysis will be required. I hope the publication of this document will contribute to and encourage that sort of analysis that needs to be undertaken.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. St. Denis, followed by the chair. We then have four members so far for a second round.

Mr. Brent St. Denis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one brief question. I want to thank you again for allowing me to participate, and I'll also thank all of our participants today.

As chair of the Standing Committee on Natural Resources and Government Operations, I can report to you here that we have had some some meetings on climate change, and we are planning to have more. This is therefore all very helpful to us.

Maybe I can address my question to Mr. Oulton, specifically on the issue of emissions trading. I know there was a little discussion of international emissions trading, a subject that our committee might pursue in greater detail. On the domestic front, if I understood you correctly, you said there is consideration being given to the idea of adding a table on emissions trading. Part of my question, then, might be what the probability is that this will happen. What are some of the major issues as you would see them?

Mr. Hornung mentioned that in his view and in the view of the institute, there was a lot of potential in the area of emissions trading. It would seem to me that if it is true, the better individual countries develop their own domestic trading schemes, the better the chance that this will evolve into an international scheme. I can't imagine an international scheme that could function without there being a workable domestic scheme, so I see the domestic plans as being the first step. I wonder if you could comment on that, because I would actually see this as a launch pad for us to continue some work on our own committee.

Thank you.

Mr. David Oulton: Thank you very much for that question.

My hope is that we will have an agreement with the provinces within two weeks, and that we will have a table that will focus on domestic emissions trading. I don't think anyone else is going to call it anything other than a table, because we hope we're going to have a more tightly focused group that might reduce the numbers and increase the expertise. At least, that's the theory. Anyway, I'm optimistic that we will have that. It should be up and running certainly within the next month, and sooner if we can do it. I think the only real question is the mandate of that group, and I think we're coming fairly close to getting an agreement on that as well.

In terms of some of the challenges there are in looking at a domestic emissions trading program, there has been some work done by the national round table to date. They have set up a series of examinations of the issue since last spring, and have also had some meetings this fall. We hope to benefit from the technical work they've done, and we will indeed use it a great deal.

It just so happens that we have John Sargent with us this morning. He's with the Department of Finance and is a member of one of the groups that has been looking at the possibility of setting up this other group, at what its mandate might be, and at what some of the issues are it will have to grapple with. So to succinctly answer your last question about the issues this table will look at when it's constituted, perhaps I could ask John Sargent if he would address that.

Mr. John Sargent: Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Oulton has indicated, we do have a major starting advantage with the work that the national round table has already done. In many cases, it's a question of extending their work.

Obviously, I think most people would agree that there is a good deal of further work required in this area in order to really flesh out options and understand how they would operate. Within the broad title of emissions trading, you have quite a range of options in terms of just how many emissions would be covered by a trading system itself—and I'm talking about the domestic side now. Of course there is also a whole range of preparations that need to be undertaken to get a better handle on the analysis of the potential contribution of this to an overall package response to greenhouse gas reduction.

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And just as a final topic that I would flag, I think the linkage to what one assumes may be happening on the international side is really very important in understanding how this would affect the domestic economy.

Mr. Brent St. Denis: That would be fine for now for me, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I'll leave you lots of time.

The Chairman: Mr. St. Denis, we are grateful for your presence and your participation, and we welcome you anytime. Your committee is our committee and vice versa.

Let me try to compress things as fast as I can. We are running out of time, but I would like to make sure we can have a second round.

I will start by focusing for a moment on page 7, on the issues that are covered in the presentation by the secretariat. Let me preface this by saying that whatever remarks I make, they are not addressed at you, ladies and gentlemen, but to those in another room who make political decisions that you have to implement. I therefore absolve you, urbi et orbi.

The issues that are covered are regretfully wanting in something that is extremely central to this exercise. Under the heading “Sectors”, there is not one item that relates to fiscal policies and the role of the Department of Finance. This particular aspect was highlighted in the Beyond Kyoto report of this committee last December. It was also fleshed out with an appendix, and I find it most regrettable that it has not found its way into the issues or the sectors that are outlined here.

Where are the perverse subsidies that are presently being offered to the oilsands development industry going to be dealt with? Where are the perverse subsidies that are presently tilted in favour of commuters with cars as opposed to commuters without cars going to be dealt with? Where is there going to be a reference to energy conservation and energy innovation, and possibly to incentives that are obviously badly needed and probably would come through fiscal policies? The question of landfills has already been raised. I would hope that perhaps it is buried, or is meant to be under the bullet “Municipalities”.

There is another sector that is missing and was not raised in the past, and that is the role of retail outlets. The retail industry in Canada consumes a lot of energy, particularly the food retail outlets. Surely they can be canvassed to determine what role they want to play in the reduction of CO₂ emissions.

To conclude this item here, I would say that the sector issue is badly inadequate. It misses a major player, if not the major player, and that is the Department of Finance, despite repeated callings for the role that it ought to play.

The second point I would like to make is that we have the benefit of having this meeting following the Halifax meeting of energy and environmental ministers. The minutes of that meeting were circulated, and I would urge members to find a moment to read them carefully. From them, we learn that

Ministers reaffirmed the two-track approach governments were taking to address climate change—taking actions that have clear net benefits now, while systematically assessing options for measures for sustained reductions.

In other language, let's do the easy stuff now and postpone the difficult stuff until later.

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Ministers made the fantastic discovery of agreeing that low-carbon energy forms, such as hydro-electricity, are an important renewable energy. Hear, hear! We are very impressed.

We learn on page 2 that “Ministers recognized the need to help Canadians understand climate change and how to address it...”. Remarkable.

We move into the summary of decisions. The record of decisions, among other things, comes up with another discovery that hydro-electricity is an important renewable energy resource. We discover further that ministers “...encouraged further examination of specific proposals for tools to serve particular sectors...” and that “Ministers agreed to take action to identify best practices and effectively disseminate that information...”.

We discover that

Ministers agreed to actively encourage government suppliers and participants in government programs to take action...

Ministers committed to explore specific opportunities for investing in greenhouse gas reducing technologies.

Ministers recognized the importance of creative and effective incentives for promoting behavioural changes in the area of transportation, and encouraged more analysis in this area.

How very bold. Congratulations to the ministers.

They reaffirmed the importance of public education. Again.

They approved the public education and outreach interim approach. Fantastic.

They agreed that “a first set of public education early action projects are a good start...”. Well, isn't that marvellous.

They said “Ministers noted the progress being made by the Credit for Early Action Issue Table”. Yes, and so are we doing here today, with some dismay.

Or this:

Ministers noted that any future system of credit for early action must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to a wide range of policy scenarios.

Well, there is some disturbing news buried in that language.

Or this: “Ministers instructed the Table to consider...allocating a realistic credit budget for early action”. How very bold. Or “Ministers requested that the Table proceed to complete its work by the end of 1998...”. Courageous.

We come to the voluntary challenge and registry, which is supported by the ministers, and it is encouraged to become a registry for early actions:

The Ministers supported the Technical Advisory Committee's direction in defining and standardizing reporting requirements for participation in the voluntary challenge and registry.

Boy, that must have taken a long political discussion around the table—I can imagine that—well into the night.

The Ministers supported VCR Inc.'s plans to introduce a new Champion recognition program and the proposed awards ceremony planned for February 1999.

What do you say about that? Isn't it remarkable?

Well, I don't know, let's hope the next report, the next notice to the media, will have some more substance to it.

It seems to me so far, from what I've learned this morning, that we are witnessing here a remarkable cat and mouse game. At the international level, we are waiting for the U.S. to decide. We are waiting for the U.S. to make the difficult decisions. We will move if they move. As Mr. Lincoln already reminded us earlier, on biodiversity, whenever that is allowed to happen on the international scene, that means regression, lack of progress.

I would like to remind you of the history of acid rain, when Canada had to go at it alone because at that time President Reagan was not ready to move. And we did move in 1984-85 and subsequent years. The Americans finally saw the light and signed an agreement in 1991.

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In addition to that, we seem to be waiting for the provinces. One can see the merits of bringing everybody on board in order to move massively, but there is a risk attached to that and there must be some leadership somewhere.

Then we seem to be waiting for the loopholes to emerge so we will know how to best play our game. I would hope that in Buenos Aires the Government of Canada will not end up with the OPEC countries in its negotiating stance. I would hope that the Government of Canada in Buenos Aires will be solidly in the group that will be giving leadership in advancing the agenda and not delaying it or searching for reasons to ask for further studies. I would like to ask Mr. Ballhorn if he can give us that assurance.

Mr. Richard Ballhorn: Of anything I can assure you about, we will not be with the OPEC countries.

The Chairman: Thank you. It's a red-letter day for us. We were with the OPEC countries in Kyoto, and that is why I'm asking this question.

Mr. Richard Ballhorn: No, we were not with the OPEC countries in Kyoto.

The Chairman: You're sure of that. Thank you.

On the second round we'll hear from Madam Kraft Sloan, followed by Mr. Charbonneau, Mr. Herron, and Madam Torsney.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: I just want to go back to the sink issue. If there's a possibility of having our forests, etc., seen as sources rather than sinks, will we still be pursuing sinks as a flexibility mechanism?

Mr. Richard Ballhorn: I'll make a general comment and if you need more detail we can go to our expert.

We would obviously pursue things, if we're rational people, that are of some benefit to us. There's a whole bunch of other things that are being pursued by other countries for their reasons. If sinks were not seen as doing something positive for our own strategy, I doubt if we'd be pursuing them.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: So would the sources be added into our emissions total then?

Mr. Richard Ballhorn: This is where you're getting more technical, so let me call our person forward. It will be useful.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Thank you.

Mr. Art Jaques: That's probably one of the really controversial things going on with sinks. We don't have agreed-to definitions on any of the terms I referred to earlier. Reforestation and deforestation are not defined, so our general approach flows from the framework convention, which is that countries should reduce sources and enhance and protect sinks. As a country with 10% of the forests, it behoves us to do that and to include sinks.

It looks like we are trying to get out of our commitments for other conventions, for example in biodiversity, if we say we don't want sinks in. So we've always taken the approach that we want sinks. Now we're dealing with the way in which sinks were dealt with in Kyoto, and I think everyone will agree they weren't dealt with properly.

There were two views. Sinks, all sinks, was our view and that of the U.S. and a number of Annex 1 countries. The other view was opposed to sinks being included at all, and there were a number of reasons for that. One argument given was that they're too uncertain to make estimates. Another argument was that they're a windfall gain—everyone thinks because we have a large forest we're going to get a big gain out of this, it will help us meet commitments, and we'll have an advantage.

Clearly from what I've said earlier in terms of the uncertainty and the range that these numbers may have, we may not have this large advantage. But there are still reasons for pursuing the inclusion of sinks, taking actions to reduce deforestation, and taking actions to enhance sinks. That's our position.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: I understand that, but if our sinks are actually sources, are we going to include them in our national totals?

Mr. Art Jaques: Given the way the protocol is now worded, we don't have a choice if we are ratifying it. We include them the way the Kyoto Protocol is interpreted. So we're working toward interpretations that are in our interest and in the interest of the framework convention, if those two can be dealt with together.

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Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: And I hope it will be in the interest of nature as well.

Are agricultural processes and agricultural lands included with sinks? How are they included if they are?

Mr. Art Jaques: This starts to get a little complex, and I don't think I'll get into it here in terms of how the protocol is worded. Our interpretation is that agricultural soils for Canada are currently estimated to be a source, but a diminishing source. Our interpretation, in terms of setting our baseline, is that source is included and we would get credit for reducing that source. That's not the interpretation everyone else is taking, so that is still open for discussion. Nevertheless, in terms of the inclusion of soils as a sink, they are not currently included. That is part of the discussions we want to keep on the table.

At the same time, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the science body, at the request of SBSTA will undertake a special report to look at the whole issue of land use—land use change and forestry, agriculture, forestry—in the way the protocol is currently written and the way the guidelines that exist request countries to report, and deal with those issues and produce a report that provides a discussion on the implications. They will not be making any recommendations.

So our concern is that we'll wait two years for that special report to be completed to continue discussions, and they may begin again exactly the way they've been in the past. Those who are opposed to sinks will say “No more discussions, they've already been dealt with in protocol”, and where will we be left then? So at the same time, we want a parallel track to guide the IPCC.

We want to continue. We've had one SBSTA workshop to discuss part of the protocol dealing with forestry. We're hoping to get agreement in Buenos Aires for a second workshop to discuss additional activities to broaden the scope and deal with some of the definitions and the way they're dealt with in terms of the measurement.

The reason we seem to be having difficulty, in terms of whether we want to include or not include—really the core of your question—is deforestation. Deforestation is included as an absolute number in your commitment period, and the removal of all of that carbon obviously will be a lot greater in a commitment period than the small growth, due to the long growing periods for forests in Canada. The special report may flush that out. We need to deal with that in terms of the measuring.

Another term that hasn't been defined in the protocol is verifiable changes in stock. Do we mean stock above ground? Do we mean below ground as well? What does verifiable mean? Those are still some of the issues on the table. You would think a forest, for example, would be defined, but that's not defined either. So all of those terms hinge on that.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Also, if you take a look at forests, if you're talking about reforestation you don't have the same kind of forest growing up as the original forest, so does it use as much carbon dioxide as the original forest did? It's less complex generally, especially if it has been reforested by man, and tends to be a more simple ecosystem. I'm not a forester, so I don't know the science on this, but it seems to me if it has been reforested it's not the same as the original forest.

Mr. Art Jaques: That would depend on what you're planting and what kind of regime you've taken in terms of harvesting. You're correct that in some cases it may not have the same biodiversity. That's another issue that needs to be looked at in light of Kyoto—the sustainability of forests and current forest management practices too. The IPCC's going to talk about that as well.

So we agree, in part, with Mr. Hornung's comments that we shouldn't take decisions until after the special report, but we also feel there are issues that can be dealt with. The issue has already been dealt with in terms of sinks and other issues on a political level, or on a policy level, in the Kyoto Protocol. So it's not clear to us that just sitting there and letting the IPCC undertake the report will solve this issue.

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The Chairman: There will be one brief question now from Mr. Charbonneau, Madame Torsney, and the chair.

Mr. Charbonneau.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Charbonneau: Mr. Chairman, I have a question for Mr. Oulton. In his presentation, he emphasized that the primary mandate of the Climate Change Secretariat was to develop a national implementation strategy in cooperation with the provinces. He noted that the principal instrument of the process was the concept of issue tables.

Since this information is available on the Internet, I glanced at the mandates, composition and work plan of each of the 15 issue tables. Although I cannot get into this much at the present time, out of the approximately 400 people who make up these tables, barely 40, or about 10%, come from Quebec, as far as I can tell.

Is this underrepresentation due to particular awareness or recruitment problems? Does this 10% representation level have anything to do with the fact that some communities have refused to take part in these tables, or is there some other reason for this underrepresentation?

[English]

Mr. David Oulton: I should say that Quebec is fully engaged in addressing this issue. It sits in on all our meetings with other provinces, and it has a most constructive role to play. Indeed, we've worked with them to try to ensure that we got what representation we could in terms of Quebec participation on the tables, and we've been open to any wish for other representation to participate.

Frankly, one of the things we found—and the way in which it broke out between different provinces is in a sense a bit of serendipity—was simply that the issue tables are very demanding in terms of people's time and dedication to them. What we therefore have done to try to create more balance in participation is create a second tier, if you will, of those who can participate who are electronically connected to the table, who can see all of what's going on, and who can put their opinions in, but who are not physically present at meetings simply because they don't have the resource capability to do so.

So we're trying to balance off through other means the discussion at the issue table where we have, if you will, distortions in representation. The distortions that ended up there were really ones simply of serendipity in terms of people's willingness to participate, because people were invited to come, but we think we have other ways of balancing it out.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvon Charbonneau: Mr. Chairman, based on the information available, as of October 13, 12 lists were still in the draft stage. May I suggest that we continue to look for people from the environmental community? There are many environmental research centres in Quebec. The environmental industry is strong and has ties with the environmental industry development cluster. It seems to me that we could step up our recruitment efforts and, instead of the looking for ways of associating them with this process through the Internet,

[English]

the second tier, as you say, I would like more people from Quebec involved in the first tier. I think there are efforts to be made, more than before, if you want to reach people.

Mr. David Oulton: Thank you very much for your comments.

As I say, we are trying to ensure that we get full representation on the tables without making them unwieldy. We are certainly open to looking at other ways of doing it, so we accept the suggestion.

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The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Charbonneau. Mr. Herron.

Mr. John Herron: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have two quick questions—one medium one, anyway.

Obviously you've been studying the numerous ways in terms of how we can reach our objectives with respect to reducing greenhouse gases. There were some comments made earlier by the chair in his remarks that we would concentrate on doing some of the things we can do now. The word “now” is rather immediate.

Could you just highlight some of these no-regret initiatives, about which the secretary says we're going to hit the ground running on this, this, this, and this for sure. Could you give me a little bit of a menu?

Mr. David Oulton: I can't.... As my colleague Sue Kirby mentioned, there are about 100 technology-based projects that are currently being commercially negotiated, and they—

Mr. John Herron: To a couple of nice ones....

Mr. David Oulton: It probably wouldn't be fair for me to pre-announce them, because they're not fully negotiated yet. But they range all the way from using alternative sources for alternative energy for transportation to developing new energy efficiency technology to landfill gas. There's a whole range. It wouldn't be prudent for me to pre-announce something that's currently being commercially negotiated. But certainly it's the intent to see that those are coming out, and I think you will see the announcements of those coming out over the next month and continuously over the next year or two.

Mr. John Herron: I wouldn't want to push the prudent line too much, but in terms of hydro-electric energies, can you share with us any thoughts that have been developed in terms of the government taking a very aggressive stance in terms of developing lower Churchill?

Mr. David Oulton: That's not within the climate change secretariat's ambit, but I can pass that on to Sue Kirby. It's a broader question in terms of discussions between the government and the proponents.

Mr. John Herron: Sure.

Ms. Sue Kirby: As I suspect you're aware, there are ongoing discussions with the Government of Newfoundland. It is not something that I can really, at this stage, say exactly where we're at or where we may be. The best I can say is there are active discussions going on.

Mr. John Herron: I have another question, Mr. Chair.

I have actually enjoyed some of this walking down memory lane with respect to the Department of the Environment. Between 1984 to 1993 we went from a department that was about the seventh in size to a department that is essentially around the 21st in size.

A lot of people talk about whether it was going to be economic Armageddon if we actually addressed things that have been challenges, like the Kyoto Protocol, or addressed things such as acid rain. But during those days we had a prime minister who was fully engaged with respect to the environment dossier.

Given the energies we've seen in so many different departments, my question to Mr. Hornung is ultimately, for us to be able to really coalesce this matrix of departments, who definitely have the best of intentions, and with the amount of energies that are being applied to this, are you almost somewhat shocked that there isn't prime ministerial involvement on this file in a more public manner?

The Chairman: That will be your final small, harmless question.

Mr. Hornung, briefly please.

Mr. Robert Hornung: Yes. To respond to that question, I think the environmental community has continually called for the Prime Minister to play a more active role on this file. That level of leadership is needed not only to demonstrate within the federal family that some action has to move forward, but also to send a clear signal to other stakeholders and provinces about the government's commitment to this issue. And I think from our perspective, the contrast between the public face of Jean Chrétien on this issue, the Prime Minister, and the public face, for example, of President Clinton on this issue is quite a contrast.

The Chairman: Thank you. We have Madam Torsney, followed by the chair, and then it's time to wrap it up.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Thanks. I guess, judging from the conversation, we can expect that in question period there will actually be some questions about environment from the parties opposite.

Mr. John Herron: I had one. If you're at QP maybe you'll be up some time, as parliamentary secretary.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: I think my second question from the last round is directed to Ms. Kirby's expert, and while that person is getting to the table, perhaps I can also request that we act on Mr. Jordan's suggestion that we get some listing of activities that are happening within the Department of Natural Resources. Perhaps for headlines for those listings, we could use the ones that were suggested by Mr. Hornung's and Dr. Suzuki's report.

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Mr. Nick Marty (Director, Demand Policy and Analysis Division, Energy Efficiency Branch, Department of Natural Resources): My name is Nick Marty, and I'm with the office of energy efficiency.

We have a number of programs to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy. We do report on them annually in our annual report to Parliament under the Energy Efficiency Act. Our next report will be coming along in a month or two. In recognition of some of the concerns of the Auditor General's Office, we will be reporting on about 50 indicators of progress that we are making under those programs.

Because time is limited, I'll just comment on a couple of aspects of these programs. One aspect is that although it's often thought that we have a voluntary set of programs, we actually have major regulatory programs.

In the case of refrigerators, for example, in 1996 the average refrigerator being sold was 36% more efficient than the average refrigerator being sold in 1990. That's a direct result of our regulations.

Another example is that in 1990, 60% of the natural gas furnaces that were sold were low-efficiency ones, as opposed to mid-efficiency or high-efficiency ones. In 1996 there were no low-efficiency natural gas furnaces sold in Canada because our regulations prohibited the sale of all furnaces below a 78% level of efficiency. So Canada actually has, in the case of energy-using equipment, one of the most rigorous regulatory programs in the world.

In talking about housing, the retrofitting of housing is certainly a key area, as Mr. Hornung mentioned. Among the new programs we introduced this year, as a result of an increase of funding of $20 million a year that came from the federal budget, we will have an EnerGuide for houses program that will be $2 million a year. Under that, we will indeed be supporting audits of houses across Canada very much along the lines of what Mr. Hornung outlined. We will be giving financial support to these audits with the belief that with this and with some information we can encourage homeowners to get the economic benefits of retrofitting their homes.

Another case is the model energy code. We developed this with the provinces and the National Research Council. It's a model energy code for houses and commercial buildings that would result in improvements in new buildings of about 15% to 30%.

My understanding is that so far, with the exception of the City of Vancouver, no jurisdiction has yet committed to actually introducing those codes into regulation. That's within provincial jurisdiction.

We have started this year with a new program on which we are spending $10 million a year to provide an incentive through paying for design costs for the construction of commercial buildings that are 25% more efficient than those levels set out in the model commercial building code. We actually believe that being 25% more efficient than the code is economical to do, let alone using the code levels themselves, which are certainly economical to undertake.

I could go on and on, but I don't think there's time for it. I'll just say though that while Canada is becoming more energy-efficient—we've done analyses to demonstrate that we have been improving our energy efficiency since 1990—the fact is that the economy and the number of houses, cars, and passengers driven keep growing, so efficiency increases keep getting offset by the fact that the economy and population of the country keep growing. Indeed, in order to achieve the current objectives, we are going to have to do more than what we're currently doing.

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Ms. Sue Kirby: Mr. Chair, not on our existing programs but one of the points you yourself raised, about the role of retail outlets in the issues table process, I thought it was worth clarifying that this is in fact taking place. The buildings table does deal with retail outlets.

The Chairman: Building conveys a notion of non-public places that is very limited. Anyway, it doesn't seem to convey that particular notion that relates to freezers, the way food is kept fresh for the purchasing public, and so on. It seems to be addressing the existing shell of a building, and not the very dynamic aspect of retail, where a lot of energy is consumed.

My question to conclude is of Mr. Oulton, and it is simply this: Will the issue of perverse tax subsidies, namely subsidies that encourage a greater production of carbon dioxide, make its way and be listed under the “Sectors” heading of chart 7 on page 7? Also, will energy innovation make its way under “Sectors”?

I appreciate the fact that electricity is listed there, but electricity does not convey the notion of innovation. If we are to get somewhere, we need a tremendous investment of thought and resources on the subject of innovation, which of course brings in its wake also the question of energy conservation and efficiency, which has already been discussed. So I'm asking you whether you intend to expand the sectors listing to include perverse tax subsidies and energy innovation.

Mr. David Oulton: Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question.

With the existing sector tables, whether they are looking at options that deal with fiscal measures, or that deal with perverse subsidies, or that deal with regulatory impediments or other impediments, the intent currently has been not to look at a particular measure and study it, but rather through the sector say that in looking at your options you should be looking at all options you can use that would enhance our ability to reduce our emissions. So we have not created those specific focus areas; rather, we've asked all tables to deal with them as part of their ongoing work, and then we've asked the modelling and analysis group to be able to integrate those measures and put them together in their analysis.

Our feeling is that the issue of innovation, energy conservation, the level playing surface issues more broadly raised and subsidies, as well as the fiscal issues, should be raised within the specific tables themselves. Indeed, what we try to do is provide ongoing, active guidance to the tables in their work, and we will start being able to focus, as they turn to their options paper, on whether they are looking at the full range. So it's our intent that this be looked at, but not segregated out, rather as part of the integral work that those tables are doing.

The Chairman: Did you submit to this committee this morning a reference to these tables? Would these focus areas you are referring to, which you have not yet created or you are about to create, not be important for public discussion? And if so, would you not want to include them in your presentation?

Mr. David Oulton: The reason I've mentioned it is that they are already part of the ongoing mandate that each of those tables has, in our view. When we ask them to look at the full range of options, these options include both fiscal options, regulatory options, and subsidy options. So if you will, it's written into the mandates for each of the tables that you have referenced.

The Chairman: Excuse me for interrupting you, but don't you think they are sufficiently important, if they are included in your mandate, to include them in your strategy paper?

• 1220

Mr. David Oulton: Indeed, Mr. Chairman, I think they will be included in the strategy paper.

The Chairman: Why not this morning?

Mr. David Oulton: In essence, because they are one of a number of options that could be used. We didn't list all of the options that were being looked at. Rather, we listed the vehicles we were using. But it wasn't because we were not suggesting that they would be looked at. We see them as being part of all of those table mandates.

The Chairman: And when will they be looked at?

Mr. David Oulton: They will be looked at as the tables are doing their options work over the November to May period.

The Chairman: But if they're not included in the listing of the tables, how can they be discussed if they're not listed?

Mr. David Oulton: They're included in the mandates that each of the tables have when we've asked them to look at all possible options.

The Chairman: I'm sorry, but on page 6 I don't see any reference to the content of the issue tables. They are just process-oriented, as the whole strategy is, and it is not oriented to content.

Mr. David Oulton: The content of the issue tables are provided in the mandates, Mr. Chairman, that are on the web site that was alluded to earlier.

The Chairman: I see.

Mr. Emmett, would you like to wrap it up please?

Mr. Brian Emmett: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In some ways I feel I started all this by reporting in May. I did report in May and made some observations. We've been asked by the committee to come back and give Mr. Oulton the benefit of our wisdom in examining his plan, when that plan becomes available in the year 2000 or late 1999—I'm not quite sure where your dates are. When I do that, I think I'm going to be taking into account the fact that I think there's a general consensus that people want action on climate change, and I think there are many ingredients in action for plans and consultations and good process and so on. But at some point, someone somewhere must actually change what they're doing, and I'll be looking for this.

I'm very pragmatic. I'll be looking even for small steps in the right direction. I know it was mentioned earlier on in this discussion that small steps might not be enough, that we might need large steps. I'm trying to be very pragmatic and look for small steps in the right direction.

My bottom line is very simple. Have we stopped digging that hole we're in?

The second point I'd like to make is that I believe a necessary condition for sustained action, that action people are looking for, is good management. This is not to suggest that the government can be a business. It's a much messier and more difficult situation than that. But I do believe there's a tendency in government to systematically undervalue the process of implementation. There's a lot of focus on policy and negotiation and often a systemic problem with implementation, and those are the sorts of things I'll be looking to see when we come back to this issue in the future.

One way to sum it up is to what extent will future plans reflect the recommendations we've made for improved transparency and better practices?

A final point I would make is that I think it's particularly important to focus on transparency and reporting. I think I as commissioner can be valuable to the committee, but a detailed examination of a major question is going to take us one year to eighteen months from start to finish to deliver to this committee or to Parliament. That's a long time. And I think a key thing for parliamentarians is that there's no reason to wait this long to get information on how things are going, but there should be routine consolidated accessible reports available to you on a regular basis so that you can understand and monitor what's going on.

I believe Mr. Hornung made the point about political will. It's awfully difficult to have political will if you don't have the information to become involved and engaged in an issue. So I place a lot of emphasis on that, and it's one thing I will be looking for in coming back to this issue in a couple of years' time.

The Chairman: I want to thank you for your three points, Mr. Emmett, and add a fourth one, which is that my colleagues and I have learned this morning that we are supposed to read the web site before having a meeting of this nature. Since that, however, places a considerable burden on the limited time available to parliamentarians, perhaps may I suggest that when we have a subsequent meeting in the future what is on the web site that is relevant to the discussion be put on paper so that we have the full documentation before us. It seems to me that this is a fairly reasonable request.

• 1225

Having said that, I want to thank all the officials present at the table and in this room, the interpreters and other people, for their time and effort and the input and the answers we have received. It was a very comprehensive and educational session. We will certainly meet after Buenos Aires.

This meeting is adjourned.