ENSU Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, November 19, 1998

• 0911

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Charles Caccia (Davenport, Lib.)): Bonjour, tout le monde. Welcome.

You may recall that yesterday we adjourned at page 82.

Mr. Marc Toupin (Legislative Clerk): Yes. We're on clause 27, L-12.

(On clause 27—Attorney General to be served)

The Chairman: We are now on an amendment proposed by Mr. Gallaway, L-12, which you will find in the larger collection, in the thick book on page 82. It deals with clause 27.

Mr. Nelson Riis (Kamloops, Thompson and Highland Valleys, NDP): Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order. I understood I was going to be pinch-hitting for my colleague here until 11 a.m., but there's been a decision to go beyond 11 a.m. Is that correct?

The Chairman: No decision has been made to go beyond 11 o'clock, to my knowledge.

Mr. Nelson Riis: All right.

The Chairman: But if the committee wishes to go beyond 11 o'clock, the chair is always very flexible and amenable.

Mr. Nelson Riis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: So we're on page 82, please, if someone wishes to move it.

Madam Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney (Burlington, Lib.): I'm not sure if it's necessarily a good thing that I move this motion, but I will note that it is the same as 83.

The Chairman: Yes, we realize that as well. We could call on Mr. Gilmour instead, if that's the wish of the members.

Mr. Gilmour, you have the floor.

Mr. Bill Gilmour (Nanaimo—Alberni, Ref.): This submission comes out of nine different witness groups, to make the government a mandatory party to the government protection actions. It gives an actual timeframe of 20 days; it's pretty self-explanatory.

It's R-9, page 83.

• 0915

The Chairman: For the benefit of the committee members, particularly the new ones, could you tell us which witness groups are proposing this amendment?

Mr. Bill Gilmour: This amendment is proposed by the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association, the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association, the Canadian Manufacturers of Chemical Specialties Association, the Canadian Petroleum Products Institute, the Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers' Association, the Alliance of Manufacturers and Exporters Canada, and the Canadian Fertilizer Institute.

The Chairman: Thank you. Your motion is identical to that by Mr. Gallaway in the text.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: Yes.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions or comments? Madam Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: I know Mr. Gallaway mentioned to me a rationale for why he wanted it to move to 20 days. I just wonder if you have a similar rationale or what your rationale might be.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: No, but that came from the witnesses.

The Chairman: That was in briefs submitted mostly by industry.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Mr. Gallaway mentioned to me, in the fairness of fully illuminating the issue, that he thought in remote locations it might aid in the serving of notices and in the process.

The Chairman: I see. You mean in the remote locations where the telephone has not arrived, so they do it by horse?

Ms. Paddy Torsney: If Mr. Gallaway were here, he could tell you about those remote locations, no doubt.

The Chairman: You have the motion by Mr. Gilmour before you.

(Amendment agreed to—See Minutes of Proceedings)

We move now to R-10. It's in the name of Mr. Gilmour. The floor is yours.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: R-10, page 84, so moved.

The Chairman: Would you like to explain it?

Mr. Bill Gilmour: This makes the government a mandatory party. A number of witnesses said the government was not part of the action. This brings the government into it.

The Chairman: Madam Torsney, please.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Thank you. I think if the mover were to look at line 10 of the bill he would see that the Attorney General of Canada has an option to participate in any suit it is interested in participating in. The effect of this motion would be to make the government a mandatory party. Again, this is a situation where it's a citizen suit and the government has the opportunity to participate if it chooses. So I don't think this would be a great amendment.

The Chairman: Are there any other questions or comments? Mr. Riis.

Mr. Nelson Riis: By expanding this, what are the implications for the government? To what extent does it commit the government and what are the implications of that?

The Chairman: As I understand it correctly, and I'm not a lawyer, this would introduce an additional step in the procedure and prolong it in favour of the defendant. Perhaps you could ask Mr. Moffatt to give you more. He could reply.

Mr. John Moffatt (Consultant, Resource Futures International): I'm not sure whether this does what Ms. Torsney or Mr. Gilmour suggested. I think this just excuses a party from serving a document on the Attorney General, as was required in the previous clause, if the Attorney General has already been served because the Attorney General was a defendant in the action. So this just removes what would be an unnecessary burden on the plaintiff.

• 0920

The Chairman: Mr. Gilmour.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: We had a number of witnesses, and their point was that the government, by not being forced into it, could duck the issue. Our amendment was much stronger, but the legal beagles got at it and it appears to be weak. We said the Attorney General shall be a mandatory party and shall have all rights and obligations. That brings the Attorney General in.

If you recall, the witnesses in many cases said the government could use this to duck an action.

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds—Grenville, Lib.): Is this R-10 or R-11?

The Chairman: We are on R-10.

Madam Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: While Mr. Gilmour is looking for that, I was also giving the defence for why I didn't support R-11, so I pre-empted that one.

I think the group of amendments he's dealing with focuses around bringing the Attorney General into every suit, and I'm not sure of the exact significance or necessity for R-10 or R-11. I think it's fairly clear in the legislation and this is unnecessary.

The Chairman: Are there any further questions or comments? Mr. Gallaway.

Mr. Roger Gallaway (Sarnia—Lambton, Lib.): My understanding is that one of the deficiencies that was perceived by a number of groups was the government's persistent failure to enforce the act, so this act under clause 27 gives people a right to sue. If it's a question of enforcement, the government is the one that is ultimately required to enforce; therefore when a third party takes action, why would the government not want to be a party to the enforcement? Why would you want a third party to be part of it?

I think the thrust of Mr. Gilmour's amendments is really to say it's not a question for the Attorney General to decide whether they will or will not jump into a particular lawsuit; we're taking this as a serious matter and the Attorney General should be a party to it.

The Chairman: Yes, but you're debating R-11 and we are on R-10.

Mr. Roger Gallaway: I thought Ms. Torsney referred to R-11.

The Chairman: No, she just said she had jumped the gun and had commented on R-11, not R-10.

(Amendment negatived)

The Chairman: We will move now to L-13. Mr. Gallaway.

Mr. Roger Gallaway: Let me just advance the same argument. The intent of this amendment is this. The stated government purpose of the Environmental Protection Act is to deal with persistent non-enforcement by government of its legislation. The government, therefore, should be made a mandatory party to such lawsuits, as the lack of government enforcement is the issue. Currently clause 27 allows the Attorney General to decide whether they will opt in or out, or participate in these suits as a party or otherwise.

It's my recollection that persistent non-enforcement of its legislation is the reason set out in the red book for the Environment Protection Act suits. One could conclude that it's the government's failure to act that is at issue, so in fact the government should be a mandatory party and should participate in these suits, and it shouldn't be optional to them.

• 0925

That's the thrust of this. If we're talking about enforcement, it's we here who enforce and it's not third parties. So if third parties want to initiate, then we should join in; it shouldn't be optional.

The Chairman: Would you like to move this amendment.

Mr. Roger Gallaway: Yes, I'm sorry. I will. I move amendment L-13.

The Chairman: The clerk informs me that this amendment and amendment R-11 on page 86 are interrelated to the point that if L-13 carries, then R-11 cannot be put. They are of a very similar nature.

Are there any questions? Mr. Riis.

Mr. Nelson Riis: Mr. Chairman, could we ask Mr. Cameron to comment on the implications of this?

Mr. Duncan Cameron (Legal Counsel, Legal Services, Department of the Environment): Certainly. The implications would of course be that the Attorney General, in other words Her Majesty the Crown, would be a mandatory party to one of these civil suits. And the comment I would make to you is that if you look at the civil suit as a way of getting at the crown to enforce its laws, then one could see that it would be an argument in favour of making the crown a mandatory party. But that's not the way we look at the civil suit provisions.

The way we look at the civil suit provisions is that it's an opportunity for individual citizens to take action against an alleged violator under the act through the civil courts, and the remedies available in that kind of case would be things like a declaration or an injunction to get the alleged offender to stop the polluting act.

As we indicated earlier, if the goal is to go after the government, then the proper mechanism for that would not be a civil suit such as this, it would be judicial review. And I would simply point out that in subclause 42(2) of the bill we have a provision that: “Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted so as to repeal, remove or reduce any remedy available to any person under any law in force in Canada.” My reading of this would be that nothing in the civil suit provisions or in the act as a whole would limit the ability at any time to pursue judicial review.

So it's really a question of which is the appropriate procedure to achieve the goal you have in mind. We think we've framed the civil suit procedure in a way that allows citizens to achieve their goal without limiting at all the ability to file for judicial review.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Jordan.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Mr. Chairman, I'm not a lawyer either, but there seems to be an inconsistency here, because when we talked to industry about enforcement they said they're all for voluntary compliance, and then if there's a problem, they want to drag us in because we didn't enforce the law.

It comes down to what's worse, not enforcing the law or actually polluting? I think this is a very dangerous road to go down.

The Chairman: Mr. Gallaway.

Mr. Roger Gallaway: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to read a quotation from the red book, and I think this is the philosophical—

The Chairman: You mean Mao Zedong's or the Liberal Party's.

Mr. Roger Gallaway: It was called Creating Opportunity. You may be familiar with it. The quote is at page 69 and it says:

We will use the forthcoming review of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act to examine giving members of the public access to the courts as a last recourse if the federal government persistently fails to enforce an environmental law.

In that case, if I'm true to my school, the reason for this provision is simply because the federal government has persistently failed to enforce the law. So we're saying to a third party, you can do it.

Who's going to do it? Is the environment department going to persistently fail to enforce the law and therefore we're going to let the public enforce it? When there's a case of enforcement—and it has to be a civil enforcement, we cannot give to third parties other criminal or quasi-criminal rights to prosecute—if in fact it is for this reason, then should the federal government not in fact be made a party to the action?

I'm going to assume that most people who institute a civil action for enforcement are not doing so on a frivolous or vexatious basis, that they're investing money in enforcement for what they believe to be legitimate reasons. Based on that belief, I believe the federal government should be made a party to such actions.

• 0930

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Herron, please.

Mr. John Herron (Fundy—Royal, PC): My question, perhaps to Ms. Hébert, is what would happen if a given company received permission to carry out a particular function from the federal government and the result, although unexpected, was that it created a fair amount of pollution? Would the company be able to claim that the government said it had permission to do it as a legitimate excuse to get out of why they actually did the pollution in the first place?

Ms. Monique Hébert (Committee Researcher): Yes, I believe so, Mr. Herron, under clause 30. This clause sets out various defences that could be raised. It would be a defence to an action. It wouldn't preclude bringing the action, but the fact that the party was authorized by a federal department or province to do the act that indeed contravened CEPA and led to the environmental damage is a defence that could be raised at trial.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Madame Girard-Bujold.

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold (Jonquière, BQ): Mr. Cameron, in what way would the inclusion of this clause and the application of its provisions be harmful? What dangers does this clause represent for the government?

[English]

Mr. Duncan Cameron: I'm afraid there's an aspect of that question I'm unable to answer. I can simply explain what it would do. I'd also take the opportunity to point out that we modelled this provision on the provisions in the Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights. In the OEBR the provincial crown has the same discretion to decide whether to participate as a party, and we felt that it was appropriate to give the federal crown that same discretion to decide whether to participate. One could conceive of a situation where you really have what is essentially a private dispute between an individual plaintiff and an individual alleged offender who would be the defendant in the case, and it may not be appropriate for the crown to participate—or not to participate as a party. The crown can participate in litigation in a variety of ways, for example, as a friend of the court. This is another option that has been left open in the drafting of the bill.

The Chairman: Mr. Riis, followed by Ms. Torsney.

Mr. Nelson Riis: Mr. Gallaway, would this motion then eliminate any need for a 45-day notice or whatever? That's just gone completely?

Mr. Roger Gallaway: You would have to refer to the legal counsel. I can't answer that question.

Mr. Nelson Riis: Could I ask legal counsel to comment on that, please, Mr. Chair?

Mr. Duncan Cameron: That would be my reading of the amendment, that's correct.

The Chairman: Ms. Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: In response to Madame Girard-Bujold's question, if the government was added to every single action, then you would have to devote resources to those cases. I think if you're talking about a question of resources, why wouldn't you want to put those in other places rather than dragging them in on every single suit? This is a citizen suit provision; it's unnecessary to have the Attorney General participate in every single one. The Attorney General has the right to participate where it wants to. The legislation is fine as it is written.

The Chairman: Mr. Gallaway.

Mr. Roger Gallaway: I've heard what Ms. Torsney has to say, but I really think she's treading into grounds on which she is not quite certain. The fact of the matter is that people do not need the Environmental Protection Act to launch suits against corporations for certain acts. Certainly, if a corporation has committed an act of negligence, whatever that might be, a civil suit could ensue. But we're talking here about an act of enforcement, and it's a stated intention of the government to be the enforcer of its own laws. At least, that's been the traditional model we have followed.

• 0935

The stated intention of this provision, of this clause, is that if the government fails to enforce its laws for whatever reason—oversight, remoteness, whatever it might be—we're giving to people a right to enter into civil courts for enforcement purposes. We're not giving them the right to go to a criminal court or to lay in information of some description as a summary offence; we are in fact saying they can go to a civil court. This is not about negligence or rights to sue, this is about enforcement.

And it's not about a spat between two parties, although one could imagine that it could occur in certain cases. But remember, Mr. Chair, that when there are spats between parties and they are of a minor nature, the court has a way of punishing those with costs. So I have to assume that people are going to use this provision for its stated purpose of enforcement. Any other suggestion that it's going to be used for oddball purposes, although they cannot be ruled out exclusively, will in fact not be used very often if the courts apply the law and punish people with costs.

(Amendment negatived)

The Chairman: We move to R-11, proposed in the name of Mr. Gilmour. Would you like to move your motion, please?

Mr. Bill Gilmour: This is the one that is very similar to Mr. Gallaway's, so I won't move the amendment.

The Chairman: The amendment is not moved. We can therefore call clause 27, as amended.

(Clause 27 as amended agreed to)

(Clauses 28 and 29 agreed to)

(On clause 30—Defences)

The Chairman: We are now on clause 30. I believe there were conversations yesterday to the effect that this item should be set aside for further reflection, or am I wrong? No? Then we are on page 7, and we have an amendment in the name of Mr. Knutson, L-13.0.

Is anyone prepared to move this amendment? Madam Kraft Sloan.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North, Lib.): I'd like to move this one.

This amendment takes paragraphs (a) through (d) out of clause 30. The reason for this is that the defence of due diligence and the defence of officially induced mistake of law are well established in common law, so there's really no need to lay these out in a legislative document like this. There is a concern, particularly in the case of due diligence, that it may direct the courts to think there should be a new, different defence of due diligence, or that there is a need to change some of the common law principles. There's concern that the courts may wonder why Parliament has laid something out that is already a well-established concept in common law.

• 0940

The Chairman: Is that it? Thank you.

Some members may find it a bit confusing because this page is numbered in some cases as 8 and in some cases as 7. But it is amendment L-13.0.

Ms. Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: My read on this is that it's setting out a system of citizen suits. You would want it to be as clear as possible for citizens who are reading these clauses so that they did realize that there were these defences that are well established in common law. I'm not sure you would in fact suggest that there is some new interpretation of these well-established defences in common law simply by spelling them out. For greater clarity, I think it would be appropriate to leave these in so that all citizens understand the defences that would be options and would be available.

The Chairman: Are there any further comments? Mr. Riis.

Mr. Nelson Riis: I agree. I think this is unnecessary, and perhaps it would even be confusing. In terms of citizen responsibility, I think this motion is an excellent one.

The Chairman: Thank you.

(Amendment negatived)

[Translation]

The Chairman: Let us now move to page 87, where you will find the amendment moved by Madame Girard-Bujold.

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: I move the deletion of subsection 30(1)(d) so as to avoid useless legal battles. What is meant by “the defence of officially induced mistake of law”. I fear that this might bring about legal battles. Why should the defendant be able to invoke, in his defence, the fact that he didn't respect the law because he was induced into making a mistake by an official? This is why I move that subsection 30(1)(d) be deleted.

The Chairman: Ms. Torsney.

[English]

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Again, I would have to disagree. It is in fact a defence in common law, and it would be available whether it was in the bill or not. But for clarity, for people who are looking to this clause to clarify how the civil suits would work, it is important to recognize that it is a defence in common law.

(Amendment negatived)

(Clause 30 agreed to)

(On clause 31—Undertakings to pay damages)

The Chairman: Thank you. We now move to an amendment numbered L-13.0.1, on page 8 of the small collection. It's a motion put forth in the name of Mr. Knutson.

• 0945

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Mr. Chair, this is an important amendment to aid in the participation of individual citizens or citizens groups in a situation in which corporations or individuals can say they want to have costs put in a bank account. If you have individuals who don't have a lot of assets or what have you, it's important that they still be able to participate in these very important initiatives, and this would just put a cap of $500 on the amount of damages—and this is in the Quebec environmental protection act.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Madam Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: What section would that be in?

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: It's in clause 31, and it's just adding it to the end.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: I was referring to the Quebec act.

The Chairman: She's referring to the section in the Quebec environmental act. Do you have it handy?

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: It's section 19.4 of Quebec's environmental quality act.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: With regard to this motion, Mr. Chair, I might also add that this would be restricting the discretion of the court, and I'm not sure there's any need to do that. The court uses its discretion wisely, one might suggest, and this would therefore be unnecessary.

The Chairman: Do we have any other comments or questions? Mr. Riis.

Mr. Nelson Riis: Reference was made to the Quebec legislation. Could someone comment on how that has been used there, or whether it has in fact been used effectively?

The Chairman: Is anyone here prepared to comment?

Mr. Nelson Riis: Mr. Chairman, to re-enter the question, it seems to be a useful amendment. I'm curious as to whether or not it has been used, and what the implications of its use have been.

The Chairman: I'm waiting for a comment.

Madame Girard-Bujold's assistant was head of the environmental movement in Quebec, so he's providing the information.

An hon. member: Ah, the Bloc is supplying the details.

[Translation]

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Excuse me.

The Chairman: No, no, Madame. I invite you to respond if you wish.

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: I was consulting my assistant, who has told me that the application of the Quebec act is based upon this principle. We insist upon the matter of principle rather than on the whole. This leads us to demand that the act be even stricter. I do not have anything further to say, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you, Madame.

[English]

Are there any further comments? Mr. Riis.

Mr. Nelson Riis: This would basically serve individuals, then.

The Chairman: That's what the intention apparently is.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: It encourages the participation of low-income people.

The Chairman: It was proposed by Mr. Knutson, who is famous for his humanitarian tendencies.

Ms. Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: If people are getting clarification about the Quebec legislation and Quebec civil suits, perhaps they could also identify if there are cases in which the Quebec courts have somehow not respected the fact that people were of low income and how they thought a sum of $500 might be appropriate for a low-income person in and of itself. Is there clarity about what's happening?

The Chairman: In the absence of the mover, who probably has done some research on this item before proposing it, I imagine it would be quite an effort— unless there is someone willing to answer the question.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: The mover is Ms. Kraft Sloan.

The Chairman: She's the mover on behalf of Mr. Knutson.

Mr. Riis.

Mr. Nelson Riis: In light of your last comments, perhaps the mover would be prepared to have this amendment stand until we actually can hear from Mr. Knutson.

The Chairman: If there is unanimous consent on the part of the committee, yes, that can be done.

Is there consent that this amendment be stood?

Mr. Bill Gilmour: No.

[Translation]

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Yes.

• 0950

[English]

The Chairman: As an act of courtesy, I don't think it would do any harm. I will ask again if there is consent.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: No.

The Chairman: There is no consent.

Are you ready for the question? Madam Carroll.

Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): I'm sorry, but if it's just a matter of courtesy, I don't see why we can't extend courtesy to the mover in order to allow him to explain it. We've stood a lot of motions here.

The Chairman: Madam Kraft Sloan.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Mr. Chair, we stood motions while we waited for Mr. Gallaway to come to this committee to make a motion. I am in a position where I am moving motions for a number of individuals, such as Mr. Knutson and Mr. Lincoln and so on. I apologize if I don't have all the answers on this particular one, but maybe the mover is the best one to answer some of the outstanding questions.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Can we perhaps ask for the third time whether there is unanimous consent to put this amendment aside?

Mr. Bill Gilmour: No.

The Chairman: This amendment is put aside for the time being.

Mr. Stan Keyes (Hamilton West, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gilmour said no.

The Chairman: I'm sorry, I did not hear it.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: Mr. Chairman, I'm going on a point of principle. We voted twice. If we have to vote three times, it's like asking the question often enough until you finally get the answer you want. People have made their point here.

An hon. member: They do that in Quebec all the time. Let's ask the question another time.

An hon. member: We're waiting for winning conditions.

The Chairman: I apologize to Mr. Gilmour. In addition to that, I have to inform the committee that the clerk has informed me that unanimous consent is not required. It can just be put to the committee for a vote and can be disposed of in that manner.

In that regard, are you ready for the question, that we put to a vote the setting aside of this motion?

(Amendment allowed to stand)

(Clause 31 allowed to stand)

(On clause 32—Stay or dismissal)

The Chairman: We next move to page 88.

[Translation]

Madame Girard-Bujold, could you explain to us the purpose of the amendment you are moving?

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Mr. Chairman, I move that bill C-32, in clause 32, be amended by replacing lines 27 and 28 on page 29, with the following:

raised in the action.

I moving this amendment, I would use the same reason that I used earlier, namely that we must avoid useless legal battles.

[English]

The Chairman: So that new members of this committee can benefit and can overcome the disadvantage of being new around this table, could you perhaps elaborate on the reasons, Madame Girard-Bujold?

[Translation]

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Mr. Chairman, BQ-15 would remove subsection 32(2)(d), that states "any other relevant matter". I would invoke the same reason that I used earlier, namely that we must avoid useless legal battles.

[English]

The Chairman: Madam Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: I'm not sure the member's amendment would in fact stop the courts from considering any other relevant matter. Of course the courts consider relevant matters. Again, this clause has been written to include clarity for people who are in fact looking to the legislation in trying to understand citizen suits. If we believe this is going to be used by individuals as well as by people who are members of citizens organizations and everything else, it introduces better clarity. The reality is that courts always consider relevant matters.

• 0955

[Translation]

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: I do not understand how she can say that it is clear. The phrase "any other relevant matter" is very broad.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: But it is the truth.

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: From a legal point of view, I could perhaps ask Mr. Cameron if he would agree to say that this phrase is so broad that it sets no limits. I fail to understand the need to include in this bill as vague a phrase as this.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Cameron, please.

Mr. Duncan Cameron: I don't think it's too vague, because it's quite clear from the context that this would be any relevant matter that would assist the court in deciding whether to stay or dismiss the action. As Ms. Torsney indicated, the court would do this in any event. However, it serves a public purpose, an educational purpose, to include it in the legislation for citizens who turn to the legislation when contemplating filing a civil suit.

The Chairman: Are there any questions or comments?

[Translation]

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Might I have the opinion of the government concerning the point I have just brought up? I am suggesting that we remove that. What say you?

[English]

Mr. Duncan Cameron: I thought I spoke for the government.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Madame Girard-Bujold, Mr. Cameron speaks on behalf of the government.

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: My question is to the two witnesses.

[English]

Mr. Stan Keyes: No.

[Translation]

The Chairman: From the Department of Justice?

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: It is for Mr. Lerer.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Lerer.

Mr. Harvey Lerer (Director General, CEPA Office, Department of the Environment): Our view when we were drafting this was that the greater the precision in clarity to help citizens, the better the legislation would be.

The Chairman: Did he answer the question?

[Translation]

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: It isn't clear enough for me, Mr. Chairman. The clerk could perhaps supply me with further details. In my opinion, the phrase “any other relevant matter” has no reason for being. It simply grants additional powers to certain people. I do not believe it should be part of the bill.

The Chairman: Madam Hébert.

Mrs. Monique Hébert: I agree that it may not add much. The elements enumerated in subsections 32(2)(a), 32(2)(b) and 32(2)(c) are elements that the court could take into account, even if this is not required. The addition of subsection 32(2)(d) that talks about “any other relevant matter” doesn't add much; it isn't mandatory. However, this expression is often used in legislation. It seems we always want to add a rather open formula allowing one to take into account any other factor that might eventually be invoked.

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Your statements support my position. If we retain this phrase, there is a risk there might be additional legal wrangling. If we remove it, we will avoid that problem. This is why I maintain that we must delete this subsection.

Mrs. Monique Hébert: Nothing prevents the court from taking into account other factors. The text of the bill stipulates that the court is indeed free to do precisely that. As the officials explained, this phrase adds a little bit of clarity, but the court could nevertheless, by definition, take into account any other relevant matter.

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Fine, thank you, Madam Hébert.

[English]

Ms. Paddy Torsney: I just want to clarify one thing. At the end of Ms. Girard-Bujold's comment, she said that it could add trouble. It cannot add any trouble, it just adds clarity.

The Chairman: Mr. Riis.

Mr. Nelson Riis: Could I perhaps ask Ms. Torsney a question?

The point she makes is that this particular clause adds clarity—someone else said the same thing—yet to me it would almost do the opposite of that by giving the courts an almost unlimited array of options.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: No, the clarity is not for courts, it's for the people who are using this legislation to have a civil suit.

Mr. Nelson Riis: Yes.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: The reality is that without this phrase, the courts will consider any other relevant matter. Should people who are bringing about a civil suit know that there could be other relevant matters? Yes, they should know that, I think. It brings clarity.

• 1000

Mr. Nelson Riis: Again, to be fair—

Ms. Paddy Torsney: You might disagree, thinking it doesn't bring clarity. I think it does.

Mr. Nelson Riis: Yes, I disagree, because when I think of certain cases, when people have added on reasons for making a decision— this opens up the aspect, wide open. But perhaps it's just a difference of interpretation. I see it as becoming almost totally inclusive, adding all kinds of potential other costs.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: It doesn't oblige the court. It says the court “may consider”, and then it lists a number of factors. Then, so that people understand the process, it says they “may consider— any other relevant matter.”

Mr. Nelson Riis: And you interpret “any other— matter” to mean more precision.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: People would understand that there could be other things that are not outlined here that might be relevant that the court would be considering, which in fact the court would do.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Madame Girard-Bujold.

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Mr. Chairman, if we agree with Ms. Torsney, in the public interest, the court may stay or dismiss an action. If all of the factors are included, why must we add “any other relevant matter?” Why not define what these other relevant matters are? I maintain that inserting “any other relevant matter” doesn't add anything, but if you were prepared to define these other elements, I would be perfectly prepared to study them with you. I'm still asking that this subsection be deleted. As Madam was saying, it doesn't add anything. If it is already provided for under the act, then why add it in here? What purpose does that serve?

Ms. Paddy Torsney: But that subsection was drafted for citizens.

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: I know, but I am a citizen, Madam.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: In my opinion, this detail isn't necessary for citizens.

[English]

You don't think you need it, and I think it's helpful. That's why we'll have a vote, hopefully soon, before the horse is dead.

[Translation]

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Mr. Chairman, if you truly wish to define the other relevant matters, then define them in the act.

[English]

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Our understanding of how the courts operate may be slightly different.

[Translation]

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: That is what I'm saying.

The Chairman: Madame Girard-Bujold, I believe that we have had—

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Fine, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The Chairman: —the opportunity to discuss this matter in depth. The elements you have brought up are very important.

Are we ready to vote on this amendment? Yes?

[English]

(Amendment negatived)

(Clause 32 agreed to)

The Chairman: You will find the next item on page 9 in your small collection.

Mr. Stan Keyes: Mr. Chairman, was amendment PC-8, on page 89, dropped? You carried clause 32, and I see this is an amendment to clause 32—oh, clause 44, my apologies.

The Chairman: There are no amendments to clauses 33 to 37.

(Clauses 33 to 37 agreed to)

The Chairman: We will then move to clause 38.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Mr. Chair, I'd like to request that this clause be stood.

The Chairman: Yes, it can.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: There's amendment L-13.0.2.

The Chairman: Is there consensus that we stand on Mr. Knutson's amendment L-13.0.2? Madam Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Sorry, I think we've gone all the way from clause 34 down to clause 37. Is that correct?

The Chairman: There are no amendments.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Thank you. I apologize.

The Chairman: The chair did call them, and I heard “carried” from the government side.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Perfect. They're ahead of me. So on clause 38, are we standing down the entire clause?

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Yes, the entire clause.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: That's fine with me. It's up to the group.

• 1005

An hon. member: Because?

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Well, that is because Mr. Knutson is not here, and I think he needs to adequately explain this for us.

Thank you.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: Will he be here next time?

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: I assume he would be.

Thank you very much.

(Clause 38 allowed to stand)

The Chairman: The clerk informs me that there are no amendments for clauses 39, 40, 41, 42 and 43.

(Clauses 39 to 43 agreed to)

The Chairman: We then move to Mr. Herron's amendment on page 89.

Mr. John Herron: Mr. Chair, since we're starting a new clause, and we've come to the hour, could I request that we stretch our legs for five minutes?

The Chairman: All right, we could. I'll suspend the meeting for five minutes.

• 1006

• 1022

The Chairman: Members of the committee, you may recall the fact that yesterday the member for Churchill River indicated his intention not to move the NDP's motion 13 on page 37. It deals with a hormone-disrupting substance and its interpretation. You will find it on page 37 of the thick book: it's NDP-13.

Now, I've been advised that it is the intent of Mr. Riis, on behalf of Mr. Laliberte, to move this amendment to clause 43. Therefore, I will give the floor to Mr. Riis to this effect.

Mr. Nelson Riis: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Colleagues on the committee, when we moved from clause 42 I assumed that we were going to pause at the end of clause 42, as opposed to including clause 43 in our group support. Just so that people clearly understand what I'm trying to do, in an effort to move an amendment to clause 43, I would require unanimous consent to revert to clause 43 for consideration.

So in an effort to provide an opportunity to move one amendment, I would ask the committee for unanimous consent at this point to revert to considering clause 43—which we've already passed, actually.

I assume unanimous consent would be required.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Could I just get a clarification.

The Chairman: Now, I'm advised by the clerk that you have amendments of a similar nature for the clause that deals with definitions with respect to the hormones. The government has an amendment for clause 44—

A voice: That's amendment G-5.1.

The Chairman: That's on page 92, and it would come in clause 44. Then there is another—

• 1025

Mr. Nelson Riis: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, I seek clarification. If the committee provides unanimous consent to revert to clause 43, and an amendment of the definition is put at that point and it is defeated, would that mean that definition could not be reintroduced in subsequent clauses?

The Chairman: In committee?

Mr. Nelson Riis: Yes.

Just so it's clear, what I'm endeavouring to do is to include a definition for hormone-disrupting substance at this point in the legislation. But by introducing it here, if it were to fail, which I assume is a possibility, would that prohibit me from introducing it later in the legislation?

The Chairman: We have, Mr. Riis, a number of amendments or proposals on the subject of hormones and disruptions and the like throughout the amendment book. You're proposing to reopen clause 43 in order to put forward an amendment under part 3, which deals with information gathering.

In my view, it doesn't preclude anyone when it comes to another part of the bill where it is appropriate to introduce a similar motion, keeping in mind that it is possible that the attitude of the committee may or may not change. But what troubles me a little bit more than that is the fact that we have a definition by the government as well, which is coming up very soon, on page 92, which also ought to be given appropriate consideration.

Anyway, we will cross that bridge when we come to it, because the first obstacle we have to remove is to seek unanimous consent to reopen clause 43. So I will recognize Madam Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Thank you. I thought for greater clarity we might note that on amendment NDP-13, if there was a desire to have something inserted here, you would probably be considering amendments NDP-13, PC-3.1 and L-9.1 at the same time.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: No—

Ms. Paddy Torsney: No? All right.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: —because I moved mine to part 5.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Okay.

Mr. Nelson Riis: So this is a sole effort, actually.

The Chairman: It would be helpful to strive for consistency in the definition. There's nothing wrong with having the definition in various parts. Now we are dealing with information gathering, objectives, guidelines and codes of practice, so it would be perfectly all right to start debating this item at this stage without precluding an amendment in another part of the bill.

Therefore, I'm again asking you whether there is unanimous consent to reopen clause 43 so as to permit a discussion of this amendment.

Some hon. members: Agreed.

• 1030

Mr. Stan Keyes: I just have a question, Mr. Chairman. By doing what you're going to do, is that going to cause you now to go back through the entire bill on all the different clauses?

The Chairman: No.

Mr. Stan Keyes: All right. So we're only dealing with clause 43.

The Chairman: We're just dealing with clause 43, which is the one in question.

Mr. Stan Keyes: All right.

The Chairman: Mr. Riis.

Mr. Nelson Riis: Just so it's perfectly clear, I was going to do this originally, but in a sense, you moved too quickly. I assumed we were going to pause after clause 42, which is in the legislation, and then we would move to part 3 for consideration. But we quickly jumped and included clause 43. So it's a technical error.

Mr. John Herron: I think that's quite right, Mr. Chairman. I think Mr. Laliberte submitted a piece of paper before the committee started stating that this was going to be his intent.

An hon. member: No, he didn't.

Mr. John Herron: No? I guess I'm wrong.

The Chairman: The chair is moving with glacial speed, actually. The fact that the chair called clause 43 was due to the fact that there was no amendment at that time. Now, you're quite right that technically perhaps we should have concluded part 2 and then initiated part 3 after the break. I didn't know that anyone was going to suggest a break, on top of that.

So we are now seeking consensus to reopen clause 43. We'll only deem to call clause 43. I understand there is consensus. Therefore, we can now proceed with your amendment, Mr. Riis.

(On clause 43—Definition of “fish”)

Mr. Nelson Riis: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Committee members should refer to page 37 in their thick book. This is in the name of the member for Churchill River. I'll wait for people to turn to that, Mr. Chairman, because there are a couple of small technical changes required to move the legislation. This particular amendment was stood down.

The Chairman: It was not moved.

Mr. Nelson Riis: It's now going to be moved, but because it's in a different sequence, there need to be a couple of small changes.

The Chairman: Your text remains untouched?

Mr. Nelson Riis: That's right, the rest remains untouched.

I would move that Bill C-32 in clause 43 be amended by adding after line 3 on page 25 the following:

“hormone disrupting substance” means a substance having the ability to disrupt the synthesis, secretion, transport, binding, action or elimination of natural hormones in an organism that is responsible for the maintenance of homeostasis, reproduction, development or behaviour of the organism;

I'd like to move that motion for consideration as part of the definition under the interpretation section.

The Chairman: Are there any comments or questions? Is everybody clear with that definition? Does everyone know what homeostasis means?

Mr. Bill Gilmour: Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Yes, Mr. Gilmour.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: I notice that the only difference between NDP-13, PC-3.1, and L-9.1—I assume—is whether we're talking about hormone disrupting or endocrine disrupting. As for whichever is the correct one, we'll have to ask our legal people which one in fact we would prefer to have in the bill.

• 1035

The Chairman: Mr. Gilmour, have you also read the definition on page 92?

Mr. Bill Gilmour: Well, it's quite different. What we're talking about is on pages 35, 36 and 37. These are all similar. The question is, are we going to use “hormone disrupting” or “endocrine disrupting?” Otherwise, it's identical. I'm just asking our legal people which is the preferred—

The Chairman: Madam Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: I just wanted to draw the members' attention to the fact that this might be a scientific issue, not a legal issue.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: Yes. Which one do we prefer? Which one is correct?

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Well, personally I prefer the definition in amendment G-5.1, which is on page 92.

The Chairman: Which one?

Mr. Bill Gilmour: What a surprise.

The Chairman: From the government.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: It would be the OECD definition, and the one the U.S. is using. But it's not up for discussion right now.

The Chairman: I don't know whether we are on the right track here when we are trying to compare all these different approaches in committee and perhaps not giving members the time to think it over.

The definition just referred to by Ms. Torsney on page 92, for instance, is couched in different words. It also contains the term “exogenous”, which is in the same league as homeostasis. These are terms that need to be explained somehow, somewhere for the guidance of the courts, I suppose.

Madam Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Could I identify that we have also included “progeny” in amendment G-5.1 on page 92. That would be future generations.

The Chairman: Yes.

Let's go back then to Mr. Gilmour's question. That was whether a decision should be made between the choice of the terms “hormone” and “endocrine.”

Ms. Karen Lloyd (Manager, CEPA Office, Department of the Environment): I don't think it matters whether you call it endocrine or hormone. Both terms are commonly used and understood in science. I would say that how you define the term will be how you'll use it in the act. That is important, not what you call it.

The Chairman: All right. Could we have your comments on the definition before us?

Ms. Karen Lloyd: On NDP-13, or which one?

The Chairman: The one on page 37, yes.

Ms. Karen Lloyd: It's very specific. I believe it's one that was originally proposed by the United States Environmental Protection Agency. I don't believe it's the term they use any more. It's certainly not the term or the description that the Endocrine Disruptor Screening and Testing Advisory Committee, which reports to the U.S. EPA, uses.

The one we have proposed is the one used by the OECD. It's very similar to the one that EDSTAC, which is the screening and testing advisory committee, uses.

The one difference that ours makes relates to the point Ms. Torsney made. It does extend to the offspring. So if the mother is exposed while she's pregnant, and 20 years later the daughter shows up with reproductive effects, then that would be captured in the definition we proposed. It's not entirely clear to me whether the one under consideration on page 37 would expand to that. I wouldn't interpret that it would.

• 1040

The Chairman: Why was it dropped, or why is it no longer in use by EPA? Would you know?

Ms. Karen Lloyd: I don't know. It's coming up in all of the various working groups that deal with endocrine disrupters, coming up with a definition. Because the topic is so broad, the scientists keep on debating, and that's why in actual fact they end up using a working definition that they can all agree to, instead of a very specific one, because it is extremely broad.

Certainly, all the end points that would be mentioned within this one would also be covered in ours, because I think it's consequent to changes to endocrine function, which would certainly include all these various points and any more, if there were any more.

(Amendment agreed to)

(Clause 43 as amended agreed to)

The Chairman: Mr. Gilmour has a point of order.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: On a point of order, by passing amendment NDP-13, do you mean that the ones on pages 35 and 36 will not come up?

The Chairman: The clerk tells me that since we have adopted clause 3, it can only be reopened by unanimous consent in order to deal with the amendments, which were not moved, on pages 35 and 36.

(On clause 44—Monitoring, research and publication)

The Chairman: We now have amendment PC-8, on page 89, by Mr. Herron. Would you like to move that amendment, Mr. Herron?

Mr. John Herron: Absolutely, sir.

Mr. Chair, it has been brought to my attention, and I seek unanimous consent at the possibility—and I think we did this earlier—that we could deal with each one of the “Minister shalls” as a separate entity, as opposed to as a block.

The Chairman: In other words, you'd like to split your motion.

Mr. John Herron: If I could, please.

The Chairman: Fine, go ahead.

Mr. John Herron: The first “shall” relates to information gathering and monitoring, but it refers to the powers of the minister, and that would take us down page 25 to page 26.

So I would like to move:

44.(1) The Minister shall

I won't read the rest of clause 44, but it refers to line 4 on page 25.

(Amendment agreed to)

• 1045

The Chairman: Next, Mr. Herron.

Mr. John Herron: Second shall refers to line—

The Chairman: On a point of order, Ms. Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: On a point of order, are we going to deal with the next two as they occur logically in the sequence of amendments, or are we going to go to the other amendments that would actually be on—

Mr. John Herron: I think Ms. Torsney is probably quite right.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: No, actually I'm not right.

Mr. John Herron: No?

Ms. Paddy Torsney: But I would like, however, to identify that the BQ-16 and BQ-17 would be identical to Mr. Herron's. Technically BQ would go before PC, but they're identical. The other two of his are split, so I'm half right.

I don't know what the process is; that's all I'm saying.

Mr. John Herron: Jocelyne.

The Chairman: I think there is an important political point here, and I want to thank you.

Mr. Herron, I think we should stick to our original understanding, and therefore the next motion would be the motion in the name of Madame Girard-Bujold

[Translation]

on page 90, amendment BQ-16.

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Mr. Chairman, this amendment relates to clause 44. I move that the verb “may” be replaced by the verb “shall”. Section 44(2) would therefore read as follows: “The Minister may— cooperate”. As you know, the word “peut” is very vague in French, whereas the word “doit” implies that there is an obligation, and this assures us that the Minister will act.

The Chairman: On line 4.

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Yes, exactly, Mr. Chairman. This same proposal applies to line 15, section 44(3).

The Chairman: Please, let us deal with one amendment at a time. Are you ready to speak to the motion?

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Yes, I have already explained to you my reasons.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you, Madame.

[English]

You heard the question, you heard the motion. Are you ready for the question?

Madam Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: The effect of this would of course do what several other amendments from the Bloc are trying to do, which is to force cooperation. Again, I'm not sure you can force cooperation by including this “shall”. I believe “may” is probably more appropriate.

The Chairman: Are there any further comments?

(Amendment negatived)

[Translation]

The Chairman: Madame Girard-Bujold, let us please now move on to amendment 17.

Mrs. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Mr. Chairman, I once again move that the word “may” be replaced by the word “shall”. These two words don't have the same meaning for me. This is a legal document. I say that the law is the law. If we use the term “may”, the Minister is free to do what he pleases. This is what I am saying. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you, Madame.

[English]

Madam Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: I would like to reiterate that I think the word “may” is more appropriate in this bill.

The Chairman: Are there any further comments? Mr. Riis.

Mr. Nelson Riis: Could I ask Ms. Torsney why she feels that way?

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Why I feel that way?

Mr. Nelson Riis: Yes. Why it is a more effective term in this bill, in this particular clause?

Ms. Paddy Torsney: In terms of cooperation, the “may” allows you to act in cooperation; the “shall” forces cooperation even if the other party isn't interested in cooperation. I'm not sure it's logical, necessarily, in this option.

• 1050

The Chairman: Thank you.

(Amendment negatived)

The Chairman: We now go to the amendment presented in the name of the government. It is number G-5.1, on pages 92 and 93. Would you like to introduce it?

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Thank you. I would be happy to move this amendment.

The effect of this amendment would be to oblige the government to do research on this emerging issue, which is hormone-disrupting substances or endocrine-disrupting substances. I think this would allow us to move forward on an issue that is important to this committee.

The Chairman: Could you possibly explain the term “exogenous” to the committee?

Ms. Paddy Torsney: I think it would be a good idea to have the scientists explain that, so I would prefer to turn to Ms. Lloyd.

The Chairman: Please.

Ms. Karen Lloyd: It means a substance outside of the body, so you're not considering things that would disrupt things that are already in there. It means “external”.

The Chairman: Madam Kraft Sloan.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Mr. Chair, I would recommend a friendly amendment to this. Perhaps we could split the amendment so that we debate both new subclauses (4) and (5), because we have just passed another definition other than what appears in (5).

The Chairman: This doesn't seem to be a friendly amendment, apparently.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Could I put it forward as a suggestion as an amendment, then?

The Chairman: No, it can only be moved as a subamendment if you wish to do so, because there's no inclination on the part of the mover to accept it.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Can I move it as a subamendment?

The Chairman: Yes, you can, but could you please repeat the substance of your subamendment?

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: We have just passed a definition for hormone-disrupting substances. The new subclause (5) contains another definition for hormone-disrupting substances that is different from the one we just passed. I'm therefore suggesting we deal with this amendment in two parts. First of all, we should discuss the new subclause (4) as a separate amendment from the new subclause (5).

The Chairman: Are you proposing—

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: That we split it?

The Chairman: —that we vote first on (4), and then on (5)?

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: I suppose, yes.

The Chairman: You're asking for us to split the amendment. There is no—

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Yes, to split the amendment, if that's easiest.

Mr. Bill Gilmour: Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order.

The Chairman: Just a moment, please.

According to the rules as we understand them, it is possible to move a subamendment that would treat the two parts of the amendment separately. First we would have a vote on (4), with a second vote on the new subclause (5). That is possible. In other words, we could entertain a subamendment to that effect, and then members will of course vote as they wish.

• 1055

Mr. Riis, and then Ms. Torsney.

Mr. Nelson Riis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I suspect we're probably going to talk about exactly the same thing. Would Ms. Torsney agree to a friendly amendment to simply replace subclause (5) in the amendment with the definition that we've just agreed to?

Ms. Paddy Torsney: I'm not actually making a point, I'm asking, on a point of order— My question is this: do we vote on whether or not we're splitting them, or we do not vote on whether or not we're splitting them? If we are going to vote on whether or not we split them, do we then want to have a discussion about the merits of splitting or not splitting? I'm just trying to clarify the process before we get into the specifics.

The Chairman: A subamendment to subclause (5) of the amendment G-5.1 as proposed by the government would be in order. In other words, the subamendment can be moved and voted upon. If it carries, we would only have subclause (4) of amendment G-5.1 before us. If all that happens, of course, it would still be possible at that point for a member to move a text in place of the deleted subclause (5)—in a text that's different, of course, from the one that might have been deleted by the committee.

• 1100

So it is now for Mrs. Kraft Sloan to decide whether she wants to move a subamendment to that effect.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Well, my concern, Mr. Chair, is that I'm very supportive of subclause (4) and I would like to give my wholehearted support to it. However, the amendment we just passed to clause 43 is a definition that is virtually identical to one I still have on the books. Therefore, because of my feelings about this particular definition, I think the one we've just passed is a better definition. I would not be able to support subclause (5).

I think it would be rather unfortunate to have to vote against the whole amendment. That's why I would like this split, so members can deal with the two separate issues. I think subclause (4) is an important amendment.

The Chairman: Do you wish then to proceed with that subamendment, as you indicated a moment ago, which is not to split, but to delete, the portion carrying the number (5) at the start?

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: I would like to split these two.

The Chairman: All right, we'll start again.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: I have a point of order.

The Chairman: If there is consent on the part of the mover to split the motion, then we can proceed that way. But we need the consent of the mover to split the motion so as to facilitate the process. We did it in the case of Mr. Herron's motion a few minutes ago.

You have a point of order.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: On a point of order, Mr. Chair, since it is 11 o'clock and this meeting was scheduled to finish at 11 o'clock, and since moving forward on either this amendment or a subamendment would perhaps create a lengthy discussion, maybe we should recognize that it's 11 o'clock and deal with this on Tuesday morning.

The Chairman: Mrs. Kraft Sloan, and Mr. Riis.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: I have another possibility, and I hope this is taken in a friendly way. As an amendment to the government's definition of hormone-disrupting substances, subclause (5), we would take a look at the definition used by EDSTAC, which is the U.S. definition. It's very similar to the government's definition, except that it adds some other things.

The Chairman: Well, this is where the suggestion just made by Madam Torsney would be helpful, so that there would be time to carry out these discussions in an informal manner.

Mr. Riis.

Mr. Nelson Riis: Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I think Ms. Torsney's suggestion is a good one, but it seems that we all agree on subclause (4) without any question. Why don't we— Oh, we don't.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Sorry, but I just think that either you're going to decide that it's 11 o'clock and you're adjourning the meeting, or you're not. So you want a debate—

Mr. Nelson Riis: Okay, I agree.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: —or you don't want a debate.

Mr. Nelson Riis: It's 11 a.m.

The Chairman: It seems to me there is a disposition on the part of the members of this committee to reflect on this particular motion, G-5.1 and it is probably in the best interest of everybody to adjourn to our next meeting.

Mr. Gallaway, you wanted to intervene.

Mr. Roger Gallaway: Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry, I couldn't hear exactly everything that was said, but I'd like to move a motion. Since it is now 11.05 a.m., I move that this committee now adjourn.

The Chairman: We don't need that motion, Mr. Gallaway. We are just about to do that, and we don't need that suggestion.

We will adjourn and reconvene on Tuesday morning at 9 a.m. For the time being, that is all I know.