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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, February 20, 2003

0905

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

The Chair

Mr. Roy Culpeper (President, North-South Institute)

0910

The Chair

Mr. John Watson (President, CARE Canada)

0915

0920

The Chair

Dr. Sheila Zurbrigg (Director, Physicians for Global Survival (Canada))

0925

0930

The Chair

Mr. Mark Fried (Program Development Officer, Oxfam Canada)

0940

The Chair

Dr. Eric Hoskins (President, War Child Canada)

0945

0950

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance)

0955

Mr. Roy Culpeper

Mr. Stockwell Day

Mr. Roy Culpeper

Mr. Stockwell Day

Mr. Roy Culpeper

Mr. Stockwell Day

Mr. Roy Culpeper

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ)

1000

Mr. John Watson

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. John Watson

1005

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.)

The Chair

Dr. Eric Hoskins

1010

Mr. Art Eggleton

Dr. Eric Hoskins

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

1015

The Chair

Mr. John Watson

Mr. Mark Fried

The Chair

Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood—St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.)

1020

Dr. Eric Hoskins

1025

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.))

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance)

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Roy Culpeper

1030

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Diane Marleau)

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.)

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Diane Marleau)

Dr. Sheila Zurbrigg

1035

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance)

1040

The Chair

Dr. Eric Hoskins

The Chair

Mr. John Watson

1045

The Chair

Mr. John Watson

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NUMBER 020

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Thursday, February 20, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0905)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are considering the situation in Iraq.

As witnesses this morning we have the privilege of having, from the North-South Institute, Mr. Roy Culpeper. From CARE Canada we have Mr. John A. Watson, president.

[Translation]

We will also be hearing from Dr. Sheila Zurbrigg, representing Physicians for Global Survival, Canada, and Mr. Mark Fried, of Oxfam Canada.

[English]

From War Child Canada we have Dr. Eric Hoskins.

We've five witnesses this morning, so if you take more than 10 minutes each, we won't have time for questions from the members. I would just like you to make a statement and try to keep it between seven and eight minutes, which would be fine for us.

Madam McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Mr. Chair, I wonder, on a point of order, if committee members might agree that we extend the time somewhat. We have five witnesses and only an hour and a half. If it's possible for them to stay a little longer, I wonder if it would be possible for the committee to extend another 20 minutes or so.

The Chair: I've had the same request verbally from Mr. Day, and if everything is going well, there's no reason we should stop at 10:30. Thank you.

First, Mr. Culpeper from the North-South Institute.

Mr. Roy Culpeper (President, North-South Institute): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We've circulated some speaking points to members of the committee, and I'll just make a very brief intervention at this point. I have actually three points to make to the committee.

The first is that under present circumstances and given current evidence, war against Iraq is not justified. This is not a pacifist position, it's a position that takes as given the necessity of war under certain circumstances, but the current circumstances we see in Iraq, in our view, do not justify war. The evidence that has been adduced by the inspectors, both UNMOVIC and IAEA, does not at this point give us any sign that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and that Iraq presents a clear and distinct threat to international security. That evidence does not exist. Moreover, military intervention in Iraq on the ground of regime change is illegitimate. As brutal and reprehensible as Saddam Hussein may be, changing regime through military force is totally unjustified and illegitimate. Third, the casualties from war in Iraq could be incalculable. Half of the population of Iraq is under the age of 15, and so the consequences of war in Iraq will be particularly devastating for a large number of children. Many of my colleagues on the panel today will be addressing the humanitarian crisis and calamity that may be unfolding in the days ahead if war takes place.

I would ask members of the committee to reflect what we have achieved through the war in Afghanistan. What has it really done to neutralize terrorism? Did it take out al-Qaeda? In fact, we haven't even yet captured Osama bin Laden, from whom we have heard recently; he is alive and well. The international community made all kinds of commitments to Afghanistan to reconstruct, to build democracy, to build peace, yet what have they done? Only a tiny fraction of the $15 billion in resources that were asked for to reconstruct Afghanistan post-war have trickled into the country. There's a resurgence of the Taliban, and feudal anarchy prevails in much of the countryside. Similarly, there's a strong possibility that a war in Iraq, far from neutralizing terrorism, will only aggravate it, will precipitate waves of terrorism such as we have not hitherto seen.

Finally, given the strong dissent that was expressed after Mr. Blix brought down his report on Friday by many member states of the UN, given the unprecedented anti-war protests in Canada and the rest of the world, I think it is time for the international community to take stock and to stop war in its tracks.

My second point is that the multilateral framework we have seen since 1945 to preserve the peace and to stop war, as imperfect and frail as that may be, must be strengthened, respected, and preserved. Unilateral military action by the U.S. on the ground of pre-emption, striking before you are struck, would be totally illegitimate, would constitute a breach of the UN charter, and would furnish a justification for the U.S. and other countries to engage in pre-emptive strikes against perceived enemies outside their border. Is this the kind of world we want to augur in?

¿ (0910)

Second, I would like to commend the Government of Canada's position hitherto in not committing ourselves to a war in Iraq on the American side and reconfirming the importance of the UN in brokering a peace and disarming Iraq. We should not be cowed by a common border with the United States. Our other neighbour in this hemisphere, Mexico, also has a common border with the United States; they are also on the Security Council, and they have spoken out against the war. Canada should be seeking partnerships with countries such as Mexico in this endeavour, an endeavour that should be to preserve and strengthen the UN and not see it neutralized or diminished.

Third and finally, we need to think about the future, we need to think about investing in peace and in security and in human development. Above all, we need to think to think about resolving the Israel-Palestine situation. The Israel-Palestine conflict fuels much of the tension and anger in the Middle East, and as long as that continues to be the case, we can expect further turmoil in the Arab world and the Islamic world. So the first thing we should address is bringing an end to the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Second, we should stop supporting autocrats in the region and should start supporting democracy, human rights, peace, and development. Unless we start to do these things, we can see further tension, conflict, hatred in this area of the world. We need to start to put in place a long-term strategy for peace, human rights, and development. Unless we start to do that now, it won't happen, and we can only predict further war and conflict coming out of the Middle East.

Let me conclude by saying war is justified in certain places and at certain times. I am not expressing a pacifist position, I am expressing a position that says that under the current circumstances, war against Iraq is the last and the most execrable of the options we can choose. Therefore, we should exhaust all other options to endeavour to resolve the problem of Iraq and seek its disarmament.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you very much for your presentation, Mr. Culpeper. We will now be hearing from Mr. John A. Watson, of CARE Canada.

Mr. Watson.

[English]

Mr. John Watson (President, CARE Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To give you a brief snapshot, CARE is a humanitarian development agency. We have been involved in Iraq since the last war doing food and winter fuel distribution in the north to the mid-1990s, then shifting our focus to water and sanitation programs and refurbishment of schools and health facilities in south and central Iraq, particularly stressing refurbishment or putting in place small town water systems. We are planning to expand that work in the event that there is a war. We're looking at water tankering operations, mobile repair workshops for water systems, some roll-in food programming.

The points I want to make briefly are the following. First, there is already a humanitarian crisis in Iraq. It's hard to imagine, but 60% to 70% of the people in southern Iraq are depending on the food from the oil for food program for their well-being; 40% have no other source. This has been going on for a decade now. In most situations families have some resources for coping, but in the case of Iraq, basically, families have sold off whatever they can to make ends meet over the last 10 years. That kind of flexibility or cushion is no longer available. There has been an advanced distribution of dry rations. Two months' advance rations have been given out. In the case of the war in Afghanistan we were able to give out five months' rations. There's very little flexibility through that route. They're dry rations, they need to be cooked, and again, if there's a disruption of fuel and electricity, that creates a problem.

What this means is that if there is a war, the humanitarian crisis will become a humanitarian catastrophe. On the food side, I ask you to think about supplying something of the order of everyone in the province of Ontario with food. This is a complex system. If there is significant infrastructural damage, just getting the food out is going to be a problem. More than that, it is a well run complex system that exists now, depending on 40,000 shops and food agents at the local level, and if that is disrupted, it's going to take quite a while to put in place an equivalent system. The importance of the UN is that there is going to be no legal entity to administer the proceeds of the existing system if there is a military occupation without UN sanction.

The situation on the water side is even worse. Iraq is not a country where people depend on water from wells. They get their water from taps and water systems. Of course, people die very quickly if water is not available. Water depends on electricity, and there are back-up generators, which depend on fuel. All of these things are likely to be put in a position of jeopardy if there is military activity.

¿ (0915)

The third point I want to make is that because of the scope of the catastrophe that is likely to be faced and because of new elements in this catastrophe--I'm referring here to the possible use of nuclear, biological, or chemical elements--certainly during the immediate post-war period--if there is a war, and we hope there will not be--the only group that will have the logistical and operational capacity to address humanitarian needs in the very short-term is going to be the military. This puts us in a very difficult position. Humanitarian agencies are focused solely on need. The only protection we have is adherence to principles of neutrality and impartiality in how we behave. That means it's very difficult for us to work with one side or the other. It also underlines the importance of the UN mandate. If there is no UN mandate, it becomes that much more difficult to work.

I want to end with the point that there is a policy gap in Canada. We have all been concentrating on the military and the preparedness of the Canadian Forces for deployment overseas. I have to tell you, in the case of the humanitarian side, preparedness is equally important, and there are no resources for a preparedness among Canadian humanitarian agencies for catastrophes like this. We were thrown on the generosity of independent donors, like Jean Coutu in our case. Our first activities in Afghanistan were entirely driven by private sources post-war. Also, we've had good support from CIDA for ongoing programming. This again increases the problems when we deal with a specific crisis. In other words, if there is no general funding available for humanitarian preparedness, even to go for funding for a context like Iraq, in some eyes, puts us in a position of no longer being neutral, because we're assuming that there will be a war. Generic funding for preparedness will allow us to do something without having to deal with that issue. It would also lessen dependence on the military in the earlier stages of humanitarian relief efforts in a post-war context.

Those are my points. We have a paper that I believe has been circulated, and we'll be happy to follow up in question period on any elements I haven't mentioned that are in that paper.

¿ (0920)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Watson.

Now we'll go to Dr. Sheila Zurbrigg from Physicians for Global Survival, Canadian branch.

Dr. Sheila Zurbrigg (Director, Physicians for Global Survival (Canada)): Thank you.

On behalf of the members for Physicians for Global Survival, I thank the standing committee for the opportunity to discuss the many profound concerns our members have over a threatened U.S. war in Iraq. It will be no surprise that PGS opposes a military invasion of Iraq, for the humanitarian reasons outlined in the recent Medact report, Medact being the British affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, an organization of which PGS is the Canadian affiliate.

In several recent public statements Physicians for Global Survival has asserted that a pre-emptive attack on Iraq is illegal under the UN charter and that the catastrophic risks and estimated consequences for the civilian population constitute a frank violation of international humanitarian law. Above all, war is unconscionable, because there are clear alternatives for achieving any legitimate goals in this conflict. We therefore call on the Canadian government not to provide military materiel or moral support for this war.

We have, of course, a further grave concern. President George Bush on December 10 of last year reiterated the threat that the U.S. would consider the use of nuclear weapons against Iraq if Iraq uses chemical or biological weapons. The destructive power of nuclear weapons is orders of magnitude greater than that of chemical and biological weapons. If they were used on Iraq, the death toll alone could be as high as 3.5 million people, followed by long-term suffering and environmental degradation. Use of a nuclear weapon by the U.S. would mean responding to a gross moral wrong on the part of Iraqi forces with an even more heinous moral wrong. Canada must not even contemplate giving support to such an act.

Just as PGS and IPPNW did in the 1980s with respect to nuclear war, we assert that there is no meaningful medical or relief response to the war contemplated now in Iraq. Humanitarian agencies, UN or NGO, cannot hope to mitigate the consequences in any meaningful way. The obligation, therefore, must remain prevention. This obligation is so much more pressing in light of the extreme vulnerability of the civilian population and the degree of suffering after 12 years of economic sanctions. As child mortality figures attest, there has been no technical fix for economic destitution over these years, nor now is there a technical fix, a relief fix, for the chaos and destruction inherent in a looming superimposed military invasion. Here I would like to remind the committee of the magnitude of the failure of that technical fix in the form of the oil for food program. Despite the inherent capacity of the oil for food program under sanctions to protect the innocent, there have been an estimated 1.5 million civilian deaths, ensuring that in the annals of famine history Iraq will figure prominently. Indeed, it already does. I have a recent article on famine in Iraq under sanctions.

I would like to highlight one particular aspect of our humanitarian concerns that has been only briefly addressed in most recent humanitarian assessments, including the October 2002 Medact report. That issue is the likely breakdown in food distribution under war and the ensuing threat of famine. I point to this as one example of the as yet poorly appreciated implications of a projected war in Iraq. I do so, I should explain, because I'm sensitized to the question of famine through my own work as a physician and a health and hunger historian.

¿ (0925)

Over 60% of Iraqi civilians, 16 million, depend primarily, many solely, on the monthly food ration system for meagre, subsistence food from an Iraqi government food distribution system made up of a network of 46,000 food ration agents throughout central and southern Iraq. For the majority of these families this food basket represents over 80% of the entire household income. This system is inordinately vulnerable to disruption from aerial bombardment of communications, power generation, and transportation infrastructure. The UN office of the Iraq program estimates that household stores of food will last six weeks, in some cases much less, because in the absence of other livelihood, many Iraqi families continue to be forced to barter food rations to meet all other essential needs.

What happens after six weeks, when these food supplies run out? We are not privy to U.S. planning, but the New York Times last week suggested, “The tactic of airdropping individual food rations will apparently be conducted on a much greater scale in Iraq, an approach criticized by relief agencies in Afghanistan as an ineffective and dangerous conflation of military and humanitarian operations.” U.S.-based relief organizations, which the U.S. hopes will replace this government food distribution system, have little or no recent history of working in Iraq, the New YorkTimes article points out, but even if in time they came to function efficiently, how feasible is it to expect that they could replace the existing network of 46,000 ration distribution agents now operating in the country?

The central question is, can external agencies substitute for the existing food distribution program? We don't know, though the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs at the UN, in a confidential report I have a copy of here from January, explicitly warns that it cannot. It should be emphasized, this report says, that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population as a whole can be met only by national authorities and not by relief agencies. In effect, OCHA is putting us on notice that the system cannot be replaced.

What we can be sure of, then, is that many households, possibly the majority of the 16 million people in central Iraq and possibly southern Iraq, will fall through the cracks, will fall through the gaps in a substitute system, and those falling fastest will be children. Even a system with near ideal administration, which exists now, still leaves 22% of children chronically malnourished and another 6.3% acutely starving. This is the ideal system that's going to be undermined and destroyed. Nor does this begin to encompass the potential chaos ensuing if invasion triggers civil war or the predictable desperation as household food stores run down and families face starvation, triggering looting and intercommunity conflict, which the OCHA report explicitly warns about. It is this “unspeakable scenario” that the UN, in another leaked document last month, hints at in estimating that one million Iraqi malnourished children are at immediate risk of death.

These questions about what will substitute for access to food must be asked, just as we ought to have asked 12 years ago how a civilian population could survive on 21 cents a day of food rations. These questions have to be answered. Canada has an obligation to insist on clear answers, though I believe there are none.

Thank you.

¿ (0930)

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Doctor.

[English]

Now we'll go to Mark Fried from Oxfam Canada.

Mr. Mark Fried (Program Development Officer, Oxfam Canada): Good morning. Thank you very much.

I will try not to repeat what my colleagues have said. Oxfam, like CARE, has a great many years of experience working in areas of conflict assisting civilian victims of conflict and trying to prevent conflict. We've seen up close what war does to civilians. I certainly concur with the comments made by previous speakers that the current humanitarian situation is already a terrible crisis and that if war comes to pass, it will be a calamity.

We don't believe war is inevitable. We think the United Nations must find a way to bring Iraq into compliance that does place civilians at such great risk. However, as my colleague from CARE mentioned, as an humanitarian agency, we must be prepared for the eventuality that peace efforts will fail. Oxfam has been undertaking, in coordination with other agencies and the United Nations, preparations and contingency planning for responding to the worsening humanitarian situation we're likely to see if war does break out.

Oxfam's area of expertise is water and sanitation for internally displaced people and refugees. This is the particular work we do in conflict areas. We've done assessments, in coordination with the United Nations, both in bordering countries and in Iraq, and I'd be happy to share those reports with you. As to the water and sanitation system currently, as frightening as the food situation is, which Sheila just described, the system for providing clean water is perhaps more frightening. It's currently in a very poor state of repair. Already diarrhea is a major cause of death of children. One in ten Iraqi children dies before the age of five, 75% of them from drinking water that's not clean. The system for delivering water, as John Watson noted, depends on electrical supply. Iraq is a developed country in that sense. People don't have rivers and streams, it's a desert country, so water is piped in or provided through tankers. The air strikes in 1991 devastated that system, the electrical grid, and much of it has not been rebuilt. If airstrikes were to happen again, as in the past Gulf War, disease would likely spread very quickly through a population that's already quite malnourished.

There are a couple of other factors in the humanitarian situation that the UN predicts. They estimate that approximately 10 million people will need food assistance immediately when a war begins, and two million additional people will become displaced from their homes. There are already one million internally displaced people in Iraq, and another two million will be displaced. They expect that as many as 1.5 million people may be forced to flee the country and become refugees in neighbouring countries, and one complicating factor in the flight of refugees is that the border between Iran and Iraq is heavily mined.

I'd be happy to answer your questions about the water and sanitation situation, but I would like to raise also in the time I have left another series of issues. If peace efforts fail and war occurs, the degree of civilian suffering and death will depend greatly on the manner in which the war is waged. The international community since World War II has built up a series of agreements, a body of law, to govern the way war should be waged, in order to keep to a minimum the impact on civilians. International humanitarian law, as this is called, has a number of implications for warring parties, but I'll cite three of them: first, to refrain from indiscriminate attacks and avoid disproportionate civilian casualties; second, to preserve the infrastructure on which civilians depend; and third, to allow free passage of refugees and packages of impartial humanitarian assistance. By “indiscriminate attacks”, the law refers to attacks that do not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Obviously, it's a difficult thing to carry out in a practice. War is very messy, and there are some tactics that make it much more complicated.

In 1997 and 1998, some of you may recall, when the United States and Britain threatened Iraq with air strikes, the government brought people they said were civilian volunteers to surround military installations as human shields. This is expressly prohibited in international humanitarian law, but obviously, the onus is not only on the Iraqi government not to do that, but also on attacking parties to weigh the effect on civilians of attacking in such a situation, compared to the expected military advantage to be gained. The law requires that weighing.

Another problem with the indiscriminate attacks is the weaponry used. Some weaponry is by nature indiscriminate. Sheila mentioned nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons; these clearly cannot discriminate between soldiers and civilians. There's also the question of landmines and cluster bombs, both of which the United States used in Afghanistan. Neither the United States nor Iraq are signatories to the landmines treaty.

I mentioned that international humanitarian law obliges warring parties to preserve the infrastructure on which civilians depend. Targeting of the electrical system, the water system, the transportation system, which are all essential for this fragile network we have now, humanitarian agencies and the Iraqi government, for supplying the essentials of life to the civilian population, would certainly have a disproportionate effect on civilians. The United States did exactly that in 1991. Of course, all parties and neighbouring countries must allow free passage of refugees and impartial assistance, that is, assistance by non-belligerent parties.

I remind you of these laws because all parties to any conflict are responsible for respecting them, but also it is the responsibility of the entire international community to ensure that the warring parties respect them. Grave breaches of international humanitarian law are considered war crimes and can be punished under the International Criminal Court. Neither Iraq nor the United States has ratified the International Criminal Court, but Canada has, and Canada must consider the implications if we somehow get dragged into a war in Iraq to participate in a U.S. attack. Canada's personnel would be liable for prosecution should we end up participating in United States actions that violate international humanitarian law.

We have a report to share with you--I've put a few copies on the back table--that outlines details of these implications. I understand the clerk will circulate it to all of you, and I'd be happy to answer your questions today.

I just want to conclude with what may seem evident to many of us. With all the vast complications responding to the humanitarian implications of a war produces for us agencies who have to prepare contingency plans for responding to feeding, housing, clothing, providing water for so many millions of people should a war happen, it seems that even the very complicated nature of a diplomatic solution seems simple in comparison. We hope the United Nations and Canada will help push for that relatively simple diplomatic solution.

Thank you.

¿ (0940)

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Fried.

[English]

Now we're going to pass to Dr. Eric Hoskins, who I understand is just back from Iraq. He is from War Child Canada.

Dr. Eric Hoskins (President, War Child Canada): Good morning and thank you.

I believe war is as close to inevitable as it could be. None of us wants it, but the urgency in my appeal this morning is based upon the belief that we are in all likelihood several weeks away from a major military conflict in Iraq.

I'm speaking as president of War Child Canada, a small Canadian NGO that works with war-affected children, but most specifically, I'm speaking in my individual capacity. I'm a medical doctor. I've specialized for the last 15 years in the impact of war on children. I've been to Iraq more than 25 times. I was in Jordan throughout the last Gulf War and in Iraq as they were signing the cease fire agreement. In 1993, when some of you might have been around in Parliament--I know some of you were--I successfully lobbied the Canadian government, with MP assistance, to unfreeze $2 million of Iraqi assets frozen in Canada to purchase humanitarian supplies for children, food and medicines. From 1998 to 2000 I was Lloyd Axworthy's senior policy advisor here in Ottawa.

As was mentioned by the chair, I returned two weeks ago from Iraq, where I was the team leader of a group called the international study team. This is an independent group of experts that functioned in Iraq completely independent of the Iraqi government, financially supported, I should add, by more than 20 Canadian non-governmental organizations, Oxfam Canada and Physicians for Global Survival among others. This past weekend I was a keynote speaker at a Swiss government-sponsored meeting in Geneva to outline the humanitarian impact of a possible war in Iraq. There were 29 countries attending that meeting, including Canada, as well as UN agencies, the Red Cross, and others.

There are three main points I would like to make. First, Iraqi civilians in 2003 are far more vulnerable than they were in 1990. As has been mentioned before, there is already a humanitarian crisis. Second, a prolonged war--and I emphasize prolonged--would be absolutely catastrophic, resulting in food shortages, disease, and thousands of deaths. That being said, I believe the much more likely scenario is that this war will be of relatively short duration. We need to prepare for the worst, but we need to understand the facts and the likelihood and not get into speculation or scaremongering. We need to look at this and examine it in a very practical and sensible way. Third, we, the humanitarian community, as has been mentioned by people already, are not at all prepared for war, and there is very little time to get ready.

As to my first point, Iraqi civilians in 2003 are far more vulnerable to the shock of a war than they were before the 1991 Gulf War. This is true using virtually any indicator of measuring the civilian status. Child mortality is 2.3 times higher than it was before the 1991 Gulf War. That translates into about 60,000 extra deaths that occur each year for some reason that wouldn't have occurred had the Gulf War and ensuing sanctions not taken place. A 130% increase in the death rate of children under 5 has occurred in the last decade in Iraq. That's the highest increase in death rate of any country in the world in the last decade. The next closest, interestingly enough, is Kenya, which had an increase of about 25% in its under-5 death rates. Twenty-five per cent of Iraqi children are chronically malnourished. Thirteen per cent, or roughly half a million, are acutely malnourished or underweight. This compares to 3% to 5% on the best estimates before the last Gulf War. So we're looking at 38% malnutrition versus 3% to 5%. These children are particularly vulnerable to disease and death should war occur. The health care system has broken down. The UN estimates that there are enough medicines in hospitals and clinics to last three to four weeks. There is an estimated one month's supply of food in the country. None of these are Iraqi government figures, all of them are UN figures.

¿ (0945)

Sixteen million Iraqi civilians, that's 60% of the total population, are completely dependent on government distributed food rations. That means that if they do not have government distributed food rations, they will starve to death. This high level of dependency is critical. If the government food distribution system breaks down, as has already been mentioned, the international community does not have the capacity to fix it or to replace it. The food ration system involves almost half a million tonnes of food monthly, roughly four times the volume that was moved into Afghanistan, and this is distributed by more than 45,000 retailers throughout the country.

If there is war, the oil for food program will immediately stop, it will be suspended. In fact, under the resolution it will be illegal, because the UN supervisors will have fled the country because of the conflict, and likely there won't be a party on the Iraqi side to oversee the distribution. Suppliers, afraid that they will not get paid, will stop supplying Iraq with food and other items, including medicine.

Iraqi civilians are obviously anxious, fearful, and depressed. Of children interviewed by the child psychologists who participated in January's international study team 40% did not think life was worth living. Many have nightmares, and they can speak for themselves. One 5-year-old, if you can believe this, said to the child psychologist, “They have guns and bombs and the air will be cold and hot and we will burn very much.” A 13-year-old said, “I feel fear every day that we might all die, but where shall I go if I am left alone?” Another 5-year-old said--imagine, those of you who have or had 5-year-old children--“They come from above, from the air, and will kill us and destroy us. I can explain to you that we fear this every day and every night.” So in summary, Iraqi civilians are worn out and run down, both physically and psychologically.

If war occurs, what are the likely humanitarian vulnerabilities? As I mentioned at the beginning, it's important not to assume that the worst will happen. It's quite possible that a war with Iraq will begin and end within several weeks, rather than several months. That being said, we need to prepare for the mostly likely scenario, if not the worst scenario, and there are very specific and practical steps that must be taken now to minimize civilian impact. The vulnerabilities obviously include things like protection, and that's what this is all about. It's about protection of civilians, particularly children. Civilians will get caught in the crossfire. In 1991 between 10,000 and 50,000 civilians were killed during the war and in the immediate aftermath of the war.

The ability of the international community to respond will be severely curtailed even as early as when war becomes imminent, because then all 1,000-plus international staff will immediately leave the country.

Unless this war is prolonged, months rather than weeks, the needs are more likely--and perhaps there's a divergence here from some of my colleagues--to be most urgent on the non-food side of assistance, trauma kits, basic medicines, measles vaccine, water purification equipment, sanitation equipment, fuel, and other things, rather than on the food side. Most Iraqi families have been receiving advanced rations for the last five to six months; most of them have probably four to six weeks of food.

Of course, if there's massive human displacement, that would dramatically change the situation, including on the food side. If the Iraqi regime is unable to continue with its ration distribution system, the responsibility of feeding 26 million, 16 million of them completely dependent on the rations, will fall to the international community. As I mentioned, the external and internal food pipeline will immediately be suspended. That happened in 1991, it's going to happen again.

In 1991 coalition bombing destroyed the electrical grid; it was reduced from 100% capacity to 5% capacity. If electrical facilities are again targeted, we will see a conflict that plays out on the civilian side, similar to 1991 rather than different from 1991. We will see the same problems. The loss of electricity will immediately lead to a loss of water, sanitation, health care, as well as household electricity. Fuel will run out quickly and will be urgently needed.

¿ (0950)

There has already been mention of ordinance, like cluster bombs, landmines, depleted uranium, the impact unexploded ordinance will have on the civilian population, and the psychological impact. In fact, if War Child does choose to have a role in the post-war situation in Iraq, it will likely be on the psychological side, with trauma counselling and psychological support being provided.

Regardless of what Canada decides concerning military participation, it is time to declare our serious commitment to the humanitarian response. In Geneva the one message that came out of the meeting unanimously endorsed by the countries, the UN, and NGOs that were present was that we have the plans for contingency planning on paper, it's time to press the button and start prepositioning food and non-food items and get the emergency planning on the move, because we have already lost valuable time and have almost run out of time. Canada should urgently commit a serious level of funding to UN and NGO contingency planning. The UN has just issued a new $123 million appeal and asked Canada to consider providing $4 million. Every day counts.

Canada must demand that both sides to this conflict respect international humanitarian law, as Oxfam has already said. Canada should also strongly encourage the UN to fully discuss the humanitarian impact of a war in all its political discussions. The humanitarian response must be coordinated by the international community, not the U.S., but the UN. And, as John Watson mentioned, Canada should help put in place now steps to ensure that the necessary legal changes and adjustments are made to the oil for food program, so that it is allowed to continue during and after any conflict.

Finally, Canada has an opportunity to demonstrate some real leadership here, regardless of the position we ultimately take on the political-military aspects of this crisis. Such leadership on the humanitarian side of this conflict, in both contingency planning and post-war relief, would be consistent with Canadian values and Canadian public opinion.

Thank you.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Hoskins.

I would like to thank each and every one of you for your comments. They are very timely, because yesterday our ambassador to the United Nations, during his address as part of the Security Council open debate, said:

The crisis is not about weapons of mass destruction alone. It is also about people, particular the Iraqi people, who have, under the iron rule of Saddam Hussein, already been subjected to two wars and a decade of sanctions. The humanitarian situation in this country is already serious. In order to eat, 60% of its population relies on the oil-for-food Program. Children and the elderly are particularly vulnerable and we need to protect them [...] The Government of Canada exhorts all members of the Council to put the well-being of the Iraqi people at the core of their deliberations.

That was part of the speech that was given by our ambassador yesterday.

We will now turn to questions and answers.

[English]

Mr. Day, please. This is a five minute round.

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance): Thanks to each one of you for the tremendous work you do and, unfortunately, the work that's going to be needed in the future, war or not. It's a war we all want to avoid and there is a possibility of avoiding. It certainly is one of the reasons the possibility of military intervention must be left on the table as a last resort, because we're dealing with a twisted dictator who is a proven serial killer and serial liar, someone who will continue to kill, maim, and destroy. We've already heard how children are dying by the thousands. The death rate is absolutely unacceptable. This is in a country that, with its sanctions, which, of course, are violated constantly, especially by France and Syria, has a high GDP and untold hundreds of millions being spent on palaces, billions being spent on weapons, and yet there is a death rate that is higher than in countries that don't have anywhere near the revenue flow Saddam Hussein enjoys. Clearly, we want to see an avoidance. We definitely have to do more on the humanitarian side and be prepared for that.

I'd like to ask Dr. Culpeper, given his comments on war, if it was wrong for Canada to be involved in the intervention in Kosovo?

¿ (0955)

Mr. Roy Culpeper: I think there is a soft area of international law when it comes to protecting the rights of the people, but that doesn't mean we should start to take apart the framework we have there now.

Mr. Stockwell Day: I agree. Was Canada wrong, in your view, to be involved in the intervention in Kosovo?

Mr. Roy Culpeper: There are arguments on both sides. I was very uncomfortable with it, and on balance, it would have been better had the UN evolved to the position where it could justify intervening in countries to protect people. The question we have to ask is, why Kosovo and not Rwanda? Some 800,000 people lost their lives in the genocide in Rwanda, and we stood by.

Mr. Stockwell Day: I agree with that. The UN totally failed there, even though our general was begging for intervention. The UN failed to intervene in Kosovo, and we had to go in there without UN support, taking out somebody who was a monster, Milosevic, but of diminutive proportions compared to Saddam Hussein. He didn't have anywhere near the chemical capacity in weapons of mass destruction or the monstrous record of death Saddam Hussein has.

I'll make the questions really quick, and if you could say yes or no, that will be good. You talked about resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan: should we allow that to continue to happen? You talked about Israel-Palestine: what can be done to stop the flow of dollars from Saddam Hussein to suicide killers, which he admits to? You talked about supporting democrats as opposed to autocrats: what can we do to emphasize that Israel is a democracy surrounded by a sea of dictatorships? What do we do to stop the Saudi flow of dollars to al-Qaeda, al-Aqsa, and Hamas?

Mr. Roy Culpeper: They are questions that I don't think allow a yes or no answer.

I think the issue of how you bring about peace and democracy in countries that are ruled by autocrats, countries such as Saudi Arabia, which we still consider an ally, deserves urgent attention, and we need to begin by stopping our support of them. It's not that long ago that we were supporting Saddam Hussein himself--this is a well-known fact. In fact, Donald Rumsfeld was in Iraq in 1983 as part of the Reagan administration talking about a strategic alliance between Iraq and the United States. Now he's taken just the opposite course. I think we need some consistency based on principles that take as their objective the need to respect and build democracy, human rights, social justice, and development. If we start with those principles and stop doing the wrong thing--do no harm--I think we might have some progress.

Mr. Stockwell Day: What about the Taliban? Thankfully, there has been a great liberating in Afghanistan, but there are still great challenges. Should we allow that resurgence to continue, or should it be stopped?

Mr. Roy Culpeper: I think what Canada has done is noteworthy, I think it's great that we're going back into Afghanistan, but you cannot bring democracy, peace, and justice from the barrel of a gun. I think you have to complement, in the case of Afghanistan, the need to bring back stability with support for development. They sought $15 billion, $5 billion was pledged, and only $1.8 billion has flowed. There's something wrong with this picture, and unless we start to back our aims and objectives with real resources to build peace, as well as to wage war, we're going to lose this battle.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Lalonde, please.

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to have to control myself. I have only five minutes, but I am very animated.

Thank you for your very troubling presentations. I am sure that it is extremely difficult to talk about what you have just presented to us without focusing on horror. You have said that we need to take positions that are independent from the political positions that Canada will take. I have a lot of problems with that.

I would like to ask you a few questions. My first question is as follows: I have read and heard that the Pentagon was considering, as a strategy--and the objective of this statement has not been denied--to drop, during the first 48-hour period, 3,000 bombs on the palaces in Baghdad and to then send in troops. Is this not a horrible scenario that would result in the destruction of the remaining infrastructure and will have the ramifications that you described?

Secondly, Mr. Watson, from CARE Canada, said, and I read his text as I listened to him:

Even if the warring parties exercise restraint, there is the ever-present possibility of an accidental release of toxic or radioactive materials.

I also read the IISS report a few months ago, which said that any type of release of these substances, if they exist, would constitute a danger.

À (1000)

[English]

Mr. John Watson: We're quite concerned abut this. Significant amounts of these substances did exist. We don't know whether they still do or not; the records on their destruction are not there. If they are used in the conflict, that's terrible. If they are released accidentally in the conflict, that's maybe not quite so bad. But what I wanted to point out is that no humanitarian agency is prepared for work if there are nuclear, biological, or chemical agents present. We simply do not have the training, we do not have the equipment. In my opinion, that is a lack that will have to be addressed, but it will take a period of years to do it.

The other thing that is worth mentioning with regard to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons is that our strategy is to concentrate on Iraqis in situ, for a number of reasons, poverty, difficulty moving around, etc. I've worked in this field for a long time, and my most important indicator of what's going to happen is our staff. And our staff are staying, they will stay for the war. I'm assuming that will be the general position. If chemical, biological, or nuclear agents are released, all bets are off. People will simple flee and scatter. So it will make the post-war context even more grim in dealing with the humanitarian aspects.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: You do not appear to be contradicting yourselves. You are asking that we make some changes so that the food-for-oil Program can continue during and after the conflict. Could you talk about this further? Are we to think that the humanitarian workers will remain in the country during the conflict, or is this to preserve the system that currently exists? I do not understand how that would work.

[English]

Mr. John Watson: The oil for food program is in fact managed by the Iraqi government, not by humanitarian agencies. To run a program of that scope takes enormous organization, takes a long time to set up. If that program, at its root level, cannot be preserved, no external agency is going to be able to replace it. There is a danger here that relates to the military options you saw in Afghanistan. There is a danger in thinking that air-lifted food can do anything substantial in meeting these humanitarian needs. The main thing air-lifted food does is give the public, in places like Canada and the States, a sense that we are being kind, that we are doing something good. Imagine no food coming into Ontario and having to depend upon packets dropped from airplanes to fill the shelves of Mac's Milk. That's what we're talking about. The Mac's Milk, if you like, of Iraq is these food agents. If that system is disrupted, it's incalculable the catastrophes that will follow.

À (1005)

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Watson.

[English]

Now we'll pass to Mr. Eggleton.

Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.): I thank the presenters for being here today, and I certainly agree with you that everything should be done to avoid war; as Mr. Culpeper says, war under the present circumstances is just not justified.

I also am in agreement with what all of you are saying, that there's going to be a humanitarian catastrophe here if this war does occur. A lot of people, when they think of that in the context of war, are probably thinking people are going to be killed or injured as a result of bombing or other fighting, what is called in the military context collateral damage, but I think the picture you're painting here is that there could be thousands, maybe millions, dying of starvation or because of a lack of clean water and sanitation, diseases that could flow from that. I don't think enough is known about that possibility. I quite agree with you that Canada at the United Nations should be making it very clear that in the planning of any of this, if there is going to be war, the humanitarian situation has to be taken into consideration, and I don't think anything is being said about that right now. I think this committee should put that forward, because when you're talking about 60% of the population depending upon government handouts for food and this being disrupted if there's a war, the catastrophe will be beyond what we can imagine. I don't know how many of those 16 million are children. I'd be interested if somebody would answer that.

I also want to focus for a moment on what would happen during that war period. We have the NGOs in there now, and presumably, we'd have them in there after a war, but what's going to happen during that war period? Inadequate as air-lifted food is, it might be the only thing that's really going to happen. Let's presume for a moment that Canadians are not part of the conflict in Iraq--we're going to be busy in Afghanistan, so I don't expect we will be. That means the Americans or the British or whoever else is going in there are the ones who are going to have to deal with this in whatever way they can. Are there any other alternatives? Are there any other ways we can deal with the question of food and potable water?

Also, let me ask you one more question about the duration of this. Obviously, the longer it goes on, the worse it gets. Dr. Hoskins, you talked about weeks versus months. We don't really know how long this is going to go on. I assume that if there is a war, it will start with bombing for some period of time to weaken the enemy, to damage the infrastructure--whether deliberately or not, I'm sure it's going to damage the civilian infrastructure;. Then perhaps there will be resistance on the ground when they go in. That would certainly lengthen things for some period of time. But I don't sense, whether it's weeks or months, that this population can withstand very many days of this kind of conflict without seeing starvation, disease, and people just dying by the thousands, if not millions.

I wonder if you can comment on those questions.

The Chair: Dr. Hoskins.

Dr. Eric Hoskins: With regard to duration, 1991 was probably informative. It was a 42-day war. Because of the way the war was prosecuted, it had devastating consequences. There were direct casualties during the war, but a far greater number resulted basically because children and the elderly drank water that was contaminated. It became contaminated because of the destruction of the electrical facilities. Water and sanitation depend on electricity in Iraq. Tens of thousands--many, including myself, would argue hundreds of thousands--of children simply died because they got diarrhea and didn't have the medicines to be cured. And 70% of Iraqi children now are dying of either respiratory disease or diarrheal disease. These are diseases of poverty. So even a short war will potentially have grave implications, and it depends how it's fought. I personally believe it's much more likely that this will be a war of short duration, however--

À (1010)

Mr. Art Eggleton: What is short?

Dr. Eric Hoskins: Weeks rather than months.

Even if it is short, 1991 has informed us that it can have grave implications, both physical and psychological. Even if it's a 5% or 10% chance that this could be a war that lasts months rather than weeks, that's what I'm worried about as well, a war that could spill over into the region, a war where chemical or biological weapons are used, a war where there is massive displacement of populations. The only consistent thing, I think, about war is that we generally know how it begins, but we never know how it's going to end. We don't know that in this case either.

My own comments were suggesting that with a short war, the most critical impact would be on the non-food side, as opposed to the food side. In 1991 sanctions, by the way, prohibited any import of food whatsoever, in a country that imported 70% of its foodstuffs, for a period of eight months. The war lasted six weeks. Despite that, there was malnutrition, but very few cases of outright starvation. Again, a lot of this depends on the duration. There is a small quantity of food available. If it's a short war, the key will be getting this ration distribution system up and running again, because it's half a million tonnes of food.

John was mentioning that the CARE staff, who are dual nationals, by the way, will be remaining, in all likelihood, in Iraq. However, it's important that this not be misconstrued. The roughly 1,000 UN staff will all be evacuated from Iraq. There are a handful of international NGOs working in the country; the most courageous perhaps, are the CARE staff, and they will likely remain, for a variety of reasons.

Finally, on chemical and biological weapons, it's not just their use, it's the threat or the rumour of their use that will have devastating consequences. If you have a rumour in Baghdad that chemical weapons are going to be used, you will have displacement of populations in the order of millions. There isn't a UN or NGO agency in the world that will, as John said, put their staff at risk, even at the threat or rumour of use of chemical or biological weapons.

The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Hoskins.

We'll go to Madam McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I too want to thank the witnesses very much for their what I'd call shocking reality therapy.

I'm very glad, Dr. Hoskins, that you've clarified this notion of short duration and long duration war, because it seems to me that one of the things your testimony and a great deal of other evidence has clearly shown is that the Iraqi war, which might have been described as short, in fact has gone on killing for 12 years and continues to kill, with the reactions from that war.

There's a total lack of humanitarian preparedness, acknowledged by the United Nations, certainly confirmed by what you've said today. There's no guessing involved in what the U.S. has in mind. It's displayed on the front pages of the paper its intention to massively reduce to rubble the infrastructure of the country within three days. So I would like to ask a question this committee needs to struggle and come to terms with. In view of the fact that participating in the reduction of the infrastructure to rubble within three days would constitute a war crime and Canada is a signatory to treaties not to participate in such activity, how does one deal with the fundamental contradiction in continuing to flirt, as Canada is, with the possibility of being part of this war, while also talking about its concern for the effect on the civilian population? I know it's a very loaded question, but I think that's the question we, as a committee, are absolutely struggling with. Morally, as well as legally under the terms of international law, it is a criminal act for Canada to decide to participate in what is absolutely predictable. Knowing what you know about all of this, do you have advice for this committee, which has a responsibility to decide what it needs to say to the Canadian government about any participation by Canada in this war?

À (1015)

The Chair: Mr. Watson, then Mr. Fried.

Mr. John Watson: I think the international law as to war is important. It may sound strange coming from a humanitarian, but the way wars are fought is important. Perhaps the number one change between the last war and this war has been the proportion of munitions that are now technologically sophisticated enough to be targeted. We've heard a lot about precision bombing. Believe me, from our experience in Afghanistan, it is precise, but it is rather indiscriminate. That in itself leads to openings for more suasion on military forces. Collateral damage in 2003 and collateral damage in 1991 are not the same thing. So I don't think one should accept that infrastructure will be reduced to rubble. It doesn't make sense. Certainly, there are other NGOs working with the American military to tell them, look, this is illegal. If you're going to destroy infrastructure, it has to be related to the conflict itself. It can't simply be gratuitous precision bombing of infrastructure that is solely there to service the civilians.

On the humanitarian side, sometimes we get too close to these things. The most important thing is to recognize that Iraq is a sophisticated urban society. It's not like Afghanistan. In Afghanistan you already had five million people outside the country, you already had tough rural people who were used to living hard, you already had 20 years of the state giving those people nothing but grief. In Iraq you have an urban population, middle-class, maybe not in our terms, but in terms of the world we're used to working in, that is dependent overwhelmingly on state structures, which I have to emphasize are run quite efficiently. You may find it to be a contradiction that you have a horrible dictator on the one hand and, on the other hand, half the population dependent upon getting their food at the local corner store through a government program, but that's the situation we're facing. So we must make sure that government program at the lower levels is maintained, or there will be a catastrophe.

Mr. Mark Fried: I'd just like to add that one thing the committee could do to ensure that Canada is prepared to uphold international humanitarian law and to press the international community to do it is bring officials of the Department of National Defence and DFAIT before you to ask how they are preparing, as well as ensuring that if Canadian forces are drawn into this conflict, they're contemplating the legal and moral implications of participating.

The Chair: Thank you.

We'll go now to Mr. Harvard.

Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood—St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to put a couple if questions to Dr. Hoskins. By the way, Dr. Hoskins, I've been made aware of some of the great work you did for Lloyd Axworthy when you were with him. There's no doubt that you're a great Canadian.

You gave some very alarming figures that point to a humanitarian catastrophe that already exists in Iraq, even before any possible war. I'd like to know where you gather those figures. I was talking to a fellow MP just this morning who was trying to find out how many people work for the federal government. He says he can't find out; he's got some figures, but they aren't very consistent. So I don't know how in the world you gather your information from Iraq. I don't doubt what you're telling us for a moment, but I would be interested to know that.

My major question has to do with the following. We who are, say, the doves, those who don't want war and believe what's happening in Iraq doesn't justify war, say to the jingoists, those who preach war, that they have the responsibility to recognize this might be a war that results in widespread killing, humanitarian catastrophe, possibly widespread starvation, and political destabilization in that part of the world. God knows where that would take that part of the world, or the entire world. That's their responsibility, we say. My question is back to us: what is our responsibility? You told us that you've been in Iraq more than 20 times, and you've gathered this information relative to the humanitarian catastrophe already existing. Have you found any evidence whatsoever in your travels inside that country, Dr. Hoskins, that there can be substantive, substantial, meaningful political change without war? Or is the world left to fear that a man like Saddam Hussein could just stay there for as long as he lives? This situation, if you date it from the Gulf War, is 12 years long. I'm not suggesting that the policies of the UN or anyone else have been working, they have not. What's the responsibility on our shoulders, beyond just saying, no war, please, no war--consider the implications?

Those are my two questions.

À (1020)

Dr. Eric Hoskins: The first one is a lot easier to answer than the second one. Thank you for that.

For the psychological data we produced a couple of weeks ago, it was relatively modest. We had two child psychologists from Norway who have been to Iraq about five times each, leading, if not the leading, experts in the world on the psychological impact of war on children. They went directly into more than a hundred households unaccompanied by any Iraqi government officials, which was the situation for our entire team while we were in Iraq, with our own translators. They also administered a mental health questionnaire to roughly 200 twelve-year-old children in schools, but their visits to households were particularly informative. They were able to speak with children, as you saw, as young as four and five, and also older youth and their families.

In 1991 I was the coordinator of the predecessor of this mission, if you will, which was much more robust. The information we gathered at that time was based on the presence of 80 experts from 20 different countries in every field, and we visited literally 9,000 households in 300 different locations around the country. I'm an epidemiologist by training, so I'm probably, compared with just about anybody I know, the most critical person looking at data. We measured more than 15,000 kids, spoke with more than 9,000 women, independently again, and based our results on that study, results that have lasted over the years, demonstrating their reliability.

As to the second question, I think part of the difficulty here is our inability to separate the political from the humanitarian. As much as we'd like to link the two, we can't. Protection of civilians, which is an issue Canada has championed for years, particularly in recent years at the UN, including the Security Council, it's as simple as that. I think it's the thread that binds us as human beings, frankly. Maybe it sounds a little bit trite, but if we are nothing else, we are and should be compassionate, and we should try to protect civilians, particularly children, who are the most vulnerable, from any negative impacts, including war. As others have very clearly stated, we have international legal obligations, but more than that, our common humanity, I think, requires us to make the greatest efforts to protect the vulnerable. Otherwise, I think we've lost something great in how we're evolving as a civilization.

With regard to change in Iraq, I feel a little bit uncomfortable--and this was alluded to by Mr. Day earlier--that somehow in recent weeks we are beginning to use humanitarian intervention as justification for a conflict in Iraq, and Tony Blair has done this recently as well. The justification that has been provided this far has been the threat Iraq poses to the rest of the world, not the threat from within to the population in that country. It's an issue of consistency as well. If we are so driven for political change in Iraq for the benefit of the Iraqi civilians, we need to apply that consistently throughout the world. Can the Iraqi people live under such an oppressive regime? Believe me, I have my own personal reasons to literally despise the regime that exists in Iraq. We need to examine whether the risks of conflict to the civilian population are not so grave as to prevent us from taking a decision that would lead to military conflict, if, in fact, our argument is humanitarian intervention to save the Iraqi people from their leadership.

À (1025)

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.)): Dr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): Thank you all for being here today.

I'm of the view that an early intervention in Iraq is actually going to make our security situation worse, for various reasons you've all alluded to. What other options do we have for meeting the security interests of ourselves and our allies, while containing the problem? Is containment the only option, or are there other options you can see that will enable us to meet our security needs and those of our friends south of the border?

Dr. Hoskins, perhaps you can be more explicit on the conflict and post-conflict situation. Who's going to do the distribution, how are we going to do the distribution, and what are we going to distribute in that situation? You articulated some of the needs very well, but could you expand on that?

Finally, many of the sanctions have been decreased over time. My understanding is that there are billions of dollars in the escrow account right now. The larger problem is that Saddam Hussein has been using that money for the purchase of his presidential palaces and for other non-basic needs. Is that true, and if so, how can we ensure that those moneys get to the infrastructure building, sanitation, medicines, agricultural products the people need?

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Diane Marleau): Mr. Culpeper.

Mr. Roy Culpeper: I'd like to just respond to Mr. Harvard's question too, because he raises some very important points about how you bring about a democratic transition in such vicious and brutal regimes. Of course, it's not going to be easy and it's going to take a long time, but let's not forget that many groups have been in vocal opposition to Saddam Hussein for a long time, even while he was thought to be a friend, rather than a foe. We should pay much more attention to Amnesty International and critics of human rights abusing regimes such as Iraq at the time they're doing it. We can perhaps call upon the UN, through its human rights monitoring, to report on human rights progress in Iraq.

Over the longer term I think what's really necessary to bring about democratic change is a process of engagement with civil society. When you think about cases like South Africa or China, they have undergone a long transition from fairly brutal totalitarian regimes to regimes that are much more open, liberal, and amenable to civil rights and human rights. That has come about through engagement, through civil society. It's also come about through trade. I used to be an opponent of trade with human rights abusing regimes, but the evidence is now accumulating that if you engage in commerce and trade with countries that are vicious, brutal human rights abusers, you can actually engage with elements of civil society that are liberal and see value in respecting human rights. So I would strongly recommend that looking forward, whatever happens to Iraq, we should think about interacting with them. We should think about providing education to Iraqis, as we provide it to many Chinese, for example, to help bring about this transition.

It's not going to be quick, and it has to come from within. I don't think it's possible, as the Americans seem to believe, that they can parachute a proconsul into Baghdad who will, MacArthur-style, bring about a democratic transition. On a number of levels, we need to think this through right now and start to develop long-term strategies for democratic transition, because we really have done very little work either at the political level or in research on these issues.

To go to Dr. Martin's question, I actually do think containment is a viable and commendable option. In the Cold War we contained the Soviet Union for 50 years. It worked. Why can't it work for Iraq, which is a much weaker country? If Iraq were to lash out at us, there's no question who the victor would be in that kind of conflict. So I really think that compared to the catastrophic consequences of war, for the Iraqi people and for the region and for the world, containment has a lot going for it as an option.

À (1030)

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Diane Marleau): Thank you.

Mrs. Redman.

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair. My question is somewhat along the line of Mr. Harvard's.

Thank you all for your presentations and the good work you do, but I have to tell you, of all of the things--and there's much food for thought; it's greatly disturbing--it's Dr. Zurbrigg's comments I find the most disturbing, when she depicts the food distribution as a near ideal system, all that in the face of the crumbling medical service and the incidence of respiratory disease and diarrhea many have spoken about.

It's interesting to hear Mr. Culpeper talk about containment. President Havel addressed the previous Parliament and talked about the rightful role of government to protect human rights. I really don't believe any recommendation this committee comes up with is going to be the deciding factor in whether or not Canada does eventually play a role in a war. I hope war is not inevitable, I would not be a defender of the Americans, and there have been many speculations as to what their true motives are, but if American troops weren't surrounding Iraq right now, I don't think we would be nearly as focused as we are on a terrible crisis that is 12 years old. How do we ensure, as an international community, that it doesn't take the threat of war, no matter what the motivation is, to draw attention that can be effective as a agent of change to the horrible plight of people in Iraq or Africa or wherever it is?

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Diane Marleau): Dr. Zurbrigg.

Dr. Sheila Zurbrigg: I'm not a weapons of mass destruction or inspections expert. I think there are processes already taking place, weapons inspections, that are credible in addressing international security issues. I don't believe Hans Blix or the other inspectors would be engaging in that process if they didn't see it as a credible one. That may not provide absolute answers, but as an ongoing, permanent process of inspection, it can address regional and international security issues.

Do you need the threat of troops surrounding the country? It's a difficult moral question. I would come at it from a different direction. Does actual war increase our security, and does it increase the legitimacy and the credibility of the international system, the UN system? If this is allowed to proceed, it will profoundly undermine in the world the credibility and the legitimacy of the UN system and international law, and our credibility if we participate in it. I don't mean to be avoiding your question, but I do think we have to see it in that light. Others could maybe speak to this more directly.

I would like to go back to the realities we are looking at. As a famine historian, a health historian, I'm familiar with the logistics of how war and the chaos that is triggered by war so easily undermine lines of food access. In Iraq and in any society young children starve to death in two to three weeks. Adults, with larger body mass, starve in four to six weeks. We don't have answers to the question, what happens at the end of six weeks? We simply don't. Therefore, to have any international legitimacy with respect to human rights, we have an obligation to have that question answered. We should all go out of this room in the days that follow knowing what's going to happen after six weeks if there is a breakdown in the existing food distribution system. The word if is inappropriate. OCHA describes this, other agencies predict this. It's very likely that there will be a breakdown in this system, and we cannot predict the internal chaos that precipitates it. This is characteristic of all famine-related war

We have an obligation, and we have an opportunity I suppose, to stand up and be asking these human rights questions in the public forum. I would suggest that when and if there is discussion in the Security Council, all Canadian representatives not just simply leave it at discussion of humanitarian issues, but insist on answers. What is going to happen to 26 million people at the end of six weeks? We are obliged to have an answer to that, and I do believe an answer exists.

There are charges of palace construction etc., and I don't think anyone in the room would defend Saddam Hussein or the existing government for the violations of all political and human rights. Nevertheless, it's important to ask what the palaces cost. By even a generous estimate, the cost of a palace wouldn't feed 26 million people for a single week, let alone 12 years. We need to be clear on what it is that's causing and has been causing chronic famine and 1.5 million deaths. It's not the palaces. As much as that reflects on his legitimacy as a political leader, that's not what's starving children. We need to keep those numbers in mind.

À (1035)

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Diane Marleau): Thank you.

Mr. Obhrai.

Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance): Thank you.

I would like to thank the speakers. They re-emphasized quite dramatically the horrors of war.

What I'm interested in knowing, from Dr. Hoskins and all the others who have been on the ground in Iraq for many years providing humanitarian assistance, is the general mood of the Iraqi people. A lot of commentary has been made about the so-called clash of civilizations, saying the Muslim world would really be very upset and pick up arms. Many of your groups have been there and will be there should war occur. Would you face hostility from the Iraqi people? Is there hostility towards the Iraqi regime out there? That's something we need to hear from people who are on the ground. Do you expect impediments, should this war go ahead, to your work, with hostility coming from the Muslim world, which is what it's made out to be? Many of you are in Afghanistan, I presume, and from what we understand, you don't have hostility in Afghanistan or in the Muslim world.

À (1040)

The Chair: Dr. Hoskins.

Dr. Eric Hoskins: In the 20-odd times I've been to Iraq I've never felt threatened. I've never been met by anything other than hospitality and welcome from the Iraqi people--and I emphasize the people, families, households. They have a remarkable ability, I think, to separate, for example, Canadians from the Canadian government or Americans from the American government. Probably everybody in the country has a particular political view, certainly adults, of the American, British, or other governments. However, and I think this is probably generally the case as well for all citizens of foreign countries, they have not been threatened and they have felt quite comfortable. So this distinction between people coming from a country and the government representatives is maintained by the Iraqis.

As to what might happen, I think it depends partly on how the war is prosecuted and the aftermath and who provides the humanitarian assistance. In Geneva this past weekend the donors, the UN and the NGOs, were all quite adamant that the post-war humanitarian assistance needs to be coordinated by the international community and the UN, partly for this reason, that it is a U.S.-led operation, which it appears to be to date. There's a great deal of frustration, by the way, among the UN agencies, many donor governments, and all of the NGOs that there has been very little discussion or cooperation with the U.S. military about what their plans post-war might be on the humanitarian side. The international community is stressing very strongly, partly because of what you said, the question of how the civilian population will respond, but for other reasons as well, that it has to be the international community, not the U.S..

Iraqis define themselves probably just as much by reference to 6,000 years of history as they do in the context of their being Iraqi citizens. Certainly, the people I've talked to over the years, regardless of how they feel about the regime--and many of them have spoken quite openly to me about their hostility towards their own regime--have a feeling that they are protecting their own history, 6,000 years of history, from an external aggressor. Perhaps in the north and the south it's unlikely that there will be serious opposition to an invasion or a post-war situation. In a place like Baghdad, when you've got two million Iraqi women over the last two years given military training as part of the defence forces, it's a big unknown how that might play out, both for humanitarian actors and for other situations.

The Chair: Mr. Watson.

Mr. John Watson: In many respects, I think your question is more important outside Iraq, and it's something we're very concerned about. We're living in an odd period, where you have an absolute disincentive for terrorist attacks to be mounted right now, because that would seem to confirm the Americans' efforts to link the Iraqi regime with the terrorist network. As soon as the war starts, that flips over. So you can expect to see a number of attacks in Europe and the North American context as soon as the Americans go into Iraq.

We talk about the war being over in a short period of time. I don't think that is the issue. The issue is what happens in other contexts, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Egypt, as a result of this war. On that score, I can tell you, it's going to be much more difficult to operate. That's why we're so concerned with not associating ourselves with the military forces. We have to go on serving people in these countries, and they're all likely to be significantly destabilized by this war.

À (1045)

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you very much.

[English]

I have one small question for our witnesses. What if Saddam Hussein decides, for his own survival, that he himself needs to destroy all the infrastructure, bridges, oil fields, the water system, anything like this? What do you think about that possibility?

Mr. John Watson: This is quite different from 1991. He knew there was an out in 1991. So unfortunately, I think there is the prospect of that type of activity. If they have any nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, there is a possibility that they will be deployed on the oil fields or some of the key opposition areas in Iraq, and we're not ready for that.

The Chair: I want to thank all our witnesses this morning. Thank you very much for coming to visit with us. It was very interesting for the study we're doing right now.

[Proceedings continue in camera]