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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, June 5, 2003

0910

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Professor Martin Shadwick (Senior Research Fellow, York Centre for International Security, York University)

0915

0920

0925

0930

0935

0940

0945

0950

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC)

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance)

0955

Prof. Martin Shadwick

1000

The Chair

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)

Prof. Martin Shadwick

Mr. David Price

Prof. Martin Shadwick

1005

Mr. David Price

Prof. Martin Shadwick

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

1010

Prof. Martin Shadwick

1015

1020

The Chair

Mr. David Price

Prof. Martin Shadwick

1025

Mr. David Price

Prof. Martin Shadwick

Mr. David Price

Prof. Martin Shadwick

Mr. David Price

Prof. Martin Shadwick

Mr. David Price

Prof. Martin Shadwick

1030

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Prof. Martin Shadwick

1035

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

1040

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)

Prof. Martin Shadwick

Mr. Joe McGuire

1045

Prof. Martin Shadwick

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

Prof. Martin Shadwick

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Martin Shadwick

1050

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Martin Shadwick

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Prof. Martin Shadwick

The Chair

1055

Prof. Martin Shadwick

1100

The Chair

Prof. Martin Shadwick

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

NUMBER 032

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, June 5, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0910)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I would like to call this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to order, and I'd like to suggest to committee members that we need a bigger gavel. This is not big enough for my purposes; I'd like to perhaps consider using this as an element of corporal punishment at some point.

In any event, on behalf of the committee, I would like to welcome Professor Martin Shadwick to the defence committee here this morning. Professor Shadwick is a senior research fellow at the York Centre for International Security.

Professor, we're very much looking forward to your comments. We apologize for getting under way a little bit later, but as you explained earlier, coming from the academic world you're used to this sort of treatment. Hopefully we can proceed fairly quickly at this point, get your comments on the record, and get some questions to you on the record as well. Again, a warm welcome to you from all the committee members this morning. You have the floor.

Professor Martin Shadwick (Senior Research Fellow, York Centre for International Security, York University): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the opportunity to offer some thoughts on the Canada-U.S. defence relationship, and indeed on Canadian defence policy as a whole.

In preparing this testimony, I was cognizant of the need to complement or supplement rather than duplicate the testimony of previous witnesses. This was a challenge, in that your previous witnesses have provided some very thoughtful analyses of the Canada-U.S. relationship.

This dilemma reminded me of the first time I testified before this committee or, more accurately, a predecessor of this committee, when the late Heath MacQuarrie lamented that he was so far down the speaker's list that all of his truly perceptive questions had already been pre-empted by his esteemed colleagues, leaving him with only, as he called it, “jaded remnants”. I'll do my utmost to avoid remnants, jaded or otherwise, Mr. Chairman. To that end, I'd like to focus on three interconnected areas of study.

First is to explore the differences in how Canadians and Americans approach the issues of continental and homeland defence and how Canadian approaches may have been altered by free trade, the end of the Cold War, and the events of September 11, 2001.

Second is the possible future directions in Canadian defence policy and force structure and how they may or may not influence or be influenced by the Canada-U.S. defence relationship, both in North America and abroad.

Third is to examine procurement and other initiatives that might usefully serve to protect Canadian sovereignty, broadly defined, while simultaneously contributing to homeland and continental defence and, I might add, in some cases to Canada's ability to play a meaningful military role overseas.

In terms of part one, it is no less true for being obvious that Canada-U.S. defence cooperation since the end of World War II has been extremely close, multi-faceted, and, by and large, mutually beneficial. This relationship has on numerous occasions also underscored the Canadian tendency to view continental defence through the lens of “sovereignty” and the American tendency to view continental defence through the lens of “security”.

An American scholar, when asked to recount the history of continental defence, is likely to focus on the early 1950s decision to construct an elaborate air defence system for the protection of the nuclear deterrent and North American population and industrial centres, the early 1960s decision that full-scale active air defence was passé in the era of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the early 1980s decision to modernize the aging North American air defence system in the face of emerging Soviet capabilities, and, more recently, of course, the homeland and continental security ramifications of the tragic events of September 11.

A Canadian scholar confronted with the same task would tend to place security against a backdrop of sovereignty. The result is likely to be a continental defence history lesson keyed to the implications for Arctic sovereignty of the American-operated DEW line, the distant early warning line, the relationship between the cancellation of the Avro Arrow and technological sovereignty, the sovereignty implications of acquiring American-owned nuclear warheads in the early to mid-1960s, the sovereignty implications for Canada of the 1985 accord on North American air defence modernization, the NAADM accord, and, more recently, the implications for Canadian sovereignty of American homeland and continental defence initiatives, including national missile defence post-9/11.

I would suggest that such a dichotomy is not at all surprising given the allied but very different military strategic roles and capabilities of Canada and the United States and given our sometimes problematic geographic location, but I think it's a dichotomy that must be thoroughly assessed and well understood by both North American partners. At a time when new aerospace and other defence technologies of potentially far-reaching consequence are being explored, or indeed in some cases actually deployed, a lack of consultation or a lack of understanding of the other's perceptions and positions could have unfortunate consequences for the broader Canada-U.S. relationship.

In practical terms, the United States must understand that while Canada is indeed a very close friend and ally, its perceptions of and its approaches to national and international security will not necessarily match those of its southern neighbour.

¿ (0915)

The United States also must appreciate that Canada, as the smaller power in an unequal relationship, will necessarily be very sensitive to questions of political, military, and economic sovereignty. The continuing American reluctance to acknowledge all of Canada's territorial claims in the far north tends to reinforce this sensitivity.

Canada, for its part, must appreciate that the United States, as the sole surviving superpower, has a unique, demanding, and important set of global commitments and responsibilities. Canadians also must appreciate the extent to which the events of 9/11 traumatized American public and political opinion and be mindful of the extent to which Canadian territory constitutes, as Professor John Gellner noted many years ago, a defence barrier or “glacis” for the United States. Geography, of necessity, forces an American interest in the maintenance of appropriate northern defences, the word “appropriate”, of course, being rather elastic. We can come back to that later.

In a present-day context, as the Chrétien government grapples with a decision on Canada's role, if any, in national missile defence, I think it is very instructive to explore for a moment the heated debate touched off in 1985 by the American invitation to participate in the early research phases of the strategic defence initiative, SDI. In turn reminiscent of the very bitter and divisive air defence debates in Canada in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the 1985 variant over SDI was plagued by an excess of partisan politics, although I must add immediately that the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Canada's International Relations made a most useful contribution to informed discussion and debate at that time. Other factors in 1985 included widespread but perhaps understandable confusion on myriad technical issues and a series of embarrassing comments by senior American officials, which were imprecise or misinterpreted and which tended to inflame passions and cause additional confusion. Indeed, the result, which must not be emulated in 2003 as we discuss national missile defence, was in 1985 one of the most confused, muddled, and contradictory debates in the history of Canadian foreign and defence policy, and that's saying something, because there's a lot of competition for that dubious title.

Admittedly, present-day comparisons with what happened in 1985 must be approached with caution, because in 1985 there were some other issues that were related or were perceived to be related and that don't really have contemporary parallels today. For example, if you think back to 1985, we not only had more or less simultaneously the debate over SDI and Canada's response to President Reagan's invitation, but we also had the controversies that were stirred up by the North American Air Defence Modernization Accord a little earlier in 1985. That year we also had, for good measure, the transit of the Northwest Passage by the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea. Those provided a mixed package of debates and controversies that overlapped and I think added to that element of confusion.

Nevertheless, I think it is also imperative to stress the degree, when we think back to 1985, to which concerns for the protection of Canadian sovereignty underscored these debates. This is not to suggest that arms control and economic and industrial issues did not make an appearance in 1985--they most certainly did--but it is to suggest that there was a very pronounced public, political, and media preoccupation with sovereignty protection. To a very large degree, the SDI debate of 1985 pitted those who believed that the protection of Canadian sovereignty was best served by “a seat at the table” against those who believed that the same end could best be achieved by avoiding a seat at the table.

I think it's also instructive to note that much of the recent NMD and NMD-related testimony before this committee has focused on how best to protect Canadian sovereignty. This is eminently understandable. Indeed, part three of my remarks, momentarily, will be directed to exploring other means by which Canadian sovereignty could be directly or indirectly enhanced in the event that Canada does pursue an NMD relationship with the United States.

At the same time, I believe there are indications at least, maybe anecdotal indications but indications nevertheless, that Canadians are tempering their traditional preoccupation with sovereignty with a new appreciation of the role of economics and trade in the Canada-U.S. defence relationship.

¿ (0920)

This does not mean economics and trade in the sense of industrial benefits for Canadian industry in the event that we join into NMD, although people are already discussing what those benefits might or might not be. Rather, it is a concern that Canada-U.S. friction over national missile defence could further damage the broader Canada-U.S. relationship in general and Canada-U.S. trade and economic relations in particular. Free trade, which of course has increased Canada's dependence on access to U.S. markets, has accentuated this concern.

Post-9/11, Canadians also appear to have become somewhat more sensitive to U.S. security concerns, at least in terms of homeland and continental defence; Iraq-type situations are still something else. Canadians may still be underwhelmed by the rationale for national missile defence, but the willingness to accept the United States' desire for some form of insurance against rogue threats, however remote, appears to be growing. In essence, with Canadian concerns over the economic and trade ramifications of declining an American invitation to participate in NMD, combined with heightened sensitivity to American security concerns and with the disappearance of some of the arms control reservations of 1985's debate over SDI, we may well have a situation where the shrill and fractious debate of 1985 can be avoided or at least muted.

Indeed, reaction in Canada to the potential deployment on Canadian soil of NMD radar and perhaps even interceptors may well be comparatively muted. This presupposes, however, that the case for Canadian participation in NMD will be clearly and cogently argued and that measures, both direct and indirect, will be taken to protect Canadian sovereignty.

The public reaction to a progressively more extensive and elaborate NMD system, most notably one that required the weaponization of space, could take another form, however. We have to distinguish between limited, medium and high intensity, very sophisticated variations on the national missile defence theme.

I would like to take a few moments to look at the question of the evolution of a broader Canadian defence policy and force structure in recent years. Obviously, continental defence is pivotal in the context of what we're looking at, but the Canada-U.S. defence relationship more broadly is also affected by the type of military establishment as a whole that Canada chooses to maintain.

Although permutations and variations abound, Canada continues to be confronted, arguably, with three core defence options. A theoretical case could admittedly be made for a notional fourth option, i.e., no military establishment at all, save for certain ceremonial functions adjacent to us perhaps, and perhaps the Snowbirds if Heritage Canada can be persuaded to underwrite the cost. I might add, this would presumably also mean relocating the Snowbirds from Moose Jaw to Hamilton.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Prof. Martin Shadwick: I had to work that in, I apologize. My students will testify, though, that I am an equal opportunity critic and sniper, so everyone will get their turn.

It is not clear in looking at this hypothetical, no military option that the cost of augmenting and otherwise transforming the Coast Guard/Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the RCMP, other government departments, and assorted private contractors and indeed creating entirely new civilian capabilities for such functions as disaster relief would be lower than the cost of transforming the Canadian Forces into some form of “constabulary”. Nor is it clear that a new division of labour for essential, what we now call quasi-military and non-military tasks would be more effective operationally than a constabularized military. Washington's reaction to this fourth non-military option could well be imagined, however.

Turning to the three more plausible scenarios as to where we may be going, the first of them would couple a thorough overhaul of the 1994 white paper on defence, which, to my mind, has aged quite nicely over the years. There's a tradition in this country of Canadian white papers on defence imploding about 24 months after they are released. It is a long-established Canadian tradition.

The 1994 white paper has fared not too badly. It is almost a decade old, and clearly work needs to be done, but by Canadian standards, it has aged quite well. The architects of that document I think got the basic calculations essentially right. That is a rarity in Canadian defence policy planning.

¿ (0925)

In any event, this option would couple the review of the 1994 white paper, which would be replete with copious references to the revolution in military affairs, jointness, interoperability, asymmetric warfare, and strategic mobility--all of the buzzwords and buzz phrases with which you've no doubt been bombarded in recent years--with the fiscal wherewithal necessary to actually fund the type of multi-purpose combat capable defence establishment envisaged but not delivered by the 1994 white paper. The resulting force structure would retain the broadest possible range of combat capabilities and be relevant to a wide variety of roles, military, quasi-military, and non-military, at home and abroad.

The second option would similarly reaffirm the requirement for a combat capable defence establishment, including an expeditionary capability, but would abandon the type of multi-purpose defence establishment advocated by the 1994 white paper in favour of so-called niche specialization. This option assumes with some considerable risk that we could accurately select the “right”, that is, the militarily and geostrategically relevant, niches.

There is always a third option in Canadian foreign and defence policy, and the third option comes in two forms. Both would be unabashedly Canada, and I might add North America-centric in their focus. One would be an essentially traditional constabulary, i.e., an aid of the civil power army, a coast-guard-inspired navy, and a coast guard of the air style air force geared to very modest home defence and sovereignty protection responsibilities and to a variety of quasi-military and non-military tasks.

By the way, when I use the term “quasi-military”, I'm referring to functions such as internal security and fisheries protection. When I speak of “non-military tasks”, I would use as examples search and rescue and domestic disaster relief operations.

This model might also embrace a limited--and I stress limited--capacity for traditional peacekeeping and natural disaster relief operations abroad. The other variance on option three would essentially retain these characteristics but would add not insignificant combat capable forces for homeland and North American defence.

Given that the dividing line between these variances has become increasingly murky since 9/11, some may wish to characterize these options respectively as a constabulary and a constabulary with an attitude.

These four options, of course, only begin to scratch the surface of a seemingly inexhaustible supply of variations and permutations. Should, for example, the overall Canadian force structure of the future be asymmetric in nature? That is, should all three services receive essentially similar priority and funding? This is certainly egalitarian but not necessarily a recipe for operational or cost effectiveness. Or should one or perhaps two of the services take precedence over the other or others?

I should add here, as you're well aware, that references to asymmetric force structure have figured prominently in recent speeches by defence minister John McCallum. One might add, though, for consideration by the committee, and indeed we should be doing this in the academic community as well, what might be the American reaction to more pronounced asymmetries in the Canadian force structure.

Second, to what extent should asymmetries exist within individual services? Should, for example, the force structure of the army overwhelmingly favour the infantry at the expense of armour and artillery? In the air force, should strategic airlift requirements take precedence over tactical fighter requirements? What, if any, would be the American reaction to such asymmetries?

Third, to what extent is it feasible? This is an important question. To what extent is it feasible to retain key--for lack of a better term--skill sets and the requisite equipment at the cadre level, minimal critical mass, either for operational training as a basis for expansion in time of crisis, or to provide a very limited home defence or expeditionary capability? In other words, if there are certain capabilities we're going to have to let go, is there at least some way to find a technique for embedding, to use another popular term from 2003, some minimal residual cadre of capability to keep certain skill sets alive and these capabilities available in the Canadian Forces?

¿ (0930)

Fourth, what is the optimal division of labour between the regular and reserve components of Canada's armed forces? We're still puzzling over this issue and we have been doing so for many, many years. I would add that in a defence environment increasingly shaped by alternative service delivery, ASD, should new categories of reserves, such as “sponsored reserves” on the British model, be adopted in Canada? I'd be happy to come back to that theme later.

To what degree should interoperability with the United States shape Canada's doctrine, force structure, equipment, and military capabilities? To what extent should Canada seek to retain military autonomy, albeit within coalition frameworks? Also, could a credible combat capable defence establishment be fashioned around a numerically smaller but information rich military utilizing the widest possible array of RMA-derived technologies?

I would add that there is a question as to whether new information and other technologies necessarily permit reduced manpower. There is certainly evidence that even some of the new equipment we've received in recent years, although in some cases a quantum leap over what it replaced, certainly was not less manpower intensive or less labour intensive. It requires more technicians and more support. So there is a quantum leap, yes, and you can say it's partly RMA-related in some cases, but there is a labour cost that goes with that--more technicians, for example.

There is a seventh point, which is, would perhaps a less RMA-oriented but numerically larger force better serve Canada's national and international requirements?

The other pivotal variable is money, or, more accurately, the lack of money. Each of the proferred core options and their numerous permutations require significant levels of expenditure. Not even the traditional constabulary model, not even the no-military option would be cost free. The wholesale elimination of selected combat capabilities would admittedly save money, but even these “savings” could prove illusory if, in the process of military retrenchment, we fundamentally damaged our broader economic and political relationships with the United States, and indeed our relationships with other allies.

Viewed from Washington, the no-military and the non-military/quasi-military constabulary--in other words, the constabulary without an attitude option--would be considered non-starters, thereby generating profound American displeasure with Canada and American pressure to fill the resulting military and security vacuum. Neither reaction would benefit Canadian sovereignty. The constabulary with an attitude variant, which includes combat capable forces for homeland and continental defence, could well intrigue the United States, but the loss of Canadian capability overseas would not be well received.

From an American perspective, the preferable options would be some variation on the multi-purpose combat capable model outlined in the 1994 white paper, or the niche combat capable option. The two latter options, perhaps ironically, would also best serve Canada's broader national interests.

Finally, I'd like to explore techniques and measures for enhancing Canadian sovereignty and security more broadly. What I've essentially attempted to do in this section, and I can move through this fairly quickly, is to identify a menu, if you will, a range of procurement and other initiatives that you may wish to take into consideration. Some of these actually conflict with each other because in some cases I've identified multiple options for fixing the same basic problem.

This list is representative rather than exhaustive. It seeks to identify measures that would enhance Canadian sovereignty and security, while in some cases also enhancing multi-purpose capabilities relevant to expeditionary peacekeeping, peace support, and combat operations.

These are measures that, in my view, can be justified on the basis of Canada's own national interests. At the same time, however, they would generate capabilities relevant to enhanced continental and homeland defence in conjunction with the United States.

¿ (0935)

Such measures could assist in providing, in the words of Nils Orvik, “defence against help”, and reinforce the understanding that participation in national missile defence, if it transpires, does not signal the end of a robust Canadian capability in support of Canadian defence security and sovereignty objectives. In other words, such measures could provide a measured counterweight to the increasing north-south pull of some elements of the Canada-U.S. defence relationships.

I'll move through these very quickly. I've divided them somewhat arbitrarily.

In terms of Arctic sovereignty and security in and of itself, there is a range of further measures we could take. As this committee is well aware, our military presence in the Arctic is not exactly extensive. It virtually constitutes the largest demilitarized zone in the world. On the one hand, that's good. On the other hand, it's perhaps so modest that it does raise some sovereignty protection implications, which the committee might like to address.

In terms of possible measures we could take, I'll run through these very fast: additional land, sea, and air deployments from southern Canada; improved multi-agency data sharing and analysis; the creation of a modest, and I stress modest, northern training centre; the retention and upgrading of the Arcturus, Arctic sovereignty aircraft, or what was nominally supposed to be an Arctic sovereignty aircraft but is now scheduled to be disposed of; acquire a supplement to the Twin Otter aircraft currently stationed in Yellowknife; acquire--and we're looking at naval options--an ice-capable seabed operations vessel; explore a full range of space-based sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, and subsurface surveillance systems, northern terrain vehicles; explore the utility of high-frequency surface wave radar in the north--I believe Dr. Leggatt spoke to you about that and acknowledged that it had some potential utility, but there were limitations; and, in the longer term, continue to explore the potential for installing air-independent propulsion power plants on the four recently acquired submarines.

In terms of maritime and coastal patrol--actually that's an old term now. One is not supposed to refer to maritime patrol aircraft any longer. The new term is ISR aircraft--intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance--to reflect the fact that there's been a metamorphosis in the maritime patrol community. Such aircraft are now capable of a much broader range of functions than purely maritime patrol, as it was understood even as recently as a decade ago.

In any event, some options here for your consideration are: pursue the deployment of high-frequency surface radar on the east and west coasts; reconsider with urgency the proposed downsizing of the Aurora fleet, and also perhaps explore the sensor packages that we're putting or not putting on the upgraded Auroras; as I mentioned a moment ago, reconsider the disposal of the Arcturus aircraft, which, I might add, were acquired at great cost in the early 1990s, making them only a decade old, which by Canadian standards means they've just been barely broken in. I'm reluctant to part with those aircraft, at this point at least.

We might wish to consider the reintroduction of a coastal patrol capability to the air force. It no longer has a coastal patrol capability. The Mulroney government privatized that function. And although various measures were made to creep back into the coastal patrol business, we have not done so under either government, the Mulroney government or the Chrétien government. We do not have, as I said, coastal patrol per se in Canada's air force.

Pursue with vigour the maritime helicopter. I think enough said at this juncture on that.

Ensure the utmost in data fusion capabilities, the ability to process and collate the data we get, because all sorts of sensors aren't going to help you all that much if you cannot collate the data you're getting, not only from military sources but from other government departments.

I think we might wish to examine too--you have been briefed earlier on Canada's participation in the joint strike fighter program. The U.S. navy has recently indicated an interest in attempting to put together a JSF-like consortium, for lack of a better term, aimed at acquiring a new multi-mission maritime patrol intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft. This is an airplane that we could well use as a successor at some future point for the Aurora.

The vast majority of people I've spoken to have been quite happy with our decision to participate in the joint strike fighter program. If there's an opportunity on the maritime patrol ISR front, perhaps that will be worth taking a closer look at. We might wish to examine unmanned aerial vehicles, of course, and perhaps as well re-examine the forces/coast guard/DFO relationship. I say that with some reluctance because I realize that relationship has been almost studied to death over the past 15 years, but perhaps post-9/11 some further tweaking at least and maybe more radical steps could be justified.

¿ (0940)

Third is strategic mobility and search and rescue. I think we should seek, where possible, to reduce our current dependence on the United States for strategic airlift--not eliminate it but reduce it and at least have some independent capability. This requires a genuine strategic airlift capacity in the Canadian Forces, preferably through the national acquisition of the Airbus A400M, or the C17 in some combination with the Hercules fleet, or alternatively, some combination of Hercules and guaranteed access to a NATO pool fleet of C17s or A400s.

I might add that the minister's, shall we say, marked lack of enthusiasm for the national purchase of a C17 fleet for Canada is not surprising. The C17 does offer eye-watering performance, but unfortunately at an eye-watering cost, and he correctly noted as well that only two of our allies, the U.S. and the U.K., currently have military transport aircraft capable of lifting what is called outsized cargo, very heavy, very bulky cargo.

The problem that is going to come, I think, early in the next decade, 2010 and 2011, when A400Ms start entering service with a fairly wide assortment of other NATO allies, some of them fairly small by Canadian standards, is we're going to be in a very embarrassing situation at that juncture if there are countries quite smaller than ourselves that have an outsized airlift capability and we do not. Even Luxembourg has bought in or is planning to buy into the A400 program. They want to operate a small number, maybe just one or two airplanes, in concert with the A400 fleet of one of their neighbouring countries.

So we'll actually be in the vulnerable situation, come 2010, 2011, or so, where we will not be able to match the strategic airlift capabilities of Luxembourg. It's one thing to be able to say we can't match the U.S. and the U.K., but not matching Luxembourg is, shall we say, cause for concern.

I wanted to add one other scenario in here on search and rescue, which at first glance may seem a strange thing to bring up in the context of Canada-U.S. relations. We are looking at, as you're aware, the acquisition of a twin turboprop, twin-engined fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft to take over the search and rescue responsibilities of the Hercules.

What I would like to suggest, though, is that if we do that--and I think you can make a pretty compelling case for buying a smaller airplane to supplement the Hercules--we make sure that new aircraft has at least a secondary or at least a tertiary coastal patrol capability, some additional supplemental resource that we could call upon if and when required. This would mean some adjustments to the sensor package on the aircraft in terms of the type of radar we placed on it and the type of forward-looking infrared system we placed on the aircraft, features that in any event, to my mind, are required on a modern-day search and rescue aircraft anyway. But let's, in effect, have a smart search and rescue aircraft.

In terms of these other quick categories, air and maritime defence more generally in terms of sovereignty-enhancing options, which we might wish to consider, certainly if any NMD facilities or NMD-related facilities emerge on Canadian soil--for example, a radar site--I think we would certainly wish to ensure joint staffing of such facilities, that it not simply be an American installation.

I think we also need to explore the requirement for enhanced air and maritime defence capabilities as an adjunct to a limited or, even more so, a comprehensive national missile defence system. This could necessitate adjustments in terms of CF-18s, tanker aircraft, the navy's major surface and subsurface combatants, shipborne ground-to-air-based radars, and data fusion arrangements.

What I mean by adjunct is this. You may recall that back in 1985 during the FDI debate there was something else the public didn't really zoom in on, and that was the ADI, the air defence initiative, because the Americans realized and our defence planners realized that if you ever did get strategic defence initiative going the way President Regan had originally envisaged it, you would also have to have a very substantial buildup of your air defence capabilities to deal with threats such as cruise missiles. In other words, there was no sense in putting, if you could, a seamless ballistic missile defence protection around the continent and then in a sense forcing your opponents to invest in cruise missiles and other weapons that SDI couldn't deal with. That meant ADI building up radars to detect cruise missiles, building up maritime capabilities, more fighter aircraft, etc.

¿ (0945)

The Americans do go into NMD, and as they are, we're going to have to give some thought to whether there are air defence and maritime defence corollaries that must go along with that. I think there will be, and whether that will have much impact on us remains to be seen, but it's certainly something to keep in mind. NMD has adjuncts and offshoots that we have to consider here.

Finally, in my sort of catch-all category, I would also suggest that it would be wise for us to avoid undue dependence on American doctrine and resources. This is more difficult in a post-Cold War age. I mean, when the Cold War was on we were interacting on a daily basis with European NATO allies. There were more influences, more interaction, professional interaction, with other countries. Now, that hasn't completely disappeared, of course, but now the American link, the pull, is greater for geographic reasons if nothing else. I think as an example of avoiding that undue dependence we have to look at some options. I alluded to the following one a moment ago.

For example, if we get rid of main battle tanks from the Canadian army and replace them with the heavy-gun armed version of the LAV or Striker vehicle, I would strongly suggest that rather than ship our people down to the States for joint training with their tanks, we retain sufficient Leopards, a modest but adequate number, for operational training in support of peacekeeping, peace support, and combat operations. I'm saying, I guess, essentially here that if we get rid of the Leopard from the armoured regiments per se in favour of a lighter vehicle, when we send peacekeepers and people on peace support operations or combat operations overseas, they'd better have an understanding of how the main battle tank functions on the battlefield. Even in classic peacekeeping that knowledge can be very useful.

I can recall one of my former bosses at York University, who was, I admit, ex-armoured corps, pointing out that in 1974 when Turkey invaded Cyprus there were large numbers of Canadian soldiers on the island who had never seen a tank before. He thought that was cause for some concern. I think the cadre solution, a small tank component remaining, even if we replace them in larger numbers with the Striker or LAV vehicle, would be something worth taking a look at.

Other options are: continuing to develop our homeland defence capabilities along the lines of the forces; a joint NBCD company; explore additional homeland defence roles for the reserves; and thoroughly and objectively review the impact of alternative service delivery on Canadian defence capabilities.

You may have detected that I'm skeptical about ASD. I'm not anti-ASD per se, but I think my attitude is best summed up as, if I might paraphrase a former prime minister, ASD if necessary, but not necessarily ASD.

Other options are to expand cooperation, as appropriate, with other government departments and agencies and also continue in terms of further developing a Canadian military educational system. We've made a lot of progress on that front in the past five or six years and I'd like to see that continue. It will require additional funding, but the military educational system at the upper levels for professional development I think would benefit from some further injections.

Finally, as I've sailed right past my time allocation, thereby also proving that I'm an academic, I would offer just these wrap-up thoughts. I've attempted to underscore three main points in this presentation.

First, Canadians are increasingly viewing continental defence and homeland defence through the lens not only of sovereignty but of economics and security.

Second, the Canada-U.S. defence relationship will inevitably be shaped and influenced by our broader defence policy and force structure choices.

Third, a variety of measures should be explored to enhance our homeland and continental and indeed expeditionary capabilities, both because they are justified in their own right and because they help to provide “defence against help”.

The measures outlined above and others not enumerated of an expeditionary nature would require not insignificant expenditures, but the result would be a tri-service, multi-purpose, and combat-capable defence establishment relevant to the broadest possible array of roles, be they military, quasi-military, or non-military in nature, or domestic, continental, or expeditionary in locale. In a world brimming with risk and strategic uncertainty, any lesser defence posture would be, in my view, naive, shortsighted, and dangerous.

¿ (0950)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you, Professor Shadwick.

Far from providing us with jaded remnants, I think what you've done is given us some new and refreshing and, dare I say as well, entertaining perspectives on various aspects of Canada--U.S. defence relations.

Before we get into questions, I would like to advise members, just on an item of business in the event that members have to leave before the end of the meeting, that we are looking at an examination of the subcommittee's report on veterans affairs next Tuesday. That report has been completed and has to be dealt with by this committee before it gets sent over to the House of Commons. If members could mark that on their schedules, that would be appreciated. I know the veterans subcommittee has been doing a lot of work in this area, and I think we would want to get that before the House just as quickly as we possibly could. So if we could block out that time on our schedules, that would be appreciated.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Just on that, Mr. Chairman, as you know, I won't be here because of a commitment I have. But I was at our subcommittee and we went through each and every one of our recommendations and, my colleagues, we made major changes, and a number of them just in the wording. We all adopted them, those who were with us. It was unanimous when we got through, sir, just so you know.

The Chair: All right. Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

We'll begin the questioning with Mr. Benoit, as usual.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Professor. It was very interesting indeed. I'll only get a chance to ask you one set of questions. I'm one of those who has to leave.

I want to deal with three items, the first one being the strategic airlift issue. The minister brushes it off saying, “How can Canada afford a $3 billion to $5 billion project? We'll have nothing to carry in the planes.” I guess with the Liberal budget, maybe that's the case, but certainly increasing the budget is an option.

Second, the life of a plane like that would be 20 to 40 years, probably 30 years at a minimum. When you spread that cost out over that time, which is what the minister is doing with that figure, it would probably cost $200 million a year for Canada to have substantial strategic airlift. Our rental costs for this year in fact could be that. So the economics that the minister presents maybe aren't entirely complete or I think are somewhat misleading.

I just want your comment, though, on what the benefits of Canada being one of those few countries to purchase strategic airlift might be in terms of the budgeting. We've gone to an accrual budgeting process now, and certainly you have to consider the annual costs, spreading it over a much longer period.

The Americans have made it clear that it's important to them that we don't keep depending on them for strategic airlift, and it would be important to them, I think, for Canada to have the ability to help them out in that regard from time to time and to help other allies out.

So looking at the relationship between Canada and the United States and Canada and our NATO allies, what would be the benefits of Canada purchasing a strategic airlift?

¿ (0955)

Prof. Martin Shadwick: Thank you. I believe they're not only desirable but indispensable. It reminded me of the paragraph on the centennial year history of the Canadian Forces authored by Professor D.J. Goodspeed. He took particular note in the section on peacekeeping about the importance of airlift capacity, and went out of his way to do it. I think that remains even more true today.

We may well wind up lightening, for example, the army through the acquisition of light armoured vehicles and the Striker series and so on, but that will only do us so much good if we can't move some of that equipment and capability more expeditiously than is currently the case.

Our Hercules fleet, as you know, has given marvellous service over the years. And some of them are not all that old, quite frankly, but their ability to carry a light armoured vehicle is extremely limited, and if you do shove a light armoured vehicle into a Hercules, you cannot fly very far with it, so you're making lots of stops and so on.

So a long-range strategic airlifter of the C17 A400 category, to my mind, is absolutely crucial if we are to move quickly. I noted with interest the Prime Minister's comments last week in terms of our deployment to the Congo, that we had this ability to move faster.

Our military airlift capacity over the years has been one of the saving graces of our peacekeeping capacity, and my concern is that we build on that foundation. Our Hercules fleet, by the way, and I think this statistic will probably surprise you--we have 32 Hercules in the fleet. That's the fourth largest Hercules fleet in the world. There aren't many capacities we have where we're in the fourth position, but we have the fourth largest fleet. The problem, of course, is that it's a smaller aircraft. It's a medium tactical airlifter, strictly speaking. You can go longer ranges, making it “stra-tactical”, if I can coin a term, but it can't be expected to carry the entire load. We still need a Hercules-type aircraft.

It appeared to me, as an outsider looking at this, that earlier this year and late last year there was a very good chance that we would buy into the C17. It has come a cropper. I'm not quite sure what the dynamics of that were or what happened.

The minister's interest in a NATO pool of aircraft is interesting. I mean, there are ways that could be made to work. We don't necessarily need to put the maple leaf on a shiny new C17. The problem, though, is finding a multinational NATO pool arrangement that will really work, and work for us in terms of guaranteed availability, the cost sharing on this work, access to the aircraft, etc., which might be problematic.

It's interesting that in NATO circles at the moment--and this is changing almost daily from what I can tell--as of a couple of weeks ago the Europeans were thinking of, when they spoke of a pool of strategic airlift capacity...because they need it too; we're not alone. The minister is quite right in that sense. They seem to be thinking of a short-term pool that would basically just formalize existing ad hoc arrangements for the lease of Russian or Ukrainian commercial aircraft to make them more readily available to NATO on a fixed cost basis, but only keep that capability until their own fleets of A400Ms arrive in 2010, 2011, or thereabouts.

If they put that into place, sort of a short-term pool, and we buy into it or participate--because I don't think anyone is actually going to be buying anything; it's just, as I said, modifying the existing leasing and charter arrangements--in 2010, 2011, or 2012, that option could go away and we would be back to square one, where we would have a superannuated fleet of Hercules and no national C17 or A400 fleet and no access to one.

If NATO does manage to put together a pool fleet of C17s or A400s, perhaps modeled on the NATO AWACS operation--although I don't want to press that comparison too closely because there's some significant differences on how the two operations might actually function--that is an option that we could consider, provided it was the right aircraft, the right quantity, the right access to those aircraft, and the right cost-sharing arrangements. That could get us out of the box, and then we would simply modernize our Hercules fleet, presumably by buying the C130J, the newest iteration on the Hercules model.

However, if there isn't a pool fleet, a really credible, robust pool fleet, I think we may still wind up having to acquire our own national strategic airlift capacity, which, logic suggests, would either be C17 and Hercules in some combination or, in the interest of commonality, perhaps an A400 fleet.

À (1000)

However, that option, unfortunately, isn't readily available to us, because, as the committee will know, that Airbus product has had an extraordinarily lengthy gestation period--so long-running you'd think an academic was in charge of the program.

I'm going to get shot for that one.

The Chair: That seems like a good point at which to end the questioning for this member.

We'll proceed with Mr. Price for seven minutes.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you very much, Professor, for being here today. I always enjoy your talks.

You covered a lot of material actually. I started writing questions in the beginning and you've already covered a lot of it, which is great.

There are a couple of things, though. You had one very interesting comment right at the beginning where you said “avoiding a seat at the table to protect sovereignty”. That was an interesting line. Could you expand a little bit on that?

Prof. Martin Shadwick: I think it comes down to literally the opposite of the seat at the table, of course. The problem is that operationalizing the idea of no seat at the table is a bit tricky. It basically means not doing anything at all and maybe sort of just wishing the whole thing will go away. This time it's not going to go away.

The Americans--and many of your witnesses have repeated exactly the same thing--are determined to pursue national missile defence in one form or another, and the “no seat at the table” option, it seems to me, doesn't really work. I mean, we're engaged here, whether we want to be or not, simply by geography.

In 1985, because SDI was so far down the road and for other reasons, the “no seat at the table” option wasn't necessarily a bad idea. When the government of the day declined the American invitation, I thought that was the right decision, for reasons I won't bore you with now.

In the dynamics of today, I don't think the “no seat at the table” model will wash, in which we sort of make a policy choice not to participate or dialogue with the Americans. I think it's better, although it carries risks of its own, to have the seat at the table instead of the head in the sand type of approach.

Mr. David Price: Another question. You just mentioned the reserves very quickly. I'm wondering if you could comment on the role of the reserves in relation to the national guard in the United States.

As reserves in Canada, if we were to train with the United States we would tend to train with the regulars more than the national guard. There is quite a difference there. Do you think we should be changing our whole set-up of reserves in order to mirror the national guard a little more? Should we be going in that direction? Or in what other direction could we go to reinforce our reserves and reinforce, I guess--how do I put this--getting our reserves working a little closer with our regulars, which tends to happen with the national guard in the United States and its regulars? They work much closer together than we do.

Prof. Martin Shadwick: Yes, this raises some very important questions. I must admit, as an academic looking in on the regular reserve relationship in Canada, I cannot help but feel exceptionally frustrated. We study and study. The first time I testified before the old standing committee on external affairs and national defence, several witnesses on that occasion were lamenting and identifying the sorts of issues you just touched upon.

We've clearly made some progress, if you look at the number of reservists that are in the Balkans or en route to the Balkans. There's still room for further improvement and a closer relationship. I think an awful lot of time in terms of the regulars and the reserves themselves is being used up counterproductively in internal fighting, wasting time and resources.

Where exactly the niche best rests with our reserves is a question of legitimate and understandable difference of opinion.

The American national guard and the reserves are interesting creatures. For benchmarking purposes, perhaps we should be looking as well at smaller countries, and Australia comes to mind, to see what their regular reserve relationship is and where their reserves fit in, or the British model perhaps.

The problem with a comparison with the Americans is you're dealing with such a vast military operation. By no means is it a level playing field. The last time I checked, the Kentucky National Guard had almost as many troop lift helicopters as Canada. It is the same with the reserves. There are abundant resources available to them. It's hard for our reserves to relate to the sorts of capabilities and resources available to their American cousins.

There are also some interesting differences, and this has always intrigued me, in terms of the use of the national guard in the United States for disaster relief operations. We've tended to make very little use of the reserve forces in Canada for disaster relief situations.

Admittedly, the legal framework differs dramatically. In the United States if the governor of state X, Y or Z--and that's a bit of a misnomer--wishes to summon military assistance in response to a natural disaster, he or she phones the commanding general of the state national guard and those resources are instantly available. In the Canadian context, the provinces do not have military resources. Requests are routed through Ottawa, which tends to respond with the regulars for various reasons.

That's perhaps something I'd like to see us streamline. I'm not suggesting constitutional changes, by the way, to provide each province with its own military establishment. We have enough problems in this country without adding whole new levels of military bureaucracy in there.

The short answer to your question is that I myself am still not convinced where the best niche is for our reserves. Clearly we have a better handle on the naval and air reserve side of the coin than we do on the militia.

As you know, the push in recent years has been to compartmentalize the militia a little bit more, get rid of some of the combat arms units and put them into combat support and service support, which would basically parallel in significant measure the American experience. If you look at deployments to the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the more recent conflict, a very high percentage of American combat support and service support came from a reserve and guard unit.

I think you can make a case for increasing the number of conversions of Canadian militia units to combat support and service support and related functions. I would not want to completely move them into that sphere, however. I think we still need to retain some of the more conventional infantry, armour, and artillery capabilities within the militia at the same time.

À (1005)

Mr. David Price: The problem we have is the culture behind it and our regiments don't want to move. Certainly we have a big barrier there to get by, to change them into service units.

Prof. Martin Shadwick: You're right. There's the cultural thing, and there's also the geographic and demographic factor, which outmanoeuvres all of these computations as to what type of militia unit. You have the problem that militia units across the country--not in every case but in many cases--are shrinking. There is the question of consolidation of units. Regardless of whether a unit is an infantry unit, there's also the added trauma of consolidating honoured and famous regiments.

I'm enough of a military historian as well to lament the passing of honoured names and the coming up with new convoluted regimental names that somehow become hybrid. That's an issue over and above the one of the exact nature of the unit's existence.

The other problem, of course, and coming from Toronto it is striking, is how there is a core of militia strength in Toronto. If you go into the 905 belt around Toronto, you have huge population bases without any militia presence whatsoever. We should have been building armouries, not huge networks--putting more armouries into the 905 belt 10 to 15 years ago when DND could afford some land in those regions. That reduces the recruiting base of the militia, regardless of whether you package it as infantry or you package it as combat and service support.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price. Thank you, Professor.

Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): If you don't understand French, you'll need the translation device.

À (1010)

[Translation]

Mr. Shadwick, I would also like to congratulate you for your presentation. Usually, when a witness comes before us, I take a full page of notes; today, I already have three pages. As you say in English, this presentation was very comprehensive.

On the other hand, there are some things I'd like to talk to you about, and these things surprised me. You have submitted to us new important data indicating, among other things, that Canadian sovereignty related not only to the army, but also to the economy and trade.

You also gave us possible scenarios as to how to proceed; for example, you talk about what might happen if we had no army at all or if we had a traditional constabulary force. I find that to be a very interesting approach.

Questions were also raised several times about the three services of our armed forces? Should they be treated equally or should we choose to invest more in one than in the others? You also said much about how Washington would see each one of the different scenarios.

I find that Canada needs a review of its national policy in the matter of foreign affairs. We should not forget that national defence is a very important aspect of foreign affairs. How a country behaves in the area of international aid or during a conflict forms an important part of foreign affairs.

Perhaps the concepts formulated in 1994 in the national defence policy may still be good, but you're telling us that it's a matter of choice. Canada must decide what policy in the matter of foreign affairs or national defence it wants to choose. You're telling us that all we have to do is put our house in order. I wouldn't say that this foreign affairs policy or national defence policy should be done in agreement with Washington, but there would have do be consultation with Washington to see how the Americans would react if we were to decide to act in one way or the other.

Finally, it's up to Canada to decide what it wants. If, as you said before, any advances to Washington are doomed to failure, maybe it would be best to try to find an area where we could agree more readily.

Do you agree with me that, even though the 1994 concepts are still good, the world has changed since then? There were the World Trade Center events, and we are now facing invisible enemies, the military doctrine is changing and we are no more faced with an army that we can attack or that is going to attack us.

I find it's high time Canada found a new defence policy and a new foreign affairs policy. I'd like to hear what you have to say on that matter.

[English]

Prof. Martin Shadwick: You've raised some excellent points.

Clearly we need in this country a more holistic approach, for lack of a better term, to these sorts of issues. That means we review foreign and defence policy not in isolation but as part of a package, and one could add international security policy. In some respects, as one of my colleagues at the university used to argue, we need an international security policy in effect as a bridge between our foreign policy and our defence. Truly bringing together all of the diverse elements you mentioned I think is absolutely crucial.

As you alluded to, we also have some choices to make. We have some range for manoeuvre. Obviously they're not unlimited choices; there are certain things we might do that the Americans would be most unhappy about, but we do have choices. It's not as if this is all at the beck and call of the United States or NATO allies. We do have some room for manoeuvre here. There are certainly examples in our past where governments of the day explored other options in conjunction with our allies to see if certain changes might be useful.

I recall the example in the 1980s early in the Mulroney period where some serious thought was given to a so-called northern defence policy to reorient our NATO contributions from central Europe to Norway and the north flank. We could repeat that again. Chatting with our allies about scenarios about how we can be most helpful and most useful doesn't mean we're giving them veto power; it means we're dialoguing with them and discussing options.

The American reaction to certain things we might propose or put on the table, of course, will in large part depend on what the proposals are. There are some choices we could make that the Americans would not be happy about. The no military option, for example, would clearly not impress them. In the current environment of a somewhat strained Canada-U.S. relationship, it would be a most inopportune moment to be talking about that. Even in terms of the other, more credible options we have some choices.

I mentioned the question, does one make a choice between strategic transport aircraft and fighter aircraft? The Americans would react to that by saying that you really need both, and I would tend to agree. How many and what types are different issues. I don't see how one could eliminate a fighter capability from the Canadian Forces in its entirety given our geographic location.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the Americans would have been underwhelmed if we had put all of our transport airplanes on alert and had no fighter airplanes to put on alert. Although getting rid of fighter planes works for New Zealand--and that's what the New Zealanders have done--in the Canadian context I don't think it would be plausible given our geography and our geographic location.

In terms of other options and scenarios, the last time this was brought to the public's attention in any visible way was in the early 1990s when Admiral Chuck Thomas, in his letter of resignation, made it clear that he favoured, in a sense, the niche models I spoke of earlier. What Admiral Thomas wanted to do was to give preference and priority in defence spending to the navy and the air force. That followed closely on the heels of the Persian Gulf War, so it was a rather logical position for him to take. You'll recall that our army involvement in the Persian Gulf conflict was fairly limited.

If we had followed that model--and I admit you could made a compelling case for that model, and there are quite a few scenarios that superficially at least look attractive--it would have meant that we would not have had the sort of army in the rest of the 1990s that would have participated in all of the peace support operations and the combat operations with which we became involved.

That brings me back to a very difficult question. It's very attractive to say let's get rid of this set of capabilities or that set of capabilities and we'll take the savings from those and pump them into areas of strength. That's an old military axiom: you reinforce success, you reinforce certain areas. The problem is there's no guarantee that we're going to get it right. We may load up on the wrong set of capabilities, which prove not to be needed, while at the same time capabilities we have given up may turn out to be required.

À (1015)

No one can tell. The finest strategic analytical minds in the world and the best computing power in the world cannot unfailingly predict the future geostrategic environment. And that's why, although clearly we're going to be getting rid of certain capabilities in the coming years to save money that can go into other areas, we have to be exceptionally careful that we don't get rid of something that we might need later on. Just keep in mind the insurance value. I know that can be misinterpreted as well. We want to save a little bit of everything, shave the ice cube. And I would be the first to admit that model doesn't work either. We can't do that.

But I do offer, if you will, a third option. If there are capabilities that have to go--and I cited earlier the example of the tank--let's at least keep a cadre of capability, and I mean a couple of dozen Leopard tanks at a combat training centre, Gagetown or Wainwright, so that we keep at least certain key skill sets alive within the Canadian Forces. In so doing, we also reduce the need to send our people to the United States, Britain, France, or other European countries to train on their tanks. So we've got some in-house. Give it up? Yes, perhaps in the broader sense, but keep a cadre of skill sets alive in those areas. I think that's very important.

À (1020)

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: I didn't expect to get back that soon.

Maybe I'll continue along that line actually, on the niche capabilities. You talked about heavy lift, and A400s and C17s coming online with our NATO partners. The Americans are also looking at adding on and changing their heavy lift capability, which is pretty old right now. Those planes have to be changed. There's no question that Canadians...as you say, we're the fourth largest fleet, and I think we've become very specialized in handling the C130s, and actually even in the maintenance side of it.

As of right now, Canadians do a lot of servicing of even the American fleet. I think it has definitely become a specialty for us. I believe we are one of the few countries who actually have women flying our C130s.

Should we specialize in that particular plane, especially since going into any theatre of operation, or almost any theatre of operation today, particularly on the first in, we usually have to use the C130 because you can't get in there with any of the larger planes? So we're moving in equipment maybe just one at a time, but we've become the specialist in that, as we are now in the world today.

We talked about the NATO pool, where we could station part of that pool in Canada and expand our own C130 fleet, and maybe station part of that fleet in one of our NATO partner countries, an exchange type of program. Do you think that possibility would be interesting?

Prof. Martin Shadwick: Indeed I do. It's an example of a more robust approach to the pool fleet. That, I think, was the key I was stressing earlier, that there are ways of doing pooling that are, quite frankly, not likely to buy us that much. There are ways along the lines you're heading that would be a more robust capability, particularly if one had some of these aircraft stationed in Canada.

It does build on an existing strength. We started to ramp up our Hercules fleet in the 1960s, and I give Paul Hellyer top marks for that expansion program. The air force at the time, as air forces are wont to do, was more interested in buying fighter planes than transport aircraft. The air force, as he recounts in his memoirs, wanted to continue rebuilding rather elderly C119 flying boxcars. When Mr. Hellyer found out about it, he quickly scrapped that program as a waste of money and directed the air force to beef up the Hercules fleet; hence one of the reasons we have a relatively large fleet.

We'll be building on a traditional Canadian strength. The robust pooling arrangement would take the lead in some way by perhaps contributing more money than some of the other partners, having some of the aircraft in Canada and being quite hands-on and involved. I think this is a very interesting thing to look at.

I would simply add that even if we could manage that--and of course we would need cooperation from our friends and allies to help contribute to the cost of that pool--we are still going to be acquiring, in some cases, sizeable fleets of A400s. Our tactical advantage to our allies in terms of having more airlift--as compared to the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s--is almost certain to be lost to some extent even if we took the lead on a new NATO pool.

That 32-aircraft fleet gave us some real prominence over the years in capabilities of this sort. I think the PM was probably alluding to that last week in terms of a rapid capability. But we're going to lose some of that cachet even if we took the lead in a pool, because when you start injecting A400s into the national air forces of European countries, some of our lead, if you will, will be lost.

You made several references to the C130. It depends, of course, on whether we use the C17 as the baseline aircraft for a pool, but it could equally be the A400. If we had C17s or a pool of C17s, we would still obviously need our own Hercules fleet. How big that fleet should be is open to some debate. One of the things that is not so readily apparent when you look at the numbers in our Hercules fleet--although we have 32 and it is indeed the world's fourth largest national fleet of Hercules--is that a significant slice of those 32 aircraft have search and rescue commitments.

In fact, if you go ahead, and this is not clear if it will happen, and introduce Hercules aircraft on the west coast for search and rescue--search and rescue on the west coast is currently handled by Buffalo aircraft--as well as the rest of the country, you could argue that as many as 12 of our 32 Hercules would have search and rescue commitments, either primary, backup, or a slice of operational training time for search and rescue crews. You could actually have a situation where a very large chunk of that 32 is search and rescue.

The problem that imposes, or the restraint it imposes, is that those aircraft cannot go out of the country for lengthy periods of time. We can call upon the Hercules attached to search and rescue squadrons for quick jaunts in and out of the country. If you want to fly a load of relief supplies to the Caribbean, for example, you can do that by grabbing an airplane from Greenwood and coming back in fairly short order, but you certainly can't touch the search-and-rescue-assigned Hercules fleet for operations in the Persian Gulf or the Congo.

À (1025)

Mr. David Price: If we become specialists in the Hercules aircraft...our American friends have a lot of them too. As I was saying, I think we're servicing their search and rescue fleet right now, which they have on the west coast. They're being serviced in Edmonton. We may become very interchangeable and interoperable with the Americans. In specializing, we have our fleet and they have their fleet, and we can go back and forth.

As we add on and continue with the same thing...I know you were suggesting another plane could do some of this search and rescue and patrolling. I'm just saying we have to be careful not to get too many different types of equipment. We're such a large country, and maybe we should concentrate on one in particular. That is the direction that I think we should be going in.

Prof. Martin Shadwick: Are you thinking in terms of an all C130 fleet or C130 plus a pool fleet of larger aircraft where we would play a prominent role?

Mr. David Price: That's right. The pool would be for when we have to really move out the heavy lift. For the Canadian operation and for our operations where we're going to be going directly into theatre where they need these smaller planes to get in and out, we would also be specializing in that. That would be our niche.

Prof. Martin Shadwick: I find the niche idea quite intriguing. There are historical parallels there, where we've had a specialized capability that other allies did not enjoy, quite frankly.

When you speak of a pool, though, the C130s would be the core then, I take it, of our air transport fleet. Would you see the pool fleet being C130s or a larger--

Mr. David Price: They would be the larger planes where we would be pooled with our NATO partners. In exchange, of course, we would provide part of the pool of our C130s to them.

Prof. Martin Shadwick: Are we talking about two types of airplanes?

Mr. David Price: Yes.

Prof. Martin Shadwick: I think that could be quite impressive depending on what aircraft we selected for the pool component, but a good solid core of C130s nationally owned, perhaps even expanded beyond the 32 aircraft, could really make this idea work, or alternatively, smaller aircraft purchased so you can release the search and rescue Hercules back into the transport pool, which would be another way of tackling the problem. However, I take note of your reservations on too many fleet types.

Then have, for the sake of argument, C17s or potentially A400s in the pool where we would take an active role. They wouldn't carry, presumably, Canadian markings, but we could have a higher-than-fair-share contribution financially in the aircraft. Some would be based in Canada. We could make sure we had a good allocation of personnel in the operation. I think that could be well worth taking a look at.

I'm going to make the assumption that because the minister has been less than thrilled about the idea of putting the maple leaf on the C17, the thinking perhaps now is that the pool idea is the one to pursue. As long as it's something better than what the Europeans were looking at this time last week--more formal arrangements to lease Russian and Ukrainian commercial aircraft--I think the pool is worth very close consideration.

If, however, for various reasons, it does not come to fruition.... Keep in mind here that pooling within NATO and setting up a NATO pool-type operation could be an interesting exercise. You know what happens when the competing demands and interests of many countries get involved, and of course there are a lot more NATO countries sitting around the table. We may wind up in a pool with the new Europe than the old Europe, but a pool is a pool.

So there might be some other interesting options here as well. I think it's certainly worth taking a look at.

The key comes down to really two options: we get an outsize capability to go along with the Hercules, either C17s or A400s, or a Hercules-type aircraft and what I will call a robust pool of aircraft that will have some real credibility, and not simply fine tuning chartering arrangements for Russian aircraft.

À (1030)

The Chair: Thank you, Professor.

I'm going to go to Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much.

I want to welcome you, Professor Shadwick. I appreciate your comments.

As you know, for quite a number of years we have cut back on our reserves and we have cut back on our military. We didn't feel until September 11, 2001, I guess, that there was a need for us to take a look at our military. Certainly it's become a priority now to look at it, but I definitely have to say that somehow, I don't know how, we have to get our people in Ottawa and across this nation to look at our military as a number one priority, as they do in the U.S.A. You never hear Americans complaining about the money that's being put into their military. None of the Americans do that, and I don't know why any of our Canadians would.

As you and I know, Professor Shadwick, they're having problems again in the U.S.A. They just recently in the past couple of weeks found more people from the al-Qaeda group--men dressed as ladies so the Americans wouldn't know they were there. Also, I think you'll find that we have problems here in Canada as well. We have the people here in Canada. It's a major concern, and it's one that should be addressed here, and it hasn't been addressed. I'm really concerned about it. I really am.

I can't believe we have had problems with another Sea King and we're still spending millions and millions of dollars to keep what we have left of these Sea Kings in the air. I don't think anyone agrees with it any more.

I've just had the opportunity in the last two weeks to be back in my riding for the inspection of the sea cadets and the air cadets, and the military as well, and I see fewer young people involved than there used to be. They're trying to appeal to them. I suggested to them that they should go into the schools and talk to them, all the students, because we really need to have them there.

My concern is this. How do we get our people in Canada and all of our people up here in Ottawa to put the military as the number one priority for the safety and security of our people of Canada, and to work with the people of the U.S.A. across the border? My God, we've always been a family in the past. We were never like this. We were a family. It was like cousins back and forth across the border. That's not the way it is today. I just heard some of the comments they're now making about us, for the first time. They're really disappointed. They truly are.

So what do you think we should do, Professor Shadwick, to try to build these bridges, to try to get a stronger foundation, to try to get our military as the number one priority up here in Ottawa, and also to build the bridges again with the U.S.A.?

Prof. Martin Shadwick: Thank you. You've raised a lot of interesting points.

It necessarily is extremely difficult to develop an equation that would answer your question. You're dealing with a country whose strategic culture, if you will, or, in other words, the way it approaches security and defence and how high those things are on the national radar screen...we don't have a strategic culture traditionally, with the obvious exceptions of the world wars and other times of grave crisis.

We tend as a people not to be preoccupied on a day-to-day basis with issues of security and defence. That goes all the way back to 1867. It's rooted in all sorts of historical baggage. It's rooted in the fact that our geography gave us unique protection, the three oceans being formidable defence barriers, and the viewpoint of Canadians being that since they've been installed by, shall we say, a higher authority, they did not require any financial upkeep on the part of Canadians. We've had the benefit, but sometimes also the curse, of having powerful friends to protect us, which tends to discourage a sense of self-reliance or thinking about security and defence issues.

Certainly if this were your Australian counterpart, we'd be talking about the strong sense of security and defence self-reliance that underscores a lot of Australian foreign and defence policy. They have the same friends we do, but they're not two minutes away, and that has an effect on how the Australians finance defence and what their attitudes are to their own military establishment.

I think in recent years, certainly even before 9/11, there were indications that security and defence issues were making their way up the food chain in terms of public, media, and some political visibility in Canada, and I think 9/11 has reinforced that. Certainly DND has astonishing reams of public opinion polls pointing to renewed public support for defence and for acquiring certain capabilities.

The problem, although we're making progress, is that Canadians still tend to be a little, well, hypocritical in terms of their attitudes to defence and security. Public opinion polls since time immemorial indicate that Canadians wish the country to be an active and useful player on the world stage. They're just reluctant to sign the cheques that go along with that, and that means a modest but modern and capable military, it means a solid foreign aid budget, and it means a solid, well-staffed Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade--sort of the troika of things you need to be active on the world stage.

So I'm encouraged on the one hand that there seems to be greater public sensitivity and awareness to security and defence issues, but there's still this reluctance, this terminal writer's cramp, to actually pay for it. I think you can see that pop up in some of the public opinion polling data, where on the one hand you get a poll that says the vast majority favours increased defence spending, or whatever the question might be. But there was also a poll a couple of years ago, pre-9/11 but not by too much, a different type of poll, where respondents were given the choice of a situation where they were being asked to spend the surplus. They were asked, “Where would you like to spend the money?” They were given a series of two choices in the same package. Defence popped up on one of those questions, and the question read, “Which would you favour: increased spending on defence or increased subsidies for Canadian film and television production?” I am saddened to tell you that increased subsidies for film and television production won out over defence. If the question had said health care versus defence, or education, I think one could understand that, but losing a poll to film and television subsidies I found appalling but quintessentially Canadian.

À (1035)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's it. We seem to have a habit of doing that in Canada. But when it comes to polls, look at the millions of people we have here in Canada. When they're doing a poll they just call a few thousand people. I'll tell you this. George Bush and his people don't bother taking a poll when they feel they have to do something for their military. They just go out and do it, and they don't bother whatsoever with taking polls. We shouldn't be doing them either. I mean it, Professor Shadwick.

What we need to do is get our priorities straight in this country, and we don't have them straight yet. I don't care which government it is that's in there; they need to take the stand for the military and come right out and say the military is number one and everything else, and you don't take a poll when you're going to do it.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Now I have to go over to the House.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

Mr. McGuire.

À (1040)

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.): Professor Shadwick, you briefly mentioned the coast guard, I think as in the “constabulary with an attitude” option. Today our coast guard is basically an arm of DFO. It used to be an arm of Transport.

The American coast guard has been upgraded to a military force since 9/11, basically, and it has become very serious about any seaborne threat, whether it's terrorists or drugs or whatever; they have sort of declared war on everything.

Yet there doesn't seem to be any kind of interoperability with our coast guard. Is an upgraded coast guard that works with the American coast guard on both coasts a more feasible option than, say, even spending money on a missile system that is going to be built anyway?

Prof. Martin Shadwick: You raise an interesting point, and it's one that has been much studied, that relationship of our navy to our coast guard and our coast guard to the American one. Certainly I think that post-9/11 a case could be made for going back and taking another look at that. How that should evolve, I'm not quite certain.

You're quite right to touch on the cultural issues, in essence. The Canadian coast guard regards itself as a quite different type of coast guard than its American counterpart. The American coast guard has always basically had a strong link to the United States navy, whereas our coast guard has had a sort of peripheral link, with a little more cooperation in recent years than in the past, but they are still very much separate empires.

Implicitly your question raises sub-issues, such as whether we should modify our coast guard along more American lines. That would mean adding some armament to coast guard/DFO vessels, not that they haven't on occasion had it in the past, but to do it more forcefully, no pun intended, with more interoperability with the navy in terms of communications links and planning. In other words, it would mean developing a navy that looks a little more like the U.S. coast guard and all that entails and also more like the U.S. coast guard in terms of its relationship with the parent navy. That's one option. If we perceive a requirement for more robust maritime security, certainly within the 200-mile limit, say, that is certainly an option we could examine.

There's also, though, the question of the navy, which does have the fleet of maritime coastal defence vessels, which do have by definition a maritime coastal defence capability. There are things that could be done to those vessels to make them somewhat more useful in the maritime coastal defence role and still stay with the navy.

Part of the problem in the Canadian context, though, has always been that there are bureaucratic politics within the departments, obviously. The coast guard doesn't really want to be militarized. It's not part of the Canadian coast guard culture, and in a sense, as a Canadian, in some ways I'm pleased to be able to say that. On a pragmatic note, or a practical note, maybe that's not such a good thing to be able to say. It has reluctance about going down the militarization route. The navy, by the same token, has concerns about picking up classic coast guard types of functions and fisheries patrol functions for fear it would turn into a constabulary.

So you have two entities whose cultures and attitudes to some extent are at odds, except for the fact that they could probably agree they should both continue along the lines that they are currently.

I would suggest in this area that it might be interesting to take a look, as I remarked earlier in a different context, at non-American comparisons to see what countries such as Australia do about this. The Australian example is interesting, because in the Australian navy's case, fisheries protection in effect is a naval responsibility. There isn't an Australian coast guard comparable to its Canadian counterpart.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Our coast guard views itself as quasi-military. Whether they are or not, they have always considered themselves so, and they're not integrating with DFO very successfully. They view their traditional role as being very different from the role DFO wants them to play, and there's a lot of animosity between DFO personnel and coast guard personnel. Maybe the coast guard is not in the right department for us to be able to utilize it fully. Maybe it should be with DND.

À (1045)

Prof. Martin Shadwick: You have raised some very interesting points. I think you're quite right. There's also the coast guard culture versus the DFO culture. When they were merged, it did raise some eyebrows in maritime circles around the world that in effect DFO usurped the coast guard rather than the other way around. The resulting creature was more DFO in flavour than it was coast guard.

If you looked at those two entities, coast guard and DFO, and arbitrarily reseparated them, I'm not sure which of the two entities would come closer and fit more comfortably with the navy's self-image of what it should be doing. In some respects, I think the navy would be a closer match for the fisheries protection role, and I cited the Australian example, than it would be with the idea of transferring, say, coast guard responsibilities for ice breaking and servicing navigation aids. Those seem more classic coast guard functions.

If you were hiving off something from the coast guard and DFO merger, my inclination would be to move the fisheries protection role over to the navy. If you want to make some changes, that would be more logical than taking the coast guard's original functions and transferring those to the navy.

I say that because the fisheries protection role is by definition quasi-military. You might have to apply force, or threaten to apply force, to accomplish your ends. That fits more closely with the navy's optics and self-image, whereas putting navigation buoys in channels doesn't really fit the navy's self-image of what they should be doing.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): You're out of time, Joe.

Mrs. Gallant.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Given the emphasis on guarding against asymmetrical threats, would it seem to you that we should reconstitute a self-sufficient battalion that is air mobile, a light infantry that trains together, such as we had before the Canadian airborne regiment was disbanded? As you may recall, it was axed for political expediency as opposed to the disappearance of a need for such a capability.

Prof. Martin Shadwick: That is worth taking a look at. If Joint Task Force 2 continues to expand, and exactly to what number from what number would open some debate and discussion, it will soon be rivalling the size of a small regiment anyway. That might give you a starting point.

It depends on how one wanted to package the special forces capability and other specialist capabilities in terms of Joint Task Force 2 versus the light infantry battalions, whether we should take the so-called jump companies of the three light infantry battalions and recombine them. That, of course, would effectively recreate the Canadian airborne regiment, although I dare say the name could not be reused. We would have to find something else.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Have you considered the problems in the idea of pooling our strategic lift with other NATO or UN nations? For example, there is the issue of safety.

Look at the upcoming mission to Afghanistan. Hundreds of experienced soldiers are now poised to sign off once their current contracts expire due to the perceived indifference the government has for the men and women in the Canadian Forces who put their lives on the line. I'm referring specifically to the use of the Russian and Ukraine planes for lift. There was a crash. Spanish soldiers and crew were killed. This is weighing very heavily on their minds. Afghanistan being a landlocked country, we are unable to bring in our supplies by sea. We're dependent on these other countries for our strategic lift. Has that played into your formulations and options?

Prof. Martin Shadwick: Very much so. Indeed, the loss last week of the chartered aircraft carrying the Spanish force with 64 lives, I believe it was, was one of the worst single days in the history of peacekeeping-related activities. It has served as a wake-up call and has heightened fears that were already developing in some circles about the air worthiness standards of some of the aircraft that were being chartered by the United Nations, by NATO, or on an ad hoc basis by individual nations.

It's not a totally new problem. You'll recall the tragic crash in the 1980s in Goose Bay when the Americans lost in excess of 250 people. That was an American chartered aircraft. Even at that time I recollect some concerns about whether it was wise to move military personnel on chartered, second-tier airlines, if you will.

This crash involving a Ukrainian aircraft, I believe it was, with the heavy loss of life, has prompted some reconsideration. I stand to be corrected on this, but I understand the Spaniards are pursuing legal action against NATO out of this one. This is going to get NATO's attention, and it must.

If one can guarantee a high quality in air worthiness standards from the suppliers, that's one thing. It seems to me that is one further objection to having ad hoc pooling, using airplanes that might be a little suspect for one reason or another, or increasingly expensive to charter. One of the things NATO has been noticing is that the costs of chartering the Russian and Ukrainian aircraft have tended to be increasing rather steadily in recent years.

À (1050)

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Also on that point, since we have only one in nine Hercules being approved for flight, we are dependent on these. The cost is about $250,000 a flight to use the foreign planes for strategic lift. It seems like a redistribution of wealth rather than truly doing what is needed.

On the idea of strategic airlift, are you familiar with the ultralight airlift using airships for strategic lift? What role do you see those playing?

Prof. Martin Shadwick: I think it's only to watch for possible future use and acquisition, but it's very much a down the road thing at this point.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: You had option three, more or less heavier reinforcement for policing, land and sea, disaster relief, as well as at home. There is the gradual decline in capabilities and the refusal to replace key traditional equipment, for example, our Hercules, our Sea Kings, our tanks, and our Iltis, the jeeps. Those are the ones where right now only 1 in 15 is being accepted for mission. They are the vehicles where the gearshifts actually fall off and the floors are missing.

Would it seem to you that, given this, the government has unofficially adopted that option?

Prof. Martin Shadwick: Certainly, if you project the trend line you would ultimately reach that point. My hope is that we've levelled off and may now be entering cautiously, and I stress cautiously, a trend line that's going in the other direction.

In purely intellectual academic terms, if we stayed on the path we have been on in recent years, with steady downward sliding in that budget line, we would wind up with a constabulary by default. Without anyone actually making a policy choice to go that route, it would simply come about as a result of lack of money to sustain capabilities. It was absolutely imperative. At least we've had a levelling off and the swing is sliding the other way, upward.

This reminds me of a sentence that appeared in a Senate committee report in the 1980s--and I don't want to draw too close a parallel--that we were in a situation where defence spending was large enough to represent a significant charge on the national exchequer but insufficient to produce significant results.

I would argue that we clearly need to spend more on defence. There's no question about that in my mind. I'm not sure the numbers are quite as horrendous as some believe. I think there's some potential by rearranging and realigning maybe some of the niche options of one sort or another, carefully chosen, combined with judicious increases in defence spending and in manpower that we could get a turnaround without having to do something radical.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Gallant. Actually, you're well over your time at this point.

With the little time that's left to us here, I'd like to get a few questions on the record myself.

Professor Shadwick, I'd like you to address the larger issue of the strategic environment we're operating in with the United States and indeed Europe. In my view, a number of very interesting pieces have been done by people like Michael Ignatieff and Robert Kagan on the whole power and weakness issue and on the burden of empire issue.

There does seem to be in the strategic environment we face a very, very significant shift away from the old attitudes and the old assumptions in terms of what the threats are and what the intentions of various states may be in the future. The U.S. seems to be preparing for that in one way and the Europeans in a very different way.

Kagan's argument in particular that the U.S. is from Mars and Europe is from Venus more or less sums up the attitude that as far as Europe is concerned, we're in a post-nationalistic, post-militaristic age, and that to the Europeans, the American fixation with security seems to be just beyond their understanding.

There seems to be a fork in the road between Europe and the United States. We obviously have some choices to make in connection with that fork in the road. If we don't get it right, we could end up being, for lack of a better term--and maybe this is not putting it very well--almost a geopolitical orphan in the international environment.

I'm wondering if you could comment on that. Which way do you see things going from your perspective on the big picture?

À (1055)

Prof. Martin Shadwick: Thank you. I'm intrigued by the concept of a geopolitical orphan. I may have to liberate that for a course outline synopsis for next year, with your permission.

You're quite right, and it is fascinating looking at the differences that have evolved between the Europeans and the Americans even prior to the differences of opinion over Iraq and an appropriate response, and of course the internal divisions in Europe over the right approach to that. But you're quite correct that the Europeans have, with remarkable speed, sort of tuned out security and defence as something they don't need to be all that worried about, with some obvious exceptions. The British position is clearly different from the French and the German. There was the speed with which the Germans cut defence spending and stood down large chunks of their forces. Now, in a sense, that was going to happen once the wall came down and East Germany was brought back into the fold. The Germans had other things to spend their money on. Rebuilding that third of their country took priority. But it's still remarkable the speed with which they did it and the depth and scope of the German defence cutbacks, and the defence cutbacks in other European countries.

It's interesting that happened (a) with that speed, and (b) with an area that had been the focal point of the Cold War for so many decades and of course had a history in the first half of the 20th century that was, shall we say, heavily security-focused for obvious reasons. And yet the Americans, who were the isolationists for much of the first half of the 20th century and were rather late getting animated sufficiently to get involved in World War I and World War II, are now taking a more forceful role.

You spoke of a fork in the road. I would hope, though, that part of the healing process in the relationship between the Americans and some European states, and we have to be careful here because we have the Brits on side for us and the so-called new Europe on side--that some common optics sort of re-animate the Europeans to security and defence issues. I think that might be useful. Not to Americanize their views, because some of the European reservations about Iraq were well stated, and I shared some of those reservations--not all them--but I think that could be part of the healing process to repair that damage. My hope is that it won't be in any way fundamental, but it will take some time.

Now where that leaves us is interesting to speculate on. There is a risk of that geopolitical orphan metaphor kicking in here, and it makes me uncomfortable, because as a good Canadian foreign policy analyst, I had it pounded into me: multilateralism; that we join every club we can; that we want to be a little careful about getting too close and too cozy with the Americans.

This is where we could play some role in that healing process, given the right diplomatic and military resources, of course, to try to bridge that Atlantic divide to some extent. But in our ability to play that sort of classically Canadian role, the north Atlantic triangle, the opportunities are limited, our resources are far fewer--far less than they were in the late 1940s and into the 1950s. But it's perhaps not a bad thing to aspire to. It keeps us connected to Washington but also to Europe, because I'm also a Canadian nationalist.

I always was rather intrigued by Prime Minister Trudeau's endorsement of the third option in terms of trade, to make sure we stayed engaged with the Europeans on trade. The problem, of course, though, is that it's a lot easier to speak of re-engaging Canada in European affairs than it is to actually carry it out. Our trade is now more than ever concentrated north-south and our military presence in Europe is negligible.

Once you discount our peacekeeping contingent, we're left with the Canadian contribution to the AWACS force and the people at headquarters, NATO headquarters, and some people in exchange positions. I'd like to find some way to re-engage us on that side as well. This speaks to a point I made earlier about making sure that not all the doctrinal and professional development influences on the Canadian military are American. I'd like some diversity in there. That's another advantage, to my mind, to trying to re-engage the Europeans. How we actually go about that, though, is much more difficult.

Á (1100)

The Chair: Professor, thank you for that answer, and thank you for all of your answers today and for your opening statement. I think it's been a very good session. As I mentioned earlier, I think you've given us some more food for thought here on the Canada-U.S. relations issue.

It's amazing that in as much as we have had many experts like yourself in front of the committee, everybody seems to have a slightly different take on various aspects of various issues, and taken together in a more comprehensive way, I think we're developing a better understanding, certainly of the nature of the relationship.

As I say, all of this is very helpful in terms of the eventual writing of the report that will be done over the course of the next number of months, and also after we have an opportunity to go down to the States and visit with our American friends, because I think all of us around the table would agree that a visit to the United States and talking to the Americans --“talking to Americans”, as Rick Mercer would say--is absolutely vital in terms of understanding better the relationship and trying to make some constructive recommendations to the government for the future.

Once again, on behalf of the committee, I'd like to thank you for being here today. I'm sure the committee's path and your path will probably cross at some point in the future again.

Prof. Martin Shadwick: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I very much appreciated the opportunity to appear today.

Thank you.

The Chair: The meeting is adjourned.