NDVA Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, October 23, 2003

Á

1105

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.))

Lieutenant-General K.R. Pennie (Chief of the Air Staff, Department of National Defence)

Á

1110

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George—Peace River, Canadian Alliance)

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Jay Hill

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Jay Hill

Á

1115

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Jay Hill

LGen K.R. Pennie

Á

1120

Mr. Jay Hill

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Jay Hill

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)

LGen K.R. Pennie

Á

1125

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Joe McGuire

Mr. Martin Benjamin (Deputy Director, Western Hemisphere Policy, Department of National Defence)

Mr. Joe McGuire

Mr. Martin Benjamin

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen K.R. Pennie

Á

1130

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen K.R. Pennie

Major-General Pierre Daigle (Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff (HS Issues), Department of National Defence)

Mr. Claude Bachand

MGen Pierre Daigle

Á

1135

Mr. Claude Bachand

MGen Pierre Daigle

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.)

Á

1140

LGen K.R. Pennie

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg—Transcona, NDP)

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Martin Benjamin

Mr. Bill Blaikie

Mr. Martin Benjamin

Á

1145

Mr. Bill Blaikie

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Bill Blaikie

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Á

1150

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

LGen K.R. Pennie

MGen Pierre Daigle

Á

1155

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

MGen Pierre Daigle

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Robert Bertrand

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Robert Bertrand

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

Â

1200

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen K.R. Pennie

MGen Pierre Daigle

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Â

1205

LGen K.R. Pennie

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

LGen K.R. Pennie

Â

1210

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

LGen K.R. Pennie

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

LGen K.R. Pennie

Â

1215

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Jay Hill

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Claude Bachand

Â

1220

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen K.R. Pennie

Â

1225

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Claude Bachand

MGen Pierre Daigle

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Robert Bertrand

LGen K.R. Pennie

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Jay Hill

Â

1230

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Jay Hill

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Jay Hill

Â

1235

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Jay Hill

LGen K.R. Pennie

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Joe McGuire

LGen K.R. Pennie

Â

1240

Mr. Joe McGuire

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

LGen K.R. Pennie

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Jay Hill

LGen K.R. Pennie

Mr. Jay Hill

LGen K.R. Pennie

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

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CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

---

NUMBER 039

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Thursday, October 23, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Á  (1105)  

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)): Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. We'll get things moving.

    First of all, I'd like to welcome General Pennie, General Daigle, and Martin Benjamin as our witnesses this morning. We're certainly looking forward to what you have to say. I'm sure we'll have some interesting questions to follow up, in particular, I think, with General Pennie this morning. He has a background at NORAD, and I think we all have questions on that. He can certainly provide a lot of information. And Elsie will no doubt have a question on Sea Kings, since the general is a former helicopter pilot. But I won't presume to go ahead on the questions that are coming.

    General, the floor is yours.

    Lieutenant-General K.R. Pennie (Chief of the Air Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you very much. Pour moi, c'est un plaisir d'être ici avec vous.

    I've only been in the air force again for a few months, and I've just come back, having been out visiting four of our wings. I'm trying to get out to see every wing and see every operation in as quick a time as I can.

    Certainly one of the things that I notice as I go out and about the air force is that it's much more fragile than it was many years ago, after having gone through the period of changes that we've all recognized. The budget reductions of the nineties and the high operational tempo have left their mark and impact. Even though we've been able to build some of that back, it's still not anything but fragile at this stage. There are a lot of things we have to do and be careful about. So I'm learning that each time I go out to talk to our folk.

    But the core competencies of the air force are still intact. As I pointed out, when I took over my change of command, I just looked back at when I joined the air force. Then there were 3,800 aircraft on the books of the air force, although I'm sure we didn't fly that number, and today we're at about 300. So we've gone through some fairly significant changes just within my career.

    Certainly I'm extremely proud of the way all of our organizations—army, navy, and air force—have been able to deal with the changes that have been thrown at us over the last decade. The professionalism and the quality of the men and women out there doing the job is outstanding. There's no doubt in my mind that we would have not got through this period of the nineties, in particular, without the quality of the people we have who are doing this job for us day in, day out.

    Also, from my experience in the U.S. and with other allies, I'm fairly convinced that Canadians in uniform really do work hard to spend their dollars as well and as wisely as they can. There's a real effort to stretch our dollars. I think we do better at that than many of our allies. I think we're better than most.

    I will say that certainly the focus since 9/11 in terms of continental security has fundamentally changed. This really impacted me on my last job—and I understand you're going to be asking a little bit about that—as I was the deputy commander-in-chief of NORAD for two years. I had only just arrived before 9/11 happened, so I lived through that experience.

    NORAD certainly does provide aerospace warning and aerospace control for North America, and that includes Canada. There are a number of protocols worked into the NORAD arrangements that work to protect the sovereignty interests of each country. That the organization has survived for so many years is really a testament to their ability to do that down in NORAD. Certainly the renewed importance post-9/11 is one factor that has revitalized NORAD. Also, missile defence is another major factor that does impact, potentially, NORAD in a significant way.

    It's important to understand that for several decades now NORAD has been doing missile warning, so any missile that may be coming to North America is monitored, and warning if necessary is provided. It's a key element of what NORAD does. That means NORAD will work to detect and validate any missile launch that has a potential to get here. It will assess and characterize such a launch. So defence against such an eventuality is the next logical step in this chain.

    The implications of BMD and the Canadian position on BMD are fairly significant for NORAD because, pending the outcome of the negotiations that are now ongoing, this will have a fairly significant impact. It's as simple as whether NORAD gets more significant or less significant in time, because this is a huge issue for our allies to the south.

    I think that's enough to say in my opening remarks. I'll be happy to answer any questions the committee may have.

Á  (1110)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you very much, General.

    We'll start the questions with the Canadian Alliance, Jay Hill.

    Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George—Peace River, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing today.

    I guess I'll just state at the outset that I had the opportunity last week to spend a day and a half down at NORAD and to tour the facility at Cheyenne Mountain. I found it incredibly educational and interesting. I think that a lot of the concerns that some Canadians have for our closer involvement and integration vis-à-vis the ballistic missile defence could be answered if they had the opportunity to get that type of a hands-on education, as it were.

    I want to begin perhaps with a question, because your arrival here is so timely, coincidently I guess, with the minister's announcement yesterday from his advisory group. According to your biography, General, you were the director general for strategic planning at National Defence Headquarters. Following up on the minister's statements yesterday, his advisory committee revealed that the government hopes to reallocate some $128 million from national defence to our front-line troops in combat roles. I wonder if you could enlighten us as to, first of all, what your understanding is—having been intricately involved there in a command position—of where they're going to find that money, and secondly, whether it's really practical to suggest that those funds would be transferred, or those savings would be realized, and over what timeline it's going to occur.

    LGen K.R. Pennie: First of all, when I go through that advisory group's efficiency report, I think what strikes me is that there's not a lot that is fundamentally new. These are problems we've been trying to come to grips with in the Department of National Defence for quite some time. So I think some of those efficiencies can be realized, and I think it's important to make every effort to do so.

    The Department of National Defence is very complex, so trying to get these kinds of changes is not easy. But if there's a commitment at the top and through the organization, I think they can be achieved. Whether they get achieved to the penny is not the issue. The issue is it's important to make every effort to do so. I believe we're committed to do so, and I think we'll achieve considerable success on that path, and I think it makes sense to do so.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Can you enlighten me and perhaps the committee, and the general public I guess by extension, as to why there would have been resistance? You say it's incredibly difficult to get those types of efficiencies. Why would there be the type of resistance that you seem to be alluding to in the command structure at National Defence Headquarters to realize the efficiencies earlier?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: I'm not suggesting there's any intentional resistance in any way, shape, or form. I'm just saying that defence is a complex business, and when you touch one part of it, another part gets impacted. It's that delicate balance, that complexity, that has to be wrestled with.

    I don't detect any resistance whatsoever on the part of the senior management team or anyone else. We went through a period, you may recall, in the nineties when we put together a management re-engineering team, essentially, to try to get at a lot of these issues, and they had limited success. But it was really challenging. I think the way we're going about this now is more sensible. I don't think there's resistance in any way, shape, or form. I think it's incorrect to characterize it that way. But it's just so complex that if you don't work it carefully, you can create an unintended consequence, and that's the issue, of course.

    Mr. Jay Hill: I'll leave that for the moment.

    I'd like to perhaps get your perspective. You mentioned it briefly. Having, as I said, recently arrived back in Canada from Cheyenne Mountain, my understanding is that a lot of the initial steps that would be taken were it ever necessary to deploy missile defence in a purely defensive mode to counter a ballistic missile threat—a launch of a ballistic missile heading toward North America—are already done, in effect, by NORAD in an integrated capacity between Canada and the United States.

    It was impressed upon me that were we at this late stage—and I say this late stage, because the Americans are committed to this program regardless of our involvement, which was also made abundantly clear to me when I was down there—to resist or reject being involved at any level, the very existence of NORAD could be threatened, certainly the NORAD as we are involved in at this time, because the initial steps already are so integrated. Canadians are involved in the command structure and in a lot of different positions at Cheyenne Mountain already, as it were, assessing any potential threat before it happens.

Á  (1115)  

    LGen K.R. Pennie: Well, I think NORAD is the product of an evolution and a partnership that has been in place since 1958. So there's a lot of experience in dealing with these kinds of issues.

    I think prior to 9/11, in many people's minds, there would have been more risk of NORAD not continuing to exist than we have today. Even if Canada does not elect to participate in some way, shape, or form in missile defence, NORAD itself does not need to cease to exist, but the significance of NORAD will have to adjust, because the air defence piece, the air-breathing threat, is still there. So we collectively, between the U.S. and Canada, still need a way to deal with that, and I think that after 9/11 NORAD has proven its worth in that domain.

    So I don't think we would be very quick to let that lapse, but the whole missile warning functionality that we do will be put under increasing stress and strain. So yes, that part of it may well have to change, because it would not make sense from a military perspective to isolate and separate the warning and the defence functions. They actually have to be part of the same chain to make it sensible.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Could you provide any further elaboration on that latter point, General, in the sense that when the warnings come in, were we not to be committed to missile defence...? I don't understand, from my point of view, why we wouldn't be. I think this is a definite step forward in global security, to be involved in something that provides defence without escalating the conflict.

    Our defence, as I understand it--and I admit that I'm a neophyte when it comes to this type of strategic military thinking--has evolved since the Second World War to be that if a nation attacks us as North America--and of course we're being protected by the Americans, because we don't have any nuclear defence--then we will retaliate. In other words, the threat of retaliation tenfold has always been the defence that the Americans have used.

    Now they're moving beyond that. They're trying to develop this purely defensive model--and it's anybody's guess at this point how successful they'll be--of hitting a bullet with a bullet. So I don't personally understand why we wouldn't be involved in that. I think it's actually a de-escalation or a step back from the brink, as it were, from what we've experienced in the past.

    I would welcome your thoughts as to how it would be possible to de-link the functions performed by NORAD now in warning of a missile launch, warning North America that something is inbound and trying to assess what it is and what the threat is, from a possible defence with the ballistic missile.

    I just can't see how it can happen if we were not involved in the missile defence program, how the Americans would allow us to be involved at the front end and have people in the room when those critical decisions that are going to be made in minutes would have to be made.

    LGen K.R. Pennie: We have to remember that the Americans are our closest and best friends, and whatever we politically agree to, we'll put in place.

    That said, from a military perspective, the warning and the defence piece of the puzzle really have to be married together. They're two sides of the same coin. Because of the timeframes you've referred to, decisions have to be made very quickly. That's why these things have to be worked out well ahead of time. And hopefully we'll never see the eventuality of having to use such a system. That's what we all hope for. So it does, in and of itself, have some deterrent value.

    But really, if the two governments elected to maintain missile warning and not participate in the defence in terms of NORAD, what is that going to mean? It will probably mean that we're going to have two people doing the same piece of work.

Á  (1120)  

    Mr. Jay Hill: It doesn't sound very efficient.

    LGen K.R. Pennie: No. It wouldn't be the military recommendation. It makes more sense to do it in one seamless piece. That's why I think the role of NORAD in missile warning per se will diminish with time if we're in fact not part of the missile defence piece in some way, shape, or form to be negotiated.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Mr. McGuire.

    Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    On August 1, 2001, you arrived in Colorado Springs, and a month later.... Can you give us a sense of what happened at NORAD on that particular day? Were you in charge? Were you in command at the time?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: No, I was actually in Washington. General Eberhart was in Colorado Springs.

    We were somewhat fortunate in the sense that there were two things happening on that day that made our response a little bit better than it otherwise might have been. One was that there was a Russian exercise where they were flying their long-range bombers. What they do is fly their long-range bombers out of area. They fly into the Arctic, and they sometimes come and have a brush against our air defence identification zones in the north, either Alaskan or Canadian. So we had our aircraft deployed north, and we were watching their exercise.

    We also had our own exercise going, a NORAD exercise ongoing, where we were exercising our own capabilities. In fact, that was a bit of an issue for some of my staff in NORAD because we were having to do the two things simultaneously. That meant that in Cheyenne Mountain we had some people in fact doing these functions.

    We happened to have a Canadian, who is now my replacement down in Colorado Springs, General Findley. He was the operations officer, the two-star in charge of operations. He had elected to do the night shift because at night he could keep a better watch on the Russian flying activity, because that happens to take place during their day, which is our night. He had just completed a 12-hour shift and monitored our own exercise.

    They were doing 12-hour shifts during this exercise period, and he was on his way home when the events of September 11 started to unfold. So he stayed. He probably stayed there for about two days before he got any sleep.

    In Cheyenne Mountain, those of you who have been there will have seen a bunch of phones. All those phones were ringing incessantly for about two days, just non-stop.

    I think the reaction was very good throughout the whole system, and although NORAD gets some of the credit, some has to go elsewhere as well. If you look at our own bases in Bagotville and Cold Lake, and our regional headquarters of NORAD in Winnipeg and our Ottawa headquarters, there were a lot of things going on simultaneously as well.

    It happened because we have a trained professional force out there that was able to react. Within 45 minutes, Bagotville and Cold Lake had generated airplanes armed and ready to go wherever we needed them to go. The same thing happened throughout the United States.

    So I think the reaction of the system was something we can all be proud of, essentially because the people doing the job were professional enough to see what they could do to help out and proceeded to do it and then called NORAD headquarters to see how we could coordinate this. So all we had to do was just coordinate a lot of stuff that was going on. That's really what the operations section of NORAD was doing for those first two days, just a lot of coordination.

    The paperwork finally followed, especially on the U.S. side. But paperwork wasn't important during those first couple of days. What was important was just actually getting the job done.

    We had fleet commanders in the United States and in Canada sending their ships to sea, putting radars up, putting fighter airplanes up in the U.S. case. We actually had carrier battle groups under our tactical control, which was kind of unheard of before September 11. We just didn't ever exercise that because we didn't think we'd need to do that, but that's in fact what we were doing on that day.

    Then, of course, as we stabilized things, we were able to get things down.

    I have to be complimentary as well to the air traffic control organizations. Both the FAA and our own Department of Transport made some tough decisions and reacted well in a tough circumstance. Systemically, it was, I think, a fairly incredible experience, which I don't think anyone who was involved at any particular point in that chain will ever forget.

Á  (1125)  

    Mr. Joe McGuire: So you're happy with NORAD's response?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: Yes.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: The American commander of NORAD is simultaneously the commander of U.S. Northern Command. How do Canadians intermesh into Northern Command? How do we operate within that structure?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: NORAD and NORTHCOM are separate structures. NORAD, the senior one, has been around since 1958. It's binational, so there is a Canadian deputy and an American in charge. It's an efficient way of running the business, but it can only do what the two nations agree it can do. It only has the forces assigned to it that either Washington or Ottawa choose to assign to it.

    One of the interesting things that happened on 9/11 is that NORAD was assigned a lot more forces very quickly for a period of time, and then that started to drop back down as things got stabilized.

    NORTHCOM, on the other hand, is a different reaction to 9/11. It's an American reaction to put one person in charge of United States defence. Prior to 9/11, we had two organizations in charge of United States defence, one doing the air, which is NORAD, and the other doing the land and sea, which was in JFCOM in Norfolk, Virginia.

    In Washington, they very quickly found that the tension in dealing with these two organizations complicated their life immensely. So they unanimously agreed that they were going to have one person who was in charge. That turned out to be NORTHCOM.

    Now, the question then became, where would NORTHCOM go and how would you structure and organize that part of the business? This was primarily a U.S. consideration as we went through that process. NORAD fed into that process, so as a Canadian I was also feeding into that process, but it was a U.S.-driven process.

    Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld decided to put NORTHCOM in Colorado Springs. That co-located it with NORAD and meant there was one spot where North American security and U.S. security could be dealt with.

    NORAD and NORTHCOM are somewhat separate. They have the same boss for efficiency reasons, but they work as partners to try to solve the security and defence situation for North America and improve it. The binational planning group is something that was created only to work at that interface, to see where we might make recommendations to even further improve that structure with time.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: When is Canada making up its mind about joining the missile defence system? Is there a time that you know of?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: I'm not sure that I can fully answer the question, but maybe Martin will have to answer. He's our policy guy and he can speak more specifically to that particular process.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: I thought that our time was now, for choosing, but I understand it has been delayed.

    Mr. Martin Benjamin (Deputy Director, Western Hemisphere Policy, Department of National Defence): To answer your question, basically on the 29th of May, the government indeed announced that we were going to have discussions with the U.S. for a potential Canadian participation. Final decision has not been made. Both ministers—and the first minister who has the lead is the Minister of Foreign Affairs—have to go back to cabinet with a final agreement, if you will.

    We are in discussions right now. We have several issues that we need to discuss with the United States. To simply answer your question, no, the final decision has not been made.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Is there any time limit here?

    Mr. Martin Benjamin: There's no timeframe. There are several issues that need to be explored, obviously. You may have heard reports in the press that we were supposed to have a final agreement by September or by December. There is no timeframe. We do want to explore all those issues, and there are several.

    What we could say, though, is that it's clear that in the United States there's a clear timeframe. They do want to have an interim operating capability in October 2004. From a Canadian point of view, it does make sense to make up our minds early, because we don't want to join a train that has already left the station.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: October 2004 doesn't give us too much time to figure out where we're going to fit in there.

    LGen K.R. Pennie: From the U.S. perspective, which I probably know a little bit better than the Canadian perspective, since I was down there, clearly they want this in place by the end of September, by October 1, 2004. It has been a target date that was laid out two years ago by the security staff.

    It was reinforced by President Bush. When President Bush, last December, made the decision to work a deployment package here, that could be construed as the first real deployment decision of this system, which essentially has been a test and development system.

    It's still in a test and development mode, but as of October 1 they're also going to have to have a real capability as well, using the test and development capability that they have in a real sense. The U.S. system has been working very hard over the past several months, and will continue to work to make that happen.

    It would be very useful earlier, you're right, as opposed to later. Again, you have to make the right decision, but there's no deadline.

Á  (1130)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

    Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I’d like to welcome both the generals in attendance today.

    I’d like a few things to be clarified concerning certain organizations, because sometimes things get a bit confused. Could you begin by telling me whether General Eberhart is in command of both NORAD and USNORTHCOM?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: Yes.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Who is his present Canadian counterpart in NORAD?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: General Eric Findley.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Does General Eberhart have a counterpart in USNORTHCOM?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: No, there’s a second in charge.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Is he Canadian?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: No, he’s American.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: As far as the Planning Group is concerned, it’s even more complicated. As far as I know, it’s also housed at NORAD. Who belongs to the Planning Group? Does it consist of equal numbers of Canadians and Americans? Who leads the discussions?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: I feel Pierre would be better qualified to answer this question.

    Major-General Pierre Daigle (Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff (HS Issues), Department of National Defence): As General Pennie has mentioned, in Colorado Springs, NORTHCOM has overall responsibility for North America and NORAD handles air defence. Last year, the government set up the Binational Planning Group in Colorado Springs. This group doesn’t belong to either NORAD or Colorado Springs, but it interacts with the two organizations.

    At present, two colonels, one Canadian and one American, head the Binational Planning Group. The entire structure of this group is binational; so there are 30 Canadians and the same number of Americans who belong to this body. The one who is at the head of this binational group is General Findley, and his second in charge is also the second in charge for NORTHCOM.

    I’m going to try and give you a clearer idea of the situation. General Eberhart commands NORTHCOM with an American general, his second in charge of NORTHCOM, U.S. Command only. General Eberhart commands NORAD, which is binational, and his second in charge is a Canadian three-star. The Canadian general heads the Binational Planning Group, and his second in charge, the general of both organizations, is American. They have two directors under them, who are both colonels, one American and the other Canadian.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Is the purpose of the Planning Group to see to all security issues and to divide them up between USNORTHCOM and NORAD? I know that the Planning Group also handles maritime control, anything that comes close to the coasts. Can you give us more details about this? First of all, is there a timeframe? Is this committee going to try permanently to work with NORAD and USNORTHCOM together, or are NORAD and USNORTHCOM going to be assigned definitive mandates?

    MGen Pierre Daigle: As General Pennie explained, airspace is well covered by NORAD.

    With the arrival of NORTHCOM, which handles all the other dimensions—air, sea and land—as well as support for civil agencies, the Binational Planning Group sort of fills in this gap on the binational level. So, at present, the chief mandate of the Binational Planning Group, which was created in December 2002, is to do planning.

[English]

It was called enhanced military cooperation with the Americans.

[Translation]

    This group must also examine how our own binational ability to encompass North America’s expenses for sea, land and so on can be improved. This is a planning team that is trying mainly—I’d say this involves 80 per cent of its efforts—to define the maritime image around the continent. It must also see how the two countries can harmonize their hundreds of

[English]

memoranda of understanding, memoranda of agreement, treaties, and so on. So you need to put some order into this thing, discipline, and make it more binational at all levels.

[Translation]

    The Binational Planning Group initially received a two-year mandate from the government.

[English]

It's not an end state in itself.

[Translation]

In December 2004, the future of this organization will be reviewed.

    So there are three bodies located at Colorado Springs. There’s NORAD, which is progressing, which is developing, and which must be re-examined and analysed.

[English]

    The NORAD agreement has to be reviewed in 2006. NORTHCOM was established last year, and has been moving up forever. I mean, it's going to be North American defence. And the planning group is moving in between the two, with people working from both organizations towards their mandate. They will come under review in 2004. Obviously, there are some decisions to be made on what's going to happen in their mandate.

Á  (1135)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I’m going to ask you one last small question to complicate things even further. Are there only politicians on the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, or do the politicians have military support for their reflections? Does the Board have anything in this entire organization, which seems to me to be a uniquely military organization? There are no civil members in it. What control does the Canadian Parliament or the American congress have over the general actions you explained to us a few minutes ago?

    MGen Pierre Daigle: This morning, the two colonels I mentioned to you, the American colonel and the Canadian colonel, provided us with a progress report on this Binational Planning Group.

[English]

    What you're talking about is PJBD, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. PJBD is definitely a political instrument, and was established in the forties for the defence of North America. In PJBD,

[Translation]

what I call the military arm,

[English]

you've got the military coordination committee.

[Translation]

    At present, the Binational Planning Group, which is a binational military body, has already given a presentation to the MCC.

[English]

    The military coordination committee is composed of military of both organizations.

    Since MCC is a kind of--I may not have the right term--subset of the PJBD, obviously PJBD has expressed a strong interest in the work of the planning group. I think you're going to be briefed on it soon, and PJBD has expressed that they would like to participate in any what they call official kind of a simulation exercise and so on in the near future.

[Translation]

    It must be recalled that the Binational Planning Group is for the time being a military body that, through its military leaders, reports to both leaders, in the United States and Canada. But of course there’s a political aspect, because it involves binational cooperation in all respects. Although we talk about the military aspect, there are also lots of efforts made in connection with coordination between the agencies.

[English]

    This means that the planning group is also working on some kind of.... They can better define their binational assistance to a civilian agency. So yes, people at all levels have some kind of involvement, oversight, or function towards this.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

    Do we have any questions on the government side?

    Mr. Bertrand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Unless I’m mistaken, it seems to me that General Hillier last week mentioned that there were many deployments outside the country and that it was often the army that was deployed. He also said that the army was the poor relation of the armed forces. He suggested as well that the air force and the navy be abandoned and that all personnel and all resources be dedicated to the army.

    General, I’d like to know whether this is being considered. Was this simply a personal comment he was making or is this something that is being openly discussed at NDHQ?

Á  (1140)  

    LGen K.R. Pennie: I think he was right in the first case, but not in the second. I think that the government of Canada needs all its forces. It sometimes needs all its services for different reasons. I think that to ensure protection of Canada and North America, we need to protect our air and sea approaches. It seems basic to me. But it’s true that we send more army personnel for overseas operations. But there are similar problems with regard to rotation of people in the air force and the navy.

[English]

    We base our force on our people. Even though we talk a lot about equipment, every force is based on people. We have had our Sea King community overextend themselves with our navy in providing support to Operation Apollo. Now we have to have a period of recovery.

    There is exactly the same problem with the army. It has been overextended. We have a small force, so I think the government needs every tool in its quiver that it can get. I'm sympathetic to General Hillier, but I think we all have the same problem here.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you.

    Ms. Wayne.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Mr. Blaikie asked if I would switch with him, because he has to go to the House to make a speech. So I'll let Bill speak and then go after. Is that okay?

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Sure, that's no problem. I think we'll be out of time, but that doesn't matter.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: What, dear?

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): I'm only kidding.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg—Transcona, NDP): He's only kidding you.

    I have just a few questions. First of all, I want to make it clear that I don't agree with Mr. Hill that national missile defence is a form of de-escalating the conflict. We take the opposite view, that national missile defence is in fact a way of escalating the possibility of a conflict, because the more people feel they can defend themselves against a nuclear war, the more likely we are to have one. At least, that's the philosophy behind the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of years ago. We think it still applies.

    You mentioned—I think particularly Mr. Benjamin mentioned—with respect to national missile defence that there were several issues you were in discussion with the Americans about. I was wondering if you could give us an idea what those are. What are the issues that are under discussion and that you're trying to sort out with them?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: Just before Martin starts, I'd like to make a point. I want to underline that the missile system as designed today is really very limited. It has been designed to deal against a very limited threat to North America. I think that's something that probably needs to be said.

    Go ahead, Martin.

    Mr. Martin Benjamin: Oh, I agree with you completely.

    Indeed, we have several issues. The first and primordial issue is really to enhance the security of Canadians. We want to participate in a system that we believe will provide protection to Canadians and Canadian territory. That's the first and foremost issue we're discussing with the United States right now. It's first and foremost a U.S. system, but we want to make sure it will protect Canadians.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie: That is to say, that they won't be shot down over us.

    Mr. Martin Benjamin: No. As the minister said, to enhance our security we want to participate in the plans and make sure Canada is taken into consideration in those plans. For us, it's enhancing our security. That's issue number one.

    Issue number two is really, as General Pennie said, that we want our participation to be anchored in NORAD. We believe in NORAD. We believe the NORAD institution has been beneficial to Canadians. We believe in its working procedures, binational aspects, and so on. That's issue number two.

    The third issue is, as I think you will appreciate, we do not want in any shape or form to change our policy concerning the non-weaponization of space. We have made very clear to the Americans that we are signing on to a ground-based missile defence system. That's what the United States intends to build in 2004. That's issue number three, and we have made it very clear to the Americans.

    Then there are other issues that are of importance to us—for example, industrial participation: we want Canadian companies to have access to and be able to bid on some of those contracts. And as we are discussing today, we do not want our participation to come at a very high price. We don't have those resources.

    Those are a range of issues we're currently discussing with the United States.

Á  (1145)  

    Mr. Bill Blaikie: Thank you for that. I understand that what is intended in the short run is a ground-based system, but I've seen the American long-range planning documents—they're in the public domain—and it's very clear that in their minds, at least, this is the first stage of something that will lead to the weaponization of space. This is a political debate, and I don't expect you to enter into it, but there is a problem, it seems to me, for the Canadian government as to what extent they can hold their hands over their eyes when it's very clear this is what the long-term American intention is.

    I'm not going to ask you questions about the Sea Kings, because that would be really unfair to Elsie, who gave up her time. I'll leave that to her. But there is an article in the paper today about the Snowbirds. I wonder if you could give the committee any idea what you think the military usefulness of the Snowbirds is, because there's a debate about whether or not they're a kind of heritage item, like the RCMP musical ride, and therefore should be funded outside the military budget, or whether they have some military significance and therefore should be funded inside the military budget. Would you care to comment, as much as you feel you can, on that?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: First of all, I'd like to go back to a couple of your comments on missile defence, just for the record. I don't think we need to worry about “over us” the same way we did back in the seventies when the whole safeguard issue was going. This system will be doing intercepts well up in space, well away from us, and the amount of debris that might come to earth is relatively minimal, and where it might come to earth is going to be very problematic. I really don't think there's an issue of things falling on Canadian heads here that's very serious at all.

    The other issue I think we need to be sensitive to is, even though the administration may want to go down that path ultimately, or.... I shouldn't say that. What they really aren't doing is taking it off the table until they've had time to look at it. But the time to design and build and launch a satellite is generally around ten or so years—that's assuming you know what you want the satellite to do and what you want in it—but the United States hasn't even begun the applied research to know if this is something that is going to be feasible or doable.

    So the timeframes here, even were they to continue down that path, are fairly significant. We're talking about probably 15 to 20 or 25 years before this thing could become a reality—in that timeframe—and that's important, I think, to understand.

    The Snowbird question is an interesting one. We think the Snowbirds are important. It's one of our centres of excellence to provide air demonstration. We know the Tutor can be maintained for a period of time now, so we've lifed it to about 2010. There's a chance we might even go beyond that, but right now we're planning to keep it until 2010.

    In the longer term, what we do behind that is a challenge. If our defence budgets were more robust, this probably wouldn't be an issue. I think what you're seeing is some of that debate starting to float up. We haven't yet come near a decision on this, but we will be working on it.

    Mr. Bill Blaikie: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you.

    Do we have anything from the government side? No?

    You're on, Elsie.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    I have to say, General Pennie, when you mentioned that the air force was fragile at the present time, you were saying that at one time we had 3,800 planes. We now have 300.

    I have had major concerns for our military since I've been here in Ottawa the last ten years. The army, navy, and air force, to me, are so key, and you should be number one. I don't say that because you're here. I say it when you're not here. You should be number one with the priority, no matter what party is government.

    In the States, they're number one. I'm wondering how you find that the United States feels about us back in Canada and about what we're doing.

    On this extra $200 million, God bless the minister for trying to get money for the army, but he said that it's for the army only. The navy and air force get no money at all. The $200 million is only for the army. I know that we need it because of our men who are in Afghanistan and working so hard there, as well as other areas.

    They expected me to talk about the Sea Kings.

    I was in Newfoundland for a meeting about a month and a half ago. When I left that day to come home, I came downstairs to check out at the hotel. There were three gentlemen waiting for me; one was an air force man, the other two were army men. They asked if they could speak to me for a few minutes. I said sure.

    The air force man said “Mrs. Wayne, we're having a hard time with our planes, and we don't have any money to buy the parts to replace what needs to be done.” He said that he was talking to me about this because he had such a concern. I said that I understood.

    Of the two army men, one said “Mrs. Wayne, I've been in the army for 23 years. When I was in it for five years, I wanted to stay for 25. My son is in the army now; he has been there five years, and because of the state of the army, he doesn't want to stay for 23 like me.”

    This, to me, really tugs at my heart and I feel very strongly.

    With the cuts that we've made in the budget, how do the Americans see us? How do they see our military? Do they ever talk to you, General Pennie, about it? Do they?

Á  (1150)  

    LGen K.R. Pennie: I guess I could give you a one word answer.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: As long as it's three letters and not two.

    LGen K.R. Pennie: It would be three letters.

    My dialogue with my counterparts in the United States Air Force is fairly well established. I know most of the senior leadership in the United States Air Force very well because I served in the United States for two years. I think I can speak fairly solidly about how their military view us. For how society at large views us and how the political system views us, you may need to talk to other people.

    The military people understand that each sovereign country makes its own sovereign decisions. They work with allies all over the world, and they understand that's the game. They generally don't talk about it.

    They understand that if Canada wants to do something, then we'll make it work. There's a real sense of kinship, a positive attitude towards Canadians, because of the quality of people that we bring to anything we do--land, air, or sea. I can certainly speak from the air force perspective. Our people are well trained, polyvalent, and very capable.

    When I worked on my staff, I had one-third Canadian and two-thirds American. Most of my Americans were United States Air Force, but many of them were from other services in the United States. The respect towards Canadians was fairly profound and fairly deep. It was more based on the mutual relationship of working together side by side on a common mission, where they could see the value added. I think wherever we can do that we're going to get the same result.

    We had a chief of staff in NORTHCOM who has since moved on, he got promoted, but he had served with Canadian army folk in Bosnia and said exactly the same thing.

    The American forces are large. They are 1.4 million men and women in uniform. As we found with people arriving in NORTHCOM, not all of them had the same appreciation if they hadn't been dealing closely with Canadians before. As they work with Canadians, they get a more balanced appreciation of what Canadians can bring to any particular operation.

    On a personal level, I can say that Canadians are valued and respected for what they do.

    MGen Pierre Daigle: If I may, I would answer some of the concerns of Mr. Hill expressed at the beginning. We have a $12 billion budget and we have a $13 billion program, and I know the minister has said that many times. In the last budget we received $800 million and the minister was committed to finding $200 million. In the efficiency committee General Pennie talked about, so far they have found $128 million, but the minister as of yesterday, at probably the same dinner you're alluding to, Mr. Hill, said publicly that he is committed to finding this $200 million.

    Obviously the $800 million we had and the $200 million on top of that--I'm not in all of the strategic planning issues here, but I don't think the $200 million will go only to one place. The $1 billion total will be assessed on the requirements of either of the services.

    By the way, this $800 million represents a 7% increase to our budget, which is quite substantial in this day and age.

    The minister also said publicly that helicopters are priority number one. Obviously the CF-18 Aurora modernization is on the books. We all hear about the modernization transformation of the army equipment, moving from heavy tanks to mobile gun systems, and so on.

    There's one thing that's very important that we're doing now. In the department we've established what we call--and I know you don't like acronyms--SCIP, which is the strategic capability investment plan. In this plan you have the strategic requirements of the Canadian Forces. And the minister and the senior people, the three stars, are very clear on that: if it's not under SCIP, nobody works on it. Obviously, when they're going to assess at a strategic level the requirements of the Canadian Forces, to bring it into the future as a transformation...if it's not on the books, we're not going to waste our time and money pushing for “nice to have” stuff while we haven't yet addressed the direct requirements of our troops.

Á  (1155)  

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Is my time up?

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): It's up.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Oh, is it really? Glory be to God, I was one question over--

    MGen Pierre Daigle: I'm sorry, I took your time, Ma'am.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: No, dear, that's quite all right.

    Thank you.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Mr. Bertrand.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Just one quick question for General Pennie.

    This morning you gave examples of all kinds of bilateral organizations that exist right now between Canada and the U.S. Is there any communication, any discussions, between let's say the U.S and Mexico? Is there any equivalent to NORAD for the United States and Mexico, or is it strictly a Canada-U.S. thing?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: I think we have to appreciate that what we have in NORAD is kind of unique in the world. There are no two countries that share their defence and warning systems the way we do. It's extremely unique and extremely rare. There's nothing like it anywhere, between any two allies, no matter how close they are.

    So the relationship between Canada and the United States is, as a consequence, fairly well entrenched and fairly well established, with lots of mechanisms and lots of bilateral discussion points and lots of areas where we interface. None of that exists with Mexico. So the United States sees North America as an entity and they see Mexico as part of North America. That's the good news for the Mexicans. But if we think we have sovereignty concerns in Canada, the Mexicans have them writ large. And they're very sensitive to the fact that they don't have the same kind of military as Canada does, let alone what the United States does.

    There are a lot of sensitivities here that have to be worked through, and the United States is now going to open that door. So there will be a dialogue, there will be discussions, and there will be opportunities, but it's going to take time. I don't see any near-term change. The positive side is we have a very good, close working relationship that's been built over many decades that is viewed positively on both sides of the border. It's going to take a long time to develop that with Mexico.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: Thank you.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Cheryl.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Mr. Benjamin mentioned that Canada has not signed on officially to the missile defence program. We've only agreed to discuss it. General Pennie has stated that the U.S. plans to implement the ground-based mid-range missile system by October 2004, which gives us roughly a year.

    How exactly would the refusal for Canada to participate in the United States proposed missile defence system affect Canada's role in NORAD, if at all?

  (1200)  

    LGen K.R. Pennie: I think it will affect the mission of missile warning. That's what I spoke to earlier; you may not have been here. There are two fundamental things NORAD does: aerospace warning and aerospace control.

    On the control aspect, if we assumed missile defence in the NORAD framework, we wouldn't have to change the mission wording. It's actually worded in such a way that it would accommodate that, because it was foreseen many years ago that this might be a possibility.

    Having said that, the warning side would be under some stress if we don't make some agreement to deal with it on the ballistic missile defence side. That means, as I have already said, we do the detection of a missile launch, we do the validation of that launch, we do a characterization of what might be coming, and we also have to assess it for the United States and Canada and pass that information in to the capital. Since NORAD does this, as missile defence comes on line, the same technologies that do the warning are actually very applicable to the defence.

    In fact, that's one of the big challenges in the United States today in NORAD: that the Americans are upgrading all their warning functionality so that it will contribute better to the missile defence functionality. Of course, those upgrades are being classified “U.S. only”, so Canadians are being already eased out, as we speak, of certain of those functionalities, because they're going to apply more to missile defence than heretofore.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Okay. Has there been any negative impact so far because we're not officially on line?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: From the point of view of being in Colorado Springs, yes, because Canadians have had to be removed from a number of areas of technology where it's being upgraded to do the missile defence function. When I was down there, I had to move about a dozen people out of jobs where they no longer had a job because they could not work on the classified material any more. They could only work on unclassified material, so they had to be shifted to another area. We had lots of work to do, so we were able to just move those individuals into other areas where they could work. But these issues of releasability were directly related to the missile defence file.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Has there been any impact, from the failure to sign on so far, upon Canada's role in NORTHCOM?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: NORTHCOM's a U.S.-only command, so there's no question about Canada joining NORTHCOM; that couldn't be allowed by U.S. law. That's why we went down the path, as General Daigle discussed earlier, of establishing the binational planning group.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: With Canada not having signed on yet, are Canadian firms being permitted to bid on the jobs related to this defence program, given that generally the United States does not reveal the classified criteria necessary to put forth a bid? And if this is affecting the ability for Canadian firms to bid, do you have any idea what dollar loss this amounts to for Canada, which ultimately translates to jobs?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: The whole industrial side of this is something I'm not an expert on, but in general what the United States has done is establish what they've called a national team. You may be familiar with what they did in World War II with respect to the Manhattan Project, where they got some of their best and brightest from all industries together, academics included, and developed a national team to build the atomic bomb.

    They've done something very similar for missile defence. They've created a national team—some of the best and brightest of all their six major industries, plus some academics—and they're working on developing this particular system. They invest, in that one project alone, the equivalent of what we spend on our whole defence budget, so it's a fairly serious issue in the United States. The industrial involvement is fairly serious in the United States.

    Since a lot of this is classified and a lot of it is sensitive, obviously U.S. companies have an inside track on bidding. They have allowed some contracts to go outside the U.S. on certain specific components, so any particular country can bid. But Canada's not signing up to missile defence does limit the opportunity for Canadian companies to bid on these kinds of contracts.

    MGen Pierre Daigle: If I may interject, at this time they have a $9-billion-a-year budget for the development of missile defence, in U.S. dollars. They have probably close to $200 billion in the full range. This is one resource people might tap into if they have more disclosure.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: My last question just requires a really short response. Public concerns about a missile defence system arise in part out of fears about the weaponization of space. Based on the fact that this is ground-based, and since my understanding is that what would be in space would be more or less sensors, how would what is being proposed with this ground-based system differ from what we already have in terms of satellite surveillance?

  (1205)  

    LGen K.R. Pennie: As Mr. Blaikie pointed out, this is a program that is growing. We're just getting it established. The ground-based component is the most mature. It's the one that's been most developed, and it's the one that will be made operational in some degree as of October 1, 2004. That was directed by the President of the United States last year.

    This thing will evolve, but primarily, the reality is you need the space-based assets to provide your surveillance, your warning, and some of the tracking. We do missile warning today using U.S. assets that are primarily space-based—that's been a partnership we've established for quite some time—so the space connection to this right from the start has been important. We've always used military satellites. Even to do what we do in Afghanistan we're using satellites for communication. This is judt part and parcel of military business.

    The weaponization of space is another issue; that is, actually permanently stationing weapons in space. No one has ever done that, and we don't know if it's ever going to be done. The Canadian position is, as has been stated previously, we don't want it to happen. But we don't think it's going to happen for quite some time. As I responded earlier, I think, given the time it takes to just design and build and launch a satellite let alone put a constellation up there, it would presuppose that at the front end you really know what you're building. The applied research for this has not yet been done, so I think we have quite some to go before we're going to see anything along these lines be real.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you.

    I think I'll slip in a couple of questions myself; everybody's had a chance.

    Continuing with NORAD, let's look at the direction that has been talked about of NORAD starting to do a little more surveillance on the land and sea. We've heard lately a lot about the opening of the Northwest Passage. It's something that's coming along rather quickly, a lot faster than we thought it would ever happen. We're saying now that within a timeslot of ten years we will actually have three to four months of open areas. So it will become a major shipping lane, with all the problems related around it—not even bringing in the problems we have with jurisdiction. But we know the north area. We don't do much in the way of surveillance there now. It's very low-level.

    Has NORAD been looking into what they can do more in the surveillance of particularly the northern areas but also the land and sea?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: NORAD would need the mission to be able to go seriously into these areas, and NORAD does not have the mission. They certainly are looking at wide area surveillance from the perspective of how to defend North America, given the present mission they have. It's increasingly challenging. Ultimately we may end up having to rely on space-based assets to get wide area surveillance, and it's going to be fairly expensive. Right know, it can't quite do the job anyway. But technically, as people progress, it might become more and more viable, and we expect it will in time.

    There have been some press reports about setting a contract to actually build an airship. This is part of a technology demonstrator—to see if we can do it on an airship—to help get wide area surveillance.

    We've looked at using RPVs. The global long-range RPV could actually do maritime surveillance and air surveillance as well. One of the concerns NORAD has is that if terrorists were to take over a ship, put something on that ship, and sail it close to our shores but not into our ports, they could launch something off that ship. It's a combination maritime and air problem. As soon as something launches, it's an air problem.

    There's a lot of thinking going into how to deal with that kind of threat, both on the maritime side and on the NORAD side. In fact, there are working groups where they're both together trying to work that problem. There are groups that are working this problem on a binational basis. I think we're making and have the potential to make even more progress because the right people are looking at this right now.

  (1210)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): I guess that's the point I was looking at too, that it is a binational issue very definitely, since we still haven't settled part of the land claims in that area.

    LGen K.R. Pennie: The reason this is a centrepiece for the binational planning group is that it wasn't strictly speaking a NORAD mission, although NORAD had a dog in that fight, if you will, but it was a NORTHCOM mission. Because there is a binational side to it, the binational planning group is an ideal forum to work this. Over time, as we understand this better, the binational planning group will be offering us potentially a way ahead here that we'll have to consider, and it may well be that we can roll it into NORAD. That would be my hope, because the fewer groups we have looking at our common problems the better we are. The more we can do it with one organization the better off we'll be in the long term.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Absolutely, and they are problems common to the two countries.

    I have another question, in a different direction probably. I'm just thinking of strategic airlift and where we're going with that. Now, there's no question there are all kinds of rumours running around about whether we should be going to heavy airlift, whether we should be investing in that, or whether we should be looking at what we tend to specialize in right now, our Hercs, our C-130s, which we do a fantastic job at. We're also getting to be rather specialist just on the maintenance side of it, as far as our subcontractors in Canada are concerned, even doing work for the Americans, for that matter.

    I was wondering what your thoughts are on that, if you think that may be what we should be doing, looking at really expanding our C-130 fleet and becoming more specialized in that--again, to help out in our Canada-U.S. relations, because that's what this is all about. They do have the heavy lift. And there has been some talk down there that maybe Canada is very specialized. Maybe we should be looking at becoming even more specialized, with more equipment.

    LGen K.R. Pennie: That's a good question, and I can't answer it in one sentence.

    Certainly when we look at the capability of air lift generally and what the Herc fleet does for us—they do a number of functionalities, and I'll talk to those—we are looking at it from a requirements base and we have been for quite some time. The stuff we saw happening in the spring really was a result of some of the work that was done in the centre of defence, and not really the air force, in trying to find the best way to deal with this.

    From my perspective, we have to get that requirement hammered out before we start launching specific options. What the Herc fleet now does is provide search and rescue across Canada—the fixed wing element of it, not the rotary wing, which is done by the....

    One of the things I see about this slide is once we replace the Labrador, which we're almost finished doing, then we're going to jump its dot up to where it's going to be about the Cormorant. That's going to be good to see. And it is working well. But ultimately we need to do that with every fleet we have, and of course we can't do it all at the same time. We've worked the F-18 modernization and the Aurora modernization; we're working each thing to try to fit it into the limited budgets we have, and those are both good ideas for good reasons.

    In the case of the Herc we have modernized the cockpit. We have been able to bring it up, but we're dealing with an almost 40-year-old airframe now. We need to take some of the stress off that fleet, and that's what we're looking at.

    I talked about the SAR role. We also do a tanker role—air-to-air tactical refuelling—out of the Hercs. We also do lift up to Alert, and back and forth across Canada, moving stuff back and forth for flood relief and “you name it, we'll move it” with this fleet. We also do strategic movement across an ocean, over to Afghanistan, or East Timor, or.... You name the place. We're going around the world, pretty well; that's almost exactly half way around the world. A Herc is not fast and can only carry so much, so it has certain limitations.

    As we look at that bundle of things we do and develop the requirements, I think one of the things we may well end up doing—and decisions haven't been made yet, obviously.... If we looked at the fixed wing SAR piece, it's a piece that is probably policy neutral. I don't know if it is or not, but I suspect it is: I don't think any Canadian doesn't want to do search and rescue over his territory. But we don't need to do it with a four-engine airplane; we can probably do it with a twin-engine airplane. That piece may well be broken out, because we have the requirement and we can probably move more quickly on it. That's something our minister's going to be looking at in the coming weeks.

    That will take some of the stress off the Herc fleet. The stress on the Herc fleet's been caused by decisions we made in the past ten years. It wasn't caused by something we did yesterday. To recover from it is going to take.... And we can recover from it. The Sea King right now is 40 years old, but it's actually flying quite well. It may not be as effective as it once was when it was new, but we can maintain old airplanes. If I get into an old airplane, I'd rather it be a Canadian airplane than anyone else's old airplane, thank you very much, because our people are good, and our systems are good, and we do well with old airplanes. We've had to. That's a skill set I'm not proud that we have, but I'm glad that we have it.

    If we are able to move on the fixed wing part of this, it will allow us to retire some of the oldest of our Hercs, and that will take some of the pressure off the Herc fleet. The elements that are causing the problem on the Herc fleet are no different from the elements that are causing problems on every other fleet. We've had challenges being able to buy enough spare parts. Sometimes it takes two to three years to get a spare part in a system, so the fact that some money been put at this doesn't necessarily result in something instantaneous.

    But the biggest impact is really on people. Any organization fundamentally depends on its people. What we had to do in the 1990s is not recruit. This is a problem relatively common to many trades in the CF. When I look at the air maintenance trades, this is one problem I'll reflect to you, but it's being felt elsewhere. By not recruiting for eight or so years, you have a demographic profile where some of your people are ten years older than they would otherwise be, and you have a number of young people coming in. We've finally started recruiting, so these young people are just hitting the hangar floor.

    We have about the right numbers overall, but when you look at your current qualified and trained people, the figure is down easily 30% and in some cases 40%. That's the issue; that's what's causing the problem. The inspection periods are taking longer, and because of lack of spares, people are having to rob from one aircraft to another, which eats into your time available with your skilled people. It just exacerbates an existing problem.

  (1215)  

We're doing a number of things to address this right now. We're putting money into the spare parts. We're going to contract out some maintenance to help relieve some of the pressure. We're attacking our training very vigorously. But the fundamental problem is going to remain for several years, and that is that we have a smaller cadre of experienced people we are relying on to support our operations overseas. We can't send our young unqualified people overseas and keep the same reputation we've had. We send our experienced people. But those same experienced people also have to turn around and train young people, so they are being pulled two ways. We rely very much on them, but it's a limited, finite resource. That's our limiting factor in the air force, as we to try to regenerate and try to modernize and bring on new fleets. And I have to work around that very carefully.

    There are some tremendous challenges. When I was down in Trenton, I looked at the maintenance crews, walked through their lines, talked to all their supervisors, and talked to a number of the troops. All of these systemic points I've made were brought to me by them, but they would also mention that ten years ago we had a third more people working this problem. We had more robustness, more flexibility to take the swings that we get through normal operations. That's one of the things I mean by fragility.

    When we have a high operational tempo that drives our use of hours, as was the case on the Herc fleet.... Ten years ago we could have absorbed that more easily, and it wouldn't have caused a longer-term problem to recover from it. But because of the fragility, the recovery is going to take a little bit longer. That's one of the realities they brought home to me as well.

    As far as the rest of the Herc, we're going to have to work that too. The requirements are something we're going to have to work up with the department, because there are many options out there in terms of airframes, but you really have to have that requirement sorted out before you start looking at the airframes. We're going to have to work through that process fairly aggressively. I think the minister is demanding that now, and we're at that.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you.

    Mr. Hill.

    Mr. Bachand, je m'excuse.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Later on you get put to the top of the list. Is that how it works?

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): It's because of the slots by parties.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: It was your predecessor who decided that. It was a very good idea. I think we'll talk it over after.

[Translation]

    I’d like to come back to ballistic missile defence. Mr. Benjamin, I think I’ve identified your parameters for discussion with the Americans. You want protection of Canadians and Canadian territory. You have a limited budget and you tell the Americans that we cannot keep up with them in spending billions of dollars. You want to hang onto a land system because you don’t want to “arsenalize”—to use the expression of the Minister of Foreign Affairs—space.

    The other day, I had some fun looking at a globe and I think that the threat of ballistic missiles comes solely from the north and not from the south. Knowing a bit about the chauvinism of the Americans, I think they might be tempted to use Canadian territory as a buffer zone. At present, they certainly have complete sovereignty over Alaska. When we look at the geographical situation in Alaska, in the far northwest, and our premise is that we have to intercept the missile as quickly as possible, we see that Alaska can always be justified. But if the missile came from North Korea, say, and we had to intercept it in its downward flight, it would probably pass between Quebec and Ontario in order to strike New York and Washington.

    I don’t know whether, in your discussions, you are aware of the fact that the Americans could tell us that we could settle that by allowing them to instal interceptors in the Canadian Far North. So they could really intercept missiles above the polar icecap, and there wouldn’t be any negative fallout here. Is this just political fiction or fictional war, when I talk like this?

  (1220)  

    LGen K.R. Pennie: Perhaps I should answer you.

    First of all, the United States has required that its system protect each one of the United States, and this gives Canadians a pretty healthy level of coverage. Secondly, the Americans have already decided to make sure they can implement their system without using the territory of any ally whatsoever, including Canada.

    However, it’s quite possible that, if an ally like us is on board and we create a partnership, we will look at what we can add. But the system as it was on October 1 is not counting on Canadian territory. It is going to operate without Canadian support. It’s not like in the 1970s, when there was talk of another system. There is no need at all of Canadian territory as a buffer. The Americans are capable of protecting their territory from a firing from North Korea without Canadian support. The missiles will be in Alaska, at a place called Fort Greeley. We’ll have 16 there, I think, and four others at Vandenberg, but these missiles will intercept above the Pacific Ocean. The fallout won’t pose a problem. Interception debris won’t fall at all on Canada.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Yes, but geographically, I don’t think that interception would take place above the Pacific Ocean; I think it would be over the polar icecap. North Korea would send missiles over the polar icecap; it wouldn’t send them by way of the Pacific Ocean. That’s what worries me.

    If the interceptors are in Fort Greeley, given the time they would take to leave from Alaska, the interception may take place over Canadian territory. I think that the Canadian government may be tempted to say, to avoid that happening, that the Americans can instal interceptors in the Canadian Far North so that interceptions can take place over the polar icecap. That’s what I’m afraid of, but maybe my fear isn’t justified.

    LGen K.R. Pennie: I think that it isn’t, because the trajectory between North Korea and Washington doesn’t go over the polar region. It goes over Alaska, then definitely Canada to cut corners, but it doesn’t go over the polar region. If it were a Russian threat, it would be different. This system is not designed to counter-attack the Russians, but rather to counter an attack from much below.

  (1225)  

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Here’s a final question. General Pennie, would you recommend to the Minister of National Defence and the Canadian government that they take part in the antimissile defence project?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: I am a servant of the Crown and I do what I’m told to do.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Yes, but often, the military make recommendations. I’m talking about recommendations. You can recommend, but if they tell you to do the opposite of your recommendation, I realize that you would serve them.

    LGen K.R. Pennie: When I was in Colorado, I strongly recommended that Canada seriously consider this project, because I think this would have a fairly significant impact on NORAD. But the decision is a political decision.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I understand that.

    MGen Pierre Daigle: If you will allow me, Mr. Bachand, I will say that, in May, the government actually said that it would announce that discussions would be initiated between Canada and the United States with a view to possible participation in the ballistic shield plan. So we already have the intention to initiate discussions, which we are very much in favour of.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. Bertrand, go ahead.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

[English]

    Just as a point of clarification, General Pennie, when you were talking a while ago about strategic air lift, you mentioned that as soon as you were done with the SAR helicopters, you would start working on the Cormorant. Now, was that a Freudian slip, or do you know something that we don't?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: I don't recall having said that, so it must have been a slip.

    What I meant to say is on this chart we're going to replace the Labrador, that blue dot down on the bottom right, and we're going to have the Cormorant up here at the top right. So that's what I referred to when I said the Cormorant. It's an example of what we try to do and we do more of.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Mr. Hill.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I want to follow up and perhaps make a few comments on a couple of issues that came up. One, the comment was made that the $800 million the minister was able to get in addition to the existing budget last spring represents a 7% increase. I just want to point out that there is at least talk right now of him going to cabinet for $600 million for the Striker armoured vehicles alone. While $800 million sounds like a lot of money, and 7% might sound like quite an increase, in the overall scheme of things, when our military is so far behind the eight ball in new equipment procurement, I think we'd all agree that it's a pretty small amount.

    I want to follow up on Mr. Blaikie's question with regard to the Snowbirds and the statement by General Pennie that we're hoping to extend their life, perhaps even beyond 2010. My understanding is that the BAE Hawk has been identified as the best equipment to replace the Tutors. I was asked about this the other day, recognizing the problem—in this particular case for the air force—in trying to arrive at priorities. We've already heard a discussion about heavy-lift capability, whether we purchase C17s or something equivalent to that, whether we refurbish the Herc fleet, the Auroras. You could just go down the list—it's almost endless—of what's due for replacement, or certainly will be long overdue for replacement if it takes as long to procure stuff in the future as it's taken over the last while.

    Anyway, I was asked about this the other day, and I suggested that perhaps, and only a little bit facetiously, the Governor General as the commander in chief of the armed forces should be asked to try to find a way and the funds necessary to replace the Tutors. She seems to be able to delve into any number of departments in addition to National Defence to get funding. We've recently seen $35 million and counting. Perhaps as our commander in chief she might take this on as a task to relinquish the problems you would have in trying to reallocate priorities.

    We're talking, I believe, of about $330 million, at least for the initial stage, for the purchase of 12 Hawk aircraft. That's only—I say “only”—about three times what this government spent on two Challenger jets they didn't need for cabinet. So we're not talking about a lot of money. I think that Canadians would certainly support maintaining the Snowbirds. That's what I've heard, anyway, as I've travelled across the nation.

    If we can't get the money for the Snowbirds from the existing budget—and here I'm reading into what you're saying—because there are so many urgent requirements for the limited money available, where do you think we could get it from?

  (1230)  

    LGen K.R. Pennie: Each year there's a different budget, so each year there's a different situation. We think the Snowbirds are fairly important, but we put our priority where we can on combat capability, because that's the essence of what we do in defence. It doesn't appear on the slide because it's not one of those capabilities that's part of our core business.

    Having said that, it adds a lot to recruiting, to our image, to the Canadian Forces, and we're very proud of what they do. They're a centre of excellence. They do an excellent job and they work hard at that. I was out there visiting them just yesterday, and I praised them for what they've been able to do. I'm very pleased with their program.

    We've looked at this very hard, and we know that we can keep that present aircraft to 2010 without any major problems. What we do beyond that we'll have to consider seriously, and how we fund that will have to be considered seriously.

    Mr. Jay Hill: If I could just interject for a second, because time is of the essence, all of us have seen this, and I don't have to belabour it, for example, the helicopter procurement, the replacement of the Sea Kings and other military equipment. It just seems to get put off and put off; requirements change, it's put off. Given that, and that 2010, if not a definitive deadline, is at least a looming date that's in the mind of people as the end of the lifespan for the Tutor, wouldn't you agree that the decision is going to have to be made soon? Because you don't just go out and buy these BA Hawks. They're not sitting somewhere on a tarmac waiting for us to pick them up, like shopping at Sears or something.

    LGen K.R. Pennie: I wouldn't want to give the impression we're not working on it. I wouldn't want to give the impression we're not working on the Herc replacement right now. We are, and we continually do. All I'm saying is that in our long-term capital plan we haven't identified where that funding's going to come from at this stage. That doesn't mean we won't in the future, but it is something we're working on and will continue to work on, as we work on every other aspect of our capabilities to try to find the way ahead and work it through the system. This is an ongoing activity that is normal in our business.

    Mr. Jay Hill: I think all of us in the room have had the good fortune to witness a Snowbirds performance at least once, possibly many times. I've been there, I've seen an audience of thousands moved to tears by this. At a time when our nation is ostensibly at war, with the war on terror, I don't think I can overemphasize the ability of the Snowbirds to bring out the very best in Canadians in the way of patriotism and a commitment to the Canadian Armed Forces. Given that and the role they play well beyond recruiting or anything like that, as you were suggesting, which they do, do you believe perhaps there's a role to be played? It has been suggested to me the Department of Heritage, for example, some other ministry.... Because the nation as a whole gets benefit from this, not just our military. I guess that's where I was going with my question when I asked where the money's going to come from.

    Is there some way that all of us, perhaps the committee, should be looking at recommending that at least part of the money should be coming from somewhere other than the military, so that it isn't such a difficult decision for the military to make as to whether we get Hercs rather than Hawk aircraft, so that we can continue the Snowbirds, that type of either/or decision?

  (1235)  

    LGen K.R. Pennie: The fundamental premise of government is that you work within the budgets that you have been assigned. So that's the rule set we're working within, and we have to work that first. I'm not suggesting that anything you propose couldn't be done, but it wouldn't be the first inclination of government to go down that path. There would be some challenges in dealing with the board and other departments, which obviously don't have that kind of money.

    Mr. Jay Hill: What about private partnership in something like this? Has there been any exploration of that potential?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: We have looked at that in the past. Some other countries do that. When you partner with private enterprise, they want to advertise. We think the Snowbirds are a uniquely Canadian thing. We're proud of the CF image that we present, and we don't want “company X” written across that airplane right now. We don't think that's necessarily appropriate. We may end up there, but that's not our first position to be in either.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): We certainly hope not. We don't want to go in that direction. But I think you're right, Jay. I think one of the interesting things with the Snowbirds in particular is that since we see a lot fewer uniforms on the streets these days, when we do get the Snowbirds into an area, it is a unit, and people get to see our military. They really don't get to see them as much any more. So I think it's something we do have to work on, for sure.

    Joe.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    As you know, there's a lot of concern, usually expressed by my colleague Mr. O'Brien, about the future of Goose Bay. The Germans are gone or going, the Belgians are gone. What is the future? Are the Americans coming? There was some talk of their being our saviour at Goose.

    LGen K.R. Pennie: I was in Goose Bay a few months ago with General Eberhart as we were checking the forward operating locations we use for our fighter airplanes. Goose Bay actually happens to have one of those, so we dropped in there. We had a short session with the mayor, and he offered Goose Bay for missile defence. General Eberhart him a very practical, but tactful answer, and the next thing we knew, in the press.... Anyway, I don't think I need to go there. The point is, I've already talked to missile defence, and there's no specific need for Goose Bay at present in the U.S. system. Whether one could be negotiated is another issue.

    The problem with Goose Bay is that it was designed to be a low-level training area. You may have watched the war that took place in Afghanistan that we were a part of and the one we weren't part of in Iraq. You probably didn't see a lot of low-level flying activity, because the technology has evolved so much in the last ten years that air forces like the United States Air Force, and hopefully ours in the future, are able to hit targets from very high up very precisely. In the latest war in Iraq, for example, we had B-2 bombers actually dropping bombs right in front of their own troops, but hitting within ten feet of the target by using satellite-guided munitions. This is the nature of war; it's changed. So the value of low-level flying training in Goose Bay, although it's still important, is less. And our allies, with reduced budgets, are making decisions here.

    So I don't know what the future of Goose Bay is, but it's challenging. It's challenging because the low-level training it offers is of less value than it was during the Cold War.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Is there a Canadian solution? Can their modus operandi be changed from low-level flying training to something else?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: We're looking at everything. I have a team looking at how we might expand the use of that range, how we might expand it to high-level. There are problems. If you go high-level, you have the transatlantic air routes that fly right over there. That's why the base was built there in the first place. But yes, high-level dropping on the ground is something we might end up doing, but there are challenges there environmentally, challenges with getting used to the air space. Everywhere you go, there are some challenges. I'm not saying they can't be overcome, but the team is looking at all these challenges right now, trying to see where the allies really want to go, where we can interest them, and where we can actually go into Goose Bay to expand the use of those facilities.

    We have in existence other areas that provide that stuff already. In Cold Lake we have one of the best air weapons ranges in the world. It's really world class. The investment required to make Goose Bay that same thing would be probably beyond our means, because these things have been developing over fifty years. But if we can find a niche that works, we'll pursue it, and that's what we're looking at hard right now.

  (1240)  

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Thank you.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Have you been looking at the possibility of SAR training there and selling it to other countries? The conditions are ideal: they're bad in that area.

    LGen K.R. Pennie: That's a fair point. The conditions are kind of rough there, but when you train, you don't necessarily want to train in the worst weather, because that really limits your ability to train. I just spent some time in Moose Jaw, where we have this NATO flying training facility, which is a world-class training facility again. It really is the best in the world. There's nothing that can touch the training facility we put in place, in partnership with Bombardier in this case, and I'm really impressed with it--sorry if I go on. But even they complain when they lose a weather day, because they've optimized this to be so efficient that whenever they have a bad day, they notice--and that's some of the best weather we have in Canada. If you put your training in bad weather, there are some advantages, and you've alluded to one, but your ability to train is stretched out over many days waiting for those days when you can actually train. People learning need to have certain objectives met, and it's hard to do that when you're in really bad weather, because then you're worried about just keeping yourselves alive and not really getting the training value you want. So that's an issue.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you.

    Jay.

    Mr. Jay Hill: I have one final question, and it flows from my very first questions. On the $128 million in hoped-for savings due to future efficiencies at National Defence Headquarters, am I left to believe that if we were to look next year at the budget of the DND, specifically at the line concerning the budget for National Defence Headquarters, we could see that it's $128 million less than this year? Is that the goal?

    LGen K.R. Pennie: I'm afraid I couldn't answer that question. Certainly the goal would be to take whatever savings we could find and reallocate them inside the department. That's what we're trying to do.

    Mr. Jay Hill: We would have to be able to track it in order to know that had actually happened.

    LGen K.R. Pennie: That will happen; we have an organization that does that.

    In a lot of these efficiency exercises we're working on, they were in training before the report was written. These aren't things that were just dreamed up at the last minute. A lot of them are the residue of what we've been working on over the past ten years. Most of them aren't new, but are things we've been grappling with for quite some time. And the good news is that we have been maturing them and working on them, so we will actually generate some savings at different periods of time. But you're not necessarily going to have each initiative resulting in a saving in that particular year, so you will see it in the next year's budget line. It is going to happen incrementally over time.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you.

    Are there any other questions?

    I want to thank you very much, General, and General Daigle and Mr. Benjamin, for being here today. It has been a very interesting exercise, and we're getting some information that was needed. We look forward to seeing you again in the near future. Thank you.

    The meeting is adjourned.