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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, March 18, 2003

0905

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

VAdm Ron Buck (Chief of the Maritime Staff, Department of National Defence)

The Chair

Cmdre J.C.J.Y. Forcier (Director General, Maritime Personnel and Readiness, Department of National Defence)

VAdm Ron Buck

0910

0915

0920

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance)

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

0925

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

Cmdre J.C.J.Y. Forcier

Mr. David Price

0930

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

0935

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

0940

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.)

VAdm Ron Buck

0945

Mr. Joe McGuire

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Joe McGuire

VAdm Ron Buck

0950

The Chair

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg—Transcona, NDP)

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Bill Blaikie

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Bill Blaikie

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Bill Blaikie

0955

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Bill Blaikie

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

1000

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

VAdm Ron Buck

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

VAdm Ron Buck

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

1005

VAdm Ron Buck

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

VAdm Ron Buck

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

VAdm Ron Buck

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

VAdm Ron Buck

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

VAdm Ron Buck

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

VAdm Ron Buck

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Joe McGuire

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Joe McGuire

VAdm Ron Buck

1010

Mr. Joe McGuire

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Joe McGuire

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Joe McGuire

VAdm Ron Buck

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

1015

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Chair

Mr. David Price

The Chair

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. David Price

The Chair

1020

Mr. David Price

The Chair

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

1025

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

The Chair

VAdm Ron Buck

1030

The Chair

VAdm Ron Buck

1035

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Ron Buck

1040

The Chair

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

VAdm Ron Buck

1045

The Chair

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

1050

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Leon Benoit

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

Mr. Joe McGuire

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Joe McGuire

1055

VAdm Ron Buck

Mr. Joe McGuire

The Chair

VAdm Ron Buck

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

NUMBER 014

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, March 18, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0905)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I call this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to order.

I would like to welcome Vice-Admiral Ron Buck and Commodore Jean-Yves Forcier to the committee—certainly no strangers to this committee—to talk about Canada–U.S. defence cooperation.

Welcome to both of you, on behalf of the committee.

Because we've already had one delay in terms of getting a late start on the meeting, perhaps we could get underway with your statement without any further delay, Admiral Buck.

VAdm Ron Buck (Chief of the Maritime Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you know, I had the privilege to appear before this committee in December of last year, and it's a pleasure to return today to discuss with you Canada–U.S. cooperation.

Before I commence, I should also note, however, that I do indeed have Commodore Jean-Yves Forcier avec moi. He is currently Director General, Maritime Personnel and Readiness, but last week his well-deserved promotion to rear admiral was announced and he will be Canada's next commander on the west coast.

The Chair: Congratulations.

Cmdre J.C.J.Y. Forcier (Director General, Maritime Personnel and Readiness, Department of National Defence): Thank you.

VAdm Ron Buck: I also know that, pursuant to the subject under discussion, Dr. Kenneth Calder, our assistant deputy minister of policy, and Lieutenant-General Lloyd Campbell, Chief of the Air Staff, appeared before this committee earlier in the year. From their presentations, you already have an understanding of our historical foundations, of our extensive defence ties with the U.S., including North American Aerospace Defence Command and our cooperation with the United States from an air force perspective. Today, I would like to focus on Canada–U.S. cooperation in relation to our naval and maritime forces.

[Translation]

First, I would like to talk briefly about the naval aspects of Canada-U.S. cooperation. You will then be able to ask all the questions you want on that issue.

As you know, the military cooperation between Canada and the United States goes back to 1938, when Prime Minister Mackenzie King met President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Since that meeting, the indivisibility of our continent's security and the need for mutual help are recognized. The good relationship between the defence capabilities of our two countries has historically been key to the security of North America and, therefore, of Canada and the United States.

[English]

Canada and the United States share a long coastline bordering the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Through both Canada–U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization agreements, our Maritime Command area of responsibility—that is, the Canadian area of responsibility—extends beyond the exclusive economic zone and totals approximately 11 million square kilometres of ocean. To the south, our areas of responsibility join with those of the United States, and together they encompass the northern seaward approaches to North America.

Canadian and American efforts for mutual joint defence are based upon a structured framework. This framework articulates our shared responsibilities, provides protocols for the sharing of information, and details how our actions will be coordinated in response to threats and attacks.

There are three overarching Canada–U.S. plans: the basic security document that was originally called the Basic Security Plan; the Combined Defence Plan, which is in the process of being rewritten; and NORAD 3310, which is the basis for North American aerospace defence. Cascading down from these plans are many subordinate agreements that cover a myriad of interactions that range from personnel exchanges through to information exchange. The information exchange includes operational, intelligence, and technological information. As well, there are binational plans and combined training and operations. Collectively, these provide for an impressive degree of interoperability, and most of this was in place before September 11.

On the subject of personnel exchanges, Canadian naval personnel work alongside their American colleagues in multilateral and bilateral commands and operations, as well as in exchange positions in U.S. commands and units. For example, within the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, which is a NATO command about to become NATO Allied Command Transformation, twelve Canadian naval personnel work in that headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia.

As I'm sure you've heard, NORAD has many individuals, but nineteen Canadian naval personnel are in fact present in Colorado Springs. Thirteen naval personnel are in exchange positions in various locations within the continental United States—and in “continental”, I include Hawaii. These include positions with the Third Fleet in San Diego; the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor; the naval shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi; and the naval explosive ordnance technical detachment in Norfolk, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 2. There are also a similar number of positions in the Atlantic fleet in the United States. And I must also add that not only are Canadian personnel on exchange with U.S. forces, U.S. personnel are similarly on exchange with Canadian units, on a one-for-one basis, generally speaking.

¿ (0910)

[Translation]

The Canadian Forces naval attaché is therefore playing a liaison role relating to politics, plans, operations, organization, doctrine and technological innovations concerning the Canadian Navy. Canada and the United States send each other not only a naval attaché, but also liaison and exchange officers. Those staff exchanges foster a mutual understanding of operations and contribute to the cooperation between our two countries on issues of common interest, such as the defence of North America.

[English]

Let me now turn to information exchange.

[Translation]

To ensure efficiency in operations, and in particular in international operations, it is essential that the planning and coordination of activities be based on common information. That sharing of information is what gives the decision makers a clear understanding of the situation and the activities that could jeopardize an operation.

[English]

Through Canada's privileged defence relationship with the U.S., we have special access to U.S. classified military information, technology, and material related to maritime operations. Within these agreed protocols, there is a connectivity between Canadian and U.S. defence networks that allows the sharing of information. Our nations share maritime surveillance information, supported by the integrated operation of facilities such as the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System, which provides subsurface surveillance of North American approaches and a common maritime operational picture that geospatially depicts the locations of vessels.

Since September 11, U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard intelligence offices have been engaged in ongoing dialogue and visit programs with our own Maritime Operational Surveillance Information Centres, or MOSICs, which are known here in Canada as TRINITY and ATHENA and are located in our naval headquarters in Halifax and Esquimalt respectively. Their function is to fuse or combine data to improve the shared maritime picture in the exchange of related surveillance databases, including what are called high-interest vessel lists and warnings. There have been corresponding visits to U.S. facilities, including visits to improve the scope and quality of binational information exchanges, as well as to improve the connectivity needed to facilitate the exchange of this information.

From the binational plans perspective, the newest initiative began through the exchange of diplomatic notes in December. You've heard much about it and have, I believe, asked many questions in relation to it. It is the establishment of the Binational Planning Group, to be co-located in Colorado Springs. This will enhance military cooperation for the protection of North America. The planning group will allow Canada and the United States to share intelligence and contingency plans, and will clearly identify how to access the resources necessary to respond quickly to crises.

I might add that, again last week, an announcement was made about the senior Canadian who, as well as being part of this planning group, will become the liaison officer to United States Northern Command. He is Rear Admiral James Fraser, who is currently the commander on the west coast, and he will bring to that job a tremendous depth of experience and capability as it relates to knowledge of the maritime threat and how we can work the issues through the Binational Planning Group.

Current military plans and arrangements for the defence against maritime and land-based threats to Canada and the U.S. require review on an ongoing basis, and in particular, of course, with the development of contemporary asymmetric threats that have been identified since September 11. This planning group will serve to enhance formal Canada–U.S. military cooperation. It will focus on maritime and land-based threats and cooperation and on the support as well of civilian authorities in Canada and the United States.

The planning group will also develop, for the approval of the two governments, detailed contingency plans, consultations, and decision-making protocols that describe the processes to be followed by Canada and the United States in the event circumstances warrant an independent, cooperative, or coordinated military response to a threat or incident in either country or in the maritime approaches to North America.

It is envisaged that the Canadian Forces' interoperability with the U.S. military will be further strengthened as a result of the standardized procedures and accumulated experience that enhanced military cooperation will bring. But I stress that this is not a command headquarters, it is a planning group. In that context, command of forces will remain a national responsibility.

In the area of combined training and operations,

¿ (0915)

[Translation]

There is collaboration between the navies of our two countries, as shown by the combined operations we have been conducting for a long time, the combined exercises, the reciprocity of our resupplying operations in ports and at sea, and the sharing of testing and evaluation facilities such as the torpedo test ranges in Nanoose, B.C.

On the operational level, our Canadian frigates regularly participate in the deployment and other training activities of American maritime groups, as is the case right now in the Arabian Sea. Generally speaking, the American and Canadian naval forces are completely interoperable.

[English]

In fact, as we speak today, the Atlantic task group is conducting training operations off the coast of the United States in the Atlantic and is working up with a U.S. carrier battle group.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization also provides opportunities for Canada–U.S. cooperation. In the context of a multinational alliance, Canada and the U.S. conduct joint planning and conduct exercises and operations that involve both nations' navies.

[Translation]

In the campaign against terrorism, the Canadian Forces have a task force, the Canadian Naval Task Group in the Arabian Sea. The makeup of that group could change in the future, but it can include patrol frigates, tankers and a destroyer.

That task force contributes to highlight the interoperability of our two countries' forces.

[English]

Lessons learned already from Operation Apollo have shown that Canadian naval elements and the Canadian naval task group are able to seamlessly fit into U.S. battle groups and indeed fit in with other coalition partners because of our ability to connect with U.S. naval command, control, and communications systems. In particular, the modernized Iroquois-class command and control fit is an excellent package. It allows Canadian commanders to command coalition task groups and, today, as you know, task forces.

As you know, Canada has recently taken command of Task Force 151 under the banner of Operation Enduring Freedom or the Canadian Operation Apollo. Maritime forces have the capability and trust of U.S. decision-makers to be offered this important component of the coalition force. The leadership interdiction operational role puts particular stress on timely information exchange, and the HMCS Iroquois' participation in the command and control suite will ensure that the Canadian commander is particularly effective in this role.

[Translation]

On the operational level, connectivity is only one aspect of our ability to work closely with the American navy. We have similar doctrines and methods, but because of our participation in American tactical groups, in the second, the third and the seventh fleets and in the NATO striking force, we are also used to working under the command and inside the structure of the American navy.

Let's not forget the good faith and mutual trust characteristic of the military cooperation between our two countries.

[English]

In conclusion, Canada–U.S. naval cooperation was extremely effective before the events of September 11. With the impetus of September 11, however, interaction is increasing on all fronts, both directly with the U.S. military—the U.S. Navy in particular—but also with the U.S. Coast Guard. The advent of the Binational Planning Group will specifically enhance national level cohesiveness and consistency.

Our defence ties are extensive and our interrelationship is complex. Equally extensive is the relationship with other federal departments—that is, federal Canadian government departments—and agencies that contribute to Canada's marine security. While different, we are also seeing changes in internal U.S. relationships within the Department of Defense and the new Department of Homeland Security, which includes the United States Coast Guard.

While each organization is evolving in response to the changing threat and environment in which we operate, we remain focused on our national security goals and mutual interest in the defence and security of North America.

[Translation]

Ladies and gentleman, this concludes my presentation. I will be happy to answer your questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

¿ (0920)

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much for that very helpful presentation, Admiral Buck.

Before we get into questions, I would like to remind committee members that the last ten minutes of this meeting, from 10:50 to 11 o'clock, will be devoted to the operational budget of the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. I just give you a bit of an advance notice there.

As usual, we'll begin the questioning with Mr. Benoit, for seven minutes.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Good morning, Vice-Admiral, Commodore.

In your presentation this morning, you stressed the importance of Canada–U.S. interoperability, and you stated in your closing that it has been increasing since the war on terror started. I assume that would be in operations like Operation Apollo, but also off the coasts of our countries and probably in other operations as well.

In operations like that, I understand that over 80% of the operations in which the Canadian navy has been involved since the end of the Cold War have been in interdiction-type operations and above-water warfare. The Sea King helicopters' main purpose was actually submarine detection and that type of thing, so I'm just wondering how effective the Sea Kings are, as they're equipped, in performing this above-water type of operation like Operation Apollo. It is no doubt an increasingly dangerous operation, I would think, especially if we do see war within the next couple of days.

VAdm Ron Buck: You are absolutely correct. The Sea King was optimized as an anti-submarine-warfare helicopter. Accordingly, the statement of operational requirements for the maritime helicopter to replace the Sea King is in fact focused on a broader mix of capabilities that will indeed provide for a mix of surveillance and detection both on and above the sea.

In the present operation, Operation Apollo, very clearly as it relates to systems on board the Sea King—and when I speak about systems, I speak about radars, sensors, sonars, and things like that—they are dated. That is clearly why there is a need for a replacement maritime helicopter. But in the context of Operation Apollo, most of the work is relatively close-in work in the sense that in the southern portion of the Persian Gulf, in the Gulf of Oman, or in the North Arabian Sea, effectively what we are looking at is a wide range of either large vessels—for which there's a fair bit of intelligence—in order to provide for their location and tracking, or indeed to be able to detect vessels at relatively short range. In that context, while a more modern sensor suite is clearly needed to allow us to fully exploit our capabilities, the Sea King has been able to contribute significantly to the role we continue to play in theatre.

Mr. Leon Benoit: They've been able to contribute, but you're saying their sensor systems are dated and that this obviously limits their ability to contribute.

The naval vessels really do depend on the shipborne helicopters to extend their field of operations. Would you agree that extension is quite limited by the Sea King helicopters as they are now with their systems on board?

VAdm Ron Buck: One of the precepts of the task group concept—and indeed the task force concept of all nations—is that you have a mixture of platforms and sensors in order to be able to give you a wide-area picture. Clearly, those platforms include surface ships themselves and their radar capability, what are called organic air assets—that is, embarked helicopters, including the Sea King, of course—and maritime patrol aircraft and other reporting sensors. What you're dealing with in any theatre of operations, then, is a combination of sensors and platforms. In that context, the Sea King, while a very important piece of the puzzle, is not the only piece of the puzzle.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Would you say this dated sensor system may in any way endanger the crews of both the helicopters and the frigates or other ships involved?

¿ (0925)

VAdm Ron Buck: One of the key issues before me and my fellow chiefs of either the land staff or the air staff, and obviously the Chief of the Defence Staff, is to assess risk as it relates to missions. Before recommendations are made to government, we essentially ensure that the risk, as well as the equipment and systems we have available to do a particular mission, are suitable for that mission. In that context, the combined capability that we currently have either in theatre or en route to theatre—in the form, in this case, of Iroquois—will give us the level of capability required to do the job we have been asked to do.

Mr. Leon Benoit: But again, my question was on safety, particularly in the case of a need for search and rescue at night. How limiting is the sensor equipment on the Sea King, and could that in fact pose a threat that may well be considered an unreasonable threat to put our crews under?

VAdm Ron Buck: Firstly, when the Sea King acquisition was made—and indeed in the acquisition of the replacement maritime helicopter—a secondary role for the aircraft was search and rescue. It is not a primary role, and it never was. Even in the MHP context—

Mr. Leon Benoit: But it's a very important secondary role.

I would ask you this: In doing this interdiction work, you do that at night as well. If there is a need to do search and rescue at night, is the equipment on board limited enough that it actually could pose an unreasonable threat to the safety of our crews?

VAdm Ron Buck: Certainly as it relates to the current operation in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the North Arabian Sea, we have dealt with a significant number of search and rescue missions in theatre, including a number in darkness, I believe. In that context, the issue is not so much an issue of safety, but an issue of positioning the individual or craft that needs rescuing. In that context, the mix of sensors, including the Sea King, have very admirably done that job.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Have there been any—

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, your time has expired. Thank you very much.

Are there any questions on the government side?

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Thank you for being here, Admiral, Commodore...or Rear Admiral, I guess I should say.

VAdm Ron Buck: Actually, it's bad luck to call him that until he actually has the rank.

Mr. David Price: I'm sorry. I'll retract that instantly.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Cmdre J.C.J.Y. Forcier: I'll have to get used to it anyway.

Mr. David Price: To go in another direction, we're talking about the Binational Planning Group. I've always felt that when we're talking about the protection of North America, Mexico plays a big part in that. If we look at its maritime equipment, a lot of it is Russian or former Russian. The Mexicans have quite a mix of stuff, and we certainly can't say they're very interoperable with Canada and the U.S., which tend to be quite interoperable. Have you been sitting down with the Mexicans to look into maybe going more in a trinational direction in order to actually put a solid ring around North America?

¿ (0930)

VAdm Ron Buck: Ultimately, the plan will clearly be to include Canada, the United States, and Mexico. At the moment, however, in part through the lead of the United States, clearly the relationship between Canada and the United States in terms of technical interoperability, doctrine, tactics, and indeed legislation, facilitates that interaction.

You're quite right. Mexico has quite a mix of equipment that is not of extremely high-level connectivity and interaction. But the difficulty is actually more a political issue as it relates to Mexico, because there are constitutional constraints on what Mexico is capable of doing. In fact, what I believe you'll see over time is some joint activity between the three nations involved, in order to work through that particular piece. But that is a piece that is yet to come.

Mr. David Price: I realize that, to date, Mexico has not sent its armed forces out of the country for any reason whatsoever, but the Mexicans seems to have an opening right now. They're interested in looking outside. In fact, I know some exchange programs are going on with the U.S. Do we have any naval exchange programs going on with Mexico? I know we do have some on the land side.

VAdm Ron Buck: Yes. In fact, notwithstanding that we are not where we would ultimately wish to be, again it really commenced pre-September 11. We're starting to open up our interaction with Mexico, and it has included, certainly laterally, some ship visits to Mexico. In this case, they would have to be by maritime coastal defence vessels, because in a Mexican context and from the Mexican perspective, they're more appropriately seen to be something that would be easier for Mexico to interact with.

So we are starting to draw those themes through a number of multilateral organizations that we work in, one of which is known is the Inter-American Naval Conference, which technically will be meeting very shortly. The Mexicans participate in that. It is an information exchange, and the subject for the next meeting is how to counter terrorism in the western hemisphere. So there is that, as well as a number of other potential exercises in which Mexico may be able to participate and in which we would similarly participate. But in all of these things, the bilateral steps—whether they be with Mexico or a number of other nations from a little farther from home—do take time to develop and you must work through both the national political issues and ultimately the military issues.

If I could draw not a parallel, but an area in which we have clearly been making some significant headway, it is actually in our military and naval relationships with Japan, for example. As you know, Japan has some similar constitutional barriers, but we are working through those. I would similarly see those relationships developing not just with Mexico, but ultimately with other nations in the Americas.

Mr. David Price: To follow up on Leon's question on the maritime helicopter, if you had a new maritime helicopter right now, with the specifications that you've already put out, what more would you be able to do on your overseas operations and also in terms of homeland capabilities?

VAdm Ron Buck: As I indicated in the answer to the previous question, the statement of operational requirements very clearly broadens our capability through an enhancement of the number and types of sensors in the aircraft. You would see enhanced radar systems, as well as, from an underwater perspective, some enhanced sonar detection type of capability. And generally speaking, it will also be a larger helicopter than the existing Sea King. In simplistic terms, in a helicopter context, a larger helicopter means you can carry more potential capability, whether that means sensors, weapons, or what have you.

So what you will be seeing would be longer-range sensors, a differing mix of sensors, and an electronic ability to relay information directly from the helicopter into the command and control systems that are extant in the ships. Thus it's a much easier transition of data to be able to build what I refer to as the common operational picture or the recognized maritime picture. Clearly, those would be things that will come with the acquisition of a new maritime helicopter.

Mr. David Price: Would this also give you capacity to relay directly to the AWACS, back and forth?

VAdm Ron Buck: Potentially, yes, because the normal link to an AWACS would probably be a link from the helicopter back to the ship and then onward to an AWACS. In a technical sense, it's called a link, and the link node, if you wish, actually tends to be the ship.

Mr. David Price: If we talk about the operational radius to which you can get out, I think you mentioned that in our overseas operations right now, it's not that important. In our own maritime protection, though, how important is it to have an extended range in terms of that aspect?

VAdm Ron Buck: Very clearly, from an operational perspective, what we are trying to balance is the requirement to conduct operations that take us to a myriad of places in the world, but specifically ones we're doing now in what we call the littoral, which is relative interland waters. Of course, we have to be able to meet the mission off our own coasts as well, in terms of endurance, range, and weather conditions. The replacement of the Sea Kings will not only give us a greater capability to do some of the things we do overseas, it will in fact give us significantly greater capability to be able to conduct surveillance particularly off our own ocean approaches.

¿ (0935)

The Chair: Thank you very much, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Price.

[Translation]

Mr. Bachand, for seven minutes.

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Admiral Buck. Good morning to you too, Commodore Forcier and, more importantly, congratulations for your appointment.

You know that we are doing a lot of work on Canada-U.S. cooperation and on the whole question of interoperability. In that regard, you mentioned earlier the name of the Canadian flagship, the HMCS Iroquois. I have several questions to ask you about that.

First of all, is it right to say that the Iroquois is commanding today a tactical group of some 20 ships, but it is under Canadian control? We always make the distinction between command and control. Is it true that the Iroquois is commanding the task force, but is under Canadian control?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: To be precisely accurate, Iroquois is en route to theatre. Iroquois is not in theatre today. The flagship in theatre today is the Canadian patrol frigate HMCS Montréal.

In concept, what happens in theatre is that there are a number of layers of command. Ultimately, the commander of a task force will have what is generally called operational control of ships. In practical terms, what that means is that the nation exercising full command of those ships delegates to subordinate commanders—in this case, a multinational commander—a spectrum of operations for which that commander can use that ship.

Command of a ship remains vested in a national authority, but the operational control within a defined box of mission, as delegated by a nation, is what is exercised. In the case of Task Force 151, each national ship that is chalked into that force—again in technical parlance—is assigned to that force, is provided to the commander of that force with a discreet set of authorities to allow the commander to direct the ship to do certain things and to do those certain things within a defined set of rules of engagement. As long as the commander exercises the control—loosely called command or a portion of command—within what has been delegated to that commander by the nation in particular, the ship or ships in question execute the mission. But all ships ultimately remain under full national command.

In the context of 151, hypothetically speaking, if the commander was not Canadian but was another national, any ships that we assigned to 151 would have a set of rules within which we would say the commander could employ those particular ships. If that commander required of that ship something outside of that particular set of rules, essentially the commanding officer of the ship in question would clearly indicate to that commander that it was beyond the authority that has been provided to use that ship.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: OK. I suppose the rules of engagement you are talking about, which are established by all nations for their own ships, are a state secret and you will probably tell me you cannot answer, won't you?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: What I am going to tell you is that rules of engagement are normally not discussed, for operational security reasons as opposed to them being a state secret. However, I can tell you that the rules of engagement for all forces—in this particular context, the Canadian Forces—are ultimately approved by Canada. In that context, the rules that we have are Canadian rules that are shared with our allies, so they are aware of the capabilities of our ships and what missions they are allowed to do and what they're not allowed to do. Similarly, our allies share with us their rules of engagement. Now, it is true in the context of 151 that a significant number of nations are present in that task force, and to a certain extent they all have differing rules of engagement, but those rules are similar.

¿ (0940)

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Commodore Roger Girouard, when he gets there, probably in a few days, will take over the command of the tactical group. How many ships and how many nations are included in that tactical group?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: It varies on not quite a day-to-day basis, but it does vary. At the moment, we are talking potentially about approximately twelve ships and potentially up to twenty ships, and it could range from a low of four or five nations up to a high of eight or nine nations, including the United States.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: And the commander now has a mandate of controlling the maritime traffic following the war in Afghanistan. But I think everybody is anticipating this question since the beginning: could Commodore Girouard be willing to accept an order to bring the whole group to war in Iraq, to get closer to the Iraqi coast and to participate in the war against Iraq? How could he combine all that? If there are French ships in the tactical group, I would be very surprised if they participated in a war in Iraq, considering the French position.

After the questions we asked in the House yesterday, it's still not clear to me if the Commodore, especially since he's commanding a tactical group, could agree that the ships under Canadian control participate in the war against Irak. I would like to have your opinion on that.

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: You have indicated that the area of operation in which Task Force 151 and Commodore Girouard are operating is adjacent to Iraq. In fact, it is the southern portion of the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the North Arabian Sea.

One of the commodore's missions is to provide protection and escort, within his defined area of responsibility, to ships of nations participating in the campaign against terrorism. Of course, as you fully understand, with the potential advent of events in the coming days, the terrorist threat to those nations engaged in the war on terrorism is likely to increase. The commodore's role will be within the context of the area of operations he is in, to provide surveillance, escort, and protection.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Admiral, Monsieur Bachand.

Mr. McGuire, for seven minutes.

Mr. Joe McGuire (Egmont, Lib.): Mr. Chair, I'd just like the witnesses' opinion on the government decision yesterday vis-à-vis Iraq. Is that going to have any effect on our bilateral military relations with the U.S., on information sharing, etc.?

VAdm Ron Buck: Firstly, the decisions that the government has taken are decisions for the government to take. It is the military's job to conduct the mission that the government has assigned to the military, and we are in the process of doing that.

Just a week and a half ago, I was at the Pentagon in Washington, with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark. Admiral Clark is very conscious of the fact that, in the last eighteen months, Canada has deployed some fifteen of a fleet of eighteen major warships—which is really unheard of by any standards—and that we continue to exercise the key pieces of providing surveillance, protection, escort, and both maritime interdiction operations and leadership interdiction operations. In that context, the relationship between the two navies is very strong, and as we continue to exercise the mandate given to us by the government, that provides a key piece of assistance to coalition forces.

To date, in the broader context of information sharing, both in terms of our deployed operations and indeed as it relates to homeland defence, there has been no effect on the exchange of information. It is fair to say, however, that for our deployed operations, for those activities that may be occurring in theatre that are not specifically related to our mission, information would not normally be shared with us. The information that is shared with us clearly relates to all of the missions in which we are participating. Clearly, given that the large number of units we are providing this service for are those of our coalition partners, it is in their interest to share that information with us.

¿ (0945)

Mr. Joe McGuire: Very good.

The U.S. Coast Guard is a military force, for all intents and purposes, while ours is not. Ours used to be quasi-military, but I think it has probably even lost that distinction. Do you have any interrelationships with our coast guard as far as the Maritimes region is concerned, and our Pacific region?

VAdm Ron Buck: Firstly, in relation to the status of the U.S. Coast Guard and the Canadian Coast Guard, yes, the United States Coast Guard has a military mandate. It previously was part of the Department of Transportation; of course, it has now been moved into the Department of Homeland Security.

From a homeland security perspective in the United States, what has happened is that the area known as the high water mark—out to 200 nautical miles—is now the responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard in a surface sense, and the area beyond 200 nautical miles is the responsibility of the United States Navy.

The Canadian Coast Guard has historically never been an armed force. It is manned, trained, and run in accordance with merchant marine standards. The best way I can describe the difference between the Canadian navy and the Canadian Coast Guard is by saying we have a different mandate and a different culture—i.e., one is civilian and one is military—and there are resource issues. But we do actually have a very extensive interrelationship with the coast guard and, indeed, with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and in a number of areas.

Firstly, as it relates to surveillance, the Canadian Coast Guard provides ship-on-station for primary search and rescue. Those ships clearly have a secondary role to report, and they do so. Similarly, the coast guard and Fisheries and Oceans actually provide a fair amount of contracted aerial surveillance. They use relatively small planes inshore, but it's aerial surveillance nonetheless. That information is shared with us and is keyed into our operational centres that I spoke about earlier, ATHENA and TRINITY.

We also have a very close working relationship as it relates to search and rescue. Canada is divided into three search and rescue regions. One is the Atlantic region, one is essentially central Canada and the Arctic, and the other is the Pacific. In the case of the Atlantic and Pacific regions, the search and rescue commanders of those regions happen to be naval officers. They happen to be the two naval commanders, one in Halifax and one at Esquimalt.

Embedded in the naval headquarters is a maritime coordination search and rescue centre that is jointly manned by the Canadian navy, Canadian air force, and Canadian Coast Guard. Ultimately, the search and rescue assets are made available, whether they be primary assets—which would include a Canadian coast guard ship and Canadian air force aircraft—or, from a secondary perspective, aircraft not with a primary SAR responsibility or ships not with a primary SAR responsibility—and that includes naval ships. The decision to task those units is actually taken by the two naval commanders in their SAR commander capacity. On a day-to-day basis, they are therefore using Canadian Coast Guard assets to effect part of that role and mission.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Are the information satellites American satellites or Canadian satellites? Where does the information go? Does it go to American sources and then get shared with us, or do we have a receptor for the information from these satellites?

VAdm Ron Buck: The source of information varies immensely. In some cases, it could be a Canadian source. In other cases, it obviously could be a U.S. or indeed an other-nation source.

Some information is satellite-based. While most Canadians would think satellites would have an all-seeing capability in terms of being a very wide-area surveillance capability, most satellites do not in fact have a wide area of surveillance capability.

Probably one of the widest areas of surveillance capability is the Canadian system known as RADARSAT, but the feed of information is from a variety of sources, both Canadian and from other nations. The trick is bringing together information from a myriad of sources—it could include human intelligence from other Canadian departments and what have you—so that you can actually assess that a particular dot on a map, if you wish, is a specific target. You then need to assess what that threat is, build a plan to track that target, and then ultimately intercept that target if necessary.

¿ (0950)

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. McGuire.

Mr. Blaikie, for seven minutes.

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg—Transcona, NDP): I'll add my thanks for the witnesses' presence here this morning. I have a couple of questions.

It seems to me that what we're talking about this morning is very topical. My questions pertain to...I first want to make sure I have it right that Operation Apollo is the Canadian operation and Operation Enduring Freedom is the American one, but that both are part of the war on terrorism.

VAdm Ron Buck: That's correct.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: My concern is this: In the event of a war on Iraq, and given that the government has decided that Canada isn't going to participate in a war on Iraq, do you foresee any problems in terms of the Canadian ships that are in the area as part of the war on terrorism? Given that we're in a joint command or situation with the Americans, could Canadian ships be drawn into the war on Iraq?

Would you foresee a need for new rules of engagement to prevent or make less likely the drawing of Canadian ships and Canadian command in that area into the war in Iraq? How do you see that unfolding? This obviously is a new situation, so are any new measures being taken in order to address that new situation?

VAdm Ron Buck: Hypothetically speaking—because we are into a hypothetical situation and I don't normally like to answer hypothetical questions—

Mr. Bill Blaikie: Let's hope it is a hypothetical situation.

VAdm Ron Buck: Essentially, what I would anticipate is that there will actually be a separate command and control arrangement and task group organization that relates to activities specifically relating to Iraq, as opposed to the command and control arrangements that are in place for Operation Enduring Freedom and the Canadian Operation Apollo. So because there will in all likelihood be separate task arrangements, it is unlikely that there would actually be an ability to draw in.

There are indeed other safeguards. The other safeguards relate specifically to the rules of engagement that the Canadian government has authorized for Canadian forces—in this case, the Canadian elements of Task Force 151—both in what they can do and how they are allowed to prosecute things. It's actually a mixture of rules of engagement and of specific missions that can be conducted and cannot be conducted.

In this particular case, there's actually another safeguard. While our ships will have a very robust capability to defend themselves and others, particularly with the arrival of Iroquois, that's exactly what that capability will be. It will be a defensive capability as opposed to an offensive capability.

The final area that I think would mitigate that concern is the delineation of the areas of operation, in the sense that the Task Force 151 area of responsibility is approximately the bottom two-thirds of the Persian Gulf, and out into the Gulf of Oman and the North Arabian Sea.

Mr. Bill Blaikie: The Canadian who has been put in a command position over this task force is commanding not just Canadian ships, but American ships. Is there any danger of that person being in a difficult spot, or is what this Canadian commanding—I can't remember his name at the moment—clearly delineated in such a way that there would be no danger that, for instance, the government would be open to the charge that we're not participating in the war but have someone in a command position over a task force, part of which is deployed in the war on Iraq?

¿ (0955)

VAdm Ron Buck: The ships that are deployed and assigned to Task Force 151, whether they are American, Canadian, Australian, French, or whatever, are assigned to that particular task force for the mission that the task force has been assigned. That mission relates specifically to the campaign against terrorism and covers, as I said, a number of items, like maritime interdiction, leadership interdiction, escort protection, surveillance, and those kinds of roles.

If a ship—and hypothetically speaking, let's assume for a moment that it's an American ship—was to be involved directly in action against Iraq—

Mr. Bill Blaikie: If its mission changed...?

VAdm Ron Buck: If its mission changed, it would not execute that mission within the context of being a member of 151. Normally speaking, it would be withdrawn by the nation in question—in this case, the United States—from 151 and would be assigned to another task organization—in this case, a different coalition grouping—obviously with a different mission.

These procedures are very well tested and have been developed over many years not just in a binational perspective between nations—in other words, these have not been developed in an ad hoc nature—they are NATO procedures. Speaking particularly from a naval perspective now, NATO command and control arrangements are very well specified and defined, so that situations such as this are very clear. You know precisely what the mission responsibilities of a given organization are, as opposed to those of another. So if the U.S. wishes to use a ship in an action against Iraq—hypothetically speaking—it would be withdrawn from 151.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Blaikie.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: Admiral, could you give us a little update on where we are as far as our new subs are concerned? In response to that, could you also touch on the interoperability of those subs with our American counterparts? How are those subs integrated into the protection of North America?

VAdm Ron Buck: On the status of the submarine project at the moment, the third submarine, HMCS Corner Brook, arrived in Canada last week, so we now have three of the four in Canada. The final submarine, HMCS Chicoutimi, is due sometime next year.

We are in the process of Canadianizing HMCS Windsor. We have virtually completed the Canadianization of HMCS Victoria. And as I said, Corner Brook has just arrived.

Most of the issues we're dealing with are being dealt with under a fixed-price contract with the Government of the United Kingdom. In fact, the rectification of issues that have arisen as we have activated the submarines—just as they would arise as you activate ships, which are very complex weapons systems—while not planned, have developed, and our U.K. partners are ensuring that the submarines are brought up to specifications and are ultimately delivered to us.

There have clearly been a number of things that were not predicted on the road to getting where we are today. But if you compare this acquisition against any similar submarine acquisition—and I include new submarine acquisitions—you would find that the track record of what we're dealing with is actually very positive, notwithstanding what some of my friends in the press would tell you.

We are very shortly preparing to make the decision on when HMCS Victoria will transit from Halifax to her new home port, which will be Esquimalt, on the west coast. That's scheduled to come. As I've said, we're in the process of Canadianizing HMCS Windsor, which is also what we will be doing with HMCS Corner Brook.

We have a finite capacity to work on the submarines to Canadianize them. Canadianization includes putting in a modern command and control system that is Canadian-compatible, and thus it is a U.S.-compatible communications suite. It also includes ensuring compatibility with our torpedo systems—and our torpedo systems are U.S. torpedo systems. As we work down that process, what we will do with HMCS Corner Brook is run Corner Brook not in an operational mode, but we will run Corner Brook for potentially the next six months to a year to actually train submariners.

One of the difficulties in not having a running submarine is that the submarine skills of individuals perish, and you need to regenerate those. We will actually use Corner Brook in the months ahead to rebuild our submarine cadre.

As it relates to interoperability with the USN, because we've had submarines operating in the Canadian navy since the late 1950s, we have historically integrated into what is called waterspace management with the United States. Because we share straits such as the Straits of Juan de Fuca and because we share ocean areas where our collective submarines may be operating, we actually have a coordinated approach to waterspace management. In other words, it's not only knowing where a submarine is, but knowing in which part of the water column that submarine will operate. It's much like air traffic control, only underwater, to be simplistic about it.

In a systems sense, upon completion of this, we will also have a very good level of interoperability with the USN, and the USN is very keen to actually work with this particular class of submarine.

These submarines will have a number of roles. They will clearly be part of the Canadian task group; they will operate in concert with the Canadian task group. They will actually do patrol and surveillance of our maritime approaches to Canada. They are very effective tool in that, in the sense that they're unseen and very difficult to detect. As well, they will obviously participate in ongoing training opportunities between ourselves and the United States. And they ultimately have a role to assist in dealing with something that in some ways reflects back to the Cold War, and that's strategic incursions into waterspace controlled either by the United States or Canada.

À (1000)

Mr. David Price: One of our problems for quite a while now has been northern patrols. Of course, when we first looked at these submarines, we were looking at the possibility of doing some conversion and putting in fuel cells. I know I've asked you this question before, but I'm just wondering if there has been any movement on that at this point. Granted, the ice cap seems to be melting and we might not need them anymore, but at the present time, I think there's still a need there. We have a large, very vast area in which we a lot of times have no idea what's going on.

VAdm Ron Buck: The plan remains that in what would be the mid-life of these submarines, we will potentially look at an air-independent propulsion capability, which would give the submarines an ability to operate near the ice edge.

In parallel with submarines, however, we are looking at a number of overhead systems in the future, i.e., space-based systems. In addition, through one of the naval plans to replace our existing supply ships, the plan for those ships will be to build them with ice-capable hulls that will allow them to operate in up to first-year ice. In fact, we are trying to address the Arctic issue from a myriad of approaches, but like everything else, of course, it is a balance of resources and where those resources are assigned.

Mr. David Price: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Price.

Next on our list is Mrs. Gallant, for five minutes.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Admiral, to what extent, if at all, have our limited capabilities—with respect to search and rescue, for example—been a contributing factor in any military recommendations with respect to participating in the potential conflict in Iraq?

VAdm Ron Buck: As it relates to any recommendations in terms of potential capabilities that the government might choose to use in an action against Iraq, search and rescue is not an issue.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: So the Sea Kings are not a factor in that whatsoever?

VAdm Ron Buck: We're looking at an operational mission, in which there is always the potential for search and rescue, yes. The primary role of the ships in theatre, and indeed their organic aircraft, whether it's a Sea King today or a maritime helicopter in the future, is not search and rescue.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: In the event that the U.S.-led, 32-country coalition requires Canada's assistance in an offensive form, are our forces capable of filling a role aside from surveillance, protection, and escort, in the event that there is a conflict in Iraq?

À (1005)

VAdm Ron Buck: In the event that there's a conflict, if a mission role were assigned to the Canadian commander of Task Force 151 and the commander found that mission to be incompatible with the assigned missions and objectives that have been assigned by the Government of Canada, he would decline to participate in whatever the action was. It is less of an issue of capability than it is of an issue of definition of mission as it relates, in this case, to the original mission largely in the campaign against terrorism.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: To what extent is it possible that the mission could change?

VAdm Ron Buck: That would require a Canadian government decision.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: And we could fulfill an offensive mission—

VAdm Ron Buck: No.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: —if the decision was made?

VAdm Ron Buck: Hypothetically speaking, the military recommendation made to the government would depend on what the mission was. As I indicated in response to an earlier question, the fit of our ships in particular, with the combined capability of frigates and destroyers, is a very robust capability to defend naval units, and not just Canadian naval units, but naval units assigned to a task force. That is the mission today, and that is what our capability is optimized for.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

With respect to combat situations, fully recognizing that this is not what we're involved in here, is it Canadian policy to leave no one behind?

VAdm Ron Buck: Excuse me, but I regret that I don't understand the question.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: How far will the Canadian military go in terms of making sure anyone who has landed behind the enemy lines...how far will we go to retrieve our people?

VAdm Ron Buck: I can only answer that question from a naval perspective. In terms of speaking hypothetically about being behind enemy lines, I think that's a question you should probably pose more aptly to General Mike Jeffery.

However, as it relates to naval operations, I spoke earlier of rules of engagement. One of the things in the rules of engagement is when you are authorized to take action under the concept of self-defence and how extensive self-defence is. Does it extend only to yourself and the unit you are in? Does it include other national units? Or does it indeed include any unit that is performing in this context, the Task Force 151 context, in that particular mission? I would say to you that in terms of executing our mission and defending others in a self-defence scenario if they are involved in the mission we are participating in, we have probably the most robust rules of engagement of most nations in theatre.

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Gallant.

Mr. McGuire, for five minutes.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Do we have any bilaterals with the Americans on the Arctic?

VAdm Ron Buck: The Arctic is a problematic issue not because it's the Arctic, but because of U.S. policy about freedom of navigation. In many ways, in terms of where lines are drawn and issues like that, the Arctic has in a sense been problematic. We may well have a number of non-military agreements with the United States—and I wouldn't be certain about that—but certainly as it relates to the military, we have some protocols. But do we actually have defined bilateral agreements? No, not specifically.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Is there U.S. submarine activity in the Arctic that we're aware of? If they want to use the Arctic waters for submarine activity, what is the procedure that they use?

VAdm Ron Buck: We have protocols in place that agree that information about underwater activities relating to both nations will be exchanged.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Do you see any need for a more formal relationship with the U.S. on the Arctic?

VAdm Ron Buck: Over time, potentially the problematic issue is more the sovereignty issue. As I indicated in answer to a previous question, the U.S. approach to international waters is what it calls freedom of navigation and its ability, without seeking authority, to use specific international straits and areas like that. They include the Arctic in that, whereas we as a country actually disagree with that international position.

À (1010)

Mr. Joe McGuire: So they view the Arctic as international waters.

VAdm Ron Buck: Effectively.

Mr. Joe McGuire: And we don't?

VAdm Ron Buck: Correct.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Where does that leave everybody here?

VAdm Ron Buck: I would suggest that it's a question you might wish to ask of a representative from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

[Translation]

Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You have been talking to us for a while, Vice-Admiral, about the rules of engagement and the choice of missions. I would like to know if those rules of engagement are issued by the minister of National Defence.

You said we're expecting rules of engagement, mission statements or mission changes from the Government of Canada. Will the signal come from the minister of National Defence?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: On the relative role of the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff—and in saying “Minister of National Defence”, I mean the Government of Canada—there are two different roles.

The only orders—and I'm using a very specific term, and that is “operational orders”—that are given to the Canadian Forces come through the Chief of the Defence Staff. The Chief of the Defence Staff will make a recommendation to government that relates to potential military contributions to any particular activity. Those recommendations would have impacts upon them. Some would be recommended in some cases, and in some cases they would not be recommended.

Once the government has approved a particular option, that option is scoped in terms of the mission and the precise things the mission will do. That direction is then provided by government, in writing, to the Chief of the Defence Staff.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Fine. Now, I would like to know if there is more terrorist activity in the Persian Gulf. It seems to me that the tactical group includes more ships than before.

Do you anticipate an increase in terrorist activity? Is that what you are trying to tell us?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: In all things, there is an ebb and flow of activity. Certainly in the run-up to events that we may face within the coming days and weeks, threat indicators of potential additional terrorist threats are on the rise.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: You said earlier that Task Force 151 could split if there is a change of rules in some of the countries whose ships are involved.

I, for one, have thought about a scenario that I would like you to comment.

Is it possible that countries like Canada, which did not and still do not want to participate in a war in Iraq, could intensify their operations in the Persian Gulf to allow the British and American ships to launch an offensive, which would amount to participating in a war against Iraq, but indirectly?

Is that a realistic scenario?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: I think not. Essentially, the mission remains counter-terrorism and the threat of terrorism against those nations involved in the campaign against terrorism. Specifically, the missions assigned to Canadian Forces—and in this case to Task Force 151, through a Canadian commander—are completely consistent with the direction of the Canadian Forces in regard to their role in the campaign against terrorism as opposed to, hypothetically speaking, any other campaign.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Yes, I agree it is coherent with the antiterrorist war, but you have to admit that the Iroquois is a flagship with great defensive capabilities; you have said so yourself earlier. What I envision is that the nations which do not want to participate in a war against Iraq could tell the Americans and the British to go to war while they pick up the slack in the war against terrorism. I suspect it's the Canadian strategy.

I don't think I'm mistaken because the Canadian participation has been increased lately. I suggest it's because we want to free British and American ships so that they can get to another theatre of operations and that is why we are replacing them in the antiterrorist war theatre.

Is that possible?

À (1015)

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: Certainly all indications to date in the context of the 151 role are that Task Force 151 has a variable number of nations involved, but consistently speaking, there is a presence of U.S. forces—i.e., U.S. naval ships in 151. We do not see that changing.

From time to time, ships will change in and out. Because they are required to refuel and do things like that, there is a finite deployment length and a number of other factors, so the mix of ships within 151 will change. But if you are suggesting that 151 would not necessarily have wide participation by nations that might be prosecuting both a war against terrorism and indeed another action, I would suggest that in all likelihood, the answer is no.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Price.

Mr. David Price: I just have one little question, and I'm going to put you on the spot a little bit, Admiral. As you sit in your office off and on, when you do have a chance to get into the office and sit back and daydream a little bit and look out the window—

The Chair: I'm sure you have a lot of time for that, don't you?

VAdm Ron Buck: That's nice on weekends.

Mr. David Price: Well, as you daydream away and say, “If only I had this...”, what would be the top three items that we could afford, not necessarily immediately, but in the short term? Of course, I'm talking about items that you see that we could actually probably fit into the operation in Iraq.

VAdm Ron Buck: The naval approach to ensuring that we have a capability for the future, and indeed in transforming the navy, has been consistent and is articulated in, among other publications, Leadmark.

Very clearly from the naval perspective, the first and foremost item is a replacement maritime helicopter, followed by the replacement of our existing supply ships, with the potential, in a very cost-effective manner, for about a 28% delta on the basic vessel, so that we can not only provide a naval resupply capability, but can actually provide a limited lift capability.

Following that would be ensuring that we continue to ensure that the frigates are fully capable of performing their functions, and ultimately addressing the requirement for the robust command and control capability that is serving us so well currently in the Iroquois class in that longer-range anti-air-warfare capability.

One of the interesting things about being able to defend and operate particularly in a hostile environment, is the concept of what is called layered defence. You need a mixture of weapons systems. You need some shorter-range weapons systems, you need some longer-range weapons systems, and you need a mix of weapons systems and sensors that will be able to deal with threats from below the surface, on the surface, and above the surface—but generally speaking, it's on and above the surface with a missile threat.

For example, when we designed and had the Canadian patrol frigates built, if we had not been modernizing the Iroquois class at the same time to put in a longer-range anti-air-warfare weapon, we would have very different frigates today. We would have frigates that would have both the short-range, more self-defence-oriented anti-air-warfare capability, plus that ability to protect others. What you wish to be able to do is deal with a threat—a threat is something attacking you, obviously—and do something about it from as far away as possible.

So to simply answer your question, the priorities are the maritime helicopter; the replacement of our existing supply ships, ideally with some lift capability and in a cost-effective way; and then modernization of the frigates and replacement of the anti-air-warfare and command and control capability.

Mr. David Price: Great. Thank you.

The Chair: Do you have anything further, Mr. Price?

À (1020)

Mr. David Price: No.

The Chair: Maybe I'll take your remaining two minutes and get a quick question in, then.

Admiral, with the current funding levels right now in terms of capital replacements for the navy, the whole issue of interoperability obviously must be uppermost in your mind, especially with the Americans. Understanding that the Americans are moving or are likely to move toward the DDX class of destroyer, do you see that interoperability gap widening or becoming more narrow over the course of the next ten years?

VAdm Ron Buck: It's hard to predict that. The issue, of course, is the rate of technological change. Ultimately, the rate of technological change obviously drives the amount of resources you have to invest in that change in order to be able to remain current.

Within their own forces, the U.S. actually has a huge interoperability problem in the sense that in their larger platforms and their more capable platforms, but specifically in carriers and cruisers, they have a full suite of connectivity and interoperability. But once you go below that level of platform, we today actually have more connectivity and more bandwidth in our ships than many U.S. ships do. The challenge, though—and you put your finger on it—is how we maintain that for the future.

There are a number of ways of doing that. In one context, you could simply buy American systems, whether they be satellite-based communications systems or what have you. Or you could do as we have done today and what we actually have done historically, which is to look at different ways to achieve the same objective. We will continue to look at different ways in combination with some very specific equipment fits that relate to cryptology systems and things like that. But the challenge becomes ensuring that, as the U.S. moves ahead, we clearly can keep up with them.

My sense is the gap will continue to become more difficult to sustain, if not grow, but I would also suggest to you that this is not a uniquely Canadian problem at all. In fact, I would suggest to you that all other nations have this problem. Once you step beyond a number of the more major European navies and nations—and I would include in that ourselves and nations like Australia—it's even more difficult for others to keep up. But the challenge ultimately is that the U.S. will have to balance how it maintains its own interoperability—which may in fact require moderating its rate of change—and at the same time maintain a pace that, collectively, coalitions, including Canada, can keep up with. The United Kingdom, for example, has some very significant issues in this particular area.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Admiral, you said the top priority in terms of equipment replacement is the Sea King replacement. Some of the Sea Kings could be flying another ten years, though, so it's not a short period of time. We have to continue to consider capability and safety over that period of time. We can't ignore that.

In your professional opinion, Admiral, does the current sensor system allow our crews to maintain a sufficient standoff range to approach, in a safe fashion, vessels that are potentially dangerous vessels?

VAdm Ron Buck: The answer to that question would depend on the specifics of the given situation, on the specifics of the given vessel, and on what weapons systems that vessel or threat might have. I would suggest to you that, within reason, all airborne patrol assets—and when I say patrol assets, I'm largely talking about maritime patrol aircraft and, indeed, maritime helicopters of a wide variety of ilk—are not invulnerable to that particular threat, and it is always an issue of balancing risk against the systems fitted.

It is clear to say that, at the moment, the Sea King, with the exception of what are called passive defence systems, does not have an effective active defence system. In the future, potential would clearly exist to move forward to have that kind of capability, but that is less an issue of the helicopter than it is an issue of what systems you would choose to acquire and fit in the helicopter.

Mr. Leon Benoit: But that's part of my point. We still probably have seven to ten years flying most of the Sea Kings. And there are some other issues having to do with that, too. In terms of the crews becoming familiar with modern equipment when they've been operating with outdated equipment, isn't there some difficulty in the transfer or movement from the old, antiquated Sea King system to the modern replacement system? In fact, doesn't it take some period of time for crews to make that change, that transfer?

À (1025)

VAdm Ron Buck: It's fair to say that over the years of service of the Sea King, the sensor suite of the Sea King has itself undergone extensive change. There are infrared systems in the Sea Kings that were not originally in the Sea Kings. Indeed, the radar system in the Sea Kings was certainly not originally in the Sea Kings. In fact, originally there was a very limited radar capability. So the point I'm trying to make is that transition is an ongoing transition.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Are you anticipating any more in the Sea Kings?

VAdm Ron Buck: That remains to be seen, and it would depend to a certain extent on how quickly we proceed with the maritime helicopter replacement and indeed on what other threats, if you wish, arrive on the horizon. As I indicated earlier, a lot of this is based on risk assessment in terms of what the threat is, and indeed what the mission is. It is possible, but could I be definitive at this stage? No.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I have a couple of short questions that are very specific.

You've explained that search and rescue operations are secondary. They're secondary operations for the Sea Kings, but they're very important, obviously. Have there been any search and rescue failures that could be reasonably attributed to the outdated sensor systems on board? Secondly, are the Sea Kings and their equipment limited enough now that any of our allies, such as the United States, have determined that they simply aren't acceptable under certain circumstances, such as nighttime operations?

VAdm Ron Buck: To my knowledge—and I stress that it's to my knowledge—the answer to your first question is a no. In relation to your second question, there is a sense that the only nation in the world that continues to fly Sea Kings is Canada. Many other nations continue to fly Sea Kings, including the United States and the United Kingdom. So in that context, no, it has not been an issue that, because we're flying Sea Kings, we shouldn't—

Mr. Leon Benoit: I mean the equipment, the sensor systems, like night vision, for example.

VAdm Ron Buck: Again, as we have dealt with changing threat scenarios, while they are not hard-fitted with night vision systems, we do use portable night vision systems in the Sea Kings. Clearly, the mission that you assign to the Sea King would be appropriate to what mission fit is in that Sea King. We do change the mission fit in the Sea Kings and have done so regularly, particularly since the early 1990s.

Could I predict precisely what we might be doing in the next few years in terms of specific equipment? No, it would be premature, as I've indicated. But is there a possibility that could happen? Yes.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

Are there any questions from the government side? No?

I'd like to follow up the previous question that I asked, Admiral, on the issue of the DDX destroyers. Are you aware of the sorts of capabilities intended for that class of destroyers in the U.S., and how do they compare to current Canadian capabilities? Can you give us a bit of a rundown on that?

VAdm Ron Buck: There are really three areas of progress, if you wish, that the U.S. in particular is trying to make in what potentially will be a class of ships or a family of ships. Some of it clearly is in the command and control area—that is, the actual ability to receive information, fuse it, assess it, analyze it, and display it—and I would suggest to you that, in that particular area, we remain at the forefront. In that context, our concern would be to ensure capability between wherever the U.S. might go and wherever we might go.

Clearly, it also relates to both sensors and weapons—and I include not just radar systems, but infrared systems and other types of sensors. In fact, there is a very effective infrared system that has been a collaborative arrangement between Canada and the Netherlands called Sirius, which we are very seriously looking at in terms of acquiring it.

The other area, of course, is weapons systems themselves, whether they be gunnery systems or missile systems. We historically have been maintaining a very good capability to be involved in those leading-edge systems. One of them is currently coming to fruition, that being a large international project to evolve the existing Sparrow missile system. It's actually called the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile system. We are a plank owner of that, we're one of the major contributors, and we have in fact committed to acquiring that weapons system.

We currently have an inventory of what is called a Mk-41 launcher and a STANDARD Missile Family missile, which is the basis of the long-range missile in the Iroquois-class destroyers. The Americans continue to evolve the system, and ultimately there is the potential to move forward with later variants of that particular system.

The next area you get into is hull design of the ship. In fact, my sense of where the U.S. is in terms of hull design for the foreseeable future is that, while they will use some non-conventional hull types such as catamarans and things like that for specific things, by and large their major warship fleet will continue to be conventionally hulled.

Again, we have a very good track record in terms of naval architecture in that area. In fact, what is not well known is that our own seakeeping requirements and what are called damage control requirements are the most stringent in the world. They're the most stringent in the world because we operate in some of the most demanding oceans of the world. They have a lot of ice—and I don't mean icebergs, I mean icing conditions and things like that.

The final area is actually in propulsion systems, in which there have been some very interesting innovations. The U.S is looking at some that relate to electric direct drive and things like that, and those are obviously areas we would continue to wish to look at. So there really are a number of those. Clearly, we are watching the U.S. program very closely, but similarly we are looking at programs in the Netherlands, in Spain, in Germany, and potentially in Australia.

À (1030)

The Chair: Thank you.

As a quick final question, I have been appalled—and probably many other members of the committee would share this view, although perhaps some would not—by the type of coverage we've had with respect to the submarines and the submarine programs, with relatively few exceptions. There have been some notable exceptions of balanced stories, but the words that come out of most stories are “leaky submarines”. Having had the opportunity to go to Halifax and to sit in on an afternoon briefing in connection with the submarines, I feel much of this coverage has been completely unfair and inaccurate.

Are you folks doing anything with the public affairs branch to try to correct some of the misconceptions that exist with respect to the cost issues and capability issues that these submarines are going to provide to the Canadian Forces?

VAdm Ron Buck: I share your concern. In fact, I've been relatively vocal myself in expressing that concern. As late as a week and a half or so ago, at the Conference of Defence Associations, I did opine that I saw a relatively general lack of balanced reporting, and not just as it relates to submarines. So I feel that quite acutely.

We are attempting, at every turn, to be able to provide information, put information out, and paint a balanced, contextual story. It is true, though, that I would argue that we run a double-edged sword in this country. On the one hand, if we had built brand new submarines from scratch, I suspect that what we would be seeing in the press today is “gold-plated” this, that, or the other thing—and I'll give you an example. On the other hand, we have bought used submarines that are very modern, very effective, and very capable. Nonetheless, they have the cachet of “used”.

Many of the press stories, and I think my favourite one—and I use that word advisedly—is the dent in Victoria. Yes, there is a dent in Victoria. We didn't put the dent in Victoria, and neither did the Royal Navy, by the way. It is a minor issue in relative context and we will deal with it, yet it was a huge front-page story in Canadian papers. It was not a front-page story and never should have been. I would suggest that, in some ways, the press are using most issues in relation to acquisition—whether it's the acquisition of a submarine or anything else—for their own means, and not to assist the Canadian Forces in ensuring that we have the tools to do the job.

In a long-winded sense, I'm coming to the fact that what I must do is set what I call the conditions for success before we fully go on-power and say these submarines are exactly what this country needs. We are very close to doing that, but the challenge is ensuring that we do it and ensuring that any other surprises that might be awaiting us down the road are not there.

À (1035)

The Chair: Thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Bachand.

Mr. Claude Bachand: My question is not about the tactical group, Mr. Chairman, but about the submarines. Since you've opened the door, I would say that what might be questioned is the relevancy of those submarines, particularly since that they can't get under the polar cap. I asked a question last time about the fact that we're beginning to talk about an independent air propulsion system to get under the cap, which could cost up to 300 or 400 millions of dollars per submarine. I don't know if those figures are accurate, but a lot of people are questioning the relevancy of the submarines. At the end of the day, it doesn't matter if they are built here or if they are second hand, but what is questioned is the need to have four submarines. It's certainly debatable.

Getting back to our presence in the tactical group, when the Iroquois arrives in that tactical group, Canada will be contributing, if I'm not mistaken, two frigates and one destroyer. Is that correct?

Vam Ron Buck: Yes.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Essentially, the tactical group's main mission in the Persian Gulf will be to control maritime traffic in the Gulf and at sea. I would say that, with the equipment you have there, there's not one terrorist boat or rowboat that couldn't be detected. I think that, essentially, the mission is to control maritime traffic.

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: If I might, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to go back to the submarine issue for a moment. I would politely disagree as it relates to the utility of the Victoria class. Those submarines are a very effective operational platform in terms of operations around the world, but also specifically in terms of conducting operations that relate to the defence of our maritime approaches. Our Oberon-class submarines proved that a number of times laterally in what was sometimes known as the Turbot War.

And with all due respect, I would also take issue with one other point that was made, and that relates to air-independent propulsion. Air-independent propulsion potentially could be very expensive, but it is only one option of a future capability in terms of propulsion options. There may be much more cost-effective options that are leading-edge technologies and would be even more cost-effective. In that context, where we go and how we enhance that remains to be seen.

To get back to your primary question as it relates to Task Force 151, there are indeed a relatively robust number of ships in the task force, but you must understand as well that the types of ships that are moving through the area of operation range from supertankers through to relatively small and generally decrepit vessels of indiscriminate origin, down through to what appear to be pleasure craft or what are sometimes referred to as go-fasts, and to decrepit dhows. All of these potentially are a threat.

In all likelihood, yes, you're going to know there is something there, very clearly. But the real issues are what it is, what's in it, what its intentions are, and how quickly you can respond to deal with it when it's sitting some 500 yards off your port or starboard beam and starts to run for you at 30 knots. That becomes the challenge, and that's why there needs to be a very robust capability to analyze and exchange information and to make command decisions on what to do.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Can you tell me if there have been several incidents or several controls? Do we need 20 ships now to control all that traffic and make sure nothing is wrong? I understand it can be difficult and you must always wonder what's on those ships, but I also think the Canadian participation is very important because we are in command.

Would you agree that the Canadian participation has been increased in the last few weeks because we are in command and we have two frigates and a destroyer in a fleet including, according to what you've said earlier, about 15 ships? How do you account for that? Have there been more incidents or has Canada really been asked to increase its participation?

[English]

VAdm Ron Buck: In each operation, we continually assess the requirement to participate and at what level to participate. As I indicated in response to a question earlier, over the period that has led to where we are today and potentially in relation to what is coming, indications of the degree of threat in the region have continued to grow. Thus, it was decided that from an operational perspective, it would be appropriate at this juncture to increase the vessel participation from two to three—which we have done—bearing in mind that I said the range of the number of vessels in Task Force 151 potentially varies. Twenty is at the high end, but it's generally around a dozen. So that relates to the number of vessels.

The types of vessels relate to the fact that Canada was offered the command role by coalition forces. That leads to the requirement for a full capability, in a command and control sense, inside an Iroquois-class destroyer.

Again, with what we are actually effectively doing in this case, a subset of 151 could be viewed as a Canadian task group, but it doesn't operate that way. What we have is a complementary set of capabilities both in relation to command and in relation to what roles our vessels themselves can perform.

À (1040)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

Are there any questions on the government side? No?

As a very quick question from me, Admiral, going back to the submarines, have you started to work on any sort of arrangement with the Americans in terms of joint training with the submarines? Is that well along at this point, or are you just getting started? Where does that sit, and what do you see as the prospects for the future in terms of using those subs within carrier battle groups and task forces?

VAdm Ron Buck: The arrangements as they relate to waterspace sharing and waterspace management in the approaches to North America are very far advanced. Historically, they were very well advanced on the east coast, because for many years we operated the Oberon class. It has been some 27-odd years since we've operated on the west coast. However, those arrangements are now in place, and a key element to those particular arrangements relates to the enhancement of Canada–U.S. interoperability, because on both coasts we now share submariners in the sense that U.S. submariners are on our staff and Canadian submariners are in U.S. submarine operational command authorities to facilitate that.

In relation to the specifics of operating within a carrier battle group, that doctrine, if you wish, and the procedures for it continue to evolve. Essentially, the requirement to progress that in a meaningful way requires you to have an operational submarine, and that will come in the next year or so. As we continue to push that particular envelope, we will develop those more fully.

One of the other areas in which there is a tremendous amount of exchange between ourselves and the United States is in underwater testing, and not just at the Canadian Forces Maritime Experimental and Test Range at Nanoose, in British Columbia, but in other ranges. That testing relates to our submarine weapons—our Mk-48 torpedoes—and those are again well-established protocols.

There is also a very well-established arrangement between ourselves and the United States in terms of submarine technologies from a specialists' perspective. In fact, through Defence Research and Development Canada, DRDC, we have some of the premier analytical capabilities that relate to submarine hull structure, hull strength, and issues like that, so much so that not only are we drawing on U.S. and British sources, but U.S. and British sources are in fact drawing on our capabilities in these areas.

The Chair: And just very briefly getting back to the Task Force 151 issues, I heard you mention that either there is a French ship or there are French ships in Task Force 151. Presumably they have the same constraints as we do in terms of rules of engagement and separating the two missions.

VAdm Ron Buck: They very clearly will have similar concerns. Their rules of engagement are not precisely the same as our rules of engagement, but they are similar.

As a bit of a snapshot, as I've indicated, today there are three Canadian frigates—Montréal, Winnipeg, and Regina, newly-joined; a Dutch ship; a New Zealand ship; a Hellenic ship; some U.S. ships; a French ship; and ships of a number of other nations, as an example.

À (1045)

The Chair: And there are no German ships?

VAdm Ron Buck: Not today.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: The maritime helicopters are an integral part of the naval systems that Canada uses. You made a comment earlier that what will determine whether the Sea Kings are given equipment upgrades when it comes to sensors and so on will relate to the procurement process for the replacements.

VAdm Ron Buck: In part.

Mr. Leon Benoit: In part? I'd just like you to explain that, but I'd first just like a short answer on whether the Sea Kings have in fact received new engines, or whether they're upgrades or rebuilt engines.

VAdm Ron Buck: The engine design in the Sea King is a new engine design in the sense that it is not the original design. Potentially included in that design are parts that may have been used in other engines, that is true. The fact of the matter is, though, that for every piece, whether it's in an aircraft engine, a rotor blade, or anything else in any aircraft fleet—but in this case, the Sea King aircraft fleet—the particular piece will operate for a finite number of hours. This is well proven in the commercial sector, and it remains very similar from a Sea King perspective. The aircraft engines are of a new design change, a changed design, as are the gearboxes.

Mr. Leon Benoit: They're not new engines, though, technically.

VAdm Ron Buck: In some cases they may well be completely new engines. But again, that's probably more precisely a question that General Campbell should answer.

Mr. Leon Benoit: In terms of the equipment upgrades for the Sea King sensors in particular, then, if you're looking at the procurement process for their replacements, what guideline do you use to determine whether you push for an upgrade or not?

VAdm Ron Buck: It's whether there is in fact a requirement in terms of an operational capability and whether it makes cost-effective sense to make such an acquisition.

Mr. Leon Benoit: What determines whether you feel there is a requirement? Some say there is certainly a requirement.

VAdm Ron Buck: In part, that would depend on the acquisition timeline and the process related to the maritime helicopter itself. It's a hypothetical question that would be very difficult to answer at this stage without knowing the specifics of a specific capability or specific scenario in which that would have to be assessed.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Do you think there's any way all of the Sea Kings could be replaced in less than seven to ten years?

VAdm Ron Buck: Again, I would suggest that this question would probably be more appropriately asked of Alan Williams, the assistant deputy minister for matériel. There is a timeline on major acquisitions. The timeline, though, can be mitigated by a number of things. From a project perspective, it would depend on what type of approach is being taken in an acquisition sense. It also depends on the maturity of the system of the helicopter—the weapons system in this case—and of its internal systems, in terms of how mature it is or how off-the-shelf it is.

Mr. Leon Benoit: On the portable night vision equipment that you referred to that is on board some of the Sea Kings, could you explain what the capability of that is, what it's used for, and that type of thing?

VAdm Ron Buck: Essentially, we're talking about night vision goggles, and essentially what they can allow in nighttime operations are some enhanced low-light detection capabilities.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Would they be the same night vision goggles that would be issued to ground troops for night operations?

VAdm Ron Buck: I would suggest that they're similar, because in some cases there are issues of stabilization and other issues. They're similar, but I would not wish to say they are identical.

Mr. Leon Benoit: How would the capabilities of that compare for the type of interdiction work that Operation Apollo is doing right now? How would the capability compare to a modern system on board?

VAdm Ron Buck: Again, I think that's a hypothetical question. Without being able to do a direct comparison of equipment that we're using today to some other specific piece of equipment, it would be hard to pass judgment. It would be fair to say, however, that an integrated on-board capability would clearly be more effective than what we are doing today.

Mr. Leon Benoit: In particular, in search and rescue operations, how would the capabilities compare? I'm just trying to get an idea from you.

À (1050)

VAdm Ron Buck: Again bearing in mind that search and rescue is a secondary capability—

Mr. Leon Benoit: But it is a very important secondary capability.

VAdm Ron Buck: It is a very important secondary capability, yes. There's no disagreement on that point. However, again generally speaking, when you're in a search and rescue scenario, the need for night vision capability would vary significantly. It would vary if the vessel from which you were trying to rescue someone had power and thus had lights or not—

Mr. Leon Benoit: What about the man overboard at night?

VAdm Ron Buck: For the man overboard at night, Sea Kings have historically been an integral part of that from one of our ships. Essentially, when there is a man overboard, the procedure is a very precise procedure. Stationed on the stern of the ship, there is an individual known as the lifebuoy sentry. Once he sounds the alarm, there is a very sophisticated plotting process that goes on instantly inside the ship to position where the individual who has gone over the side will potentially be.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay, but what about someone who has gone overboard from another vessel and not necessarily—

VAdm Ron Buck: Generally speaking, the issue then becomes one of being able to detect and know precisely where the individual is. An individual, as opposed to a vessel, is very difficult to detect on radar, because the radar of an aircraft is primarily focused out ahead as opposed to being focused on something very close to you and under you.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So are Sea Kings pretty much limited to night search lights in terms of locating—

VAdm Ron Buck: That is a capability that they have, and they also have some night vision capability. But the key to search and rescue, no matter what helicopter you have, is being able to accurately position and to know where to send the helicopter. Sending a helicopter out to do a wide-area search for anything that is small and floating on the surface is not the best use of a helicopter, because it has a finite capability in terms of endurance and all helicopters have a finite search capability for what is effectively a needle in a haystack.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, I'll interrupt you there just to advise committee members that because we don't have quorum at this point, we can't deal with the subcommittee's budget. We'll try to deal with that as the first thing up at the next meeting.

Are there any questions from the government side at this point?

Mr. McGuire.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Given that we can't sell a box of oysters in the United States without it being declared bioterrorism-free, given that the NATO alliance is weakening at this point—it may be shorn up in the future—and given the commitment by the U.S. to protect their homeland, can you put your futurist's cap on and predict what kind of strategies will be put in place that might affect this study that we're participating in as far as the future of Fortress North America is concerned, or even Fortress Western Hemisphere? Do you see it going to that point? If you do, what kinds of strategies would be put in place, Canada–U.S., in the future, say in the next ten to twenty years?

VAdm Ron Buck: I think it would be inappropriate for me to comment on what essentially are issues for the government. However, I would fundamentally say that, both from a Canadian perspective and a United States perspective, both nations collectively, at the government level and at the level of our citizenries, have to have a very good understanding of not just what we perceive the U.S. potentially to be doing, but of the root causes of why they are doing it. Indeed, we have to ensure that the actions that we might take in the future as a country fully take those concerns into consideration.

From a Canadian perspective, the issue then becomes one of taking what would hopefully be appropriate decisions. In my view, depending on what they are, they will be decisions that potentially could have a far-reaching impact both on North America as a whole and fundamentally on both Canada and the United States.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Given the level of expenditures—the U.S. is spending $1 billion a day, which would use up our budget in a couple of weeks—do you think there's ever going to be a point at which we can do our share? If it becomes Fortress North America, and given the advances the Americans will be making with their heavy investment in technology, will we ever be able to keep up and play a meaningful role in the defence of our continent?

À (1055)

VAdm Ron Buck: In some ways, I would draw a parallel, if you wish, to the relationship that we have between Canada's navy and the United States Navy. The U.S. Navy is 365-odd ships in size, and the Canadian navy has 18 major warships. That's a huge difference in size, obviously. But I would suggest to you that, for our size, we are extremely effective and credible, and we maintain that by adopting a number of innovative ways to achieve our aims.

In a dollar-for-dollar sense, we obviously never will be able to compete with the United States, nor would I suggest that we should try to do so. What I would suggest, though, is that we must pick our areas to ensure that we have the right initiatives. As well, I think I would suggest that we must collectively do a much better job of making our case, because I don't think the understanding inside the United States about what Canada, one, is capable of doing, and two, is doing, is at all well understood, particularly at the level of U.S. citizens.

Mr. Joe McGuire: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

Are there any questions from the opposition? No?

With that, Admiral, I would like to thank you again for being here today to answer a wide variety of questions.

We appreciate your participation here as well, Commodore Forcier.

It's been good to see you both again, and we look forward to your next visit to the committee.

VAdm Ron Buck: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: We're adjourned.