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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
EVIDENCE
CONTENTS
Tuesday, February 18, 2003
| ¿ | 0905 |
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The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)) |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair (Director General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) |
| ¿ | 0910 |
| ¿ | 0915 |
| ¿ | 0920 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance) |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John McNee (Assistant Deputy Minister, Africa and Middle East, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Stockwell Day |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance) |
| ¿ | 0925 |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ) |
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Mr. John McNee |
| ¿ | 0930 |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Francine Lalonde |
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Mr. John McNee |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.) |
| ¿ | 0935 |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
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Mr. Art Eggleton |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
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Mr. Art Eggleton |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
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Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.) |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP) |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
| ¿ | 0940 |
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Ms. Alexa McDonough |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
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Ms. Alexa McDonough |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood —St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.) |
| ¿ | 0945 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John McNee |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John Harvard |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John McNee |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC) |
| ¿ | 0950 |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
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Mr. Bill Casey |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
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Mr. John McNee |
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Mr. Bill Casey |
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Mr. John McNee |
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Mr. Bill Casey |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John McNee |
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Mr. Bill Casey |
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Mr. John McNee |
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Mr. Bill Casey |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Bill Casey |
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Mr. John McNee |
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Mr. Bill Casey |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
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Mr. Bill Casey |
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Mr. John McNee |
| ¿ | 0955 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.) |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
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Mr. Murray Calder |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
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Mr. Murray Calder |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance) |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
| À | 1000 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John McNee |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Keith Martin |
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The Chair |
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Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.) |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John McNee |
| À | 1005 |
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Mrs. Karen Redman |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John McNee |
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The Chair |
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Mrs. Karen Redman |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Keith Martin |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John McNee |
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Mr. Keith Martin |
| À | 1010 |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John McNee |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Keith Martin |
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Mr. John McNee |
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The Chair |
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Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.) |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John McNee |
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Mr. André Harvey |
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Mr. John McNee |
| À | 1015 |
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Mr. André Harvey |
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Mr. John McNee |
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Mr. André Harvey |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ) |
| À | 1020 |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Art Eggleton |
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Mr. Stéphane Bergeron |
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The Chair |
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Mr. John McNee |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Bill Casey |
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The Chair |
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Mr. Bill Casey |
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The Chair |
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Ms. Jill Sinclair |
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Mr. Bill Casey |
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Mr. John McNee |
| À | 1025 |
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The Chair |
CANADA
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade |
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EVIDENCE
Tuesday, February 18, 2003
[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
¿ 
(0905)
[Translation]
The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): I call the meeting to order. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we shall begin our consideration of the situation in Irak. To provide us with the department's analysis of the latest report of the United Nations' inspectors, Mr. Blix and Mr. El Baradei, we have with us this morning from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Mr. John McNee,
[English]
who is the assistant deputy minister for Africa and the Middle East, and Ms. Jill E. Sinclair, director general of the International Security Bureau. I understand, Madame Sinclair, you have a statement. S'il vous plaît, the floor is yours.
Ms. Jill Sinclair (Director General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Translation]
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have a short presentation to begin with today, it is fairly detailed. If I may, I will read to you a statement about the presentations made by Mr. Blix and Mr. El Baradei last week.
I'll try to speak slowly. We are of course here to answer your questions as well.
[English]
Canada's long-standing concerns about the Iraqi government's intention to conceal or reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction program is based in large part on the very detailed reports from inspectors that we had up until the time they withdrew from Iraq in 1998 and the UNMOVIC and IAEA reports that we have received from Drs. Blitz and El Baradei this year—the reports they gave to the council.
In short, just to give you a sense, we assess the information provided by Drs. Blix and El Baradei to be factual and correct, and indeed our own available intelligence material corroborates the information provided by inspectors.
Before getting to the details of the reports by Drs. Blix and El Baradei, I'll just recall a few basic background facts. The key elements of Resolution 1441, which as you know is the guiding document for all the work the inspectors are undertaking.... This is a resolution about disarming Iraq, in which the Security Council decided to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by Resolution 687 of 1991 and subsequent resolutions of the council.
It's worth noting that until UNMOVIC and the IAEA report to the council that Iraq has complied with its disarmament obligations, or until the council decides itself to adopt a subsequent resolution addressing the issue, it's Resolution 1441 that guides the work of inspectors.
Inspectors have three missions. One is to confirm the status of sites that were under regular inspection up to 1998, a process that is termed “re-baselining”. This is just making sure you have the right basic information. This process should be completed by March for UNMOVIC, while the IAEA has finished this part and is moving to the investigative phase of its inspections.
Another issue is to deal with unresolved disarmament issues, that is, investigations that were either ongoing or planned in 1998 but were not resolved prior to the withdrawal of UNSCOM. Inspectors are also launching new investigations based on information and intelligence acquired since 1998.
Now returning to the presentations that were given last week by Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei, in short, Mr. Chairman, they said there was some progress but there were significant issues to be resolved and significant questions yet to be answered. As Dr. Blix noted, the inspectors have conducted more than 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites since their arrival in November. The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq at industrial sites, ammunition depots, research centres, universities, presidential sites, mobile laboratories, private houses, missile production facilities, military camps, and agricultural sites. Chemical and biological samples have been collected. The staff of the inspectors now exceeds 250 from 60 different countries.
Dr. Blix indicated in his statement on February 14 that there has been progress since his last report on January 27. But he indicated that immediate, active, and unconditional cooperation by Iraq with inspectors was still not forthcoming. This was a view Dr. El Baradei also supported in his separate report, which focused on nuclear-related activities.
Dr. Blix also reported on new and worrying discoveries, such as long-range missiles that should have been destroyed. These discoveries indicate that Iraq has not been in full compliance with UN Security Council resolutions.
I'd like to provide the committee with an initial assessment of the inspectors' January and February reports and our analysis of some of the key issues, which I hope will guide you in the questions you might like to ask us.
With regard to outstanding questions on which Iraq must provide evidence to weapons inspectors, there are several categories of unanswered questions and information still required. On nuclear weapons, Dr. El Baradei reported that the IAEA has found to date no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq. Nevertheless, and despite provision of some additional information and a modest improvement in cooperation by Iraq in recent days, there remain a number of unanswered questions and unresolved issues. For example, there's the issue of high-strength aluminum tubes that Iraq had attempted to procure. They could be used for manufacturing centrifuges as part of a nuclear weapons program. There's the question of high explosives that had been relocated or may have been used; it's very difficult to verify what happened to these high explosives. There are reports of Iraqi attempts to import uranium from an African country and also efforts to procure high-strength carbon fibre and a facility to produce magnets, which may have been for the purpose of uranium enrichment.
There are lots of unanswered questions.
¿ (0910)
Dr. El Baradei concluded his report by noting that prompt, full, and active cooperation by Iraq would speed up the inspection process and enable the IAEA to reach a high degree of assurance that would be required by the Security Council. In our view, this final point indicates that the IAEA is still not fully satisfied by the level of Baghdad's cooperation.
Our own analysis of the IAEA reports supports Dr. El Baradei's conclusions. Resolving these unanswered questions is crucial. Our main concern centres on the unwillingness of Iraq to produce documentation or to make available personnel on the IAEA's list who need to be interviewed so that we can remove any outstanding doubts with regard to Iraq and nuclear weapons programs.
The next item is on proscribed missiles. Post-1998, there was a need for satisfactory resolution on questions of why no remnants of 50 conventional warheads declared as unilaterally destroyed by Iraq were recovered. We need accounting for proscribed propellants, which they also claim to have unilaterally destroyed. We need accounting for the unilateral destruction of seven indigenously produced missiles, and we need accounting for the unilateral destruction of combustion chambers and assemblies that could be used to produce missiles.
In our view, Dr. Blix's reports are accurate and also of some concern. We agree with the inspectors' conclusion that the Al-Samoud 2 missiles are part of a development program that is clearly proscribed by the council. Iraq must fully comply by destroying components and fully dismantling this missile program.
Inspectors also investigated declared casting chambers that were destroyed by UNSCOM but reconstituted by Iraq. We agree that these chambers could be used to build engines for missiles with a range over 150 kilometres. Any missiles over a range of 150 kilometres are proscribed. How Iraq responds to these assessments will be a clear test of its willingness to fully cooperate and comply with its disarmament obligations.
On the question of chemical weapons, when inspectors left in 1998 they were unable to account for 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas declared by Iraq to have been lost shortly after the Gulf War. They were unable to account for approximately 30,000 unfilled munitions, one and a half tonnes of the chemical agent VX and 242 tonnes of key precursors that could be used for the production of VX.
In his February 14 presentation, Dr. Blix noted that these questions still remained unresolved and that new documents provided by Iraq suggested some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agents are still unaccounted for.
We agree with Dr. Blix's report that the information provided by Iraq to date on VX and anthrax is insufficient to confirm unilateral destruction. In our view, there are serious implications when we know that even a drop of some agents such as anthrax can kill.
Iraq has volunteered the names of 83 personnel that it claims have been involved in its undocumented destruction of this material, and it has established two new commissions to search for any possible remaining munitions and related documents. We await with interest the progress that will be made by these commissions.
On biological weapons, on January 27, Dr. Blix indicated the need for evidence and documentation regarding an Iraqi claim that it had unilaterally destroyed 8,500 litres of anthrax and 650 kilos of bacterial growth media that Iraq had declared in 1999, but not again in its 2002 report, that it had imported.
In our view, due to the nature of biological weapons--the ability to produce and store relatively small but lethal quantities and to avoid detection--we have serious concerns regarding Iraq's compliance with its disarmament obligations in this regard. While Iraq has now suggested putting together a list of Iraqi personnel who took part in unilateral destruction of their biological weapons programs, we believe much work remains to be done to provide assurances to the international community, the Security Council, that Iraq is not concealing an ongoing program.
With regard to the conduct by weapons inspectors of private interviews with Iraqi scientists, Dr. Blix's February 14 report noted that previous interviews had proved informative, but that no further interviews have since been accepted on inspectors' terms, though I notice there are perhaps some developments today in that regard. He had hoped this would change. While the IAEA is now conducting private interviews, the interviewees continue to insist on taping the interviews for their own protection from Iraqi authorities. This procedure is unacceptable, in terms of being able to secure freely the information required by inspectors. It's becoming clear that interviews outside of Iraq may be the only way to ensure that scientists and other personnel will be able to provide the necessary information to inspectors.
¿ (0915)
With regard to the acceptance by Iraq of overflights of surveillance aircraft, Iraq's ambassador to the UN indicated that Iraq would now accept use by UNMOVIC and the IAEA of surveillance aircraft, such as the U-2, or the Mirages offered by France. However, President Hussein immediately called for a halt to U.S. activities in the no-fly zones. In our view, this is an unacceptable condition placed by Iraq on such flights. In the past, the surveillance aircraft overflights have proven to be very valuable to the work of the inspectors. During UNSCOM's time, surveillance and imaging flights provided valuable information to inspectors and also deterred Iraq from pursuing illegal programs.
As for the enactment of national penal laws to secure the enforcement of Iraq's obligations to disarm and not to reacquire weapons of mass destruction or proscribed missiles, all UN Security Council resolutions relating to the disarmament of Iraq have called on Iraq to enact national legislation that would enforce its obligations under these resolutions. On Friday, Dr. Blix reported to the council that Saddam Hussein had issued a presidential decree that morning banning the import and production of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. In our view, the decree is a rather overdue first step. The behaviour of the Iraqi regime to the present provides little assurance so far that Iraq is prepared to implement fully these new laws, but we do welcome the announcement of the decree.
Mr. Chairman, before concluding, I have just one last point, which relates to the question of countries in the past who have shown their bona fides in complying with disarmament obligations. I would just cite an example that Dr. Blix himself used. He talked about the experience of South Africa, whose apartheid past, combined with its nuclear weapons and missiles program, was no secret. When the South African government decided in 1990 to get out of the nuclear weapons business, it did so with clear determination and complete transparency. It invited in international inspectors to witness the disarmament of its program, and it signed the NNPT.
Again, as Dr. Blix said on February 14, the period of disarmament for Iraq could be short if Iraq were willing to be forthcoming. As Canada has made clear from the outset, we support the process for inspection and disarmament set out in 1441.
Mr. Chairman, you also asked us to give you a bit of insight into what happened on NATO. I'm happy to report that over the weekend the allies came to an agreement on contingency planning for the defence of Turkey. Over the past few weeks NATO has gone through a difficult time as it struggled to come to consensus on this issue. We've now agreed to begin contingency planning through the use of NATO AWACS aircraft, theatre missile defence, and chemical and biological protection in Turkey. The NATO decision is very clear; it in no way prejudges the outcome of the Security Council process nor the involvement of NATO in any potential future action. What it does is to ensure that the NATO alliance will act in support of an ally.
Merci beaucoup, monsieur le président.
¿ (0920)
[Translation]
The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Sinclair.
[English]
Now we're going to go to questions and answers. It's for five minutes at a time.
Mr. Day, please.
Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance): In light of everything that's happened, and this very fair and factual presentation, we're still trying to determine what in the eyes of the government is going to constitute a breach of 1441. Presented faithfully here has been a painful but accurate litany of non-compliance of the most serious nature.
There are still questions about the nuclear program, about the missing missiles and their propellants, the thousands of tonnes of chemical compositions unaccounted for, the chambers destroyed by the inspectors but rebuilt by Iraq, the fact that witnesses cannot testify to the inspectors in private, and the fact that we hear on one day that reconnaissance is going to be permitted and then Saddam Hussein saying it will not be permitted over the no-fly zones. If these indeed are not seen as breaches to date, can the committee at least agree to put the question to the government, what in the government's mind is going to constitute a breach of 1441? Just tell us what constitutes a breach. Then we can discuss what needs to be done. What constitutes a breach?
The Chair: I'm just going to ask the witnesses if they wish to answer, because you mentioned the mind of the government.
Mr. McNee.
Mr. John McNee (Assistant Deputy Minister, Africa and Middle East, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Mr. Chair, I have a very short answer to make in two parts. Resolution 1441 begins by saying that it finds Iraq in material breach at the point of time when the resolution was passed. Then it sets out a process for a final opportunity or chance for Iraqi compliance. Then the judgment reverts to the Security Council as to whether or not Iraq has complied.
So it's really a decision of the council, not of the government.
The Chair: Mr. Day.
Mr. Stockwell Day: Deepak also has a question, but I would just put out for further consideration the point that I feel this committee must ask that question of the minister. Obviously, it's not fair to ask it of the people who are here.
The Chair: Mr. Obhrai.
Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, Canadian Alliance): Thank you.
When I listened to your presentation on Mr. Blix and everything, there are two parts coming out. One is that it is quite clear that Saddam Hussein is not cooperating. He only does it when the stick or sword is at his neck, and then he will only move slightly, and then he seems to stop. So based on all of these things, the intention of this resolution was to disarm Saddam.
Now, my question asks for analysis from you. If there is no regime change in Iraq, meaning any method of regime change, whether it be Saddam going into exile, or anything, what assurances do we have that Saddam Hussein, if he remains in power, will subsequently not flout the resolution and that we will not be back to square one? What is your analysis of this situation?
¿ (0925)
The Chair: Ms. Sinclair.
Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you very much.
The provisions of all of the Security Council resolutions, going back to 1991, provide not simply for inspections to look at the disarmament task, but also what's called ongoing monitoring and verification. This is the response to the second part of your question.
The first task of the inspectors is to ensure disarmament, but then there are provisions through Security Council decisions to have basically 24/7 monitoring, or permanent ongoing monitoring and verification of sensitive sites. This would include cameras, spot inspections, and all sorts of provisions by the IAEA and Dr. Blix's inspectors to ensure there is no procurement and no restarting up of any prohibited weapons activity.
[Translation]
The Chair: Ms. Lalonde, please.
Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to make a few short remarks before I ask my question. You talked about Irak's refusal to allow over-flights by surveillance aircraft but there has already been one such flight. I think that this will have to be brought up to date. Everyone has stressed that this first flight has already taken place and why it was necessary.
As for the prescribed missiles, it would have been useful to note that the prohibition applies to a range over 150 kilometres but judging from what I saw, the missiles we are talking about may have a range of 188 kilometres. I think that this should be underlined because we are not talking about missiles that have a range of 2,500 kilometres, but something slightly in excess of what is authorized.
Do you not think, I was going to say like most of the commentators noted on Friday, that Mr. Blix's report demonstrates a greater degree of satisfaction with the cooperation shown by Irak, while stating that it is still not satisfactory and insisting on a certain number of points? At the same time, Mr. Blix corrected in no uncertain terms information given by the American Secretary of State Mr. Powell and clearly stated that in his view, it was necessary to continue and intensify the present inspections and bring pressure to bear on Irak.
I'm putting this question to you because it seems to me that you are only highlighting the negative elements of the report. Is the purpose of your analysis to note that you do not agree with Mr. Blix's report or do you think that this is a good report and that it will enable us to achieve what everyone is looking for, I hope, namely the peaceful disarmament of Irak?
Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chairman, I would say first of all, as Mr. Graham noted, that there were signs of progress observed by Mr. Blix in his presentation last Friday but he also indicated that we may be seeing the kind of cooperation from Irak that we should have obtained 11 or 12 years ago.
As for the analysis of the presentation by Secretary of State Powell, he did make comments on one aspect, one fact, but I would say that generally speaking, we do agree with the analysis of the two chief inspectors. We draw to the attention of the committee Mr. Blix's conclusion in which he expresses his continued support for the inspection process provided there is true cooperation from Irak.
¿ (0930)
The Chair: Ms. Lalonde.
Ms. Francine Lalonde: And that is his job because he has to keep on putting pressure. I'd like to take advantage of your presence here to ask you whether you do not realize the importance of the demonstrations that took place this weekend throughout the world, including Montreal, where there were 150,000 of us. That is a very large group of people. With the exception of the demonstrations after the rejection of the Meech Lake Accord, I've never seen such big crowds in Montreal.
Do you not realize that people feel that there is a disproportion between our criticisms and expectations of Irak and the threat of war against this country, this Pentagon announcement that 3,000 bombs would be dropped 48 hours before sending troops to Baghdad?
Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chairman, we do not consider that war is inevitable in the circumstances and the work being done by the Government of Canada is aimed at coming up with a peaceful solution to the situation. I'd also like to note, as was done by the European heads of State yesterday and was also noted by Mr. Blix, that the pressure on Irak, including the presence of military forces in the region, has been a very important element in persuading the Iraki regime to change its behaviour. So I think that these factors must be taken into consideration. In the final analysis, the Security Council is responsible for deciding what is to be done about the situation. Of course, governments are attentive to what their people say and do.
[English]
The Chair: Merci beaucoup, monsieur McNee.
Just before we go to Mr. Eggleton, I want to ask Ms. Sinclair a question.
In the new Iraq declaration yesterday, they said inspections could not continue indefinitely in the absence of full Iraqi cooperation. I just want to know if we have another meeting scheduled in the Security Council for a report from Mr. Blix and Mr. El Baradei.
Ms. Jill Sinclair: Mr. Chairman, quarterly reports are envisaged in the Security Council, so the next one is at the beginning of March.
The Chair: Mr. Eggleton.
Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.): I'm sorry Mr. Day isn't here, because I just want to say as a preamble to my question that I don't think whether Saddam Hussein is in breach is the issue here at all. Of course, he's in breach; he's been in breach for years. He has breached all sorts of Security Council resolutions. Yes, he's in material breach.
The question is, can he and Iraq be brought into compliance short of going to war? Since we all agree that war is the last resort, I think we need to give the inspectors every opportunity to be able to do their job, as long as they're progressing. Mr. Blix said last Friday that they're progressing. He gave a mixed report, saying they were doing this and not doing that, etc. But he said there has been some progress. As long as there's progress, I think war continues to be a last resort. Whether we ever end up there, I don't know, but I think we've got to give them every opportunity to not end up in war.
I want to ask the presenters about the question of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein says they don't have any in Iraq and others insist they do have them. Nobody has found the so-called smoking guns; nobody has produced anything of any substance in that regard. Yet we don't seem to get the information from Iraq as to how they disposed of them. That's the point Mr. Blix is making—“Tell us what you did with them”.
Is there any information on the quantities unaccounted for? Do we know if there are very substantive quantities they haven't accounted for? When they're confronted with that question, what has their reaction been to it so far?
The other question I have is about these missiles, which Madame Lalonde asked about already. I take it that the issue is not that they can't have missiles but a question that they can't have missiles of a certain distance. Do I understand correctly that the missiles they do have, which have been found to be in non-compliance, have something like a 10% greater distance than allowed? What does all of this mean in terms of the reach of the missiles they actually have versus the reach of the missiles they're allowed to have?
¿ (0935)
The Chair: Ms. Sinclair.
Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you very much, Mr. Eggleton.
With regard to the quantities, there's a lot of precision in the earlier reports by Mr. Blix and Mr. El Baradei. For example, there are tonnes of chemical agents missing—1.5 tonnes of VX; 242 tonnes of precursors, which could be used to produce VX; and there are also 650 kilos of bacterial growth medium, which you need to produce biological weapons.
Iraq has said they've unilaterally destroyed this, but the inspectors have found that they haven't had sufficient documentation, and they haven't been able to find through sampling the proof that these things have been destroyed. And because the interview process has not been as fully open as they would like, they've not been able to get this directly from the people who have been involved in the programs—though the Iraqis have now said they will offer up some of these people for interviews.
Mr. Art Eggleton: They're all afraid.
Ms. Jill Sinclair: That might be a suggestion.
So there is a lot of specificity with regard to what are called the still unresolved disarmament tasks.
With regard to the missiles, I should thank Madame Lalonde for bringing precision to this. The Iraqis are permitted to have missiles up to a range of 150 kilometres but not beyond that. The missiles that have been found have a range of 180 kilometres. Of course, depending on the payload that you put on a missile or the weight it is carrying, you can actually increase the range of a missile, which gives you a sense that they are—
Mr. Art Eggleton: But even with that range, I take it that it could reach a country like Israel, could it?
Ms. Jill Sinclair: It would be able to reach some of its neighbours, for sure, depending on where it was placed within the country. So it presents a regional threat.
Ms. Aileen Carroll (Barrie—Simcoe—Bradford, Lib.): Who came up with 150 kilometres as okay?
A voice: Everybody who lives outside that range.
The Chair: We'll go to Ms. McDonough.
Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to pursue two brief subjects. Those who would advocate “Let's just get on with it and launch a war” or “Let's justify a regime change” make the argument that the inspection process is not rigorous enough, not robust enough, and even if it were for now, we know this bad cat is going to resort to the old ways and the destructive ways.
I think we received some very convincing and compelling evidence before this committee before Christmas from a group who had come together to really look at alternatives to war. One of the things they stressed very strongly was exactly what you, Ms. Sinclair, have referred to, and that is needing to make that verification process ongoing, more permanent, more robust, and so on.
My question is, at this point, what contribution has Canada made, or is in the process of making, to step up that inspection process?
There were proposals put forward from Germany and France advocating the need for that. Specific offers were made by them, and I'm wondering if you could tell us a little bit about Canada's contribution to that more rigorous, more robust inspection process.
The Chair: Ms. Sinclair.
Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you very much, Ms. McDonough.
With regard to the inspection process, Canada has been offering its full support to the work of UNMOVIC. A year or so ago we offered a training program for UNMOVIC inspectors. In the hopes that the inspection process would get started up again, we had inspectors in Canada for a five-week training course.
We have a very distinguished Canadian who is on the UNMOVIC college of commissioners, who helps and advises Drs. Blix and El Baradei. We have two Canadians who are working in UNMOVIC headquarters in New York. We have several Canadian experts who are part of the UNMOVIC rosters, and there's a Canadian who's running the field office in Iraq, in Mosul.
We've been offering that sort of support to the inspectors to date. The minister has also written to and spoken with, on several occasions, both Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei, saying, let us know if you need anything more from us. Dr. Blix has said, with regard to some of the other proposals that are out there, that at the moment, with full Iraqi cooperation, they actually have the staff they need. They're standing up their operations in the field. They're getting their helicopters on line. They're starting to get the ability to do some overflights. So at the moment he basically has what he needs, but Canada has said, “Let us know if you need anything else from us, because we do have expertise that we would be pleased to offer you”.
¿ (0940)
Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you very much. I think it's extremely helpful for us to have an understanding of that. I guess the one thing I would say is that I think the more voices from Foreign Affairs and our own minister can be heard building confidence in this process, the more important it can be to offset the continual propaganda and undermining of the weapons inspection process.
My second question is around this matter to which you also made reference, the problem of getting totally confidential and transparent access to the scientists for evidence. It concerns me a lot to hear suggestions that it may become necessary to depend, I'm not sure if you said “totally” or “mostly”, on evidence that might be given by scientists who have in fact been defectors or who are outside of Iraq. I wonder if you might speak a little more about that. There are often very alarming stories about how some of that evidence is offered up or extracted from scientists who have actually defected rather than being in Iraq and at close range.
I would like to have a better understanding of what the possibilities are for dealing with the reality that some of those scientists may be on the receiving end of severe retaliatory measures--pretty extreme if they in fact come clean totally--but at the same time their evidence is very important. So is it not possible to have some protection for them in the way of transcripts, or whatever is in fact a necessary part of the process, and we shouldn't totally discount the value of the evidence they're in a position to give?
The Chair: Ms. Sinclair.
Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you very much. I didn't mean to mislead when I talked about--
Ms. Alexa McDonough: I may have misinterpreted it.
Ms. Jill Sinclair: I'm sure not.
The information that comes from human sources is considered to be among the most useful. Obviously that needs to be offered up freely and willingly.
Resolution 1441 has a pretty detailed paragraph in it precisely about this issue, because people realize that if Iraq said they destroyed stuff, maybe they cleaned the sites. Maybe the only way to find out if they really did is by being able to speak with a number of people who were involved in the process. In order to do that, people have to be able to speak freely.
Clearly, the Iraqi regime is not one that fosters any sense of freedom for its citizens. That's why Resolution 1441 was very clear about this obligation on Iraq to offer up people, to enable the inspectors to be able to speak with them freely, and to not have minders about. The onus is really on the Government of Iraq to say, “Look, we have nothing to hide. Please feel free to speak freely to the inspectors.” That's what Resolution 1441 talks about.
There's also a provision in Resolution 1441 that recognizes the point you've made that some of these people and their families may feel very vulnerable. So there is a provision to take people out of the country and even perhaps relocate them. This has been done in the past. Clearly the best thing would be for Iraq to say, “Please speak freely to the inspectors, as Resolution 1441 has said. You won't suffer any reprisals. We want you to offer full information to them.”
The information that comes from individuals is extremely valuable. The work of UNSCOM showed that some of their best information came from speaking to the scientists and the people who had worked on the programs.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Harvard, please.
Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood —St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to ask either of the witnesses a couple of questions about this situation and what we have to do about looking at the Iraqi issue in the context of international law.
As I understand it, Ms. Sinclair, only the Security Council can decide whether Iraq remains in non-compliance. Insofar as international law is concerned, it really matters little what the United States, Britain, or Canada thinks. It's the Security Council that has the sole responsibility for deciding whether Iraq is in non-compliance. I also assume that the Security Council has the sole responsibility to decide what consequences, if any, there will be in the event of continuing non-compliance.
My question then is this. What does the international law say about exhausting all remedies to avert war before a decision is taken on military action?
¿ (0945)
The Chair: Mr. McNee.
Mr. John McNee: We don't have our legal adviser with us today, so I'm sorry, we can't really give a legal opinion.
One point to make is that the Security Council has the responsibility for maintaining international peace and security under chapter 7 of the UN charter. The series of key resolutions dealing with the Iraq problem, up to and including Resolution 1441, were adopted by the council pursuant to chapter 7. So they are the resolutions that are of binding force and can authorize serious consequences--the language of Resolution 1441--and all necessary means, in other words, the use of force if necessary.
I'll have to take your question about exhausting all other remedies under advisement. I'm not sure that's necessarily part of the portrait of the charter and chapter 7 because they're in response to grave threats to peace and security. If this council deems there are grave threats, the council has a responsibility to act.
The Chair: Mr. Harvard.
Mr. John Harvard: I think our colleague, Irwin Cotler, has referred to one of the legal principles being the exhausting of all remedies. I know he made reference to it in one of his remarks in the House of Commons. I'd like to know more about that. Next time I see Irwin, I'll ask him.
I assume that if war doesn't break out in the next few days or so there will be another report from Mr. Blix in March. The last two have been somewhat encouraging in that there has been some cooperation. They have some evidence, but it's not enough to answer all the questions, because there is a litany of questions, be they on biological weapons, chemical weapons, or nuclear weapons.
Is there any reason to believe that the next report in March, if there is one, will be more definitive? Will we be left with still more nagging questions, and will it come down to whether Mr. Hussein can really be believed? Will the ultimate consideration be a pre-emptive strike based on what the man has done over the last 10 to 20 years?
The Chair: Mr. McNee.
Mr. John McNee:
Mr. Chair, in response to Mr. Harvard's observation, I'd note what the Secretary General of the United Nations said yesterday when asked about the inspection regime and Dr. Blix. He said, and I quote:
| There is not a fixed deadline in the resolution but at some stage the Council may decide that we are wasting our time and we should call a halt to the inspections - but at the moment they do continue. |
So I think that's really where things are right now, that Dr. Blix and the inspectors continue day by day expanding their work. They do have, within the parameters of Resolution 1441, the responsibility to report back to the council if they find that cooperation has broken down or to report a major problem outside of the scheduled reports they might make.
The Chair: Thank you.
To respond to Mr. Harvard, I want to let him know that for next week we're looking at the possibility of having a legal expert on Iraq international law in front of our committee.
Now, Mr. Casey.
Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC): I understand there's an effort now in the United Nations to draft a second proposal, or a second resolution, to follow up on Resolution 1441. Is Canada involved in that? Do we have any input? Do we have an opinion on what that resolution should say?
¿ (0950)
Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thanks, Mr. Casey.
First of all, Canada is not a member of the Security Council, as you know, and many of these efforts are kept very closely held by those who are drafting texts.
In our view, Resolution 1441 presents a process, it presents a framework within which the inspection process can proceed, and it represents a very clear set of obligations and decision-making moments for the Security Council. So we're not involved in any drafting at the moment, and Resolution 1441, in our view, presents a pretty clear way forward at the moment.
Mr. Bill Casey: Aren't the new resolutions being debated in the General Assembly today? We could have an opinion there. Do we not have an opinion?
Ms. Jill Sinclair: There's an open session of the Security Council, Mr. Casey, in New York today and tomorrow. In fact, Canada is inscribed as a speaker and will speak tomorrow I think on the broad issue of the reports provided by Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei.
I'm not aware, though John may be--I don't think formal debate of resolutions would happen at that time.
Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chair, to add a point of precision, this would be the opportunity for other countries to comment on the reports of Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei from Friday. Friday was the occasion for the members of the council, so it opens up to broader debate. But, no, to our knowledge, they haven't got to that stage yet. It may be a matter of days before a second resolution would be forthcoming, if indeed that's going to happen.
Mr. Bill Casey: But we have no input on it in the next resolution?
Mr. John McNee: We haven't been a part of that. The minister has made clear that the modalities of dealing with it are up to the members of the council itself.
Mr. Bill Casey: I have heard several different estimates of civilian casualties in the event of war. They range, if I remember correctly, from 5,000 to 500,000 civilian casualties, counting famine and everything, and other health issues that might result.
Do we have an estimate of civilian casualties if there is a war?
The Chair: Mr. McNee.
Mr. John McNee: I think the short answer, Mr. Chairman, is no. I think it's almost impossible to predict, the range is so wide. One just doesn't know what the course of the conflict might be, and what the damage might be is beyond us.
Mr. Bill Casey: Does anybody have an estimate?
Mr. John McNee: I think, Mr. Chairman, there are estimates of the numbers of people who might be displaced by a conflict, but as to the actual numbers, I don't think anyone has an estimate that would really be solid. How can you know?
Mr. Bill Casey: I'm not asking to know; I'm just wondering what the estimate is.
The Chair: You can estimate it as good as anybody else.
Mr. Bill Casey: I hope not.
I think we should have an estimate. There's going to be a price to pay in the event of a war. We should have an idea of what it is. Could you see if there is an estimate or if the Americans have an estimate or anything for us?
Mr. John McNee: We'd be delighted to see what's out there.
Mr. Bill Casey: That's all I'm asking.
Mr. Blix, although there are problems, obviously feels that we are making progress. Do you see any reason to ask him to cease, or do you think he should continue?
Ms. Jill Sinclair: Mr. Casey, it's not for us to ask him to cease or continue. His mandate comes from the Security Council. He said he's making progress. There are some unanswered questions and some concerns out there still. It's up to the Security Council to determine.
Mr. Bill Casey: So we don't have an opinion on the resolution, we don't have an estimate of the casualities, and we don't have an opinion on whether we should support the weapons resolutions or not or the inspectors or not.
Mr. John McNee: I think that's a little unfair.
The Chair: It's very easy, Mr. Casey.
Mr. John McNee: Just to go back, the Prime Minister has said that a second resolution would be preferable, but it was up to the Security Council to decide.
On the estimate of civilian casualties, we will do some research on that, but I really think in my heart of hearts that it all depends on what its nature is; that will be the answer. If there were some surgical way, if it comes to war, to do this, it could be very light or it could be very messy. One doesn't know.
On the business of the next steps and what resolution might come forward in the council, as my colleague Jill said, we've been very supportive of the framework set out in Resolution 1441, and we have emphasized the important principles of trying to work for unity within the council and the international community. We've seen a step in that direction with the statement of the European Union leaders yesterday encouraging the Security Council to face its responsibilities, but without proposing specific wording for a resolution, or a statement, or whatever modalities the members of the council may come up with.
¿ (0955)
The Chair: Mr. Calder.
Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.): Thank you very much Mr. Chair.
One thing I have watched with a lot of interest is that, resolutions or not, the United States is still moving more equipment down to the Middle East.
The question is, how much equipment do they feel they have to have down there if in fact they are going to launch an attack? If you go by the standard of Desert Storm in 1991, given the military might of Iraq at that point in time, they probably need about six aircraft carriers and about 250,000 men on the ground.
I know right now that the USS Constellation and the USS Abraham Lincoln are heading down there. The question is, would they have that strike capacity in place by the end of this month?
The Chair: You should ask this of our counterparts in the United States. I'm not sure if we can answer this. You can try, but I'm not sure--
Ms. Jill Sinclair: I'm afraid, Mr. Calder, that I was going to say I think you need to ask that of the United States, ask them what they consider they need in terms of military capability in the region in order to launch an attack.
Mr. Murray Calder: Is this something we're researching too? I see the resolution Mr. Casey was talking about. It seems to fit right into a whole scenario of events right now that all hinge around the March 1. I know full well that one thing the U.S. is going to be watching with a lot of interest is the Iraqi summer, because if in fact they are going to do any ground activity, they have to do it before it gets too hot.
Ms. Jill Sinclair: Again, I think we're in the realm of speculative U.S. military planning. We can all readJane's Defence Weekly and other things that will tell us what they need and when, but sorry, I can't answer that question.
Mr. Murray Calder: Fair enough, that's fine for me.
The Chair: Mr. Martin.
Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Dr. Patry.
I have a deep concern over this rapid march to war that we have. My first question really deals with our number one interest and that of our neighbours down south, and that's our security. My fear is that a premature invasion into Iraq will actually make our security system worse by opening up a much larger pool of individuals for al-Qaeda to dip into and also cause a conflagration, not only in the Middle East but also within the expatriate Muslim communities in the west particularly.
So my question is, is containment, weapons monitors on the ground, plus U-2 surveillance planes on the top sufficient to contain the threat of the export of WMDs abroad or the use by Saddam Hussein?
My second question really deals with post-conflict reconstruction. As I understand it, half the population in Iraq are children under the age of 15. Beyond this leaked document from the U.S, is there any post-conflict reconstruction planning taking place with respect to governance issues, economic issues, and the larger implications of a conflagration on the whole Middle Eastern structure, whether it's the Kurds, Iran, Palestine, or Israel? Is there any plan in terms of post-conflict reconstruction? We haven't done a good job in Afghanistan, and our history is wanting in that area.
The Chair: Ms. Sinclair.
Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'll take the first question and then, John, perhaps you can take the second.
Dr. Martin, thanks very much. Your question was basically, is containment sufficient to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein?
The Security Council has determined that indeed they want disarmament--that's what Resolution 1441 is all about--and then ongoing monitoring, verification, to make sure the programs are not reconstituted. So if we can get there using the Security Council resolutions...I'm not sure how you would define that. I'm not sure that's containment. That's verified disarmament to the satisfaction of the international community. That's what's needed, I think, to ensure Iraq's neighbours and others that they are no longer a threat to international peace and security.
À (1000)
The Chair: Mr. McNee.
Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chair, on the second half of Dr. Martin's question about a possible conflict period of time, I stress again that we don't see war as inevitable. Our hope remains for a peaceful disarmament of Iraq.
At the same time, it's only prudent to think ahead on contingencies, and the United Nations system has been doing that and Canada has been participating in planning discussions. UNICEF, WHO, the World Food Programme, UNHCR, the whole range of institutions of the UN family have been analysing what the impact might be on the civilian population of Iraq in the first instance, and I think there's an expectation that Canada would continue to play a part in that process should it come to it.
On the broader question, the regional questions, the impact, the reconstruction of the country, the Americans themselves have been doing a lot of thinking about that. I think it's too early to really venture a very firm view on what the nature...or what shape might come....
As I say, we go back to our first premise. We hope the path set out in Resolution 1441 can work, short of coming to conflict.
The Chair: Mr. Martin.
Mr. Keith Martin: It would be fair to say that an assessment has been made on the possible impact, but there has been no plan of action in terms of post-conflict reconstruction and exit strategy and so on and so forth into that.
Is it possible that Iraq could have destroyed these chemical weapons without documenting this, given the type of environment Iraq has?
In the corridors of power in the White House, I wonder if a defanged Iraq is sufficient, because Saddam Hussein would still be there in the event of removing weapons of mass destruction. In your view, is that sufficient in terms of the White House's larger objectives for Iraq? As you defang Iraq but you still have Saddam Hussein there, your problem is still there. What do you do with it?
Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thanks, Dr. Martin.
I guess you have to ask the White House on that one.
Resolution 1441 was adopted unanimously by consensus of the Security Council, so we take that to be an expression of the views of all of the members of the Security Council. The issue is disarmament.
With regard to the possibility that Iraq destroyed CWs without documentation, I think it's entirely possible. I think that's why Dr. Blix has said that the inspectors need to be able to take samples. They need to be able to say to people, “Okay, if you didn't document this in the way that many of us would document it, you can find residual samples.”
You're a doctor. You know this stuff much better than I. If you can speak to people...there must have been a lot of people involved in the destruction process. Also, if this stuff was put underground, there are a lot of unanswered questions that could be answered if there was full cooperation.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mrs. Redman.
Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.
One thing that haunts me, and Mr. Casey was actually touching on it a little, is the plight of the Iraqi people. Dr. Martin just touched on the reconstruction.
Given that the sanctions internationally have been in place about 10 or 12 years, and it's devastated the Iraqi people, I'm wondering whether anybody has done any monitoring or whether there has been any international outreach that would allow the Iraqi people to look at other international initiatives, whether it's Resolution 1441 or the fact that the rest of the world is worried about security, and make them think, in any way, that the international community is actually worried about their welfare.
The Chair: Mr. McNee.
Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chair, I think the welfare of the Iraqi people has been a central concern of the Government of Canada since the outset of this crisis. The fact that Saddam Hussein has been willing to sacrifice the welfare of his people, the fact that it took him four years to accept the oil-for-food program offered by the Security Council, have led to this terrible misery for the people of Iraq.
Right now, the estimate is that some 60% of Iraqi households are dependent on the food distributions through the oil-for-food program for their basic needs. And that will be one of the challenges, should there be a conflict, to ensure that the means to meet those basic needs of the people are met rapidly. So that's very much on our mind.
The fundamental point is that the issue with Iraq is one of the government and of the regime and its unwillingness so far to disarm itself. There's no quarrel with the people of Iraq, and indeed their welfare is very much a concern of ours.
À (1005)
Mrs. Karen Redman: I appreciate that. I guess the nub of my question was, do we have any sense that the Iraqi people look at the international community as perhaps part of the solution? Do they recognize the fact that it's the regime that's oppressing them? As much as the spectre of war is terrifying for everybody, and it can't be any more so than for the Iraqis, do they recognize that the international community is concerned about them? Have we demonstrated that? Has that registered? Have we monitored that at all?
The Chair: Mr. McNee.
Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chair, it's fairly tough to know that in the closed, totalitarian, ruthlessly efficient police state of Iraq. It's fairly hard to sound public opinion, but I think the general analysis is that people would be delighted to be free of the oppression in which they've lived and of the misery of the two wars that this regime has brought the Kurdish citizens of Iraq in the north and the Shiites in the south. So it's our view that they would be very happy if this could be lifted from their shoulders.
The Chair: Thank you.
Do you have another question, Mrs. Redman?
Mrs. Karen Redman: No.
The Chair: Fine.
Mr. Martin.
Mr. Keith Martin: On the issue, again, of the invasion, my concern, as I said before, is with respect to al-Qaeda. Our prime security threat is al-Qaeda and the terrorist network, and an invasion of Iraq is actually going to make matters worse. What has the Department of Foreign Affairs done in terms of engaging with the Americans and our partners in dealing with the security threat from terrorism in the event of an invasion taking place? And what are we doing to defuse that situation, which is our number one security concern?
The Chair: Mr. McNee.
Mr. John McNee: Mr. Chair, I'm sorry, I didn't respond to Dr. Martin's earlier question.
I think this concern about the new threats to Canadian security since September 11 is one of several important factors that have encouraged the government to push for the greatest degree of international consensus on how to deal with the challenge of the regime in Iraq. The more unity there is around any action that might be taken, the more you lessen, we would argue, the threat to which you allude. That is why the minister has been so consistently arguing that it's vital that the international community come together in this regard.
The continuing presence of al-Qaeda, the recent bin Laden tapes, the specific threat in the tape before Christmas mentioning Canada, are of great concern. These are of ongoing concern to the government, and I think we've seen reinforced liaison among the police and security agencies with which Canada normally deals in the wake of the crisis.
Mr. Keith Martin: But specifically with the Americans, are we liaising with the Americans and saying, look, your security system is actually going to worsen by prematurely invading Iraq rather than finding sufficient proof to say to the international community, “We endured 9/11, and here's not soft proof but hard evidence that we have no choice but to go into Iraq at this point in time for our own security”? Are we liaising with the Americans in terms of trying to get them to express a little more restraint in their march toward an invasion of Iraq?
À (1010)
[Translation]
The Chair: Mr. McNee.
[English]
Mr. John McNee: I think the primary, consistent emphasis laid on this by the Prime Minister and the minister, going back to the summer, has been to encourage the Americans to seek, pursue, and continue with the path of the United Nations in dealing with the crisis. That's been our consistent message to them.
On an analytical level, we share analyses with them on threats to Canadian security and threats to American security, because of course these can easily overlap.
I think those are the two prime avenues of our dialogue with them.
The Chair: Ten seconds.
Mr. Keith Martin: I believe the American doctrine that Mr. Harvard referred to is that preemptive strikes can happen if, number one, there's an imminent threat, and two, all other efforts to defuse such a threat have been exhausted. I don't believe we're at that stage right now. That's the American doctrine.
Mr. John McNee: In that regard, as Mr. Graham said on Friday, there still is time, although it's not unlimited, for Iraq to comply and to find a way out of this dilemma.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Martin.
Before I give the floor to Mr. Harvey, I want to remind colleagues that next Thursday we will have the humanitarian question. There will be witnesses here from the NGOs, not from the department.
Monsieur Harvey.
[Translation]
Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm also pleased to thank our witnesses. Obviously it is easy for us to indulge in strongly anti-American declarations and to act as though we were not living in the real world but we must understand that if Western countries, particularly the Americans, are adopting a firm attitude, we should not be too hasty in our judgments. We should remember that Saddam Hussein, Mr. Chair, is not Jean-Paul II or Mother Teresa and that is important.
I'd like to ask our witnesses whether they think that the priority is to disarm Irak or to change the regime, this absolute dictatorship with its total control over the society through its different cells and informers. Under the empire of Saddam Hussein, Mr. Chairman, these people cannot live a normal life. In your view is the ultimate aim to bring about a change of regime in Irak?
[English]
The Chair: Mr. McNee.
Mr. John McNee: That's a good question, Mr. Chair, and it takes us back to the beginning of the problem.
[Translation]
Since the Gulf war, the Canadian government policy has always been disarmament, the removal of the threat of weapons of mass destruction. The Canadian government's policy has never been to attempt to change the system of government or the president in Irak.
Mr. André Harvey: But at the present time, is not the ultimate aim of the intervention of American and other forces to change the Iraki regime for the benefit of the people of Irak and the neighbouring countries? I think that the short-term objective is disarmament. But is disarmament not a first step toward a change of regime?
Mr. John McNee: As my colleague mentioned, the Security Council resolution says that disarmament is the purpose of all of this. Of course, successive American administrations have emphasized their desire to change the regime in that country but as far as we are concerned, the objective still remains disarmament and the same is true for the Security Council.
À (1015)
Mr. André Harvey: Have there been any statements from Canadian or Western political authorities to the effect that the ideal solution would be the departure of Saddam Hussein?
Mr. John McNee: I think that the Prime Minister and our minister indicated on a number of occasions that that would not be a bad thing. We would certainly not shed any tears if he were to leave. But that is one thing. The other thing is to understand what is the purpose of multilateral action in dealing with a threat to regional and international security.
Mr. André Harvey: I have one short last question, Mr. Chairman.
Without the deployment of American and British forces, that is almost 200,000 people in the vicinity of Irak, do you think that the United Nations inspectors would have been in a position to do a fairly efficient job?
The Chair: Ms. Sinclair.
Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Harvey, I think that the fact that we have a military presence in the region may have motivated the Irakis to concentrate their efforts on working with the inspectors but the inspectors did not require a military presence to carry out their work.
Mr. André Harvey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair: Mr. Bergeron.
Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have two questions, one of a political nature and another which is more humanitarian in scope.
First of all, I'm in full agreement with Mr. Harvey when he says that Saddam Hussein is not Mother Teresa or Jean-Paul II but this determination we have seen for some time, at the insistence of the Americans, to isolate and target Irak in particular as an international troublemaker is something that I personally find very disturbing since, when we look at the number of violations of UN resolutions, we note that Irak violated some 16 or 17 of them. In comparison, if we look at Israel, which is in violation of about 20, we may get the impression that there is a double standard in the attitude of the international community towards Irak as opposed to other violators like Israel. Irak is supposedly a threat to world peace and security because it has allegedly developed and stockpiled weapons of mass destruction but, on the other hand, there is North Korea which openly has such weapons of mass destruction, it violates international agreements and no earlier than this morning, it said that it was ready to withdraw from the Armistice Treaty concluded by the belligerents after the Korean war.
Is it not a greater threat at the present time to world peace and security than Irak, since the facts have been verified in the case of North Korea? In other words, do you not believe that the international community is now going along with the internal political game being played in the United States? That is my political question.
My humanitarian question is the following. According to Amir Khadir, a volunteer with Médecins du Monde, on his return from a mission in Irak, the infant mortality rate in Irak is allegedly 10 times higher than the average for countries that have also undergone a collapse in their ability to look after the safety and health of their children. That is the present state of affairs.
If a conflict does break out, it is expected that in the first day of an attack, the death toll would amount to between 60,000 and 90,000 people. There would be about 1.5 million refugees. In addition to the already very high rate of mortality, malnutrition would pose a threat to the lives of 30 per cent of the children as a result of such a conflict since the Iraki State, that now looks after the distribution of food sent by international aid, would no longer be able to distribute such supplies. In other words, we are talking about absolutely catastrophic humanitarian consequences. As recently as Friday, Kofi Annan indicated that the UN is in contact with donor countries in anticipation of a conflict.
My question is a very simple one: has Canada answered the UN appeal to provide assistance to the people of Irak who would suffer enormously from a conflict, particularly children?
À (1020)
The Chair: Ms. Sinclair.
Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll answer the first question and then John can answer the second.
[English]
You ask, Monsieur Bergeron, if the international community is not playing into the hands of domestic U.S. policy. I would answer, absolutely, certainly, not.
We are responding to the repeated real and actual violations of Iraq of its international commitments. We are looking at Iraq. This isn't a comparative game at all. You look at each case on its own merits, or lack thereof, as the case may be.
Iraq constituted a weapons of mass destruction program. It's been documented by the UNSCOM inspectors, who spent a lot of time trying to get rid of it. It used chemical weapons on its own people. It developed a nuclear weapons program. Iraq invaded its neighbours. It refused to have international inspectors come back in. Even now, being given this last opportunity, there are still indications of some progress but lots of unanswered questions.
So there's definitely a question here of dealing with Iraq based on the obligations it has taken itself. It signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol with regard to the non-use of chemical weapons, which it then violated. It signed a non-proliferation treaty, which it then violated. It signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which it then violated.
We are dealing with Iraq on its own merits, the merits of the case, and the concerns that are represented by Iraq as a threat to international peace and security as reiterated in numerous resolutions by the Security Council over more than a decade.
The Chair: Mr. McNee.
Mr. Art Eggleton: We should ask about North Korea. North Korea is a far bigger danger.
Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: That was my question. But we have to deal with each case on its own merits.
[Translation]
The Chair: Mr. Bergeron, perhaps we can let our witness answer.
Mr. John McNee: On the humanitarian question, we share the approach of Kofi Annan, that is we do not believe that war is inevitable but it is still prudent for us to engage in planning. At the invitation of the UN, we are taking part in consultations on this subject and Canada's response is under study. But as Ms. Whelan would have noted yesterday, we are active in this area and we are very conscious of the potential humanitarian crisis that the world must deal with if ever this situation were to come to pass.
[English]
The Chair: The last question goes to Mr. Casey.
Mr. Bill Casey: Thank you.
The Chair: No big preamble, please.
Mr. Bill Casey: No.
I just wondered, based on my last question about whether we are playing a role in drafting the second resolution, if Canada did have an opinion on what form that second resolution should take, if we did have a feeling and we wanted to play a role, how could we influence that? Even though we're not on the Security Council, is there a way we can have our voice and opinion heard? Can we express ourselves somehow?
The Chair: Ms. Sinclair.
[Translation]
Ms. Jill Sinclair: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[English]
John can add to what will probably be my inadequate answer.
Mr. Casey, obviously, even though we're not on the Security Council, of course we can always make our voice heard. We do it in numerous ways. We do it publicly through the statements of the Prime Minister, with the minister. John again can speak to the numerous conversations the minister and Prime Minister are undertaking with all of the key leaders at the moment as the members of the Security Council decide what to do next, so that Canada's voice and concerns and interests are being heard.
Then clearly there's the ongoing work we have with all of our colleagues around the world, when we say, look, these are the things that could be done, the areas where progress could be made.
So it isn't simply that you have to be on the Security Council to make your voice heard. Canada does have access and other ways to do it too.
John, you might want to--
Mr. Bill Casey: Are we doing this on the second resolution?
Mr. John McNee: I would just add, Mr. Chairman, that I think probably tomorrow our ambassador to the United Nations will be speaking in the open debate to present our position.
As I indicated earlier in response to Mr. Casey's questions, we have not attempted to draft a resolution ourselves. We thought it was more appropriate for the current members of the council to do and to consider. But as my colleague Jill has indicated, this doesn't mean we haven't been very active in trying to urge the maximum degree of consensus and unity in the council for dealing with the issue.
À (1025)
[Translation]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. NcNee. Thank you, Ms. Sinclair.
[English]
It's always a pleasure to have you in front of the committee. It's always very interesting and very instructive for us.
We're going to suspend for five minutes, and we'll be in camera after that for future business of our committee.
Merci.