NDVA Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Monday, December 9, 2002

¹

1530

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Vadm. Ron Buck (Chief of Maritime Staff, Department of National Defence)

¹

1535

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance)

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

¹

1540

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Vadm. Ron Buck

¹

1545

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

Vadm. Ron Buck

¹

1550

Mr. David Price

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

Vadm. Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

Vadm. Ron Buck

¹

1555

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Claude Bachand

Vadm. Ron Buck

º

1600

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Vadm. Ron Buck

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.)

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Robert Bertrand

º

1605

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Robert Bertrand

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP)

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Vadm. Ron Buck

º

1610

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Peter Stoffer

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC)

Mr. Peter Stoffer

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Bob Wood

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

º

1615

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Vadm. Ron Buck

º

1620

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Peter Stoffer

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Bob Wood

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Bob Wood

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Bob Wood

Vadm. Ron Buck

º

1625

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Bob Wood

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Vadm. Ron Buck

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Joe McGuire

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Joe McGuire

º

1630

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Joe McGuire

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Joe McGuire

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

Vadm. Ron Buck

º

1635

Mr. Leon Benoit

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

Vadm. Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.)

Mr. John O'Reilly

The Chair

Mr. John O'Reilly

Vadm. Ron Buck

º

1640

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

Vadm. Ron Buck

º

1645

Mr. Claude Bachand

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

Vadm. Ron Buck

º

1650

The Chair

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Peter Stoffer

Vadm. Ron Buck

The Chair

Vadm. Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

º

1655

Vadm. Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Vadm. Ron Buck

The Chair

Vadm. Ron Buck

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

---

NUMBER 005

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Monday, December 9, 2002

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹  (1530)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I would like to call this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to order. With us today is Vice-Admiral Ron Buck, Chief of the Maritime Staff.

    As is the tradition here, Admiral, on behalf of all of the members, I would like to welcome you once more to the SCONDVA. We're very interested in getting your comments today in terms of the state of the forces, and the state of our maritime forces in particular. We look forward to your comments.

    Again, welcome, and you have the floor.

    Vadm. Ron Buck (Chief of Maritime Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am again pleased to be here before you in my capacity as the Chief of the Maritime Staff, to update you on the subject of Canada's naval forces and the contribution they are making to the country's defence objectives as a component of the combat-capable, multi-purpose Canadian Forces.

    First, I will state that the naval contribution to Operation Apollo has demonstrated yet again the validity of the Canadian task-group concept as a highly effective instrument of our foreign and defence policies. Our task groups and their wide range of capabilities are the result of the navy's determined transformation that started in the 1980s. It is also a testament to the effectiveness of our individual and collective training regimes.

[Translation]

    When we received the order to deploy, the Naval Operational Group was ready to go. We even arrived at our destination a full ten days ahead of schedule. We were the first to reach the theatre of operations despite our lengthy voyage. Of all the allied countries, we had the greatest distance to travel. Obviously, US and UK forces in place prior to September 11 were already there. Since that day, our ships have travelled over 500,000 miles.

[English]

    A large part of the fleet has been deployed, as you know, including both tankers, two of our three operational destroyers, and eight of our twelve frigates. To date, over 3,000 naval personnel have been deployed. Further ships and staff are now preparing to deploy. From an initial surge of six ships, the task group now consists of two frigates, one of them acting as the flagship for the commander. As the flagship, it carries a Canadian commodore and his staff. In his command capacity, he has responsibility for surveillance and control of a large portion of the area of operations, and he controls the warships of up to six other nations, often including American warships.

    Our maritime interdiction efforts continue. We have hailed 11,700 vessels, of which 225 have been boarded. That's fully half of the coalition total.

[Translation]

    We have also escorted countless important vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. Our operational pace, that is the ratio of time spent at sea to time spent on land, is nine to one, the second highest among countries serving in the multinational force.

[English]

    Suspected al-Qaeda members were apprehended mid-summer, a first for allied forces at sea. We are also conducting maritime interdiction operations in support of UN sanctions against Iraq. We have been responsible for intercepting substantial illegal drug, alcohol, oil, and other military shipments.

    These operations are our highest level of theatre operations since the Second World War, and have involved our longest ever at-sea deployments. Moreover, at home we have continued to maintain our domestic sovereignty operations.

    Canada's naval role in the war on terrorism is widely regarded as a key and effective contribution to the campaign. Sustaining it has been quite an achievement by the men and women of Canada's maritime forces, and I am very proud of them. Their expertise, dedication and excellence is often recognized, regrettably more abroad than here at home, but there is both a personnel and financial cost that must be recognized and balanced.

[Translation]

    When I addressed the committee last March, I gave members my assurances that I was determined to see Canada's Naval Forces get the equipment, the respect and the quality of life they deserve. My commitment hasn't wavered, but the challenge is ever greater.

[English]

    Many in Canada opine that we are unable to maintain five to six ships deployed continuously. Canada's navy is small and is not sized to do so. Canada's navy is sized to provide a three- to five-ship task group—as it did—and then to maintain two to three units on an ongoing basis, as we are doing. To do more would be untenable in balancing our personnel tempo, and would be unaffordable within the assigned resources or existing fleet size.

    Our sustainment challenge is also complicated by inflationary pressures, such as rapidly escalating fuel costs, consume resources; some key personnel shortages; and the need to progress transformation to the future. In brief, not only do operations put pressure on personnel and equipment, the current situation is exacerbated by some recruiting shortfalls, inflationary pressures, additional maintenance costs, and costs to transform, for which the navy is not resourced.

    In order to balance the impact upon our personnel and to ensure that we can maintain the required naval capability for the future within the current financial situation, my short-term priorities are to sustain our commitment to Operation Apollo at an appropriate level; to conduct my assigned domestic maritime surveillance missions; to conduct essential individual and collective training, including the required training at sea; plus to introduce the Victoria-class submarines into operational service. However, this will mean a continued juggling of resources and activities.

¹  (1535)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Chairman, the men and women in the Canadian Forces continue to carry the greatest share of the load. This gives Canada a number of options, but nevertheless, the necessary resources must be allocated in order to meet real anticipated costs.

[English]

    I will again refer to my remarks made to you last March. I stated then that I am committed to providing a navy that will serve Canada as a multi-purpose, credible, combat-capable, interoperable force worldwide. That still describes the navy. How much longer that description will hold will depend upon decisions that belong to Canada and Canadians. On behalf of the men and women of Canada's navy, I can say that the level of support voiced by Canadians today is gratifying, but support against expectations must be demonstrated in a tangible, concrete manner.

    Mr. Chairman, thank you. I look forward to any questions the committee may have for me.

    The Chair: Thank you for that very thoughtful presentation, Admiral Buck.

    Mr. Benoit, for seven minutes.

    Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Welcome, Admiral Buck. It's very good to see you here today, and I'm looking forward to your presentation. On behalf of the official opposition and of Canadians, I do want to thank you for the job you're doing in leading the navy. It's very much appreciated.

    My first question is about the agreement that was announced today by the foreign affairs minister and the defence minister, on establishing a committee so that Canada and the United States can work out an agreement to have help from the other country in the case of need. One of the things mentioned by the defence minister in his announcement was the need to coordinate maritime surveillance. If you could, I'd just like you to tell us whether there's likely to be any change in what you do, what the navy does, in the area of maritime surveillance, as a result of the announcement or any other changes. I know it's early to say. The committee is just being set up; it hasn't even been approved by cabinet yet. But as best you can, can you do a projection for us?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Certainly. Thank you.

    Mr. Chair, even before September 11, the relationship between Canadian and U.S. authorities, and particularly between Canada's navy, the United States Navy, and the Canadian Coast Guard, were strong and had many links. That continues to be the case. However, at the national level—the strategic level, if you wish, as opposed to the operational level—the planning group that will be attached to NORAD will allow us to better achieve a better exchange of information and a better ability to assess maritime threats, and will allow us to develop plans and procedures to deal with those threats in a more timely manner.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Are you saying, Admiral, that even before this committee is established, you have a pretty good working relationship with the United States, that information goes back and forth? Are you saying this committee isn't likely to negotiate anything that will have a substantive impact on the way you operate with our American neighbours?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: To answer the first question, the relationship between the navies and with the U.S. Coast Guard will undoubtedly not change. What will change, however, is our ability to exchange information on a broader front, to have standing contingency plans, to deal with a specific range of threats. On a day-to-day basis, however, it will not fundamentally change how we do maritime surveillance or how we actually work at executing a specific mission. This will give us the opportunity to be able to pre-plan at the national level, an opportunity that does not exist today.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: When we were in Colorado Springs, at Cheyenne Mountain and the headquarters of NORAD, we spoke with both General Ken Pennie, the Canadian deputy commander of NORAD, and General Ed Eberhart, the American commander of Northern Command and NORAD. They told us they really feel that with the immense change that has gone on in NORAD, North America is fairly well protected from the air, but that in terms of terrorist attacks, the greatest threats come from ships coming into port with some dangerous substance on board and doing an incredible amount of damage. Of course, most of our major cities in North America are accessible by water. How do you feel about our ability to defend against that? What's needed to improve that ability?

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    Vadm. Ron Buck: The key to dealing with any potential threat to Canada or America, and particularly a maritime threat, is the information or intelligence that there is a threat coming to us. One of the key activities that has happened post-September 11—and which you now see formulated through the planning group—is a better ability to share the totality of that information so that we can have a much more comprehensive picture of what those threats actually are.

    I would hasten to add that it is not just a Canada–U.S. issue, it is also an issue of better sharing of information between various agencies in the United States itself, and also the various agencies and departments of the Canadian government. That process is well in train as well.

    So it's the ability to know that there is a threat there and that this will very much enhance that ability.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Admiral.

    I'd just like to ask about the maritime helicopters. We've been told at committee before, by different people, that the Sea King can perform a function aboard our frigates and destroyers, but how much difference would it make to have a new helicopter on board our naval ships?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Very clearly, the requirement for a new helicopter is predicated on fully exploiting the capability that we have in our existing fleet's frigates, destroyers, and replenishment ships. While the Sea King very clearly has a radar capability, it is dated. It also has a very dated sensor package and other types of detection systems, if you wish. Therefore, the replacement of that helicopter will clearly allow us to be able to fully exploit our search and surveillance capabilities.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Would you say that by putting a new helicopter on board, what each frigate could do, what each naval vessel could do when out on a mission, would be enhanced quite substantially for some missions that we're involved in?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Yes.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you.

    Do I have more time?

    The Chair: In fact, you do, Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: That's amazing, since I'm so used to being cut off. I'm just delighted.

    The Chair: You took me completely by surprise.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    Mr. Leon Benoit: I would like to ask you...the Canadian Alliance and I, as the chief critic, have taken the position from the start that our new submarines were in fact a good buy, and I still believe that. There have been lots of problems in getting them ready to operate and to help us in terms of some real needs that we have, but I would like you to tell us whether or not you think they were in fact a good purchase. Or are they duds, as so many in the media are saying? If they are good vessels, when are we likely to have them operating with our navy?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: The acquisition of the Victoria-class submarines will provide Canada with state-of-the-art diesel-electric submarines at about a quarter of the cost of a new build. In that sense, they will greatly and fully enhance our task group capability, which, in conceptual terms, you may have noted in something called Leadmark. Leadmark basically has a submarine capability in the task group. These submarines have a wide range of capability, both in terms of surveillance off our own coasts and obviously broader afield. They are a good acquisition.

    You have indicated that we have a number of difficulties. In fact, to be precise, there are probably three. There is an issue of a dent in one particular submarine—which frankly is a very minor issue—there is a valve issue, and there is a signal injector issue. All of those are being rectified under contract through the United Kingdom, so in terms of cost, the bulk of the cost of putting these submarines into service is actually not being borne by Canada. We have a contract within which we are operating with the United Kingdom.

    By the way, this is not abnormal in introducing new vessels—submarines or surface ships—into service. In fact, if you were to look at parallel programs around the world, you would see very similar situations. In one particular case, a class of submarines that was built new is still not in full operational service. And by the way, to an extent, we had exactly the same teething problems as we introduced the frigates, yet it is greatly accepted today that the frigates are state of the art and are very effective platforms in everything they do.

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    Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you, Admiral.

    Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. Price, for seven minutes.

    Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you, Admiral, for coming today.

    I think I'll continue a little bit on the submarines, too, but go a little larger.

    On a regular basis, we do exercises with the Americans in the Arctic, particularly in cold-weather operations. If we look at our new Victoria-class submarines, one of the background reasons for why we bought them—and I talked to you about this before—was that we had hydrogen fuel cell technology. There is also an R and D contract out there, so we're looking toward that for the submarines. I would like to hear if there has been any movement ahead on that.

    At the same time, there have been some rumours flying around about the maritime helicopters. One of the cutbacks in trying to reduce costs would be their cold-weather capabilities or their Arctic operations. We've heard there would be cutbacks on de-icing and that type of thing. Could you comment on that and set the record straight?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Certainly.

    Firstly, as it relates to Arctic submarine operations by conventional submarines, for a submarine to operate under ice in the Arctic, it obviously requires the endurance to do so. In terms of a diesel-electric submarine, that endurance is provided by a system generically known as an air-independent propulsion system. There are plans that, in the mid-life of these submarines, we would look at the option of introducing an air-independent propulsion system into the submarines. A number of options are out there. One of them happens to be Canadian. There was an R and D contract, although that has been completed. Those plans remain extant, though, and we are hopeful that if the resources are available, we can move to providing that capability into the Victoria class in the future, such that it would give us a greatly enhanced ability to patrol Arctic waters, particularly under ice.

    As it relates to the maritime helicopter, when I speak about the maritime helicopter in terms of icing conditions, I would tell you that, not just in relation to helicopters but in relation to all of our naval systems because of the parts of the world that we operate in—ranging from the North Arabian Sea through to our Arctic, the North Pacific, and the North Atlantic—our design criteria for both ships and aircraft are some of the most rigorous. In fact, the sea-keeping of our ships is more demanding than that of virtually any other nation. There are no plans to change the operational requirement of the maritime helicopters as it relates to them being able to operate in all weather conditions within which we would expect them and the ships that they're borne on to operate.

    Mr. David Price: As far as the ships are concerned, we're looking at the frigate refits coming up very soon. I'm sure that's in the planning stages now. Since we expect that the maritime helicopter should be coming along very soon, would there be any contingency plans to start looking at how they're going to install those helicopters on the frigates and at the alterations that have to be made?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: The specific modifications that would be made to any ship platform for a specific helicopter obviously must await that particular helicopter and, in particular, the knowledge of what its avionics and sensor suite will be. However, having said that, when the patrol frigates were designed, they were actually designed to accept the largest potential contender of helicopter in terms of its weight and size. Similarly, design plans have been in place for a number of years in terms of that same weight and space issue, in order to make those changes to the Tribal class when required.

    In part, then, that is work that has already been completed as it relates to the frigates, but the final pieces in regard to actual connectivity and interfaces would have to await whatever the final helicopter is.

    Mr. David Price: Of course, on the helicopters of two of the bidding manufacturers, I believe the specs would require that the hangars be made even larger. They weren't large enough to take in the helicopters. That's why I was wondering if plans were underway to at least be prepared to do that once those frigates come in for refits.

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Again, when the frigate was designed, the major design issue was actually the strength of the deck as opposed to helicopter hangar dimensions. Again, those are potential modifications. You would not do the detailed planning for them until such time when you know precisely which platform you are going to embark.

    Having said that, the frigate design in particular was designed to accommodate that full range. That means any physical modifications that have to be made to hangars could indeed be made within that existing hull design.

¹  (1550)  

    Mr. David Price: Do you actually have a timeline for the frigate refits? When would they start?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: For our older ships, we use a refit concept. For our frigates, we use a slightly different maintenance philosophy. They move from what are called “short work periods” to “dedicated work periods” that are not quite as long. They're more frequent, but not as long as refits. They cycle through at approximately the two-year point in each ship's life. Depending on the final schedule as it relates to the maritime helicopter, we would choose at that point when to inject it into the maintenance cycle of the class as opposed to a specific ship.

    Mr. David Price: You mentioned the naval task group before. Since we don't have submarines in there right now, we're looking at losing a couple of ships if we don't get a new shipbuilding program going. Are we still going to be able to maintain a naval task group as designed in the concept that was originally meant to be?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Within assigned resources at the moment, we can sustain it for some number of years ahead. The nominal design life of the Tribal-class destroyers is approximately 2010, but that is referring to the hull and engineering systems, not to the weapons and sensor suite. As you know, the sensor suite is very modern and very comparable and complementary to the frigates.

    In discussions internal to the department, the concept of the need for a command and control and long-range anti-air-warfare capability is accepted internally. The challenge before me is how to provide either that or options to do that in a cost-effective manner in the future.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price.

    Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I'd also like to welcome Vice-Admiral Buck. It's always a pleasure to see him.

    Mr. Chairman, may I just remind everyone that the committee's mandate before the holidays was to assess the level of readiness of Canada's Naval Forces to deploy in the event of a conflict with Iraq. However, before I get to that subject, I'd like to tell the Vice-Admiral that I appreciate as well the tremendous contribution of our Naval Forces to the war effort in Afghanistan. Many Naval Forces members were deployed in the Persian Gulf and many people are exhausted, for many of the same reasons as other forces members, because of the rotations. Forces members are deployed on many missions and ultimately, fatigue sets in.

    In the event of a conflict with Iraq, regardless of whether war is waged under the auspices of the UN or as part of a US- led coalition force, what is the capability of Canada's Naval Forces at the present time?

    Judging from what General Jeffery said last time, there could be up to a six-month delay in deploying our armed forces.

    Can the same be said of our Naval Forces? What kind of capability would they have if, after the holidays, they were asked to participate in a mission against Iraq? Can you give us some idea of the number of vessels that could be deployed to assist in this mission and of the number of navy personnel that could be deployed once again to participate in a mission like the one launched in Afghanistan?

[English]

    Vadm. Ron Buck: The issue of whether or not Canada would be prepared to participate in any hypothetical action against Iraq remains a government decision. That decision has not yet been taken. Therefore, Monsieur Bachand, the question is hypothetical, and I'm always cautious in dealing with hypothetical questions.

    That being said, I did indicate in my opening comments that we have ships in operations now and that we have more preparing. Hypothetically speaking, then, some capability could indeed be provided from a naval perspective. What that would be would depend first and foremost on a Canadian government decision to participate. Secondly, it would then very much depend on the nature of the mission, the nature of the operation. Those are discussions that are not occurring at this juncture, until such time as Canada is in a position to make such a decision.

    So it would be premature for me to comment. And frankly, from an operational security perspective, it would also not be appropriate for me to get into a specific suggestion of what force options might be available from a maritime perspective.

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[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: My next question could be for you, Mr. Chairman.

    Isn't the current mandate of the committee to examine the state of readiness of Canadian Forces in the event of a conflict in Iraq? Wasn't that the committee's mandate for the period leading up to the holidays? And if that's in fact the case, are we not wasting our time here if every time we ask a question, the generals respond that for security reasons, they cannot get into the specifics or even that the government has decision-making authority and that the situation is hypothetical? In your opinion, aren't we spinning our wheels and simply biding our time before the holidays?

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): I think that's an issue for the steering committee to discuss, but you're partly right. We agreed to examine the readiness of our forces -- that was the purpose of this whole exercise -- but we also said that this was something we could not discuss directly at this stage of the game. However, the subject could always be broached by the steering committee.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I see. Then you're saying I'm partly right.

    Continuing on, since we're here to enjoy ourselves, let's have some fun.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): We'll continue for a few more minutes.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, I'd now like the Vice-Admiral to talk to us about submarines. I'd like him to tell us what purpose submarines serve in the context of a war on terrorism. In my view, submarines are ill-suited to waging this kind of war.

    Is the real issue here sovereignty or the presence of naval forces in the Far North? I'd like the Vice-Admiral to comment on this point.

    I'd like to get his reaction to an article that I read a month ago reporting on the fact that 300 naval forces personnel had been sent to England at a cost of several million dollars to receive submarine training and to learn about life on a submarine.

    Did this article accurately report the facts? Are there still naval personnel in England learning manoeuvres or how to pilot a submarine? I'd appreciate an explanation.

[English]

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Mr. Chairman, in response to Monsieur Bachand's first question in relation to the role of submarines, they have a very wide range of roles. Submarines clearly have a role in the surveillance of waters adjacent to Canada and North America. In a previous question, I was asked about patrol and surveillance in terms of maritime threats. Submarines have a huge role to play in that. In fact, they played that role a number of years ago—in that case, the Oberon-class submarines—in relation to a fishing dispute that we had with another nation. In addition, if they had been in operational service, they also could have had a role in the North Arabian Sea. They actually have a wide range of roles that relate directly to sovereignty operations in North America and to a series of operations in support of our surface ships in their capacity both as single ships and as task groups.

    Much like a helicopter can extend capability, the submarine is unseen and clearly can do much the same. Indeed, submarines also have a strategic role. What I mean by “strategic role” is incursions into North American waters that might not fall into the category of an asymmetrical threat, but which might be by some other state. So they have a wide range of capability, and they are very effective at doing that.

    The small crew size is 49 to 50 individuals, as opposed to that of a frigate, which is about 225. So they also have a wide range of capability and are very cost-effective in that sense.

    As for the second question, in acquiring the submarines, part of the contract with the United Kingdom was a commitment by the United Kingdom to provide a significant amount of training to all of the submarine crews and to a number of support specialists. That training was delivered by the United Kingdom under terms of the contract and was paid for as part of the contract. That training was conducted in the United Kingdom, and obviously there were accommodation costs. Over time, we're talking of training approximately 300 personnel, as you've indicated.

    The training is by and large complete. However, we still have two of the submarines in the United Kingdom. One is HMCS Corner Brook, which will be returning to Canada very shortly. Its crew is in the United Kingdom with their submarine. For the fourth of the submarines, HMCS Chicoutimi, some technical specialists from the project management office are resident in the United Kingdom to assist with the overhaul of the submarine prior to Canadian acceptance.

º  (1600)  

[Translation]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

[English]

    Admiral, I guess we could actually say that even when they were over there, the crews were just the crews taken off the Oberon class before. We would have been paying them anyway.

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Yes, the issue is certainly salaries. These are submariners who, by and large, were drawn from the extant submarine force, or they were some new trainees. Clearly, because the training was provided, there was an accommodation and travel cost, and, yes, the country bore that. It was planned for us to bear that cost.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you.

    Mr. Bertrand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    Most of my questions, which had to do mainly with submarines, have been answered.

    I'd appreciate more information about a few points. With respect to the costs mentioned by Mr. Bachand, if memory serves me well, the cost of a submarine was in the neighbourhood of $600 million, with $150 million allocated for training submarine personnel.

    Will you be meeting, or exceeding the projected $750 million budget?

[English]

    Vadm. Ron Buck: In terms of the costs that were projected in terms of training individuals and in terms of those items to be delivered under contract by the United Kingdom, we are basically proceeding largely as planned. In one area, some small growth has arisen because it has taken longer than anticipated to prepare the submarines in the United Kingdom. In that sense, there have been some incremental costs in travel and accommodation. But overall, from a naval perspective, the costs that were projected are by and large tracking as we had anticipated.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: If I understood you correctly, four submarines have been purchased and, as you stated earlier, two are in England. I would assume that the other two are docked here in Canada.

    When do you think the two submarines still in England will be ready to go into service and return to Canada?

[English]

    Vadm. Ron Buck: The third of the submarines, HMCS Corner Brook, will sail for Canada in approximately the middle of January of the new year. I anticipate that the fourth of the submarines, HMCS Chicoutimi, will sail either in late 2003 or early 2004.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: In your opinion, if ever our forces were deployed in Iraq, could the two submarines now docked in Canada be pressed into service by Canada's Navy? Are they combat ready?

[English]

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Again, Mr. Chairman, that is a hypothetical question. If you would recall, one of the issues we are resolving with the United Kingdom concerns what are called diesel exhaust valves. Diesel exhaust valves are very significant pieces of a submarine. It is absolutely fundamental that those valves are fit for service, and we are working through a regime with the United Kingdom, at the U.K.'s cost, to ensure that those valves are fully fit for service. First and foremost, we would wish to have that issue resolved before we would consider putting the submarines into operational service.

    Secondly, I would add that before we actually commit submarines to operational service in terms of an operation, there are tests and trials in terms of our weapons systems and things like that. We would proceed with those first, and those we have not completed. I therefore think it would be premature at this juncture to be talking about when we might be in a position to commit the submarines for operational service.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: I have one last question. I was truly surprised at the cost of training a captain -- I believe that's the proper title -- or a commander. As I recall, the cost was nearly $10 million. I know that the cost of training a CF-18 pilot is about $1.5 million.

    Are these amounts accurate?

º  (1605)  

    Vadm. Ron Buck: I'm not sure of the exact cost.

[English]

What I will say, though, is that unlike when one is qualifying to be a pilot, which is a discrete training activity, a series of qualifications, along with experience with those qualifications, must be gained over time prior to becoming a commanding officer of a warship. One must first train as a junior officer and become what is called an officer of the watch. One then becomes a specialist officer in a warfare sub specialty. One would then become a broader warfare specialist—and we call that qualification an operations room officer. One would then have to qualify in command, and prior to assuming command, one would normally fill the position of second in command, which is a very critical position on a ship. All of that is to say it takes approximately twenty years from the time an individual joins the navy to the time they are ready to assume command, both in a qualification sense and in an experiential sense.

So the cost is indeed high in that context. I would also add, however, that the capability those individuals hold in their hands is the lives of many Canadians, plus a very potent weapons package. Our training standard for qualification to command is viewed around the world as probably one of the best.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: Thank you.

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you, Mr. Bertrand.

    Mr. Stoffer.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank Admiral Buck for appearing today.

    Sir, Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery said last week that it may be time to bring all the troops home from Bosnia in order to give them a rest. In your capacity in the navy, would you concur that it's time to bring home all of our troops from our naval services overseas in order to give them a rest?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: With all due respect, Mr. Chair, I'm not exactly certain those were exactly General Jeffery's words. I know he has been quoted as such or has been reported as saying that; however, when I read the transcript, I read it quite differently.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: So that's a misquote then, sir?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: All I can tell you, Mr. Chair, is that what I read in the transcript would suggest that General Jeffery said something slightly different.

    From my own perspective, I believe the following. Given international obligations, particularly from a maritime perspective, it would not be appropriate to suggest that we withdraw from commitments that we currently have.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: That's exactly what I wanted to hear. Thank you very much.

    Sir, in his "On Target" column in today's Halifax Chronicle-Herald, Scott Taylor wrote a really scathing report on the submarines, as you know. As you also know, in regard to a previous letter that you had written, some people compared what's happening to the submarines to the Westray tragedy. Not only was Admiral Glenn Davidson angry, you, many others, and I were very angry over that.

    One of the concerns, of course, is that a lot of newspaper articles have said we paid $750 million for these submarines, when, in actuality, we didn't pay that. We actually did a sort of contractual services exchange. If I could then, sir, I'd like you to just put on the record exactly how that submarine deal transpired, so that we can get it straight once and for all.

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    First of all, to pick up on your comment about a media report that did compare the acquisition of the Victoria-class submarines to Westray, I'm on record as having responded to the newspaper in question that I felt that comparison had no basis in fact or in any other manner, and that it was in fact unfair to the families of Westray and to the submariners and their families.

    The arrangement with the United Kingdom was that the purchase price of the submarines would be negotiated in terms of offset costs that the United Kingdom was paying Canada for training services provided in western Canada. In addition, there was an incremental cost arising from the need to Canadianize the submarines. We're doing that work in Canada, and of course Canada pays for that directly. But the vast bulk of the cost of the submarines is basically being paid for by having U.K. forces use training facilities in western Canada. In that sense, they're not being paid for directly by Canada.

    As part of our arrangement with the United Kingdom, we also have what, in commercial parlance, would be called a fixed-price contract. Many of the issues that we've been talking about, whether they be hull valves or other issues, are therefore being borne by the United Kingdom at their cost, within that contract. This is the subject of some discussion with the United Kingdom from time to time, because I think it is fair to say it is costing the United Kingdom more than they had anticipated to activate it. But that is not a cost at all to Canada.

º  (1610)  

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you, sir.

    We heard from officials from the Conference of Defence Associations that they're very concerned about the financial concerns and restraints within the military at all levels. One of the concerns that they have is that if the next budget doesn't show some sort of direction in terms of quite an increase in the military budget.... In regard to retention purposes, even the minister himself has said he fears an awful lot of good people will leave the military in the future unless we're able to meet those financial concerns.

    Sir, in your capacity as head of the navy—and I know this is hypothetical and that you don't like to answer hypothetical questions—if the government does not put some form of directional funding into the military in the next budget, can you see an awful lot of good men and women of the navy leaving just out of pure frustration?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: As I indicated in my remarks, the Canadian Forces, and indeed the maritime and naval components of the Canadian Forces, are operating at one of the highest tempos we've seen in many years. They're performing excellent service throughout the world, and are providing options for Canada. Therefore, as I've indicated, as the minister has indicated, and indeed as the Chief of the Defence Staff has indicated, I believe the Canadian Forces are at a crossroads and that expectations placed on the Canadian Forces must be balanced against the resources that are committed to the forces.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Sir, you made one comment about the fact that Canadians in general are very supportive of the men and women, of the troops. You're absolutely bang-on on that.

    I also just want to congratulate you on one thing. It says in your CV that we have here that Persons with Disabilities has asked you to act in the role of champion for them. I just want to congratulate you on acting on behalf of people in this country who have disabilities.

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Thank you, sir.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Elsie has to go, so I'll give her whatever time I have left.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): You have two minutes, Mrs. Wayne.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): I don't know who was next on the government side, but I would ask my colleague—

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: You can take my two minutes.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Go for it.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'm wondering if my colleague on the government side would let me do my seven minutes and then they can do theirs, because I have to go. I would accommodate them if things were the other way around.

    Mr. Bob Wood (Nipissing, Lib.): Oh, well, Elsie, it's me.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Oh, well, then I have no problem at all.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much, Bob.

    An hon. member: [Inaudible—Editor]

    Mr. Bob Wood: I don't want her talking that long.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I won't talk too long, Bob.

    First, Admiral Buck, I want to apologize for being late. Unfortunately, things like what's happening outside here do happen. It's our Christmas dinner and I'm Mrs. Santa Claus.

    I laugh, Mr. Chair, because I have to say that this chap ran into me when I was coming up the stairs and he said, “My heavens, they're talking about ships and you're not there. You never stop talking about ships.” I said, “Yes, and I'm going to talk about ships once again.”

    As you know, our shipyard in Saint John, and the one in Quebec as well, built the frigates. If and when we get a replacement for the Sea Kings, and if the frigates have to be modified and changed to accommodate whatever helicopter we get, I feel very strongly, as you are aware, that we should be building our ships here and we should be modifying our ships here.

    This is something that not only helps the navy, Mr. Chair, it also helps our economy. You have all those workers working at those shipyards, and you have all those companies that have to provide all the parts and everything else required for those ships. It's a two-way, positive effect.

    So if you have to modify these frigates that we have in order to accommodate whatever helicopters we get, where do you think we're going to do it, sir?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: From a Canadian naval perspective, we certainly have a very clearly stated requirement to have a robust ship repair capability in the country. The issue of shipbuilding, however, is a government policy issue. As it relates to modifications required in hangarage or any other arrangements that might be required once the new maritime helicopter arrives, that would be done in the context of a refit or what's called the docking work period, and I would see that work being done in a Canadian shipyard.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Hopefully, it will be the Saint John shipyard. With your help, I'm sure we could do that.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Or maybe the Halifax shipyard.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'll share it with you.

    I also have to say that when it comes to the replacement of the helicopters, we know there has been an announcement that there is going to be a tender going out right after the first of the new year. I thought that tender had already gone out in a split contract, but apparently it didn't—and thank God it didn't. But if we're going to get a replacement for the helicopters, do you feel it should be just the lowest cost, or should it be whatever is best?

    I've been told the EH-101 has three engines. If our men are flying this helicopter and one of the engines collapses, they still have two others. But the other helicopters have one engine. When that engine collapses, the helicopter goes down. So I'm wondering if you feel it should be the lowest cost or if it should be the best for your navy.

º  (1615)  

    Vadm. Ron Buck: I believe the equipment acquired by Canada's military must meet the stated operational requirements. The military states that operational capability. In this particular case, as long as a given helicopter meets that operational capability—including the capability to fly in weather and icing conditions—subject to the environmental areas that we operate in, that is what is required.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I have one last question. I won't be taking my full seven minutes, and Bob can use the rest.

    Last week, Colonel Alain Pellerin made a very observant link between global warming and threats to our national security. He suggested that the waters in the Arctic have become or are becoming increasingly navigable because of global warming. He argued that we simply don't have the resources to increase patrols in the north, mainly because we don't have the resources to patrol our Atlantic and Pacific coastlines either.

    Admiral Buck, would you comment on the opening of the Arctic waterways, and perhaps elaborate a little on what the Canadian navy is doing in the region to patrol and protect it?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Very clearly, we are watching the situation in the Arctic closely. I would suggest that the ability to navigate is very limited at the moment, particularly in the western Arctic, although that is not to say global warming won't change that. We recognize that.

    Over the years, we have been looking at options that we can indeed use to enhance our capability to conduct surveillance in the Arctic, whether it be by naval platform, including submarines, or by fixed systems that are either seabed systems or overhead systems. We continue to monitor that situation very closely, because, indeed, as global warming does or does not occur—and I would suggest that the vote seems to be a little bit out on that at the moment—it is very clearly an area we do have to focus on.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Mr. Chair, I just have one little, short question.

    When it comes to the submarines, Mr. Chair, I'm just a little bit concerned about the fact that when our men over there in London, England, were told they should go out and put this last submarine on a trial basis, they said they were not going. And rightfully so, because when it went out, it took on water. They knew.

    Wouldn't it be better, Admiral Buck, to cancel the lease with the United Kingdom with regard to these submarines and to get our own submarines either built here or buy them brand new, even if we have to buy them from a foreign country? Wouldn't that be better than going through this and putting our men's lives in danger that way?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Firstly, as it relates to submarines proceeding to sea with Canadian crews on them—in this case, I am talking about the Victoria class as we bring them back into service in the United Kingdom—as the U.K. authorities prepare to sail the submarine, I have a number of requirements before we give the go-ahead. The first is a requirement of my submarine technical authorities to ensure that, in all manners, the submarine is technically fit and safe for the sea. Secondly, I require that the commanding officer confirm his confidence to me—and it's not only his confidence, but that of his crew. Notwithstanding what you may have seen to the contrary in the press, at no time were submarines in the United Kingdom sent to sea knowingly in a condition that was unsafe. That has not happened.

    As it relates to your comment about proceeding to a new build, I would suggest to you that examples around the world would show you that, in many ways, you have exactly the same problems when introducing a new class of ship or submarine. Therefore, I would not deem appropriate the suggestion that we proceed in some other direction. At the end of the day, the Upholders or Victoria-class submarines will provide a world-class capability to this country. And I would also add that the teething problems that we're seeing with the Victoria class are not dissimilar to what we saw in introducing the frigates.

º  (1620)  

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you.

    I have to leave.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Actually, Elsie, you went over time with that.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Oh? Well, I would invite all my colleagues to come to our Christmas party.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: What's for dinner?

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Unfortunately, Mr. Wood, we'll probably have to cut your time.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Mr. Wood, the floor is yours.

    Mr. Bob Wood: What's left of it.

    An hon. member: A reindeer jumped all over it, Bob.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Maybe it was an elf.

    Mr. Bob Wood: Admiral, I was reading an article today that talked about the need for Canada to have a military force capable of defending the homeland. I don't know if that's possible. There are fewer maritime patrol planes now because I think some of the Arguses are in for a retrofit, or they're going to be very quickly. As we just saw, long overseas deployments last around 200 days or so, so we have a more and more limited availability of ships to patrol our coasts.

    In your opinion, does Canada—or many nations outside of the United States, for that matter—have a force that is capable of defending its boundaries? Or will the future of all this depend on our allies?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Mr. Chair, as I understood it, the opening part of the question was focused on security. I would make the following point, first and foremost.

    Security is an overarching requirement that any country has. Part of security is defence, but defence is only part of it. As it relates to maritime security, there are a number of issues, including knowing what's in your maritime approaches—in this case—and knowing what threats are in those platforms that are operating. There is a need to have surveillance, to have information, and then ultimately to do something about it. As in the United States, that is not the sole purview of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces in this country. It is a responsibility shared between a significant number of government departments and agencies. The same is true in the United States.

    In answer to a question previously, the most important thing is knowing what's out there, knowing that there is a threat, and then being able to do something about it. The truth of the matter is that in absolute surveillance terms in a maritime sense, a ship is not the best surveillance platform. An overhead system, a wide-area surveillance system, be it an airborne radar system or some other similar system, is actually a better overall surveillance piece.

    Ships have a role, but they are not the primary surveillance asset. They are the interdiction asset. They are the asset that brings things together. Once you know there's a problem there, your ships can actually go out and do something about it.

    So it is not just an issue of the Canadian navy, the Canadian air force, or the Canadian Forces, it is actually a national effort of a very wide number of systems, if you wish. The same is true of the United States and true of any other nation that, in particular, has long coastlines.

    Mr. Bob Wood: Sir, I don't know if you can answer this or not. Given the rapid technological advancements even in the past five years or so, what do you, as the gentleman in charge, see as the military needs for our navy in the future, in the next decade or so? Do you think about those things?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Indeed we do think about them, often in the middle of the night.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

º  (1625)  

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Technology is rapidly evolving, and one of the keys to that technology is information exchange, turning information not just into information but into knowledge, and being able to effectively use that knowledge. In the future as it relates to where we would need to go in a naval sense, we have to ensure that we remain on that cutting edge as much as possible. In many ways, we are there today. We are one of the few nations that is blessed to be able to be there. But the challenge is taking that information remaining in that capability and fundamentally ensuring that you have, in whatever platforms we have in the future, the appropriate mix of capabilities needed to do a wide range of functions.

    I think the one thing that all people in uniform understand is that whatever war we fought yesterday, it's probably not the war we're going to fight tomorrow. The threat of yesterday will probably be a different threat tomorrow. Therefore, the capabilities we need to have to be able to react will have to be relatively widely based, but they will have to be based in a context of being able to deal with the unexpected and to deal with it in a rapid manner.

    That's not a very precise answer to your question. I understand that, but I'm afraid there is no precise answer at this juncture, because this will evolve. We talk often of revolutions. One of the revolutions that's referred to is the revolution in military affairs. In many ways, it's more an evolution, albeit at very high speed. Certainly, the current revolution that we're seeing is largely in the business of information, information sharing, and what we call data fusion, which is taking information from a wide variety of sources and basically bringing it together so that you know the true picture of what you're looking at it, so that you can then make the decisions about what you need to do about it.

    Mr. Bob Wood: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): I think I'll just ask one quick question myself, just to follow up on that.

    Looking at all those sources that you use for gathering that information, if we look at NORAD, which is basically air, they also still have certain assets that do look at the ground. The Americans definitely look at our north. Is that information sharing going on now? Are we pushing information back to them, and are they pushing information to us?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Yes, and that sharing pre-dates September 11 of last year.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you.

    Mr. McGuire.

    Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to go back to Mr. Wood's first question.

    Who has the primary responsibility for coastal surveillance and protecting our sovereignty? Is it the navy? The air force? Who is...?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: From a Canadian Forces perspective, bearing in mind that the Canadian Forces do not have total responsibility for surveillance of the maritime approaches, they do have a portion of that responsibility. In the way in which that is executed within the Canadian Forces for the maritime component, air assets—normally speaking, the Aurora aircraft—are under the operational control of the naval commanders on both coasts. Both of those commanders build what is called an integrated surveillance plan, of which maritime patrol aircraft and other assets are a part. The naval commanders execute the Canadian Forces part of that plan, utilizing both our own resources, coast guard resources to an extent, and indeed other government department resources from time to time, but also specifically air force aircraft.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: How do you and the Canadian Coast Guard interact? Is it daily and directly?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: We have direct, daily interaction, in addition to our other connections. As you are aware, there are three search and rescue regions in this country, with a central region driven out of Trenton. In the Atlantic and Pacific regions, the headquarters for the search and rescue forces in each region are actually co-resident in the naval headquarters in Halifax and Victoria. In fact, both admirals on the two coasts are the regional search and rescue commanders. It is a facility jointly manned by Canadian Forces personnel and Canadian Coast Guard personnel, so that interaction is done daily in the conduct of search and rescue.

    When we are dealing with some other type of asymmetric threat, the Canadian Forces will normally develop a coordination plan with the other agencies and government departments, in this case including the Canadian Coast Guard. We will collectively build up a plan, and under the appropriate leadership of the lead department that has the jurisdictional responsibility, we will then execute that plan.

    So our relationship with Canadian Coast Guard at the working level is very close and happens on a day-to-day basis.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: The coast guard is saying they don't really have the resources to do their job. In the House, we've had a special debate on the readiness of the coast guard to perform its functions.

    I see that the United States Coast Guard is looking at small, swift vessels, as is the United States Navy. The American navy is also looking at smaller vessels that are able to intersect drug dealers or whatever. They're also looking at unmanned airplanes and so on to help them in enforcing sovereignty in the United States. Do we have on the planning board, on the drawing board, any plans to really beef up? Just on the Atlantic side, we have a huge coastline, and it appears that we come nowhere close to enforcing or supervising illegal fishing, drug running, or all sorts of illegal activities. What do you really need to do the job there?

º  (1630)  

    Vadm. Ron Buck: As it relates to issues relating to resources in the Canadian Coast Guard, I think I'll leave it to the Commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard to answer.

    However, I would point out that the Canadian Coast Guard and the United States Coast Guard are very, very different organizations. The mandate of the two organizations is different. The United States Coast Guard is a military force, among other things. The Canadian Coast Guard is not a military force. It does not have jurisdiction to the degree that the U.S. Coast Guard has it, because it has a different mandate.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: It's not military, though, is it?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: It is effectively a merchant-marine-manned organization.

    I'm often asked questions about the difference between the Canadian Coast Guard and the Canadian navy.

    There are three major differences. One, our organization, the Canadian Forces, and in this case the navy, is a military organization. Two, the Canadian Coast Guard is not a military organization but is largely based on the merchant marine. And three, our mandates are extremely different.

    Mr. Joe McGuire: Thank you.

    The Chair: Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Admiral, when you were answering the question about the modifications that would have to be made to the frigates to accommodate new helicopters, you said the frigates had in fact been designed to accommodate the largest helicopter. Isn't it true that the frigates were designed to accommodate the EH-101?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: At the time the frigates were built, the indications were that the replacement maritime helicopter would indeed be the EH-101, but the EH-101 was used largely because it was representative of effectively the largest helicopter that potentially would be a possible contender. That's why the decision was taken to stress the flight deck, for example, for a 30,000-pound helicopter.

    What was not done in the frigate design was any major modification to the hangar or interfaces that might be required, because we did not know precise design measurements and things like that at the time. Clearly, if you're going to do modifications to a ship, you want to make sure you're only doing them once, as opposed to trying to guess what you might be doing.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: With the Sea Kings on board the frigate.... I started this line of questioning before, but I'd just like to ask whether or not, in any mission the navy has been involved in over the past five years, the unreliable nature of the Sea King—not being able to leave deck at an appropriate time, or some other problem caused by the Sea King simply not being available when you need it—has endangered missions. Is that likely over the next years as the Sea King is still on-board the frigates? Isn't it likely to jeopardize future missions, and certainly some particular missions?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Very clearly, as we look at the missions that we undertake, we ensure that those missions are suitable to the capability that we're bringing. When we're looking at deployment of a task group or ships, part of that is very clearly the helicopter capability that we bring to the table.

    As for the Sea Kings themselves, you often hear about 30 hours of maintenance for each hour of flying. In the minds of most members of the Canadian public, I think that leaves the idea that every time you land a Sea King on the deck of a ship, you have to do another 30 hours of maintenance before you fly it again. In practice, that maintenance that you're talking about is maintenance amortized over the life of the platform. Some of that is what's called depot-level or, in ship terms, refit-type maintenance. If I could give you a parallel example, an F-14 takes approximately 44 hours of maintenance per flying hour.

    So for these aircraft, grosso modo, the maintenance profile today is not largely different from when they were designed. Very clearly, however, we do not put our ships, the men and women on our ships, or indeed our aircraft, into a mission in which they would be put at risk by not having the appropriate capability.

º  (1635)  

    Mr. Leon Benoit: Have you rejected missions because of the Sea King being the helicopter on board, as opposed to having a brand new helicopter?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Again, that's a hypothetical question. In many cases, without knowing what the capability of the new replacement maritime helicopter is, it would be a bit speculative to comment.

    The truth of the matter is that we knowingly assess missions because there are capabilities, whether it be a Sea King or its replacement, that you would not put it into—because either the crew is not trained to do the job, the equipment isn't on board, or whatever. Again, it's very much a hypothetical question, but we have not knowingly committed individuals to any mission, ships, or helicopters, when they don't have the equipment to do the job.

    Mr. Leon Benoit: But my question was whether or not there have been missions in the past that the Canadian navy simply hasn't been able to do or that you've decided not to do because we have the Sea King on board, as opposed to a much more capable new helicopter.

    Vadm. Ron Buck: In terms of overall mission, no. There has never been a commitment, certainly since 1990, that we have purposely decided not to participate in, from a naval perspective, that was in any way related to the Sea King.

    The Chair: Thank you, Admiral Buck.

    Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

    Mr. O'Reilly.

    Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you for recognizing me. And welcome back. I'm glad to see you've come back and restored order here. Things got a little out of control while you were gone. One member came in after not being here for the presentation, someone then gave his time to her, and now she's gone again after making a whole bunch of comments that didn't make any sense.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    Mr. John O'Reilly: And we didn't have unanimous consent to do that. So I think the other chair is still blowing in the past.

    The Chair: Mr. O'Reilly, you're eating into your time here.

    Some hon. members: Hear, hear! Oh, oh!

    Mr. John O'Reilly: I think the witness we have with us today is very credible. I've been with him on a number of occasions, good, bad, and indifferent, on some of the things we've been to.

    The thing I want to know about first of all is how our recruitment campaign is affecting the navy. Is it on line? Is it coming up? Is it below expectations?

    Of course, then there is the six-month rotation and what kind of stress it has on the personnel, given the high level of it. I've been at events at which a ship is coming in, and they're a lot different from when one is going out. However, every sailor I've met has said they're there to sail, so let's get this thing away from the dock so they can get on with it. They all seem to have that view, but it's a pretty high tempo right now.

    I wanted some comments on that, as well as on your twenty-year planning model. Could you comment on what you see as the navy of the future and on what you're gearing toward?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    First and foremost, as it relates to recruiting, I believe members of the committee know we have had a very ambitious recruiting campaign underway for approximately a year and a half now. From a naval perspective, the trends are moving in the right direction. Certainly as they relate to key technical trades, those are doing extremely well.

    There is one challenge that we have from a naval perspective, however—and this was a comment I made in my opening remarks about Canadians probably not fully understanding completely what their navy does. Some of our operator trades have somewhat esoteric names, like naval combat information operator, naval electronic sensor operator, or naval communicator. In some cases, the descriptions of those occupations or trades are not self-evident in terms of what the individuals do. If you say the trade or occupation bo'sun, I think most Canadians intuitively understand that it's a seaman.

    Our recruiting advertising to date has not been focused specifically on the navy, on these operator trades. This is an area in which we still have a shortfall. To redress that, the advertising campaign that is scheduled for the first of the year will focus specifically on those naval occupations.

    So from a technical perspective, we're doing quite well. Overall, the trend is in the right direction, but a number of occupations or trades are indeed still short. That clearly has some impact on our ability to do things, since the navy is short by some number of hundreds of individuals in a navy of approximately 9,000.

    As it relates to the operational tempo, indeed the operational tempo is high. As I've indicated in other fora in the last year, we've deployed twelve of the eighteen ships in our major warship fleet. By any stretch of the imagination, that is a significant undertaking.

    That being said, I would make the following point. Navies historically do deploy for relatively long periods. Even before September 11, naval units and task groups would regularly deploy for three or four months at a time. So the concept of long deployments per se is not abnormal to the navy. What is abnormal, of course, is that these deployments have been more in the range of six to seven and a half months.

    As I believe most members of the committee may be aware, we have a policy saying that once we commit an individual to such a major deployment, we normally do not send them back to sea in a major deployment sense for another year. If we have to do that, we have a procedure called waivers, whereby the individual effectively agrees to go. We don't actually get their permission in that context, but we make an assessment and it's generally a volunteer.

    If I can give you an example today of the 2 ships deployed and the number of staff supporting them—from a navel perspective, we're talking about 600 or so people deployed at the moment—there are 4 waivers. I would suggest to you that this is quite a manageable number. That's not to suggest, however, that we are taking this lightly. We are tracking individuals when they return from deployment to ensure that we can balance the personnel tempo, as we call it. In that context, I would suggest that we're not in bad shape at the moment, but it is something that normally we monitor on an ongoing basis.

    The third part of your question relates to where the navy is going in terms of capability, as I understood the question. We've talked about the maritime helicopter. That's a key piece, and we're proceeding with that.

    Next on my priority list is replacing the existing replenishment ships, HMCS Preserver and HMCS Protecteur. When they were built in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these ships combined in one platform an ability to fuel ships, provide electronic and other spares, provide food, and provide water. At the time, no other navy in the world did that; they had different ships playing each of those roles. Ours were groundbreaking at the time. Clearly, though, they are now getting old and we need to replace them. They are first and foremost in terms of what I desire to replace.

    The good news is that, by and large, these ships are actually of commercial design. They're not hugely complex in terms of a typical warship. Subject to resource availability, there could be an option to enhance the capability in these ships by adding to them the potential to be able to do some strategic sealift of equipment—a subject on which there has been much debate in the press of late. Of course, that would depend on resource availability.

º  (1640)  

    I'm then focused upon incrementally enhancing the capability in the frigates to keep them current and world-class. Then, as I indicated in a question earlier, I'm looking at options for how we would replace the command and control capability and the longer-range anti-air-warfare capability that is currently resident in the Tribal-class destroyers. Along with that, on a smaller dollar scale, I also wish to ensure that we can enhance the capability of the maritime coastal defence vessels to further enhance coastal patrol surveillance.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Admiral.

    Thank you, Mr. O'Reilly.

    Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    In response to one of my questions, the Vice-Admiral noted that submarines were used for a wide range of missions. A growing number of naval officers and personnel are speaking to me about the importance of maintaining a presence as part of surveillance operations in the Arctic, among other things.

    Could the Vice-Admiral tell us whether, in his opinion, our patrols in the Arctic and our submarine operations in the Far North are important? Would these be deemed important missions?

[English]

    Vadm. Ron Buck: As a Canadian, I believe an ability to provide adequate surveillance in the Arctic is indeed important. Like everything else in this country, of course, you must balance capability against resources. As the Canadian Forces and as a navy, we have long been focused on ensuring that, over time, we could enhance our capabilities to conduct surveillance in the Arctic. In particular, if global warming does not occur as some are predicting it will, the ability to be able to operate under ice, in a submarine sense, would continue to be critical.

º  (1645)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to know what the Vice-Admiral thinks about the idea of conducting patrols under the polar cap.

    Many people have told me that because they have electric diesel engines, Upholder submarines must surface regularly. For the Vice-Admiral's benefit, let me just clarify that I'm talking about submarines with AIPS, or air-independent propulsion systems.

    Many people have said that unless we acquire submarines with air-independent propulsion systems, a feature that would add $500 million to the cost of each submarine, our Navy will never be able to carry out the kind of important mission you just talked about. The submarines would not have the capability to navigate under the polar cap.

    If submarines cannot navigate under the polar cap, how will they carry out their mission? Barring any hidden costs, Canadian taxpayers will be on the hook for an additional two billion to outfit submarines with the AIPS system.

[English]

    Vadm. Ron Buck: As part of the acquisition of the Victoria-class submarines, one of the intentions over time was to provide an air-independent propulsion system in the mid-life update of the submarines. That plan still remains as part of the long-range capital plan.

    It would be premature to discuss today the exact amount that would cost, because, first of all, it is sometime in the future. This is an evolving technology. There are a number of options for how one could do air-independent propulsion, but we would only do it in the context of when we were already planning a very major mid-life update to the class of submarines. In other words, we would wish to minimize the cost to do that.

    Like everything else, that capability does have a dollar cost attached to it. The exact amount remains to be seen, and all of that will obviously be subject to the resources that are available to the department and the Canadian Forces.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Therefore, if I understand correctly, until such time as we invest in an AIPS, we won't be assigning any new Canadian submarines to patrol duty under the polar cap. As things currently stand, that would be impossible.

[English]

    Vadm. Ron Buck: That is correct.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Do I still have some time remaining?

[English]

    The Chair: Yes.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Vice-Admiral, when we toured the Washington Military Institute, many people told us that the era of super vessels was over and that from now on, countries would be looking to acquire much smaller vessels that were easier to manoeuvre. Aircraft could take over the job of patrolling our coasts.

    It is my understanding that some of your CP-140s are already doing patrols. There is even talk of having unmanned aircraft patrol the coast.

    We're a mere step away from having some people declare that are naval resources have become obsolete. Army and air force generals probably feel that the navy serves no purpose and that we would be better off investing in ground and air forces.

    What do you think of the generals' views on the subject?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to thank Mr. Bachand for his questions.

[English]

Not surprisingly, however, I would not agree.

    A discussion about the appropriate platforms needed to conduct a range of missions is really the issue. I said earlier that in terms of wide-area surveillance, the most effective platform is not a ship. A ship platform has a surveillance capability, but it also has a capability to interdict.

    The size and type of ship would depend on the mission assigned to Canada's navy and the Canadian Forces. Currently, in today's context, we have a wide range of roles and missions, ranging from coastal patrol and surveillance to interdiction in a sovereignty sense, through to some of our higher-intensity operations that we are conducting with our coalition forces elsewhere around the world.

    As I indicated in answer to a previous question, the challenge is ensuring that you have a force mix—and in this case I mean a Canadian Forces force mix that would include land forces, air forces, and naval forces—that would give you the spectrum of capability needed to meet whatever operations the country wished its military to conduct. In terms of pure surveillance missions, you would clearly wish for a mix of platforms. Some of them would be air and some of them would be naval, but in the wider mix of capabilities and operations that you would be involved in, you would probably need a different mix. For example, in terms of our ability to conduct task group operations, to command and control other forces—in this case, I would include not just coalition forces, I would include U.S. forces if we were operating in a combined manner to prosecute a mission that was endangering the sovereignty of North America—I would suggest that it would be a very essential capability. Now, whether or not that is in a destroyer hull remains to be seen.

    Of interest too is the fact that while there is an argument in the United States for smaller ships, indeed I would point out, Mr. Chair, that our destroyers—or what we currently call destroyers—are actually sized as frigates. In a displacement sense, they're only 250 tonnes larger than the Canadian patrol frigates. By U.S. standards, they're not large ships at all.

º  (1650)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

    Are there any further questions from the government side? No?

    Mr. Stoffer.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you.

    Admiral Buck, I just have a couple more questions.

    In terms of the new frigate class, how many did Canada actually build altogether?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Canada built twelve Canadian patrol frigates. Nine were built by Saint John Shipbuilding, and the remaining three were built by MIL Davie, outside of Quebec City.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Have they all seen active service?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: They've all seen active service. Not all, however, have deployed on Operation Apollo. Eight of the twelve have deployed to Apollo, along with two replenishment ships and two of the three destroyers.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: In newspaper articles, we read a lot about the fact that we have some of them up in dry dock. As has been reported about our CF-18s, we have robbed Peter to pay Paul and have taken parts from one plane and put them in another. Are we doing that with the frigates?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Maintenance of a ship class is always done by class. That means that in a ship class of twelve ships, we always have some ships planned into maintenance, because it's cyclical and it takes a number of months to do. As a ship is in a maintenance period, key systems are often removed and returned to manufacturers to undergo what is called third-line R and O, or repair and overhaul. That continues to happen.

    At times—and well before September 11—in terms of an urgent need that arises from time to time, we do actually transfer a spare from one ship to another, but it is always done such that the next spare coming out of the pipeline goes back to the ship that the first spare was drawn from. That is really normal business, and we are certainly not, in a huge manner, denuding some ships to be able to maintain our capability in Operation Apollo.

    Mr. Peter Stoffer: Very good, sir.

    As my last question, I have a lot of friends who are overseas right now on these various frigates. Some of them are my neighbours. Because this is televised and I'm sure they will be watching this with bated breath, if you were to send one Christmas message to all our men and women overseas right now, I'd like to give you the opportunity to go right ahead and do so.

    Vadm. Ron Buck: May I, Mr. Chair?

    The Chair: Absolutely, Admiral.

    Vadm. Ron Buck: To all of Canada's men and women in the Canadian Forces deployed, from myself, from the leadership of the Canadian Forces, and indeed from the Canadian people, you are demonstrating your excellence on a day-to-day basis and you are making a difference, and Canadians know and understand that. Bravo Zulu.

    Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

    The Chair: Admiral, I think all of the committee members would share those sentiments.

    Monsieur Bachand, do you have any further questions?

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I have one last quick question, Mr. Chairman, concerning the air-independent propulsion system.

    Would the submarine need to be retrofitted in order to install this type of system?

[English]

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Yes, it would. In effect, you would be enlarging the submarine, because you would be adding to the submarine a piece of equipment that, depending on which type you did, is relatively large in size. You would therefore have to physically increase the size of the submarine. In the naval vernacular, the term that refers to adding something to the hull is called “adding a plug”, because it's actually an incremental piece of the hull. Again, then, that is one of the reasons you would only undertake such an activity around a very major, scheduled maintenance period, in any event.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Then, the $750 million figure is only an initial quote. If we truly want to equip our submarines for navigation under the polar cap, taxpayers will undoubtedly be facing additional costs down the road.

º  (1655)  

[English]

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Mr. Chair, from a Canadian perspective, I would suggest that the requirement for air-independent propulsion is often highlighted in the context of an ability to do under-ice operations. As well, from a normal operational perspective, it is something we would be looking at in any event, because the ability for a submarine not to have to surface to recharge batteries in any operational context is a great enhancement to that submarine's capability.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you.

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

    Are there any further questions from the government side? No?

    I have one quick question for you, Admiral, and it relates to a conversation I had not long ago, concerning mobilization plans. This individual indicated to me that if the Canadian Forces were to mobilize, then as far as he was aware, there was no mobilization plan for the navy. There were others for the army and perhaps for the air force, but nothing for the navy. Can you comment on that?

    Vadm. Ron Buck: In terms of mobilization, the key is not just to have individuals, it's to have trained individuals and, just as importantly, to have the equipment for them to operate. The long lead item, generally speaking and from a naval perspective, is in fact not recruiting particularly in the context of a national emergency, but in the context of having the required fleet size. In that context, yes, we do have modest plans to be able to enhance the force structure. Those plans are largely based on the reserves. But the bigger issue would be how you actually grew the appropriate naval capability over time, in terms of ship construction and issues like that. In fact, the situation in the Second World War was quite illustrative of exactly that.

    The Chair: On behalf of all of the members of the committee, Admiral, thank you again for being here today and for sharing your thoughts with us on some pretty key issues as we go into a pretty interesting period in our world's history as far as the Middle East is concerned, and in terms of some of the issues relating to the general operational readiness of the Canadian Forces.

    Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

    Vadm. Ron Buck: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: The meeting is adjourned.