NDVA Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, November 6, 2003

Á

1110

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Hon. John McCallum (Minister of National Defence)

Á

1115

Á

1120

Á

1125

Á

1130

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George—Peace River, Canadian Alliance)

Á

1135

Hon. John McCallum

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Hon. John McCallum

Á

1140

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Hon. John McCallum

Mr. Rodney Monette (Assistant Deputy Minister, Finance and Corporate Services, Department of National Defence)

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Mr. Rodney Monette

The Chair

Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.)

Hon. John McCallum

Á

1145

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien (Labrador, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Á

1150

The Chair

Hon. John McCallum

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

Á

1155

The Chair

Hon. John McCallum

The Chair

Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.)

The Chair

Â

1200

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

The Chair

Hon. John McCallum

Â

1205

General Raymond R. Henault (Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence)

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC)

Â

1210

Hon. John McCallum

Â

1215

The Chair

Mr. Alan Williams (Assistant Deputy Minister, Materiel, Department of National Defence)

The Chair

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)

Hon. John McCallum

Â

1220

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Mr. David Price

Hon. John McCallum

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

Â

1225

Hon. John McCallum

Â

1230

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Hon. John McCallum

Mr. Alan Williams

The Chair

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.)

Hon. John McCallum

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Â

1235

Hon. John McCallum

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Hon. John McCallum

Mr. Rodney Monette

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Hon. John McCallum

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Hon. John McCallum

Mr. Rodney Monette

Hon. John McCallum

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Â

1240

Hon. John McCallum

Mr. Rodney Monette

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Mr. Alan Williams

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Mr. Alan Williams

Mr. Robert Bertrand

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Hon. John McCallum

Â

1245

The Chair

Mr. Alan Williams

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. David Price

Hon. John McCallum

Mr. Alan Williams

Â

1250

The Chair

Mr. Alan Williams

Mr. David Price

Hon. John McCallum

Gen Raymond R. Henault

Â

1255

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

·

1300

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Hon. John McCallum

The Chair

Hon. John McCallum

·

1305

The Chair

Hon. John McCallum

The Chair

Mr. Alan Williams

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

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NUMBER 043

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Thursday, November 6, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Á  (1110)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to order.

    On behalf of the members of the committee, Minister, I'd like to welcome you here today.

    I would like to welcome as well Mr. Alan Williams, ADM, Materiel, and the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Ray Henault.

    We are here to discuss the supplementary estimates

    Minister, I understand you have a statement.

    Before we get into that statement, though, I would like to advise committee members that I would like to take about 5 to 10 minutes at the end of this meeting to update members on the issue of future committee business as it relates to the proposed trip to the United States in connection with our study of Canada-U.S. defence relations.

    So, Minister, without any further delay, perhaps we could get right into your statement.

    Hon. John McCallum (Minister of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, committee members, ladies and gentlemen. I am certainly familiar with the good work this committee has done in the past, as well as with your ongoing work, including your current study on Canada-U.S. defence relations, and I look forward to continuing to work with you on these issues.

    Today I will give you an account of my department's activities and priorities over the past year. I will focus on four main topics: our ongoing domestic and overseas missions; our commitment to our people;

[Translation]

    measures to put Defence's financial house in order; finally, actions to meet the challenges of the future, particularly the need to rethink continental defence and to pursue a more strategic approach to equipment purchases.

[English]

    While there's always more work to do, overall I'm pleased with the progress we've made on these fronts over the past 12 months.

    My first responsibility as Minister of National Defence is to ensure that Defence delivers on its core mandate, that is, our ongoing domestic and overseas missions.

[Translation]

    On the home front, over the past few months, the Canadian Forces have responded to natural disasters with great alacrity and efficiency—and to the total satisfaction of the provincial governments that were involved. In particular, some 2,600 Canadian Forces members were deployed to British Columbia to help fight the forest fires, while more than 1,000 military personnel helped deal with the aftermath of Hurricane Juan in Halifax.

[English]

    We also moved quickly with a $100-million advance payment to British Columbia under the disaster financial assistance arrangements program. Premier Campbell stated, and I quote, “...our emergency officials said this is the fastest they've ever seen a response to these sorts of circumstances...”.

    Working with our own officials and provincial governments, I intend to make rapid payments the norm rather than the exception.

    Turning now to overseas missions, nearly 2,000 Canadian soldiers are serving with the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. They are conducting security patrols, helping the local army and police, and facilitating much needed humanitarian relief.

    The grief of the nation was palpable following the deaths of Sergeant Robert Short and Corporal Robbie Beerenfenger. They died on a mission of vital importance to Canada in terms of both Canadians' longstanding commitment to help troubled nations and our country's willingness to step up to the plate in the campaign against terrorism.

    The government, of course, is absolutely determined to carry on with this mission. Once again, I stress my personal commitment to spare neither money nor effort to ensure that the army has the tools to do the job in Kabul.

    Early next year the Chief of the Land Staff, Lieutenant General Rick Hillier, will take over command of the entire ISAF force. As the first Canadian lieutenant general to command an international mission since the Suez crisis, I am confident that General Hillier will do an outstanding job.

[Translation]

    I should also remind you that the navy has done outstanding work in the Gulf region in its two-year marathon following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The air force has been in that theatre continuously, and its work is vital to the success of our mission. As well, some 1,500 Canadian Forces members continue to do a very good job in Bosnia, the Middle East and Africa.

Á  (1115)  

[English]

    Canadians can take pride in the fact that we're living up to Canada's Pearsonian tradition. Our main focus is now Afghanistan, a place where Canada has critical mass and where National Defence is working with Foreign Affairs and CIDA to make a real and positive difference in that country.

    People, as always, are at the core. It is our people who will ultimately determine our success or failure.

[Translation]

    Early in my time as minister, with little previous exposure to the military world, I became hugely impressed with our rank and file soldiers, sailors, and airmen and women: their professionalism, their courage and their unvarnished attitude of service to Canada. So from the outset, I have certainly aimed to do my best for them.

    This task was made easier for me because in recent years the government has made great strides in improving the quality of life of our military members and their families. This committee will be aware of these improvements, as you were intimately involved in bringing many of them about.

[English]

    Over the past year, my own personal priority on people has been to reinforce the government's commitment to treat rank and file members of the Canadian Forces with dignity and respect. I believe Canada is blessed with one of the best systems in the world in this area, as well as a committed military and civilian leadership.

    I also believe, however, that in any large system there is always a risk that the little person will fall through the cracks, and we have taken action to prevent this. Earlier this year, for example, we brought forward legislation to expand insurance coverage to all regular and reserve force members of the Canadian Forces, regardless of rank, for accidental dismemberment while on active duty. No longer is it the case that a Canadian Forces member must hold the rank of colonel or higher to be entitled to a payment of some $250,000 for the loss of limbs while on active duty. With the passing of this legislation last spring, this anomaly was corrected, not only prospectively but also retroactively to 1972. I thank all political parties, indeed all parliamentarians, for their assistance in the rapid passage of this bill in both chambers.

    A good gauge of the system's respect for the rank and file is the speed and transparency with which the system handles grievances. To say that the department's historical performance in this area has been less than stellar is to understate the reality. That is why, thanks in part to advice from former Chief Justice Antonio Lamer, I have committed to the total elimination of the grievance backlog within one year, as well as the institution of measures to prevent similar delays from occurring in the future.

    The necessary resources have been allocated, and I will receive monthly progress reports to make sure this commitment is honoured. I thank the Chief of the Defence Staff, the director general of the Canadian Forces grievance authority, and the acting chair of the Canadian Forces grievance board for their full cooperation on this important issue.

    The government is also committed to ensuring that our men and women in uniform are taken care of, have confidence in their future, and are appropriately compensated for their service.

Á  (1120)  

[Translation]

    That is why we are now in the process of modernizing the pension legislation for Canada's military. These new changes will, among other things, shorten the minimum period of time required to qualify for a pension benefit from ten years to two years; improved pension benefits for survivors; and provide coverage for our reservists.

    Last April, we opened the Canadian Defence Academy to help develop the leadership skills, professional knowledge and management abilities that will be required of Canadian Forces leaders.

    I've also put in place an Education Advisory Board to advise me whether the Canadian Forces are on the right track and to recommend new initiatives. The board consists of a dream team of highly qualified people, and I am confident it will do a fine job.

[English]

    I come now to budgetary matters. Before the last budget, the Department of National Defence had a $12-billion budget and a $13-billion program—not a sustainable proposition. To close this $1-billion gap, I requested and received an additional $800 million in base funding in the last budget. This was a 7% increase in our base budget, the largest such increase in over a decade.

    I knew that in order to get that kind of increase I had to offer something up. So I committed to find the remaining $200 million through reallocating our own resources from lower- to higher-priority areas. I'm very pleased to report to the committee today that I am delivering in full on this commitment.

    Two weeks ago I announced $128 million in annual administrative savings that will be fully implemented in fiscal year 2005-06. The remainder of my $200-million commitment will come from the retirement of our Leopard tanks and other military hardware, such as the Javelin air defence system, equipment that is no longer particularly relevant. One of our destroyers, which has been effectively out of service for several years, will also be formally retired.

    I believe in reallocation. Partly this is because I know that without my $200 million in reallocation, National Defence would have received an amount in the order of $300 million, rather than $800 million in the last budget.

[Translation]

    More important, I embrace reallocation philosophically. Just as companies have a responsibility to shareholders to reinvent themselves continuously, so too governments owe it to taxpayers to shift resources from lower to higher priorities in an ongoing, never-ending process. Certainly, if I have the opportunity to propose a future budget increase as Defence Minister, it will be accompanied by a substantial commitment to further internal reallocation.

[English]

    I come now to my fourth priority for Defence, and that is to position the department and the Canadian Forces to meet the challenges of the future. These challenges arise from fundamental change in both the security environment, as terrorism replaced Communism as our principal threat, and the rapid pace of change in military technology.

    For National Defence to succeed in the future, we must embrace this fundamental change in all aspects of our work. In my remaining time I will focus on two areas—rethinking continental defence and implementing a more strategic approach to equipment purchases.

    The attacks of September 11, 2001, changed both the North American security landscape and the U.S. security mentality. The U.S. has fundamentally altered its outlook and approach to its own defence and the defence of its citizens. In my view, this is a lasting, not a transitory, change in America's view of its security, and Canada needs to recognize this reality.

    If Canada is to preserve a meaningful role in continental defence, not to mention a solid overall partnership with our southern neighbour, then we must be prepared to embrace change in the Canada-U.S. defence relationship. We must be prepared to rethink our approach to continental defence.

    NORAD is our principal vehicle for binational continental defence. The NORAD agreement is scheduled for renewal in 2006. While I am not in a position to present a comprehensive blueprint for renewed Canada-U.S. defence relations, I will highlight two sets of actions that will have a bearing on such a plan.

    The Binational Planning Group was created last December, and it has been at work for several months. The planning group is looking at ways to improve the coordination of Canadian and U.S. maritime surveillance, intelligence sharing, and threat assessments in order to help prevent terrorist attacks and improve contingency planning to respond to such attacks.

    The planning group envisages joint Canada-U.S. training exercises as well as the possibility of enhanced naval cooperation. Both Secretary Rumsfeld and General Eberhart, who is CINC NORTHCOM and NORAD, are pleased with these developments. I believe it is in Canada's interest to pursue them vigorously in the lead-up to renewal of the NORAD agreement.

    The government is also exploring options with the United States with regard to Canadian participation in continental missile defence. While no decision has been made, I believe Canadians are better off inside the tent.

Á  (1125)  

[Translation]

    It is clear that if Defence is to embrace change, our management and our decision-making must be innovative, strategic and decisive. Certainly that was the view expressed in the recent report of the efficiency committee that I released and endorsed enthusiastically two weeks ago. And that is the direction in which the department has been heading over the past 12 months.

    For example, in the spending of this year's 800 million-dollar budget increase, funds were directed to where they were most needed for sustainability and transformation. They were allocated disproportionately and asymmetrically to the capital budget, the army, recruiting and training programs, and support to the reserves.

[English]

    Defence's long-term strategic capability investment plan, or SCIP, as it's known locally, is another tangible demonstration of the type of management and decision-making that is required to prepare the Canadian Forces for the challenges of the future.

    In the past, capital investment planning has been very much a bottom-up exercise. Proposals emerged from proponents in the navy, the army, and the air force. Inevitably, the sum of these projects exceeded the budget by a very large margin. This year we moved to a much more strategic top-down approach, in an atmosphere of greater financial predictability.

    As a consequence of the $800 million budget increase, not only has it been possible to increase the annual capital budget by $160 million, but also progress toward the achievement of sustainability in the overall budget has resulted in much greater stability and predictability for the capital budget.

    The SCIP will provide a strategic vision of Defence's capital plans over a period of 15 years. Henceforth, it will be expanded to include other investment areas; it will be reviewed annually; and planners will work only on projects that are in the SCIP, thereby economizing on both human resources and human frustration.

    I am now satisfied that my own priorities for the strategic capability investment plan have been met, and I congratulate all who were involved in the process for a job well done. I will be signing the plan in the near future.

    I'd like to conclude my remarks today with three messages. First, I am proud to say that the Canadian Forces have been delivering very well indeed on their core domestic and international missions.

Á  (1130)  

[Translation]

    Second, we are striving to become more efficient, always working to ensure that Canadians get value for their defence investments.

[English]

    Third, we're embracing change. In response to fundamental worldwide shifts in technology and the security environment, we're embracing change in continental defence; we're embracing change in our approach to buying equipment; and we're embracing change in our management and decision-making.

    Canada's military, while by no means the largest in the world, is certainly one of the most capable and effective. It is clear to me that we cannot relegate the Canadian Forces to a pure niche capability status, in the style of Norway. Canada has a responsibility to do more. Equally, however, we should not look to acquire the broadest possible spectrum of military capabilities. For Canada, the worst defence policy in the world is to aspire to the status of a miniature replica of the United States. Capabilities without depth are a recipe for mediocrity. We must strike the right balance and make the tough decisions required to do what is right for Canada.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'll be very happy to take any questions.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Minister, for that comprehensive statement. You certainly have touched on a lot of issues that, I think it's safe to say, have engaged this committee over the course of at least a year or more.

    Mr. Hill, for seven minutes.

    Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George—Peace River, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for appearing before the committee today.

    Mr. Minister, before I get to some questions—and obviously there are a myriad of questions that I'm sure all committee members would like to pose to you today—I want to take a bit of an exception to something you informed us of that, at least to me, would appear to be a pretty glaring contradiction.

    On the one hand, you say Canada has a responsibility to do more, yet you said we're embracing change, in particular in our approach to buying equipment. I note that today you announced your intention to do away with 115 Leopard tanks, as far as I know, and replace them with 60 Strykers—or at least that's all that has been announced thus far—a piece of equipment that will not replace tanks. I think that's pretty evident. Also for the 2,500 Iltis that are long overdue to be replaced, you're going to replace them with 802 G-wagons.

    I'm having a bit of a problem. I guess you can understand where I'd be coming from. I'm having a problem in trying to understand how we have the responsibility to do more, but there's a pretty dramatic downsizing going on, no matter how you cut it, on the equipment side, never mind the personnel side, when we see that kind of dramatic downsizing being announced.

    I also want to note your appearance here today. While I appreciate the fact that you're here to defend the estimates, they've already been reported back to the House of Commons. It's kind of like the proverbial closing of the barn door after the horse has already gone. Nevertheless, we do appreciate you appearing.

    I want to specifically, though, get to the issue of funding for Operation Athena. It's my understanding that you announced last June that there was about $200 million that was outside the department's budget that would be allocated to Operation Athena. Following that, there was about another $387 million announced by the finance minister. I'm left to believe there would be about $587 million earmarked for the ongoing costs of our yearly deployment to Afghanistan under Operation Athena. Is that accurate? If so, is any additional funding going to be necessary to complete the mission?

    We've been there almost three months now. I think we should have a pretty firm grasp on what the costs will be if we extend them ahead for the remaining nine months. Could you update the committee on those costs and what your best guess is?

Á  (1135)  

    Hon. John McCallum: Thank you.

    On the question of tanks, which was your first point, those tanks have been used little, if at all, on recent deployments. It doesn't really matter whether we have 116 tanks or 116,000 tanks if they're sitting in Edmonton or Valcartier. I'm quoting General Hillier here, who said “the best tanks sitting in Edmonton or Valcartier are useless to our soldiers in Kabul”.

    The other principal issue I should clarify is that this is the army's plan. It was General Jeffrey, the predecessor to General Hillier, who had his plan for the army of tomorrow, which I heard early in my time as defence minister and with which I was highly impressed. I said yes to this plan. It is the army plan that envisaged the replacement of tanks with a more modern, direct-fire capability. My role was not to create the plan, but to make it happen five or six years faster than it otherwise would.

    General Hillier has endorsed this enthusiastically, notwithstanding his decades as a tank person. He has a picture of a tank in his office. The message, he has said, is to say to others that if he can do this, get rid of tanks, then others should also be able to do so. He has described this as losing a millstone around his neck.

    Recently, Barry Cooper and David Bercuson, not traditional friends of the Liberal government, wrote in the National Post an article of which the headline is “The Stryker will hit the mark”.

    The regimental sergeant major from Afghanistan, back in Canada, described the shift as “awesome” and quoted his soldiers to that effect.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Mr. Minister, I hate to interrupt you, but the whole seven minutes is going to be used up.

    The Chair: I'm not going to allow you to interrupt the minister.

    Mr. Jay Hill: The whole seven minutes will be tied up with this.

    The Chair: He has a right to respond. There were a number of issues you laid out for the minister, Mr. Hill. I'd like to allow the minister to respond to those.

    You will have another opportunity to ask questions. If there is a supplementary you'd like to ask at the end of the minister's answers, I'd be happy to accommodate you on behalf of the committee.

    Hon. John McCallum: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I won't say too much more about tanks, but that was the question. I will just conclude by relating my own experience.

    When I asked the army whether they would want tanks on the current mission in Kabul, they said no. They didn't request tanks. When I asked the army, if it had been available, would they want to have the Stryker, they said of course they'd leap at the chance because the soldiers were saying it would be awesome.

    I am convinced that this army plan is an excellent plan. It creates the army of the future with a more rapid, more deployable capability that is suited for the future.

    Now on your question about budget, the supplementary estimates contained a number of items. There is $800 million in additional base funding; $393 million to cover the costs associated with the Afghanistan mission, of which $193 million is new money; over $107 million for wage increases; and $24 million for contaminated sites. I don't know when we had a budget increase as large as that, but that's about $1.3 billion in additional funding from the centre for Defence in a single year.

    I'll leave it at that. If I haven't answered part of your questions, I'll turn the floor over to Mr. Hill.

Á  (1140)  

    The Chair: A quick supplementary, Mr. Hill.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Well, I guess a quick supplementary would be that I'd appreciate it if you could answer the question I asked, which was whether or not your best estimate of the cost of operation of ATHENA will already be included in this budget or whether there are going to be cost overruns.

    We know that Operation Apollo, for example, went $100 million over the estimates. Surely to goodness, after having been there for three months, we have a pretty firm idea as to whether the money allocated within the existing budget will be sufficient for the deployment or not.

    Hon. John McCallum: I have no reason to believe it won't. But on the finance issue, perhaps I could ask the ADM of Finance to provide more detailed information.

    Mr. Rodney Monette (Assistant Deputy Minister, Finance and Corporate Services, Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman and Mr. Hill, we have about $400 million set aside for this particular operation. We do believe it will be sufficient for this year.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Mr. Chairman, may I have a clarification?

    The Chair: Very quickly.

    Mr. Jay Hill: For this year, does that mean up until the fiscal year or for the year's deployment?

    Mr. Rodney Monette: Mr. Chairman and Mr. Hill, it would be up until the end of the fiscal year, so that would be until March 31 of next year.

    The Chair: Ms. Neville.

    Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Minister, I'm going to try a slightly different tack on questions.

    You spoke in your opening remarks about the little guy giving rank and file members dignity, and that frequently the little person falls between the cracks. Could you speak to that a little further? You referenced it in your remarks, but you intervened, particularly in the matter involving the former Canadian Forces members Henwood and Stopford. Could you could speak a little bit to that? Why did you feel that was necessary?

    Could you also elaborate on yesterday's tabling of the Lamer report on grievances? I'd like to know a little bit more about that, please.

    Hon. John McCallum: Through you, Mr. Chair, thank you very much for that question. It is a matter of importance to me, because while I have great faith in our own officials and our own system--I think it is one of the best and fairest in the world--I also believe that in any very large organization, there can be a Kafkaesque risk that a little person would fall through the cracks. And I think it is appropriate for a minister, not too often, but once in a while, when a case is brought to his or her attention, to take action on such cases.

    The first one was Major Henwood, and the fact that he was a major and not a colonel meant that he didn't get the quarter of a million dollars or so that he would have received after he lost his legs in action. I referred to that in my speech, and I thank the parliamentarians and all political parties for helping to address that anomaly.

    The second case the member mentions is Warrant Officer Stopford. I intervened in that case to satisfy his double request: that we pay for him to go to the Mayo Clinic and that the department not appeal his right to sue the department. I thought that was just and I intervened in that case.

    The third issue the member raises that is important to me is the grievance system. I think the speed, the fairness, and the transparency of the grievance system speaks volumes to the respect that we, as the leaders of the organization, have for the rank and file members. I think a quick and fair resolution of grievances is essential to demonstrate the respect we hold for the rank and file members. As I said in my remarks, the performance over the years in this area has been less than stellar.

    So prior to the release of former Chief Justice Lamer's report, prior to my receiving it, I discussed this with him. I was determined that we would eliminate the grievance within one year, by the end of calendar year 2004, so that by that time, the maximum anyone would have to wait for a grievance resolution would be one year. By the end of 2004, there will be no grievance outstanding for more than one year, and going forward that will be the maximum time before a grievance is resolved. Hopefully, in the great majority of cases it will be far less, but one year will be the maximum.

    To demonstrate that I'm serious about this we have put in substantial resources, temporarily, in the case of the grievance board, and the chief has put resources on the military side, to make sure this happens. It does generate additional work for the chief, because there are a large number that he has to personally decide on. But this is a serious matter. We've put the resources in. I'm receiving monthly reports to monitor progress. If we ever appear to be slipping, we will know monthly and we will be able to take steps to get back on track.

    I want to emphasize the seriousness of this commitment to get rid of that grievance backlog by the end of 2004. I would like to thank the Chief of the Defence Staff and the grievance board for their full cooperation in making sure we are serious and we deliver on this commitment regarding grievance backlogs.

Á  (1145)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Minister.

    Are there any further questions, Ms. Neville?

    Mr. O'Brien, did you want to get a couple of minutes' worth of questions in?

    Mr. Lawrence O'Brien (Labrador, Lib.): Do I get another chance after?

    The Chair: The committee attempts always to be fair to all members, Mr. O'Brien.

    Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Minister, thank you for the opportunity.

    First of all, I would like to thank you for your trip to Goose Bay back some time ago. Certainly we feel you are a friend of our base, and we are looking forward to working with you and your department as we go forward on the great struggles we are enduring in Goose Bay.

    I would like to pose a few questions to you, Minister.

    Goose Bay is struggling. The German air force is leaving in 2005, and the Dutch have already left. We're looking for a costing formula for the British for 2006, and the Canadian Forces for the last three months has refused to give the British a cost for 2006, after the MMOU. I find that offensive. In less than a week they gave a cost for Cold Lake, but they won't give one for Goose Bay. It is extremely offensive. I pointed that out to you, Minister, a couple of days ago.

    The other points are that they're looking to cut 30 uniforms out of Goose Bay under your $200 million savings. I think that's wrong. I think we should know where we're going. We should have a plan as part of the training plan that's under way under Lieutenant Colonel Houlgate.

    We need some substance. Right now all we're getting is rhetoric. We need to know where we're going.

    We have the Griffin helicopter doing search and rescue in Goose Bay. I believe the Canadian Forces could consider doing some training there as part of their ongoing plans with the Griffins and stuff like that.

    I would like to specifically ask you, Mr. Minister, what is the plan? We're seeing things. I believe in you, Minister, and I believe in your political staff, and I believe we have a new Prime Minister who sounded very good when he was in Goose Bay--Mr. Martin. I'm talking about transparency, stakeholder involvement, and growing the base. We're going to be talking about that with the Prime Minister.

    But I want you to share with me, is there hope for Goose Bay? We are right at rock bottom right now and our frustration has gone straight through the roof. All we're getting from the Canadian Forces in Ottawa is pure rhetoric. We believe we need better, we deserve better, and we need to know better. We make money for Canada through the allied training. Instead of that going back into general revenues, I think it should be going into restoring and rebuilding that base and others like it.

    Thank you.

Á  (1150)  

    The Chair: Mr. Minister, can you attempt to answer that question in about a minute? I know Mr. O'Brien is going to want to come back to it, I expect, but could you give us a fairly brief answer on that?

    Hon. John McCallum: Yes.

    Is there hope for Goose Bay? Yes, of course, there's hope for Goose Bay. We are committed to finding solutions. Yes, there are challenges. It is unfortunate that the Germans and the Dutch are in the process of pulling out. That creates a challenge.

    But I have asked the department in a briefing I received just days ago to accelerate the pricing proposals, because what we need to do is have a pricing formula that is both simple and not too high. It is absolutely crucial that those who are remaining, the British and the Italians, stay, and we also have to work to get more customers.

    The other thing I would say is that we are actively working with the Newfoundland government on this file. The former mayor of Goose Bay...I'm not sure if he's in the cabinet, but he has been elected. And we hope to work effectively with the provincial government and with other departments in Ottawa, because the additional funding, if that is needed, is not purely a military matter. There are other departments with an interest.

    So I'm telling you I am seized of this. I had a briefing less than a week ago, and I understand it's a challenging situation. It is important, and we're moving forward on it.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Mr. Chairman, I too would like to welcome the minister, General Henault and Mr. Williams.

    I'm going to raise a topic that I bring up every time you appear before us. I'd like to point out that we issued a dissenting opinion when the report on the readiness of the Canadian Army was released a couple of years ago. In that dissenting opinion, we said that before investing more money in the Canadian Forces, there should be a defence policy review. And in 2002, in response to questions I asked him in the House, your predecessor said that defence policy was coming soon. It will soon be 2004, and we still have no defence policy.

    I find you pleasant to deal with. You are a very nice person. I don't want to blame you personally, I want to blame the national defence system in general. I have examples.

    It appears to me that at present, all of the decisions that are being made—at any rate, this is what I make of it—are dictated by events. I'll give you an example. Two soldiers die in Afghanistan. Two days later, you stand up in the House to say we're doing away with the Iltis and buying Mercedes from now on. Things happen... Take, for example, our refusal to participate in the war in Iraq when the Americans asked us to participate. You stood up in the House to announce that some 2,000 soldiers would be sent to Afghanistan. There are a number of examples of this kind. There is no logic to it. Reference was made earlier to the Stryker purchase. One hundred and thirty-nine million dollars were spent on upgrading the Leopard, and today we're told it's no longer needed. I hope it's not a general whose photos are on the wall who is dictating national defence policy. A general who is an artillery man better not be saying that we need to buy more canons or bigger canons. Sometimes you can't help wondering if it goes that far.

    These are fundamental issues. You tell us today that you think Canadians prefer to be inside the tent in the discussions on the space shield, but you're the one who is deciding to put them inside the tent. Canadians have not decided to be inside the tent. Perhaps it's time to consult them on national defence policy that is now almost 10 years old. The world has changed so much since then. We don't have all of the necessary resources and we can't do everything. Currently, we're merely doing one quarter of what we are capable of doing. Perhaps it's time to say to ourselves that we should set priorities and put the money in the right place. Currently, in my view, there are plenty of issues that defence policy could at least touch on.

    Take the policy of the Buy American Act. There is now a bill in Congress that would make it just as strict for the U.S. Army as for ordinary trade. However, there were agreements that made exceptions to the Buy American Act. There are arms makers asking me to intervene and write to the U.S. Congress. We have friends in Congress and we deal with them at NATO. So I am writing to them. However, there is nothing in national defence policy. It's as if there's no desire to have one, because this way, the minister can do what he likes based on the recommendations of generals.

    I think it's perhaps time, as we speak, to listen to taxpayers. They're the ones who are paying. The general is there, but he's not the one paying. He's paid by the department. Perhaps it's time to put forward a certain number of scenarios to taxpayers and ask them what they think. That's my question, and it's always basically the same.

Á  (1155)  

[English]

    The Chair: Actually, I think most of us heard quite a few questions in there, Monsieur Bachand, and the minister has less than three and a half minutes to respond.

    Minister.

    Hon. John McCallum: Sometimes it's an advantage to have many questions. Then you can choose which ones you want to answer.

[Translation]

    In any case, there are two things that are predictable whenever I appear before this committee. First, Mr. O'Brien is going to talk about Goose Bay, and second, Mr. Bachand is going to talk about policy review.

    First, the absence of a review shouldn't be an excuse for doing nothing. Things have to be done. Action must be taken, and we have taken action. We haven't yet done the review because the government is in a period of transition. However, Mr. Martin has said a number of times that there will be a review. When the member talks about a lack of logic, I have to say that some of his statements lack logic.

    For example, he suggested that the replacement of the Iltis was connected with events in Afghanistan, but that's totally false. It's true that I want decisions made faster at the defence department, but this kind of decision is not made overnight. It takes months and months. So the plans to replace the Iltis were spread out over a few months, if not years. It has nothing to do with the tragedy in Afghanistan. Nor does the mission in Afghanistan have anything to do with the fact that Canada chose not to participate in the war in Iraq. A sovereign country needs no excuse not to go to war. The Government of Canada decided not to participate in the war in Iraq. The decision to go to Afghanistan had nothing to do with the decision not to go to Iraq.

    As for the Stryker, it's going to give us a better army, regardless of government policy. It's a recipe for a better army, an army that is adapted to the conditions of today and tomorrow. Whatever the findings of a future review may be, we're better off with the Stryker than without it for a large number of missions. So we will have a review, but we can make decisions before that review.

[English]

    I make no apology for that. I make no apology for taking appropriate actions even though we have not yet had a defence review. The actions we have taken on Stryker, on Afghanistan, on the Iltis replacement, and on missile defence do not preclude conclusions from this policy review that will take place.

    He seems to be saying that the absence of the review is an excuse for inaction. That is not my point of view at all.

    The Chair: Thank you, Minister.

    You're out of time, Monsieur Bachand.

    Mr. Peric, you have a point of order.

    Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.): Yes, Mr. Chair, I was wondering if you could explain to this committee whether it's appropriate for retired generals to sit back and make faces and gestures while the minister is answering.

    The Chair: Mr. Peric, I don't see that as a point of order. As long as the people who are in the room are not misbehaving or causing a disturbance....

    I have not seen any problem that way, so I will continue with the questioning here.

    Actually, Mr. O'Brien, we owe you some time.

  (1200)  

    Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Mr. Minister, again, there are just a few more points I want to make, following up on Goose Bay.

    In 1990 when Goose Bay had 1,200 jobs, and now that is 400, there was an accumulation or an amalgamation of finances from other departments--Transport, Public Works, and so on--that helped make up the budget of Goose Bay. I get the sense from the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces right now that they are seeing that in the context of their own particular budgetary process. I believe we should be cognizant that those funds were voted by the Government of Canada in 1990 for the operation of Goose Bay. I hope the Canadian Forces understand that and do not lose sight 13 years later that this was why it was put there--if you understand my point.

    I make that a point for consideration. It was amalgamated 13 years ago, and now I see it in a different context.

    The other point I want to make is that you mentioned the senior officials' working group and other departments, which goes back to what I had been used to 13 years ago--I am talking about ACOA, the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, and others. The problem I have with that, Minister, is that it is done with lower-level officials, and they have no authority. The local people at HRDC back in Goose Bay are the ones on that, and they have no authority to deal with anything. So if we are to make that truly workable, we have to make sure the appropriate ministers of those departments give direction to the proper officials to be on that committee to make something happen. So that is a very major concern.

    The other point I have is about infrastructure removal at Goose Bay. The previous CO of Goose Bay had one mission when he came to Goose Bay: to remove infrastructure. He was removing infrastructure, and all the time he was saying, “We have a plan to rebuild some.” He removed a whole lot, but he didn't rebuild one single thing. There is a big long list for the Canadian Forces to remove a lot more infrastructure right now.

    The point I am making is that the Canadian Forces, I believe, have a move afoot to take away the infrastructure and put nothing back. Therefore, at some point, there will no longer be a base. So we are not supporting any more removal of infrastructure from Goose Bay, just like the people in Summerside, P.E.I., didn't back when their base went down.

    As one final point, Minister, would you support or entertain a delegation of provincial, municipal, and federal officials going on a military trade mission to potential clients and customers around the world, including the United States and all the countries in Europe, and so on, that could potentially do work in Goose Bay?

    I will conclude by saying thank you for listening. You've been a tremendous supporter. I have a good rapport with you, Minister. I hope the same thing follows through from the defence staff.

    I would like to follow along the lines of what Mr. Martin said in Goose Bay on June 18. He said he wanted this file to be transparent and have stakeholder involvement. So far it is not transparent, and there is no stakeholder involvement, from my point of view.

    Thank you.

    The Chair: Minister.

    Hon. John McCallum: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I guess the broad form of my answer is the same as before, that I have instructed the department to come up with a pricing formula that is low enough and simple enough to retain the people we have and to have a good fighting chance to get more people to come. I am committed to working closely with provincial governments and other government departments to market Goose Bay and to deal with any issues that arise over the years.

    With regard to your specific points, my understanding is that the cost to the department is in the order of $40 million per year. We don't mind paying that. We're happy to pay that.

    With the departure of the Germans and the Dutch, the cost may rise, because they won't be paying any money after a while. We don't want to penalize the remaining players, so we need more money, in all likelihood. That is partly why I have discussed this matter with Gerry Byrne, the ACOA minister. He is aware of the situation, and we're working closely with the provincial government. We will also engage other government departments in Ottawa.

    Certainly the marketing is very important. We have had conversations going on between a major general in Canada and major general counterparts in other countries to ascertain their needs in a more transparent and clear way.

    We are working on marketing. It's possible that your suggestion of a large mission is the way to go. It's possible that some other method might work better, but certainly marketing is key, because we want not only to maintain what we have but to grow it.

    Maybe the Chief of Defence Staff will have a comment on infrastructure. My only comment is that I understand, in terms of the housing that is there, there is a very, very high percentage not used and in a state of disrepair. So I think there is some demolition of housing going on that is very much surplus to our needs, and it's only a small proportion of the houses that exist. But I will ask the Chief of Defence Staff if he has anything to add.

  (1205)  

    General Raymond R. Henault (Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you, Minister.

    Mr. Chair, the operation of Goose Bay, of course, is done by the Canadian Forces as a wing of the Canadian Forces. It belongs to the 1 Canadian Air Division. So we fund the operation on a cost-sharing basis with the allies through the normal business planning process.

    I'm not familiar with the agreements of 1990, but in this day and age, that operation is nonetheless funded through the normal allocations for operations and maintenance for our wing at Goose Bay.

    The flying training that's done there is something we provide as a training opportunity for NATO air forces, and that's the reason it was established there, to provide for the low-level flying training and other types of training that are being done. We are trying to find other training capabilities that will make it more attractive for other nations, because we have no control over whether or not nations are willing to expend the funds required to train in the NATO flying training environment that Goose Bay represents, and as a result of their own downsizing and cost-cutting measures, and so on, the Dutch and the Germans have made the decisions they have.

    So we do have to go out there and try to market Goose Bay that much more, and that may mean investing in Goose Bay in an interdepartmental, intergovernmental fashion to make it more attractive, more modern, and to provide the improvements, like a modernized air combat manoeuvring range, for example, which makes it that much more usable.

    Finally, the infrastructure removal is very much in view of trying to reduce costs so that we can reduce the cost share that goes to the other partners. These buildings are surplus to requirement, as mentioned by the minister. They are very expensive to heat through the kind of heating system that's there, the steam system, and the maintenance and overhead that comes with that very much needs to be reduced--again, all in favour of reducing costs for the allies and making it more attractive, not in view of closing the base.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Thank you, General.

    Thank you, Minister.

    Actually, you are over your time, Mr. O'Brien.

    Mrs. Wayne.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    I want to welcome the honourable minister here. You'll note that I didn't wear one of my sweaters today. I just wore a scarf today.

    But I will say this. I was in Newfoundland about a month and a half ago for some meetings. On the day I was checking out to leave for the airport, when I went to the desk, there were three gentlemen there who wanted to know if they could speak to me. One was an air force gentleman. The other two were army gentlemen.

    The air force gentleman said, “Mrs. Wayne, we have to have parts to replace in our Hercules, and we don't have the money in our budget. We don't have the parts for our Hercules. We need some help.”

    The other two men were in the army, and one man said, “I've been in the army for 25 years, Mrs. Wayne. My son's been in the army now for five years. When I had been in the army for five years, I wanted to stay for 25, but my son doesn't want that any more because of the quality of life we have.”

    I tell you this, because I was really humbled by them waiting to speak to me on these issues. As you know, I've been one of the voices speaking on the replacement of the Sea Kings. I would like to know just exactly when we are going to have the replacement of the Sea Kings. Of course, as you know, I am not in favour of the cheapest; I'm in favour of the best, whatever is the best for a replacement. But I have to tell you this is for two reasons. One reason is the coastal surveillance on the west coast as well as over in Newfoundland. When we have foreign ships coming in dragging the bottom of the ocean, taking the eggs and the baby fish and so on from the bottom of the ocean—I'm talking about hundreds of thousands of them—we're killing the fishery. That is what has killed the fishery. We don't have the surveillance we should have.

    But when these men told me they didn't have the money for the parts that require replacing in the Hercules, it almost brought tears to my eyes.

    I want to congratulate you, because you have not played politics with the military, and you never have. I appreciate that, but I'm going to say this. We can say what we like about the States. Down there, as you know, in the Bush government, the military is a number one priority. It truly is. They don't have to fight for money. They don't have to push for money. Everybody agrees.

    I still feel very strongly, Mr. Minister, that we in Canada have to make our military a number one priority. To me, it's before health, education, no matter what we look at. We have priorities, but the military men and women—and there are some here today—can't come up on the Hill and protest. They look to us and look to you.

    All of us, we have to take the politics out of it. You don't play politics around this table, and most of our colleagues do not play politics with it. We're here to try to support you, and we will continue to do so. But I still feel very strongly that the military has to be a number one priority with our Government of Canada, no matter who is the government, and we have to make sure our voices are heard.

  (1210)  

    Hon. John McCallum: Well, I thank Mrs. Wayne. I know she has been a friend of the military. In that sense, we have always been allies.

    I guess I'd like to respond to three parts of her question. Many of these questions are multi-faceted. The question was about the importance of the military, and about the Hercules and the Sea King. If there's time I'll also ask Alan Williams to comment on the Hercules.

    Of course, as defence minister, having been hugely impressed with our people early upon my arrival, I am committed to doing what is best for them to the best of my abilities. I lobbied hard to get the $800 million. And I think you'd agree--you may say it's not enough--it's not a bad start. It's a 7% increase in the base budget, the biggest in a decade, and we certainly put quality of life at the top of our agenda. Now, you'll tell me we need more, and I won't necessarily disagree, but the future government will have a review, and we hope something good comes out of it.

    On the question of the Hercules, I made three personal priorities in the investment plan. One was to have enough money for the helicopters, to get them as fast as possible. The second was army transformation, which I announced recently. The third was the Hercules, because the Hercules is the workhorse of our military and we need it. We must take imaginative measures. Those were my instructions to Mr. Williams--and he's good at this--to think outside the box, to be creative to increase the serviceability rate of the Hercules in the short term and increase the capacity in the long term. And if there's one thing that held me back from signing the SCIP--and I haven't signed it yet--it was that they weren't making enough progress on the Hercules. I think they have now, and Mr. Williams will speak to that.

    Finally, before I give over to Mr. Williams, you also mentioned the Sea Kings. I've been working with Ralph Goodale, acting in the here and now, as of the moment I became minister about a year and a half ago, which is the same day he became Minister of Public Works. We have been doing everything we can to speed up the delivery of the new helicopter. We've done three concrete things. First, we have moved from a double contract to a single contract, which makes it faster and there's less risk. Second, we're instituting a system of bonuses and penalties to give the companies a strong incentive to deliver fast. Third, as I said earlier, I've made sure the money will never be a problem.

    So we're following the processes. We will have an RFP, a request for proposal. I can't give you a precise date, but it will be in the not-too-distant future. The thing is making progress, and certainly I am committed to doing everything I can to get that helicopter replaced as fast as possible.

    Now, if there's time, can Mr. Williams say something about the Hercules?

  (1215)  

    The Chair: Perhaps just a very brief synopsis of the situation, Mr. Williams.

    Mr. Alan Williams (Assistant Deputy Minister, Materiel, Department of National Defence): Thank you, Chairman. I have a couple of points.

    One is that with regard to spares, over the last five years we have doubled the amount of money we're putting into maintaining the Hercules. We now spend about $100 million a year. It was about half that in 1998 and 1999, and even a year or two ago it was $80 million. So the requirement to put more money in is there. We're also spending in the order of $144 million over the next few years to upgrade engines and wiring in order to make them more reliable.

    So the message you're reflecting to us is one that the minister has also been hammering us on, and we're trying to do our best with the moneys we have reallocated to this piece of equipment.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne. Thank you, Mr. Williams. Thank you, Minister.

    Mr. Price.

    Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you for being here, gentlemen.

    Mr. Minister, I'll start off with flowers. I just have a little list here--the things you have been doing in the short period of time you've been here. And I think it's great. There's the additional money, as you mentioned, and I know you had to really fight for that, as for the Strykers. I look at SISIP, the measures you've been taking for efficiency in administration. It's great stuff. The continued work on quality of life--good. There's the grievance system. And I had written “new helicopters”, but that's for a little later on, I guess.

    I'd like to hear you talk about Canada's international weight, the weight we're pulling internationally. As you know, at NATO we tend to talk an awful lot about the percentage of GDP. We tend to relate that to our military weight. As of late, Lord Robertson is talking a lot more about getting more people on the ground. Right now he has to get a lot more forces out there. He's looking at countries that have the forces but aren't getting them out there.

    I'd just like your thoughts on that, on where we're situated as far as that's concerned, and on the level of other countries.

    Hon. John McCallum: Thank you for your positive preamble. You could have gone on longer if you'd wished.

    I think you raised a core issue. Lord Robertson has mentioned this a number of times. The world is crying out for NATO soldiers. Afghanistan is a good example. Everybody agrees that we should have security forces outside Kabul. But everybody wants it to be with some other country's soldiers. And we have a structural problem that on average the NATO country militaries have about 5% of their people actually deployed, or perhaps it's 4%. That is a low number, but even with 4% they claim they're overstretched.

    We have to change. All NATO countries have to increase the number of deployable people relative to the total number of people, because if we need more soldiers, there are two ways to do it. Let's say we need twice as many soldiers. We can either double all of the NATO armies, which is impossible budgetarily, or we can, on average, instead of deploying 4%, deploy 8%. That's difficult, but not totally impossible, and that's the route we have to go.

    Canada is in an extremely good position in the sense that we have the second highest percentage of our army deployed of any NATO country right now, approximately 15%. The U.S. is higher because of Iraq. We're the second highest. That's a double-edged sword.

    We are efficient in being able to deploy a higher proportion sustainably than most of our NATO partners, but we cannot have that number permanently deployed because it's not sustainable. So we made a commitment to be in Afghanistan for one year. That is twice as long as any country before us had ever committed, but we cannot sustain 2,000 soldiers forever. Our commitment is for one year. We are looking at smaller commitments after that one year. So we stand out in a positive way in NATO, but we cannot maintain that 12%.

    The last thing I'd like to say about this is that it is a question of balance. Yes, we want to step up to the plate and do our bit in the international scene. Right now our focus is on Afghanistan, a place where we have critical mass, a place where we can make a difference. I would very much like to be able to stay there more than one year.

    But the other side of the ledger is that we have to be fair to our people and to the families of our people. If we have too high a percentage deployed for too long, we are being unfair to the members and to their families. It's important to be fair to them: first, because it's the right thing to do because they are putting their lives at risk for our country and we must be fair to them and to their families; and second, because if we're not, they'll quit.

    To be perfectly practical and sounding like an economist, we have a problem and a challenge in retention and recruitment. Like any big organization, a lot of our skilled people will be gobbled up by the private sector. They're very marketable. So we have to treat our people with respect, with dignity, and with fairness, not only because that is the right thing to do, but also because, from a practical point of view, if we don't, we will have ever increasing problems of recruitment and retention.

  (1220)  

    Mr. David Price: Do I still have time?

    The Chair: You have about a minute and a half.

    Mr. David Price: Thank you.

    Thank you, Minister. I think very clearly we are definitely pulling our weight out there in the world today.

    Talking about Afghanistan and the mission there, one of the interesting buzzwords that Canada has out there right now is the three Ds: defence, diplomacy and development. I think that's being looked at by the rest of the world too. We're probably the first country doing that, getting in on the ground with all three.

    How well is this working together? And is there budget sharing with this whole operation? How do you work that?

    Hon. John McCallum: Just in case anyone doesn't know what the three Ds are--there are so many acronyms in Defence, I'm sympathetic to people who don't know them all, including myself--the three Ds are diplomacy, development, and defence. It means we are working more holistically together, CIDA, Foreign Affairs, and Defence, so that we can be as effective as possible in Afghanistan, because it's partly military providing security, but it's partly foreign aid to provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and it's partly diplomacy. So the object is to work all together holistically for the benefit of the overall mission, which is to improve the security and well-being of the people of Afghanistan and to prevent Afghanistan from falling back into the hands of the al-Qaeda.

    So working together, each of us bringing different strengths, is extremely positive. It's real in a sense that the deputies of the three departments are meeting periodically, and three of us ministers meet every two or three weeks, or at least once a month, to coordinate matters.

    I think it is definitely the way to go. All three of us have been to Afghanistan, all three ministers. I've been there twice, and I'm going again in a couple of weeks. I've spoken twice to President Karzai, and to Defence Minister Fahim Khan. We're all three gaining knowledge and experience of the place so that we can work better to make a difference in that country. I believe that process is working well.

    The Chair: Thank you, Minister. Thank you, Mr. Price.

    Mrs. Gallant.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Mr. Chair, ever since the decision was made to close the Emergency Preparedness College in Arnprior, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, OCIPEP, has gone from crisis to crisis, totally unprepared, and the training programs are in shambles.

    On March 12 of this year the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness produced a threat analysis to Canada's critical infrastructure. Under this section “Impact of Accidental Threats on Canadian Critical Infrastructures”,it had this to say about power failures:

The North American hydro grid is more interconnected today than it was at the time of the Great Northeast Blackout. “This interconnectedness has increased the ability of the grid to withstand unexpected disruptions as managed by coordinated real-time monitoring across North America.” Officials have gone to great lengths to ensure that the entire breadth of the North American electricity grid is carefully monitored for fluctuations and special protection systems are in place. This work is therefore making the possibility of another massive blackout that would leave large areas of North America without power, remote.

    Nowhere in the minister's “Lessons Learned” document does he acknowledge or even consider the need to be prepared for a power blackout, let alone apologize to Canadians for this subsequent misinformation that came out of OCIPEP.

    This is even more serious given the fact that the minister is aware that in the aftermath of 9/11, CSIS and the RCMP had been monitoring a missing employee from the Labrador hydroelectric power station and that detailed blueprints were found of power stations on his personal computer. Yet the minister still considered that there was no risk to power installations.

    Now, this week, we learned that the Deputy Prime Minister was sailing through the Caribbean instead of participating in Operation Topoff--that stands for “top officials”--a joint U.S-Canadian emergency preparedness exercise that was two years and $10 million in the making. He assumed that because of the U.S. focus on Saddam Hussein at the time, Topoff would not proceed.

    We know that the Deputy Prime Minister had a luxury jet follow him around through the islands to the tune of $25,000 a day, but the defence minister's agency could only muster a tabletop version of the exercise instead of the full capacity for Operation Topoff that was intended. That was only after Mr. Rumsfeld personally called Mr. Manley to find out whether or not he was still going to proceed.

    How can the minister justify the fact that OCIPEP crashed within 50 minutes of zero hour for the exercise, and why are Canadians being asked to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on an office like OCIPEP that doesn't work and is out of control, and considering the fact that OCIPEP continues to fail Canadians?

  (1225)  

    Hon. John McCallum: Well, that is a smorgasbord of questions, and without necessarily accepting any of the premises, I would congratulate the member for her devotion to her riding and to Arnprior. But my devotion has to be elsewhere. My devotion has to be to emergency preparedness, and the college in question was unsuited and unfit for carrying out my mandate, which is why it was moved. My first responsibility has to be the training of first responders in carrying out the government's mandate in this area, and that has to trump considerations of Arnprior.

    The notion that OCIPEP and the government's response to emergencies has been a flop is incorrect. One of the things I've noticed in dealing with emergencies--and we have had more than our share this year--is that, for me, it is extremely important for the government to respond effectively, and it is extremely important that this be done not only at the official level but at the political level.

    In the case of the power failure, I had a very positive relationship with Mr. Runciman, the then attorney general, who spoke extremely positively about the government's efforts and the military efforts to get transformers successfully.

    In the case of British Columbia forest fires, we had 2,000 soldiers putting out forest fires. I got $100 million very early in advance payment to the premier, who commented that it was the fastest response he had every heard of from his officials. I am planning to make the quick response the norm rather than the exception, and that British Columbia experience provides a model.

    In the case of Nova Scotia, I was out there visiting our 1,000 soldiers working in the streets, and the premier, Mr. Hamm, said, “I'm very pleased with the federal response. In fact, I can't think of an instance where we have had such an efficient response from Ottawa.”

    So when it comes to emergencies, I insist on working at the political level. We work together irrespective of any political differences, like the Eves government. We were not on the same page on many things, but Mr. Runciman and I worked effectively.

    In the power situation in Ontario, the forest fires in British Columbia, and the hurricane in Halifax, all three provincial government premiers or ministers expressed their total satisfaction. We worked well together to get the job done, and that, rather than the situation of the college in Arnprior, has to be my priority.

  (1230)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Minister.

    A very brief question and a very brief reply.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

    That still doesn't answer my question about the missing employee and why we weren't prepared for the blackout, given that he has the grid plans for the entire eastern seaboard.

    The decision to grant Bombardier a 20-year sole-source contract at Moose Jaw has now come back to haunt that company, and as you know, they have been trying to break that $1.3 billion contract during the last several months. How much is breaking that contract going to cost the taxpayers of Canada?

    Hon. John McCallum: I'll give a general point on Moose Jaw, and then I'll ask Mr. Williams to provide more details.

    The general point is that the government secured this NATO training facility in Moose Jaw. It has been a great success. It has created lots of jobs in the west. Had we not done that, the facility would be somewhere in the United States. So that has been a very good move, in terms of the western part of this country, for economic activity. It's providing excellent training for NATO pilots. I've been there. I know it's a great success. Our allies are extremely comfortable and pleased with the training their pilots have received.

    As for the situation of the Bombardier contract, I'd ask Mr. Williams to respond.

    Mr. Alan Williams: Thank you.

    Just a couple of points. First of all, the sole-source contract allocated to them was, in my view, not only a smart business decision on the part of the government, but certainly totally consistent with the Agreement on Internal Trade, which says that in fact if you have an unforeseen situation or opportunity, you grab it. If you recall, Bombardier had the foresight to come in in the fall of 1994 when in fact proposals were being considered in February. Had they not done that, there is absolutely no question that we would not be in the position we're in now, where we're really recognized around the world as providing the best pilot training anywhere. As the minister said, the countries that participate with us...each one of them is tremendously pleased and only has positive things to say about the training.

    The program, from our perspective, is going very well. Bombardier is very successful in it. The rules that will guide any subsequent purchase by any other company require the government, and in particular the Minister of Public Works, to verify and validate that any contractual commitments they have to the crown can and will be transferred and will be upheld by any subsequent bidder.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Williams. Thank you, Minister. Thank you, Mrs. Gallant.

    Monsieur Bertrand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Minister, I would like to welcome you and your colleagues to our committee.

    I would like some clarification about the supplementary estimates. On page 49, it says “Acquisition of machinery and equipment”. You're going to spend $332 million on these purchases. I just want to know, in a general sense, what you're going to buy with this money. I don't want you to go into any great detail, but in general, what is this money going to be spent on?

    Hon. John McCallum: Which line of the table are you referring to?

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: I think it's line 9.

  (1235)  

    Hon. John McCallum: Perhaps my colleague could say a few words about this after, but in terms of capital and machinery spending generally, because of the 800-million-dollar budget increase, the capital budget was increased by $160 million. What is being done with this money? There are all kinds of projects, including the modernization of the CF-18s, the Aurora and others. We have almost completed a 15-year capital plan, as I mentioned in my presentation. Personally, I had three priorities: the helicopters as quickly as possible, the army project, which I just announced, and the Hercules aircraft. There is a whole range of capital projects. We now have a plan that is more stable and more predictable than before. It is a 15-year plan that I have all but signed.

    If there are any more specific questions about these figures, my colleague can answer them.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: That's basically what I was asking. Is the money to be spent on helicopters and the Stryker part of the $332 million?

    Hon. John McCallum: In general, yes, but my colleague will answer more specifically about the connection between these figures and the capital funds.

    Mr. Rodney Monette: Thank you very much, Minister.

[English]

and Mr. Chair.

    Thank you, Monsieur Bertrand.

    These particular figures are related primarily for Operation Athena. For example, the kinds of things we would be purchasing would be modular camps for Athena, ammunition, aircraft parts, spares, and so forth. That would be the general nature of those expenditures.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: I have another question on the same page, page 49. You refer to the assessment, management and remediation of contaminated sites. Among those sites, are there American sites from the former DEW line that need to be cleaned up?

    Hon. John McCallum: Yes, there's a large number of contaminated sites, and my department is firmly resolved to reduce the environmental consequences to a minimum.

    It's hard to provide a summary, because there are a lot of sites, but we have a major program for that. There is a group at the department that deals with all of those contaminated sites. Goose Bay is one site where there is a lot of contamination. We are working diligently on all of these projects. There's a list of seven contaminated sites here. I don't know if I need to read this list, but there are seven of them.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: Minister, when I was following the department's activities more closely, the Americans didn't seem to want to compensate us for the work we were doing to decontaminate their sites. I was wondering whether, in recent months or years, there's been any change in the American position on that.

    Hon. John McCallum: I know that there have been discussions with the Americans in recent years, but I don't know the state of those discussions at this point. Is there anyone who can answer this question more specifically?

[English]

    Mr. Rodney Monette: Minister, Mr. Chair, and Mr. Bertrand, I am not aware of the particular status at this point in time, but certainly we could furnish that information.

[Translation]

    Hon. John McCallum: We will give you that information as soon as possible.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: If there is any money coming back to us, we'll have to make sure that National Defence keeps it and that it doesn't get put into the notorious consolidated revenue fund.

  (1240)  

    Hon. John McCallum: Certainly. I hope that will be the case. Will it be the case? I'm told it will.

[English]

    Mr. Rodney Monette: Yes.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: The last question is for Mr. Williams.

    I notice here in your bio that you're a member of the Conference of National Armaments Directors, a senior NATO committee, which develops and promotes cooperative armament programs within the alliance.

    Are there any programs you are looking at right now that NATO is looking to purchase for its members?

    Mr. Alan Williams: There's a wide range of programs we look at that follow from the different ministerial direction provided to us. The one that comes to mind automatically is alliance ground surveillance, which has been indicated for a number of years as NATO's top military priority.

    Together with all of our colleagues we're trying to find a number of different ways where all of us can participate in a cost-effective way. I mean, that's one example.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: How often do you meet?

    Mr. Alan Williams: We meet twice a year. In fact, we're meeting right now over there, but I'm over here.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: You're good.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Merci, Monsieur Bertrand. Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With respect to the defence policy review, I agree with the minister when he says that the absence of policy mustn't be an excuse for doing nothing. However, that wasn't the purpose of my earlier remarks. Rather, I was saying that the absence of defence policy mustn't be an excuse for all kinds of questionable actions. That was what I was saying earlier, and I wanted to end on that point.

    I would now like to talk about another topic that I find extremely interesting, a topic raised by our journalist friend Lawrence Martin. As you know, in a biography of Jean Chrétien, he said that the Canadian Army had drawn up a scenario for possible intervention in Quebec in the case of a referendum victory for the “yes” side.

    I have in my possession a document that was printed in 2001, following the 1994 White Paper, but after reading it, I think it was definitely written after 1995. It was you, General Henault, who headed up this study. This document was prepared by Major Last. I have a lot of questions, because this document gives credence to what Lawrence Martin was saying.

    The document reveals, among other things, on page 2, in a section on national political trends here in Canada, that Canada could lose part of its cohesion and even resort to violence. Among Canada's fundamental interests, strengthening Canadian unity internationally is identified.

    There are other passages that I find dangerous. It talks about regional instability. On page 8, it says:

Anglophone-francophone-native tensions, land claims, imported homelands conflicts, social and economic pressures may lead to domestic unrest requiring aid to the civil power.

    First of all, I would like to know whether the general remembers Major Last submitting this document to him. Minister, does this not substantiate the theory that in the aftermath of a “yes”, the Canadian Army would have been ready to protect federal interests and federal buildings in Quebec?

[English]

    The Chair: Minister and Monsieur Bachand, I think we're treading on some rather uncertain ground here, to say the least, in terms of a question that is asking a minister about what may or may not have taken place with respect to another minister.

    It's normally the practice of this committee to ask the minister questions related to what he is doing within the portfolio at this time and not to visit issues the minister had no responsibility for and perhaps no knowledge of.

    Minister, if you want to offer up a response, it's entirely up to you, but I don't think you should feel compelled to respond.

[Translation]

    Hon. John McCallum: The member mentioned a number of things and I would like to provide some clarification. First of all, it can't be said that we have no defence policy; we have the 1994 policy. We are talking about conducting a policy review soon.

    In terms of Quebec, there's nothing I can say. I wasn't even in politics back then. I believe that the Prime Minister and some other ministers have already answered that question.

    In another question, the member mentioned the Buy American Policy and I didn't have time to answer. I can say that I discussed the Buy American Policy issue with Mr. Rumsfeld at a bilateral meeting and he agreed fully with us. So we have a major ally in that regard.

    If you don't mind, Mr. Chairman, given that the member asked a question about the Buy American Policy and that it's an important question, Mr. Williams could give a more detailed answer.

  (1245)  

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you, Minister.

    Mr. Williams.

[Translation]

    Mr. Alan Williams: Thank you. As you know, in May 2003, Congressman Hunter proposed a change that will have two significant consequences for us.

    The first consequence of the Buy American Policy affects other countries, i.e., companies will have to buy only from other companies in the United States. There's also another thing that is perhaps more important for us, and that is Canada's exemptions in relation to the North American defence industrial base. There are a lot of discussions going on right now between administrations, the House of Representatives and the Senate, to try to find wording that everyone can agree on.

    At the moment, the wording about our place has been removed from the legislation, and that's good for us. We will also be exempt from the Buy American Policy for companies.

    I should also add that Mr. Hunter will be there for another four years and there will be a lot more to be done, not just now, but also in the coming years.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, I think that you and I will not agree on ministerial responsibility. It seems to me that the Prime Minister and the minister answered questions from Bloc Québécois members in the House on a possible intervention by the Canadian military in Quebec. However, you're telling us that the minister can't answer in committee because he wasn't there back then. I challenge that. I think you don't want the minister to answer the question. That's what I take from this, and that's all I have to say about that.

[English]

    The Chair: Okay, you have made your point, Monsieur Bachand, but I am upholding rules of this committee that have existed for some time. Actually, the rules of the committee are more stringent, in many respects, than the rules within the House.

    I think it is important for us to stay focused on what our mission is right here, as the military would say.

    Mr. Price.

    Mr. David Price: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I have two totally unrelated questions.

    First, to carry on with the “buy American” thing, for the joint strike fighter program, there has been a little bit of nervousness lately because of the talk of the “buy American” policy. Could you tell us where we are on that? What parts are we going to get out of that contract? What do we have already?

    My second question, Minister, would be on the PRTs. As you said, you'll be going back to Afghanistan and you will be talking to President Karzai, as you did last time. I was present too. Of course, one of his major requests is going to be, can Canada take over one of the PRTs, at least one, if not more? Are we looking at that situation? What are the possibilities there?

    Hon. John McCallum: Mr. Williams will answer the first one and I'll answer the second question.

    Mr. Alan Williams: Thank you very much, Minister.

    With regard to joint strike fighter, I think that's one of the great stories that people are probably not well aware of. This is one of the occasions where Canada jumped early into the program. After the signing by the Americans and the U.K., we were next in.

    As a result of that, this procurement, which is the largest in U.S. history, a $200 billion program, has allowed our companies to aggressively meet with the American primes, Lockheed Martin Corp. and Northrop Grumman. We've invited them up here. This is designed to give our companies an opportunity.

    I am pleased to report that for the government's $100 million investment, essentially, as well as Industry Canada money, we have already garnered contracts worth over $118 million. The way the process works, this is all based on value added, so there is no fair share.

    If you maintain your cost curves, in accordance with what you've done already, you're essentially guaranteed production, which in this case would translate to $3.5 billion worth of business for the Canadian aerospace industry and jobs in Canada.

    I would also like to say that our Canadian companies' winning percentage is better than Tiger Woods'. Of 68 opportunities, our companies have won 50. In fact, we are now being cited by Lockheed Martin as the example and model that other countries should try to emulate. We are now working with Turkey, Norway, and Denmark to help them get contracts, which so far have alluded many of these other countries.

    I think we have done well from a defence standpoint. We are benefiting from a lot of the studies and the information, and that helps us.

    We have not, of course, made a decision as to whether or not we will acquire these aircraft in the future.

  (1250)  

    The Chair: I am sorry to interrupt, Mr. Price, but could you, Mr. Williams, give us some idea as to what the return on investment is?

    Mr. Alan Williams: I don't know what thousands of percent it is, but it is very high. I don't know. It's $3.5 billion compared to a $100 million investment. It's thousands of percent of return already, providing these things happen.

    And we are nowhere finished with the opportunities. We are continuing to be super aggressive. I don't know if it's 3,000% or what it is, but it is a very high percentage return on investment.

    Mr. David Price: That's fine on that. What about the PRTs, the provincial reconstruction teams?

    Hon. John McCallum: This is very important for NATO. As a whole, a good part of the last NATO defence ministers' meeting was devoted to that. Security is the sine qua non of progress in Afghanistan, and security must extend through the country to the degree possible.

    So NATO is committed to expanding the number of these provincial reconstruction teams across the country. At the same time, we can't let our political commitments exceed our resources. NATO is pressuring countries to commit resources. This is ongoing.

    I should also mention that the concept of a PRT varies. There is a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum is the German model, which is principally almost entirely military. It's like a security force similar to what we have in Kabul, going outside Kabul.

    At the other end of the spectrum, a PRT is primarily humanitarian assistance and reconstruction workers protected by military. Other countries in more stable regions might have that model. The model varies, and I think there is room for different models depending on the region of Afghanistan and the taste and preferences of the particular country.

    But in all cases, an absolutely crucial thing is extraction in the case of emergency, and that is that nothing will happen, certainly not for Canada, without a very clear and guaranteed extraction policy should things go very wrong.

    I can say that we had a team visiting different regions of Afghanistan recently involving Foreign Affairs, Defence, and CIDA--again, the three Ds--to investigate possible actions. The group is back in Canada now and we are working on that.

    The idea is that following the end of our mission in August of next year--we haven't committed yet--we will likely undertake a much smaller mission in the form of one or more provincial reconstruction teams.

    At this time the Chief of Defence Staff might wish to comment on PRTs as well.

    Gen Raymond R. Henault: Mr. Chair, the minister has covered it off exceedingly well. I would only add that as a part of the NATO transformation and as part of NATO's intent to become more relevant in the aftermath of 9/11, it has been engaging in out-of-area operations much more aggressively.

    Afghanistan is really the first one, and part of that is an ability to intervene where necessary on a wider-based capability, especially on a global basis if it were required. The NATO response force and the provincial reconstruction teams that go with that, as part of a more mobile NATO, are a very high priority for NATO, particularly for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

  (1255)  

    The Chair: Thank you, General and Minister.

    Mr. Hill.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have perhaps a quick statement, and then I'll try to squeeze in a number of questions in about half the time I have and then ask the minister to respond with the other half.

·  (1300)  

    The Chair: Taking a page from Mr. Bachand's book, are you?

    Mr. Jay Hill: Exactly. That way at least I get all my questions on the record here, because I'm not sure, with the upcoming change in leadership, whether I'll get the opportunity to question this minister again.

    First of all, I was a little bit concerned under the earlier comments about the minister stating that he was just about ready to sign off on a 15-year procurement plan, and I was wondering how that would relate to not having a defence review since 1994. There's some concern there, and that's my statement.

    Now for questions. I note that in response to my earlier question about the cost of Operation Athena, the statement was made that there are no anticipated cost overruns for this fiscal year. Specifically, with the belated shipping of additional light-armoured vehicles to Afghanistan, I wonder what will be the transportation cost, if that's known, to get those vehicles over there. My understanding is there are a few that have already reached the theatre. I wonder whether that will come out of the existing budget. That's the first issue.

    Next, I note that there are only going to be about 802 various variants of the Mercedes G-wagon purchased to replace 2,500 Iltis vehicles. At least that's my understanding at this point in time. If that's true, I'm led to believe that either we're going to have fewer troops who need to get a ride somewhere or they'll be walking more often. I wonder if you could address that. How we can replace 2,500 scout cars, as they're called, or whatever, with 802 G-wagons. Of those, my information is that only 118 have some variety of light armour to them, where they could withstand even a small mine strike, that type of thing. And given recent developments and the unfortunate deaths of Sergeant Short and Corporal Beerenfenger, are there plans to take another look at that and perhaps increase the number of armoured ones among 802 in addition to the 118?

    My last issue deals with the Stryker. Obviously from his comments, the minister is a strong champion of the Stryker. I hope it's not going to turn out to be a lemon, like some of the other purchases we've seen made in the past, the Iltis being one example, and some trucks another one. At any rate, I have some questions, because there seem to be some misconceptions about the Stryker, if you could make note of them.

    One of the things that's always been said is a strong argument for the Stryker over tanks is that they're air mobile, and yet I understand there have been no tests done with the gun platform Stryker model that the minister has said he supports purchasing, in terms of where it will fit into the bay of a C-130 Hercules. Have there been tests done where the Stryker doesn't have to be stripped down to fit in a Hercules? That's the first thing on that issue.

    Secondly, once it is on board, if it indeed can be put on board, what is the range of a Hercules? It's one thing to say it's air mobile, but if it can only go a few hundred miles, obviously we can't get it across the oceans, so it's effectively still here. I understand the Americans when they say they are going to consider purchasing some Strykers because they have an air mobility in a C-130. They're going to get them to theatre on C-17s and then transport them once they're in theatre with the smaller aircraft, the Hercules. That's my second question.

    The third deals with the cost. My understanding is the ones the Americans are ordering are going to be about $6 million Canadian, the equivalent in U.S. dollars, and yet my understanding is that the ones we're going to order could cost up to $10 million each. Why the difference? And why would it be cheaper for Americans to buy a product built in Canada than it is for us?

    It's a lot of questions. I don't know how much time I used. I tried to squeeze it in as much as possible.

    The Chair: You used a little over four and a half minutes. I think you're right on par with Mr. Bachand.

    Minister.

    Hon. John McCallum: Mr. Chair, how much time do I have to answer all of these questions?

    The Chair: You have about two minutes at this point, Minister, but I think we've been fairly flexible with this committee today, and we did start late as well, so let's continue with that flexibility and maybe go over a few minutes.

    Hon. John McCallum: Thank you. I'll be economical in my language.

    There is a 15-year procurement plan, yes, but that doesn't mean that the years out there are written in stone. This plan will be revised every year. The next two to three years are fairly firm. But if you get out there, it's much less firm, given the inherent uncertainty about the future. It is a plan, but it's a moving plan and a working plan that will be adjusted as developments change over the course of the years.

    For the second question on the transportation costs, yes, those are additional. This additional recent shipment had not been foreseen, so it's an additional cost that will be added to the incremental cost. There may be some costs that will be reduced, but if there is nothing offsetting it, that will be an additional cost.

    As I have said many times, we will spare no money and no effort to make sure the army has whatever it needs. Because of the changing security environment, the Canadian Forces and all other NATO countries revised their assessment of their needs. We responded quickly. The fact that it costs some additional money is fine because this remains a top priority.

    The number for the Iltis replacement is not 802. The number is 1,663, for one thing. But in any event, you can't compare apples and oranges, the number of tanks versus the number of Strykers. These are apples and oranges comparisons, as I said before, but one might as well get the number right. It is 1,663, not 802.

    Yes, the Stryker will fit in the Hercules, my colleague assures me, or else we wouldn't have bought it. That is also an American requirement. Yes, we will get the same price as the Americans.

    You know, you tell me that I like the Stryker. I do. This is the army of the future. This is a dream deal, because it's made in London, Ontario. That's not bad, with benefits, assuming that we go that route, in nine provinces out of ten. It's the same production line as the United States, so we will be interoperable because it'll be the same vehicle.

    We're hugely interoperable with ourselves because the LAV IIIs have the same chassis. Because we're on that same production line as the United States, we get it faster and cheaper than we otherwise would. You may think 2006 is a long way away for receiving the first vehicle, but I can tell you, by the standards of the defence department, that is lightning fast. I'm hoping that will be the model of the future and not the exception.

    This is a great investment. It makes for a more deployable, more modern, more capable army. We're getting good industrial benefits. It's a state-of-the-art vehicle. It's the same as the Americans; it's the same production line, same price, and cheaper. It's a great part of the transformation on which the army has now embarked. So yes, I like the Stryker.

    But you asked about getting them to theatre and within theatre. Okay, I like the Stryker. I don't like the C-17.

    Let me explain the strategic lift. There's some misconception here. We would never get them to theatre in a Hercules. That is inefficient. We would get them to theatre, as we did recently in the case of the armoured vehicles getting sent to Afghanistan, in a larger aircraft that we would lease.

    One of the things that I made crystal clear is that we are not in the market to spend billions of dollars on these large strategic lift airplanes, because we spend far less than the interest on the capital costs annually for the strategic lifts we rent.

    When we needed that strategic lift, do you know how long it took to sign the contract? It took two days. Two working days after the decision was made, we had the contract.

·  (1305)  

    With these large airplanes, we have a standing agreement with the company that we can have them within four days and at a minimal, minimal cost compared with buying our own unilaterally. And no one has ever told me of a single case where we have not gotten from A to B with our people or our equipment because of the lack of owning these airplanes.

    You have to make choices in Canada. We can't have everything, and not buying those planes will free up money in the billions for high-priority investments. That is one of the choices we have made.

    The thing about the Hercules is that, within theatre, we get the Stryker from Canada to Kabul in a large rented plane at a low cost. Once it's there, if we have to move it around within the theatre, it is important for us, just as it is important for the Americans, that these Strykers be able to move around within the theatre in a Hercules airplane, and that's what it does, and that is my answer to that question.

    Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Minister.

    I think we've gone a fair bit over our scheduled time today, and I would like to thank you, Minister, and Mr. Williams, General Henault and other officials, Mr. Calder and Mr. Monette, for being here today.

    I understand, Minister, you have some booklets for us relating to the equipment of the Canadian Forces.

    Hon. John McCallum: On the principle that a picture is worth a thousand words, I think this book, which contains short descriptions and pictures of our equipment, might be useful to the members of the committee.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Minister.

    Mr. Williams, if we require additional copies for research staff and so on, would those be available?

    Mr. Alan Williams: No problem at all.

    We're also producing them on CD-ROM, so that will be another way of getting it too, if you prefer.

    The Chair: Excellent.

    Once again, thank you for being here today, Minister.

    I would ask committee members to stick around for a few more minutes. We'd like to go in camera for less than five minutes. I want to provide an update with respect to our committee travel relating to our Canada-U.S defence relations study.

    I would ask the members of the media, if they could, to talk to the minister outside.

    [Proceedings continue in camera]