ENSU Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Monday, October 20, 1997

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[Translation]

The Chairman (Mr. Charles Caccia (Davenport, Lib.)): Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to our meeting. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we will proceed with Consideration of the harmonisation initiative of the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment.

[English]

Those of you who did not attend the meeting of the steering subcommittee have received the schedule of recommendations that was sent to you by e-mail. There is a schedule and there is the substance of the subcommittee report.

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When we have a quorum I will entertain a motion to the effect that the subcommittee report be adopted, if you are in agreement, of course. But for the adoption of the motion to adopt the subcommittee report we need two more members. We can proceed to hear the witnesses in conformity with our agreement at our first meeting that five members of the committee representing two parties would be an adequate number.

Before doing that, may I make a brief announcement to those of you who are interested in the subject of supply in the world of fossil fuel reserves. It is a topic that does not appear frequently in the media, but I think it will sooner or later become a fairly common topic.

The question of availability of supplies, and particularly of the oil supply, is being examined by an agency in Paris called the International Energy Agency. That agency has made forecasts as to when we might run out of non-reserves and it also has an estimate for when we might run out of reserves that are not yet known.

I will not go beyond alerting you to the fact that this agency exists. For those of you who are interested in the long term, particularly in relation to fossil fuel reserves, there is an institution to which you can write by e-mail or fax and obtain detailed information according to your preferences. I will leave a photocopy of a letter by John Ferriter, who is the executive director of the International Energy Agency, with our clerk for those of you who are interested in the subject.

Having said that, we still don't have a quorum. We don't want to hold up our witnesses, so we will proceed and have the adoption of the subcommittee report later in the afternoon.

Mr. Ian Glen (Deputy Minister, Department of the Environment): Mr. Caccia, we'd be more than willing to co-operate if you need to interrupt us at some point in our session.

The Chairman: That's very kind of you, Mr. Glen. If you want to proceed, by all means do, Mr. Glen. Please introduce yourself and your colleagues and then determine in which fashion you wish to proceed. Welcome to the committee, first of all.

Mr. Ian Glen: Thank you, Mr. Caccia. We're pleased to be here this afternoon to share with members of your committee our understanding of the harmonization agreements that are being worked on and then answer your questions.

My name is Ian Glen. I am the deputy minister of Environment Canada. I will introduce my colleagues. Norman Brandson is from the province of Manitoba and he is the deputy minister of their environment department. Peter Underwood is the deputy minister for the Department of Environment in the province of Nova Scotia. Sid Gershberg is the president of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, which is part of the federal government. A colleague is Liseanne Forand. Liseanne is the executive director of what's called CCME, the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment.

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The Chairman: Why is she punished by not being allowed to be at the table with you? How about bringing her forward. We would welcome her. There's lots of space.

Mr. Ian Glen: Well then, as they say in the quiz show, Liseanne, come on up.

The Chairman: Would you like to start then, Mr. Glen?

Mr. Ian Glen: I think I would. I would turn to my colleague, Mr. Brandson. We have material provided to the clerk. If it could be handed out to members, it might assist in going through the presentation we would have at the start.

Mr. Norman Brandson (Deputy Minister of the Environment, Government of Manitoba): I would like to start by giving a very brief background to CCME's harmonization exercise.

We will be necessarily brief in our remarks, leaving as much time as possible for questions and answers that are of interest to you who are on the committee.

First I would like to touch on why we need this harmonization of environmental jurisdiction in the first place.

First, it is because environmental problems cross political boundaries. In Manitoba we're at the apex of the funnel of the Hudson Bay drainage basin and we're particularly sensitive to the need to have a certain degree of uniformity of approach to environmental issues in Canada.

We think that Canadians in all parts of the country deserve a high level of environmental quality.

It is also because federal and provincial governments both have legitimate authority in the environment and really there's no guidance in our Constitution concerning environment.

It is also because we've learned through past efforts at CCME, the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, that co-ordinated action by governments on environmental issues of national importance produces the best results. Acid rain, ozone-depleting substances, and water quality are but three examples of that partnership action.

It is also, I think, because resources are not unlimited. We can't afford to use resources in a way that creates gaps in our environmental management system, through duplication or any other inefficiencies.

Finally, it is because first ministers have been very clear in their direction to environment ministers to improve the system. Environmental harmonization was identified as a priority for the efficiency of the federation exercise. CCME itself identified harmonization as its number one priority in November of 1993, so this exercise goes back a considerable period.

I would describe the work that they initiated at that time as being quite ambitious. We described the elements of the environmental management system in Canada and then attempted to craft the co-operative machinery needed to run the system most efficiently and effectively.

A lot of good work was done. The starting point was a clear statement of the purpose, the objectives, and the principles of the exercise. Real problem situations were identified. We looked at what was being done to rationalize central and local environmental jurisdiction in other federal states.

An environmental management framework agreement, an EMFA as it became known, was drafted, which set out the principles under which this co-operative system would work. Eleven schedules were drafted, which described in detail the federal-provincial operations in each component of the Canadian environmental management system.

This process was not undertaken in haste. It covered a two-year period. It involved public consultation by the individual jurisdictions, as well as the establishment of the national advisory group of stakeholders, which in turn was able to liaise directly with officials preparing draft documents.

But perhaps our reach exceeded our grasp. In attempting to address everything at once, to be comprehensive with this EMFA and this multitude of schedules, it was becoming increasingly difficult to reach a consensus.

So in May 1966 ministers directed officials to prepare a harmonization accord that was simpler than the previous EMFA, which was clearer about the goal of harmonization; namely, improving the existing system to achieve the highest level of environmental quality for Canada. That responded to some of the major concerns raised during the extensive consultations on this previous EMFA document and it focused on a few priority areas where we could show early progress. Specifically, they requested draft subagreements under this accord for inspections and Canada-wide environmental standards. They also requested a paper on a new approach to environmental assessment.

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In the succeeding months, after May 1996, the documents were developed and input received through an electronic forum and written submissions. In November 1996 ministers approved the accord in principle and indicated that work on the two subagreements, namely standards and inspections, was satisfactory and substantially complete. They also instructed officials to complete a draft subagreement on environmental assessment for consideration at their next meeting. We are at that point now. The next meeting is now scheduled for early in November.

Having gone through some of the background, the history that leads us to today, I would ask Ian Glen to deal with the accord itself, what is in it, some of the principles; in fact the harmonization model that was used to structure this accord.

Mr. Ian Glen: The model that was in essence the guide for people to draft the particular documents was to ensure that certain features were captured. It was to be satisfied that in the end you would have co-ordinated action plans to achieve collective results. In essence the parties working together could be focused on collective actions that would address the highest environmental standards. The model would ensure there was freedom to act unilaterally when there was no consensus. It was not a drive to the bottom. If you could not reach consensus, then parties were free to act independently of that.

There was to be public accountability for environmental performance. Accountability regimes were part of the model. There would be no devolution of authority of powers. You would be able to maintain overlapping authorities where federal and provincial legislation did that. Yet generally as a goal you would try to ensure no duplication of activity. It would bring some efficiency and some economy to the application of resources.

Now, as Norman said, we have an agreement in principle before us. I believe that documentation has been shared with members of your committee.

The accord is taken by all parties as a political accord. It sets parameters for partnership. The vision set out in that accord is one that strives for the highest standards of environmental quality for all Canadians. The accord tries to clarify for all governments that they can maintain authorities, but in turn they will try to work to common principles. Some of the principles that are known and accepted generally in good environmental management, such as the polluter-pays principle and the precautionary principle, pollution prevention as the best approach to environmental protection—these principles are captured in the accord as well. From a philosophical to an operational basis, we're trying to set that out in the accord.

The accord will provide safeguards if agreement to act jointly cannot be reached. As I said, there will be in the document a capacity for jurisdictions to act independently of the others where you have no common agreement.

There is an expectation of openness and transparency in the administration of the accord in the subagreements and more critically in the opportunity to ensure people understand how the documents are developed and have input into it. As Norman said, there has been opportunity for public input. There would continue to be opportunity for public input, or a capacity to comment on the drafts of the subagreements as we develop the elements under the accord in the months and years ahead.

We have gone to some lengths to ensure that through the new forms of Internet technology, the Web site for Environment Canada, the Web site for CCME, we have these documents available to the public. In addition we have them in print form, available through CCME. Liseanne may wish to speak more if you want to question on that.

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Accountability to the public through clear and regular reporting: the accord will expect that governments will report on the initiatives set out under the accord or the subagreement and be prepared to declare that for public scrutiny.

Additionally, there is a five-year review for the accord to give all jurisdictions the opportunity to assess at the end of a five-year period and ask themselves if they have it right and if the management regime they want their collective efforts to be committed to is doing what the vision expects of Canadian government.

In terms of the subagreements, I'm going to turn this over to Peter, who will first speak about the standards. He has been the chair of the public servant working group that is developing the standards subagreement.

Mr. Peter Underwood (Deputy Minister of the Environment, Province of Nova Scotia): Thank you very much, Ian.

Ladies and gentlemen, it's a pleasure to have this opportunity to be before you today.

As Ian said, for about the last year and a half I've been the chair of a working group of officials trying to put together an agreement for the establishment of Canada-wide standards under the umbrella of the harmonization accord. We've been working from the principles and the general framework outlined in the accord, as given to you in summary by Ian.

Really, the standards agreement approach is, I think, a more formal and co-ordinated approach to doing what CCME has already been doing for a number of years. There is a whole bunch of examples of standards that have been developed nation-wide. On a voluntary basis those standards are picked up by jurisdictions and written into our permits.

One example is biomedical waste incinerators and their standards for dioxin and furan emissions. We, as a province, the permitting authority for these facilities, write those CCME standards into our operating permits. They have the force of law in our province.

There are a number of other examples. One is petroleum storage tanks. Another is all of the guidelines with respect to the quality of contaminated soils clean-up.

As a small jurisdiction without a lot of research capability or scientific capability, we routinely rely on and have relied heavily in the past on the collective work of the jurisdictions under CCME to help us define what we should be writing into our permits.

In many ways, as I said, the standards agreement really just provides a little more of a consistent framework within which that process can flourish. In many cases where we have worked together it has been successful. We do have standards, and in most cases they've been picked up by provincial jurisdictions and applied through their permitting process.

It's very simple. This process is not driven by a desire to iron out the dearth of guidance in the Constitution with respect to the environment. It's driven by a common view of what the priority environmental issues are, based on an attempt to deal with risks to help in the environment. In each case, the role and the responsibility that each level of government is responsible for may be quite different.

The first step in the process is the identification of priorities. Collectively we look at what the issues of national priority are that we have to work together on in order to make some progress in solving those issues and addressing those problems.

The process described in the standards agreement is an open and accountable one with opportunities for input from all facets of Canadian society at each step in the process.

The second step is the development of a work plan. This is perhaps boring, but we have to work out the outcomes. What do we want to see? What's our objective in dealing with the environmental issue that we've defined collectively as a priority? What are the indicators, the milestones, and the timeframes?

As bureaucracies, as governments, we need to have that kind of accountability built into our structure to make things happen.

What actions are needed? What do we need to actually do to solve this problem? Is it a product standard? Is it an importation standard? Is it an end-of-pipe discharge standard? There is a whole set of tools in the toolbox to deal with environmental problems, and they're going to vary depending on which problem we're addressing.

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Then we look collectively at what our capabilities are. Who has the tools, ability, or capacity to best take responsibility for the actions that have been identified?

The next step would be making that political commitment to the obligations you're willing to accept to help solve this particular environmental issue. That means stating what you're going to do and being prepared to come back to the group of your peers, as ministers, and be accountable for the commitments you've made. So built into the agreement you'll see monitoring or reporting requirements.

Then in keeping with the general framework of the harmonization initiative, if parties are not meeting their commitments there's a process to identify that and deal with it. There's also the opportunity for jurisdictions to act unilaterally either to address the shortcomings in commitments given by one of the parties or to perhaps make the requirements more stringent in an individual jurisdiction.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you. Who's next?

Mr. Ian Glen: Inspections is an area in which you vary somewhat from the standards approach, but at the same time you try to work within the accord and its basic tenets.

Here we're trying to ensure that, as much as possible, there's a single-government-window approach, in essence, when it comes to the task of inspecting, or whatever the particular responsibility could be. Say there's a particular monitoring and then inspection around the maintenance or control of certain deleterious wastes at institutions. As much as possible, it would be done through one source so that there would be one inspection. The industry, institution, or whomever, would know who, in essence, is coming to inspect.

That being said, all jurisdictions would retain their authorities. So we're not trying to ensure that the law itself is changed jurisdiction by jurisdiction, but rather, the capacity to go in and inspect with the authority of either the federal or the provincial laws in play would be available.

Because of that, all governments would maintain their inspection capacities. So this isn't a matter of one area being abandoned by one jurisdiction in favour of the other. It would be determined more by what we're referring to throughout the accord as the best-situated government to conduct the inspection.

Because of that, we'll be more directly involved in developing bilaterals with jurisdictions that will focus more on the nature of the activity. For example, if it was in the area of PCBs, depending on jurisdictions and the nature of the industries for which PCB storage or handling of PCBs would be sensitive, you would look at the capacities in operational terms across the jurisdictions and then determine who best should carry out the particular inspection responsibilities.

In some provinces, by reason of the industries that are located there and concerns around PCBs, they may say it's up to the federal government or vice versa. So it's a rationalization of resources committed to applying the laws that are required from either jurisdiction and for bringing some order to the inspection approach.

Because of that, there would then be concern that we should pay attention to training our people appropriately in a common way so that the skill sets and capacities that your inspectors should have will meet the requirements of both jurisdictions. This is to ensure that in terms of the application of laws and the dedication to obtaining the right results, either laws can be supported well through one officer, or one office, going in to do it.

So it will require us to develop common training programs. Hopefully, it will have us committed to the same standards for the accreditation of our inspectors so they understand well what it is that's needed across the country.

The inspection subagreement will require each government to be accountable for meeting its obligations under the agreement. Say the obligations aren't fulfilled. For example, take a particular jurisdiction in which we work out a bilateral with Norman for his organization in Manitoba. We have them taking the lead on inspections of a particular industry and on the environmental standards we expect of that industry. If it was determined by the federal government that, in our view, Manitoba was not living up to its obligations and that adequate inspection services were not being delivered, we are to engage with them to determine whether alternative plans are required to ensure that the laws are being fully enforced. If alternative plans cannot be worked out to the satisfaction of the parties, the federal government would then step in and resume its full inspection capacities under federal law.

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So we do have a capacity to reconcile what might have been expectations not met. At the same time, we respect the genuine commitment of jurisdictions to serve the one-window concept as much as possible, but again without giving up authority.

If I may then, Mr. Gershberg is going to speak to the environmental assessments.

Mr. Sid Gershberg (President, Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency): Thanks, Ian.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, as jurisdiction for environmental assessment is shared, the challenge and objective in this subagreement is to ensure that we conduct environmental assessment of the highest quality without overlap and duplication.

Over the years, both levels of government have developed environmental assessment processes. While they're similar in principle, these processes also have a number of differences. Consequently, some projects—generally the larger ones—are subject to both federal and provincial environmental assessment laws. The proposed subagreement is really based on the concept that only one process should apply to each project, with one party serving in sort of a lead administrative role and the other having the full opportunity to participate co-operatively in order to ensure that the legal requirements of both processes are met.

The scope of the assessment and the broad analysis of the factors to be examined in an environmental assessment must meet the needs of both parties or both jurisdictions. In this way, we can ensure that the harmonized process incorporating the requirements of each government will be of higher quality than a single process by one jurisdiction alone. For example, the definition of “environment” or of “environmental effects” in the subagreement will be quite broad, because it will incorporate the legal requirements of each of the parties involved in the assessment. It's a sort of additive concept.

To ensure efficiency, the subagreement establishes a framework for the determination of a lead party responsible for the process aspects of the environmental assessment. The lead party, however, is required to ensure that the environmental assessment process generates the type and quality of information needed to meet the legal requirements of each of the parties, as well as the conclusions on the environmental effects as required for decisions by each of the parties.

The subagreement also creates a framework for public participation opportunities consistent with the policies and the legislation of each party. Participant funding to enable interveners to participate in panel reviews will continue to be provided by any of the parties requiring it.

Following the completion of the assessment, each government will use the results to make its respective decision. From a federal perspective, that is on whether to provide funding, to issue a permit or an authorization, or to transfer land. There is no delegation of decision-making under the subagreement.

Implementation of the subagreement will be based on a co-operative approach and will be done through bilateral agreements on a province by province basis. The bilateral agreements will clarify respective requirements and procedures to be followed when both jurisdictions require an environmental assessment, but will not reduce any of the CEA requirements—the Canadian environmental assessment.

There is nothing in this subagreement that requires an amendment to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act for its implementation. The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, which came into force in January 1995, already contains appropriate provisions to allow for harmonization with the provinces, as envisaged in this subagreement.

Thank you.

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Mr. Ian Glen: Mr. Chairman, I should have mentioned when I was giving the structure of the accord itself that there is a work plan that ministers agreed to and encouraged officials to work on when they met in November last year in Toronto. I don't want to leave the impression that the accord is simply the principal document and three subagreements. There is expectation the work will be moving forward on enforcement, on monitoring and reporting, environmental emergency response, research and development, and regimes across jurisdictions. So there are other pieces that will come in due course, but at the same time the priority given to officials by ministers was to start with these as well.

The other comment, if I could—and I'm sensitive to time for members' questions—is perhaps it would help, particularly for new members, Mr. Caccia, if Liseanne Forand took a couple of minutes to explain what CCME is. It is a slightly different construct from normal federal-provincial relations that departments engage in. It has a capacity to work on behalf of the collectivity.

Liseanne, perhaps a couple of minutes, briefly?

Ms. Liseanne Forand (Director General, Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment): Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Chairman.

The first precursor to CCME was formed in 1964 by the resource ministers. Environment ministers joined the council in the 1970s and in 1989 formed the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment. CCME is a not-for-profit corporation established under the Canada Corporations Act, called CCME Incorporated. It has bylaws and other corporate mechanisms.

The members of the corporation are the thirteen ministers of environment for the federal government, the ten provinces and the two territories. All members are equal members in the corporation and the chair rotates annually among the members. Every thirteen years each of the members sits in the chair. The council is funded strictly by the members, and it is supported by a small secretariat located in Winnipeg.

The objectives of CCME are set out in the bylaws of the corporation. They are three objectives, as follows: to establish and maintain an intergovernmental forum for discussion and joint action on environmental issues of national, international, and global importance; to harmonize the development and implementation of legislation, policies, procedures, and programs; and to develop nationally consistent environmental objectives, standards and scientific databases and complementary strategies, accords and agreements. These were the objectives of the corporation that were determined in 1989 most recently.

Very briefly, on the structure and operation of the council, the council of ministers establishes priorities and approves any products or policy instruments that come out of it. The council is supported by a committee of deputy ministers and a steering committee of assistant deputy ministers. Multilateral task groups from all the jurisdictions do the hands-on work on the individual projects.

The council operates by consensus, which is defined in the bylaws as “the absence of dissent” and includes the process of narrowing an issue until there is no dissent. Implementation of CCME products is voluntary, at the discretion of the members, the jurisdictions. The importance of those two points as set out in the bylaws and in the way the organization works is that the need for consensus and voluntary implementation reflects the need to respect the authorities of governments in their own areas of jurisdiction. It means that the responsibility for implementation rests, as it should, on elected governments, and CCME cannot compel any members to act or prevent any member from acting.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you. Does this complete your presentation? Then we are ready for questioning.

Before we do that, since there is a quorum in the room and the question of the report of the subcommittee is one that requires adoption, I will ask whether the members have had an opportunity to receive the report of the subcommittee that set out the schedule for today and the balance of the week, and whether there is anyone willing to move its adoption.

(Motion agreed to)

The Chairman: Who would like to go first on the side of the official opposition?

Mr. Casson.

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Mr. Rick Casson (Lethbridge, Ref.): I'd like to ask a question, and it may be more for clarification, being new on the committee. On harmonization, is there some component of this that's meant to streamline the process? Is that what this was intended initially to be—a streamlining of the environmental assessment and all the rules and regulations that go with it? Was that part of the consideration?

Mr. Norman Brandson: That was certainly part of the intention of this exercise, the streamlining being a result of some of the steps that Mr. Gershberg had outlined as enshrined in the subagreement. So yes, that was one of the objectives.

Mr. Rick Casson: When you talk about harmonization and bringing the two levels of government together, it seems to me that in the end, if there is no consensus.... And to me there could be a lot of issues where you couldn't come to agreement, the province or the government. You see that all the time in different areas, but then the one can override the other. It still has that. So is there any additional...? You say there's no devolution of powers, but how does this help harmonize? If in the end there's no consensus, it still goes back to the federal government.

Maybe these are silly questions, but I just want to—

Mr. Ian Glen: No, it's not a silly question, because it is one of the things that concerns us when we're trying to work on things such as Peter's explanation of the standards work in this. What we're trying to bring is a rationalization across the country of certain environmental standards that we expect industry to adhere to, or whatever the component of society that has to comply with the laws.

We're trying to bring efficiencies, and that's not just economies. The streamlining ensures there is a consistency that people can plan towards, work with and adapt to, but at the same time we take great care to ensure that you're not in essence being driven to the bottom, if I can use that expression.

If jurisdictions feel the standards being set or the approaches of inspection or what not are ones that cause them discomfort, they can opt out. It works both ways, of course. One jurisdiction may well say they thought they agreed to a higher effort than what they're now seeing, so they've lost their consensus, and they could act. It's not meant to say we've all agreed on a low common denominator. Rather, are we satisfied that this will gain the environmental results we expect in this country across our jurisdictions?

Consensus or no consensus is really a capacity to say if we're not satisfied with the way things are going, jurisdictions can continue to act with the authorities they have in place and proceed accordingly. But the common commitment is to try as much as possible to bring uniformity of approach and expectation to the people we address with our laws. That's the streamlining or efficiency that we're hoping to achieve.

Mr. Rick Casson: So then, if there is a variation in provincial standards.... Are you saying now that there isn't, that the provinces have all agreed to the same standard to bring that uniformity? Or will some provinces still have different regulations from others in certain areas?

Mr. Peter Gershberg: I wonder if I could respond to that in the context of, for example, the environmental assessment, which you mentioned.

In my remarks I mentioned the additive process. Each province of course is different, and their legislation is different, as ours is. What we've agreed to do in the subagreement is take the definition of “environment”, or the environmental standard, if you wish, and add the two together, so the legal requirements of both would have to be met. In some cases provinces have to do certain things; in some cases the federal government has to do certain things.

In this particular case we've agreed to meld the two so that all of the requirements in both jurisdictions would be looked at and analysed in the context of any given environmental assessment that's done co-operatively. The whole idea is to push a co-operative model. The whole thing really depends on a co-operative model and a cooperation, and agreeing to a set of process steps in developing this environmental assessment.

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I think the key thing in terms of efficiency is, as one looks outward to the proponent, for example, the private sector proponent, who now has to deal with two governments, two sets of legislation and two sets of processes...what we're trying to do is bring the two together and say rather than going to the province and say here are the kinds of standards you have to fill for us, come together and say, here is one set of things; they may be additive, but we'll tell you once and here's what you have to do. Follow these steps and you'll meet both our requirements.

It's really trying to be a bit more efficient and more of a single-window approach to the project proponent.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Mr. Sauvageau.

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau (Repentigny, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Please excuse my ignorance, but certain points of your presentation are not clear. I've read a bit and I've tried to collect information, but I would like to obtain some clarification.

It says that in the harmonization model, there will be no transfer of responsibilities or powers. Therefore, there will continue to be overlap in powers. And immediately on the following line, it states that there will be no duplication of activities. To my mind, this is contradictory; perhaps I misunderstand the wording, but in my opinion, it is not clear. Further on, it says that the decisions are taken by consensus and that, if there is no consensus, each level of government can act independently. This is just willfulness.

I think it would be safe to say that the record of the provinces and of the federal government for environmental assessment or improvement is not a glowing one. One simply has to think of the ozone layer or the greenhouse effect. How can we have such vague terms and say that we hope there'll be consensus, and otherwise everyone can act independently?

Further on, it says that the results to be attained and the benchmarks to be set to attain them must be defined together by consensus. I'd like to know who will verify them, especially since you go on to say that each case will be dealt individually. Has the role of the environmental Auditor General been taken into account? Has the role of each of the provinces been taken into account, since there is no devolution of powers?

You also said that you were going to obtain information on a case by case basis to determine who will conduct the inspections. Given that our negotiations are not always a tea party, don't you think that there's a risk that this may be a somewhat complicated process?

For my last question, let me say that I really haven't understood the difference between the harmonization agreement and the CCME. It seems to me that you're going to be taking over their mandate. Isn't this an exercise in futility? I don't understand.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Sauvageau.

[English]

Mr. Peter Underwood: Perhaps I could begin to answer your question. First of all, the CCME, as a collective of environment ministers in Canada, with environment ministers from each of the jurisdictions, is the organization that is bringing forward this accord and the subagreements for approval by each one of the jurisdictions. The CCME is not an entity that has a constituency other than the ministers', and the responsibility, of course, to consult with Canadians on behalf of those ministries. Perhaps I could use the standards agreement as an example of how we envision this process working.

First of all, you're right. It is complex, but I think we, through these proposed agreements, provided a way to at least focus that complexity into very clear decision points and reporting requirements.

If you take, for example, benzine and gasoline or benzine in the environment, that's a problem. Benzine is a toxic compound.

Mr. Chairman, I'm just using this as a hypothetical example.

Is there an agreement around the table of environment ministers that benzine is a problem? That's the first consensus decision point. If the determination is yes, this is a priority issue for the development of a Canada-wide response, then the next question that has to be answered is, what needs to be done to solve the problem?

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It may be that we have to control the use of benzine in gasoline. It may be that there are certain facilities that generate benzine as part of their production process. So here we have a problem that we've agreed to as a problem, and we have also a number of things that need to be done in order to address that problem. As a collective we then determine who is best able to control the use of benzine in fuels. I would suggest that the federal government would be the best situated body to do that. Who would be best situated to deal with benzine issues at a gas station level? I suggest perhaps the provinces might be.

So you would work out what needs to be done. Here's what each jurisdiction is making a commitment to do to reach the goal, whatever it may be, for the elimination of this compound in the environment. Once that's done, the agreements set up a process whereby there's an accountability to do what you said you were going to do. You must report back in an open and public way as to what your obligations are and whether or not you've met those obligations. During that period—and this is where I think the devolution/non-devolution confusion arises—where you are required to meet your obligations and are meeting them, another level or jurisdiction of government agrees not to exercise their jurisdictional rights in that area because they're doing another part.

You report back regularly, and if everyone's doing what they're supposed to be doing, the holding in abeyance of your constitutional authority will continue. If not, then each party has the right to proceed unilaterally.

This is a political contract; it's not a redesign of the Constitution of this country, which is not something that environment ministers have been authorized to do. We're trying to find a way through, I call it contractual federalism, but it's basically doing a deal in order to reach a common objective. We would do this in the case of each one of the standards.

The Chairman: Very good, Mr. Underwood.

Mr. Knutson, please.

Mr. Gar Knutson (Elgin—Middlesex—London, Lib.): I come from the province of Ontario. My riding is on the north shore of Lake Erie, and it concerns me that we're going to do a deal to have a common objective with the government of Mike Harris in terms of environmental standards inspection and so on. I just say that as my opening comment.

Let me ask you about the issue of inspection. We're going to have an agreement in place that says...I take it the one-window shop is going to be a provincial shop.

Mr. Ian Glen: Not necessarily.

Mr. Gar Knutson: Is the federal government then going to take responsibility for inspection across the country?

Mr. Ian Glen: No. It would be determined on the basis of what industries or what concerns we're dealing with and which jurisdiction would be best suited, best situated, to take on that responsibility. It could change depending on where you are in the country, but there will be an expectation that we will combine our inspection resources both federally and provincially to address the concerns. It shouldn't be assumed initially that everything would go down to a provincial level. That being said, the provinces in what I would call the workforce of inspectors for the environmental departments across government are substantially greater in number than in the federal government. We actually are taking advantage of a workforce on the ground across the country numbering around 2,000 or more compared to about 200 for the federal government.

• 1620

Mr. Gar Knutson: I'll come back to the issue of inspection, but it's my view, and I guess the view of others as well, that historically the federal government has had a higher standard of environmental protection than the provinces have had. Our concern is that, by entering into a harmonization agreement with the provinces, ultimately our standard will drop. I hear terms like “We're going to become one voice of 13 people and we're going to work things through to a consensus”, but I don't see a lot of consensus in environmental matters now. There has just very recently developed a consensus around the whole issue of climate change, after years of debate.

I could give you any number of issues. Because of the complexities of biology, the complexities of human beings, and the fact that viewpoints often get biased by economic interests.... If we're going to work things through to consensus and then we're going to act, it seems to me that that's a very slow process. In the meantime, we may have chemical spills that cause kids to get cancer.

While the whole language here is great in terms of co-operation and support and efficiency, there's no language of urgency, there's no language of immediate action required, there's no language of, perhaps, dual authority to drive the standard up even higher.

I'm just trying to summarize the views of the opponents of the agreement as briefly as I can. It just seems to me that ultimately, at the end of the day, the federal government standard will drop.

Mr. Ian Glen: I'll allow my colleagues to defend their provincial interests in terms of whether they are committed to good environmental management.

Certainly, in the document we're working with in directing the various subagreement components under the main accord, we're taking quite seriously that there is a declared vision that ministers wish to have in this document: the governments working in partnership to achieve the highest level of environmental quality for all Canadians.

From the federal government perspective, in terms of administration by Environment Canada, we're very pleased that that vision is there, and our understanding of and commitment to this document is striving toward that vision. So, from the federal perspective, I'm quite comfortable in saying that we do not see this as a weakening of the capacity. We see it as being a good opportunity to work across jurisdictions to ensure that we are collectively committed to this vision.

Perhaps to leave it to the provinces—

Mr. Gar Knutson: Do you put the issue of everyone around the table having a common vision to the test by actually looking at the performance, say, of the Minister of the Environment in Ontario? Do we know how many people they're laying off in their department? Do we know what changes they're making in legislation in terms of provincial standards? I guess you're telling me that they have a common vision with the federal government.

Mr. Ian Glen: The engagement of Ontario officials with us in working on these documents has been a very genuine commitment and very much involved in drafting and understanding what we will put forward in this regime.

The public accountability expectations under this document will focus on governments' reporting on achieving the environmental results that the standards will expect, or the approaches taken on inspection, or what other subagreements are.

So at this point in time it certainly isn't my role or my interest to question the genuine good faith of jurisdictions coming together to try to make this work.

Mr. Gar Knutson: Is it your role to ignore, say, evidence to the contrary if it's a headline in the Globe and Mail stating that the Ministry of the Environment provincially in Ontario is laying off x number of inspectors or is gutting its environmental legislation?

It's one thing not to question the genuine interest of the officials. I agree. Probably everybody's acting in good faith, but I'm saying that collectively the Mike Harris government, I think, has a different view of the environment and its priority from that of the federal Liberal government. It's curious to me how we can sit down and then sign a harmonization agreement—not to mention other governments. I'm not an expert on what's going on in Alberta or British Columbia, but certainly the folks back home are worried about what Mike Harris is doing with his environmental agenda.

• 1625

Mr. Ian Glen: I'll leave it to either ministers or provincial ministers to speak to what the political commitments are.

About this document, we're satisfied it provides a very adequate framework under which jurisdictions will work collectively to achieve the results expected by the vision.

The Chairman: Mr. Lincoln, please.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln (Lac-Saint-Louis, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to preface my remarks by saying I think there's a very important place, of course, for provincial environment ministries. I was a minister of the environment at the provincial level myself. I was president of the CCME for one year. I know this has to be a complementary system, and it should continue that way, of course. It's a shared jurisdiction.

At the same time, what I'm worried about is what has been expressed by my colleague, Mr. Knutson. We are going into so-called harmonization at a time when the federal government has cut back the Department of the Environment by 35%-plus. By the time it's finished it will be 40%. We have lost scientists. We have lost experts. We have lost staff. So as fast as we devolve to take care of the cutbacks to the provinces, the provinces in turn, the large ones.... Certainly Ontario has cut back massively. Quebec is cutting back substantially. Alberta has cut back. The smaller provinces didn't have a huge ministry apparatus to start with. Some of them have very small departments. What the federal government was ensuring was that in key areas, such as toxics, there was a critical mass of scientific expertise, of assessment expertise, of evaluation, and also of inspection of experts.

I know I'm not by myself in expressing strong reservations. It's very interesting to find that all environmental groups, I think almost without exception, fear this thing like the plague. It's strange that even industries, for some reason, are saying this is going to be too much of a devolution of federal powers.

What I can't understand is that the objectives of harmonization are to enhance environmental protection. I would like to ask you this, Mr. Glen. How can we enhance environmental protection when everybody cuts it back? I know it's not your fault, and it's not you who causes it, but how can we enhance environmental protection when our ministries are almost a see-saw of ministers and deputy ministers going back and forth since 1993? At the federal level there were three ministers, three deputy ministers. It has been the same in Ontario. It has been the same in Quebec. We say “accountability”. Who is accountable?

During the CEPA review we visited places. We heard in Ontario from federal officials, we heard in Quebec from federal officials, that it's not true that people are more accountable. The fact is that when we are devolving enforcement, enforcement is not taking place.

I'll give you an example. Under the Fisheries Act I put the question several times, and nobody has given me a satisfactory answer. In the case of Quebec, for instance, for various constitutional reasons they don't swear inspectors of the Fisheries Act. So what happens is that the Fisheries Act is not being enforced.

If you look at the case of Kronos in Quebec, we missed the deadline and the Department of Justice federally decided not to prosecute because it was falling between two stools. Nobody was moving and eventually it was too late to prosecute. I think if we look at Kronos, we're going to find there was a deficiency in prosecution there.

In the objectives we talk about predictability. How can we predict when there will be more jurisdictions and they will have to sit around the table to decide? As one of our colleagues said today, who is responsible for benzene and who is responsible for this toxic and that toxic?

I just look at enforcement and frankly, I'm not very comforted by the famous vision, because it says, under enforcement:

2.2 This Sub-Agreement does not apply to enforcement activities or any other matter governments agree to exclude as specified through implementation agreements.

What does that mean?

The Chairman: Where are you looking for enforcement?

• 1630

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: It's under the Canada-Wide Environmental Inspections Sub-Agreement, paragraph 2.2.

2.2 This Sub-Agreement does not apply to enforcement activities or any other matter governments agree to exclude as specified through implementation agreements.

What does that mean?

The focus of the subagreement, paragraph 2.3, is on areas where federal, provincial, and territorial governments have the ability to take actions in the same situations.

I find, in actual fact and practice, that it's not the draft, the legalities, or the fact we sat there and agreed on a beautiful document; it's the fact that when it gets transferred over, enforcement is not taking place.

If you want some examples I will give you examples. I'd like to find out, for instance, under the pulp and paper devolution of regulations, how many prosecutions have taken place. How many times, for instance, where there should have been prosecutions for deliberate infringement, were warnings given because we didn't want to rock the boat? We were at a sensitive time of negotiations between the province and the federal government.

What I would like to ask you, Mr. Glen, in simple terms is this. If this is such a wonderful thing, why are the NGOs, who are really committed to the environment as volunteers and as the people in the field who have battled over the years to preserve the environmental cause in Canada, almost holus-bolus against this thing? Why are so many of us here on this side of the House so worried about it? Why can't we get an assurance that finally somebody will be accountable? Why did the original people who appeared before us in the CEPA committee say eventually you cede to the province and the province goes to its industry associations and devolves on them, as happened in Alberta, and then they're responsible for enforcement?

Who is finally accountable in all this? I know legally you are, but how do you ensure that you have a critical mass of inspectors, scientists, and enforcement people whom you have kept federally, so if by any chance the enforcement doesn't take place in Alberta, B.C., Quebec or wherever, your people can just step in and do it?

Can we get your assurance that this will happen that way, or are we going to have to look at the manual each time to see what happens?

I'm just expressing a lot of frustration and the feeling amongst a lot of us that it's not right.

The Chairman: Mr. Lincoln, you may want to leave some time for a reply.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: Sorry.

Mr. Ian Glen: I'm trying to decide which question is the easier one to answer.

I'll address the anxiety, because there is anxiety by environmental groups and we've heard it as well. We've heard it in the public consultations we've had on the documents. I've heard it in advisory groups that have helped me prepare this. A lot of the anxiety rests not necessarily on these documents but on the general circumstances around cuts across governments, particularly in our case as they affect the environmental departments, but more broadly.

Within the resource bases given to me and my colleagues across the provinces, we feel this accord gives us a platform and a confidence of approach to ensure we have maximized the impact of our collective resources to preserve the best of environmental interests. That's not political speech-making; that's a public administrator saying that if there are benefits in ensuring that the accord brings some confidence of approach across jurisdictions against the resources we have, this allows us to help plan more effectively, deploy our resources, and know whether certain resources are better located in one level of government or not.

For example, there is a very strong concern that the federal government preserve as much as possible the R and D capacity through its laboratories and its knowledge generation to be shared across provinces. There are some jurisdictions that quite frankly cannot do that and need that to be provided by us. There are other areas of the administration of our environmental activities where provinces are better suited, and we want to take advantage of that.

In terms of maintaining the capacity to act in the absence of proper conduct, as expected, all jurisdictions will be trying to maintain their capacity within the resource bases.

• 1635

Is it a worry? Of course it's a worry, and I wouldn't deny it. It's a worry for environmental groups, and you expressed it well. I think other members of the committee would have that worry, and I have that worry. But the effort is to try to work with my colleagues to ensure that we have done our utmost to preserve an overall capacity to effectively administrate our laws.

Because we will all be maintaining an inspection capacity, there will be occasions when I would be putting inspectors in, whereas I would rely upon a province in normal circumstances. If a province was not fulfilling its inspection responsibilities, the federal government would maintain the authority to go in and use its authority to inspect.

Perhaps a provincial perspective might now be useful.

The Chairman: A brief intervention, please.

Mr. Norman Brandson: Just very briefly, if I could speak from purely a provincial perspective—and I guess the Manitoba perspective, which I know best—this question of resources certainly is a sensitive one, as you have indicated. I can tell you a bit about how we've tried to deal with it in Manitoba, because the message we get from our own citizens is that the environment is a vitally important issue. What we've tried to do is to extend our reach within the Manitoba government. Beyond our own budget in environment, we have added inspectors from the Department of Natural Resources, the Department of Highways, the Department of Transportation, our parks people, and our environment officers under our Environment Act. That's one means by which we've extended our reach, and which doesn't show up in our budget and at our bottom line. It shows up in somebody else's, but those functions are being carried on in government. So we have in fact extended our pool of inspectors, enforcement people, and people on the front line.

We've also looked to the CCME and to these kinds of agreements in order to help pool our resources across the country. so we can use our resources more effectively, working in concert with our federal colleagues and other provinces. That's another way in which we've tried to extend what we have, extend our capability.

Finally, we want to use wisely the resources that we do have. If I know the federal people are doing something in Manitoba, I don't want to be doing the same thing. I want to be doing something different.

On the question of environment groups and the anxieties they have expressed—and we've certainly heard these—the anxiety is there in Manitoba, but I did not personally receive the feedback that environmental interest groups in Manitoba were opposed to harmonization. There were some points of anxiety, but I heard the message that was in fact supporting the concept of harmonization. There was a recognition that there were some things that the environment groups felt were necessary.

So in our consultations I didn't get that unmixed message of opposition. There was in fact some support, and some anxiety as well.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Brandson.

Mrs. Kraft Sloan, followed by Ms. Carroll and then other members.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North, Lib.): Thank you very much. I have three short questions.

In the presentation there was something that had been discussed around a national advisory group. I'm just wondering if you could tell me a little bit more about that. Who is in that group? How does it operate? Was this only in regard to the EMFA process?

Ms. Liseanne Forand: The national advisory group was created during the EMFA process phase of harmonization. It was a multi-stakeholder group with representatives from all across the country, although not from the province of Quebec initially because Quebec was not at the table for the EMFA discussions.

The role of the national advisory group was to provide advice to something called the lead representatives committee of officials, and the advisory group also provided broad policy advice on harmonization. More particularly, it provided advice on how the lead reps committee should consult. They were key in helping us to design the two national workshops that were held during the EMFA phase, and in reaching out to their associates in either industry, in the NGO community, or in the business community. The national advisory group continued to provide advice to CCME collectively while the accord was being developed, but additional consultation mechanisms were introduced at that point, including posting the documents on the Internet; setting up a discussion group on the Internet; and, in the case of environmental assessment, creating a focus group of experts to work with the committee that was developing the agreement.

• 1640

The national advisory group ceased to provide advice on this issue after ministers met in November 1996, once the accord process was over. Then the focus group was created for environment assessment, and consultations continued on a wider basis over the Internet.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: The national advisory group was finished last year?

Ms. Liseanne Forand: Actually, by the time it was finished, it was probably the spring of 1997. They were in existence from the summer of 1994 until the spring of 1997.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Currently the only semi-formal consultation is the focus groups, and that's only for the environmental assessment side agreement.

Ms. Liseanne Forand: The focus group provided advice during the development of the EA subagreement while it was being drafted.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: What kind of consultation process is it? Is it just a very informal process now?

Ms. Liseanne Forand: Right now, the CCME web site has been used to seek comments on the text. The text of the accord was approved in principle last November and has not changed since then. The standards and inspections subagreements were deemed to be substantially complete by ministers last November and have not been amended since then. The EA subagreement was developed over the winter.

In working with the draft standards subagreement, a workshop held in September involved stakeholders in looking at ways of putting in place some of the processes involved in that subagreement. In addition, we have continued to get comments through the Internet.

In addition, ministers will be meeting with stakeholders in November, in two weeks, when they meet on the broader issues of CCME priorities and what CCME should be doing. There will be some 18 stakeholders meeting with the ministers in conjunction with their meeting.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: So you have yet to determine an ongoing consultation process.

Mr. Ian Glen: As the further subagreements are worked on, the same public engagement would be expected, either from environmental groups, interested citizens or industry through industry associations. With the interest they took in the earlier pieces of this, I am sure they will be equally engaged or equally desirous of being engaged in whatever the further pieces are.

Ms. Liseanne Forand: We have a mailing list of 1,200 people who we write to whenever a new initiative is started. For example, on harmonization we sent three mail-outs to these 1,200 people, telling them where we were, that the text was available on the Internet, and that we welcomed their comments. I expect something along those lines as work continues.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: One of the major rationales for the harmonization process that we have heard, which you have stated in your overhead, is concern around gaps or duplication of activity because of limited budgets, etc. KPMG completed a study for the CCME that concluded otherwise. I am just wondering what happened to that study and how that was dealt with.

Ms. Liseanne Forand: The KPMG study referred to the environmental management framework agreement, the EMFA. It was a study of the possible impacts of four schedules that were developed under the EMFA on five jurisdictions. It has no relationship to the accord and the subagreements being submitted to ministers now.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: So the KPMG study did not look at overlapping duplication as an issue, then.

Ms. Liseanne Forand: The KPMG study was looking at the impacts of four of the schedules under the EMFA.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: You didn't look at overlapping duplication.

Ms. Liseanne Forand: It was looking at what the impacts would be on the jurisdictions, if those four schedules of the EMFA were adopted, and it looked at five jurisdictions in particular.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: So overlapping duplication wasn't an issue in the study.

Ms. Liseanne Forand: It could be an issue in the sense of whether or not one of the impacts of any of these schedules was to reduce or increase overlapping duplication, but its primary function was to look at what the impact of those four schedules would be. That was done two years ago.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Okay. I want a clarification here. The witness from the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency said there wouldn't be any amendments required under CEAA as a result of the subagreement on environmental assessment harmonization.

• 1645

Mr. Sid Gershberg: That's right. Our view—and that was true I think right through the negotiations of the subagreement—is that there's nothing in this subagreement that requires an amendment to the act.

The Chairman: Mr. McTeague.

Mr. Dan McTeague (Pickering—Ajax—Uxbridge, Lib.): I'd like to know, Mr. Glen, if you could explain to me—I am new on this committee—what relationship your department has with Health Canada, specifically the health protection branch, when it deals with questions such as examining substances, products or wastes, or the whole issue of human health. Do you have any interaction with that department from the point of view of what happens to those inspectors when they find something that's a bit off colour?

Mr. Ian Glen: We work with Health Canada on administration of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act. To that end, we will join with them in planning whatever the activities may be to deal with particular toxic substances. We're focused on the first level environmental consequences; they may be then focusing on health consequences.

Mr. Dan McTeague: Let me be more elaborate. Maybe I could suggest to you that I have a concern in terms of the closure of the labs. Do you use those labs at all to do your inspections? This relates of course to the ultimate question of whether the federal government can continue to do its job in harmonization.

The Chairman: It's a beautiful question for estimates, Mr. McTeague.

Mr. Dan McTeague: I understand, but the reason I'm asking that, Mr. Chairman, is simply to qualify whether or not the federal government will have in it.... It is certainly complementary of the remarks that were made by Mr. Knutson and by Mr. Lincoln concerning the efficacy, the ability, of the federal government.

If your inspectors indeed from time to time do consult with the federal labs, then if those labs are closed at the food directorate or at the drugs directorate when it comes to perhaps the assessment of toxins, etc., will that have an impact on your ability to inspect properly or accurately?

Mr. Ian Glen: I'm not able to answer completely for you today. I'm not entirely certain of all of the closures that are being considered by Health Canada and I'm cautious.

I'd have to check for you, Mr. McTeague.

The closures that were affecting either food inspection or their health protection bureau lab should not impact on the work we're doing, but I offer that caution. I can certainly try to get a more complete answer and provide it to the committee.

Mr. Dan McTeague: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Jordan.

Mr. Joe Jordan (Leeds—Grenville, Lib.): I just want to get back to your initial point about lack of constitutional guidance in the whole area of environment.

Again, I'm new to this committee—I'm a new member of Parliament—and this may be, as my colleague across the way said, a stupid question. It would seem to me that if we're trying to get above the negotiation of environmental issues, then certainly from a provincial point of view—and I don't want to put words in your mouth—you would have some concerns. I'm trying to picture in my mind what type of negotiation would go on.

The provinces' view of the environment—and I think Gar said it in terms of Ontario—certainly revolves around the economics of the province. That would influence what their priorities would be. Their planning timeframe, their position in the election cycle—it would all impact on their particular view of what they think is good for the environment of their province. But clearly this issue transcends provincial boundaries.

Rather than harmonization, was any thought given to a centralization of this? What rationale can we have for provincial ministries of the environment? Why don't we just assume these budgets at the federal level, if we trust each other? Or is it an issue of trust? I don't understand why we need so many links in the chain. I don't know what they bring to the picnic.

If the federal government is going to start negotiating globally, then clearly the problem I see in the environmental area is that you have lead and lag economies that you're dealing with and trying to compete against. We've got them internally too.

Why don't we eliminate those and then get on the world stage and start acting as a nation on this issue? I don't know if that's a question or not.

The Chairman: Well, it certainly is a statement.

Mr. Ian Glen: There was a question found in that.

• 1650

Mr. Peter Underwood: I'll go back to the opening remark or question, which I think was on the lack of clarity in the Constitution. The fact is when the Fathers of Confederation were designing the division of powers in our Constitution, the issue of who would have responsibility for protection of the environment was not before them and they did not come to any conclusion on that. So we've been left with a situation where we have to find a hook somewhere in order to do things.

In the federal government's domain there would be issues that transcend provincial boundaries through the water or through the air—international issues, that sort of thing. In the provincial realm you have things I deal with on a day-to-day basis: septic tanks, dumps, gas stations; those types of issues at the community or municipal level. Since the Constitution is vague about environmental issues.... Even if it had been before them, I don't know if they would have been able to carve it up in a nice, clean, tidy fashion.

As to your suggestion of giving all the money from provincial environment departments to the federal government, I suppose in a hypothetical way it would be just as reasonable to ask to give it all to the provinces. But I think we're trying to get beyond that dispute and recognize there are things that need to be done. We are all dealing with finite resources. How do we use them in the best fashion?

Mr. Joe Jordan: Why don't you build on the single-window concept you introduced yourself? I don't think the argument is either/or. I think there's a strong argument to be made for centralization and I don't see the corresponding argument made for devolution or harmonization, whatever we want to call it.

The Chairman: That's an excellent thing to raise in the national caucus.

Mr. Joe Jordan: Okay.

The Chairman: Mr. Laliberte.

Mr. Rick Laliberte (Churchill River, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

I just want to try to find a reason for all this. If you were to formulate a paragraph with these points that were distributed.... The first opening statement is understandable, that you would harmonize under the instruction of first ministers. That's a jurisdiction. The boss tells you to do something; you're doing it. But the main reason seems to be in the closing paragraph.

To try to make something out of the paragraph.... You're right, there are a lot of gaps in there. But the way I interpret it, it's that we can't afford growing environmental challenges. That seems to be the bottom line. We cannot afford environmental challenges in this country. You're scrambling to harmonize and rationalize responsibility, but the bottom line is we can't afford it.

You're looking for reasons. A growing reason right now, as we speak, is the flooding of the Churchill River. The cutbacks in Environment Canada stopped water monitoring in northern Saskatchewan and northern Manitoba over the summer. You're saying give responsibility to the province. Okay, the water corporation in our province and also the hydro industry, Saskatchewan Power Corporation, is extended a responsibility of letting people know how these water levels are going to impact on the communities and the environment. Well, they let the water go. The communities are heavily impacted. Most of them are aboriginal communities, depending on the local environment for sustenance, the land and the rivers.

I don't see any communication or dialogue on harmonization with aboriginal communities and leadership here. You seem to be comfortable dealing with the federal and provincial jurisdictions. You haven't brought in the aboriginal representatives, who do have a vested interest in the many treaty jurisdictions and the many livelihood jurisdictions throughout this country.

You highlighted the issue—

The Chairman: Would you proceed with your question.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: Do you agree we can't afford the environmental challenges this country has faced? Is that the bottom line? You're trying to justify the cutbacks through harmonization.

Mr. Ian Glen: No, I don't agree. I would say the statement that would locate my colleagues and myself today on the deck put out would be that co-ordinated action is the best solution to get results. We believe that very strongly. The accord helps drive that. We're committed to then ensuring our administration across jurisdictions works effectively.

• 1655

So if I were to look at that sheet, I agree with you, one can be driven by a statement, first ministers' instruction; it is compelling. I would locate and co-ordinate action as the best solution to get results.

In terms of dealing with the interests of aboriginal Canadians, there have been efforts to draw them into the consultations. At my level, I have had consultations with aboriginal groups when we were developing our positions on the accord. We would continue to do that.

In the accord itself there is a recognition in the document, item 12, under “Principles” that states that this accord and subagreements do not affect aboriginal or treaty rights. It's a clear recognition that where treaty rights engage, we will respect that and work with it.

We anticipate that as aboriginal self-government as a concept comes into reality across the government there will be accommodation of these documents to reflect that, and we would be committed to working with aboriginal Canadians in their government structures in the future.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: In terms of assessments, there have been intervener funding cuts. There's the anxiety of the NGOs in this country, or aboriginal communities, or any community group out there, or municipal governments or local governments. Due to cutbacks, again, you're not giving an opportunity for people to create the issue of assessments.

There were two issues over the summer, of course. The Hamilton fire was one. How does the federal government maintain its responsibility for issues like that?

There was also the Cheviot project, which seems to have been a shining example of harmonization, as referred to by our Minister of Environment this year. Where is the role going to go here? Are these pilot projects you're running? With the cutbacks, these are all impacts. That's the bottom line again.

Mr. Sid Gershberg: On the question of intervener funding, there is intervener funding or what we call participant funding in the act, and it has been at a pretty steady level of about a million dollars a year over the last four or five years.

There is an issue in terms of the funding as of next year, and we're looking at that now. But certainly no decisions have been taken with respect to that. It's a requirement of the act, and we expect that there will continue to be participant funding.

The Chairman: As is customary in this committee, we will complete the first round of questions. We have Mr. Herron and, lastly, the chair. For the second round, which will be a shorter one, we have Mr. Sauvageau, Mr. Knutson, and Mr. Casson.

Mr. Herron, please.

Mr. John Herron (Fundy—Royal, PC): My question pertains to enforcement, in terms of the ability of the federal government to intervene in a situation where perhaps the provinces are not maintaining their agreed-to obligations under any kind of harmonization.

The environmental NGOs have sort of proclaimed en masse that the length of time it would take the federal government to actually intervene could be too excessive in order to maintain its environmental commitment. Can you explain to us how long it would take for the federal government to intervene, should it deem that necessary?

Mr. Ian Glen: The accord has a provision that identifies for what we call environmental emergency situations. Item 10 under the subagreement:

10. Nothing in this Accord will prevent a government from taking action within its authority to respond to environmental emergencies consistent with existing emergency response agreements.

My colleagues, who I know have had more experience in the environmental field than I, might speak to that. But there are already agreements in place on how to effectively engage and address environmental emergencies. There is not an expectation that, in essence, when there is an incident to be addressed promptly and with full effectiveness by whatever jurisdiction, you sit back while you negotiate an agreement for six months. You will deal with the circumstances of the situation.

• 1700

Mr. Norman Brandson: Perhaps I could follow up from our provincial perspective. Again, this is an anxiety we have certainly heard before, but it is one that seems to be expressed in a hypothetical sense.

Every time I think of specific examples on the provincial scene in which the province may be doing inspection and enforcement activities in a specific set of circumstances, it is very difficult for me as a provincial administrator to imagine a situation in which we are performing unsatisfactorily—there are problems occurring—and somehow sustaining that action in the face of environmental groups, the affected public, and so on, who are clearly making this a public issue.

In a hypothetical sense, I understand the anxiety. I have trouble, just based on my own experience, imagining real situations in which this kind of malfeasance would occur yet be acceptable and sustainable by the provincial inspection.

Mr. John Herron: I understand that there is a component whereby it could take up to six months for them to actually intervene in some kind of dispute in terms of standards or regulations.

Is that a nod?

Mr. Norman Brandson: That is in non-emergency situations. We're not talking about—

Mr. John Herron: How do you determine an emergency from a non-emergency?

Mr. Norman Brandson: I know in our particular legislation—I think it may be true in the federal legislation—that it's actually defined in law. I think it's quite a broad definition. In other words, it relates to there being actual or potential harm to public health or the environment. It is quite a broad definition of emergency situations.

Mr. Peter Underwood: I have just a point that I think is important to make here. The inspection subagreement specifically excludes enforcement activities. It may be argued that this is rather an arbitrary line as such. I personally have some difficulty in cutting the line between inspection and enforcement. But clearly, if I was going to be entrusting to the federal government the responsibility for enforcing a provincial law, in the negotiation of the agreement on enforcement, I would want to make sure that you did not have that same six-month program that we have in place for working out details on standards and scientific issues.

Number one, this agreement doesn't cover enforcement yet. Number two, when we get to enforcement, I would think that the discussion would be somewhat different, because we are talking about an operational issue that would need a very quick response if there wasn't compliance.

The Chairman: Before we proceed with the second round, here are a few questions from the chair. The first one has to do exactly with this point.

For the life of me, I have difficulty in understanding this, but perhaps you can explain to us why enforcements are not included in the agreement. Let's assume that everything goes well and there is in place the best possible agreement with the highest possible standards. How can you have inspections at the national level without enforcements carried out with the same intensity, with the same kind of agreement, to search for the same, highest-possible common denominator, yet keep the two separate? I am just picking up on the last comment by Mr. Underwood. I have enormous difficulties in seeing the separation. Is there a political reason for the separation, or was it a technical one?

Mr. Ian Glen: Political. We were instructed to work on these subagreements first, and then enforcement and other pieces were to follow. I have indicated in discussions with my colleagues at meetings we have had that, in my view, enforcement is like a horse and carriage: it goes together with inspection. There is a continuum. Our expectation in the future is that we finish that work and that piece will fall into place exactly to meet the expectations you would proffer. But at the moment it wasn't one of the three priorities that ministers tasked.

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I can't speak for the politics of why it's being held out, although I think Peter may have addressed it well enough. Let's see how we go on inspections. But I'm not going to share my enforcement authority until I'm absolutely certain that this accord and the approach that's being suggested is acceptable.

Our own view is that we expect to work.... Looking at the timeframe, enforcement was asterisked in the work plan with a question mark as to whether it should be within 18 months or three years. I think the expectation is it would be one of the ones we would move smartly with in the future, to work on. Certainly that would be my advice to my minister.

So, yes, there is a continuum, and it would address the logic that you see to it as well.

The Chairman: You realize of course that this is again a political question that diminishes the credibility of the accord if the accord leaves out a very important engine, and that is the engine of enforcement, because it leaves it an unanswered question. Maybe we'll do it in 18 months, maybe we'll do it in three years, maybe we'll never agree.

Then it creates the strange dichotomy where you have inspectors who will be, according to the agreement, inspecting according to provincial or federal legislation, but then you will have enforcement officers who will be either federal for the federal legislation or provincial for the provincial legislation until of course this matter is resolved. Is that a fair description?

Mr. Ian Glen: I think it's this strange dichotomy that will probably drive this item as one of the early ones to continue on and resolve.

You would still have the capacity, quite independent of the accord, to work out arrangements across jurisdictions to in essence share or empower an officer at the other level of government to carry out enforcement responsibilities if your law permitted. But I think in terms of the point you're making from a public servant's perspective, I agree with you. I think it is a piece that has to move soon.

The Chairman: Thank you. I have another brief question about this. Do you have a study that dealt with overlaps and duplications, and if so could you make it available to the members of this committee?

Mr. Ian Glen: Yes, there are others. There is the one that Liseanne Forand spoke about, the Peat Marwick, KPMG, one. I think the Conference Board of Canada did one. What we'll do—

The Chairman: No. Has Environment Canada not conducted one, or any of the provincial governments?

There is this mythology out there—excuse me for using this expression—that there are lots of duplications and lots of overlaps. The members of this committee would like to know where are they, which are they? Evidently a study must have been conducted.

Mr. Norman Brandson: There was also a study commissioned by the Macleod Institute in Alberta.

The Chairman: What is that?

Mr. Norman Brandson: I'm not familiar with them, but it is another study that's available on the topic of duplication.

The Chairman: So where does this notion of overwhelming duplication and overlaps come from?

Mr. Norman Brandson: I don't know if it's embodied in a formal study, but my recollection is that most, if not all, jurisdictions compiled some specific examples in their own jurisdictions of existing overlaps and duplication. I can't cite a specific document.

The Chairman: But at the CCME you didn't find it sufficiently important to study it?

Mr. Ian Glen: I can't speak for CCME. I know that in the last year working on this, overlap and duplication weren't the single drivers of doing this. It was trying to rationalize the administrations.

In terms of studies, I will ask officials within my own department if we've done particular studies in recent times that would be helpful. I'll provide them to the committee.

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The Chairman: Please, if you would.

The next question has to do with the Hamilton fire, Mr. Glen. If the accord were in place, would the Hamilton fire be dealt with any differently today?

Mr. Ian Glen: I'd have to go to the emergencies work that existed quite separate from the accord. In terms of working co-operatively across jurisdictions, the Ontario government did have lead responsibility in that. Environment Canada did offer assistance to the province of Ontario both in technical and in other resources if they required them. They did not require them in addressing that particular situation.

We certainly would expect under the accord, or quite frankly independent of that, just across jurisdictions, that—and this would apply, I would say, to my provincial colleagues as well as myself—where there was an operational capacity to assist and it was sought of us, we would provide assistance to ensure the emergency was being addressed.

The Chairman: Finally, in determining which level of government will conduct inspections when you come to the crunch, which criteria will you be looking at in order to determine the appropriate level to conduct inspections? What will be your guiding principles or criteria?

Mr. Peter Underwood: I wasn't involved—-

The Chairman: Is it proximity or budgets or experience? What will be the elements that will guide you in making the decision?

Mr. Norman Brandson: There is a list of criteria contained in the inspection subagreement that will all be factors in determining which order of government would conduct inspections. All of these factors are important. The weight given to each would have to depend on circumstances, I think.

The Chairman: The list in point 4.4 does not seem to include the origin of the legislation, whether provincial or federal. Is that implicit in any of those points? You would naturally prefer to have an inspection carried out by an inspector who knows the federal law, for instance.

I've been given the answer now. Thank you very much.

On the second round, M. Sauvageau.

[Translation]

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: Thank you very much for your judicious questions, Mr. Chairman.

My questions are with regard to your draft agreement. Point 2 states:

2. delineating the respective roles and responsibilities of the federal, provincial and territorial governments within an environmental management partnership [...] specific roles and responsibilities will generally be undertaken by one order of government only;

The point of this is to ensure that either the federal or the provincial government exercise the specific roles and responsibilities. Who will define those? I will try to ask brief questions and obtain brief answers as much as possible. Who will define this? Is it the federal government or the provincial government, or will we have a consensus agreement?

[English]

Mr. Ian Glen: It would depend on what the particular initiative is that we're trying to come together on, whether it might be consensus or a bilateral arrangement to the administration of the laws. The objective there is to try as much as possible to bring certainty as to which level is best situated and most able to address a particular responsibility and they would do it. In essence you wouldn't have both levels going in at the same time or addressing the same aspect of the problem.

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[Translation]

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: Yes, but who will decide? Suppose in one instance, Ontario exercises its environmental powers and that the federal government also intervenes. One could consider this overlap. Who will decide to withdraw, and who will decide to stay?

Can that question be asked?

[English]

Mr. Ian Glen: If it's unique, it would be discussed between those two governments. They would discuss between themselves how best to address the particular responsibility.

[Translation]

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: That's all very nice in harmony and in an ideal world, but let's suppose there is no agreement. Who will have the last word? The federal or the provincial government? Or would both remain?

[English]

Mr. Ian Glen: If there's no agreement, then both jurisdictions continue to have the capacity to act.

[Translation]

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: All right. Now for my second question...

[English]

The Chairman: And if there is agreement?

Mr. Ian Glen: If there is agreement, that agreement may well divide the particular tasks across the jurisdictions or it may concede that yes—and in this case I'll use Ontario as the example—you're best situated to address this problem, so do it, and here are the expectations or here are the authorities we will share with you to do it completely.

[Translation]

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: All right. Now, I see a slight contradiction between points 4 and 9. You can surely clarify this. In point 4, it states that one of the objectives is: "Preventing overlapping activities and interjurisdictional disputes". It was my understanding that overlap was being ignored, although there's an attempt to prevent them.

Point 9 states:

9. Nothing in this accord alters the legislative or other authority of the governments or any of them with respect to the exercise of their legislative or other authorities...

If the agreement does not alter existing powers, how can it reduce existing overlap?

[English]

Mr. Peter Underwood: I think it would be a bit presumptuous even for environment ministers to think that they could alter authorities under the Constitution of Canada. This is a political agreement, one of the objectives of which is to prevent or minimize overlapping activities. But it's very common in federal-provincial agreements to reinsert the caveat that it will not alter the Constitution.

Yes, on the face of it you're right when you say there is an inconsistency, but you have to recognize that there's a difference between two jurisdictions agreeing on how they share their respective jurisdictional authorities and an amendment to the Constitution of the country.

[Translation]

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: Mr. Glen, tell me if I'm interpreting your statements correctly and whether the translation is accurate. It was my understanding that you said that if the federal government deems that a province has not carried out the inspection correctly, it can ask its own inspectors to do so. Did I understand you correctly? On what basis could the federal government deem that an inspection is not satisfactory?

[English]

Mr. Ian Glen: I'm pausing only in the hypothetical. We would also want to use and to work effectively under section 7 of the accord:

7. In instances where a government is unable to fulfil its obligations under this Accord, the concerned governments shall develop an alternative plan to ensure that no gaps are created.... As a general guideline, these plans will be completed within six months.

So you have a capacity to engage across your jurisdictions and say, look, in some fashion what we're trying to achieve here is not being addressed.

It could well be a need to better clarify what the expectations are and how the jurisdictions will work effectively together. If you really have circumstances in which the governments are on entirely different courses or have entirely different expectations of what can address the problem, there is the capacity to set in train either alternative plans or to say after the appropriate period, we'll resume the application of the authorities under our own responsibility.

[Translation]

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: I'm not asking what would happen if the federal government decided that the provinces did not conduct an inspection correctly. I was referring to a province that is not able to conduct an inspection and that asks the federal government to agree to help because it does not have the resources necessary or because it's too far, or for whatever reason.

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However, if a province assumes responsibility for that inspection itself, the federal government cannot tell that province that it deems its work inadequate, that it will conduct its own inspection instead, and if you will allow me the use of a negative term, it cannot interfere with this inspection. You may act upon a request from a province, but you may not complete action it has already undertaken.

[English]

Mr. Ian Glen: That's right. We would offer great care in intervening after having worked effectively on a bilateral as to how we would commonly approach inspection responsibilities. I think there is a sensitivity across jurisdictions that you do not simply rush in and say, get out of our way, back to us. There would be some—and I think it's fair—administrative arrangements, but also some political politesse around how that might be done.

[Translation]

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: Can I ask another question?

The Chairman: The last one.

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: Thank you. If I've understood correctly, national environmental standards are determined by consensus; the standards that will appear in this agreement will have been set by consensus. If that's the case, I would agree with my colleagues opposite and I wonder whether that consensus will be about the lowest common denominator and not the highest.

[English]

Mr. Peter Underwood: Aside from the clearly articulated commitment to the highest standards and the accountability framework contained in both the harmonization accord and the standards agreed, I think in many cases the record will show that when CCME, the collective of environment ministers, have put their minds to coming up with a rigorous standard for environmental protection, they have been able to do so. As I said, as a province, we take those standards and write them into our permits. In many cases we have closed facilities or have forced compliance. So the record does not show that consensus breeds no consensus or the requirement for consensus breeds no agreement or the lowest common denominator.

The Chairman: Mr. Casson.

Mr. Rick Casson: It seems to me there's one level of government, municipal government, that hasn't been mentioned, and in a lot of cases these are the people who are issuing the development permits and they are the people who will first identify a problem, if it does exist. I suppose maybe one of the deputy ministers from one of the provinces can explain how a municipality works with the provincial jurisdiction.

To get back to one of the questions of the chairman, if we're going through this exercise to maximize resources, to make better use of tax dollars, to get rid of overlap and duplication, it seems to me somewhere you should be able to show us that you have looked at where the overlap exists and where the duplication exists and how this is how we're going to get away from that. Maybe it's in here and I haven't seen it, but to me that's the problem.

Maybe just answer how the municipalities would fit into this as part of the inspection standards and environmental assessment. Then I'm just not convinced you're making maximum use of resources here. I don't know if you can convince me of that or if you want to try. Maybe just the municipality question first....

Mr. Norman Brandson: I'll try to address both questions from a provincial perspective.

Again, we get back to this notion of duplication and overlap. Is there any? All I can say is from a provincial perspective, from a small province, not a highly industrialized province, we still do have what I would say are regular examples of overlap and duplication, with two sets of inspectors going into the same facility from time to time, dual enforcement actions when one would accomplish the same at less cost.

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There are those kinds of examples out there. We haven't gone to a lot of time and expense to document them, frankly, because it's been a regularized part of our operations that we've had to deal with.

Again, we're not highly industrialized. So these may be small examples, but I know they are out there in my province and we do deal with them on a fairly regular basis.

In terms of municipal governments, again speaking in Manitoba, the results of this harmonization exercise are, we feel, what will be of most use to our local governments, keeping in mind that these agreements are to cover environmental issues of national significance. Municipalities deal with many environmental issues, but a much smaller menu of ones that would fall into this category of national significance. Where they do, things like nationally agreed upon water quality objectives across the country are, I think, invaluable to local governments as they work through some of their responsibilities in the environment and some of the other standards and more rational processes that follow out of these agreements.

Municipalities are not signatories to these agreements, but certainly at the provincial level it's our intention to harmonize to the next order of government as well, at the local level. Many of these products will help us do that.

Mr. Ian Glen: There also is an effort in these what we call stakeholder consultation efforts with ministers to ensure that a municipal voice is factored into those discussions. Mr. Brandson is right: a lot of the issues can be treated truly as local, but if you're trying to adopt national standards, you're trying to bring some uniformity of approach, which should bring industry efficiencies, but also buy-in on it.

Municipalities are a part of worrying that one through. The voice of municipalities is more and more becoming a voice that all governments, provincial and federal, have to listen to and engage well. They would not be absented from the discussion around what we're trying to develop. This particular accord and the subagreements reflect simply the constitutional parties that are at play here, and those are the federal and provincial governments.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: Could I ask Mr. Gershberg a couple of questions about environmental assessment in order to confirm that I've read the subagreement right?

The way I've read it, the lead jurisdiction is decided on, whether it's territorial government, provincial government or the federal government. If the lead is not clearly established, each jurisdiction has a time period to decide whether it is a responsible government, what kind of assessment will take place, and whether there will be an assessment, and there's a time period for the assessment to take place.

Have I understood that right?

Mr. Sid Gershberg: There is talk in the subagreement about establishing time lines. It's one of the issues, if you wish, in terms of efficiency and single window.

The first thing that has to be decided is whether the federal government and the provincial government are indeed parties to a particular project assessment. In the majority of cases, that would not be the case. There will still continue to be many assessments, at both the federal and provincial levels, that will be undertaken simply by either the provincial government or the federal government. So this agreement deals with those where there is a combination, where both governments are involved in a particular assessment.

In that case, there will be a period of time after project notification to in fact go through the process of deciding whether or not each party is a party to the assessment. It's not always clear at first glance. Sometimes you have to get further information about the project to know whether or not, for example, the Fisheries Act is triggered or an ocean-dumping permit is required.

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Once that is established, however, the subagreement does call for a lead party to handle the administration and be the sort of single-window entrance for the project proponent. It will be working co-operatively with the other party, whether it's the federal or a provincial government, to establish the terms of reference and the nature of the assessment that would be undertaken.

At that point the two parties would work co-operatively to develop that assessment and then a decision would have to be taken. That assessment would then be used quite independently by both the federal government and the provincial governments for the actual decision on providing funding, a permit that might be required, authorization, or any transfer of land. So the final decision-making remains with the two jurisdictions independently.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: Am I not right in saying that if there's one chapter of this harmonization agreement that has led to a lot of problems and questioning—one minister was very reluctant to get into it—it is the fact that the Oldman River Dam almost forced the federal government to get back into assessments?

Since then, when we look at the large mining projects, for instance, that involve land, natural resources, the provinces and federal jurisdictions on water and aboriginal issues and so forth, isn't it true that when you look at the key mining assessments that have come through recently—BHP, Voisey's Bay, Cheviot Mine and, in B.C., Huckleberry—each one of them has become a problem child? It seems that the mines and the big mining companies win and the environment loses.

I would like to ask you a specific question about BHP because I took a special interest in that project. Is it true that right now with BHP in the north—it would involve the territorial government and the federal government—there is no need for assessments for foraging and drying up lakes for exploration purposes, and several lakes are involved now? I understand two of these lakes have died. There was a court case involving BHP for toxic pollution of at least one lake, maybe two, and somehow the case was dropped by the federal government. Is there a connection between this and the sort of compromise assessment report that came through? Do you know?

Mr. Sid Gershberg: I'm afraid in this case, sir, I can't answer on the specifics. It was an assessment that took place a couple of years ago, before my time, and I'm not familiar with the details you're raising. I can look into it and get back to you and the committee on that.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: I would like that.

I was raising this example because it seems to be the case that when you get into mining, especially where the potential damage to the environment is huge—Voisey's Bay and Cheviot Mine would be good examples—somehow it's so complicated and eventually the assessment seems to fall between the cracks. For instance, Cheviot Mine is a typical example where somehow everybody closed their eyes. Is it your considered feeling that this is going to help the process? Doesn't it make it even more complicated than before in regard to federal jurisdiction?

Mr. Sid Gershberg: I think there's been some history over the last number of years of trying to involve those parties interested in the particular assessment in the public review panels. I think it has been beneficial for all involved. It is a very large process, where I think it would be very difficult if there were, for example, two quite independent panels.

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In the case of Voisey's Bay, for example—and I believe this is a first—the two aboriginal land claim groups are directly involved and are signatories to the memorandum of agreement—

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: Thank the Lord.

Mr. Sid Gershberg:—exactly—which also includes the federal and provincial governments. That will be, I think, a very comprehensive study of that particular project. As you know, the company has been concerned because of the extensive guidelines they have been given, the amount of work that's involved, the timeframes, and so on. Nonetheless, that is going forward, and it will be a very comprehensive look at the potential environmental impacts of that project. I think in this case a harmonized process can be of great benefit in bringing together all the parties that are directly involved in the environmental assessment.

Mr. Clifford Lincoln: One last question, Mr. Gershberg. Could you let us have the reasons...? I know you were not there at the time of BHP, but I'm very interested in the contrast between the BHP criteria for assessment and those that have been applied to Voisey's Bay, which I agree with you are much more comprehensive, especially because of the aboriginal involvement. Could you tell me why, for instance, the same criteria and the same norms and the same benchmarks were not applied in the case of BHP? I would be very interested to know.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: I guess I'll move on to my question.

CCME's guidelines seem to be consensus, voluntary, non-legally binding, as I interpret them, as opposed to regulations, which would be legally binding. With all these guidelines your intentions are to define the highest standards, but you're not challenging yourself to put your highest standards on paper. What standards?

Just an example. With your guidelines in the decommissioning of Argentia, cost-prohibitive reasons come into play. So is it highest affordable standards? What is the terminology you would like to see? How would harmonization strengthen your guidelines in today's reality?

Mr. Peter Underwood: There were several questions. I'll try to pick them off.

About standards versus guidelines, the continuum of laws to policy, there are steps along the way where in the normal course of business as governments some are enforceable as laws and some are simply policies and guidelines. We've had this discussion and debate at length around the table in the development of the standard subagreement, and the scope of the agreement clearly, under 2(1), includes the whole breadth of possible tools you might want to use.

Historically, a CCME guideline on, for example, the maximum allowable emissions of dioxins and furans from a biomedical waste incinerator—which at this point is non-binding; it's just a standard developed after discussions by experts on what should be a reasonable and safe standard—is turned into actual laws when it comes to my province. We write the stipulations right into our operating permit. To this point there has been a loose arrangement. We are not required to do that under the arrangement with CCME. We're not even required to report that we do it.

So I think the agreement will help in a number of ways. First, it will put a little more process and accountability in for the table of environment ministers to come up with what priorities, what standards, we should be working on, and then there will be a system where you're not just left to take them if you want or not if you don't; you have to make a commitment as to what you're going to do in order to achieve that objective.

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The other point you mentioned was, where are the standards? I think the answer to your question rests in the annex or the work plan to the harmonization agreement, in that as a first step we have come up with a list of substances or environmental issues for which we intend to develop standards over the next 12 to 18 months. We have 12 months to finalize the priorities and set plans for achieving those priorities. They are particulate matter in air, ground level ozone, benzene in air.... So there's a list of those. So we have a work plan to get on with the job of developing the standards.

The agreement itself doesn't have any specific standard in it; it's just the structure within which we will develop the standards.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: As another component to this harmonization, there's really no relevance to generation of capital resources to implement this. Has the CCME looked at...? There's a fear of where provincial jurisdictions can compromise environmental standards to attract industry as opposed to a neighbouring province, but the federal jurisdiction should protect that.

I think that for corporate taxation Canada is the lowest in developmental countries. Have you looked at a means of rationalizing or acquiring or accessing capital for taxes on corporations to keep the environmental standards as high as possible?

Mr. Ian Glen: It's not germane to this, but, more generally, are we paying attention to what in fact environmental regimes may serve as an incentive or disincentive to industry locating and where we look at matters such as greening of the budget to be more environmentally sensitive and what not?

There definitely is work in the federal government, and many other interested parties as well, on assessing tax regimes and the play they may have for or against environmental planning.

In terms of the accord itself, no, we haven't factored that in. I'm not certain why we would necessarily do so in the framework we're considering, but I wouldn't rule it out if there was thought to do it.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: My perception is that you've highlighted the reason for harmonization. You're bringing it on because of budgets being limited: you can't afford duplication, you can't afford the issue of gaps. Why don't you address the issue of the affordability of this and look at the revenue generation? As opposed to harmonizing services and programs on the expenditure side, look at the revenue balance side.

The Chairman: Because it's outside their jurisdiction.

Any further questions? No?

Going back to Mr. Sauvageau's intervention when he inquired about section 7 under subagreements of the Canada-wide accord, Mr. Glen, could you tell us who will determine whether a government is unable to fulfil its obligation? Will it be the government itself or the group of governments as a whole? Who will wave the red flag?

Mr. Ian Glen: In the most worrying of scenarios it would probably be the federal government that would wave it. I'm trying to address it from the perspective of provinces who fear that, having engaged in trying to do their best, someone's second-guessing them. That would be the most worrying scenario.

There is a collective concern, certainly, if the particular initiatives are ones that were commonly agreed to be addressed and one particular province was falling behind.

I'll say, for example, setting a common course across the country to deal with one of the standards that Mr. Underwood was mentioning in the work plan—let's say a common approach to deal with ground level ozone—and in one jurisdiction it just wasn't reporting that they were having the same success that was elsewhere in the country. Several scenarios may arise.

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One might be a collective effort to go in and work with that province to determine what more needs to be done to address the reductions that were sought under the common approach. It may be identifying particular industries that are a problem...and so focus on that. That would fall into the more benign case of “government is unable”. It lacks the capacity. In some fashion the national plan is wanting, and you come in.

The more worrying one would be where one level of government, the federal government, for example, would say, you are not cutting it, and we are going to come in and decide that under our authorities we will continue to address this situation independently of you. In that circumstance there is an expectation you will plan over an extended time to work that through.

The Chairman: Mr. Glen, look at this unlikely scenario. In Alberta tomorrow an NDP government is elected and its views are very strong on the reduction of CO₂ and it signs an accord for the reduction of CO₂ according to a formula. In the following election the Conservatives are brought back to power. They don't like that accord, and they are certainly not able to live up to the accord, because they don't want to. Ottawa could say to Alberta that it's not living up to its accord. Does it have any power to enforce it?

Mr. Ian Glen: It would continue to have the authorities it would have in federal legislation and it could use those authorities as it felt appropriate.

The Chairman: So the accord would fall apart with a change of a government provincially.

Mr. Ian Glen: Well, no. Let's assume in your scenario a particular course of action is to abandon any commitment to a common planning approach to address a problem. It would be a worry not just for the federal government but for the other jurisdictions across the country if in fact there were a common commitment to address it through national standards and a particular approach; a common initiative to address an environmental problem. So I don't think it would be solely one jurisdiction—

The Chairman: Eight provinces would agree there is a need to proceed with the accord, but Saskatchewan and Alberta would say, no, no, we want to retain our level of CO₂ emissions because that is what the petroleum industry wants.

Mr. Ian Glen: To the degree that any jurisdiction continues to maintain its legal authorities and they feel it's necessary to exercise those legal authorities, the accord does not preclude that happening.

The Chairman: Finally, is it fair to conclude that the agenda of this accord is driven in part by the cuts and the corporate sector? Would you agree with that statement?

Mr. Ian Glen: There is no one sole driver, in my view, certainly not in the instructions given to me and to Environment Canada to work on this. There was a recognition in the material we provided that there was a political driver for it. There is a recognition of a need for co-ordinated action for budgets. I would say no one single driver is putting—

The Chairman: Would you care to identify them?

Mr. Ian Glen: We tried here to identify some of them. The recognition that jurisdictions across the country, several, have reduced budgets is a reality that brings us together to try to push this initiative in its proper terms. Co-ordination of action is the best solution. Working across jurisdictions on environmental issues that quite frankly do not adhere to jurisdictions is an important element of planning ahead.

I would say there is no one single driver that is trying to see this move forward. At that point it's probably fair to say that is a question to ask ministers.

The Chairman: When you turn the light off at night, do you lose your sleep that the accord has not yet been signed?

Mr. Ian Glen: Actually, I lose my sleep over many other issues as well. It's just one of many.

The Chairman: On behalf of the committee members, I thank you very much indeed for this very informative session.

This meeting is adjourned.