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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, March 25, 2003

0910

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Ms. Jill Sinclair (Director General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

0915

0920

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance)

0925

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. Michael Dawson (Deputy Director (Political), United States General Relations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

Mr. Leon Benoit

Ms. Jill Sinclair

0930

Mr. Leon Benoit

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Ms. Jill Sinclair

The Chair

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. David Price

Ms. Jill Sinclair

0935

Mr. Michael Dawson

Mr. David Price

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. David Price

Ms. Jill Sinclair

0940

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. Claude Bachand

0945

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Michael Dawson

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)

Ms. Jill Sinclair

0950

Mr. Joe McGuire

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. Joe McGuire

0955

Ms. Jill Sinclair

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC)

1000

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. Michael Dawson

The Chair

Mr. Michael Dawson

1005

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien (Labrador, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

The Chair

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Ms. Jill Sinclair

1010

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

The Chair

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien

Ms. Jill Sinclair

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

1015

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Ms. Jill Sinclair

The Chair

Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.)

Ms. Jill Sinclair

1020

The Chair

Mr. Michael Dawson

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. Michael Dawson

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

1025

The Chair

Mr. Michael Dawson

Mr. Claude Bachand

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. Michael Dawson

The Chair

Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.)

1030

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. Ivan Grose

The Chair

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Mr. David Price

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. David Price

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Mr. David Price

The Chair

1035

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Michael Dawson

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Mr. Michael Dawson

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

Mr. David Price

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. Michael Dawson

1040

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Ms. Jill Sinclair

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Ms. Jill Sinclair

1045

Mr. Leon Benoit

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. Leon Benoit

Ms. Jill Sinclair

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Ms. Jill Sinclair

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

1050

Ms. Jill Sinclair

The Chair

Mr. David Price

Ms. Jill Sinclair

The Chair

Mr. Michael Dawson

The Chair

Mr. Michael Dawson

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

1055

Mr. Michael Dawson

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Ms. Jill Sinclair

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

NUMBER 016

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, March 25, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0910)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to order. Today, we're very pleased to welcome two representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. With us are Ms. Jill Sinclair, director general of the International Security Bureau, and Michael Dawson, deputy director, political, of the United States General Relations Division.

I'd like to welcome both of you, on behalf of the committee. You're obviously here at a very critical time in terms of what's happening in the world right now, and also at a very interesting time in terms of Canada–U.S. relations. I'm sure all of the members of this committee are looking forward to your comments today, so without any further delay, perhaps we can get right to them.

Ms. Jill Sinclair (Director General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you very much for inviting us here today, Mr. Chair, committee members. It's really a privilege to be in front of the committee at, as you say, this extremely important moment.

I'm delighted to be joined by Michael Dawson, who is one of our department's experts on defence and security matters with the United States bureau.

I have a few notes that I'm going to use just to introduce the topics, but I sensed from the chats we've been having on the margins that there are a lot of very real questions that you'd like to put to us. I'd therefore like to leave as much time as possible for those questions.

I must say we were inspired by the study outline the committee has provided, so what I want to do is touch on some of the areas you identified in that study outline, just to get the discussion launched on the very comprehensive set of issues that you're looking at. I think there's probably no more propitious time or appropriate moment to be looking at Canada–U.S. defence and security relations than in the current context.

As I say, if you'll forgive me, I'll just go through some of the issues you have identified in the study outline, and then we'll leave the time open for questions and comments.

Let me start off with the issue of U.S. Northern Command, which you identified as your first issue in your study outline. From a Canadian perspective, we're not really talking much about Northern Command anymore. As you may know, it is a U.S.-only command. What we're trying to focus our efforts on these days is our newly established Binational Planning Group.

The creation of the Binational Planning Group happened last December when Minister Bill Graham, Minister John McCallum, and Secretary of State Colin Powell signed an agreement that established the Binational Planning Group. It's located in Colorado Springs. It is not part of North American Aerospace Defence Command, but it's definitely benefiting from the infrastructure of NORAD.

I'm pleased to say I've had the privilege to go down there to speak to the people on the Binational Planning Group and to see their work firsthand. The group is looking at coordinating binational maritime surveillance and intelligence sharing. It's designed to provide attack warnings and threat assessments to both governments. It's looking most particularly at developing contingency plans for binational military support to civilian authorities and at conducting joint exercises.

I think one of the most interesting, innovative, and important value-added dimensions of the Binational Planning Group is the fact that it's trying to link up the civilian and the military. As I say, I was there at one of the very first meetings that General Ken Pennie—our current head of the Binational Planning Group, although he will be moving off from that job—held in Colorado Springs, and it was fascinating to see the array of civilian and military organizations being brought together, Canadian and American, to look at how they can interoperate much more effectively for the combined security of North America.

I can tell you the implementation of the planning group is well underway. Even though it was only stood up in December, we consider this to be another important new component of our bilateral defence and security relationship with the United States.

You touched on the issue of NORAD in your study outline. As the members of this committee well know, the NORAD agreement is one of the cornerstones of the Canada–U.S. defence relationship. The agreement will be up for renewal in 2006. By that time, we'll have a better sense of some of the issues that will play into that renewal process. I think we already see them emerging, and they've been flagged in your study outline. They include issues such as the U.S. plans for Northern Command and U.S. ballistic missile defence architecture issues. There's no question that these sorts of issues will have an impact on NORAD, and we'd be delighted to take questions on those issues in the course of our appearance here. I just want to assure you that even though 2006 seems a long way off, we're already thinking about NORAD renewal and how we can make sure we keep this bilateral relationship robust through NORAD.

On missile defence, the United States is moving very rapidly on missile defence, as members of this committee know. In the past, discussions on missile defence tended to be largely theoretical, but with President George W. Bush's statement last December that the United States would have an initial missile defence capability up and running by September 2004, missile defence is becoming a practical reality. It's becoming a real issue in terms of the Canada–U.S. bilateral defence relationship, and it's something we're spending quite a bit of time thinking about.

The United States has already approached the United Kingdom and Denmark about upgrading American early warning radars that are on Danish or Greenland territory and on U.K. territory. The U.K. has already agreed to the U.S. request. The Danes, with the Greenland Home Rule Government, are considering the request from the United States, but it's likely that they'll agree too. The U.S. requires that sort of territorial coverage in order to be able to get the radar coverage needed for the whole of the continental United States. The U.S. doesn't need Canadian territory for a missile defence system as currently planned.

I just want to tell the committee that we have maintained a very close consultative process with the United States, particularly in the last few months, so that we can be fully informed of American intentions and planning; understand how missile defence fits the overall U.S. strategic doctrine; and understand the sorts of impacts it might have with regard to Canada and to North American defence issues. We had consultations in Ottawa in the summer, and then I was privileged to head our latest round of discussions with a large range of U.S. military and civilian officials in Washington in January. Those discussions were very open and very frank, and I would say we have a very good basis for dialogue with the United States on these issues.

In addition to the bilateral consultations that we have on a privileged basis with the United States, the U.S. has also engaged its allies in consultations on missile defence through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO is looking at feasibility studies that would examine options for protecting alliance territory—that is, NATO territory—forces, and population centres, against the full range of missile threats. So work is going on within the NATO family, as well as bilaterally.

These consultation processes allow us to engage the United States in a full range of discussions on missile defence as it moves forward. They also give us an opportunity to raise with the United States some of our concerns about various dimensions of missile defence. Here, I'm thinking about the non-weaponization of space, a long-standing Canadian foreign policy objective, because some dimensions of the missile defence program certainly envisage weapons in space. We have a respectful, frank forum, both bilaterally and within NATO, and we can raise these questions with the United States and move forward with them as they continue their planning on missile defence.

As a word on NATO, again because you flag it in your study outline, in terms of working closely with the United States, few allies work as closely with the U.S. in NATO. Obviously we're the North American part of a transatlantic relationship that remains absolutely key to Canada. In terms of the evolution of NATO, I think Canada and the United States are leaders.

Canada and the U.S. are unique in sharing a vision from many years ago, one of ensuring that the alliance opened its doors to include the countries of Central Europe and Eastern Europe that would be emerging from the dark days of the old Cold War, and to welcome them into the alliance. We're delighted that we will add seven new countries to the NATO alliance in May 2004. As I say, I think Canada and the United States have really led the way on this.

Also, we've been working very closely together in developing what we call a business line on counter-terrorism. We've been looking at how the NATO alliance can respond to and deal with the very real threat posed by global terrorism.

We are also working with NATO to increase NATO's capacity to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction. We've played a very creative role in initiatives to counter this threat, including the establishment of a laboratory and an event response team. This team is going to be conducting a training exercise in Alberta this spring in order to enhance the alliance's ability to respond or do what they call consequence management in response to weapons of mass destruction.

So the partnership within NATO remains very strong. Indeed, it was Canada that helped to broker the initial agreement in the last set of discussions about Turkey. You may remember those from a few weeks back, when the alliance was fractured on the issue of providing support to Turkey in the event of an attack by Iraq. It was Canada that brokered that agreement by working very closely with the United States.

¿ (0915)

You've mentioned the rest of the world, too, and particularly the rest of North America. Just as a couple of introductory words there—and again, I'm happy to take questions on this—I would say this is again one of the areas in which we've worked most closely with the United States.

Since joining the Organization of American States at the beginning of the 1990s, Canada has worked with the U.S. in trying to develop cooperative approaches to hemispheric security. It was the Canada–U.S. partnership that brought about what I think were groundbreaking developments in terms of establishing confidence and security-building measures for the region; looking at issues of transparency in terms of the development of defence budgets; standing up new arrangements so that civilian defence ministers could speak to one another; and basically underwriting the transformation of the hemisphere to a democratic space. This has been very much due to a Canada–U.S. partnership, and I've been privileged to work very closely on this.

We also recently joined the Inter-American Defense Board. In December of just this past year, we joined the IADB, and this has opened up a new channel for us to have even more detailed consultations on hemispheric and defence relations. It's no secret that Canada has a transformation agenda for the IADB. We want to make sure it remains an engine of democratic change within the hemisphere. Our membership has been very warmly welcomed, particularly by the United States. We had already been working with the Inter-American Defense College to try to bring these sorts of issues forward—including governance issues, confidence building, and these sorts of questions—into the defence realm in the hemisphere, and our membership in the board will simply enhance that ability.

We're now getting ready for a special OAS conference on security. It will be held in Mexico from May 6 to May 8, and that conference is going to look at various different threats to security in the hemisphere and how we can develop common approaches to addressing them.

As I said, Canada is leading the way, but we're working very closely with the United States in getting to an agenda that responds to the real security threats of this hemisphere. Those threats are quite diverse. If you're in this hemisphere, a security threat could be the price of bananas. It could be climate change, because you might lose your small island state if water levels rise too high. It goes right through to the threat of guerrilla groups and non-state actors in terms of running your government with illegal money from the drug trade. We need to deal with all of those in the hemispheric setting, and we're working together with the United States and our hemispheric partners in that regard.

You touch on the PJBD, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, as one of the key elements of a very successful binational defence relationship. I'm pleased to say that even in the current, very difficult circumstances, the last meeting of the PJBD was held just last week, in Washington. It was a day-long meeting, and notwithstanding all the various calls on people's time, our American friends decided to go ahead with the meeting.

The theme of the meeting last week was expanding continental security. I can say that the discussion mirrored many of the issues you've touched upon in your study outline. The PJBD has a very forward-looking agenda. Of course, it was established in 1940, so it has a rich history. Our own view is that it has been a very resilient body, it has been a place where we've been able to have privileged discussions with the U.S. on very practical issues of defence cooperation, and its relevance is perhaps greater than ever in the current circumstances.

I would just conclude my very brief opening comments by saying we've witnessed an unprecedented degree of activity on the Canada–U.S. bilateral defence and security front in the last number of months. I know we're in a particularly complex space at the moment, and I'm assuming the committee may want to ask us some questions about that. Obviously, Iraq is very much on our minds, and the management of the Canada–U.S. bilateral defence relationship permeates everything we do.

I just wanted to give you a sense that, notwithstanding the tensions and some of the complexities that we're seeing played out at the moment, this bilateral defence and security relationship is one that is deep, profound, and, I believe, tremendously resilient. I believe the relationships that our military colleagues have with one another are not easily broken or frayed, because the contact and the cooperation are so unique in so many different ways. But that doesn't mean we don't have to carefully manage our relationship, that we don't have to nurture it, and that we don't have to recognize that we have a very privileged relationship. We will want to spend our time and attention making sure it remains strong for the future, because the security challenges in front of both Canada and the United States are increasing, they're not diminishing as we look forward.

Thank you very much.

¿ (0920)

The Chair: Thank you very much for that presentation, Ms. Sinclair. It was a very comprehensive presentation in terms of the work the committee is doing.

As usual, we'll begin with Mr. Benoit, for seven minutes.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Good morning, Ms. Sinclair and Mr. Dawson. It's very good to have you here today. You're right. There are a lot of questions in the area you're involved in now, particularly as a result of Canada's lack of support for the effort in Iraq.

Some of the backlash resulting from that lack of support has been felt across the country already. For example, a person from my hometown called my office to say he hauls horses into the States and that he was going to haul a load to someone in Montana last week, but the person phoned him up and told him not to bother coming. There has been a lot of that kind of thing. It hasn't been widely reported yet, but it's very real. I don't know whether it's fact or not, but I'm told even large companies like Cargill Inc. are no longer buying Canadian commodities in some cases when they can find a replacement in the States, whereas they have traditionally been buying from their Canadian subsidiary.

This kind of action on the part of private companies is a great concern. It has an impact. It has already had an impact, and it will have a greater impact. I'm wondering whether that impact has spread to the defence trade area yet, and to the 2000 agreement. There has been some talk that the United States will in fact back off from Canadian involvement in military trade. I would just like your comments on that.

¿ (0925)

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you very much, Mr. Benoit. I'll share my stage with Michael Dawson.

I should have prefaced my comments by saying that when you talk about the Canada–U.S. bilateral defence relationship and you talk to Foreign Affairs, you're only getting part of the story, so you'll forgive me if I can't answer some questions because they really are in the purview of my Defence colleagues. I must say defence trade is one I can't give you any details on. I don't know if Michael is aware of any immediate impact or backlash, but I can't say I've heard of anything yet. It may be, though, that you're speaking to the wrong people and that we can simply try to get a response to your question.

Michael.

Mr. Michael Dawson (Deputy Director (Political), United States General Relations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Benoit.

On that particular question about impacts on our defence trade, from what I have heard, none are obvious quite yet. However, we're involved in a couple of major programs. One is the Joint Strike Fighter program. Because we joined that program, we've already been able to recoup a considerable amount of our taxpayers' investment through contracts for Canadian companies.

The Joint Strike Fighter program is structured on the best-value principle, the idea being that contractors and subcontractors will go out and get the best deal. If a Canadian company can do that, it will get the business. But I think there's an element of relationships in that. It's a big industry, but the defence contracting industry is a small club. While I can't say I've heard of any incidents such as the one you mentioned about Cargill, some of these things are optional. Contractors can choose their subcontractors as they see fit if they're approximately equal. So there is a risk, but I wouldn't want to say we've seen a major impact yet.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I thank you for that. I understand that talking to someone in the trade area would be more appropriate, but I wanted to ask about it.

Speaking of involvement in projects, though, in 2000, the Canadian Alliance took a formal position in favour of Canada becoming involved in missile defence as the concept was portrayed at that time. We took that position because Canada would then have been involved in the internal discussions. We'd have the ability to influence and to get the economic spinoffs from that. Several defence analysts—including, I believe, two who have come to this committee in the past couple of months—have said the window of opportunity for Canada to become involved in missile defence has closed. One of them said that, and I believe the other one said the economic benefits of joining would be greatly reduced already because we wouldn't get the same level of involvement economically. I'd like your comments on that.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: I don't think it's true to say the window of opportunity, economic or political, has closed. As I say, I actually lead the discussions with the United States on those issues.

The U.S. is certainly taking serious procurement decisions now. Those decisions will have an impact out to around 2007. I think our timing is just right for the level of discussion that we're having at the moment, for the exploratory discussions we've been having with the United States to try to determine exactly what it is that they want and where people have to insert themselves.

As Michael was saying on the Joint Strike Fighter, some of the same principles are going to pertain to the procurement behaviour of the United States on missile defence. That is, they're not looking for a lot of new, exotic things to be developed. They want to buy the stuff that's available, and they want the best stuff. If it happens to be Canadian, they'll come to Canadian companies. Again as Michael said, relationships will count for a lot, but they won't count for everything.

So I don't believe the window of opportunity has closed. I don't believe either that the economic benefits package has been greatly reduced. I think we're in exactly the right space. I think we're in the space of a lot of other countries with regard to missile defence.

¿ (0930)

Mr. Leon Benoit: Do you anticipate Canada taking a position on joining with the United States on missile defence in the near future?

Ms. Jill Sinclair: That's obviously a question for cabinet to answer, but I can tell you that at the bureaucratic level, we're certainly doing all the bureaucratic due diligence to make sure we have the facts. If ministers decide they would like to consider these issues, they'll then have the full range of facts regarding the security implications, the Canada–U.S. bilateral defence dimension of it, and the economic spinoff side of it, and everything will then be ready in order for cabinet to make a decision.

Mr. Leon Benoit: When our group, including Mr. Price, visited NORAD headquarters and USNORTHCOM headquarters in November, General Ed Eberhart made it very clear at that time that the United States sees it as very important for Canada to become involved in missile defence. Anything that can be done to encourage that involvement would therefore be greatly appreciated.

When we visited USNORTHCOM headquarters at that time, they said there was only one Canadian there. I know this is an American organization, but there's certainly Canadian involvement so that the two-way communication is welcome and encouraged. We only had one person there at that time. Has that changed since November?

Ms. Jill Sinclair: I don't believe so. Of course, USNORTHCOM is a U.S.-only command, so the fact that there is even one Canadian there is quite unusual. Other countries—for example, the U.K.—would very much like to have some sort of a more intense interface with USNORTHCOM, but it's a U.S.-only command. That doesn't mean we don't have connections with USNORTHCOM. Of course we do. And we're very fortunate that the commander of USNORTHCOM happens to be the commander in chief of NORAD, too. We therefore have intrinsic interrelationships and synergies there.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit, Ms. Sinclair, Mr. Dawson.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you for being here this morning. This is a little different side of the topic we deal with on a regular basis.

You talked about NATO and the Americans asking for use of the European radar systems, but also the European start on their own missile defence system. In fact, they are already in set-up mode. They even have some of their missiles set up, but only in the second tier. They haven't gone to the third tier, although that's in the long-term planning stages. The Europeans are also looking at the third tier, but we don't hear much talk about that. The Americans can do it, but we seem to be against that here. However, the Europeans are actually looking at that, too.

If we look at many of the countries, the Dutch have their second missile frigate being built now as part of that missile defence system, the second-tier one. The French have their own system. And from what I understand, within about a year and a half from now, that ring will be complete around Europe. They will be able to defend from there at the second tier.

I'd just like your comments on that, because what we're looking at here is the fact that they're doing it on a basis of NATO partners. Canada and the U.S. are also NATO partners, yet the U.S. doesn't even have a second-tier system set up as of yet—although they certainly have the equipment to do it—and Canada is not involved in any of it.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Again, Michael may have something to add here, but I think what you're referring to is the system called Theatre Missile Defence. Canada has been part of that exercise. A feasibility study has been going on within NATO for the past number of years. Canada has helped to fund that feasibility study, and obviously the United States has, too.

Mr. David Price: The point I was getting at, though, is that it's all being done over there. We're not doing any of it here.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Maybe this is naive, but for me, the there and the here within NATO doesn't make any difference, because there is here and here is there. This is what an alliance is all about. The fact that we're able to do it cooperatively with our European and American allies in the setting of NATO represents, for me, the very best use of time and resources. We pool them. That's the great thing about the alliance. Certainly a lot of work has been done on Theatre Missile Defence, and Canada has been fully a part of that.

What the Americans are doing, of course, is looking at a globally integrated system that no longer differentiates between the theatre and the strategic. That's why it's now called ballistic missile defence. They've changed the terminology, and what they're looking at having stood up by September 2004 is a system that will provide the coverage for the continental United States. There is no such plan that I'm aware of yet to cover the whole of Europe. That's certainly envisaged perhaps downstream, and some of the discussions in NATO will take us in that direction. At the moment, however, the Europeans are looking at theatre. Of course, in Europe, theatre is strategic, so it cuts both ways.

Michael.

¿ (0935)

Mr. Michael Dawson: That has always been one of the interesting and inherent contradictions, Mr. Price, in that what is strategic for the Europeans is really a theatre system.

It's one thing to start the production of systems, but it's another thing to have them completely integrated. Everything we've learned about the American approach to missile defence stresses the short timelines for decision-making and assessment of what is actually coming. Therefore, an extremely high degree of systems integration is needed between sensors and the algorithms that actually do the battle management right through that whole chain. It's one thing to have some basic ballistic missile defence capability, but it's another thing to actually have a system that can deal with multiple launches and retargeting and having a second shoot. As the Americans like to say, “Look, shoot, look, shoot.” They have these little mantras, as I'm sure you've heard when you've been in Colorado Springs.

I think the theatre problem is inevitably perhaps a bit more amenable. It's still a very difficult technological problem, but the Americans have been working with the Europeans for quite a while now on various programs, and they have had European industrial cooperation. For example, for the system they call MEADS, the Medium Extended Air Defense System, which is a relatively short-range system, a considerable amount of work has been done and many technologies have been shared through the NATO connection. I think they're still at a fairly early day yet, but they, too, will rely on the American satellite detection and assessment of attack.

Mr. David Price: Just to go in another direction, you mentioned how good the military cooperation is between Canada and the U.S. On the other hand we see a deterioration in our Canada–U.S. government relations, because of recent events in particular. And then we talk about the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, which meets at very sporadic periods of time. In fact, that board really meets very little. I'm wondering if you don't think they should be meeting more often and on a very regular basis, to establish and have our contacts on a more steady footing.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: In fact, the PJBD does meet on quite a regular basis. It meets twice a year, regularly. And then there are other committees of the PJBD. Military cooperation committees meet on a much regular basis—in fact, on an as needed basis—so if there are specific issues that they have to work out—

Mr. David Price: I guess that's the problem. That's what I was leading up to. The military side seems to be meeting regularly and there's a good relationship there that's working fine. But on our government relations side, we don't meet often enough, not on a regular basis, so there's not a regular dialogue.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Again, I don't want to paint too rosy a picture, but when you have a real relationship, I don't think you always need the formality of a meeting to have that relationship play itself out. Whilst the PJBD may get together formally twice a year and the military side does its thing on an ongoing basis, we have ongoing contacts. With my counterparts, for example, we don't have to have a formal meeting in order to be able to resolve problems or raise issues. We just get in touch with people.

The PJBD provides the forum within which you can build the relationship. I can pick up the phone, I can speak with General Eberhart, I can speak with General Pennie—soon to be replaced by General Eric Findley—I can speak with my counterparts at the State Department, or I can speak with the other people we deal with. The PJBD provides the foundation for that, but the relationships are very much living relationships. So I'm not sure more frequent formal meetings would be necessary, although I certainly take your point that you don't feel there is a parallelism between the intensity on the military-to-military side and that on the political-military side.

¿ (0940)

Mr. David Price: That's right, the political side is missing.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price, Ms. Sinclair, Mr. Dawson.

[Translation]

Mr. Bachand, you have seven minutes.

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would first like to welcome you. I've never had an opportunity to do so personally, but I would like to congratulate Ms. Sinclair for the tremendous work she has done on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines. I am pleased to see that you are now using your talents in the service of foreign affairs.

Second, I know that the minister is appearing today before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and that you are undertaking a foreign policy review, which I have no doubt will place a great deal of emphasis on our relations with our American friends.

Being a member of the Bloc Québécois, however, I have been lobbying for over a year now to have a national defence review undertaken, since it seems to me that national defence is an important aspect of Canada's foreign policy. The actions of our armed forces and the types of operations they are involved in are important for Canada's image abroad, I imagine.

I know that you have some questions about the foreign policy review. But do you not feel that it is more important for Foreign Affairs and International Trade to work with National Defence on a new policy, particularly given the current difficult climate surrounding our relationship with our American friends?

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you for your question and thank you as well for your remarks about my work within the Foreign Affairs Department on land mines.

I think that your question should be addressed to the minister, because it is absolutely true that National Defence and Foreign Affairs and International Trade work closely together. Every day, we are there, we work together, and I think that there is a synergy between what the Department of National Defence does and—

[English]

our foreign policy review.

Certainly, as you pointed out, a lot of the questions in the discussion paper for the foreign policy review touch on issues of military relevance. A lot of those questions were inspired by the work that the defence department was doing itself, in looking at national defence.

Should there be greater synergies between National Defence, Foreign Affairs, and, I would suggest, International Development? Yes, I think that's true. I think you're seeing that sort of debate emerging in the course of the discussions that Minister Graham is having on the foreign policy dialogue. I think he is trying to move us forward into the area that you're suggesting. Maybe it's not quite as joined up as you would like to see at the moment, but I think it very much permeates the work of a foreign policy review.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Very well.

In the same vein, various documents show that there are a lot of interrelationships and shared operations between Canada and the United States. Among other things, I see that there are 80 defence agreements, 250 memoranda of understanding and 145 bilateral forums.

First of all, I would like to know whether Foreign Affairs and International Trade is responsible for follow-up and coordination with respect to those forums. Do you take stock of what is happening with them from time to time? Are they all active? Will the foreign policy review look at whether these agreements, memoranda and forums are still useful? What role does National Defence play in determining the relevance of each of these things?

¿ (0945)

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you again for the question. In fact, we are not actually responsible at Foreign Affairs and International Trade for coordinating all these agreements with the United States, since many of them involve defence people only.

[English]

They're absolutely military-to-military cooperation agreements. If they are treaties, then obviously the Department of Foreign Affairs is responsible for treaty arrangements.

Your question is an excellent one, though, in the sense that one of the things the Binational Planning Group is doing almost intrinsically in its work is looking at all the existing bilateral cooperation arrangements that we have, whether maritime, in the air, or on land. Do they meet the contemporary security needs and challenges of Canada and the United States? Do we need to update them? Are there gaps? That sort of systematic work is being done by the Binational Planning Group, and that was one of the reasons why we established it.

You asked whether this review of the bilateral arrangements is part of the foreign affairs review. It is not formally part of the foreign affairs review, it's a much more technical work than what the foreign affairs review is designed for. That's designed to actually reach out to the Canadian public. What we need to do is an internal review with the United States in order to make sure all of our bilateral mechanisms continue to be relevant to contemporary and future security needs. That's what's happening with Foreign Affairs and DND and with our counterparts in the United States.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Dawson, is it true that the current level 3 contract between Canada and the United States for the Joint Strike Fighter has no specifications about a return on our investment, which is nearly $200 million in Canadian spinoffs? Is it true that there is nothing in the contract that specifies that?

[English]

Mr. Michael Dawson: You don't have an expert on the agreement right here with you. I'd have to verify the details exactly and get back to you on that.

The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Bachand.

Mr. McGuire, for seven minutes.

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.): Just to follow up on Claude's line of questioning, in regard to NORAD, I think you said it's going to be renewed in 2006. Do you see any great changes in NORAD that will see it become more of a North American organization that has Mexico included, and a strengthening of that agreement and maybe a lessening of the commitment to NATO as a result of the recent French, German, and Russian activity in regard to Iraq? Do you see NATO becoming of less importance to the U.S. and an expanded NORAD becoming of more importance to the United States?

Ms. Jill Sinclair: You've asked several questions, Mr. McGuire, so let me just unpack them.

You talked about NORAD and whether it will become more North American and perhaps include Mexico. Incredible transitions are taking place in Mexico at the moment. I think Mexico is still in a bit of a state of flux politically, though. In the near term, at least for the 2006 renewal of NORAD, I don't think there's any suggestion that Mexico should be brought into that alliance.

Certainly, again from my chats with General Eberhart and from being down at NORAD, I know the Mexicans are interested in NORAD. They come in, they look, they talk to the Canadians, and we have good relationships with them bilaterally, but I've heard no suggestion at the moment that they might become part of that partnership.

In terms of the trade-off between NORAD and NATO, I don't think there is any trade-off. The security derived bilaterally for North America through NORAD is very unique and very particular to our circumstances. It's aerospace defence, not a substitute for the NATO alliance. NATO brings other sorts of security to Canada and the United States.

Notwithstanding the tensions that we see within the NATO alliance at the moment, I think the alliance is robust. It continues to serve U.S. security interests. Obviously, there's a desire on the part of most Europeans—I think all Europeans—to keep the United States very much as a part of the European security equation, so I don't think a strengthening of NORAD means a diminishing of NATO. Those two have existed together for many years, and, again, with the increase in security challenges, it's not the time to be doing away with very well functioning alliances, whether they're in the North American or European context.

¿ (0950)

Mr. Joe McGuire: Obviously Europe is thinking that it is an economic counterbalance to the overpowering dominance of the United States economically. Led by France, are they not really looking to be a military counterbalance as well, and to not really allow the United States to be the policeman of the world? Is there not another thought process out there that Europe is going to be leading that counterbalance? Isn't there that different point of view? If that happens, if that is true, maybe NATO will be diminished as far as being an international treaty organization is concerned, and maybe the United States will have to look more to North America.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: I don't think there's any doubt that certain members of the European Union have quite grand aspirations for Europe. Certainly all the members of the European Union have agreed, as have Canada and the United States, that it's a good idea for Europe to have its European security and defence identity and its European security and defence policy, and those are taking a more practical form now. For example, the Europeans will be taking over the previously NATO-led mission in Macedonia, and Canada will be participating alongside them in this European venture. But Europe's capabilities are nascent. Many within the European Union do not want to see Europe develop a set of capabilities that competes with those that already exist within NATO. That's certainly Canada's point of view. Why rebuild something that works so well?

As I say, though, there are those within Europe who have certain aspirations and visions, no question, but others say they're not going there and that, for them, whatever Europe does on the defence and security side has to be absolutely complementary and has to fit within the overall architecture of NATO.

I don't think NATO will be diminished, at least not in the near term. I think it's interesting to see that this alliance that people said was outmoded and was an archaic vestige of the Cold War is about to get seven new members, with more in the queue. The tasks have increased. It's responding to the terrorism challenge and it's dealing with weapons of mass destruction. This is an alliance that is resilient, that's flexible, and is meeting new challenges.

All things can happen, of course. Who would have foreseen the demise of the Soviet Union? But my sense, at least, is that NATO is not going to diminish in the near future, and it remains a vital part of U.S. security architecture globally.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Can you expand on the connection with the OAS. You said the OAS is meeting on inter-American defence topics. What, if any, is the connection between NORAD and the OAS on the military side? What is Canada's contribution financially to the OAS? And do you see Canada having to make a deeper contribution there financially to fulfil the aspirations that the OAS obviously is beginning to take on?

¿ (0955)

Ms. Jill Sinclair: I'm afraid I don't know the answer to your last question about what our assessed contribution is to the OAS, but we'll let the committee know. We'll get back to you with that number.

Largely thanks to Canada, the Organization of American States established a committee on hemispheric security in the early 1990s. That committee, for the first time, started to talk about security issues in the hemisphere. It brought together diplomats and the military to talk about confidence- and security-building measures, defence spending, and how you produce an accountable defence budget. Don't forget, we're talking about a part of the world where the military used to get its budget as a percentage of copper earnings or whatever. There were some pretty odd ways in which military spending went on in the Americas.

But Canada has invested quite a bit of work in this committee and in working with the Inter-American Defense College and the Inter-American Defense Board. There are meetings of defence ministers and meetings of the armies of the Americas, and each of the various services also has its meetings. So we're quite involved on the military track and the political track with regard to hemispheric security.

In terms of a connection to NORAD, there is no formal connection to NORAD through the OAS at all. I think some OAS committee members have been to NORAD on study tours, as you have been, but there is no formal connection except for the fact that Canada and the United States, as NORAD partners, are part of the OAS and can feed experience into that forum.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Sinclair, Mr. McGuire.

Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): I was glad we had a few moments to discuss certain issues, Mr. Chair, because I wanted to bring them up prior to the meeting. I will say this. Further to what Leon had to say, one of our truckers back home in the Maritimes was at the Calais, Maine, border crossing. He was there for many hours, waiting to get over into the U.S.A. When he got through, he went to get gas at the service station where he always got gas. They said they weren't selling gas to any Canadians, and they wouldn't fill his truck. So we have a lot of bridges to build, we truly do.

I want to talk about maritime security. When I was talking to you and Mike earlier, he was saying he was not aware of all of the things like those in Saint John, New Brunswick, where we have the largest privately owned oil refinery in Canada. From Vancouver right through to Newfoundland and Labrador, we have the largest privately owned oil refinery. I have to tell you that I have brought many businessmen into Saint John, and when you drive them by it, they just can't believe what they see. We have a nuclear power plant in Saint John, New Brunswick, too, and we're also an international port city.

So when it comes to security and Michael says he has never heard tell of all of these things, that tells me that at Foreign Affairs, National Defence, and all of the others, they're not looking at the maritime provinces, they're looking at central Canada and they're looking out west. But they better start looking at eastern Canada for security, because if you're a terrorist and you're looking at which border crossings don't have the security that they should have, you'll be looking at the border right there. And that's not right. It truly is not, I have to tell you, and I'm really concerned.

I had an opportunity to meet with Vice President Dick Cheney about a year and a half ago, and I was talking to him about free trade. I asked him about the Jones Act. He said, “What's that, Mrs. Wayne?” I said, “Well, in free trade, there's the Jones Act, and you can bid on all contracts in Canada when it comes to building ships, but we can't bid on any of your contracts to build any of your ships.” And he said, “I didn't know that, Mrs. Wayne, and that is not right.” I said “No, sir, that is not right.”

He brought his staff in, Mr. Chair, and he told them what I had just told him about the Jones Act. He told his staff that he wanted them to look into this, that he wanted them to get in touch with us in Canada, that he wanted to sit down with us to discuss it. But when I talked to the U.S. Ambassador to Canada, what he said to me, Mr. Chair, was that he had never been asked by the U.S. government to even look at it. But he agreed that it should be looked at.

So I'm just wondering if anyone ever brings up the Jones Act in these discussions that are held annually about exports—and this is what's going on now between the U.S. and Canada; they meet annually—or anything about maritime security. Is maritime security becoming a priority with the government?

Jill, you deal with security. I note that your branch is the International Security Bureau. This is something I'd like to know. Just what kind of security are you looking at, at the border point at Calais, Maine? What kind of security are you looking at for the maritime provinces? At the beginning, you were talking about binational maritime surveillance, military support, and so on. We also have CFB Gagetown, and it's not too far from Saint John. All of the tankers going over from Great Britain to Iraq came through the Saint John port. You should have seen them. And we were shipping those to them.

So we play a major role, but we're very quiet. We're not big like they are in central Canada or out west. We're small in numbers, if you like, but we play a major role, Jill.

À (1000)

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you very much, Mrs. Wayne. I'm not from New Brunswick, I'm afraid, but as a student out of Dalhousie University, I know just how important the Maritimes are. I just want to tell you that they're not neglected in our purview, certainly.

You asked what sort of security we're looking at. I have to tell you that our security is more the esoteric military security, rather than the border security issue, so you would need a different set of colleagues from our department to answer your questions in detail.

I can tell you that when we were looking at establishing the Binational Planning Group with the United States, one of the things considered was looking at maritime security and maritime surveillance. We realized that we had, through NORAD, an extraordinary degree of cooperation and effectiveness in terms of taking care of our airspace, but in regard to our maritime approaches, we needed to make sure we had the coast guards, the navies, the civilian authorities, and the first responders in places like Saint John, Halifax, and other places, joined up as part of an overall effort to make sure the wrong things were not coming onshore, whether it was on the east coast or the west coast. So certainly that's a major part of the effort in the Binational Planning Group.

As I say, we can't really answer your questions. I take note of what you say about Irving Oil, the nuclear power plant, and all of those. I guess it goes without saying that the government has been investing billions of dollars in the security agenda and the safe borders initiative. Maybe Michael will be able to talk a little bit about that, and perhaps we could get you more detail, but you might want to get some of our colleagues who deal with that dimension of security to come to the committee at some point.

Michael.

Mr. Michael Dawson: If I could, Mr. Chair, Mrs. Wayne, my amazement was not so much that we had Irving Oil in New Brunswick—I'm well aware of that—I was commenting more specifically on your mention of the fact that the border at Calais had been experiencing significant delays. I'm not personally involved in these files, but in our bureau I naturally hear all the conversations on them. They usually talk about Windsor–Detroit and Sumas, Washington–British Columbia as being places that are hotspots.

I will take this back to my colleagues who do the border business, and I will pass your comments on to them that there are delays out of the ordinary being experienced there, because we have capacity problems as much as we have security problems. The two came together at the same moment in history, so to speak, and that's really what the smart border accord is designed to do: make the border both more fluid and more secure at the same time. I think we're having some good success on that, but I'll take that point back.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

Mr. Michael Dawson: Mr. Chair, could I make one little comment about the Jones Act?

All of us who deal with Canada–U.S. relations inevitably find out about the Jones Act early in our experience. I understand why Vice President Cheney might not be personally cognizant of it, but my experience has been that almost every member of Congress who has anything to do with the sea or ships knows all about it and likes it a great deal.

À (1005)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I know.

Can I just make one little, tiny statement?

The Chair: I think we're going to have to save that for your next round, Mrs. Wayne, because you're well over your time. We have other members who want to ask questions, so I have to go to Mr. O'Brien right now.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien (Labrador, Lib.): I have a number of points basically following from what Elsie and Leon are saying. A good friend of mine whom I talk to quite often spends a lot of time in the United States in the wintertime. He just came back from the United States early—he's an entrepreneur and a well-known person, but I'm not going to name him, of course—and he sounded very distracted. His American friends whom he has known for thirty or forty years don't want to talk to him anymore.

I'm very concerned that, regardless of what we say as a country, whether it's in the House of Commons or whether it's the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister, or anybody else, the fact of the matter is that the people who work the streets and the gas stations and the restaurants are the real people who are part of this North American continent. I happen to believe it's getting worse by the second. That's my take, and I can't change my mind. Those are my feelings, based on what I see and hear.

I'm seeing it, and I do believe we are going to pay an ultimate price—if we're not already paying it—at the border, in trade, with our friends who come visit us in the summertime as tourists and use our rivers and streams and whatever in Labrador or wherever they may be. I just think we have a long way to go, following this particular confrontation, to put ourselves back on the footing we were on a year ago, and I am absolutely dismayed as a Canadian and as a parliamentarian.

I happen to believe Foreign Affairs is a big part of the problem. That's my take on this. I'm not going to blame you personally, but I do not like what I see coming out of Foreign Affairs.

And to add a little more to this, the United States has asked countries around the world to withdraw from diplomatic relations with Iraq, and Canada again has steadfastly said no. That's more fuel being thrown on the fire, and the fire's getting bigger, so I just happen to think we are facing serious problems.

I talked to some of my colleagues in the House of Commons, and do you know what they've said to me as parliamentarians? “Well, you know, we do have a problem, but I support the government, so what we need to do is change our trading partners.” Well, come on, folks. Change our trading partners? Who am I going to sell to? Are we going to move products by truck across the Chinese border? We have to get serious, we have to be practical, and we have to understand the real world, and the real world that is unfolding in front of me is not one I really like.

Would you comment on that, please?

The Chair: Mr. O'Brien, could you direct your comments through the chair rather than to the witnesses? That would be helpful.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: I'll direct them through the chair.

The Chair: Thank you for your comments.

Ms. Sinclair.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. O'Brien. I think that was more a comment than a question, and—

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: I think there were a lot of questions in there.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: There were, so where do I begin?

Obviously this is a moment of high emotion around the world, not least in the United States, particularly when we see what's happening with the prisoners of war and when we see that the campaign is turning into a war. Wars are unpleasant. Our friends and our partners and our allies are out there fighting in Iraq, and it hasn't been going well the last couple of days.

But I think there is also a lot of misunderstanding, and maybe the full blame should fall on Foreign Affairs in terms of not being able to get the fullness of Canada's position out. There is no doubt that we took a position on Iraq that said we wouldn't formally become part of this coalition. Some people may agree with that and some people may disagree with that. I think the minister and the Prime Minister have gone to great lengths to explain that position, so I don't need to go through it here unless you would like me to.

I think what's not getting out is the fact that, notwithstanding the fact that we're not a formal member of the coalition, 1,280 Canadian Forces personnel have stood by their task in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the Strait of Hormuz, in the campaign against terrorism. They have stood steadfast with a conflict raging about them, to make sure they're serving alongside our friends and allies in the campaign against terrorism. These are our ships and these are our aircraft. Canada is heading the coalition's Task Force 151 in extremely dangerous circumstances.

We didn't move away from that task. We didn't say we were going to abandon our friends and allies, even though we will not formally be part of the coalition. It isn't that we disagree with what the Americans are trying to do in terms of dealing with the weapons of mass destruction issue in Iraq, it's just that we think there should be a different way of going about it.

I don't think that's out there enough. I don't think the American public knows that, in addition to that commitment that's ongoing, we're getting ready to send 1,500 Canadian Forces personnel to Afghanistan for a twelve-month rotation to continue that fight against terrorism, in support of everything that happened to the United States on September 11.

So I think our commitment is absolutely undiminished in terms of our partnership with the United States on security issues, and I don't think we should be very coy about speaking about that fact. Is it not exactly the space that everybody would like us to be in? Have some people misunderstood what we're doing? Perhaps, and maybe we need to articulate our messages better. But I don't think there's any doubt in regard to where Canada stands in terms of being a friend and ally of the United States.

À (1010)

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Mr. Chair, that may very well be so—

The Chair: You have about a minute, Mr. O'Brien.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: —but my only point is that in public life, particularly in democratic countries, the perception is the rule, the rule itself is not. That's what we're facing here.

I have one last question. Why is Canada so reluctant to enter agreements, or have we tried to agree or have there been any discussions in any way on anti-ballistic missile deployment? I'd like to see Canada take more of a lead role and participate in that for the defence of North America in its totality, rather than letting the United States just do it and probably impose it on Canada.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: We're in active consultations with the Americans, active discussions. I think we're leading those discussions with the U.S. in terms of finding out what they are doing, what the best things for Canada are, what the impact on Canadian territory is, what the opportunities are for Canada, and when we need to take decisions. I think I can assure you, Mr. O'Brien, that we are engaged, we're not in a passive mode. I don't think the U.S. is going to impose anything on us. I think they're looking for partners, but it's for partners to decide what they'd like to do. As I mentioned earlier, then, it will be for cabinet to take the decision.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. O'Brien, Ms. Sinclair.

We will go now to Mr. Benoit, for the five-minute round.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Ms. Sinclair, I hope you've picked up the message from at least three MPs about what they're hearing on an anti-Canadian backlash. I think it's not so much due to the fact that Canada isn't involved with our allies in Iraq. Quite frankly, I think it has more to do with the anti-American comments coming from three debates on Iraq in which we've heard members of Parliament say the United States is more of a threat to world security than Saddam Hussein, in which we've heard the Americans being called various names by members of the governing party—including the Prime Minister's very anti-American comments—and now with a cabinet minister—the natural resources minister, I believe—making his statements. Those are the types of things the Americans notice, and they do get.... I fully understand that you can't do anything about that, but I do think—

The Chair: But Mr. Benoit, you should also add that Ms. Sinclair, as an official within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, would probably be loathe to comment on any political statements made by any politicians on either side of the House.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Chair, I wasn't going to ask her to comment. I was asking her if she had picked up the message on the harm that has been done in terms of our trade with the United States, and to our exports to the United States in particular.

I just want to start by asking a little bit about the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. John Duncan, our trade critic, was at the meeting last year. I believe it was in Comox. That was the same board, wasn't it? Or was it in Victoria? I believe that was a meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

We talked about that a little bit, and he was quite shocked at the level of the Canadian government's representation at that meeting. The MP from the government side wasn't a minister and had no particular knowledge on foreign affairs or defence. John commented to me that he was quite shocked by that. He said the meeting of the joint board is an opportunity for Canadians and Americans to get together to discuss some joint interests on defence.

In terms of the meeting in Washington, who was there from the United States and who was there from Canada, as far as you can tell me, in terms of the level of the individuals from both the Canadian and the American sides?

À (1015)

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Well, first of all, yes, I've picked up the message with regard to the comments that have been made around the table, and we'll make sure we convey them.

On the PJBD, the PJBD is not a ministerial-level group, although the co-chairs are appointed by their respective heads of government. The Canadian co-chair is Jacques Saada, who is a member of Parliament. He was appointed to that job by the Prime Minister and reports back to the Prime Minister, so there is a direct reporting relationship, one might say, to the most senior level in Canada. Similarly, Jack David was appointed by President Bush as the American co-chair, so there is a direct political relationship up the chain there.

In terms of last week's meeting, normally I head the Foreign Affairs side of the delegation, and my counterpart from the Department of National Defence is General Cam Ross. Because of the crisis with Iraq last week, I couldn't go, so I sent the director of our Defence and Security Relations Division, and he headed the Canadian side on the Foreign Affairs side.

He told me it was a very good meeting. They had 25 senior-ranking U.S. military officials at the table all day. I would note that this was on Wednesday, the day before the conflict started, so this was a pretty impressive dedication of time by the United States. And my State Department counterpart is the person who sits at the PJBD on the political side, so it is at a senior officials' level. That's where the PJBD has always met, but with a reporting relationship up to the Prime Minister and the President.

Mr. Leon Benoit: When this was established—during the war, I believe, or right after—

Ms. Jill Sinclair: In 1940.

Mr. Leon Benoit: —was there not more involvement from elected officials, or wasn't there more involvement from elected people on the board after the war?

Ms. Jill Sinclair: I must say that I don't know how things went back in the 1940s, but I'd be happy to research that for you. I don't know if Michael knows, either.

The Chair: Jack Granatstein might be the person to ask, or some other military historian.

Mr. Benoit, your time has expired.

At this point, we'll go to Ms. Neville for five minutes.

Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much, particularly for your very cogent presentation on Canadian participation and our relationship with the U.S. I certainly appreciated the comments you made in your response to Mr. O'Brien. I'm new to this, but I'm learning, to put it mildly.

Early on in your remarks, you spoke about the Binational Planning Group. When you spoke about it, you made some reference to the link-up between the civilian and the military. I'm interested to know what the civilian component is and what that relationship is.

I also want to know what the relationship is between the Binational Planning Group and the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, if there is a relationship—and I'm just asking all my questions, and then you can answer.

I'm also particularly interested in Canadian–U.S. relations as they relate to northern Canada. What's happening in the Arctic? What is of particular concern, and what kinds of negotiations are happening there?

Ms. Jill Sinclair: With regard to the civilian–military relationship, the Binational Planning Group is a civilian military body, and there was real concern after September 11 that we didn't have the right linkages with the military, which would have to be supporting what are called the civilian first responders. If you remember, on September 11, it was the New York City Fire Department and the police. Those are the people on the front lines, and indeed they have the responsibility to respond to those sorts of disasters, in both Canada and the United States. But when their capabilities and capacities run out, they need the military to come in behind them. One of the things the planning group is doing is making sure we have those linkages.

We're pretty well organized in Canada, actually, because we have OCIPEP, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness—and I had to learn that; I use the acronym but I never know what it means. We're fairly well coordinated through there, and OCIPEP does in fact take part in this planning group. On the U.S. side, it's the Department of Homeland Security—which Michael can speak about a bit more—but on a much grander scale. The U.S. is still trying to organize that office.

At the end of the day, the idea is to make sure we have those linkages so that, if the civilian first responders need assistance from the military to deal with a chemical weapons attack or whatever, they know who to call and how to make the links. It has all been exercised in advance so that there's immediate response.

Your second question was with regard to the planning group and the PJBD. Indeed there is a relationship mentioned in the agreement that we negotiated to stand up the planning group. There is a link between the work of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the planning group, but we still have to figure it out because we haven't worked out all of those details yet. At the last meeting of the PJBD, the planning group people reported in to the PJBD, so we'll make sure there are linkages there as the two things get themselves working.

On U.S.–Canada relations in northern Canada and the Arctic, maybe Michael could speak about that issue, because I don't have too many details.

Mr. Chair, might I ask Michael to take that question on the Arctic?

À (1020)

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Michael Dawson: Ms. Neville, I'd like to divide it amongst a number of areas on Canada–U.S. relations in the Arctic. One of the most important areas right now is energy. The Arctic has tremendous resources in terms of natural gas and petroleum. Right now, of course, the United States likes to concern itself with what it deems to be energy security. That means trying to produce much of its own energy or to get it from secure sources.

In the eyes of the U.S. government, Canada is a secure source for energy, which is very much to our advantage. Right now, we have a number of proposals being made for major pipeline investments coming down from the Arctic for natural gas. Of course, we also have our ongoing dispute with the Untied States over drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, in Alaska. In terms of the status of that, in the most recent congressional go-round, the U.S. Senate refused to go along with it. For the moment, then, we are still holding the line on that. It's a fairly important issue, and we've spent a lot of time on trying to preserve the natural habitat for the binational herd of caribou that move back and forth.

So energy is a big part of our relations in the Arctic, but a couple of latent issues will become more important perhaps. We have an ongoing border dispute with the United States between Alaska and Canada. It all depends on how you read the maps. It's really something for which I would recommend that you have one of our lawyers in, in order to discuss it in detail.

And there's also the question of the status of the waterway, should global warming actually make it a viable commercial waterway. The United States considers it an international passage, and we consider the waters to be territorial waters. It's not an issue on the front burner in any way, but it's out there.

Of course, we conduct a certain amount of our relations with the Untied States on Arctic issues through the Arctic Council and other circumpolar groupings, which I'm not a member of. I'm not too sure of their latest developments, but a lot of our relationships on the social level, the cultural level, the educational level, and the level of environmental protection, are done in that context.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Dawson, Ms. Neville.

[Translation]

Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand: I have a few more questions, but since Mr. Dawson raised the issue of arctic waters, I was wondering about an incident which happened in the North-West Passage. The Canadian government had authorized an American icebreaker to go through the North-West Passage, but here's the thing: the icebreaker was already underway. I would like to know whether there were other such incidents.

[English]

Mr. Michael Dawson: As far as I know, not recently. I would have to check on that, though. I could get back to you on that. I remember the incident, but I don't think we've had anything since.

The Chair: Monsieur Bachand, are you referring to the SS Manhattan?

A voice: The Polar Sea.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Yes.

The Chair: I think that was back in 1969.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Yes.

À (1025)

The Chair: To put it in context, it didn't happen recently.

An hon. member: There has been one since then.

Mr. Michael Dawson: Yes, there has been one since then, I believe, but I could clarify that.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you.

Based on what you said a little earlier, Ms. Sinclair, with respect to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence between Canada and the United States, I gathered that there was a recent meeting in Washington and that the expansion of continental security was discussed. It also seems that there is a growing trend towards interoperability between Canadian and American forces and that this has led to certain problems. Indeed, the issues debated these last few days in question period bear witness to that.

I'd like to expand a bit on this concept of fortress North America which Americans have talked about. I presume that the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade is the faithful guardian of Canadian sovereignty. But the fact that all American policy is increasingly being based on the idea of fortress North America implies that we will have to bring a good deal of our own legislation in line with theirs. Given the growing integration of Canadian and American military forces, I would like to know what the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade thinks about the eventual loss of Canadian sovereignty with regard to its American neighbour.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you very much for your question. Once more, I will ask Michael to help me respond.

[English]

Whatever the United States may see as its vision with regard to a Fortress North America—they have talked about perimeters and all those sorts of things—that doesn't necessarily mean Canada shares that approach. Indeed, it's in settings like the Permanent Joint Board on Defence that we can talk about expanding cooperation between two sovereign national governments in terms that respect both sets of national interests. Expanding cooperation doesn't mean you cede sovereignty, necessarily, although sometimes a sovereign government takes a decision willingly to cede sovereignty. That's part of being a sovereign state—although I don't want to be too esoteric here.

I would just say that I don't fear—though you might need to ask my defence colleagues—that cooperation with the United States, including close cooperation on the military-to-military level, diminishes our sovereignty in any way. On the contrary, I think the U.S. forces and our U.S. colleagues respect us because we are a sovereign country, and they know they can rely on the quality and well-trained professionalism of the Canadian Forces as an independent military entity, not as a part of some sort of U.S. force.

Michael, you might like to add something here.

Mr. Michael Dawson: If I may, my experience in serving in the United States and from going to many PJBD meetings has been that the United States respects the Canadian military. The professional relationship is very strong, and there's a lot of respect.

I go back to 1938, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King met in Kingston and were talking about the defence of North America. The President mentioned at the time that the U.S. would not allow a foreign empire to attack Canada. The Prime Minister responded that we had our obligations, as a good neighbour, to make sure our territory, our land, our seas, and our airspace, were not being used to get at the United States.

That has always been the mainspring understanding in our defence and military relationship with the United States. I think that cooperative endeavour, in which the United States has full confidence in the Canadian military—and they do have a lot of confidence in the Canadian military—is in fact one of the best exercises and guardians of our sovereignty.

The Chair: Monsieur Bachand, your time is up.

We will now go to Mr. Grose, for five minutes.

Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.): I'm sorry I wasn't here to hear your testimony. I was trying to solve a problem in my constituency, but you'll be glad to know it had nothing to do with passports.

For the benefit of the other committee members, I'd like to say that when we went to war against tyranny in 1914 and 1939, the United States didn't go along. I can't attest to 1914 because I wasn't around, but I was in 1939. We took some very harsh words from people in the United States, but we didn't pay much attention, we went on with the job.

I would like to ask a question that doesn't bear directly on U.S.–Canada relations, but I think it has great bearing in the long run. I know you people are tuned into what's going on and what's being said all around the world, and not just by diplomats, but by editorial writers and so on. What is happening as far as our position is concerned vis-à-vis the U.S.–Iraq undeclared war? Or is nothing happening? Is no one paying attention? This is going to create a swell that will come back. In the long run, I think that's more important than what American editorial writers think about it right now.

À (1030)

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Yes, we do pay attention to what the reaction around the world is to Canada's policies. Michael can contradict or correct me here, but I don't think there's a lot of surprise at the Canadian position. I think it's being seen for what it is. That is, it's a position that tried to privilege the role of the United Nations in finding a solution to a problem that we jointly identify with the United States. We share the concerns of the United States, there's no question about that, but our methodology would have been different.

Also, the fact is that Canada has decided to continue in the campaign against terrorism, to continue to work alongside the United States in all those other ways. Some people see it as a bit of a nuanced policy, but those who know Canada know we never choose between the United States and the United Nations. First of all, the U.S. is the UN. They're part of that same family, so you don't choose between those. What you try to do is make sure both relationships work in ways that will produce real security.

So I think the commentary around the world has been one of basic understanding, and not quite the visceral reactions that we've seen closer to home, and that's understandable.

I don't know whether or not that answers your question.

Mr. Ivan Grose: Yes, it does, and very well. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Grose.

There's still some time left, and I have Mr. Price on the list from the government side.

Mr. David Price: I liked your comments in response to Mr. O'Brien, but I've gone out with those same comments and I get treated as a dissident when I go out with them.

An hon. member: So does the chair.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. David Price: It seems there's something very wrong with the agenda. We seem to have a major—

The Chair: We won't count the laughter in your time, Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: Thank you.

We're doing a terrible job of getting the message out. I would blame both Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister's Office equally for that. It's like our public relations people are on vacation. No message is going out. The message seems to be strictly what's coming out of the House during question period, instead of preparing things and moving along. The way you replied was excellent. Why can't we see that message out there? We're not getting it out.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you, Mr. Price—

Mr. David Price: Maybe just to give you a question, is the public relations department working on this in any way that you know of?

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Making sure our messages are heard in the United States is certainly a key part of our work. It's not just now, it's an ongoing effort. I think our department—and Michael can again add more detail—has been working assiduously to try to make sure the Americans do hear the right messages, because things do become distorted. The messages are not always crafted or heard in the way in which we try to deliver them.

We have tried to use some new approaches and some new advocacy campaigns. You will remember that, after September 11, we tried to consolidate that base of good feeling that was in the United States by putting advertisements in the New York Times and by doing other things like that. Can we do more and be more effective? I'm absolutely certain, and this current situation shows that we really do need to find different ways of getting our messages across.

Speaking through the media is one way. Making sure parliamentarians speak to one another is also absolutely key. You have contacts that none of us can replicate.

Mr. David Price: And there go my next questions.

The Chair: [Editor's Note: Inaudible]

Mr. David Price: No? Okay, I'll be back.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Sinclair.

Mrs. Wayne, for five minutes.

À (1035)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Michael, to go back to what I was saying before about the border crossing between St. Stephen, New Brunswick, and Calais, Maine, I sit on a joint committee that was established by our friends in the U.S.A. and our friends here in Canada, all of whom are mostly from that district. We've met several times, and we're meeting again in the next two weeks, because some of the truckers had to wait for twelve hours. They sat there for twelve hours, and they were not making any money. There's no question about that if you're sitting there for twelve hours.

Michael, you were saying you were going to look into some things. Is there any specific person I should speak to in your department, or is it just you that I should deal with?

Mr. Michael Dawson: I think it might be best if I were to identify the person and have them call your office.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, I would appreciate that greatly.

Mr. Michael Dawson: I can think of a couple of people, but I'd want to talk to them first. I'll have someone contact you on that.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'd appreciate that, I really would.

There's another thing, too. We talk about our relationship with the U.S.A., and of course we do a lot of exporting there, there's no question. But the head of state of Canada is the Queen.

Here we are with Great Britain and the U.S.A. over there, and we have said no to what's going on. We're not going to take part in it. We are actually taking part in it with our ships over there and the thirty-some men who are there. I'm just wondering if what we've done and what we have not done is going to affect our ties with Great Britain in the future, Jill.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: I think the United Kingdom, like the United States, understands what our position is, so I don't think this will affect our relations with the United Kingdom.

We tried very hard, through the United Nations, to find solutions that would meet both U.S. and U.K. interests while keeping this under UN auspices. From the frequent conversations that our minister had with U.K. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and that the Prime Minister had with Prime Minister Tony Blair, I know they understood what we were trying to do. And again, while some might express disappointment at where we came out at the end of the day, I think they understand. It's not the first time countries have taken decisions that differ, and that's okay.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I just have one other question. Could you tell us when our NORAD treaty will be up for renewal?

Ms. Jill Sinclair: In 2006.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: In 2006? Thank you.

The Chair: Do you have anything further, Mrs. Wayne?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: No, that's fine, thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Price, did you want to finish your questioning?

Mr. David Price: Yes, thank you.

Just to finish my response to your question, you mentioned the fact that it is partly up to us, too, to get together with our counterparts. The problem, though, is that we don't have any method. There are no real set-ups of binational get-togethers between our elected representatives, be it the Senate or... There is the Canada–United States Inter-Parliamentary Group, but that's about all we really have officially.

We were talking about the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, which has only one member of Parliament on it, and Mr. Benoit does have a point. This is a board related to foreign affairs and defence, and that particular member is not involved that heavily on the side of foreign affairs and defence.

Do you not think we really should have some more formal set-ups in which we meet on a much more regular basis with our counterparts in the States? Or do you know of certain venues that are set up but which we aren't using?

Ms. Jill Sinclair: With your indulgence, Mr. Chair, I might ask Michael to respond, because this is much more on Canada–U.S. relations management.

Mr. Michael Dawson: Mr. Price, one thing we do have is the Canada–United States Inter-Parliamentary Group. In my experience from working with that group in providing them with briefings before their annual meetings, I think they have a fairly detailed agenda. They divide it up into strictly bilateral things, international security things, and economic issues, and I think they do have a fairly engaging and detailed discussion with their American opposite numbers. I'm not any sort of permanent expert on the IPG, I only assist it from my division once every year. However, I think their meetings get down into the weeds, so to speak, on the details.

Aside from that, I believe there are—and this is where I'm not the expert in any way—local groups across the border, regional groupings of parliamentarians who meet informally.

À (1040)

Mr. David Price: In actual fact, I can speak from experience on that since my riding sits on the border. I have all of New Hampshire and half of Vermont, and I touch the corner of Maine. In actual fact, there is no exchange between the two. I had more exchanges when I was mayor of the municipality. I dealt a lot with government forces on the other side then, but as a parliamentarian, no.

There is a relationship with the provinces, actually. The Atlantic provinces do meet with them on a state basis, state and inter-province, and that works very well. But we're not involved at all. We're not even invited. The federal level is not there, so we're really missing the boat very badly.

On the other hand, on the direct NATO issues, there is the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, in which I am involved. I have a very close working relationship with the few members of Congress and the few U.S. senators who are involved in that, but that's one little part. We have the Canada–United States Inter-Parliamentary Group and NATO, but apart from those, we are really not meeting, not interacting with a large mass of people down there. Just getting to know each other is as important...that's the first thing we have to do before we sit down and start talking about the different problems we're having and the different problems we should try to solve. So that's my problem. We lack that method of getting in there.

The other thing I should also mention is the fact that they deal with elections on a...they rotate a lot more than we do, so it's even more important for us to establish those and not have long periods of time in between those meetings.

I guess that was just a statement.

The Chair: I don't want to put words in your mouth, Mr. Price, but would you say parliamentary efforts, in terms of parliamentary diplomacy, could augment the existing diplomatic channels that we have in place?

Mr. David Price: That is the bottom line, for sure.

And I should say that the foreign affairs department does a great job at it at their level, but we're missing the other level.

The Chair: Are there any comments from our witnesses?

Ms. Jill Sinclair: I think this is an excellent line of discovery, if I may say so. There is no substitute for the contacts, especially with the Americans in the congressional system. I think parliamentarians are absolutely essential, so maybe the committee might want to consider a recommendation or a thought or two in that direction. We'd certainly welcome it.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Price.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Chair, I'm just going to ask some questions about NATO.

You commented on the strained relationship among NATO members right now. I think we all know what has led to that. Actually, there has been a growing strain in the relationship between France, Germany, and the United States in particular for some time. You feel that when you're at the meetings of the NATO parliamentarians, and I'm sure it's going to be much worse now.

Pierre Trudeau actually seriously considered pulling Canada out of NATO. Is there ongoing discussion about that in your department? Is there a consideration of whether Canada should remain a part of NATO or not?

Ms. Jill Sinclair: No, Mr. Benoit, no consideration is being given to withdrawing from NATO. As I say, NATO has shown itself to be an absolutely essential security instrument for Canada, now more so than ever. If we didn't think it was relevant at the end of the Cold War, it proved its relevance in getting us through that. After September 11, Article 5 was invoked for the first time in NATO's history, thus showing it really was a collective defence alliance in the truest sense of the word.

And if I might be forgiven for perhaps contradicting you, I think one of the sad things is that before this present strain that we've seen around Iraq, relations between France and the United States, and certainly between Germany and the United States, have never been better. The French were increasingly playing a role not simply on the political side, but even tentatively on the military side of NATO. This had always been taboo, but there was a new pragmatism in the French approach. And the relationship between Germany and the United States, through NATO, has certainly always been strong, and never more so than up to this very recent moment. So I think this is an aberration that we're seeing in NATO, frankly.

À (1045)

Mr. Leon Benoit: I was talking about the elected parliamentary level.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: Oh, okay. Forgive me.

Mr. Leon Benoit: The strain is there, and it does show. In fact, it shows itself quite clearly at times. So there has been no consideration of that.

Has there been talk in your department that maybe Canada has focused a little too much on European security and maybe not enough on other levels of security, such as a Canada–U.S.–United Kingdom relationship possibly, some special type of relationship between those three countries from a security point of view?

The United Kingdom really doesn't feel very comfortable in the European Union. With what has happened recently, I now doubt they'll take up the euro for some time. They may, but I'd be quite surprised if they do. With that added strain, I'm wondering if Canada has been involved in special talks on that, or if we've considered that seriously.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: I guess it's up to Tony Blair to let you know how he feels about the euro and what he wants to do with his country in the current circumstances.

I don't think there's any feeling that we're focused too much on any type of security. Again, security is not derived from one source or t'other, especially in the current security environment, in which you're looking at asymmetric threats and things like that.

You have to deal with security at many different levels. You have to have partnerships around the world. You can't just do North American security and think all your flanks are protected. You can't just do European security and think everything at home is somehow going to be fine. That's why we focus on rebuilding the relationships and strengthening the relationships with the United States through the PJBD, the Binational Planning Group, and NORAD, and by looking at other things like the evolution of missile defence. That's why we're looking at a robust, large, inclusive NATO. That's why we're making sure we get the hemisphere right. That's why we're playing into the Middle East peace process. That's why we're working with our ASEAN partners, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, in trying to deal with North Korea. That's why we have a peace and security initiative launched by the Prime Minister, out of the G-8, on Africa—the NEPAD initiative, the New Partnership for Africa's Development. Security has to be comprehensive and multi-disciplinary. It's the only way you're going to protect your people.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Would you agree that NATO is probably the most effective security body in the world right now?

Ms. Jill Sinclair: NATO is the only collective defence alliance in existence. That means you have an agreement whereby an attack against one is an attack against all. It is truly unique. It has unique capabilities. Certainly, for that type of security, there is no substitute for NATO.

Mr. Leon Benoit: But my question was a little broader than that. I think the UN has lost a lot of relevance in terms of being an effective security agency. It may have some value in other areas, certainly, but I think NATO has shown itself to be an effective security body.

The Chair: Please respond very briefly, Ms. Sinclair.

Ms. Jill Sinclair: I don't believe in trading off on security. Again, the United Nations Security Council has unique legitimacy with regard to its role for international peace and security, and NATO has its role. The thing is to match up all of these and make sure you get comprehensive, complementary security for all of the people of the world.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

Mr. McGuire.

Mr. Joe McGuire: As Elsie would probably agree, Mr. Chairman, eastern Canada has a particular relationship with the U.S. because we've been emigrating there for over a hundred years. Just in terms of the personal relatives and generations of family that we have in what we call the Boston States, things go pretty deep. However, it's still amazing how ignorant people in the eastern states and right across the United States are toward this country.

Even with the eastern premiers and governors, in the attempts they've been making over the past number of years to set up trade relations and so on, basically there has been very little news or very little understanding of what makes Canada tick. We've hired ex-ambassador James Blanchard and so on to do some PR for us in that regard, but what is going to make the news or what is going to clarify our position for the United States will happen on May 1, when the President visits. It's going to depend on what he says, because that will be carried across all the news channels in the United States. Maybe Pat Buchanan might even be asked to comment about Soviet Canuckistan or whatever.

The relationship with the OAS intrigues me. I wonder if you could go into that a little further, in terms of the fact that the OAS is getting more into defence of the hemisphere rather than trade in the hemisphere. Is the United States leading that move to expand the interests of the OAS into defence as well as trade? Who is driving the agenda as far as that interest is concerned within the OAS?

À (1050)

Ms. Jill Sinclair: The work of the OAS is focused much more on security than it is on defence, if I may say so. I think the democratic transition in the hemisphere is still in early days, so we've not really talked about more formal defence relationships, although our ministers of defence sit down with one another, as I said.

In response to your question, I can say that was an American initiative. They wanted to find a way to reassure the early civilian ministers of national defence that they actually did have some colleagues in the hemisphere, because having civilian ministers of national defence is a new phenomenon in the Americas. So, yes, that was a U.S. initiative.

As I say, Canada has been working alongside the U.S. because we think hemispheric security is something on which the countries of the Americas could cooperate, whether it's in dealing with the drug trade, for example, in dealing with illegal migration, or in dealing with illegal transfers in shipments of light arms and small weapons that are so destabilizing to so many of the societies in the Americas. These are very practical security issues that we think we could work on, so I think it's a shared agenda. As we see the transition in places like Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and other places, these countries are very interested in cooperating, as a hemisphere, on a broadly defined security agenda.

The Chair: Mr. Price, there is still a bit of time left. I understand you have a short question.

Mr. David Price: Yes, I have two short questions, and I'll ask them both. They're actually specific questions this time.

First of all, on the Binational Planning Group, you mentioned before that it wasn't just military, but that civil associations or something like them are involved. Could you tell me what they are? Which civil authorities are involved? And if President Bush does cancel his trip, is Foreign Affairs prepared to handle the fallout from that and get a good message out?

Ms. Jill Sinclair: On the planning group, Mr. Price, the civilians on the Canadian side who are forming part of the team that's down there are drawn from OCIPEP, from the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness. There will also be a civilian in the person of a political adviser from Foreign Affairs. That person will also be serving alongside the head of the planning group, who is a Canadian. The Americans have yet to determine who their civilian representatives will be, because, as I say, they are in the midst of a much broader exercise. But that's the civilian participation.

I don't know that we're planning for a cancellation of Bush's trip. I think we're assuming he's going to come and that our relationship is resilient and healthy. We've seen hiccups and bumps along the way in the past, but there's much more to this relationship than this one issue. So we hope the President will join us here in beautiful Ottawa.

The Chair: Very quickly, Mr. Dawson.

Mr. Michael Dawson: If I may, sir, I've heard absolutely no murmurs, rumours, or hints that the visit is going to be cancelled or delayed.

The Chair: You couldn't be more definitive than that?

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mr. Michael Dawson: I wouldn't want to be. You never know. The world is complex, but as far as our planning process is concerned, in cooperation with the U.S. embassy and the National Security Council in Washington, that is going ahead full speed on all the many details that have to be worked out.

The Chair: Thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As far as I know, President Bush's visit will focus on energy and I believe that the American demand for energy is growing by 2% a year. That is why I would be surprised if President Bush cancelled his visit, because he is probably interested, amongst other things, in tapping into our various sources of energy, including the oil sands.

While I still have the floor, I would also like to remind my colleagues of the importance of our relationship with our American counterparts. From the outset, I had insisted that this issue be addressed in a chapter of our study. In fact, I mentioned the example of the House Armed Services Committee, which has one, as well as the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. I don't think there is any reason to wait for anyone before accepting this recommendation. I think we will have to meet our American counterparts much more often, which is how we will open the channels of communication leading to a mutual understanding, instead of only leaving it up to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. I personally think that we must also get involved.

I now have a question about ITAR, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Everyone knows there are high and low points in trade defence agreements. Sometimes, the United States unilaterally withdraws from trade agreements, claiming that it has lost interest. I presume that Canada must protect its basic industrial defence infrastructure. So, I would like an update on the most recent developments with regard to ITAR. Are there any ongoing discussions? Do you meet regularly, and whose mandate is it? Is it yours or that of the Department of National Defence? Perhaps you could give us an overview of the situation and tell us whether there are ongoing meetings with respect to ITAR.

À (1055)

[English]

Mr. Michael Dawson: I can deal with the ITAR, but I have to say that neither of our divisions or areas of the department are the real experts on them. We have a specialist division in DFAIT that deals with the ITAR and does the negotiations or leads the negotiations vis-à-vis the United States. I think the ITAR are a semi-permanent sort of negotiation. They're very complex, and if you wish, I can get one of the specialists from the division that deals with them to contact your office.

The Chair: I think it would be beneficial, Mr. Dawson, if we could perhaps get a status report or general information on the status of the ITAR at this point.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, do you think that the aforementioned expert could come before the committee to speak to ITAR's more recent developments? I think that's very important.

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Bachand, I don't think that's a bad idea. We're going to have to check the witness schedule to determine whether or not it's feasible, though. Perhaps after we come back from the United States, there may be some windows of opportunity that we could look at on that subject.

I don't want to cut into any more of your time. Do you have any further questions, Mr. Bachand?

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Yes, I think so.

Mr. Dawson, in the meantime, I would be interested in obtaining a report. You said that you would send it to my office. The chairman told me that we could perhaps meet with the expert after we come back from the United States. I would like to see the report you mentioned before I leave for the States. So, if you could send it to me, I would greatly appreciate it.

[English]

The Chair: Actually, Monsieur Bachand, with respect, I think we'd be looking for a status report for the entire committee before we go down to the States. That would be extremely helpful for us while we're down there, and perhaps we could look at bringing a witness in after we come back.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you. I don't have any more questions.

The Chair: We're only a couple of minutes away from our...are there any further questions on the government side? No? Then I'll just raise one question myself.

From the standpoint of ballistic missile defence, obviously there have been some discussions and consultations done in Washington relatively recently. I'd be very interested in knowing if the department has essentially completed its work in that regard. I know you can't speak about any particular recommendations, but has a report been forwarded to cabinet on this subject? Can you tell us if this is before cabinet at this time?

Ms. Jill Sinclair: We're still working on finalizing the report that derives from the discussions we've had with the Americans, Mr. Chair. Obviously, we're working closely with the Department of National Defence. The report itself is not yet finished, but we're pretty close. I think we have most of the answers to the questions that were posed to our American colleagues and by our American colleagues.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

There are times when it's a real benefit to be the chair, and there are times when it's a bit of a drawback. Today was a bit of a drawback for me in the sense that I didn't get an opportunity to ask some of the questions I would have liked to have posed. However, from the exchange that we've had at the table, I think you can tell there is a tremendous amount of interest, with a wide scope of questions from committee members.

On behalf of the committee members, I'd like to say we appreciate your responses very much. They will be very helpful to us in terms of preparing our report. I think you've provided us with some ideas for investigation and for possible recommendations within the report. So on behalf of the committee, thank you very much for being here today.

With that, ladies and gentlemen, we'll adjourn.