ENSU Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Wednesday, May 26, 1999

• 1544

[English]

The Chairman (Hon. Charles Caccia (Davenport, Lib.)): I apologize for the delay. We now have a quorum, so we can start.

This is a rather important meeting, although the presence of people in the room may not reflect it. It is one of those topics that is seen as of marginal significance, but it is of central importance to this committee in particular. We therefore welcome the presence of the witnesses.

Before doing that, I understand Mr. Laliberte has a point of order to raise.

Mr. Rick Laliberte (Churchill River, NDP): Yes. It's just a point, Mr. Chair. We hear the House might be recessing earlier than people are expecting, and there's an item on our agenda, the Sydney Tar Ponds visit. Is it possible to bring it up at a later time to strategize on when we could possibly make this? Is there a committee meeting tomorrow morning?

• 1545

The Chairman: Well, tomorrow morning will be a bit tight, because at 10 o'clock, as you know, the House will start with the report stage of Bill C-32. You were notified overnight, I believe, that tomorrow morning we'll start at 8.30 and will devote an hour and a half to Mr. Gershberg and CEAA. So tomorrow I expect it to be a rather tight hour and a half.

In a meeting with Environment Canada officials—and I don't know whether you were present or a colleague of yours was—we asked them to supply us in writing with a position or possibly even with a plan for the tar ponds, and we indicated to them that we would like to have it before a decision is made on travelling. That report should arrive, I would imagine, any day. I will ask the clerk to follow up to see when the committee can receive the text. Then, when we have that report, perhaps we should have a short session to discuss travelling plans, so that we make decisions with something in our hands rather than in a vacuum.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: Okay.

The Chairman: Mr. Emmett, welcome. If you would like to introduce your colleagues and launch the discussion, by all means do so. Welcome to the committee.

Mr. Brian Emmett (Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, Office of the Auditor General of Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm the commissioner of the environment and sustainable development, and with me is Alan Gilmore, who is the principal in charge of the work we've done here on nuclear emergency preparedness. Would you like the other witnesses to introduce themselves now?

The Chairman: Yes, please.

Mr. Rod Raphael (Acting Director General, Environmental Health Directorate, Health Protection Branch, Health Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm Rod Raphael from the environmental health directorate of Health Canada. I'd like to introduce as well Jean-Patrice Auclair from the radiation protection bureau of Health Canada and Dr. Jack Cornett from the radiation protection bureau at Health Canada. Thank you.

Ms. Ann Marie Sahagian (Executive Director, Emergency Preparedness Canada): And I'm Ann Marie Sahagian, the executive director of Emergency Preparedness Canada.

The Chairman: In which department?

Ms. Ann Marie Sahagian: The Department of National Defence.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Marchildon (Director General, Atomic Energy Control Board Secretariat): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Pierre Marchildon and I am the secretary of the Atomic Energy Control Board. Today I am accompanied by Mr. Jim Blyth, of the Power Reactor Evaluation Division, and Mr. Barclay Howden, of the Research and Production Facilities Division.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Marchildon.

Mr. Emmett, the floor is yours.

Mr. Brian Emmett: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

Thank you for the opportunity to meet with your committee today.

In 1987 we reported to Parliament on gaps in the federal government's preparedness for catastrophic earthquakes, large chemical and oil spills, and major nuclear accidents. In 1989, 1992, 1994, 1995, and 1997—we're nothing if not persistent—we reported on follow-up audits of emergency preparedness. The focus of our 1998 follow-up chapter was nuclear emergencies.

[Translation]

A brief summary of events indicates our continuing concerns. In 1984, Health Canada was designated the lead department for nuclear emergencies. In 1986, following the Chernobyl accident, Health Canada's review of the Federal Nuclear Emergency Response Plan found that the objectives of the Plan and the means to achieve them were not clearly defined and there were major implementation deficiencies. Our 1989 Report continues to identify a lack of clear goals and coordinated plans.

• 1550

In 1992, we noted that major improvements were still needed in federal emergency planning. We found that most of the 1986 improvements to the Federal Nuclear Emergency Response Plan either had not been implemented or were in the beginning stages of implementation.

In 1992, Health Canada initiated a review of the Nuclear Emergency Response Plan. It issued an interim plan in December 1997, now renamed the Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan.

However, most of our concerns about preparedness for nuclear emergencies reported in our reports have not yet been adequately addressed.

For example, 13 federal departments and agencies have significant responsibilities and are expected to prepare support plans. At the time of our audit, Health Canada had not completed its own support plan and had only received two departmental support plans. Without such plans, it is difficult to ensure a coordinated effort.

[English]

An emergency preparedness advisory committee has significant decision-making responsibility. It is composed of assistant deputy ministers from key departments and agencies. However, decision-making may be hampered, because as of December 1998, most of the committee members had not attended meetings during the last four years. Further, none had participated in emergency preparedness training sessions specifically designed to prepare them for their roles.

In 1987, 1992, and 1998 we noted concerns about the lack of national guidelines for initiating protective action against radiation exposure. Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick have different guidelines. This lack of common standards may result in unnecessary delays and confusions, because citizens of different provinces confronted with similar threats may receive different advice and direction. Health Canada acknowledges that the provinces significantly differ in capability to deal with nuclear emergencies and that it does have adequate information on resources required.

In 1997 Ontario Hydro assessed all its nuclear generating stations. Seven of 19 operating reactors were closed. All were rated below standard with respect to emergency preparedness. The Atomic Energy Control Board concluded that although defence in depth for safety had been eroded at Ontario Hydro nuclear generating stations, the reactors could continue to operate safely in the short term. The AECB told us the status of nuclear stations in Quebec and New Brunswick is similar to that of Ontario Hydro.

In April 1999, subsequent to our report in December 1998, the interim federal nuclear emergency plan was tested in CANATEX 3, an interdepartmental, provincial, and municipal desktop simulation exercise. Health Canada and other departments are evaluating the results of this exercise. Your committee may wish to consider reviewing these evaluations when they are completed.

As well, you may wish to consider obtaining information to allow you to assess the Atomic Energy Control Board's regulatory approach to the safety of nuclear power plants, including its review of nuclear physical security regulations for these plants.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. We would certainly be pleased to answer the committee's questions.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Emmett. Your report today seems pretty close to what the Auditor General reported in chapter 8 of the 1998 reports. In other words, there doesn't seem to have been much progress.

• 1555

Who will be the next speaker? Mr. Raphael, would you like to proceed?

Mr. Rod Raphael: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd first like to apologize for the glitch we experienced getting the materials to you ahead of time. The clerk now does have the materials for what is a very brief statement, which is now being copied. So I would put us at the disposal of the chair to proceed with the short summary, with the materials to follow within a few minutes, I suspect.

Oh, do you have it now? Okay.

[Translation]

Do you have the French version as well? All right, thank you.

[English]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for inviting us today to present to you some of the work surrounding the federal nuclear emergency plan. I hope to show you the progress we have made since the 1998 report, and I'd highlight that that progress was under way at the time of the report.

The Chairman: Considering the length of your brief, I wonder whether you can compress it into 10 minutes so that we don't erode the time available to members for questions. Would you please speed it up?

Mr. Rod Raphael: I will definitely.

I will skip the second page, which is really just a highlight of how we would like to proceed. I'll look at the background, the issues raised, and then the conclusion. We have materials available for the committee to explain most of the surrounding background and history.

As Mr. Emmett has said already, it is a shared responsibility among Canadian governments as well as industry. The Atomic Energy Control Board is the federal nuclear regulator, and Emergency Preparedness Canada will also be addressing you here today.

In 1984, as Mr. Emmett has highlighted, Health Canada was designated the lead department to plan and coordinate the federal government response to a major civil nuclear emergency affecting Canada or Canadians at home or abroad. At the time this responsibility was given, no additional resources were allocated for this responsibility of the department.

At that time, as noted, there were no national or international guidelines or standards within the area of nuclear emergency preparedness. However, over the course of time and following a number of emergencies, such as Chernobyl in 1986, a considerable evolution in emergency preparedness benchmarks has taken place. All responsible authorities have reviewed the resources devoted to these activities and have increased their level of effort. Health Canada is no exception. We are increasing our level of effort and emphasis.

The first issue highlighted by the commissioner's report in 1998 was that the federal nuclear emergency plan is incomplete. The plan is completed, with five provincial annexes also complete. It is not one single document, but a series of documents that together form a complete preparedness and response framework for dealing with a nuclear emergency.

The current version of the FNEP was completed in the fall of 1997, and as noted earlier today, it was implemented and tested during the latest exercise, called CANATEX 3, hosted by Canada.

It is fair to say that in the past, the pace of progress has been affected by the low amount of resources and effort allocated to this activity and to fiscal restraints imposed within the department and on the department. However, the department has made additional resources available and has recognized the need to adjust the resource levels devoted to this activity in the future.

The department has focused its resources on completing the most important documents and activities first, including the annexes for all provinces with nuclear power stations, as well as all provinces visited by nuclear power vessels, and the mutual aid agreement with the U.S.

• 1600

The department has also recognized that the job is not yet complete, and as with anything else, an ongoing preparedness cycle is now being initiated.

The interim plan still needs to be tested. As has already been said, we held the test on April 27 and April 28, which will be evaluated over the next few months, with a report coming forward in September. At that time we would be prepared to share with you committee members and parliamentarians the results of that review process. Formal plan approval by participating departments and agencies will follow once we have had the chance to incorporate the materials from the tests and make adjustments to the plan.

You have been given a pictogram of participating international bodies and countries in the recent CANATEX exercise. It was also the platform for INEX, which is an international nuclear exercise. You can see that over 32 countries accessed the web site, using their appropriate codes, to actually participate in the exercise by adding information or canvassing for information.

We note that over 30,000 pages of information on the web site were accessed. Approximately 40% of the hits on the web site could not be resolved, but the sources would be distributed among one or more of the countries listed above. So it truly was a compliment to the national exercise to have the INEX role played within the recent experience in April.

The third issue is lack of national radiation exposure standards. Provinces have direct responsibility for protecting the health and safety of their citizens. Three provinces with nuclear generating stations have established protection action levels. Draft national guidelines for contaminated food have been prepared and are undergoing provincial review. These draft guidelines are undergoing review by a select number of federal departments and agencies as well. Our hope is to complete the review and revisions of the current drafts by June 2000. The Atomic Energy Control Board is leading the development of national off-site nuclear emergency preparedness guidelines.

The fourth issue is that the support needs of provinces are incomplete, and additional provincial annexes are required. Annexes have been completed for those provinces with the potential for a nuclear emergency, which would invoke the FNEP. They are Quebec, Ontario, and New Brunswick, due to their nuclear power stations, and Nova Scotia and British Columbia, because they are from time to time visited by nuclear-powered vessels.

Annexes for the remaining provinces and territories are on the list of future activities, but will be subject to the support, priorities, and active participation of those provinces and territorial governments involved. We have begun to plan for this activity.

So far, no other territorial or provincial government has asked to create a FNEP annex. However, we will make a formal request and raise the issue at the next federal-provincial-territorial nuclear emergency committee, which will happen in the first quarter of the year 2000.

Briefly, in conclusion, substantial progress has been made in nuclear emergency preparedness and with the creation of FNEP and the annexes. We recognize that a significant amount of work remains to be done, and we expect this progress to continue in forthcoming months and years. Of primary interest is that CANATEX 3 provided a good test of FNEP, and the lessons learned will form the basis for finalizing the plan, completing procedures, and providing guidance on supporting activities still outstanding. Health Canada has recognized and incorporated these activities into our five-year work plans for FNEP, and we remain largely on track.

Finally, I would like to reiterate Health Canada's commitment to nuclear emergency preparedness and that the department is evaluating options for long-term funding necessary to ensure that progress continues on these activities in the future. This funding has been, in the last two years, a major priority issue within the department, and we're attempting now to put it on a permanent basis within the department.

• 1605

Thank you. I hope I didn't go over the 10 minutes.

The Chairman: You did, but you will be forgiven. Thank you, Mr. Raphael.

Madame Sahagian, please.

Ms. Ann Marie Sahagian: Mr. Chair, as EPC has primarily only a support role to the nuclear emergency plan, I have not prepared a series of extensive remarks. I'd simply comment on the fact that EPC was involved in its role of providing technical and other advice to Health Canada throughout the preparation of the plan. Emergency Preparedness Canada also was responsible for the exercise design and assisted by providing the administrative support, control staff, and other exercise inputs into the operations of CANATEX 3.

Other than that, we have no opening remarks for the committee today.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Monsieur Marchildon.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: Thank, Mr. Chairman.

On behalf of the Atomic Energy Control Board, I would like to provide you with a brief explanation of the role that the Board plays in nuclear emergency preparedness. My intent is to provide you with some background information about the work of the Board, a brief overview of AECB's response to observations made by the Office of the Auditor General and, finally, a summary of what the AECB has accomplished in the area of emergency preparedness.

The AECB was established in 1946 under the authority of the Atomic Energy Control Act. It is an independent federal agency that reports to Parliament through the Minister of Natural Resources Canada. The role of the Board is to regulate the nuclear industry in Canada in such a matter that the development and use of nuclear energy do not pose an unreasonable risk to health, safety, security and the environment. The Board also has responsibilities under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

For many Canadians, the nuclear reactors, the CANDU power reactors operated by electric utilities are the most obvious examples of a nuclear facility. However, the AECB also regulates nuclear research reactors, particle accelerators, uranium mines, mills and refineries, nuclear fuel-fabrication plants and radioactive waste management facilities.

In addition to the nuclear facilities, AECB also administers 3,500 to 4,000 licences for radio-isotopes that are used in both industry and hospitals. To achieve this mission, the AECB administers a comprehensive licencing system that covers all aspects of nuclear facilities, prescribes substances and equipment. Once a licence has been granted, the AECB undertakes a stringent monitoring and inspection regime to ensure compliance with licence conditions and with the regulations in general.

I believe that it is fair to say that the nuclear industry in Canada is more stringently regulated than most other industries dealing with hazardous substances. I want to make it clear that it is not the AECB's role to promote the nuclear industry. We are neither anti—nor pro—nuclear industry. The AECB does not make decisions on whether to use nuclear power in Canada. Once such a decision has been made, however, our regulatory role begins. Our role does not end until a facility has been successfully decommissioned according to requirements specified in our legislation and the associated regulations.

• 1610

[English]

I would now like to turn to the 1998 report from the Office of the Auditor General. That report, which is a follow-up to the 1992 report, contains no comments, either critical or complimentary, on AECB performance with respect to its responsibilities in the federal nuclear emergency plan and the AECB emergency response plan. Nonetheless I would like to take this opportunity to respond to three observations made in the report that do relate to the work of the AECB.

First, the report noted that after six years, the federal nuclear emergency plan is still incomplete. My colleague from Health Canada has already spoken to this point. The AECB plays an important, albeit supporting, role in the implementation of the federal nuclear emergency plan and is committed to continuing to work with its partners, both federal and other, in this regard.

Secondly, the Office of the Auditor General also noted that the interim federal nuclear emergency plan had not been tested at the time of the follow-up. As pointed out again by my colleague from Health Canada, this testing has now occurred, with the CANATEX exercise that took place in April.

Finally, I would like to respond to the observations made by the Auditor General concerning improvements required in the operation of Ontario Hydro's nuclear power plants. As noted by the Office of the Auditor General, Ontario Hydro's independent integrated performance assessment in 1997 ranked the performance of Hydro's nuclear stations minimally acceptable. This assessment concurred with AECB observations.

As far back as 1989, the AECB recognized that the operating and maintenance standards at Ontario Hydro's nuclear plants were declining and that corrective actions were required. The AECB discussed this issue publicly on several occasions at board meetings, and discussions were recorded in various documents that are publicly available.

To correct the situation, Ontario Hydro proposed a nuclear asset optimization plan that involved the layup of seven of its 19 operating reactors. This was an Ontario Hydro management decision based mainly on economic considerations and on the resource requirements needed to sustain improvements in operation. The decision was not based on immediate safety concerns, in the sense that all reactors were operating safely under the conditions of their licences and for the length of time the licences were issued. There is no doubt, however, that Ontario Hydro needed to make operational maintenance and management improvements if they were to continue to be licensed.

Ontario Hydro, or rather its successor, Ontario Power Generation, is now in the process of implementing its optimization plan, and the AECB is closely monitoring the progress made.

Finally, I would like to provide the committee with a very brief background on emergency preparedness at the AECB and a summary of significant accomplishments since 1990.

In 1990 the AECB's advisory committees on nuclear safety and radiation protection produced a report entitled Emergency Preparedness in Canada, which was quite critical of the insufficient level of effort spent in this area. Partially in response to this report, the AECB in 1991 assigned additional resources to emergency preparedness and initiated an upgrade of its internal plan. By 1994, this upgraded plan had been completed and implementation commenced.

• 1615

Between 1994 and 1998, the plan was put to trial use and adjustments were made. This phase also included the preparation of detailed procedures, the development of training programs for AECB staff, and the construction in 1995 of a new emergency operations centre.

Also during this time period, the AECB participated in numerous other activities related to emergency preparedness. Examples include the 1993 Canadian and American INEX 1 exercise and the 1996 Swiss INEX 2 exercise. By 1998, the AECB emergency response plan had been revised based on that experience and was approved by the president of the AECB.

As mentioned previously, the AECB has recently been closely involved in the CANATEX 3 exercise. Preparations for the exercise have included staff training as well as participation in other tests and activities. The AECB participated, for example, in the Pickering corporate nuclear emergency exercise in December 1998 and in the Darlington nuclear emergency exercise the following month.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, the AECB has well-documented plans and procedures for responding to nuclear emergencies and is committed to continuing to work with other departments and agencies on issues relating to emergency preparedness.

At this point I will echo the comment made by my colleague from Health Canada. There is no doubt that a lot of work remains to be done, but we are committed to doing it.

I would be pleased to respond to questions the committee members might have.

Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Marchildon.

[English]

Mr. Casson, would you like to go first?

Mr. Rick Casson (Lethbridge, Ref.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Emmett, you state in your brief in item 8—and this was from the December 1998 report you studied—that an emergency preparedness advisory committee has significant decision-making responsibilities. However, nobody has shown up at these meetings, has taken part, or has been trained to further their role.

Who's putting these meetings on, who's hosting them, and who's not showing up? Who are these 13 departments? And why haven't they? Maybe that's not a question for you to answer, but somebody should.

Mr. Brian Emmett: This may not be a question for me, Mr. Chairman. The concern we expressed was that this is a high-level committee designed to take decisions in a situation where there is a nuclear emergency, representation is designed to be at the assistant deputy minister level, and our observations were that in the four years previous to our follow-up report, 1994 to 1998, assistant deputy ministers had been delegating their attendance at these meetings. That led us to have questions about the capacity of this important committee to take the decisions it needed to take.

But perhaps my colleagues in departments have more recent or more updated information on that.

Mr. Rod Raphael: Yes. We have recently held the exercise, in which this committee did function, and prior to that—I can speak for some but not all departments—there was commitment and training of the ADM-level representatives to take their role within the exercise we held in April.

• 1620

Mr. Rick Casson: So you don't agree with this claim that over the last four years, nobody has been participating? He's making that statement here.

Mr. Brian Emmett: I don't believe we said no one has been participating.

Mr. Rick Casson: I'm sorry; you're right. You said none had participated in emergency preparedness training. Nobody was taking this training.

Mr. Brian Emmett: That was as of the date of our audit.

Mr. Rick Casson: Yes, I realize that.

Mr. Rod Raphael: That was a deficiency we recognized as we were going through our work last fall. The only answer I have to that is the action taken during the January, February, and March period in preparation for the exercise. There was a commitment, and training was done.

As well, the ADM committee did meet through the exercise and is one of the areas of the exercise that will be rated in the review that is under way now and that we hope to share with you by the end of the summer.

Mr. Rick Casson: I'd like the definition of a statement here. Item 11 of Mr. Emmett's presentation says seven of 19 operating reactors were closed, and all were rated below standard with respect to emergency preparedness. AECB concluded that defence in depth for safety has been eroded. What does “defence in depth” mean?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: I'll try to explain that in summary form.

You all know certain risks are associated with the operation of nuclear stations, but the nuclear stations are designed such that if some failures occur, there are protective systems, measures, or procedures to minimize the consequences of such failures.

The series of systems, measures, or procedures all put together constitute what is called defence in depth. If any one of them fails, that does not mean the consequences necessarily will be catastrophic, but an erosion of defence in depth is a cause for concern, because it indicates a trend we have to take care of. We have to be conscious that improvements have to be made.

I don't know if that answers your question.

Mr. Rick Casson: Yes, to a certain degree.

We recently heard discussion about the possibility of burning weapons-grade plutonium in Chalk River. The discussion centred somewhat on how to get that across Canada to the plant, whether people have been trained in the areas where this is going to be travelling, and how to respond to a disaster or some kind of accident. Who is responsible? Who is ultimately responsible to make sure that people are ready to respond and that the training has taken place to prepare them for that? Which department?

Mr. Rod Raphael: Thank you. I think it's probably best if I give a short introduction and then pass this on to my colleague from the AECB.

In essence, FNEP does not cover that type of situation in terms of the response we are doing with respect to emergency preparedness. The responsibility and training for incidents around transport—and transport is going on most of the time with these materials—falls within the purview of Transport Canada and the board, which issue the licences.

Maybe Pierre can speak to the preparations and licensing issues around transport.

• 1625

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: Basically the AECB would license the containers that are used to transport such equipment, but the responsibility in terms of transport is a shared one between Transport Canada and the Atomic Energy Control Board.

Mr. Rick Casson: Who would be responsible then for ensuring that the people along the route, emergency response people, would be trained to handle an accident—Transport Canada?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: Essentially, yes.

Mr. Rick Casson: Okay.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you.

[Translation]

Ms. Girard-Bujold, please.

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold (Jonquière, BQ): Good afternoon.

Mr. Raphael, on page 3 of your presentation, you state that nuclear emergency preparedness is a shared responsibility of the governments and Canadian industry. Are you referring to industries or to the Department of Industry Canada?

[English]

Mr. Rod Raphael: I meant industry in terms of the people who operate and manage the facilities in which the nuclear power is generated.

[Translation]

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: All right. You are, therefore, stating that these industries are completely responsible for the preparation of emergency plans for their sites. Is it mandatory that they prepare such a plan? To whom are these plans submitted? What references must be made in this plan? Is an audit conducted when there is a spill on their own site?

On the third page of your brief, you indicated that there may even be an impact beyond the designated sites. I would like some clarification, please.

[English]

Mr. Rod Raphael: There are two parts to your question. I will do a short introduction and then have Mr. Marchildon from AECB give the in-depth response.

It is the responsibility of all power generators that are using nuclear power to have plans and exercise those plans for incidents, pursuant to their licence. Mr. Marchildon will go into that.

Where our FNEP comes into play is when there has been an incident and there's a potential for something to go beyond the plant or to implicate human health or the environment beyond the plant.

With respect to who they have to submit these plans for, that is a condition of their licence, and I'll have Mr. Marchildon go into that.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: It is the operator or the owner who is initially responsible for the security of a nuclear facility. As I explained, the Atomic Energy Control Board establishes the standards and issues licences. Before a licence is issued, the operator must submit, to the Board, numerous documents dealing with the safety, the security, the environment, etc., including a contingency plan demonstrating that the facility can deal with incidents or accidents that may occur on site. If the Board is not convinced that the facility has adequate contingency plans—and here we limit ourselves to the site—a licence is not issued.

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: All right.

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: When the ramifications of incidents or accidents go beyond the boundaries of the site in question, the provincial authorities intervene because they are responsible for the implementation of province-wide emergency plans.

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: When it is time to implement the provincial plans, does the province work in co-operation with Emergency Preparedness or with your Board? What is the procedure? Do you always oversee spills that occur outside the sites or is it the province that assumes full responsibility for the operations?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: There is co-operation at every level. The province and federal government agencies all intervene in the process.

• 1630

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: In the case of a spill, who has the lead role to play in supervising operations? Which department is the lead department? Who supervises all of this? Do all the departments work together or does one department take a lead role?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: I must ask you for some clarification. Are you talking about the federal level or the provincial level?

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: I'm talking about the federal level because you said that you always have some say over what happens in the province. Who controls everything at the federal level? There are many departments here. Which one has been given this responsibility?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: The agency that's on the front line, if you may call it that, is Health Canada. This department has the initial responsibility at the federal level.

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: What does Emergency Preparedness Canada do in all of this?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: Emergency Preparedness Canada is another department that's involved. As Ms. Sahagian said, this is a department that provides support to the federal emergency plan.

[English]

Ms. Ann Marie Sahagian: With emergencies, Emergency Preparedness Canada does have a special role to ensure there is an appropriate level of civil emergency preparedness in Canada, but it does this through support to those agencies that have a lead responsibility where this is the case.

In the case of federal nuclear emergency preparedness, the lead is Health Canada, and therefore the role Emergency Preparedness Canada would play would be to provide them with support in developing and exercising the plan and in reviewing procedures at their request to assist them in any way possible to ensure the quality of the plan is what is required to meet the need. But the front-line responsibility for the plan, its development, its implementation, and its mise en place is in fact Health Canada's.

[Translation]

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: There are national standards and provincial standards. Do the national standards take precedence over the provincial standards if there's a spill? You're talking about two kinds of standards. Which one takes precedence?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: Provincially speaking, the province has the authority to take the steps or measures necessary to deal with the situation.

A bit earlier, we talked about the fact that standards had been set by the provinces and that the respective standards of the three provinces where there is nuclear activity, Quebec, Ontario and New Brunswick, weren't necessarily compatible. At the federal level, there's an effort going on at this point to try to harmonize the standards as much as possible.

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Could you spell out what “harmonize” means to you?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: It means, for example, trying to determine the levels of intervention which are most appropriate for the different steps that can be taken after a spill.

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Are you talking about harmonizing the standards of the three provinces in question? Are you the one who's going to do the work? Are you the one who's going to tell the provinces that they must harmonize their standards in such or such a way? That's all I want to know.

M. Jean-Patrice Auclair (Section Head, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, Health Canada): Health Canada presides a federal- provincial-territorial committee where that kind of matter is discussed. As the first responsibility falls to the provinces, for the time being, there's no legislative tool available to the federal government to set up standards and impose them upon the provinces. The primary responsibility is the provinces.

We work in committee with the provinces to try to review the different standards, not only those that already exist in the three provinces but also those that are suggested at the federal level, the US standards as well as the international ones, to arrive at a consensus on the standards that should apply during an incident in Canada.

• 1635

The Chairman: One last question, please.

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: You know that Mr. Chrétien has given permission to import plutonium from the USA and Russia. That makes it possible to run tests. Who is responsible for carrying this plutonium? Who's responsible for the trials? Are there standards applicable and applied to this kind of plutonium transformation trial?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: If you're just talking about the trials that are due for the Chalk River laboratories, the Control Board's role is to determine whether those trials can be done within the framework of the Chalk River research reactors' present operating permit.

This review was done and the Board decided that in view of the minor quantity of materials used, these trials could be done under the Chalk River reactors' present permits.

The Chairman: Thank you, Ms. Girard-Bujold.

Mrs. Kraft Sloan followed by Mr. Laliberte and Ms. Torsney.

[English]

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

To follow up on what Madame Girard-Bujold has been discussing and asking, in the Health Canada brief it says you have draft national guidelines for contaminated food, they've been prepared, and they're undergoing provincial review. In material I have here from the Auditor General's office, it says there are issues with regard to radiation exposure from contaminated air, water, and soil, so it's not just food. Are guidelines for standard-setting being addressed for air, water, and soil as well, or is it just food?

Mr. Rod Raphael: Guidelines are being addressed for all the media—air, water, soil, and food—within the various federal-provincial groups looking at environmental quality and other health and environment issues for each of those media.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: So are you talking just about levels of contamination or guidelines as to how to deal with contamination?

Mr. Rod Raphael: The guidelines fall into two categories: for example, in the drinking water area, what might be termed tolerable, or levels that are thought to be within safe limits for consumption; and also guidelines that look at what should be done should some of these become contaminated. For example, the food guidelines are looking at the fallout from an incident or an accident, and as such, these guidelines would not only come into play in terms of the work of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, but also may potentially have trade aspects should there be an incident or accident that results in contamination of foodstuffs.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: And what is the process for setting these standards and guidelines?

Mr. Rod Raphael: The process has several components. One major one, very early on, is a scientific assessment, accessing information and expertise nationally and internationally to look at the impacts of certain levels of certain types of radioactive materials on the substrate being examined, whether it be water or food. A lot of this work is similar to work that's gone on in international agencies and other national agencies in the U.S. and in Europe.

• 1640

The scientific assessments then usually generate a recommendation that is examined by both the federal and the provincial scientists engaged in the exercise to arrive at a level or an approach, as the case may be, to protect that medium from the point of view of human health, of which I can speak, and also the environmental consequences.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: And who makes the ultimate decision?

Mr. Rod Raphael: The ultimate decision on the recommendation of what is an acceptable, tolerable, or safe level is taken usually by the jurisdictions together. They have the scientific assessment and sit in a federal-provincial body, such as the federal-provincial subcommittee on drinking water, which takes the scientific recommendation and sets the national guideline.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Is this by consensus? What if there's a conflict between the jurisdictions about a higher or a lower standard—

Mr. Rod Raphael: And there are usually conflicts.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: —or a more stringent or a less stringent guideline? Who ultimately makes the decision here?

Mr. Rod Raphael: Ultimately we strive to reach some sort of consensus. We do try to address scientific and technical issues as they arise, but sometimes the issues go beyond those areas, and it is not in the purview of one order to force a level on the other order. We usually try to address the issues, whether they be scientific or otherwise, to arrive at a guideline or a level that is protective.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: How do you deal with a conflict of interest? You have a situation with Ontario Hydro, which has had problems with its nuclear power plants. We know there are examples of leaks into the water supply and things like this. How do you deal with conflicts of interest when you're dealing with a province that is actually operating some of these facilities? Someone eventually has to make a decision somewhere.

Mr. Rod Raphael: I can give you the experience we've had in the water area. Ontario Hydro does not sit as a part of the federal-provincial body looking at this technical assessment.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: But someone from the provincial Government of Ontario sits there.

Mr. Rod Raphael: That's true; someone from the provincial Government of Ontario sits there. Usually, in the case of Ontario, which happens to be the chair of our federal-provincial subcommittee on drinking water, the person who is there is from the Ministry of the Environment from Ontario.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Who gives them their marching orders? How much of this is science-based decision-making?

I'm still trying to wallow in this, going around in circles, especially when you have a conflict, when you have a conflict of interest, or when you have a provincial government that is closer to the operation of some of these nuclear plants, so they obviously have a certain vested interest. You have different standards in different provinces. It's not clear to me how this is rectified. It's not clear to me who is acting in the name of the public interest and making a final, science-based decision.

It sounds as though it's a very wishy-washy sort of process. I know sometimes these things are hard to describe, but it doesn't sound as though someone is ultimately responsible. If both the federal government and the provincial governments are making the decision, who is ultimately responsible when things go wrong? And who is ultimately responsible for making the decision that sets the particular standard in the public interest, as opposed to in a situation where there may be some conflict of interest?

Mr. Rod Raphael: Within the federal-provincial committees, we are dealing with the scientific issues and what would be called the science assessment, and then implementation considerations. This information is made public and is usually put out for consultation and for the purposes of informing and advising before being finalized.

• 1645

The decisions are made by the federal and provincial governments, which are ultimately responsible for the levels arrived at.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: But no one is there to break the tie.

The Chairman: All right. We have Mr. Laliberte, Madame Torsney, and the chair, and then time for a second round.

Mr. Laliberte.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: I'll start off by asking a question of our member from the AECB.

You mentioned that a new emergency operations centre was opened in 1995. Does that mean there was an existing older one somewhere? Is that your centre? Is that a coordinated centre? What is that centre for?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: I was referring to the emergency centre within the AECB to enable us to monitor and be in contact with all the other partners during an emergency. So it is the AECB operations centre in our building here in head office.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: If you have a central vision of what's happening in case of a nuclear emergency, why is Health Canada the lead department then? If you're responsible for the nuclear industry and nuclear regulations, why did it shift over to a department that did not receive new resources, as they said?

This affected the pace of the progress of getting a plan. Low resources were allocated and fiscal restraints were imposed on a department that seemed to be an innocent bystander and was given this heavy load of creating a huge nuclear emergency plan. You are the regulatory agency of nuclear energy and industry in this country.

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: Our role during an emergency is twofold. Part of it deals with the interactions that take place between us as regulators and the utility—for example, Ontario Power Generation or Hydro-Québec or N.B. Power.

We continue to be the regulator during an emergency. It's quite feasible that during an emergency, the utility will want to take certain measures that are not normally authorized during normal operation. For that purpose, they would contact us, and we would be making the decision to allow them or not to allow them to take such action. That's one role.

The other role is this. Again, if an emergency goes beyond the site of the accident unit, then the primary responsibility is a provincial responsibility, and of course the provinces cooperate with, or there is a response at, the federal level. In that context, the AECB becomes a supporting organization to both the provincial organizations—Emergency Measures Ontario, for example—and the other federal organizations involved, such as Health Canada and EPC.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: So the jurisdictions of on- and off-site are pretty distinct in terms of responsibilities and roles here.

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: When the consequences of the accident go beyond the site, yes, there is a big difference.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: In the situation of Chalk River, who is the lead agency in running those test sites? Is that AECL?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: In terms of regulation, AECL is the owner and operator. They are regulated by the AECB, just the same as Ontario Power Generation or Hydro-Québec or N.B. Power. They're one of our licensees.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: In your statement for the AECB, you said you are neither pro- nor anti-industry, but the AECL and the AECB both report to the same minister.

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: We both report to the same minister because we are both organizations of the federal government, but it's very clear that there is no connection between AECB and AECL. As I said, AECL is one of our licensees, and we treat them just the same as we would treat any other licensee.

• 1650

Mr. Rick Laliberte: A fund has been created for fuel waste from these sites. Is there a fund for, or is that fund partly for, resources in emergencies? Is there such a formula, or is that something Health Canada is begging for—new resources over here that could be utilized?

I just want you to expound something else. If you can't answer this, certainly I'd welcome it in writing later, but can you make an international comparison, for example, with our neighbours to the south or Europe? What is their emergency preparedness, and is there an agency?

I'll leave that with you, because I want to go back to this whole issue of preparing more of Canada's firefighters, volunteer firefighters, medical personnel, and police for nuclear emergencies. The definition of “nuclear emergency” that I found in here does not include other radioactive materials that could affect the soil, the water, and the food in large areas.

In my area, we called two major highways the Yellowcake Highway. In any situation, any day, a truck could overturn, and the whole river system could be polluted with yellowcake. The road conditions in the northern mining areas, as you probably are very well aware, aren't the best conditions. You have one bridge. If two trucks meet on that bridge, one of them is going to have to give up; it's a game of chicken. You have no choice when you have the two valleys; they're pretty high.

If you ever have that sort of accident, it's like a satellite hitting northern Canada or a populated area. It scatters radioactive waste in a huge area. Are we prepared? Is that region prepared, or is Saskatchewan supposed to get prepared itself, or are the villages along these rivers supposed to prepare themselves? Who's taking the lead on these issues?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: You've referred to waste and you've also referred to yellowcake. In the case of uranium mines—that's what you're talking about—the transport of uranium minerals above a certain radioactive level is regulated, and it has to be transported in authorized containers. The regulator, again, is the Atomic Energy Control Board.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: Well, so is a radioactive site, but in case of an emergency, is that part of your emergency preparedness plans? Even though they're contained and transported by licence, what if an accident does happen, as it did in Montana when one of the trucks was run into by a train? That situation could happen tomorrow on a bridge and pollute or contaminate a river system, a huge river system. It could happen today, tomorrow, or the day after. It doesn't matter when. Are we prepared to handle those situations?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: In those cases, depending on the circumstances, the emergency plan of the province could be invoked.

The Chairman: Make this your last question, please.

Mr. Rick Laliberte: I want to touch on another item that hit the headlines last year, the Cassini NASA project. Is that part of your hypothetical preparedness? Plutonium-powered satellites could bounce off our atmosphere and sprinkle plutonium particles into our neck of the woods. Are we prepared for that side of the situation? I think that's what Madam Kraft Sloan was saying about science. When do the alarm bells go off? How do you track these situations?

Mr. Rod Raphael: That type of situation, a nuclear-powered satellite crashing to earth, is covered by this type of response plan. In fact the work on this federal nuclear emergency plan—what used to be called the nuclear emergency response plan—was triggered by such an incident: a Russian satellite crashing to earth, one of the Cosmos satellites.

Such an event would trigger the plan and actions under the plan.

• 1655

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Laliberte.

Madame Torsney, followed by Mr. Herron, followed by the chair.

Ms. Paddy Torsney (Burlington, Lib.): Thank you.

Maybe I'm the only one who doesn't get this, but could someone explain what this exercise is all about and how this is an indicator of anything?

Mr. Rod Raphael: I'll turn it over to Dr. Cornett, who will go through the exercise.

Mr. Jack Cornett (Director, Radiation Protection Bureau, Health Canada): The CANATEX exercise, as Mr. Raphael explained, was an international test of not only Canadian preparedness and the plan you've referenced, the federal nuclear emergency plan, but also our companion plan and our arrangements with the United States, and it went further to test international communication protocols.

This figure gives you an example of the number of participants that were involved. There were 32 countries, so it was a rigorous test of the plan. That's the first purpose of that map, to show you just where participation took place.

The second thing it does is give you an idea of the amount of interest in those areas and our ability to respond to the requests for information. There were 30,000 pages of information requested and provided under the FNEP plan during that time period. So in two days, we answered 30,000 requests for information.

It was a rigorous test of the plan, and this is just a visual example of how the plan was tested and the response we got from the international community.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Okay, but I still think I'm hearing about the end of something, and I'm wondering what the beginning is. Was there a simulation or something? What was the model that was set up? What happened? What does “requests for 30,000 pages” mean?

Mr. Jack Cornett: The probability of a nuclear emergency on this scale is very low. If you're going to test your plan, you don't want to wait for an actual event.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Right.

Mr. Jack Cornett: So you set up a whole series of plans to actually run a test exercise in which the people who were involved in the exercise, such as us here at this table, don't know exactly what will happen. It's like responding, if you wish, to a board game in which your opponents have events occur and you have to respond to them, and then they evaluate your response.

You could view it as a test set up by an independent agency to test our plan. We invoke our plan, and then there is this independent third group that evaluates how well we have performed against our plan. That evaluation is going on right now.

The first and second parts of the three parts have already occurred. As for the third part, the provisional report will be in June, and a final report will be in September.

Does that answer your question?

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Sort of. What was the model? Did you say there was a nuclear accident, or a satellite hit Canada and it was a windy day, and things travelled through the Arctic? What was it?

Mr. Jack Cornett: What was the actual simulation? The simulation was an accident at Darlington nuclear power station and Ontario Hydro. The purpose of this exercise was to test all aspects, not only the Canadian plan you're discussing and focusing on today, but also Ontario Power Generation's plans at the corporate level and their plan at the actual site level, at Darlington.

It also tested the provincial plan, the Canadian plan, and the international connections, and most specifically it tested our linkages and our communication ability and coordination with the United States. So it tested the plan on many different levels.

Just to give you a feel for it, about 500 people were directly involved in the test.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Okay.

My other question is to Mr. Raphael. Much has been made of differences between provincial and federal guidelines. What kinds of differences? Can we get some actual numbers to apply so that we understand whether this is significant or not significant? Differences can be significant, but there's not a lot of information about the specifics.

Mr. Rod Raphael: I myself am not technically up to speed with what all the differences are.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Maybe Mr. Emmett?

• 1700

Mr. Rod Raphael: But we can provide where we are today to the committee, and what some of these differences are. Some are dealing with actual levels and units and so on. Without going too much further, if Jean-Patrice wishes to take you through, if you don't mind—

Ms. Paddy Torsney: I'd like at least one example.

Mr. Rod Raphael: We can leave a copy of this for the committee.

Mr. Jean-Patrice Auclair: Scientifically speaking, there isn't a large difference. Usually what happens is jurisdictions put a range of values for specific doses that would be attributed to the public for which the protective action should be considered. By way of example, I'm looking at a table within the federal nuclear emergency plan that summarizes the guidelines on protective measures for various jurisdictions. Sheltering is a protective action you can ask for a population in a very defined geographic area.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Like Oshawa or something?

Mr. Jean-Patrice Auclair: Right. It's usually downwind, and you're asking them to stay inside their homes and close their windows and doors for a specified period of time, usually in order for the cloud to blow over.

The Province of Ontario recommends a range of one to 10; I will avoid the units for the sake of argument. The Province of Quebec has the figure of three over a 12-hour period. The Province of New Brunswick has a unit specifically addressed to the dose to a child's thyroid; 0.5 would be the equivalent. The United States has a range of one to 100.

They're basically guidelines for the decision-makers at the time of the incident. When you get to those levels, you have to consider the possibility of applying this protective measure, but you also have to assess other factors that could impede, not so much in this case, but in some others. When you're considering evacuation, obviously weather conditions that prevail, road conditions, and other factors would come into play for the decision-makers.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Okay. I guess I understand more about the problem.

Mr. Emmett, it struck me both yesterday and today that no real numbers are attached to what kinds of allocations you think would be in order to get things in line in a manner you think would be sufficient. On this particular issue, what kind of money do you think needs to be appropriated to solve the problem, assuming that there's total will? We seem to have capable people, but we have....

Mr. Brian Emmett: Thank you, Ms. Torsney.

We do have good people. It's not my mandate to suggest to departments how they should spend their resources. That is for ministers and their officials to determine and to be responsible to the House for. That's a policy decision, and I certainly don't want to be involved in suggesting to departments or second-guessing them about what their priorities should be for nuclear emergency preparedness relative to prevention of smoking programs or whatever number of things a department is normally faced with in the normal day-to-day business of making budget allocations.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: But you're an auditor, and you're reviewing operations, and you've suggested yesterday and today that there aren't follow-up audits, or that there needs to be a more rigorous approach. Surely you have some kind of budget figure as to whether or not 10% of a budget is implemented this way, or something. That's where the rubber hits the road, isn't it?

• 1705

Mr. Brian Emmett: That's a really interesting point. Much of what I've talked about yesterday and today is not about spending money; it's about doing things differently. I'm not 100% certain, relative to the discussion we had yesterday, that more money wouldn't do anything except create more confusion. What I'm looking for is more efficiency, more use of a continuous improvement approach to management, and a more systematic and orderly approach to carrying out our environmental duties.

The Chairman: Thank you, Madame Torsney.

Mr. Herron, please.

Mr. John Herron (Fundy—Royal, PC): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My question is for Madam Sahagian.

I know people like to be as proactive as they possibly can, especially in the department you're in, in terms of emergency preparedness. Are you working currently with the Department of Transport to prepare an emergency response plan for the MOX fuel shipments?

Ms. Ann Marie Sahagian: That specifically I can't respond to. I know we work diligently with all departments, but in terms of preparation of a precise plan, I would have to check to see where we are in working with the department on that.

Mr. John Herron: On this potential MOX program, you haven't called your friends at Transport Canada and said, “Hey, how are you doing? Are we going to work on this together?”

Ms. Ann Marie Sahagian: I have to fall back on the fact that I'm relatively new in my portfolio, having been in my job now for about a month. I'm afraid I'm not aware of every single arrangement we have with every department in terms of what we're promoting. But certainly the role of Emergency Preparedness Canada is the promotion of appropriate planning. It would be my supposition that we are actively engaged with Transport Canada in the preparation of a whole host of contingency and emergency preparedness plans, but with respect to that particular plan, I would have to get back to you.

Mr. John Herron: Does anybody know if we're currently chatting with Transport Canada and working on developing an emergency preparedness plan for, one, a potential MOX plan or program, and secondly, even the trials that could potentially take place this summer?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: I can respond to that by telling you the AECB is in constant discussion with Transport Canada on these issues.

Mr. John Herron: On those issues?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: Yes.

Mr. John Herron: So are there a couple of individuals working on this, dedicated to this particular project?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: I wouldn't say they're dedicated full-time, but each time there's a meeting to consider the issue, we are in contact with our colleagues from Transport Canada, yes.

Mr. John Herron: I've been told that in the past, AECL has used MOX fuel for testing in Chalk River as a lead-up to what we're going to be doing, potentially even this summer. Is that the case?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: I can ask Mr. Howden.

Mr. Jack Cornett: Do you want me to answer that?

This MOX fuel is approximately 120 grams of plutonium in what is called a fuel bundle. A typical fuel bundle, when it's removed from a nuclear reactor, has between 100 and 130 grams of plutonium in it. So the fuel bundles of plutonium being handled in this burn at Chalk River contain no more plutonium than you would have in a normal fuel bundle when it is coming out of a reactor, depending upon where it has been in the reactor and for how long.

The only difference is that this plutonium comes from a different source. It was not produced in the fuel bundle by the process of fission and neutron absorption. It was basically produced from the weapons test program and incorporated into the fuel bundle. But in terms of the amount, there is no difference from what would normally be present in a CANDU fuel bundle in a reactor. I know that, not from my position in Health Canada, but from 15 years at AECL doing safety-related operations.

• 1710

Mr. John Herron: Okay. Where I'm coming from is that there's a cost issue I'm starting to be concerned with. It stems from the fact that the minister said in the House it would be entirely commercially viable to do any project with respect to a MOX program, so it wouldn't cost the Canadian taxpayer any money in that regard.

So if we have anybody spending time on developing emergency preparedness plans, which is imperative work to do if we were going to do that sort of thing, is that going to be costed into billing whichever country we end up participating with? If we've participated in a MOX plan already, is that going to be billed back to any potential company or country down the road?

Are we keeping some kind of detailed account of the energies and the precious resources we have participating in any kind of MOX plan, so that we can send an invoice to someone so that the Canadian taxpayer doesn't necessarily pay the price for that? That's where I'm coming from.

Mr. Jack Corbett: The majority of the costs for this plan, as Dr. Marchildon indicated, are to be borne by the organization involved in the program, which is Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. They are costing that plan. They have consulted with me specifically at Health Canada for information—

Mr. John Herron: They're costing it now?

Mr. Jack Corbett: They are keeping track of the costs, and they are doing it on a cost-recovery basis.

Mr. John Herron: So ultimately then, if we participate in it, we'll be sending an invoice to someone for the startup.

Mr. Jack Corbett: That's correct.

Mr. John Herron: Do you have any idea what that cost might be, and can you share that with the committee?

Mr. Jack Corbett: I cannot comment on the total costs, but the costs for the health and safety part are a very small fraction of that. I don't know the answer. I think you'd need to direct that question to Atomic Energy of Canada.

Mr. John Herron: That's where my concern is about Transport Canada. If we were using, say, the port of Halifax, or if we were using the railways along that line or whatever, for any kind of emergency preparedness in terms of getting people prepared for this sort of thing, would we make sure to recoup that kind of cost as well?

Mr. Jack Corbett: I think the answer is yes, but there's one thing the committee should bear in mind.

Pierre, you can correct me if I'm wrong, but there are approximately 600,000 shipments of so-called hazardous radioactive materials within Canada every year. This is one shipment, so if you amortize that at 1/600,000 of the preparation, the incremental cost for being prepared is not that large. This shipment is subject to identical safety considerations that any other shipment would be required to meet. There is nothing unique in the standards about this shipment.

Mr. John Herron: But you still have to prepare your plan.

Mr. Jack Corbett: There are plans in place through Transport Canada for all of those.

Mr. John Herron: These plans, I'm trusting, aren't with volunteers; they're paid professionals.

Ms. Ann Marie Sahagian: I can provide some information on this.

All ports and other transportation modes are required to have plans under the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, and it falls under Transport Canada's lead responsibility to ensure these plans are in place. So they already have them, and Transport would be considered the one accountable as the lead department.

As for the question you asked previously about the MOX plan, I've been advised by one of my senior advisers that it is in fact the transporter who is accountable for developing the plan. It would be under, again, the lead responsibility of Transport Canada to ensure these plans are being put in place, consistent with provincial and other jurisdictional requirements. Therefore EPC's role in this would simply, again, be providing ongoing, general emergency preparedness information and support and technical information to Transport Canada so that they could play their role in the development of these plans.

Mr. John Herron: Do you know if Transport Canada has some people working on this project as we speak?

• 1715

Ms. Ann Marie Sahagian: I would have to verify with my colleagues in Transport Canada exactly how many or what individuals they have working on it.

Mr. John Herron: Can you get back to me on how many will be working on it, and an approximate time they would be doing that?

Ms. Ann Marie Sahagian: Certainly; I'd be pleased to do that.

Mr. John Herron: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Herron.

Before launching a second round for those who are keen to do that, I have a few questions. They have to do with the effectiveness of being prepared.

We heard from you, Mr. Marchildon, that the AECB has well-documented plans and procedures. So evidently the AECB is declaring that it is ready to act, it is available, and it has done its homework, if I understand you correctly.

From a very brief intervention from Madame Sahagian, we can conclude that National Defence is ready, has done its homework, and its role is completed.

To understand the totality of the picture then, one is tempted to ask this question: What is still needed for an effective preparedness? What is still missing?

We don't get the impression that Health Canada is prepared. It speaks in its conclusion about substantial progress, but that doesn't tell us that if tomorrow morning a nuclear emergency were to take place, Health Canada would be ready. If not, it would be interesting to know when it will be ready.

But the question doesn't stop there, because Mr. Herron was just inquiring about Transport Canada. With their plans, which are required, evidently.... You have all told us you have sent out the request for plans to be ready, but are the required plans in place? Are all these other agencies ready to move?

Beyond the federal jurisdiction, you have also told us the provinces and municipalities have to be on board. We learn from the briefing notes that Ontario asked for a postponement until April 1999 for this exercise. The question now therefore is, since we are in May, is Ontario ready with the required plan? Is Quebec ready? Are the other provinces ready? And are the municipalities ready?

Who can give us this kind of assurance? If you can't give us this assurance, how do you gauge the degree of preparedness by all the participants in this very important exercise? Evidently Mr. Marchildon can only answer for his agency and Madame Sahagian can only answer for her department obviously.

Mr. Raphael, are you in charge of the rest? What assurance can you give us that your department is ready? Can you also speak for other federal departments? And who can answer for the provinces and municipalities?

Mr. Rod Raphael: There are several parts to your question.

The Chairman: Yes, I realize that.

Mr. Rod Raphael: I'll address the main part, which is the overall preparedness to exercise FNEP, and then I'll go through the others.

We are responsible for the plan, for its ongoing care, and for maintenance. As noted by the Auditor General, the plan had major gaps and deficiencies. We have addressed some of those. We have taken the opportunity of the CANATEX exercise. As you mentioned, it was postponed.

The Chairman: That is the desktop, nice little shuffle of papers. Come on. Now we have to come to the hard answers. Where is Transport, for instance? Mr. Herron was asking that question. Are you in a position to answer for Transport? Have they done their homework? Are they ready?

Mr. Rod Raphael: I would ask my colleague to talk about Transport's departmental plan.

The Chairman: Fine.

Mr. Rod Raphael: But Transport is only one of several, as you know.

The Chairman: Yes, of course.

Mr. Rod Raphael: Would you like to talk about Transport's situation?

• 1720

The Chairman: You can review the entire series of federal departments in that process, by all means.

Mr. Jean-Patrice Auclair: You've touched on a particularly sensitive subject. The federal government's emergency preparedness legislation puts responsibility for a departmental level of preparedness with the minister.

The Chairman: Of which department?

Mr. Jean-Patrice Auclair: The minister responsible for a department has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that his or her department is prepared to deal with all emergencies that affect their area of responsibility. What the Prime Minister delegated to Health Canada in 1984 was not a responsibility to ensure the preparedness of each individual ministry or department, but rather the overall coordinative planning lead to ensure that the response actions of the various departments, when there is an emergency, are coordinated.

Therefore Health Canada does not have legislative or any other clout. Much the same way EPC does for earthquakes, basically we can only promote and request that departments do their planning for these kinds of emergencies, but it's up to their own departments and ministries to make the decision as to what level of planning they deem is required to deal with the emergency.

In the case of Transport and other departments, they often have emergency plans to deal with very specific kinds of emergencies, but the way in which they prepare those plans may be as what we term “all-hazards”. The way in which the department responds to a specific kind of emergency is really not very different from the way in which they respond to other kinds of emergencies. So they can use those plans—

The Chairman: Can we conclude from your very helpful explanation that in the case of Transport Canada, the required plans are not yet in place?

Mr. Jean-Patrice Auclair: We are aware of no support plan within Transport Canada for the federal nuclear emergency plan. However, they do have plans they could use to respond, depending on the nature of the emergency.

The Chairman: And you are satisfied with that, or not?

Mr. Jean-Patrice Auclair: To be honest, Health Canada has not made an independent audit of Transport's plans, but essentially we take the word of the departmental officials. If they say there is no requirement for a specific support plan for the federal nuclear plan, we accept that answer.

The Chairman: What other departments still have to complete their required plans?

Mr. Jean-Patrice Auclair: That is a question the Auditor General has raised in his findings as still an outstanding issue. We have committed to request formally that the departments provide those to us. We already have done that at the deputy ministerial level, but we have not received a full response from all participating departments.

The Chairman: From how many?

Mr. Jean-Patrice Auclair: We have received support plans from the Atomic Energy Control Board and from National Defence. Those are the only two so far.

The Chairman: So we have still a long way to go.

Mr. Jean-Patrice Auclair: Potentially, yes.

The Chairman: How about the provinces? Do we have any responsibility there? Can any form of measurement be applied to determine whether the required plans are in place, and if so, in which province?

Mr. Jean-Patrice Auclair: All of the provinces that have licensed facilities of the scale of a CANDU reactor or of the scale that would fall under FNEP do have provincial plans, not only dealing with often very specific facilities, but also to cover the province-wide response, to coordinate. Much the same way the federal plan coordinates federal actions, they generally have a lead ministry or a lead department in charge of coordinating the provincial response to a major emergency.

• 1725

I would defer to Emergency Preparedness Canada, but my understanding is that virtually every province has some kind of contingency plan to do that function. Again, the issue becomes this: Of the six other provinces that do not have a major nuclear facility, is there a requirement to have a provincial nuclear plan when they don't have a power reactor, for example, on their territory? That is a provincial decision to make; it's not a federal one that I'm aware of.

The Chairman: You said they have “some kind of plan”. That means there are differences in standards, quality, and comprehensiveness.

Mr. Jean-Patrice Auclair: Potentially. For example, most provinces would have plans to deal with forest fires and they may have a plan for severe weather, such as tornadoes, or they may impose, through legislation, that their municipal governments have plans to deal with those kinds of issues. But not all the provinces have CANDU reactors, and therefore perhaps they have not seen the need to develop a plan distinct from their existing all-hazards plans to deal with a nuclear threat, if they don't perceive that there is a credible one for their territory.

The Chairman: Thank you.

I've had my 10 minutes. We'll go to a second round.

Madame Girard-Bujold.

[Translation]

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Mr. Chairman, in 28.34 of the Environment Commissioner's Report, Mr. Emmett, it says that Health Canada still doesn't have the information available on the support and resources the provinces would need in the event of a nuclear accident or on where they could obtain those resources.

Could the Health Canada representatives tell us if the department, today, has this information available on the support and the resources it can give the provinces and on where they can find them? Can they answer this point raised by the Auditor?

[English]

Mr. Rod Raphael: I can reply that we have not completed that work. That is still outstanding. We are working with the provinces to get that information, but it has not yet been completed.

[Translation]

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Do you have any deadlines? Do you have a date by which you'll have all the information? Have you come up with a specific timetable for this?

[English]

Mr. Rod Raphael: We are targeting the spring of the year 2000, which would allow us to not only collect that information that is outstanding, as noted by the commissioner, but also update the plan on the basis of our experience in April.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Madame Torsney?

Madame Kraft Sloan?

Then I have just a few nuts-and-bolts types of questions.

In your opinion, Mr. Raphael, when will the national standards of radiation exposure be achieved? That work is under way, isn't it?

Mr. Rod Raphael: It is under way through a number of committees. I can't promise an exact date for that, but we do have some standards in effect that are being updated on a regular basis—for example, water—and the food is in the process now of being discussed. So I'm expecting that in the spring of the year 2000, when we are able to gather our experience from this year, completing the support requirements as noted, we will have significant elements of those either completed or available in draft form for consultation.

The Chairman: So will you try to have arrived at these national standards possibly when we meet you next time, in May 2000?

Mr. Rod Raphael: We are working on it, Mr. Chair. We have a considerable effort under way now, as compared to the effort we had during the time covered by the previous reports.

The Chairman: Thank you.

• 1730

Now, who of you can answer the question of below-standard emergency preparedness levels, which are pointed out in the Auditor General's report in point 28.36? It reads as follows:

Ontario Hydro's report ranked all stations as “below standard” with respect to emergency preparedness.

Can anyone tell us whether these standards have been elevated to the required level, and if not, when?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: I'll start by answering this question, and then perhaps I'll ask Mr. Jim Blyth to provide additional information, if that's acceptable.

The words “below standard” or “minimally acceptable” used in Ontario Hydro's assessment are not Canadian regulatory definitions. They're below standard or minimally acceptable as compared to worldwide industry practice. This is why we say that although many aspects of Ontario Hydro reactors were assessed as either below standard or minimally acceptable, that does not mean these reactors did not meet the fundamental requirements that allowed us to let them operate for a certain time.

Now I'm going to ask Mr. Blyth if he has additional information on that.

The Chairman: Very briefly, please.

Mr. Jim Blyth (Head, Issue Management Section, Power Reactor Evaluation Division, Directorate of Reactor Regulation, Atomic Energy Control Board): What I can add is that in fact Ontario Hydro has completed its improvement programs in this area, the AECB has audited the improvements, and we find them acceptable.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Finally, again from the Auditor General's report, he noted that the AECB report, your report, noted that “significant improvement is necessary in Ontario Hydro's operations to improve safety margins”. Has that been attended to, and if not, when will it be attended to? I'm referring to point 28.38.

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: This is part of the improvement plan Mr. Blyth was referring to. Ontario Hydro has set various target dates for completing improvements on various aspects of their operations, and the AECB is monitoring progress made. But in some cases, these actions will be ongoing yet for several months and maybe a few years. For us it is extremely important to ensure that the utility not only is able to correct shortcomings, but is able to sustain the high level of performance required.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Would it be reasonable, Mr. Marchildon, perhaps six months from now, before the end of the year, for you to write to the members of this committee a note indicating whether the improvements are satisfactory and give the members of the committee an assessment on this issue of safety margins?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: I can do so.

The Chairman: That's very kind.

A member of this committee who is presently not in this room has put in writing a number of questions he would like to have answered. Most of them deal with the AECB also. Some deal with the AECL and some deal with CANDU. So it's a mix of questions. If the clerk were to pass them on to you, Mr. Marchildon, could you then handle them in due course and provide an answer?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: We will.

The Chairman: That's very kind of you.

Mr. Pratt, do you have any questions? No questions.

Are there any questions from the members?

[Translation]

Ms. Girard-Bujold, one last question.

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: The lady or Mr. Raphael was saying that every year there are 800,000 shipping movements of hazardous products all across Canada.

• 1735

Are imports of hazardous materials subject to the same control? Is there also a manifest in those cases? When it's interprovincial, you don't need a manifest but is there a manifest to import hazardous materials from outside Canada? Does only Transport Canada have a right to oversee that or does the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada also have a right to oversee the hazardous material imported into Canada?

[English]

Mr. Rod Raphael: Basically there are requirements under the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act that require manifesting safe transport by appropriate containers and prior notification and information. I can give you that general look. To give any more specific answer, we would have to have our colleagues here from Transport Canada to give you the particulars on how these things are shipped and how the materials are maintained in a safe manner.

[Translation]

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Does the Atomic Energy Control Board have a right of oversight on that?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: As concerns the import and export of nuclear material, the Board has a right to oversee especially concerning its obligations under the non-proliferation treaty. To import or export certain kinds of substances or materials, you need a permit from the Board. So the Board also has, in that area, a system of permits.

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: Could you list those materials for me?

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: Yes, I can send you additional information on that.

Ms. Jocelyne Girard-Bujold: That would be clearer. Thank you.

Mr. Pierre Marchildon: Fine.

The Chairman: Thank you, Madam.

[English]

Before inviting you to conclude, Mr. Emmett, I must say it's extremely difficult, compared to yesterday, to summarize this meeting. Today a very complex, varied picture is emerging. In political terms, I would say we should use Mr. Raphael's terminology and say substantial progress has been made, but the impression left in this room is that substantial progress is still to be made.

Mr. Emmett, you may want to inject your thoughts.

Mr. Brian Emmett: Very briefly, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The Auditor General started making comments on this area in 1987, and 12 years later we're in a situation where, as you have aptly summarized, some progress has been made, but there appears to be a substantial amount to be done. That time lag is quite troubling, particularly given the seriousness of the issue.

One thing I've been struck by in the conversation today is that we're dealing with very complicated systems—nuclear reactors and other things that use radioactive materials. We're dealing with very complex relationships between institutions. We're dealing with hypothetical situations in which there's an emergency and people are going to be deeply worried about what is going on, and there is going to be a search for clarity. Yet one of the things I don't really find is much clarity in terms of the relationships, or much clarity in what guidelines apply in which situation.

One of the questions that occurs to me is how, in a situation where emotions are running high and people are fearful, will Canadians get authoritative material in an unambiguous way that will allow them to make a judgment about whether a situation is being responded to or not?

A voice: Yes.

• 1740

The Chairman: Mr. Emmett, Mr. Raphael, Monsieur Marchildon, Madame Sahagian, Monsieur Auclair, Mr. Cornett, and the officials in the room, this was extremely educational for us, and on behalf of my colleagues, I thank you very much for your participation and availability today. We look forward to another meeting, perhaps before the end of the year. In the meantime, I wish you well.

I remind my colleagues that tomorrow morning we meet at 8.30 in this same room.

This meeting is now adjourned. Thank you.