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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, April 8, 2003

0910

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

Mr. Michael Hawes (Executive Director, Canada-United States Fulbright Program)

0915

0920

0925

The Chair

Ms. Annette Hester (Director, Latin American Research Centre, University of Calgary)

0930

0935

0940

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Michael Hawes

0945

Mr. Stockwell Day

Mr. Michael Hawes

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.))

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ)

Mr. Michael Hawes

Ms. Francine Lalonde

0950

Mr. Michael Hawes

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Ms. Annette Hester

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Ms. Annette Hester

0955

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.)

Ms. Annette Hester

1000

Mr. Michael Hawes

1005

Ms. Annette Hester

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Michael Hawes

1010

Ms. Annette Hester

Mr. Michael Hawes

Ms. Annette Hester

Mr. Michael Hawes

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.)

1015

Ms. Annette Hester

Mr. Michael Hawes

Ms. Annette Hester

1020

Mrs. Karen Redman

Mr. Michael Hawes

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ)

1025

Mr. Michael Hawes

Ms. Annette Hester

1030

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron

The Chair

Mr. Michael Hawes

1035

Ms. Annette Hester

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North, Lib.)

Ms. Annette Hester

1040

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

Ms. Annette Hester

Mr. Michael Hawes

1045

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

Mr. Michael Hawes

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NUMBER 029

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, April 8, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0910)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): We're going to start the order of the day, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), consideration of a dialogue on foreign policy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

As a witness this morning we have with us Michael Hawes,who is the executive director of the Canada-United States Fulbright Program. Mr. Hawes has been a professor of international political economy and international relations in the Department of Political Studies at Queen's University since 1985. During the 1999-2000 academic year he was the William Fulbright Distinguished Professor of International and Area Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, and he was the John A. Sproul Senior Research Fellow in the Canadian Studies Program. Also, from the University of Calgary, we have Madam Annette Hester, who is the director of the Latin American Research Centre. She has also participated in round table discussions on hemispheric integration and trade negotiations.

Welcome, both of you. As you're aware, we have about ten minutes of presentation time for each of you, and after that we'll have a question and answer period.

Mr. Hawes.

Mr. Michael Hawes (Executive Director, Canada-United States Fulbright Program): Let me begin by expressing my appreciation to the committee for allowing me this opportunity to communicate my views on what I believe to be a critical and timely issue in Canada, the current state and future prospects of our relationship with the United States. While I would like to address a great many of the issues enumerated in the dialogue paper and raised by this committee and would be equally pleased to speak to the logic and strategic vision articulated in your December 2002 “Partners in North America” report, I will focus my comments this morning almost exclusively on our relations with the United States. More specifically, I would like to deliberate on broad strategies that balance the need to maintain an independent foreign policy in Canada, preserving, protecting, and promoting unique Canadian values and preferences, while at the same time recognizing the profound and pressing need for a strong and positive relationship with the United States.

Nearly 20 years ago I wrote a small book entitled Principal Power, Middle Power or Satellite: Competing Perspectives in the Study of Canadian Foreign Policy. At the time there was a relatively vigorous debate in Canada as to whether Canadian foreign policy was driven by a clearly, and perhaps cleverly, articulated strategy of middle power diplomacy or simply a reflection of Canada's increasing dependence on the United States. In other words, was Canada's foreign policy made at home or in Washington? There are those who would argue that this debate is back, albeit in the context of a more complicated world, or even that it never left. I would argue that it has always been critical to our understanding of Canadian foreign policy and that any careful assessment of Canadian foreign policy, and certainly any plan of action, must be predicated on how one sees the problem and what one imagines might be possible.

In my written statement I have reviewed the middle power perspective, the satellite perspective, and the less compelling principal power perspective, and I simply would like to argue that Canada has and should continue to have a healthy middle power role in international politics and has formulated and pursued a foreign policy based on that logic. I see, frankly, relative little reason to change the underlying thrust of our foreign policy. What's more concerning is where we go.

My own modest contribution to that debate involved a systematic assessment of the three perspectives and a relatively thorough critique of their main points. In the end, as I just mentioned, I found the middle power argument to be far more compelling than the other two, and I still do. The empirical evidence in support of this perspective was much stronger and the internal logic of the argument more consistent.

What's important in this debate, though, is the fact that for 50 years, in my view, two basic and interrelated facts or truths have shaped and subsequently characterized Canada's role in the world. The first is the disproportionately large role the United States has played and continues to play in the economic, social, cultural, and political lives of Canadians. The second is a significant commitment to the principles and practices of multilateral diplomacy and multilateral management. To use an old cliché, Canada, with respect to the international order, was present at the creation. We were there at the birth of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and other post-war economic instrumentalities. More to the point, I think, is the unflagging and long-standing commitment to these organizations, their principles, and their activities Canada has demonstrated again and again over the years. The underlying rationale for this activism has been that the development of international rules is the surest way for a middle power to defend and advance its unique national interests.

Dramatic recent events in world politics have caused Canadians and their governments to reconsider these two basic truths. In the immediate post-Cold War period, where the principal driving force in world politics was no longer a single, identifiable external threat, the logic of multilateralism came under considerable scrutiny. This led to significant implications both for security and defence policy and for foreign economic policy. Among other things, the post-Cold War, post-9/11, and I hope soon to be post-Iraq conflict world is increasingly unipolar and increasingly characterized by both a formal and an informal drive towards regions and regionalism.

¿ (0915)

With respect to the first basic truth in Canadian foreign policy, the regionalist impulse has served to deepen our relationship with the United States, though, to be sure, it has generated some very real differences and disagreements, beginning in 1988 with what was, you'll recall, a relatively acrimonious public debate. Canada eventually signed a comprehensive free trade agreement with the United States, which later, in 1994, was transformed into the North American agreement. The events of September 11, though, seem to have redefined the post-Cold War world, given Canadians a somewhat different take on American power and influence, and led us to a commitment to the war on terrorism and a renewed emphasis on what is a trickier relationship with the United States. The notion that America is vulnerable, I think, considerably softened the long-standing, if modest, anti-American sentiment in Canada. However, the more recent conflict in Iraq, I think, has pushed the pendulum back in the other direction, though it is not clear yet how far that goes.

On the surface this suggests that Canadian governments are faced with a serious dilemma. It would appear that Canada has had to choose between multilateral institutions and arrangements and regionalism. In fact, the recent decision with respect to our participation in the conflict in Iraq would seem to be a very clear illustration of this dilemma. However, what I'd like to argue here is that the Canadian government can and should pursue a foreign policy that is sensitive to regionalist trends, while at the same time remaining committed to the more general principles and practices of neo-liberal institutionalism and multilateral management. The central thesis of this very short presentation is that the interplay of changed and changing circumstances, coupled with Canada's long-time commitment to these principles, has led to a situation where regionalism necessarily plays an increasingly central, though not necessarily determining, role in Canadian foreign policy. This is to say the relationship cannot proceed in the context of this larger framework of multilateralism.

To put this all in more practical terms, an objective assessment of the current relationship suggests a somewhat mixed result. On the one hand, despite the fact that the international system is increasingly complex and the challenges to national governments increasingly troublesome, there is reason to be somewhat optimistic about our ability to manage the relationship. As Ambassador Michael Kergin recently reminded us, it is not just the Canadian economy, but “the global economy that is dominated by the United States--from advanced technologies to business practices, from monetary prevalence to investment destination. Canada's proximity to this powerhouse brings particular challenges and remarkable opportunities.”

On the positive side of the ledger, Canada has been a steady and stable partner on the war on terrorism: Canada stepped up in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 events, both as a destination for stranded U.S. commercial planes and in support of maintaining capital flows; Canada was the fourth largest contributor to the international coalition in Afghanistan; Canadian businesses and consumers overcame the severe challenges to the border; the two governments managed to put a new smart border initiative in place; and border and airport security arrangements seem to have been developed and proceeded apace.

On the other side of the ledger, however, there have been ongoing trade disputes, not the least of which having to do with the seemingly intractable softwood lumber issue, mounting political differences, and what appears to be a distressing deterioration of public confidence in the other partner and in the relationship. My sense is that there has been a general deterioration over the past few years and a very specific weakening of the relationship in the last several months.

A number of my academic colleagues, along with some in the press, have argued that the relationship is at risk of moving towards a new low point. In fact, there are startling similarities to the last great crisis in the relationship, which, frankly, in my view, was a crisis in the capitals, not among the peoples, which dates back to the early 1980s. We are faced with a relatively new, fairly conservative, and somewhat inexperienced administration in the United States, at least as relates to foreign policy. Moreover, the foreign policy situation is especially complex and particularly difficult. We are, as we were in the early 1980s, at what might be described as a moment of creation in the international system. At the very least, there is reason to see the current conflict and the attendant conflict within and among the so-called western states as reflective of a fundamental crisis in the international order. On the Canadian side we have a government, or more accurately a leader, nearing the end of the current mandate, much more liberal in its preferences and priorities than our American partners, and characterized by a certain degree of political uncertainty with respect to the future of the government. To complicate matters further--and the same could reasonably be said of the early 1980s--the preferences of the individual most likely to take the helm are not well known, nor is it certain that this individual will take up that role.

¿ (0920)

What remains to be seen is whether this is simply a predictably difficult moment in the relationship or the beginning of something akin to the big chill. Over the past couple of months I've spent a considerable amount of time on college and university campuses in North America, from Vancouver to Tennessee, and must confess to being concerned about the mood. More importantly, though I could be misreading their public pronouncements, the activities of the U.S. Congress seem to bear out the perception I got throughout the United States.

What I would like to suggest here is that there are actions that might be taken to militate against this phenomenon and move us in a direction other than the one in which we seem to be headed. There are a number of key strategies that might be pursued with respect to Canadian foreign policy, the first and most obvious being the present full-scale national debate on the future of Canada's foreign policy, and obviously, the work of this committee and the process set in train by the announcements of the minister's dialogue on foreign policy move us a long way in this direction. Moreover, in my view, it is worth considering additional ways to take this process further, including, as a possibility, another commission along the lines of the Macdonald royal commission in the early to mid-1980s.

Although I'm not going to discuss any of these strategies in any detail here, others who have testified before this committee have argued for the creation of a national security strategy or the articulation of an integrated foreign policy that specifically attempts to consider security within the context of the broader debate on prosperity. Still others have offered interesting and important observations about developments on aid policy and development, about the importance of multiculturalism, and about broader concerns that have emerged from the challenges born of maintaining one's values and culture in a world where regulatory policies, particularly content-based strategies, are increasingly threatened by technology, by trade rules, and by the rapidly rising cost of cultural products. What I would like to propose, and this is where I will focus the remainder of my brief remarks, is a more aggressive strategy of public diplomacy, along with a more systematic attempt to understand and appreciate the complexities of the relationship.

As I see it, the United States is central to our economic prosperity, is undeniably linked to our physical security, and has the potential to dramatically affect Canada's cultural landscape, whether we like it or not. The challenge, in a very real sense, is not about whether we will or should pursue a close relationship with the United States. Rather, it is about how we go about maintaining and promoting our unique Canadian values and how we pursue a genuinely independent foreign policy where and when it really matters.

With respect to public diplomacy, I would argue that Canada can and should make a much more serious attempt at increasing our representation in the United States. In very simple terms, while our missions in the United States work very hard to represent Canada and deepen the understanding of Canada, there is a very clear commitments-capabilities gap. This can, in my view, be easily addressed with a modest investment of additional human and financial resources, which would be more than offset by a deeper and more nuanced appreciation of Canadian views and priorities in the United States. As I said, in my recent travels throughout the Untied States it has been abundantly clear to me that while there is a certain amount of healthy disagreement, and even disharmony, the problem is the misinformation and miscommunication that has been characterized, or at least captured, in that perception and those concerns. As a practical matter, I think this is a problem that can be solved.

Having said all this, I think we also need to enhance and support the growing commitment within the federal government to understand and appreciate our foreign policy priorities, especially as they relate to the United States. I would argue that recent enhancements to the Canadian Centre for Management Development, developments at the PCO, including a broader commitment to learning, and the work of the policy research initiative should be further encouraged. I think a systematic attempt to offer serious mid-career development in this area would make a good deal of sense.

¿ (0925)

There is another instrument we should be paying attention to in all of this, one I think I understand reasonably well. The program I'm currently associated with, the Canada-U.S. Fulbright Program, a joint bi-national educational exchange initiative, attempts in a systematic way to address the larger question of how to promote mutual understanding. Academic exchanges go beyond the political, they involve reciprocal arrangements, they include a strong youth element, speaking to the critical issue of generational change and understanding, and they offer the potential for a very substantial multiplier effect.

Among other things, we are in the process at the foundation of putting in place a network of visiting chairs in academic institutions throughout Canada and the United States, bringing scholarly research to bear on key issues of the contemporary public policy agenda. These chairs are in the area of trade remedy, global governance, North American studies, ecological and environmental studies, borders, and security. The opportunity to target areas of special interest to Canada, while remaining above the political debate, allows us to develop capacity and represents an important long-term investment in the relationship. This strategy is aimed at openness and understanding and allows for a more thorough and respectful appreciation of each other's views, but most particularly, the views of Canada within the United States.

Nearly 50 years ago Senator Fulbright argued that “Education is the best means--probably the only means--by which nations can cultivate a degree of objectivity about each other's behavior and intentions.” As I see it, this observation is equally true and equally compelling today. In my view, if we are to have the ability to pursue a genuinely independent foreign policy, driven by enlightened and centred self-interest, we must have a strong and steady partnership with the United States, able to withstand the times when we have and should pursue legitimate differences in both our priorities and our policies.

Thank you for the invitation and for your attention.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Hawes.

Now Ms. Annette Hester.

Ms. Annette Hester (Director, Latin American Research Centre, University of Calgary): Good morning, and thank you very much for the invitation to be here.

I take a view parallel to that Michael expressed, and pointedly enough, I'll talk about how the Fulbright program is financed.

The current situation in Iraq, and especially the decisions that led to it, underlines the relevance of the questions posed by this committee in the introductory discussion note and key questions for panel and government foreign policy dialogue. It is important for Canadians to reach consensus on what role Canada should be playing in world affairs and how to get there, especially how Canada can maintain its independent thinking in foreign affairs, while at the same time maintaining a positive and influential relationship with our neighbour and most significant business partner, the United States. In essence, what do we think Canada's strategic position in the world should be? How can we position ourselves to ensure that we can keep our economic prosperity in a world that is increasingly connected and exert influence to ensure that others share the wealth? Above all, what can we do to ensure that we live in a peaceful world?

This is also the essence of the questions being posed by Minister Graham's foreign policy review initiative, reflected in the paper “A Dialogue on Foreign Policy”. I agree that these are indeed relevant and important questions, but I didn't come before you to answer them. I came before you to talk about how Canada's strategic position on issues pertinent to foreign affairs, international trade, defence, and a host of other key areas is formulated, discussed, and taught in our universities and research centres, or not. I came here today to share the view that while Canadians, particularly academics and NGOs, are increasingly asked to participate in public consultations of one kind or the other--in the last three months I personally have been asked to participate in four different consultation processes, one on CIDA, the dialogue on foreign policy, the FTAA negotiations, and the upcoming hemispheric security conference--aside from informal conversations with DFAIT on a number of specific regional and bilateral relationships, this government doesn't seem very concerned on how the views that have been expressed are being formulated. I also come before you because I do believe changes are needed, but they will only come when you, our elected representatives, believe they are needed and rally behind getting them done. I know you can make a difference, the question is, will you make a difference?

In order to discuss these points, the formulation, discussion, and teaching of Canada's strategic positions vis-à-vis the world in universities and research centres, I would like to offer a comparison with the United States. Since World War II the U.S. has dedicated resources to creating experts who would serve America's strategic needs, thanks to the original National Defense Education Act of 1958, in particular to title VI. In passing this legislation--and I have attached it as an appendix to my presentation--the U.S. Congress recognized that the defence, security, and economic interests of the nation were inseparably bound with education and committed financial support for programs, fellowships, and research centres at institutions of higher learning. This support is now commonly referred to as title VI, and it has been the lifeline of international education in the U.S. for the last 40 years. It is core financing, as opposed to project financing, and this is an important distinction, for 14 different programs, to a total of $80 million in 2002.

¿ (0930)

Canada's approach, on the other hand, has centred on delivering foreign aid. According to Dr. James Shute, director of the Centre for International Programs at the University of Guelph, Canada's participation in the Colombo Plan of 1950 marked the beginning of Canadian bilateral international assistance as an expression of Canada's Canadian foreign policy, and from that decision evolved two main themes that have characterized the international dimension of Canadian universities, the visa student presence and the development cooperation.

While hindsight is always 20/20, the short-sightedness of such a policy has become crystal clear since September 11. When the FBI and the CIA realized that it was not more technology they needed, but more people, specifically expert in foreign languages and culture, the resources were there. The fruits of the U.S. post-Second World War policy were ripe for the picking. There were hundreds, if not thousands, of knowledgeable Americans working in think tanks, NGOs, universities, the corporate world with the necessary kind of international expertise and contacts. For example, in the U.S. international centres or area centres, and there are 15 designated areas, such as Africa, Middle East, Latin America, constitute one of the programs out of title VI, which has $80 million, and in 2002 accounted for $27.17 million out of the total financing. To give you an idea of what it means, 118 centres were given average grants of $231,000 each.

At the inception of this legislation the funding for the establishment of various centres was provided solely by title VI grants. However, there have been numerous changes, including the fact that now this grant must be matched to at least 50% by other than federal government funds. As one can see from the vitality of the U.S. institutions, U.S. foundations, such as the Ford Foundation and the Kellogg Foundation, corporations, and state governments have been happy to ante up. The result of 45 years of steady financing is a wealth of well-established, first-class international study and research centres.

Mrs. Nannerl Keohane, President of Duke University, mentioned at a recent address given during the International Education Conference:

Title VI has been instrumental in stimulating our growth in this area, and Duke has to date eight federally funded Title VI international centres, up from four a scant decade ago, from the venerable and very successful Joint Consortium in Latin American Studies to a newly opened Rotary International Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution. Title VI has succeeded in at least one important way, despite its modest size relative to the federal education budget. It has been effective in leveraging resources for graduate and professional training in many campuses. Higher education is more internationally diverse and internationally savvy than it used to be.

The situation in Canada is remarkably different. There is no coordinated strategy linking Canada's national interests in the global context with education at any level. Although recently Human Resources Development has funded a university-level international mobility program, historically, funding for international activities in Canada's universities has been delivered primarily through the Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA. The mandate of CIDA programs is to address the education and development needs of recipient countries, project by project. This may be an excellent model for the delivery of foreign aid, but it's a lousy one for promoting international research and education. Moreover, it places the priority on the needs of developing countries and leaves Canada's own strategic needs in the dust. For instance, Canada and Brazil recently had some tense moments in their relationship. The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade had to scramble to assemble a handful of Brazilian experts to come up with a remedial recommendation and future strategies. The list of candidates was frightfully slim. We actually all know each other by first names and can meet in a room much smaller than this.

This huge hole in Canadian policy is highlighted as one of the strongest challenges to higher education by a report on internationalization published in 2000 by the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada. It's concluding remarks read:

Institutions are clearly concerned at what they perceive as the lack of coordinated national strategy to enhance internationalization and the lack of financial support.

¿ (0935)

The only Canadian experience that parallels that of title VI has been the core funding the Department of National Defence has granted to institutions for the creation of a number of centres for strategic and military studies distributed across the country. Although critics always point out what is not working with this initiative, the result of this policy has been the creation of five centres that have raised the profile of issues regarding national defence in Canada, that provide expert opinion to the department and Parliament, and that train young Canadians to think about these issues from a Canadian strategic position. This is all well and good, but it needs to be put into some kind of perspective. It is not sufficient to understand that our national security is important. We have to think of our continued survival in a global marketplace and how we interact with other nations on cultural, social, and economic levels as equally important. Yet when it comes to funding for centres that research international affairs, there is no policy.

The meagre resources allocated to DFAIT have almost solely been dispersed to organizations that function as extensions of DFAIT, such as the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development. Unfortunately, it seems that even this is being jeopardized at the moment, as the treasury department is making waves about withdrawing all available resources for core funding, leaving DFAIT exclusively with funds to allocate to projects. Moreover, when funds have been made available to independent centres, according to press reports and available public information, they have been granted on the basis of political connections, not by DFAIT, but by ministers, as was the case with the recent announcement of a matching grant of $30 million to the Canadian Research Institute on Global Governance at Waterloo.

One can always say there are no core funds available to allow centres to carry on research on issues at large, but there is plenty of demand for our expertise. So the second point I want to address is the increased demand for participation in public consultations. As I mentioned, parallel to this dismal lack of funding, there's an exponential increase in demand by the government for the services of individuals who conduct research in international affairs. This is reflected in the new participatory method of conducting public consultations on almost every aspect of Canadian public policy, particularly ssues concerning foreign policy. I'd like to emphasize that as mentioned, this has happened without any allocation of funds for research in this area. The consequence in the short-term is that the quality and availability of the presentations made before various fora are greatly compromised. In the long-term the consequence of this policy is that we have a whole generation who have not been schooled to think of Canada's strategic position, but who are nevertheless asked to voice opinions on the matter. Needless to say, this opens a wide space for special interest groups to sway opinions, possibly leading to polarization of public opinion in ill-informed ways.

In conclusion, I'd like to stress that the gap between supply and demand in the area of international scholarship in Canada is growing quickly. We need to address this deficiency head-on. Funding research and education related to Canada's strategic position vis-à-vis the world must be a priority if we want to keep pace with western leaders, let alone develop a wealth of innovative new ideas in this country. The challenge is clearly yours. I'd like to know who will champion this cause.

¿ (0940)

The Chair: Thank you.

We're going to start now with questions and answers, but first, because I see we have the numbers, I would like to ask my colleagues if they all agree that the clerk be authorized to prepare a working lunch with Dr. Karsten Voigt, who's the coordinator of cooperation between Germany and the United States. He will be in town around April 30. Agreed? Fine.

Mr. Day.

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, Mr. Hawes and Ms. Hester, for your time and your presentations.

I appreciate what Mr. Hawes was saying. There is a difference between the capitals and the peoples, the broad citizenship of the countries. Those two are distinct. My sense is, and my colleagues may agree, from travelling where people are, that there's more of a sense that we can work things out and an understanding that we have differences. There's more collegiality of spirit among the population than in what happens in the capitals. Unfortunately, when it starts to fracture in the capitals, in Ottawa for instance, as it has over the last few months, the hard work of our missions in the United States is affected. Those people, whether we're talking about the embassy in Washington or other places, really have to scramble to try to keep relations smooth, and they do a good job of it, given the fact that the crisis in our capital in not being able to articulate a principled and coherent policy position creates a lot extra work for them.

Ms. Hester talked about the whole funding approach, and I would agree. CIDA, with all of its funding, is thinly spread among too many countries, and this crucial area of research development and learning, along the lines you're talking about, is missing. The tax structure in the United States allows for and encourages the creation of foundations, as you know, huge foundations. That gets away from the concern about political connections, as Ms. Hester has mentioned. When a foundation is coming straight from a minister, it might work out, it might be fine, but the concern about the political connections is there and the diversity of views is limited.

Having just come back from doing some lectures at Yale about three weeks ago, I was very impressed with Canadian student representation there. Ms. Hester may know one of the Calgary grads, Samir Kaushik--you may have run into him. He's very active on campus at Yale. And there's also Dianna Lee. Canadian representation on the United Nations model in Yale is very significant. On a percentage basis, is the same representation coming into Canada? Are our foundations, Fulbright and others, bringing in U.S. students and U.S. professors to expose them to what Canada is all about, so that when they go back, they can have the same potent effect as people like Samir and Dianna can have?

Mr. Michael Hawes: The Fulbright Program is aggressively reciprocal. For every student who goes south, one student comes north. For every faculty member who goes south, one faculty member comes north. In fact, over the last 18 months I have put in place a series of visiting chairs, where American scholars come to Canadian universities on an annual basis, at the University of British Columbia, in Alberta, I'm pleased to say, one and now a second one this fall at the University of Calgary, at the University of Alberta at Lethbridge, at the University of Ottawa, at Carleton University, at Queen's University, at the University of Toronto, at Dalhousie, at the University of New Brunswick. So we have a systematic attempt to bring scholars and students north.

The big problem, as Annette has so carefully and clearly articulated, is the levels. The Fulbright Program world-wide is much larger than title VI. In fact, the congressional allocation for Fulbright this fall was $274 million U.S., straight public money. And all Fulbright arrangements are matched. My foundation is a binational foundation. A third of our money comes from the U.S. Congress, a small amount, a third comes from the Department of Foreign Affairs, also a small amount, and a much larger third comes from the private sector. The problem is not the binational or reciprocal nature of the program, it's the physical size. When I took the job 20 months ago, there were about 40 participants in the program. This year there'll be close to 80, but frankly, when it comes to achieving our goals, we're only just scratching the surface of what can and might be done.

¿ (0945)

Mr. Stockwell Day: Do you make recommendations to our government on the tax structures, so that on the Canadian side there could be as vibrant a private sector involvement? Do you make those kind of presentations without fear of repercussions, that we need to have some encouragement on the tax side for the private sector?

Mr. Michael Hawes: I do. I've met with three different deputy ministers in the last ten days.

[Translation]

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.)): Ms. Lalonde.

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Thank you very much. First of all, Madam Chairman, I'm sorry I wasn't able to hear the witnesses address the committee in turn. They represent two different fields of expertise and I would have liked to put some questions to these two witnesses. Therefore, I apologize to Ms. Hester. Nevertheless, I'm certain she can answer my questions.

Thank you very much, Mr. Hawes, for your highly interesting presentation. I have two, maybe three, questions for you, the first of which is as follows. Among the various events of note, you cited the signing in 1988 of the Free Trade Agreement and the conflict against Iraq. You also mentioned September 11. I just want to say that in both of these instances, Quebec did exert considerable pressure, in my opinion. It's well known that in 1988, we made some serious enemies elsewhere in Canada. As for the war against Iraq, I feel that Quebec has brought considerable pressure to bear. I'm curious as to your opinion of the influence Quebec wields when it comes to Canada's foreign policy.

At a UQAM symposium on relations with the United States, Marc Lortie observed that much like the situation in the 1980s, one of the biggest problems we were likely to encounter was the sad state of the US economy. Do you share that view?

Some in Canada may have championed the free trade agreement precisely because the sorry state of its economy drove the US to adopt a protectionist position. The $500 billion deficit and the $500 billion trade deficit may have given some the impression that we would be better off turning once again to protectionism or to bilateral agreements. It was stated in no uncertain terms that the free trade zone of the Americas was really no longer on the agenda. At least that's what was rumoured. Things would likely move faster and more efficiently if bilateral agreements were in place.

I'll confine myself to these two questions, so as to allow sufficient time for your response.

[English]

Mr. Michael Hawes: One thing that's clear about this country is that there are legitimate regional differences. I think Quebec's position has been consistent with respect to the United States and, frankly, quite admirable. I wouldn't pretend to understand how that has translated into foreign policy or public policy. Clearly, Quebec has been an important issue in the United States, and it continues to be. I had dinner the other night with the Quebec délégué général in New York, and I will see Monsieur Boucher, the Quebec délégué général in Los Angeles this coming week. I would make the same argument: a modest commitment of resources, and so much more could be done.

On the question of Mr.--

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I'm sorry.

[English]

I want to be understood. I said in the free trade agreement in 1988 Quebec was a decisive factor, voting massively to give a mandate to Mr. Mulroney. If not for Quebec, it is possible that Canada's position would have been different then. Maybe later on they would have changed their minds, but in 1988 it's possible that there wouldn't have been a free trade agreement. Second, with the war in Iraq, if the opposition in Quebec had not been so strong at that moment, it's possible that the government would have thought differently. That is what I meant.

¿ (0950)

Mr. Michael Hawes: With respect to Iraq, the Canadian government took their position very quickly, anticipating public opinion. In my view, they anticipated correctly, but it would be interesting to know what would have happened if there had been more time.

With respect to Monsieur Lortie's remark, absolutely, economic fortunes in the United States determine their tendency towards protectionism. The United States is by nature and historically isolationist and protectionist. The way Congress and the administration interact, the American political system is by nature protectionist. Frankly, this only strengthens my argument that we need greater representation in the United States, especially at those times when the pressures to pursue narrow, parochial, self-interested economic strategies become greater. We didn't need so much representation from 1996 through to 1999, when the American economy was booming and there weren't pressures to address job losses or regional differences in economic growth or mid-American crises on the economy. Now the situation has changed, I think our need is substantially greater. Without getting into too deep an economic analysis here, it's fair to say the business cycle model is basically well understood and appreciated by most people, and we're going to find ourselves at different high and low points, based on a number of different circumstances, and will indeed find that our need for representation is frequently at the level it's at now.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Madam Hester.

Ms. Annette Hester: Could you repeat the question?

Ms. Francine Lalonde: What do you think of the role played by Quebec in those two big issues, 1988 and the war in Iraq?

Ms. Annette Hester: I can't reallly comment on the role played by Quebec, but the research and the participation of Quebec in international matters is remarkably different from in Alberta, not only because of its position, but because of the way the international centres, the universities, the businesses, and the government work together. I often comment in Alberta that I'm green with envy, absolutely jealous, because Quebec does function when you go abroad. I travel in Latin America frequently. When you see the interaction between the different players in Quebec society, it is very well integrated with a sense of where they are going and how they are going to get there, and they each play a role. It's quite interesting how they are, particularly when they want to be, more effective in sending their message out. I'm not sure what kind of message they want to send in the States right now and how effective they're going to be. That remains to be seen.

As Michael was saying, it stresses how important it is to look at Canada strategically, because our position in the Americas is very strategic to us at the moment. The Security Council had Mexico and Chile in a very difficult position, one in which they looked to Canada for support. Both Mexico and Brazil are extremely forward in their representation in the U.S. and how they build up their image in the U.S. Brazil has a centre in Washington that is a partnership between private business and government. It has a sole mandate to lobby and place articles about Brazil in U.S. newspapers. They are relentless. They organize conferences inside Congress on issues of importance to Brazil. Mexico is just as relentless in pursuing their image inside the States. Our different partners in the Americas are doing what you're suggesting and putting a lot of resources into getting that done and building their image and their connections with the U.S. Congress.

¿ (0955)

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Mr. Calder.

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.): Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Annette, Michael, welcome this morning.

Michael, I like your analogy of middle power, and with the guy in the middle, it means to say you're being pulled from both sides. Having said that, I think we have to take a look at the United States themselves at the present time, why they think the way they think, and I have two questions.

Right now American policy, under the current administration, is very unilateralist in its approach, more so than in the past. I think one of the reasons is that you have an inner circle that has been carried forward from 1991 and has much more influence now than they had back in those times. You also have a President that has been schooled in international affairs and has not learned them by experience, which is a difference between the two Bush administrations. We, on the other side, are put in this unenviable position where we're concerned about our closest neighbour and trading partner, and yet we still want to be able to exercise sovereignty and that middle power, that multilateral approach we have. How can we reconcile our need for a strong bilateral relationship with the United States and still enhance our need for strong international institutions? And how can we best influence the United States to work with the international community?

As the parliamentary secretary for international trade, I have a question for you, Annette. In the past we haven't been as aggressive in Latin America as the United States has been, although we're changing that. What is the Latin American perception of Canada, and how might we either use that to our advantage or present ourselves more effectively to Latin America?

Ms. Annette Hester: I think, with a few exceptions, such as our relationship with Brazil, which got to be tenuous at times, overall, we have a very good image in Latin America and a very good relationship with the different partners, because we are a balance to the United States. I just got back last week from Brazil. I was talking about training opportunities in oil and gas in Canada, and the number of people who expressed a desire to come to Canada, especially now, because they don't want to go to the States, is remarkable.

I think it works both ways. It's really important that we have a very strong relationship in Latin America, but they will be, and are, our biggest competitors in our market with the United States. So the better we understand them, the better off we're going to be in the long term, because they will be there to compete with us, whether we like it or not. That's the case with Mexico, although Mexico is also a close ally. I think understanding Latin America strategically is to our great advantage. When it comes to international trade in agriculture, we negotiate from the Cairns Group, which includes Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, and so on.

So I think we have our own sort of schizophrenic approach: we want to be the good guys, but we also want to defend Bombardier, which, by the way, I think is seen as perfectly natural in Latin America. We have this idea, or at least there is always this image, that Canada has to be always good, and people in Latin America think Canada has to defend its interests, and that's that, end of the conversation.

But other than that, we have every reason to have a very good relationship with Latin America. We're well respected and looked to as a partner that counterbalances. I think we should be looking at Latin America and the different countries, especially Mexico and Brazil and the bigger countries that are the deciding powers in the regions, as our allies and competitors in future relations with the United States.

À (1000)

Mr. Michael Hawes: I could actually just use that as a segue into the questions you asked me. Frankly, my perception of U.S. policy towards Latin America is that it's gone. It's not that they've stopped paying attention to the FTA process, they've stopped paying attention to Latin America. What drove that relationship between the United States and Latin America, issues relating to narco-terrorism, to trade, to larger political issues, has simply been replaced by those concerns driven by Iraq, by terrorism, and by the Middle East. I think the opportunity for Canada to make significant progress with respect to Latin America is very pressing right now. It's a good time.

Let me then answer the two questions you asked me, and I really think they are the flip side of the same question. How do we reconcile the need for a strong bilateral relationship with our preference for multilateral management and institutions and liberalism? The first response is that we have to have a clear, focused foreign policy and know exactly what it is we want, so that we can choose, in essence, when to pick our fights. There are going to be times when we have differences with the United States that are important and determining, so we should know in advance what those are and we should be prepared to regularly make the case. If it's Cuba, we should regularly be making the case in Washington that when it comes to Cuba, we are not interested in the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. We have our own policy when it comes to Cuba, here it is, and we'll go this far with that.

In the last few months ithere was some confusion with respect to what Canada's preferences and policies were, which brings me to my second response, and that's the whole business of process. I think, with respect to Iraq, it's fair to suggest that the process on both sides broke down. The concern I pick up in the United States is a concern not with the ultimate decision taken by the Canadian government, but rather with the process that led us to that decision.

Third, I think we need, as I said, to focus a lot of our energies on the sub-national level. This can't be about a relationship with the U.S. administration. Administrations change, as you yourself pointed out. There are some features of this administration that don't necessarily lend themselves to the Canadian view. That's going to be true from time to time. Whether that will an extended period or a short period we don't know, whether the elements in the United States administration that are more conservative will end up having the day or not we don't know at this point, but we certainly should prepare for this.

So the question is, how do we make our case in Washington? Frankly, Canadian middle powermanship, if I can use that expression, was always predicated on our ability to do two things, have a clear understanding of where we're going and have the ear of the U.S. administration. I think that's unreasonable right now, putting all of the eggs in that basket, being able to deal largely at the level of the administration. I argued in the little book I wrote all those years ago that middle power diplomacy is predicated on exemptionalism and exceptionalism. We would scurry down to Washington and seek exemptions to policies we didn't like because we had a strong relationship with the United States administration. To a certain extent, we have still to be prepared to do that, like the Brazilians and the Mexicans, but I think we have to have a much deeper, much more focused strategy of understanding what we want and how we get it, whether it's through the promotion of academic research centres, through encouraging state and local governments to be concerned about Canadians and Canadian issues, or about Congress. We have to operate, I think, at all those levels.

À (1005)

Ms. Annette Hester: I couldn't agree more about knowing what you want and once you know what you want and you have a specific goal, going and getting it, and we doubt that specific goal. When I talked about the research centres and the funding, this is what I'm talking about. How do you formulate what it is that you want and how you're going to get there?

What you're saying about the U.S. administration in relation to Latin America is very true, but when you say, I want to make a stand on Cuba, you also have to remember--and that's what research does--that every person at the White House right now dealing with Latin America is dealing with an ex-Cuba file. If you decide to make a stand on Cuba, for instance-- and I'm not saying yes or no--you have a secondary implication that you're going to wake up every single dormant individual in foreign affairs in the White House who deals with Latin America. All they understand is Cuba, and maybe Venezuela, but they don't even understand Venezuela, because they just make a mess out of the stuff. They fumbled that file so badly it was pathetic to see. Venezuela is paramount to U.S. energy needs. They hold a million barrels a day of refining capacity through CITCO, they are the third largest distributor of gasoline in the United States, they are the largest manufacturer of asphalt on the east coast, they are in petrochemicals, they are the largest supplier of petroleum products to the United States, and they still fumble that file.

So Latin America is definitely not high in the U.S. administration, but they are all very high on the Cuba file. I would pay attention before I stepped into that one.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Thank you.

Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): Merci beaucoup.

Thank you for being here today. I have three questions for you.

Professor Hawes, I believe, in the situation we find ourselves in with the U.S. internationally, their unilateralism speaks to failure of multilateral organs to deal with the challenges we all face. How do we as a country buttress and improve the multilateral institutions we have, put teeth into them, given our diminished ability to engage not only our partners south of the border, but also our partners in organizations like NATO and the UN, because of our failure to contribute militarily to many different situations and for many other reasons?

My second question deals with something we've been speaking about, our ability to simply engage with our counterparts south of the border. All of us have difficulty when we go down there. We're looked upon as being, perhaps, little more than a wonderful curiosity that jumped out of a zoo somewhere. As one of our counterparts said, oh, I'm here to see you because I have a cottage in Canada--that's nice, but that's not why we're here. So how do we engage with our counterparts south of the border in a more meaningful fashion?

Finally, to address, Professor Hawes, what you refer to as the capability gap, do you think we need a federal minister in cabinet solely responsible for Canada-U.S. relations?

Mr. Michael Hawes: Question three is easy. Yes, absolutely. Frankly, I think we need a national education strategy too. I know we're not supposed to say that “e” word here in Ottawa.

À (1010)

Ms. Annette Hester: I didn't know that. I blew it all the way.

Mr. Michael Hawes: We need to use the word learning.

Ms. Annette Hester: Oh, good.

Mr. Michael Hawes: Let me go to one and two. How do we bolster multilateral institutions? First of all, we have to decide that's what we want to do. Second, as I used to tell my children when they were young, now is a choosing time. Lloyd Axworthy used to argue that when it comes to international organizations, you build them, we'll join. We have a systematic record of joining international organizations, we join them all. The difficulty right now is that not only are international organizations facing a crisis from above, as it isn't clear that all governments are fully committed to those organizations any longer or that they can meet what are extraordinary expectations of them, there's also a challenge from below. The so-called anti-globalization movement is arguing that these are anti-democratic or non-democratic institutions and don't have any validity to begin with. So what used to be a sort of challenge from above, along with a concern that many of us had about moral hazard, is coupled now with a threat from below, and many of these organizations are virtually under siege. You then add the third part, which is, let's be honest, a weak commitment on the part of the United States government--and this is not new and it's not unique to this administration--to broadly based multilateral organizations, and you get a very difficult situation.

There's no easy answer to your question, important and timely as it is, because we clearly can't do this alone. One strategy is to try to build a separate international coalition in support of those institutions we feel are most important and most pressing. I think we do need to choose which institutions, which organizations we want to devote what resources we can to.

On the matter of how we engage Americans more meaningfully, the only answer I have is the one I've offered before: we need to be there. I took this current job on the September 1, 2001. I spent that week in Washington, my training week, the week that was to be the week of September 11. I had just left my office at Berkeley. I still had the office there and still had my phone in place. I checked my messages on September 14, and there were 181 calls from press in the Bay area. I was the only Canadian whose phone number they knew, and I wasn't there.

Engage them more meaningfully, in the same way we addressed the Mexican situation. By simply enhancing transactions, we stopped the stereotypes, that Mexico is a tourist destination, that there isn't anything meaningful that comes out of the relationship. I think we simply have to ratchet it up, and I think we have to pay for that.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Thank you.

Madam Redman.

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

I've really enjoyed both of your presentations, and I have to tell you, I find your candour really refreshing, Ms. Hester.

I have a question for both of you. It seems to me that in political life there are two scenarios for when things go wrong: either the political body did not get good advice or it got good advice and chose not to listen to it. You talk about all the initiatives and the money that's being invested in the United States, and while I think that's really commendable, I know there are people within the United States who would tell you that there is a small cadre that has hijacked the attention of the administration.

I was really interested, Mr. Hawes, when you talked about engaging youth, because as a public representative--I come from the Kitchener-Waterloo area--I often lamented the fact that my children and the youth I talked to would be far more prone to join an NGO than to consider a life in politics. I find that troubling, so I'd really like you to expand a little, if you could, on engaging youth, because I think that's a component we need to be attentive to.

Also, what would be the indicators, in your view, to decide whether or not we are experiencing a wrinkle in our relationship with the United States, or indeed, if this is the beginning of the big chill? How do we know, as we continue down the road?

Ms. Hester, you talked about the funding of international organizations. I come from Waterloo region, and the principals invested $30 million in a centre called, I think, the Institute on Global Governance. That's private money, matched by $30 million from the Canadian government. I'm wondering if you see that as an example of what you're saying there needs to be more of in Canada. Also, WLU attracted the Academic Council on the U.N. and it is hosting it. So I think what you're talking about has been acknowledged in Canada, and maybe what you're saying is we need to do more, but I wonder if you would comment on that.

À (1015)

Ms. Annette Hester: I would like to see more matching funds. I think having matched funds is much better for the institutions, because you can't have 100% of your funding coming from one source and not be bound by that source. On the other hand, because you can attract $30 million from a private institution, you can attract $30 million from a minister. That didn't go through any transparent process, that was a handout, a political agreement. It's not the program itself, it's the fact that we have no transparent, coordinated funds available for everyone in competition, and that's what title VI does have, so that everybody is competing. You know how you put a proposal forward, then you're judged on whatever criteria, and everyone has the same chance. Then we'll find private funding. I can also find private funding, but what's to say, without Liberal representation in Calgary, that I get matching funding? The way it's done is not ideal.

On youth, I also have a 19-year-old, who tells me, actually, she would like to be Governor General. She think it's the best job in the world. But I wonder if youth in Canada aren't also a reflection of our universities and their ideas. I see that a lot, that they are apt to join an NGO. Put in 40 years of CIDA and foreign aid and get a framework for international studies inside universities. At universities we don't talk about Canada's strategic needs--what is Canada's strategy, what are our needs?--so we have a whole generation that goes off and talks about NGOs and everything, but at the same time, it is almost disconnected from the fact that 75% of our income is dependent on trade, most of it with the United States, or is dependent on oil and gas, so they can fly all over the world to protest. There is the inability to think strategically about Canada and what we strategically need in order to maintain the style of life we have here. At least, that's a lot of what I experience. We have great thinking in NGOs and a lot of idealism, but often I'm caught thinking to myself, what do you think Canada needs?

Mr. Michael Hawes: I'm going to use the Waterloo example as a segue as well. Keeping in mind that there may have been procedural questions, I sort of like the John English-Andy Cooper-RIM partnership. The Canadian government shouldn't be providing the original money, but rather, should be supporting initiatives that bring the community and the private sector into this work. I don't really know the process that John and Andy and others arrived at to get that. The Centre for International Governance Innovation I think it's called, and they are indeed the new home of ACUNS, which moved from the University of Alberta. More, please.

Ms. Annette Hester: But through due process.

À (1020)

Mrs. Karen Redman: There has also been the observation expressed that if we're going to be a grown-up country, we need to look at a different balance of trade, not just within the North American ambit, but with China and other markets. I wonder if you'd comment on that.

Mr. Michael Hawes: I'll do that, and then youth and the big chill. Actually, I can sort of link these.

There's always been a consistent commitment in Canadian foreign policy and with respect to Canadian trade policy to reduce our vulnerability in the United States through whatever we want to call that infamous third option strategy, always having a counterweight to U.S. influence. The problem, as we've discovered over the past 50 years, is that geographic proximity, cultural similarity, economic realities don't really fit the way the theory might suggest. I spent a disproportionately large amount of time in the nineties in Tokyo. I taught at the University of Tokyo and at Kokusai Daigaku. There certainly are a collection of Canadians and some interests here in Ottawa and in the business community who would like us to significantly increase our trade with China, Japan, Taiwan, whoever it might be. But realistically, I think we're still always looking at 20%, at the outside, unless something very significant occurs. The United States is a huge and dramatically resilient economy.

On the matter of youth, frankly, I don't want to blame youth at all. I think young Canadian men and women are unbelievably interested in all sorts of things. But one of the things that's happened in the Canadian university system and, frankly, in the Canadian educational system is that the reduction of public funding and the reduction of available resources has encouraged young men and women to narrowly specialize. It has encouraged universities to restrict their business to the activities of line departments--stick to your proverbial knitting. We don't send them out. If you had more young men and women going out on exchanges, going abroad, thinking and acting that year, they would come back and say, what are my public responsibilities, what might I do, what could I do? So I think the answer is simple. We have to widen the opportunities for them, broaden their scope, and they'll respond, there's absolutely no question. I spend a lot of time on U.S. college campuses, and the Canadian students, as Mr. Day said, are extraordinary. There's absolutely no question that we stack up well. Whether I'm in Tokyo or Beijing or London or California, Canadian students stack up extremely well against any of those, but we're just given fewer opportunities.

The Chair: Thank you.

Monsieur Bergeron.

[Translation]

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I want to thank the witnesses for their presentations and for coming here today. I want to say right away that I'm somewhat perturbed by some of the comments often heard about Canada's diminishing influence south of the border and within international organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I always wonder if these comments relate more to the role, or influence, Canada enjoyed ten, fifteen or twenty years ago on the international stage. That influence, as everyone knows, was disproportionate to its real political, economic and military clout. Or do these comments have more to do with Canada's current position on Iraq, putting it among the pariahs, the countries that play a marginal role on the world stage? In truth, Canada is on the same side as Russia, France, Belgium and Germany in this case. It is not a marginal member of the international community. I would say that the United States and the United Kingdom are in the minority when it comes to the international community's stance on the conflict in Iraq.

That being said, Mr. Hawes, you concluded your presentation with a statement that surprised me a great deal. You stated that if Canada is to have an independent foreign policy, it must have a strong and steady partnership with the United States.

I find that statement rather paradoxical. The challenge associated with Canada's foreign policy is precisely how to draw a line between Canada and the United States. The current situation in Iraq has demonstrated the limits of Canada's ability to act independently when it comes to setting foreign policy without fear of the threat of sanctions, be it a loss of influence, more distant political ties or economic repercussions. Yet, this is surprising since at the beginning of your presentation, you mention the deteriorating state of Canada-US relations since the early 1980s. During the ensuing years, Canada has displayed a spirit of openness on a number of occasions and has been very supportive of the United States. Remember the hostage crisis in Iran, the decision to boycott the Moscow Olympics following the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan, Canada's participation in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan with the resulting lost of Canadian lives, Canada's decision to initiate talks on common borders, just to mention a few things. Yet, these actions were never acknowledged by the Americans. Neither were Canada's efforts openly appreciated. Yet, when Canada shows signs of wanting to be somewhat independent, the US bares its teeth and expresses its displeasure.

The US ambassador to Canada is acting in an undiplomatic way and is threatening Canada with possible US reprisals because of the position this country has taken. Seriously, Mr. Hawes, how can you expect Canada to pursue an independent foreign policy based on a strong and steady partnership with the United States? Do you not see the paradox?

À (1025)

[English]

Mr. Michael Hawes: I really don't think it is a paradox. Mark Twain once said the true test of brilliance is to hold two completely contradictory ideas and still be able to move forward. I think he was right. The way you allow yourself to take difficult decisions when it really matters and to take independent positions is to have a strong and stable relationship with your biggest partner and to have sufficient confidence on the other side that they can say, all right, we're not going to agree on this issue. The reason it's not a paradox or a puzzle, I think, is that process is so important here. I don't think any elected political official I have ever met has misunderstood the fundamental importance of re-election or the relationship between them and their electorate. I don't think anybody in the United States would be troubled when you told them you have a responsibility to your constituents. If the majority of your constituents want you to pursue a strategy that is contrary to the one being forwarded in Washington, in a strong relationship you can easily make that case.

Again, you have to very carefully choose where you want to differ, what fights you want to pick. Disagreement is a normal part of human interaction. Where disagreements break things down is when we disagree just for the sake of disagreeing. I often hear people claim that the test of an independent foreign policy is if it is contrary to those policies expressed and pursued in Washington. That may be, but it may also not be. It may be that our interests in the continent are sufficiently similar that we choose to pursue the same policies. It may be that our interests in the international system, our interests driven by the need to promote and guarantee order and stability are sufficiently similar that we choose the same instruments to pursue them, but we must have a relationship that is strong enough to withstand significant and real differences.

Ms. Annette Hester: I think the counterpoint to what Michael is saying is what I was mentioning about the difficulties with Brazil. They happened because the relationship is so thin, exactly the opposite. What happens when you have a relationship that is so narrow and so weak in the basis is that with the first disagreement on one issue, which is completely normal, everything seems to be crumbling apart. I think we already have the basis, and we just have to strengthen our relationship with the U.S. It's close enough, it's deep enough, wide enough that you can agree to disagree and move forward.

Certain things that get said end up being grandstanding on both sides of the border. Anyone watching the proceedings of politicians talking takes a step back and sees it more as grandstanding, whether it is an ambassador or a public figure. I do a lot of writing for newspapers, and I'm often surprised at the headlines that are put on my articles. I just go, whoa, where's that coming from? At times I wonder whether they even read what I wrote. It's amazing how headlines become headlines, pulled out of a speech. For anyone who's been in that situation, I'm certainly a reminder there are a lot of elements.

À (1030)

[Translation]

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: I couldn't agree with you more about the need to maintain close relations with the United States, given the significance of the economic, political and cultural ties that bind our two countries.

My question to you is this: In all honesty, do you believe that Canada can disagree with the United States on an issue such as Iraq? Although Canada is not officially part of the war effort, it finds itself in a situation right out of a Kafka novel, because some Canadian soldiers are in fact fighting alongside the British and the Americans, even as countries like Spain, which backs the US, have no soldiers in the theatre of war?

Do you really think we can back out without having to make some compromises, such as the ones we are making today, both in Iraq and in the Commons? To all intents and purposes, we're discussing a motion that amounts to an apology for the position we have taken vis-à-vis the United States.

[English]

The Chair: Rapidly. It was a comment, not a question.

[Translation]

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron: It was a question, and I would appreciate you're not commenting on or voicing an opinion about my questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: I merely wanted to know if you had a question.

[English]

Mr. Michael Hawes: In my view, you're exactly correct. We can and should pursue independent foreign policies. If the bulk of the Canadian electorate is opposed to this kind of intervention, we should take that position. No one said foreign policy is supposed to be easy or our position with respect to the United States isn't going to require a lot of difficult work on your part, on your colleagues' part, on the part of the Department of Foreign Affairs. I'm not trying to be flippant or dismissive in any way, but I honestly believe it is the strength of the relationship that allows us to operate this way during those very difficult moments. And this is not going to be the only one. We clearly had some very difficult moments with respect to Cuba. Our position, in my view, was unassailable. We should have taken no other position than the one we took. It was going to cause trouble in Washington, absolutely. Our position with respect to acid rain in the early 1980s, which I think generated the first of my crises in the capitals, was a position we should have taken and did take. It reflected Canadian interests, it reflected the position of the Canadian public, it reflected those things the electorate told you it wanted you to guarantee and protect for them.

Yes, sir, it's going to be hard, it's going to require an enormous amount of energy, and the stronger and steadier the relationship at moments other than these ones, the better off we are, the easier it's going to be to withstand this. The United States holds one position, but a great majority of the world holds another position. We can and should always protect and promote our unique values, but it's going to be difficult.

À (1035)

Ms. Annette Hester: That's what makes Canada great. I was in Brazil, and we were all commenting exactly on how wonderful it was that Canada was against the war, but actually continued with its commitments. They had to do with the Gulf, you had people there, but you could be there and still have the moral fortitude to say we don't agree with that.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Kraft Sloan.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Madam Hester, I wanted to talk to you about your proposal for a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to funding and supporting international research. I do a lot of environmental work and, though not with exactly the same kinds of arguments, have talked about the need for this capacity in that field. My first question relates to linkages with the policy-makers, the second relates to funding.

You have talked about a very substantial investment in an institutional instrument that deals with making this whole thing transparent etc. You've also talked about a significant commitment of public funds. It would seem to me, then, that some of the work would have to result in the achievement of certain public policy objectives. I know you don't always want to tie those things to a particular administration, because it's not always in the public interest to do so. With the United States as a particular model, if indeed you're going to develop this capacity for international studies and research, that would then mean, as a result, there is a good understanding of the rest of the world and the country's place in the world. I also hope, maybe just because I'm a Canadian, there would be an improvement, or enhancement, or a good situation with regard to the country's position within the multilateral process and framework. It seems that in the particular case of Iraq there's been a dismal failure in that regard. You also mentioned that they don't seem to understand Venezuela, they get that wrong. So maybe from a substantive point of view, there isn't a good information flow. I want to understand how you develop good linkages with the public policy-makers, because one would hope that research is going to influence the legislators.

Second, with regard to the partnering and the funding, because of my experience in Canada in the environmental movement, I know the Canadian foundations just cannot begin to compete with their sister or brother foundations in the United States. It's a whole different realm down there. So the foundation funding would be dicey, at best, and probably related to projects and research papers and things like that. And if a substantial amount of the money is coming from the private sector, again I have concerns about the outcome for good public interest-based policy. So I'm wondering if you could help with that.

Ms. Annette Hester: The fact that the U.S. administration has chosen not to use the expertise available, to me, doesn't mean that the expertise isn't available in the States. When the outbreak in Venezuela happened, the coup and counter-coup in April, the most poignant commentary was coming out of the States, out of the Carnegie Endowment, a series of scholars, and a series of centres. So the expertise is there. How the administration decides who they're going to choose to be there, I'm at a loss to comment on that.

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Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: Is there another nation that has a similar structure for support of these kinds of research centres?

Ms. Annette Hester: There are all kinds of different models. Britain has some different ones. But title VI has allowed the creation, on a scale proportionate to the size of the United States, of expertise in areas that is really second to none. When it comes to my area, Latin America, although Europe has some, it's really impressive, and it is independent scholarship of the highest kind, whether or not the administration uses it, which at times it has.

We are in a position, as a research centre, to fund projects; I don't have any problems finding project funding. The problem is that you go from project to project to project, and you never even stop to breathe. You're always looking for funding for the next project, and you can't stop and research, you can't stop and think, when you're trying to stop to think, to look at the picture and see where you're going, to be able to give somewhat informed advice of where should we be going, why we should be going there, whether we have considered the administration, whether it is important enough, all the little things that, in your experience as a researcher, you would bring together. You can't do that unless you can turn the lights on. I can't turn my lights on, I can't have a secretary, so I do very well at going to the post office. I'm going to get a PhD in photocopying, I do it very well. I write the paper, I print it, I photocopy it, I take it to the post office, because no one wants to provide core finance. We have support from companies, and they would like to have a deliverable result. I can talk deliverables until my face is blue--I'm a consultant to business, I know how to do that.

Also, we are supposed to do a business plan that is self-sustaining. Great, that means I'm a consultant, but if I'm a consultant inside a university, it means I'm competing with the private sector. I'm using the university backing and means to do that, which is even worse. So I don't do consulting, then I fight with my boss and my dean--who's a sweetheart--and the president of the university, because I said I'm not going to put out this business model that says I'm supposed to be self-sufficient, because I don't believe in that. The idea is that eventually, if you have a proper tax structure, if you build a system that gives the right incentives, hopefully, business and foundations will up the ante. This is where we're getting to in Alberta, where I'm saying, we can work as a partnership, what we see in Quebec is working very well.

When I travel abroad with ministers, with government, with businesses, I play a role nobody else can play, and if I'm a consultant, I can't play that role. I won't have access to the newspapers, I won't have access to journalists, I won't have access to different elected officials, even other business leaders, from the position of a consultant, but I do have that as a scholar and commentator.

We all have a part to play, and at some point we have to understand what the university and research centre support and go from there to the linkages with businesses, governments, and so on.

Mr. Michael Hawes: Nobody is operating at the same order of magnitude as the United States, period, but the German situation is attractive, with much more money for independent research, much more interest in an exchange, much more interest in outreach, as is, to a lesser extent and in a curious way, the Japanese situation. You might notice some historical similarities between the three countries.

Second, you're absolutely right about linking it with public policy. One of the things I've tried to do in the past 20 months is develop in my program a specific relationship with the CCMD, with the policy research initiative, with the PCO, with Justice, with CIDA, with the U.S. Geological Survey, with the United States Institute for Peace, because it's not just about academic research, it's about turning this into policy. I have just worked out a new arrangement with CIDA. The way that happens is to have people come and talk to them, for there to be an actual relationship between the research you're talking about and the people who pursue those policies.

Finally, I can't agree more, we need to have the foundations. Whatever structure that is, we need to have the objectivity, we need to have an organization where selection is made independently of political and business preferences. In my own organization we have, I think, one of the most cumbersome arrangements ever. In order for a young Canadian man or woman to get a Fulbright award, there's an academic committee of nine persons who view all the files without names, age, or gender. Then we have a six-person committee of three university presidents from Canada and three university presidents from the U.S. Then we have a congressionally sanctioned, presidentially appointed thing called the foreign scholarship board, who have to agree as well. But the bottom line is that we get to the end of the day, and there is no politics in this anywhere. It costs money for that long, complicated, arduous process, but we can absolutely guarantee that academic freedom and intellectual freedom are unassailable.

À (1045)

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: There's a program in Canada where members of Parliament spend time, a week, either in a labour union or a large corporation. I spent time with Shell Canada in Calgary. I don't know if anything like that exists between Canada and the United States. It might be a worthy project to consider, maybe not for you, but for someone else.

Mr. Michael Hawes: This September my foundation is going to put in place the first ever undergraduate exchange program between Canada and the United States. The Mexican government has such an internship for students and for faculty in the United States Congress, in the United States courts, and in United States businesses. We have no such thing. The U.S. State Department has provided me with some resources to look at what they call a trilateral enhancement project, and we're going to look at doing that. But there's nothing yet.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan: I've had American interns in my office several times.

The Chair: I want to thank both witnesses this morning for accepting our invitation. Your testimony, in a sense, was a little bit different, but it was very good.

I just want to say to colleagues that after our Thursday morning session I invite the members of the committee to take time to discuss some ideas regarding the content of the report about our foreign policy.

Thank you. I hope you have a nice day.

We're finished.