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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, February 13, 2003

0910

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Dr. Kenneth Calder (Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), Department of National Defence)

The Chair

Dr. Kenneth Calder

0915

0920

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance)

Dr. Kenneth Calder

0925

Mr. Leon Benoit

Dr. Kenneth Calder

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Dr. Kenneth Calder

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien (Labrador, Lib.)

0930

Dr. Kenneth Calder

0935

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

Dr. Kenneth Calder

0940

Mr. Claude Bachand

Dr. Kenneth Calder

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

0945

Dr. Kenneth Calder

Col Rick Williams (Director of Western Hemisphere Policy, Department of National Defence)

0950

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC)

Dr. Kenneth Calder

0955

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Dr. Kenneth Calder

The Chair

Dr. Kenneth Calder

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

1000

Dr. Kenneth Calder

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.)

Dr. Kenneth Calder

Ms. Anita Neville

The Chair

1005

Ms. Anita Neville

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

Dr. Kenneth Calder

Col Rick Williams

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Col Rick Williams

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Dr. Kenneth Calder

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Dr. Kenneth Calder

1010

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

Dr. Kenneth Calder

1015

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

Dr. Kenneth Calder

1020

The Chair

Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.)

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Mr. Ivan Grose

Dr. Kenneth Calder

1025

Mr. Ivan Grose

Dr. Kenneth Calder

Mr. Ivan Grose

Col Rick Williams

Mr. Ivan Grose

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Dr. Kenneth Calder

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

1030

Dr. Kenneth Calder

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Dr. Kenneth Calder

1035

Col Rick Williams

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Col Rick Williams

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

The Chair

Miss Deborah Grey (Edmonton North, Canadian Alliance)

Dr. Kenneth Calder

1040

Miss Deborah Grey

Dr. Kenneth Calder

Miss Deborah Grey

Dr. Kenneth Calder

Miss Deborah Grey

The Chair

Miss Deborah Grey

Col Rick Williams

1045

Miss Deborah Grey

Col Rick Williams

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

1050

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

The Chair

Ms. Anita Neville

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

The Chair

Mr. Bob Wood

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

1055

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

The Chair

Miss Deborah Grey

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

1100

The Chair

Mr. Wolf Koerner (Committee Researcher)

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

The Chair

Ms. Anita Neville

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

1105

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Ms. Anita Neville

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Leon Benoit

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

NUMBER 010

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, February 13, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0910)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

As a first order of business, I'd like to welcome our guests. Dr. Kenneth Calder is the assistant deputy minister responsible for policy at the Department of National Defence, and Colonel Rick Williams is director of western hemisphere policy for the department.

Before we get into presentations by the witnesses, I would like to advise members that at approximately 10:45, we should end this meeting and commence consideration of some budgets that we have, including travel budgets and other budgets from the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. We should deal with those so that they can make it to the Liaison Committee next week.

With that, again, welcome to the defence committee, gentlemen. We'll start with your presentations.

Dr. Kenneth Calder (Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), Department of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It's a great pleasure to be here on this rather crisp morning.

My understanding is that you have a series of departmental witnesses on your schedule in the not too distant future, each dealing with their particular areas in the department. If you agree, it's my intention today to kick this off, from the government's point of view, with a very broad-brush approach, and to then turn to questions.

I think you've all been given a deck, which I will walk through. I will try to be reasonably brief so that we have lots of time for questions.

The Chair: That deck is in the process of being distributed.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: Very good.

Prior to the Second World War, Canada saw its security in the context of the British Empire. That began to change in 1938, when Prime Minister Mackenzie King and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt met to cooperate on the threat posed by Nazi Germany.

In 1938, King and Roosevelt met in Kingston. The United States pledged to come to Canada's aid if it were threatened, and Canada pledged not to allow its territory to be used by an enemy to attack the United States. That strategic bargain endures to this day. They acknowledged the indivisibility of continental security and established the principle of mutual assistance, which of course still endures.

The 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence for regular consultations between senior Canadian and American military and diplomatic officials. The Canada–U.S. defence relationship matured during the Cold War, built on two pillars, one represented by NORAD for continental North America, and a multilateral pillar through NATO. In addition to mutual assistance, collective defence, and consultation, NATO and NORAD added institutional stability and interoperability to the Canada–U.S. defence relationship.

The United States is our most important ally. In collaboration with the United States, the defence of North America is an enduring mission of the Canadian Forces. We have more than 80 treaty-level defence agreements with the Americans, some 150 bilateral fora in which we communicate to each other, and about 250 memoranda of understanding, all giving some substance to the relationship.

Of course, we benefit very much from our relationship with the Americans. It gives us some voice in U.S. defence policy formulation where our security interests are involved. It provides us with significant opportunities for training and operational experience by working with the Americans. It gives us privileged access to significant defence-related intelligence and information. It provides Canada with a cost-effective defence of the continental approaches to North America and our airspace. And it gives us privileged access to the U.S. defence market. Of course, it is a relationship that should never be taken for granted.

With respect to interoperability, Canadian frigates can substitute for American ships in U.S. naval carrier battle groups. Canadian CF-18s participated along with the United States and NATO allies in the Kosovo air campaign. A Canadian battalion operated with a U.S. Army brigade group in Afghanistan.

The most important structural part of our relationship is NORAD. It is a quite unique binational command. It is commanded by an American four-star general with a Canadian deputy, and it is responsible to the national authorities in both countries. As I said, this is a unique arrangement that allows both countries to coordinate their responses while respecting each country's sovereignty. A Canadian commander exercises operational control over all forces in Canada, whereas the U.S. commander exercises operational control over all forces in the United States.

In the post-9/11 context, the United States has undertaken the most far-reaching restructuring of its governmental apparatus since the early days of the Cold War. Bilateral relations have been affected across the board, including new cooperation measures in border security, law enforcement, intelligence, critical infrastructure protection, and, of course, the military.

With respect to NORAD, it provided the first military response on September 11, putting fighters aloft within minutes of the attacks. Unfortunately, of course, there wasn't enough time to actually prevent them. Until that time, NORAD had tended to concentrate on external threats to North America. Emphasis has now turned decidedly toward surveillance of the domestic airspace. Readiness and operational activity are high, and there is an ongoing effort to conduct combat air patrols over selected North American cities and critical infrastructure.

¿ (0915)

In the wake of 9/11, the United States established Northern Command. Northern Command is a U.S.-only command in charge of the defence of the United States, including military assistance to their civil authorities. U.S. Northern Command centralizes U.S. military responsibilities for homeland security. Its mission is the defence of the United States. We are not a part of that organization, nor indeed is any other country. It will, however, conduct defence cooperation with countries within its area of interest, including Canada and Mexico. That cooperation will include exercises, exchanges, and visits.

In our view, this does not in any way diminish our access to and influence in the U.S. decision-making process. We will maintain our long-standing strategic relationship with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the office of the Secretary of Defense, while at the same time we will be cultivating a new relationship with the commander of Northern Command, who fortunately, from our point of view, is also the commander of NORAD and is therefore someone who intimately knows Canadian issues.

In December, we announced the creation of a binational planning group, co-located with NORAD in Colorado Springs. This initiative addresses gaps in maritime and land cooperation for the defence of North America. It focuses on intelligence sharing, surveillance, contingency planning, and exercises. It includes linkages to civil emergency response planning.

Within the planning group, the maritime cooperation will focus on planning, surveillance, attack warning, and assessment. On the land side, it will focus on military assistance to civil authorities, particularly the provision of specialists like medics, engineers, logisticians, and so forth, to supplement the civilian capabilities. It will assist the civil authorities, but will not in fact usurp the role of the first responders.

The planning group will allow for more effective cooperation, while at the same time protecting sovereignty and policy independence. It enables both countries to work together, but it does not oblige them to work together. They can in fact have their freedom of action to work separately.

NATO is also a part of the defence of North America, of course. We saw that post-September 11 when NATO deployed the AWACS over to North America. So NATO is in fact an element in the North American equation.

With respect to missile defence, the U.S.A. is quickly moving ahead with the intention to deploy an initial operating capability by the autumn of 2004. It will have a rudimentary system of twenty ground-based interceptors at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, in addition to up twenty sea-based interceptors.

The United States is talking to its friends and allies about participation bilaterally and within the context of NATO. We have yet to make a decision. The policy stated in the 1994 defence white paper is to gain a better understanding of missile defence through research and consultation. We have been doing precisely that. We have been consulting regularly with the Americans to understand the implications of their programs for Canada. That said, of course, the United States will proceed whether Canada participates in the program or not.

Any government decision will need to consider a number of factors. One is the security of Canada in the face of growing missile threats. Another is the U.S.–Canada defence relationship, and particularly the possible role of NORAD in any future missile defence system. We'll have to take into consideration industrial opportunities and cooperation. There's also an issue of cost, of course, if we do actually participate in some major fashion. We'll also have to consider the impact of missile defence on Canadian policy, including arms control policies and particularly the policy with respect to the non-weaponization of space.

The 1994 white paper said we should have greater engagement with Latin America. Canada joined the Organization of American States in 1990, and at the end of 2002 announced its intention to join the Inter-American Defense Board. When he was defence minister, Art Eggleton visited Mexico City, signalling an increase in Canadian interest in developing defence ties with Mexico. We also provide training to various Latin American countries, through the military training assistance program, such as hosting Latin American students at our colleges and at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.

In conclusion, we have a strong and healthy relationship with the United States. One of our challenges is preserving that relationship, remaining relevant, and continuing to enjoy the benefits that relationship gives us. We also have a challenge of enhancing that relationship, adjusting it to the new security environment in dealing with the campaign against terrorism and dealing with the issues of weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation. Maintaining and enhancing that relationship is therefore an ongoing and permanent task of the Department of National Defence.

¿ (0920)

With that, I would take questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Calder. We have many questioners lined up here, beginning with Mr. Benoit, for seven minutes.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Good morning, Mr. Calder and Colonel Williams. Welcome.

Some members of the committee went to NORAD headquarters before Christmas, and some pretty clear messages were given. One was that Canada is being excluded more and more. Even at NORAD headquarters at Cheyenne Mountain, we're being excluded from more and more meetings. There are some areas where Canada is no longer welcome, and I think that's more than symbolic. General Ed Eberhart, the head of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, made it clear that he's really looking for and would hope for Canadian support of missile defence, and he would like to see Canada with more observers in, let's say, USNORTHCOM.

Right now, I forget if it was an official comment or in an informal conversation, but I was told there's only one Canadian in the USNORTHCOM headquarters. Of course, that's an American strategic group, but Canadians are welcome to observe and to give the two-way communications. The feeling expressed was that we're not doing that appropriately.

I'm certainly concerned, and I think anybody who really cares about the Canada–U.S. defence relationship has to be concerned that we're losing ground with our American friends and neighbours. As you've said, we count on them for so much in terms of protection, yet we're very slow as a country to show support for missile defence and for having observers in USNORTHCOM so that there's more of a two-way flow there.

Have you any thoughts on how soon Canada will formally support missile defence, or whether we will?

Dr. Kenneth Calder: I would start off just with a comment on Northern Command. Because we made the announcement in December, we're in the process of discussing with the Americans how we set up the planning group, which will be in Colorado Springs and which will be in many ways our relationship with USNORTHCOM. I think it's a question of when that group is established, and I think we're talking about putting more than thirty additional people down there as part of that planning group. That planning group will establish a very clear link with Northern Command, and I would assume it will in fact solve the problem you mentioned about observers. That is still a work in progress and we're negotiating that kind of stand-up for that organization, but I think that will deal with USNORTHCOM.

You were talking about us being excluded from various things. Of course, we had a very intimate relationship with United States Air Force Space Command when Space Command and NORAD were side by side and together. With Space Command moving off to United States Strategic Command, we're probably losing a certain amount of contact there. That's regrettable, but in a sense it's difficult to deal with them when the Americans separate those.

With respect to ballistic missile defence, as I said, there's no doubt that if the Americans are going ahead, we have opportunities to be involved, depending on the decision of the Canadian government. If we do become involved, I would assume we will then be involved in the planning and the consultations that take place with respect to missile defence. On the other hand, if we say we're not interested in missile defence or it's not our cup of tea, then we will in fact be excluded from what the Americans are doing on missile defence, as would be only right and proper from the American point of view.

¿ (0925)

Mr. Leon Benoit: So right now, Canada is in fact excluded from many discussions on missile defence, and our people are not even allowed into the areas in Cheyenne Mountain that are allocated to that function. To me, it's a concern when you see missile defence—which the Americans feel and I feel is a vital part of the protection of North America—and we're excluded from even discussion on that, or at least the formal discussions.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: I share your concern, but I think it's not quite as negative as you suggest. We do have a liaison officer with the Missile Defense Agency in Washington, which is in effect leading the effort on missile defence. At the moment, and for some significant period of time in NORAD, we have also participated in the missile warning aspect of missile defence. For a long period of time, NORAD has been in the business of detecting missile launches and doing warnings on them. Canadians have been involved and are still involved in the missile warning function.

We also are speaking to the Americans both through NORAD and in Washington. We recently had a team down in Washington, so we have sent signals to the Americans that, given where they are in their program, we want intensified consultations that will enable us to inform the government of the implications for Canada and will be able to inform a government decision. I would certainly hope that comes in the not too distant future.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I certainly have more questions for you, but I've even heard members of Parliament in the House of Commons say Canada should terminate its role in all of these Canada–U.S. bodies. That's almost unbelievable coming from members of Parliament, but I've also heard it from members of the media—

The Chair: Is that Alliance policy?

Mr. Leon Benoit: It's hardly Alliance policy, as you know.

Members of the media even occasionally flirt with the idea of saying we've lost sovereignty because of these close ties with the Americans through our defence relationship.

I know you obviously have very little time to answer, but in your opinion, what would happen if Canada were to pull out of NORAD and separate ourselves more from the Americans?

Dr. Kenneth Calder: I'd start off by saying that I think Mackenzie King and Franklin Delano Roosevelt got it right back in the 1940s. Our defence of the North American continent can best be done in cooperation. I think everything we've seen since then has proved that.

If we were to go it alone, it would cost us a great deal more money. If we were to provide what we get from intelligence on our own, I don't know how much it would cost, but it would be an eye-watering figure. If we were to provide on our own what NORAD provides us with, it would also be very expensive. As I said, we get many benefits in terms of training together and in terms of access to the American market. We would suffer a great deal, and it would cost us a great deal more for the same benefits.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

Mr. O'Brien, for seven minutes.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien (Labrador, Lib.): I'm brand new to this committee, but when it comes to some defence issues, I have some knowledge.

I want to talk a bit about the missile defence potential. From where I sit, I certainly believe in very strong relations between Canada and the U.S. in terms of defence. I look back at the historic days of World War II and at places like the naval base at Argentia, Newfoundland, or the air force base at Goose Bay, which is one of the finest bits of infrastructure in this country. The Americans built it back then, and it was used quite effectively by them up to and including the time when technology took over and other things came on. Again, that's exactly what we're talking about here when we're talking about missile deployment and whatever. It's again a new era, and there's new technology and a new way of doing business.

What I'm suggesting is that, from where I sit, I'm quite concerned about Canada sometimes. Of course, we have to be Canada and we have to be Canadians. At the same time, we have to be North Americans. I sometimes get mixed signals. We're certainly Canadians, but sometimes I'm not so sure just how long it takes us to be the fully integrated partners called North Americans. That's a concern of mine.

The point I'm making is that I would certainly like Canada to look at the missile defence issue. I would certainly like this committee to dig in deep on it in terms of what our role is and what our suggestions and recommendations are to the Government of Canada, and certainly on the ultimate decision by the government.

I want to take that a little bit further. I am concerned, because even the enlightened stress levels of the Americans these days are quite high, and I don't think they're going to go down very quickly—and nor should they, I suppose. I think we have to feel some of that. When I've read the news in the last few days and heard talk about how we're always ready and our government is always on alert for a possible terrorist attack, from my perspective it seems to be a bit of a lackadaisical type of approach. Oh, we're ready, we're ready. Well, if someone blasted the ass out of some big building in Montreal or Vancouver or Toronto some day soon, would we be ready? Is that what readiness is. We've seen the British in the last couple of days with a couple of thousand troops at the airport in London and we've seen the high alert in the States, but we never seem to sense any of that here.

I'm not looking to make it happen. Don't get me wrong. I don't want it to be arbitrary and I don't want it to be false, but I think we have to be concerned as a government, as a defence department, and as the leaders of the country, be it at the Prime Minister's level, the minister's, or whatever, or, constructively, all of us.

I'm trying to get down to a couple of more points here, Mr. Chair. I'm saying a lot of things, but the point I'm making is that we should zero in, focus, not drag our feet, and see where we're going. I'm talking primarily about missile defence.

I would like to throw in more than a little catcher for myself, as an MP from Labrador. Mr. ADM and Colonel, I can tell you that we'd be very happy to have Goose Bay and places like Goose Bay, from my point of view, as an interceptor base if Canada ever chooses to move on that.

Geography has to come into play. It is part of North America. Why were Goose Bay and places like that built in the first place? They were built for exactly the same kinds of reasons, except for different technologies: to ferry across the Atlantic. Well, if it is ferrying across the Atlantic, maybe we have to intercept some of this stuff that's coming our way.

¿ (0930)

I'd like to make that point, and I'd like to get your comments on some of the comments I've made.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: I think I saw that one coming.

I did indicate that we have intensified discussions with the Americans on this now that they're actually moving ahead with their program. At some point or other, there will obviously be a decision, so in your consultations with American officials and during your visits to the United States, I would certainly very much encourage this committee to dig deeply into the missile defence issue. It is one of those issues that is on the Canada–U.S. agenda in the not too distant future. I'm sure this is an issue Parliament would in fact want to deal with.

I would say that, for many years now, every time we've had discussions with the Americans, we've asked about their interest in Canadian territory both for interceptors and for radars. What we have been told is that, in the foreseeable future, they do not really have an interest in putting interceptors or radars in Canadian territory. That is essentially because of the geography. They have facilities in Alaska, they have radar facilities in the United Kingdom, and they have a large radar facility in Thule, Greenland. Because of that coverage, they don't actually need Canadian territory for radars, for example.

What I understand is that the interceptors would primarily be in the United States. They wouldn't be that far forward. So, in fact, whenever we have asked them, they have said they don't need our territory. That doesn't mean they wouldn't change their minds if, for some reason, they didn't have the radar in Thule, for example. A long way down in the program, many years from now, they may also be interested, but we'll certainly keep Goose Bay in mind when we're talking to our American colleagues.

¿ (0935)

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Calder, Mr. O'Brien.

[Translation]

You have seven minutes, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Mr. Chairman, I'm pleased to note that we once had a lobbyist for Shearwater and now, we have someone lobbying on behalf of Goose Bay. Members of this committee always do a bit of lobbying for their own regions. I've always lobbied hard for Saint-Jean, because it is home to a military base that in my estimation, is important to the future of the Canadian Forces. My colleague Mr. Benoit was probably directing his comments at me earlier, because I've always been very interested in matters pertaining to sovereignty and independence.

As you know, my party is a sovereignist party. We are currently doing a study on Canadian-American cooperation in the military field. Mindful of the fact that you are both responsible for departmental policies, I'm wondering if you are concerned about this question. Personally, as a sovereignty supporter, I get the feeling that Canadian sovereignty is increasingly under assault and that as a sovereign nation, the margin we enjoy in terms of our independence is growing ever more narrow.

I see here that we are a party to 80 accords that are equivalent to treaties and to 250 protocol agreements and that we serve on 145 bilateral tribunals. In your paper, you talk about interoperability and about how important it is for our forces to properly integrate, and so forth. When I hear that, I have to wonder how sovereign this nation really is.

If ties with the US were suddenly severed tomorrow morning, Canada would not be sufficiently autonomous. We cannot protect all of our territory on our own. We would be cut off from US intelligence that supplies us with a constant flow of information.

When it comes to new issues like ballistic missiles or the space shield, I find that Canada no longer has much, if any, say in these matters. Are you concerned by this, Colonel Williams and Dr. Calder? Given the large number of treaties in place, the vast degree of interoperability and the almost total degree of integration with our American partners, do you not get the feeling that Canadian sovereignty is under attack in a major way?

Dr. Kenneth Calder: Let me assure you that we are always mindful of the sovereignty issue during any negotiations with the United States. That was clearly the case during our negotiations on the planning groups. All of our accords with the United States are aimed at helping to facilitate the cooperation process and to provide us with more freedom to act. We are also mindful that in the process, it's important for us to protect our freedom of action.

We are not in a situation where we have no choice but to go along with the United States. We always have a choice. We can act unilaterally, if we so choose. We can also work with the Americans, but that's not absolutely essential. Therefore, in that respect, our sovereignty is protected.

¿ (0940)

Mr. Claude Bachand: Earlier, you stated that the lobbyist for Goose Bay and Labrador had suggested his base be used for interception purposes. You also said that the Americans didn't seem very interested because they wanted to keep these facilities based in the US. Do you not get the feeling that they are only interested in Canada in so far as it can serve as a buffer zone between them and an attack from another country? Isn't it true that a ballistic missile attack is more likely to come from the north and that since Canada is located to the north, intercepting the missile over Canadian soil would be the best course of action? Isn't it likely the Americans feel they are better off keeping their interception bases in the US and actually intercepting the missile over Canadian soil to guard against fallout over US soil?

Dr. Kenneth Calder: It's a fact that almost all of the missiles that might be launched in the direction of the United States would pass over Canada. If these missiles were intercepted, this would likely occur in Canadian air space.

[English]

Almost all of the missile tracks toward the United States pass over Canadian territory, and almost all of the interceptors would pass over Canadian territory. The intercepts might not actually take place over Canadian territory, because the desirable thing is to stop the missiles even sooner than that.

Almost all of the missiles that would head for North America would come from somewhere between Morocco and Bangladesh probably, or Korea on the other side. The desirable thing in many cases would be to intercept those in the atmosphere, even north of Canada or over Europe. This is speculation, of course, because they haven't actually established the systems yet. The systems are not in place, so it is not clear how that would work out.

I would not say it's a case of the Americans using us as a buffer zone. That happens to be simply a result of the fact that our geography happens to be between them and the other side. That happens to be a fact of Canadian geography.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: If you were deploying out of Goose Bay or a place like that, they'd be a lot further away from us.

Mr. Claude Bachand: There would be a little bit of negotiation room.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Are there any questions on the government side? No? Then perhaps I'll avail myself of the opportunity to ask a few.

Dr. Calder, on the issue of the weaponization of space, I was reading an article not too long ago, in a well-known defence magazine, about the possibility of low-earth-orbit nuclear blasts, potentially by rogue states. The capability exists right now if a state has the ballistic missile to carry a weapon into low earth orbit. The potential is there to do a tremendous amount of damage. Approximately $100 billion worth of civilian satellites are orbiting the earth right now. If we don't have some means of protecting those assets either on land, at sea, or in the atmosphere itself, and if those systems don't do the job in terms of protecting those assets, then clearly it seems to me that we're going to have to look at this issue of the weaponization of space, if only for defensive purposes.

In terms of that issue, if you can, how would you characterize the thinking at this point within the Department of National Defence, and within the Department of Foreign Affairs as well? Obviously, some proliferation issues are involved here, but there is also the very practical problem of attempting to deal with potential threats and protecting very valuable assets, because I think we would all shudder to think what would occur in terms of the international economy if the satellites that are serving us right now were no longer functioning. Could you comment on that?

As well, just very briefly, maybe you could provide me with some information on the issue of how far advanced the planning group is. In terms of actually putting the mechanisms in place to ensure that if there were incidents that did arise—terrorist incidents, for instance—how far off are the triggering mechanisms that would either place Canadian troops on U.S. soil to help them or U.S. troops on Canadian soil to help us?

¿ (0945)

Dr. Kenneth Calder: Mr. Chairman, I'll let Colonel Williams take the second one after I deal with the first one.

If you were to set off a nuclear weapon anywhere in the atmosphere, it would send out an electromagnetic pulse that would knock out most of our communications systems, our electronics, and so forth, and it would do a significant amount of damage to our ability to communicate. We don't know an enormous amount about this, because we haven't done it very often, fortunately. If someone wanted to knock out all of the satellites, my understanding is that they could do precisely that by sending a missile into orbit and setting off a large nuclear weapon, which would not necessarily physically destroy the satellites but would make them inoperable.

That is a danger that exists, and people have the technology to do that today. The thing is that, in many cases, it's not in the people's interest to do that. When you knock out all the communications, you knock out your own communications as well, so there's a question about the rationale for doing that, unless you are a rogue state. I suppose that's possible, but the rogue states have not reached that capability yet.

If they reach that capability, are you best protected by having weapons in space? I don't think people have actually worked out the cost-benefit of that. There may be different ways of actually dealing with that threat. Having a weapon in space, if that weapon worked, would be one way of doing that, but I'm not sure it would be the best or the most cost-effective way of doing it.

There are a number of difficulties with putting weapons in space. Of course, I'm not a physicist, so I'm going back to my nuclear planning background. First of all, one problem is that putting weapons in space is enormously expensive. Secondly, when you put weapons into space, everybody knows they're there. You can't really hide things in space, so the weapons themselves are vulnerable. In fact, you might have weapons on the ground that could eliminate those in space. Because the programs are not far enough advanced, a question has not yet been answered about whether or not it makes sense to put weapons in space at all from a military point of view.

The Americans, of course, have programs on putting weapons in space. To my understanding, they are not funding these as high-priority items. This is an issue that is significantly far over their horizon, so it's not an immediate problem. It's not yet clear whether they will in fact develop the technology that will make this cost-effective. In the meantime, of course, the Canadian government has a very long-term, long-standing policy of opposing the weaponization of space, and I certainly would not imagine that changing at any time in the near future.

Colonel Williams can talk about the planning.

Col Rick Williams (Director of Western Hemisphere Policy, Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, I take your question as both a medium-term one on what we are doing to set the planning group up, and then as one on what happens once the planning group is in place, in terms of the kinds of hypothetical situations we would talk about. We must recall that the planning group was officially chartered in December of this past year. Therefore, they are in the very early days of setting themselves up.

The department has a plan in place to populate the planning group, from the Canadian side, in two tranches. The first tranche of approximately a dozen to fourteen people will be in place no later than June 1 of this year. They will be partnered up with an equivalent number of U.S. officers who will be double-hatted from roles and responsibilities either with NORAD or U.S. Northern Command. Our plan is that, next year, we would complete the population of the planning group up to around thirty Canadians. That's our best estimate at this point in time.

Of course, any military organization that stands up wants to be very clear on what its mandate and mission are. That is the work the planning group has focused on almost exclusively for the past two months. I think they've made significant strides in getting their guidance and their terms of reference and in identifying those points of contact that they will reach out to in order to establish the clear process for maritime surveillance, warning, and reaction. I think some significant work has been done between the planning group and the navies on both coasts, both American and Canadian, and also the coast guards on both sides, to understand what processes are in place, what information is available, and so on.

That is unfolding as we speak. They're very optimistic that, as the people come in early in the summer, they can actually mechanize some of those processes so that they're in a position to fulfill their mission.

In the longer term, what we're hoping is that they will establish a very robust ability to generate a recognized maritime picture that surrounds the North American coastline. They can marry that up with the recognized air picture that already exists within NORAD. The combination of those two will provide us with what we like to term situational awareness. We will understand what's going on in the approaches to North America, whether by sea or by air. Coupling that with the vast number of initiatives that are ongoing for port security and for the inspection of containers and so forth, it will give us a much more robust capability to meet the kinds of threats whose existence we recognize in this new security environment.

In terms of how quickly they can react, it is important to recognize that the planning group itself was not chartered to have an execution authority. It is simply there to collect information, assess it, and provide guidance to governments. There's a people loop in that situation, and I think that is just and proper and is in fact what the planning group was asked to do.

¿ (0950)

The Chair: Colonel, I'm going to have to cut you off, because I'm over my time.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: Inasmuch as your answers are very interesting, we're going to have to go to Mrs. Wayne for seven minutes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Dr. Calder, in reading this morning's paper and in listening to the Minister of Defence talking about the role Canada is going to play in the future, they're talking about sending our troops into Kabul, Afghanistan, this summer. Does Canada itself have enough resources to ensure by itself, without the U.S.A., the complete surveillance of its airspace, its waters, and its territory? Or do we have to rely on the U.S.A.? Do you have and do we have the resources needed for us to look after our country here?

Dr. Kenneth Calder: With the NORAD arrangement and with cooperation on both coasts, we have in fact provided that surveillance in cooperation with the United States as a joint Canada–U.S. effort. If we didn't have that reliance on NORAD to provide the same amount of surveillance, we would have to invest more. We have managed to do it in a more cost-effective manner because we're working with our American allies.

¿ (0955)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: As you know, many of us at this table today have been really pushing the government to put more money into our defence budget. Hopefully that's going to happen in another week.

The reason for that push is that when our men were in Afghanistan, they had to be airlifted by the U.S.A. When I asked the minister a couple of weeks ago, I wanted to know if our Coyotes and our tanks had the same type of paint on them as those of the U.S.A., so that when American helicopters are flying over, they can see that the tanks are part and parcel of a friendly mission. I found out that it's not paint that we have; we put some form of stickers on ours. When you use special glasses, the stickers come out green. I'm not sure whether the U.S.A. uses these glasses or not.

Mr. Claude Bachand: How did the minister answer you?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: He came over to my office.

Anyway, we have cut our budget and we've continued to cut our budget because there has been peace here in Canada. The military or the governments of the day in the last twenty years haven't felt they needed to put the money there. Now you can see what's happening in some areas, as my colleague Lawrence O'Brien was saying.

We've cut back to the point where we've really stripped our military. We have to put money back into that military. We truly do. And the U.S.A. knows it as well. I'm saying right now that, no, we don't have all the ships we need. And we should be building those ships here in Canada. We shouldn't be looking at buying them from some other country, I can tell you that, Dr. Calder. And if I get your voice going, we're going to be building them in Canada, that's for sure. And when it comes to our helicopters, they should have been replaced.

You can see that our priorities right here were not the military. Now the U.S.A. is saying they want us to play a major role with them and be part of NORAD, and they're asking us about missile defence and so on. I'm telling you that I'm really worried, because back where I come from, Dr. Calder, we have the largest privately owned oil refinery in Canada. We have a nuclear power plant. We know the terrorists had a list of all of the nuclear power plants in Canada and where they are.

What I want to know is whether or not we're going to get more money. Are we going to be able to put more men and women in uniform? Are we going to get you those helicopters? Are we going to get you—

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.): Wait until Tuesday.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Wait until Tuesday, yes, when he's going to give you $800 million instead of $1 billion. And the poor old Minister of Defence, for God's sake, is taking the $200 million out. I can give you a list of what he took out. Anyway, I don't blame him.

But you must see that, Dr. Calder and Colonel Williams. Don't be afraid to speak out. Just tell us exactly what you think.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: Thank you for that. Given that we've—

The Chair: Mrs. Wayne, I think both of our witnesses will tell us exactly what they think.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: Since we live in expectation for next week, this is perilous ground. I wouldn't want to have been the one to throw the budget off the rails. Of course, the Minister of Finance hasn't let me in on his secrets, either.

As you know, this committee has recommended more money for defence. The Senate committee has recommended more money for defence. Mr. McCallum himself has said we need more money in defence. There are even a few people in my building who think that as well.

As I say, we live in hope of next week. That said, Canada has never had the full range of military equipment in the world. I don't think we'll ever see the day when we will have it. What we do want, of course, is to make sure the troops we put in the field have the best possible equipment that is up to date and of the highest quality. By and large, our record is not bad on that.

Really, in terms of money and defence, it's a question of how much defence you want. If you want more than we have now, that actually requires a larger defence budget, but that's a choice I don't make. It's a choice the government makes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's all right. You'll keep your job. Don't you worry.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: When it comes to our men and women, according to the paper this morning, Mr. McCallum is saying 1,500 will be going to Afghanistan this summer. As you know, we did not have replacements when they came back the last time. If we send 1,500 of our armed forces into Afghanistan, does that put us in a position whereby, if there is a war with Iraq, we will be peacekeepers in Afghanistan and will not be playing a role in the war in Iraq?

À (1000)

Dr. Kenneth Calder: First of all, I would say you shouldn't pay too much attention to that number of 1,500, because that depends...obviously the mission in Kabul will be done in cooperation with a number of other countries. In the current mission now, I think something like 28 countries are contributing. The size of our contribution is going to depend very much on the result of the negotiations with others and on exactly what we're able to get others to contribute as well.

It is peacekeeping in Afghanistan, it is peacekeeping in Kabul. The mandate of the mission is to maintain stability and to help the Afghan Transitional Authority. I would point out that it's peacekeeping, but it's going to be fairly muscular peacekeeping. The situation in Afghanistan is not entirely resolved. It is unstable, and there certainly will be risks involved. Nobody should think we're taking an easy way out in any sense. The assignment in Kabul is going to be very tough and very difficult. However, my understanding is that this deployment to Kabul does not negate the possibility of a contribution to a conflict in Iraq, should the government decide to do that.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne. Unfortunately, your time is up.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I just want him to know that I bought 700 sweaters. I'll send those over with the men when they go, so they'll be looked after.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: On behalf of the committee, we thank you for that gesture.

Ms. Neville, for seven minutes.

Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.): I'm very new to this committee and very new to the language and the issues, so I thank you for your presentation.

In your presentation, you talked about the shift of emphasis within NORAD from external attacks to domestic airspace. When you concluded, you spoke about the future of NORAD and you spoke about the importance of this strong an healthy relationship with U.S., which I think everybody around here would agree with.

But you also talked about the challenge of maintaining and enhancing the relationship. What I'm interested in is how our relationship has changed since the shift in emphasis to domestic security. What do you see as the challenges of the relationship within NORAD as we move toward 2006?

Dr. Kenneth Calder: As I indicated, the major change with respect to NORAD is a shift of focus for NORAD, from looking at what would come to North America from across the ocean to what's happening inside North America. That shift has already taken place and—Colonel Williams, correct me if I'm wrong—NORAD has been working with civil aviation authorities to get a better control of that.

When I spoke about enhancing and maintaining the relationship the first and most important thing in terms of enhancing it was the establishment of the planning group, which gives us a fuller breadth of cooperation. In addition to that, of course, we may well be able to use the question of missile defence, if the government so chooses, as a way of enhancing our relationship. We also have ongoing relations between the armies, navies, and air forces in North America, and we are attempting to work together to ensure interoperability and so forth.

Those are the areas in which we are trying to enhance our relationships.

Ms. Anita Neville: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Neville. Do you have any further questions?

À (1005)

Ms. Anita Neville: Not at this time, thank you.

The Chair: Mrs. Gallant.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Yesterday, George John Tenet confirmed that North Korea has the missile capability to reach North America, so we're all thinking about strikes from the sky. My first question is whether or not any discussions have been held on resuscitating the old DEW Line installations. Or has that type of low-altitude radar detection been rendered obsolete these days?

Dr. Kenneth Calder: I'm going to say a few words, and then defer to the air force officer beside me.

We have the North Warning System, which is in fact still functioning, still in operation. That provides warning to a certain extent, although it's primarily devoted to aircraft and so forth.

In NORAD, we have a missile warning system. If I understand correctly, it can detect a missile launch anywhere in the world and can tell you where it has been launched from and where it's going. In some cases, it can do that fast enough that you can actually warn the people in advance that something is coming in their direction. So there is a missile warning function. As I say, I stand to be corrected by the air force colonel with me here, but if there was a launch from Korea, for example, this would be picked up by NORAD and NORAD would immediately know what was happening and where it was going. Since there are no existing missile defence systems in North America at this point in time, however, there's nothing anybody could do about it.

Do you want to add anything, Rick?

Col Rick Williams: Yes, I would, sir.

From the NORAD perspective, the North Warning System meets the operational requirement for bombers and heavy threats. Coupled with the missile warning capabilities that we have, I think those systems are adequately protected. From NORAD's perspective, where we see a gap is with low-level cruise missiles or even civilian aircraft.

Other capabilities are being looked at rather than fixed, land-based radars. One of them is the possibility of a high-altitude airship that could remain aloft for extended periods of time and have radar on board that could be used to provide the coverage where it is needed. That's being looked at as an advanced concept development.

The other aspect is the high-frequency surface wave radar project that exists out in Newfoundland right now. It's a Canadian development that has some promise to be used for the over-the-horizon type of coverage. That could also be used.

So I think Canada is actively participating. We have our own projects underway, and we're working with NORAD to find modern ways of providing effective surveillance and coverage for the possibility of low-level threats to Canada.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: So it's not quicker, faster, or more economical to put the base in Clinton, Ontario, for example, back into operation. It just doesn't make sense.

Col Rick Williams: No. Without getting into the technicalities, these other areas are more profitable.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: On interoperability, our tank corps seems to be poised for mothballing in the spring and summer. Will our military be able to retain its operational knowledge and ability by relying solely on U.S. equipment and training exchanges?

Dr. Kenneth Calder: Excuse me, but you referred to something being mothballed.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: The military seems to eventually get rid of a capability by doing it through slow, incremental measures. It makes perfect sense to have the tanks in Wainwright, but the tanks are so old that we see this as part of the overall goal of just getting them out of commission altogether. If we are to get rid of the tank corps—and this has been discussed in regard to what we can get rid of, in regard to having a finite number of dollars—and if we're just going to depend on the U.S. and borrow their equipment and send our ladies and gentlemen over there for training, do you think it's possible to maintain their abilities, to just buy tanks at a later point in time and have these people capable of operating them and understanding the tactical knowledge required to conduct combat?

Dr. Kenneth Calder: My understanding is that no decision has been made with respect to the tanks. If a decision were made with respect to the tanks, in that they were no longer effective enough or needed in the Canadian Forces, I think the army commander would tell you he would want to replace them with another type of direct-fire support capability, as we refer to it. In other words, it's something that carries out the same function. We would probably want to do that over a period of time.

He would certainly want to maintain the people skills involved in providing that sort of capability. The last thing he would want to do is to shut that down so that we've lost those skills. He would want to maintain those skills by either using the residual number of tanks in training, or by replacing them with some other piece of equipment that did the same function. But certainly he would want to maintain that combat skill.

À (1010)

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Gallant. Your time has more than expired.

Mr. McGuire, for five minutes.

Mr. Joe McGuire: With the recent developments in NATO and the way France and Germany are behaving these days vis-à-vis the U.S.—and some people say this is inevitable, that it has been bound to happen anyway ever since the Cold War finished—this is really a watershed week in the life and the future of NATO. Does Canada see this alliance taking a different turn? If so, what kind of a turn do you see it taking?

If the result of this is movement toward more of a Fortress North America in the minds of the Americans—they haven't been saying very flattering things about our French and German allies because of their stand—do you think the Americans will now become more North American-continentalist in their thinking? What affect will that have on the expenditures, as Mrs. Wayne said, in terms of contributing to a more North American defence organization, along with Mexico?

Dr. Kenneth Calder: That's a good question.

In many ways, we're seeing this problem unfold, so I think it's probably a little bit premature, although we can all speculate, in a sense. I don't think the problem we currently have is inevitable. I don't think that kind of transatlantic split is inevitable. In fact, with the end of the Cold War, NATO has been becoming more vigorous rather than less vigorous. It has become more vigorous in terms of the operations it has conducted in the Balkans, for example, and more vigorous in terms of its expansion. We're now moving to 26 countries. So I don't think the split is inevitable, but it is indeed possible.

Are we at a watershed? I hope not. Once again, it is possible that a number of different countries will derive unfortunate conclusions out of what is happening, but I would certainly hope that's not the case. Certainly, I think I can fairly confidently say the Canadian government feels NATO is fundamental in Canadian foreign and defence policy and it would not want to see NATO damaged. In fact, my minister said that this morning in regard to the strength of NATO.

One should recall that NATO has gone through many crises since its foundation. Most people in our defence departments and foreign offices have dealt with many NATO crises in the past, so in many ways there is a lot of optimism that we will overcome these crises. But it is certainly a very serious crisis.

If I can just digress a bit, the situation is that we have an ally with a country on its borders that most people believe possess biological and chemical weapons and has the ability to use them. That country, Turkey, which has Iraq on its borders, feels threatened. I don't think it's surprising that the Turks would feel threatened in that circumstance. With such a neighbour, I think we would feel threatened as well.

The Turks have asked NATO to plan. A certain amount of confusion exists in the media, and some suggest we're talking about deploying forces to Turkey and so forth. What is on the table in NATO is a request for NATO military authorities in SHAPE, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe, to plan for the contingency of having to assist the Turks. So far, that has not been agreed to.

It has not been agreed to for reasons that are well explained by the French and German governments. It is my understanding that those reasons actually have nothing to do with Turkey. They have everything to do with the situation in Iraq and with a French and German sense that it is the wrong time to do this, that it's too early to do this. They don't share the Turkish assessment of the threat. In fact, they are reluctant to, as the French would say, subscribe to a logic of war.

With any luck, this crisis in NATO or this difficulty in NATO will be solved within about the next 48 to 72 hours. I would certainly hope so.

À (1015)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

[Translation]

You have five minutes, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I've observed Canada's behaviour when it comes to making decisions, whether it be the decision made yesterday to send troops to Afghanistan, or last year's decision to take part in the war in Afghanistan, or the decision to purchase submarines. In the course of Canadian-US talks on cooperation, the US must be wondering what Canada's overall mission might be. However, if the US wants to refer to documents setting out the government's priorities and how it perceives the role of our Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs and that of the US' National Defence Committee, it would need to refer back to a 1994 paper setting out our national defence policy. I recall the former minister stating that a defence policy would be released shortly. That was just before the holidays last year and we still haven't seen one. Yet, I think such a policy would be an essential tool.

Many questions were raised this morning about tanks and armoured vehicles. However, any decisions made should be tied to a new national defence policy, and we haven't heard any more about this. Yet, in the Throne Speech — I'd have to reread the excerpt in question — the government promised to release a defence policy before the end of its current mandate and I think it's been letting matters slide somewhat. We have no idea where we are going with the defence policy. Decisions are being made a piecemeal fashion and no comprehensive plan is in place. From a defence perspective, such a plan is critically important. I would even say that the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade is attempting to get the better of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs because an entire chapter is devoted to questions such as: What is your perception of the Canadian Forces as an representational or foreign affairs instrument? This is a major component of the foreign affairs policy. Canada's defence policy is almost a decade old and very little mention is made of it. Does the department intend to release a revised policy shortly? Or, has the matter been relegated to the back burner, with the department intending to continue acting in a piecemeal fashion?

[English]

Dr. Kenneth Calder: To start off, I would say you put this in terms of the Americans not understanding where we are going. In fact, we have very close contacts between our defence department and the Pentagon, and very close contacts between Mr. McCallum and Donald Rumsfeld. I think the Americans have a fairly clear idea where we are with respect to NATO, with respect to North American defence, with respect to the war on terrorism, and so forth.

With respect to a new defence policy, I would argue that much of the 1994 policy is still valid today. We said in 1994 that we needed combat-capable land, sea, and air forces that would be required to operate anywhere in the world; that we would support the United Nations and NATO; and that we would carry out a number of roles in the defence of Canada, including aid to the civil power, assistance to civil authorities, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance. We said that the roles abroad for Canada were the defence of Canada, the defence of North America, and contributions to international security. In that light, we said we would do things like conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and international humanitarian assistance. All of that, quite frankly, remains valid to this day. I would argue that much of what has happened since 1994 has in fact validated the fundamentals of that policy.

That is not to say things cannot be updated, improved, and readjusted. In any new policy review, we would need to take into account the question of homeland security, although we don't call it that in Canada. That's the American term. We would have to review national security from the point of view of asymmetrical threats and terrorism. We would have to make those adjustments, but in many ways I would argue that much of the 1994 policy still remains valid today. Of course, I was involved in the 1994 process, so I would say that, wouldn't I?

The government did say in the Speech from the Throne that it would provide direction on foreign and defence policy. We have a process that has been launched by Mr. Graham. There is a lot of logic to doing this sequentially in terms of getting the overall objectives of foreign policy set out before you look at defence policy. My understanding at the moment is that we did the defence update but are awaiting the outcome of the budget, and then we will see. I must say that I cannot tell you whether or not there will be a formal defence policy review, but in the meantime, the 1994 white paper gives us reasonable direction in terms of where the government should be going.

À (1020)

The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Calder, Monsieur Bachand.

Mr. Grose, for five minutes.

Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.): I trust Mrs. Wayne's sweaters will be identifiable.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: In what way?

Mr. Ivan Grose: Let's leave it at that.

An hon. member: Yes, let's.

Mr. Ivan Grose: I'm a rather simple fellow. I just fell off the turnip truck on the way into town, so I'm baffled. I've always wondered about these anti-missile systems. Suppose someone puts a missile up and you assume it has a nuclear warhead. It's in a suborbital flight, it's in the atmosphere somewhere, and you knock it down. You have to explode the nuclear warhead. As was unfortunately just evidenced with the space shuttle coming back into the atmosphere, the fallout can be quite extensive and it will fall all over the place. Whoever sent this missile up has therefore achieved his purpose to a degree.

Or he can put the thing into orbit. A lot of nations can do this at the moment, and some we don't know about probably can do it. Anyway, he puts it into orbit, it floats around up there, and he dumps it on you whenever he feels like it. You have a choice. You can explode it while it's in orbit and throw out all our satellite systems, or you can try to take out the guidance system and bring it down into the atmosphere, where you explode it and you have this nuclear fallout again. Or you can let it land, hopefully somewhere where there are not too many moose around, and again he has achieved his purpose.

I fail to understand how there can be an anti-missile system. Once the missile goes up, the horse is out of the stable and you can't get him back in.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: I think it depends on how the horse comes down. The existing intercontinental ballistic missile systems—what the United States is primarily talking about for missile defence, because we're not talking about cruise missiles, but ballistic missiles—would be outside of the atmosphere for most of their flight. If at all possible, you would want to intercept them outside of the atmosphere, before they come in. You have a real problem if you're intercepting close in to where their target is. You want to hit them far out.

If you hit them far out, then given the speed the missile is travelling and the speed your interceptor is travelling, both will be blown to smithereens in the process. We don't know, because we haven't done this very often. We haven't done this at all, actually. Nobody has been testing it. I don't think we really want to test some of this. To some extent, people are guessing what would happen, but the most likely scenario is that the nuclear warhead would not in fact explode. Because of the nature of the explosive device on a warhead, it would be damaged and would not explode. The particles that would be blown to smithereens would burn up in the atmosphere. Some radioactive particles might actually come through the atmosphere, but if you have a choice between intercepting it in the atmosphere or letting it land on the ground, it's quite easy.

Your choice is quite simple. You want to hit such a missile in the atmosphere and destroy it. It does have a certain amount of logic to it, but you have to make the system work, of course.

À (1025)

Mr. Ivan Grose: In other words, it's one of those scenarios that's like the one when we first developed the nuclear weapons: it just couldn't happen. We have to hope this doesn't happen.

There's a downside to it no matter what happens. If you intercept outside the atmosphere and hope the nuclear warhead doesn't explode...I don't think we know enough about it. When the space shuttle came apart at 200,000 feet, we expected that absolutely nothing would land on earth. An awful lot of it did. So we really don't know do we? This is all theory.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: It's not entirely theory. A certain amount of physical experimentation is involved. But certainly it is undesirable that anybody would launch a missile with a nuclear warhead on it. If somebody does, though, it would be desirable to actually destroy it before it lands on the ground again.

Mr. Ivan Grose: It reinforces the idea of going in and eliminating the source of where the missile might come from initially, which is the story with Iraq, of course.

Col Rick Williams: If I may, the whole missile defence system is built to look at all of the various phases of the missile's flight. The United States and some allies are looking at various capabilities that can actually deal with the missile in its boost phase, when the rocket plume is fully illuminated. These are new technologies, and they're trying to explore how each of them could be best used to provide the best possible protection.

Mr. Ivan Grose: The boost phase, though, is a very limited time. You really have to anticipate it before it starts the boost phase.

Fine, you've answered my question. Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Grose.

Mrs. Wayne, for five minutes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Dr. Calder, if we are to play a role in a war with Iraq—and when you listen to the news, it seems President Bush really wants to go to war with Iraq—what role can we play when, as I've stated before, we don't have the helicopters we need, we don't have the ships we need, and we don't have the necessary number of men and women in uniform?

Dr. Kenneth Calder: In the last Gulf War, we played a role that may provide some sort of model. We do have naval and air assets in the region that are quite effective. Essentially, the role would be assisting the coalition forces in one capacity or another in the conduct of that conflict.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: When we built the frigates in the Saint John shipyard, they were to come back in, one at a time, to be modified in order to accommodate helicopters. That hasn't taken place yet. When you look at our men and women and at the Sea Kings, those helicopters are a cause for major concern in regard to the lives of those who are flying them. So what role can we play?

This is why I say this. Each and every one of us seated at this table has a major role to play in making sure our military becomes a number one priority in this country. Right now, we more or less rely on the U.S.A. We have to, and that is not the way it should be. It truly isn't. No, we're not as big as the U.S.A. We know that. Nevertheless, we are a country that looks after ourselves, and we don't want to have to rely on them for our security.

If you were able to put the number of men and women back in uniform, the number we require in Canada and the number who should be there, what would be the number you would want to have included in the army, navy, and air force?

À (1030)

Dr. Kenneth Calder: It's misleading to focus on numbers of people. If you look at it historically, armed forces have been declining in size as they improve in quality and in punch, so I don't think one should focus on the numbers of people, quite frankly. I think one should focus on the capabilities that you put forward. A single soldier today has vastly greater firepower than the Canadian soldier in the First World War. There is a qualitative change.

I appreciate where you're coming from in your sentiments, but I think you do run the risk of underrating the people we do employ out there. As an example, as you know from the newspapers, we have been invited by the Americans to take command of this task force in the Gulf, Task Force 151. That is a significant naval command. They would not have asked the Canadian navy to do that if the Canadian navy was not of the highest quality.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I want you to know that while I had an opportunity to speak—and I won't say where because I don't want to get the gentleman in trouble—the colonel at the time said we do have the best. He said that when he was over in Afghanistan, he was told that our people are the best trained. He agreed with that, but he said he'd also agree with Elsie that we need more now because of what's happening around the world. We need to have more men and women.

Our men and women are rated number one. I'm not degrading them. I'm going to tell you that, as far as I'm concerned, I'm really proud of them. Glory be to God, there are very few other places in the world where their men and women could go over and do the job ours have done. Nevertheless, we have to have more because of the uncertainty around the world now. We don't really know what's going to happen. We don't. When Bush goes to war with Iraq, look out Canada. I mean it.

My colleagues have been saying that if a missile is up there, yes, it isn't supposed to strike here. But glory be to God, look what happened just recently when it came to what took place in the atmosphere. I don't want to see that happening with us either. Somehow, we have to find peace.

Can I just say one thing?

The Chair: Very quickly, Mrs. Wayne. You're over your time.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Okay.

I was at NATO meetings in Bulgaria. At that time, they wanted to have nuclear disarmament. The motion was put on the floor at that meeting by the representatives of the U.S.A. Do you know that five countries voted against it? I mentioned this to Bill Graham just the other day. I told Bill to get out his records, because those five countries are the ones we're dealing with now. And that wasn't yesterday.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

We're now going to go to Mr. O'Brien for five minutes.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: A couple of the points I wanted to raise have already been addressed in some ways by Mrs. Gallant and Ms. Neville. One was on the North Warning System. Of course, we have a number of systems throughout the north. I'm quite familiar with them. In my preview in going around, I came to know a lot of them.

Like Mr. Grose, I want to be quite simple about this. I'm trying to draw the connection between the North Warning System, the CF-18s, deployments for interceptions, and all these sorts of things, because I've seen these things happen in the past. Can both of you give me a picture, in more detail, of what is meant by going from external attack—I have some sense of that—to domestic, of how those CF-18s will be deployed, of where, and of the whole nine yards of it? How will this interface with Canadian domestic security? I'm thinking primarily about the urban centres and places like that, and maybe along the lines of what Mrs. Wayne was saying about the nuclear plants and so on. How will this warning system help in any way with civilian aircraft, or drugs in some cases, or whatever the case might be? Or does it still help or assist in any way? Is what was set up for yesterday still meaningful today?

Dr. Kenneth Calder: I'm very happy I brought an air force officer along with me. I will defer to him on that question.

À (1035)

Col Rick Williams: I'll try to make this quick.

Fundamentally, NORAD is an adaptable creature with tremendous capabilities that can be applied. Prior to September 11, we always said NORAD looked out, and we were looking for specific kinds of targets. At the same time, we had capabilities available for the commercial aviation that was flying across the pole. We could survey that aviation, detect things that were unusual, and use those kinds of capabilities to react to those situations.

When we say “look in”, it means we have to work much more closely with the civil agencies that talk about air traffic and navigation. It is not widely known, but within North American airspace, we had always assumed airplanes would fly with transponders and that they would cooperate with the system by telling us where they were, who they were, what they were doing, and so on. Well, on September 11, the very first thing the hijackers of those airplanes did was turn off their transponders. We didn't have primary radar, so we couldn't find them. We couldn't until the fighters got airborne with their radars and could look for targets and so forth.

Part of the negotiation to make NORAD capable of looking inward is to work very closely with NAV CANADA and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration to replace the kinds of systems within continental North America that enable us to look for non-cooperative targets. That's really the phase we're in right now. We have the backbone, we have the command and control, and we have the primary fusion centres that look at all the information, bring it together, and enable us to make very good decisions. That's the kind of work we're getting into now.

The Chair: You still have another minute, Mr. O'Brien.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Just to give an example, we have Bagotville, Quebec. We also have CF-18s flying out of Cold Lake. We'd love to have them in Goose Bay, but you won't give them to us. How does this fit now with Montreal, Toronto, Ottawa, Vancouver, and these sorts of places that are now your domestic safe havens for protection?

Col Rick Williams: Primarily, we have a very good system of working closely with NAV CANADA. Two centres in Canada coordinate air traffic. The military are co-located there, and that information is immediately made available to the NORAD network. If we have a target—let's say it's a commercial airplane—then very quickly, the information goes from the commercial side to the military, and the military and commercial sides work together to coordinate what's going to happen and where.

Perhaps the single lesson that came out of September 11 was that, although we hadn't really prepared for such a major event, we were very quickly able to adapt. That we were able to safely shut down air traffic in North America, in probably one of the busiest parts of the world, and land hundreds and hundreds of airplanes across the region without an incident speaks highly of the command and control and the adaptability of the system.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. O'Brien.

Miss Grey, for five minutes.

Miss Deborah Grey (Edmonton North, Canadian Alliance): Lawrence, regarding the CF-18s, or at least those still able to fly, we're really happy to still have them in Cold Lake.

Gentlemen, on your presentation, I was really interested in that. Thank you, because I am not a military expert. By way of reference and introduction, Dr. Calder, in response to someone else's question, you just said the U.S. does know where it's going. My concern is that I'm not sure Canada knows where it's going. There's an increasing sense of frustration and apprehension across the country among not just Canadian citizens, but among parliamentarians. None of us obviously wants to go to war, but we see clearly what's happening with the breakdown in NATO over Turkey. You say these things have cropped up over the years. Yes, they have, but this is about the scariest one we've ever faced. It's certainly the scariest one I have seen.

In your presentation, on the page that's not numbered but is entitled “Defence Ties”, your first point says “US is Canada's most important ally”. I agree with that, absolutely. But are we theirs?

Dr. Kenneth Calder: Probably not. When you look at the United Kingdom, I think the U.K. is probably their most important ally. But that actually depends, even in terms of geography. You'd probably have to ask the Americans. Obviously, Japan is an extraordinarily significant ally in the Pacific. Certainly in NATO, the United Kingdom is a very important ally.

There's a certain question of magnitude here. The British have a size of armed forces that gives them a significant amount of military clout, but we are extremely important to the Americans in terms of our geography. The Americans know that when we say we're going to do something, we'll do it. They know that when we deploy forces, we deploy people of the highest quality. They know that when we deploy our ships, for example, they can rely on them utterly. They don't have to worry about what we feel.

The Americans would like us to do more. They have said that. At the end of the day, though, while we may not be the biggest ally, we'd probably be one of the closest to the Americans.

À (1040)

Miss Deborah Grey: When Elsie asked a question about an optimum number, you said not to focus on numbers, but on capabilities. However, the question still remains. Do we have the best, optimum number/capabilities? I was at the Grey Cup in November, and there were more people in Commonwealth Stadium than there are in our entire armed forces. That would cause someone to be just a hair nervous.

Dr. Kenneth Calder: Perrin Beatty used to make that comment years ago.

Miss Deborah Grey: Well, cheers for Mr. Beatty. Sad to say, though, I have to say it in 2003.

It would seem to me that if we do have the capabilities.... I agree that we have the best trained armed forces. I represented CFB Edmonton and Cold Lake for eight years, two terms, and I'm now in my second term still with a huge amount of presence with CFB Edmonton and the superbase. Everybody's lobbying for wherever, so I would put in my oar for that one, of course.

You did say, Dr. Calder, that the troops we do put in the field do well. Nobody disputes that. But the number that has been thrown around has been put at about 1,000 yesterday and possibly 1,500 today. Last week the military said we could deploy 3,000 troops. I was on the street in Edmonton to celebrate the return of these folks when they came home from Afghanistan. The talk on the street is that these guys are just simply not able to go out on quick rotations again.

Look at post-traumatic stress disorder and what I think is an appalling lack of treatment and concern for that. If we are going to pre-deploy or deploy troops now, I get nervous about the whole human factor in terms of people. In terms of numbers and capabilities, as Elsie said, what do you think is optimum?

Dr. Kenneth Calder: Just as a point, when we did pull out of Afghanistan, we did say we would not be able to replace them at that time and would not be able to do so until the summer. This deployment to Kabul will in fact fit that timetable.

Secondly, you're right about the wear and tear on the individuals. Having been in this business for some time now—in my current position, I'm in my twelfth year, and we've deployed a lot of people abroad over that period of time—I can assure you we pay a lot more attention to that today than we did twelve years ago, because we simply didn't have the experience and we didn't know. We've been learning a great deal, so a great deal more is being done.

When it comes down to the number, it is really a matter of the choice made by the government, not by assistant deputy ministers or other bureaucrats. It's really a choice on the part of the government in terms of how much of a role and what sort of role we want to play in the world. We can play a role with the numbers we have. Quite frankly, we play our hand well given the resources we have. But at the end of the day, it really is a question of the government determining whether we want to have a more important role or not. So I would prefer to beg off on the optimum number, since I'm not the minister.

Miss Deborah Grey: Of course. Granted.

Just to wrap up—

The Chair: Very quickly. You have about another minute.

Miss Deborah Grey: You said there's a sense of urgency. Obviously, I think we all feel that.

Colonel, you said the planning group is in the early days of being set up, with June 1 as the target for twelve to fourteen people, with the number going up to thirty people in 2004.

I know these things take lots of time to get organized, but without fearmongering, the newspapers and the news know we are getting to a very critical point. None of us wants to fearmonger, but the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca, is over really soon, and there's a heightened state of alert.

Somehow with this planning group a year down the road, never mind the “doing” group, I don't sense that sense of urgency that we'll be right ready to go, right smartly, if the call comes.

Col Rick Williams: I understand your question. When I answered, I was saying what the planning group's way is.

À (1045)

Miss Deborah Grey: Granted.

Col Rick Williams: What I would say is that Canada and the United States today maintain an effective dialogue on protecting North America across the board. It's just that we don't have a dedicated body to do it.

As of today, I can say to you that, yes, there are ongoing discussions about the protection of North America. Those are going through the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff on the ops side. That information is being communicated back and forth with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. That communication essentially does what we hope the planning group will help in the future. That planning and protection consideration exists today, it's just done directly between the staffs.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Miss Grey.

On behalf of all of the committee members, Dr. Calder and Colonel Williams, I'd like to thank you for being here today. You've certainly provided us with a significant amount of information and with certainly lots of breadth to the subject matters that were dealt with today. I'm sure your comments will be certainly very helpful when it comes time to do our study on Canada–U.S. defence relations. Again, on behalf of the committee, thank you very much for being here.

At this point, I would like to have the committee deal with the items on our agenda that relate to budgetary matters with respect to the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. Mr. Wood is here.

Bob, would you like to join us at the table?

And we have some other travel budgets as well.

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): Thank you.

The Chair: I'll give everybody an opportunity to have a look at the motions and the attachments.

Bob, did you wish to make any comments on these motions before we consider them?

Mr. Bob Wood: Yes, Mr. Chair.

The operational budget that we have before us is really an operational budget to continue the work we started in the spring of last year. We toured the western provinces, and this is just to make sure we can continue on with that particular work. We'd like to start in St. John's, wrap this up, and make a final report.

Barry Hamilton was with us before and has done work for this committee before, so he's no stranger to the committee. It takes in some of his salary and some other salaries for calling witnesses if we have to. Basically, that's what the operational one is.

The travel budget is fairly self-explanatory. It's for members of the committee to travel and to get this work done.

As you know, Mr. Chair, we put in an interim report because we found there was a fair amount of discrepancy in some of the hospitals that the vets are using. We did an interim report to make sure some of those disparities were hopefully remedied in the next six or seven months. This is a continuation of what we were doing last year.

À (1050)

The Chair: Thank you very much for that.

Maybe on behalf of committee as well, I could take this opportunity to offer my congratulations to you for being elected as chair of the subcommittee, Mr. Wood.

Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you.

The Chair: Are there any questions, comments, or motions?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I move that the budget be adopted.

The Chair: By my count, we have three motions. Maybe we could have separate movers for each one. Let's start with the operational budget if we could.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I so move.

The Chair: On the first motion on the operational budget, it's moved by Mrs. Wayne that, in relation to its study on long-term care for veterans, the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs be authorized to retain the professional services of Mr. Barry Hamilton.

Mr. Joe McGuire: I second the motion.

(Motion agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: On the second motion, will someone move that, in relation to its study on long-term care for veterans, the proposed operational budget in the amount of $26,305 be adopted?

Ms. Anita Neville: I so move.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I second the motion.

(Motion agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: The third motion is with respect to the travel budget for the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, in the amount of $66,848.50. Do we have a mover for that?

Mr. Joe McGuire: I so move.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I second the motion.

(Motion agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: Mr. Wood, your business has been completed.

Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you for being here. On behalf of the members of the committee, I'd like to wish you well in your work with the subcommittee. We look forward to receiving your report.

Mr. Bob Wood: Right on. Thank you for your kind words, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Colleagues, we're almost done here. What is now being distributed is the motion for the committee to travel to the United States and for other operational aspects of the budget. We have three motions.

Mr. Leon Benoit: On a point of order, Mr. Chair, I understand that we haven't received proper notice for discussion of these motions. Therefore, we should put them off until we do receive appropriate notice.

The Chair: I would take the opposite view, in the sense that we asked for these motions to be prepared, and that said request did in fact constitute notice for the committee.

I'm in the hands of the committee on this. I can tell you that our schedule is to have these in front of the Liaison Committee by next Thursday. Whether we pass these motions today or on Tuesday, it will not make any difference whatsoever.

I would also suggest as well that the fact that we dealt with the veterans affairs subcommittee motions is an indication that the committee didn't have any difficulty with the various motions that we've adopted thus far.

I'm in the hands of the committee, but I don't think much hangs on it one way or the other, quite frankly.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Chair, with all due respect, I think we have to stick to the rules of the committee. We should have the appropriate 48-hour notice specifically to deal with this issue. I request that we do that.

À (1055)

The Chair: Can I ask why you were prepared to deal with the veterans affairs subcommittee motions—which were essentially on the same basis—but are not prepared to deal with these?

Mr. Leon Benoit: I chose to allow those ones to go ahead because I know of the sense of urgency there. I didn't want to block the process on those. On these ones, I want proper process. I think we have to make the point that we have the process in place and it should be respected.

The Chair: Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I don't know if Leon was at the meeting or not, but we did discuss the fact that we were going to travel, when we were going, and so on. We have to get our proposed motion in so that it is included in our budget, so that we can have that opportunity.

Look, we have to stop playing politics with this. We really have to work together. Glory be to God, we only have about another week. We're supposed to have it there next Thursday, so I'm going to move the motion on the travel budget.

The Chair: I think it's safe to say we're still dealing with a point of order on this.

Mrs. Gallant and Miss Grey.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Mr. Chairman, we have all the makings of a fine, non-partisan committee. Already with our new members, we can tell they genuinely want to work in the best interests of the Canadian people as a whole.

As you know, the real conflict behind this is in regard to the misinterpretation of the agreement on speaking rotation order and times. Since we do have all-new members, can we go back on this and look at the minutes to clarify what was decided? Perhaps in the future, we'll then be able to avoid this sort of conflict.

The Chair: Quite frankly, we've been around this bush before—quite a few times, as a matter of fact. If members of the opposition, members of the Canadian Alliance, wish to introduce motions to change the speaking order, you're welcome to do that at any time in terms of going through the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure and dealing with such motions there.

As I say, we've been through this before and the decision has been negative. I don't see any reason why the decision would not be negative again in terms of the motions that were adopted at the beginning of this Parliament.

However, I would like to add as well that the clerk has just brought something to my attention, In terms of the specifics of what I was indicating before, according to the minutes of the meeting of January 30,

Your Sub-Committee met on Tuesday, January 28, 2003 to consider the Committee’s future business and agreed to make the following recommendations:

1.—That the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs undertake a study on Canada-United States Defence Co-operation and on other related matters;

2.—That the Chair ask the Clerk of the Committee to prepare a travel budget for a fact finding mission to the United States from May 5 to 16, 2003.

And there was also one on extending an invitation to the American ambassador. That was the report adopted by the committee, and, as chair, I take that as notice that we were going to get these motions in front of the committee. That's precisely where we are right now.

As I say, not a lot hangs on this, but I think we may be wasting some of our precious time in terms of whether we vote on them today or whether we vote on them on Tuesday.

Miss Grey, and then Mr. Bachand.

Miss Deborah Grey: I think a few things are important here in terms of the speaking rotation. Obviously I'm subbing in for Rob Anders today, but if I do the math, I think there are certainly some concerns about numbers and people in the House.

Regarding travel, I think you could solve a whole lot of these problems in a whole lot of committees by saying to get at it on the votability of private members' business. That's been going around the bush longer than your discussion has been going around the bush, I'm sure, and I think that would probably solve it. As Elsie says, let's quit playing politics—but you're not half bad at it yourself, Elsie, on other topics.

In this, let's make sure all of us are very careful about what we're doing. These motions need to be passed. The trip may not happen anyway if the private members' business stuff doesn't get out of the way. I therefore suggest that you use your influence to talk to your government members and get on with that. We can then get on with this.

The Chair: Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, I'm somewhat opposed to the idea that decisions made by other committees with no ties whatsoever to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs could have a negative impact on our proceedings. I believe this issue has already come up for discussion. I recall that at the time, there was talk of some Canadian Alliance members not travelling with NATO because they had blocked a travel budget. We expressed our disagreement, arguing that these were two separate issues. The work of the Standing Committee on Procedure and Government Affairs shouldn't have an impact on a major study undertaken by our committee.

On another subject, I have some questions concerning the hiring of Mr. Hamilton. I know he was hired to examine the state of readiness of our forces. Now, he's been awarded a $50,000 contract, including the amount that has just been voted. Why was the contract awarded to the same person? Does Mr. Hamilton have expert consultants working for him or does he work alone? I have to wonder why the committee always seems to retain the services of the same people. I don't know if you can answer that question.

Á (1100)

[English]

The Chair: That's a very legitimate question, Mr. Bachand.

For some of the other committee members who are new members to this committee, Mr. Hamilton was initially involved with the quality-of-life study. Of course, many members who were around for that will remember his work on that study.

From my own experience, I can say we thought he did an excellent job. He has long experience in the military, and a broad-brush type of experience in the military. We also thought he did quite a good job on the operational readiness study as well.

The researchers obviously are the ones who have to work with Mr. Hamilton on a fairly regular basis. I would therefore ask them if they have any comments on the issue, and give them the opportunity to make those comments known.

Mr. Wolf Koerner (Committee Researcher): I think that sums it up pretty well. Barry is easy to work with. He's had a lot of experience. He's very reasonable in terms of what he charges to the committee. In fact, he only used a small portion of his budget last time, and a lot of the work he did was pro bono.

The Chair: But I think it's an important question to ask when we go back to the same individual on a regular basis.

Mr. O'Brien, and then Mr. McGuire.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Just briefly, I thought I was getting away from something, but it seems like I ran into it again.

The Chair: That has a way of happening in this place.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: I know. Having been around for seven years, I'm not naive enough to think it's not going to happen on into the future.

I came here with the hope of dealing with the bigger picture of life. I understand people have grievances in Parliament, but there are appropriate places to deal with grievances. I hate to see the bigger picture of the department and the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs being paralyzed because of a completely different issue.

Mr. Chair, I would ask you to make this motion votable today, to have a mover and a seconder, and to vote. Let's try to get on with business. I've only been here for two sessions, and I've enjoyed both of them. It's overwhelming to me to hear the kind of discussion that takes place. As one new committee member, I certainly would like to partake in more meaningful, practical, feet-on-the-ground, eyes, ears, nose, and whatever, as part of some of these sessions that I plan to partake in.

Let's get on with it. I ask the Canadian Alliance to start considering some of these things in the bigger context.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. O'Brien.

Mr. McGuire, and then Ms. Neville.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Mr. Chair, I agree with the remarks my colleague just made. We have given proper notice. Nothing is out of order, and nothing is to be gained by delay. I move that we proceed with the business of the committee.

The Chair: Ms. Neville.

Ms. Anita Neville: I'm repeating what has been said, Mr. Chair, but I think we've heard much about the urgency and the importance of the relationship between Canada and the United States on the defence issue. As a new member of this committee, I'm impressed with the work of this committee. I think it's important that we move ahead, and I think it's important that we not resort to gamesmanship as we deal with those kinds of issues.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, I'm going to give you a final comment here, but I'm judging from the tenor of the committee....

Mr. Leon Benoit: I would like to say that I agree with what the Liberal members who are quite new to this committee have said. I certainly hope this committee can operate on a non-partisan basis. We've had a lot of partisanship in the past, and I would suggest that it isn't the Canadian Alliance that's primarily the problem. We will respond when the chair—who in some cases has been extremely unfair, in my judgment—and other members have played their partisan games—and Elsie certainly isn't beyond that.

Á (1105)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I don't play partisan games.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Certainly, we want to get around those, because we have important business for this committee to deal with. Unfortunately, even on something as simple as speaking time—

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, I'm going to have to cut you off, because we're into an area now that has absolutely nothing to do with the motions or the point of order you originally raised.

Do we have a mover for the operational budget?

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: I so move.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'll second the motion.

The Chair: So this motion is in connection with Mr. Barry Hamilton.

Mr. Leon Benoit: On a point of order, Mr. Chair—

The Chair: I'm sorry, but I'm not going to hear that point of order. We're in consideration of a motion right now.

(Motion agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Chair, usually you deal with a point of order.

The Chair: We were into the consideration of the item, Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: There was no discussion on the item, was there?

The Chair: There was considerable discussion on the item.

Mr. Leon Benoit: There was discussion after the motion was made?

The Chair: I'm going to ask for a mover for the second motion, that the operational budget in the amount $66,235 be adopted.

Ms. Anita Neville: I so move.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'll second the motion.

Mr. Leon Benoit: On a point of order, Mr. Chair—

The Chair: It's moved by Ms. Neville, seconded by Mrs. Wayne.

(Motion agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

Mr. Leon Benoit: On a point of order, Mr. Chair—

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, I indicated to you earlier that we heard your points. The committee, by majority, indicated that they wanted to move ahead with consideration of these motions. If you want to address items related to the business of this committee after we're finished dealing with the final travel budget, then I'm prepared to hear you.

Mr. Claude Bachand: We're finished, aren't we?

The Chair: We have one more. It's the travel budget for the committee.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I so move.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Chair, normally you hear points of order.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: I second the motion.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Secondly, you haven't answered the question regarding the proper notice for these motions, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: It's moved by Mrs. Wayne and seconded by Mr. O'Brien.

(Motion agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

The Chair: Do you have anything further, Mr. Benoit?

Mr. Leon Benoit: There's obviously no point, Mr. Chair. You won't hear a point of order. You haven't answered the question about proper notice—

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, I dealt with your point of order—

Mr. Leon Benoit: You never dealt with the issue that I brought up about proper notice about the motions.

The Chair: I dealt with your point of order, and I dealt with the notice issue as well. The committee, I believe, accepted my view.

Mr. Leon Benoit: No, you did not, Mr. Chair, nor have you dealt with the speaking rotation. I believe you've interpreted it improperly. I brought this to your attention before. You said you would deal with it and then bring it back to the committee, but you have not done that. That's no way to run a committee.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, you moved the original motion. We went back and we even looked at the tapes—

Mr. Leon Benoit: This partisanship has to end, Mr. Chair, or this committee will not be very effective.

The Chair: —of that particular meeting. If you want to revisit that issue again, you're free to bring it up at the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure.

If there's no further business for the committee, we'll adjourn. Thank you ladies and gentlemen.