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37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, March 25, 2003

0905

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

The Hon. Bill Graham (Minister of Foreign Affairs)

0910

0915

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

0920

Mr. Stockwell Day

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Bill Graham

0925

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ)

0930

Mr. Bill Graham

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Bill Graham

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Bill Graham

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Bill Graham

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Bill Graham

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ)

Mr. Bill Graham

0935

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.)

Mr. Bill Graham

0940

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. Art Eggleton

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.)

Mr. Bill Graham

0945

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

Mr. Bill Graham

0950

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Mr. Bill Graham

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

0955

The Chair

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC)

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. Bill Casey

Mr. Bill Graham

Mr. Bill Casey

The Chair

Mr. Bill Graham

1005

The Chair

1010

Prof. Peter Stoett (Professor of Political Science, Concordia University)

1015

1020

The Chair

1025

Prof. Andrew Cohen (Professor, School of Journalism and Communication, Carleton University)

1030

1035

1040

The Chair

Mr. Stockwell Day

The Chair

Prof. Andrew Cohen

1045

Mr. Stockwell Day

Prof. Andrew Cohen

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Prof. Peter Stoett

The Chair

Prof. Peter Stoett

1050

The Chair

Prof. Andrew Cohen

The Chair

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.)

1055

The Chair

Prof. Peter Stoett

The Chair

Prof. Andrew Cohen

Mr. Murray Calder

Prof. Andrew Cohen

The Chair

Mr. Keith Martin

1100

Prof. Andrew Cohen

1105

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North, Lib.)

The Chair

Prof. Peter Stoett

1110

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

Prof. Andrew Cohen

1115

The Chair

Prof. Peter Stoett

Prof. Andrew Cohen

The Chair

Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.)

Prof. Andrew Cohen

Mr. André Harvey

The Chair

Prof. Andrew Cohen

Prof. Peter Stoett

1120

The Chair

Mr. Art Eggleton

The Chair

Prof. Peter Stoett

1125

The Chair

Prof. Andrew Cohen

The Chair

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.)

Prof. Andrew Cohen

1130

The Chair

Prof. Peter Stoett

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Redman

The Chair

Prof. Andrew Cohen

The Chair

Prof. Peter Stoett

1135

The Chair

Mrs. Karen Redman

The Chair

Mr. Jason Kenney (Calgary Southeast, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Prof. Peter Stoett

1140

The Chair

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Chair

Prof. Peter Stoett

The Chair

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

1145

Ms. Francine Lalonde

The Chair

CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NUMBER 025

2nd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, March 25, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿ (0905)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): The order of the day, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), is the consideration of a dialogue on foreign policy by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

We have the pleasure this morning of having before the committee

[Translation]

the Hon. Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Minister, welcome to our committee. We are eager to hear from you this morning. Committee members are looking forward to asking you questions and to receiving goods answers, if you please.

[English]

Mr. Minister, the floor is yours. Please start.

There are ten minutes for questions and answers afterward. We'll be very strict, because the minister has to leave for cabinet at 10 o'clock.

Mr. Minister.

[Translation]

The Hon. Bill Graham (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope that I will provide good answers, but that depends on the spirit in which the questions have been asked and received, isn't that right?

[English]

I am very pleased to be here with you this morning, Mr. Chairman and colleagues, at a moment that is obviously extremely important for us in our international relations. I'm sure that the war in Iraq is probably foremost in your minds—as it is in mine. We hope that it will soon end with minimal loss of life. When it does, Canada will be with the international community in a United Nations post-conflict reconstruction of that country, which will improve the lives of the Iraqi people.

Of course, there are other important matters for us to deal with. One of them in my current portfolio is the dialogue on foreign policy, which I'm pleased to discuss with you today. As you know, I launched these national public consultations on foreign policy in January, and they will run until May.

It might strike you—as it has struck me in recent months—that these are rather busy times to be launching public consultations on long-term directions in foreign policy. Certainly when we were doing the planning we did not anticipate conducting them amid the Iraq crisis now playing out. Yet the crisis does bring to the fore the exact types of broad questions that need to be thought of in a long-term perspective. Just to mention a few, these include our commitment to multilateral institutions and processes; our relationship with the United States; the shape and purpose of our military; the components of global security; and the application of Canadian values to a global context. As I've been telling people around the country for two months now, we can and must continue to address these broader and long-term issues of concern to Canadians, even as we deal with the urgent issues arising in our international relations.

And as I ask Canadians to help us reflect on choices and priorities for the future, I've also been reminding them that the government has been working in its own way to strengthen Canada's foreign policy capacities, by improving planning and coordination among the many departments whose work extends to international affairs. The development of an international policy framework will show citizens that we in Ottawa are determined to ensure that all branches of government work together in promoting the values and interests of Canadians, both at home and abroad.

[Translation]

The dialogue consultations are being carried out on many fronts, including through the traditional means of public meetings, expert round-tables and written submissions.

And, more innovatively, we are also using a website that enables people to read the dialogue paper online, respond to the question it poses, consult information resources and engage in discussion with other Canadians on topics of their choice. I'm asking to receive all contributions by May 1, and will report to Canadians on what I've heard in June.

As fellow parliamentarians, all of you here have a vital role to play in the dialogue process. In your capacity as MPs, I hope that all of you will take up my proposal to hold town hall meetings on foreign policy in your ridings, and to pass on what you hear from your constituents.

As members of this committee, you have already made a major contribution to this process through the report you delivered last December on our North American relationships. The fact, Mr. Chairman, that you chose to have it translated into Spanish is, in my view, an eloquent testimonial to the new reality of North America, and I congratulate committee members for this initiative. I think it sends an important signal that our Parliament is engaged in the process of North America.

The government will, of course, deliver its response to this report, which also serves as a significant part of the ongoing dialogue process. Your findings and the recommendations you give—on topics from sovereignty to trade, security and diplomatic relations—will be strengthened.

I understand that your next report is on a topic that is also central to the dialogue, namely Canada's relations with the Muslim world. One of the issues I'm asking Canadians to consider is how we might seek out opportunities for fostering global intercultural dialogue and inter-faith understanding.

As part of the dialogue process, I've also been conducting outreach efforts with Canadian ethnocultural communities in order to foster discussion about how we can ensure harmonious intercommunal relations here at home.

Colleagues, I strongly believe that this committee, which is broadly reflective of Canadian political opinion, can make an important contribution to our understanding of this issue of great global significance, and of potential Canadian contributions to dealing with it.

Now I'd like to tell you a bit about what has come out of the dialogue process so far.

To begin with our dialogue website, we've had plenty of interesting and diverse responses coming in. Unsurprisingly, a large number of people are weighing in on topics of security, and an even larger number are responding to the general question of how Canada's foreign policy can better reflect the interests and values of our citizens.

Both on the dialogue website and in the town hall meetings I've conducted, the Iraki crisis weighs heavily on people's minds. And that has been a mixed blessing in this context. The concern with immediate events does crowd out long-term and broader issues for some people; but on many occasions I've been struck by the fact that this crisis has focused Canadians on long-term questions about where our country should go in global affairs, and it has produced some remarkably sophisticated and insightful remarks on the connections between questions of security, prosperity and the values that Canada stands for.

¿ (0910)

[English]

I've been to quite a few town halls now, in Winnipeg, Montreal, and in each of the Atlantic provinces. Everywhere, the Iraq crisis has prompted broader reflections on the questions of our relationship with the United States; to what degree we can and should forge our own distinctively Canadian foreign policy; and to what degree our own economic welfare compels us to support U.S. agendas in world affairs.

In every town hall so far, there has been a strongly voiced call for Canada to take a broad, long-term view of security for ourselves and others, by putting more money into third world development and poverty eradication, and more effort into making a fairer international economic system.

Canada's record of peacekeeping and our promotion of human rights are also themes that are often mentioned by individuals in discussing how we can have a distinctive international role in promoting global security and prosperity.

It is not just security and prosperity that has been discussed, but also much discussed has been the third pillar of our foreign policy. As I mentioned, there is a great desire among Canadians these days to talk to each other about what Canada stands for, and what the deepest values are that shape the interests we have. Particularly in the Atlantic provinces, I was struck to hear how foreign students speak up and express how glad they are to be studying in Canada; how much they have learned about our society and institutions; and how much they hope to be able to return to their own countries to work to make them a bit more like Canada in many ways. Their comments, and the responses of native-born Canadians as well, show the importance of making educational outreach and exchange a central part of our third pillar. And on a final third pillar theme, I've just returned from discussions with representatives of our leading arts organizations at the Canadian Art Summit. They too have spoken eloquently about how much we can gain by doing more to present our arts and culture abroad.

These are all themes that I plan to study carefully in the coming months. In so doing, I look forward to drawing on your insights and experience, and I thank you for the contribution that your SCFAIT report has already made to the dialogue. The committee spends a great deal of time consulting with Canadians, and I am sure you all agree with me that this is one of the most vital aspects of our democratic government and our role as parliamentarians. I believe that it will stand us in good stead as we craft long-term priorities and directions for our country's foreign policy.

Thank you very much.

¿ (0915)

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister.

[English]

For the record, could you introduce the people who are sitting with you, beginning with Mr. Costello?

Mr. Bill Graham: Yes, I have with me Mr. Dan Costello and Ms. Natalie Brender, who have been associated with me in preparing the dialogue and working on the consultation process we are presently engaged in. Mr. Costello, of course, is my executive assistant.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you.

[English]

We'll go to questions and answers. It will just be one ten-minute round. If any party wants to share their time, I would agree with it.

Mr. Day, please.

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to thank the minister and his officials for being with us in a very busy and pressing time.

We have only ten minutes, and one of the challenges of this committee, of course, is that all members have good questions and it's difficult to get them all in. So what I am going to do is to ask the minister five very specific questions. With his ten minutes, it will give him about two minutes per question, should he choose to allot it that way, which is more time than he gets in question period.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask the minister if he could make his initial responses brief, and then give us in writing all background information and comments that he feels may be necessary. His response will determine the plan of the official opposition with regard to the government, be it a plan of attack or cooperation. Of course, we hope it is cooperation, because that is what flows from our hearts most readily.

The questions are as follows, which I have written out and will pass to the minister.

(1) Are there any circumstances under which the federal Liberals may change their position, and officially commit Canada to military participation with our allies in Iraq?

(2) Will the minister actively advocate for a specific war tribunal to bring charges against Saddam Hussein for crimes against humanity?

(3) Will the minister publicly request that the government join its allies immediately in banning the terrorist groups Jemaah Islamiah—the Bali bombers—the Al Aqsa Brigade, and the Iraqi-based National Liberation Front?

(4) Will the minister advocate on behalf of Taiwan's request to receive observer status at the World Health Organization meeting in May?

(5) What is the approximate amount of humanitarian aid Canada is proposing for the people of Iraq?

Thank you, Mr. Minister.

The Chair: The questions are very short and they did not have much of a preamble. We're waiting for your answers.

Mr. Bill Graham: Okay. How much time do I have?

The Chair: You have exactly eight minutes left.

Mr. Bill Graham: Mr. Day suggested I had ten minutes, but he did take some time asking the question, so let's be reciprocally fair about this.

I'll go backwards, Mr. Day. On the amount of humanitarian aid, obviously this is Ms. Whelan's department specifically. At present there is a commitment for $1.7 million to the United Nations for actual humanitarian aid, to which has been added another, I believe, $3.5 million. Don't hold me to the exact numbers, but it's around $6 million of commitment to the UN request, which had gone out to date. I understand, however, that the Secretary General will be making another call, and obviously the matter of humanitarian aid will be discussed with us in cabinet. I think that number will probably increase, if I could suggest that, but I can't give you a concrete number.

In terms of Taiwan observer status at the World Health Organization meeting in May, I would like to get back to you with a written response on that specific question. I see the representative of Taiwan here. It is not from any lack of wanting to make sure that the World Health Organization and Taiwan are able to play their role there, but there are some complex features that I'd like to check before I give you a complete answer, and I'll write you in the immediate future, not over a long term. I'm sure I can get an answer back to you very shortly.

On the terrorist groups, this is a matter more in the bailiwick, if you like, of the Solicitor General, who is actually engaged in preparing and determining which organizations are to come under these bans. My belief is that the groups you have mentioned here, I'm not sure about the Iraqi-based National Liberation Front, but the other two are already on the UN terrorist list prepared by Canada. The Solicitor General is currently reviewing the status of all such organizations, and this is a decision by a special cabinet committee. When it's made, it will be announced, and I will convey to the Solicitor General the interests of the committee in making sure that these three are considered.

In terms of a specific war tribunal, I spoke to your colleague some days ago in the House. Again, I know this relates to some extent to the motion your colleague Mr. Kenney introduced in the House. We certainly sympathize with the prospects of a war tribunal.

The reason there's been some discussion around the proposition of the Canadian Alliance support on this issue, in my understanding, is that if we're going to have a war crimes tribunal and we follow the model of the former Yugoslavia war crimes tribunal, obviously these are set up by the Security Council and are authorized by the Security Council. We would certainly support that. We would certainly support a tribunal of that nature to deal with Iraq.

If other parties propose other types of tribunals, and there are amalgams of other types of tribunals--after the Second World War there were various types of tribunals, some of them set up by the actual Allied powers themselves, some of them under international agreement, etc.--we'd have to look at it, whether it was a form of an international agreement, rather than a Security Council process, or another process. But certainly we are supportive of the idea of a war crimes tribunal under, if I could say, the former Yugoslavia model under the Security Council.

I've answered, of course, the question about commitment to military participation with our allies in Iraq. One is not capable of foreseeing all possible consequences under which such a decision might have to be made, and therefore we are not commenting on that as to what circumstances it would be, because I can't foresee every form of circumstance.

¿ (0920)

I do want to assure the committee that the government of course monitors all of these situations extremely carefully, and we will act always in terms of the interests of Canada and with our allies in these types of circumstances as they arise.

Mr. Stockwell Day: Just to be clear on that final question, the government has not ruled out the possibility of eventually joining our allies in an official military capacity related to the Iraq conflict. That has not been finally ruled out and that door closed. Is that correct?

Mr. Bill Graham: The government does not foresee at this time any reason that we would join in a military intervention.

The Chair: Mr. Martin, one question.

Mr. Keith Martin (Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, Canadian Alliance): Thank you.

Mr. Graham, at the end of the day, a foreign policy has to have a good defence policy. They can't exist in isolation, but must be constructed in tandem. Would you support a combined defence and foreign policy review?

Mr. Bill Graham: It depends again on what you mean by combined. Last time we did a foreign policy review it was a Senate and House of Commons committee, which took two years to do its report and then subsequently to get the report of the government in. If one were proposing a combined defence and foreign policy review of that kind where you would put together the defence and foreign affairs committees with a Senate committee, I know from my experience with the structures of the House that, while it's not impossible, it's extremely complicated to manage. Mr. Bergeron, who was there at the time of the first review, I think, would probably agree with me. It's a complicated process to manage. I'd like to get something done perhaps sooner than that. The Speech from the Throne called for the defence and foreign reviews to be done in a way that we can get some long-term guidance in future, which I think has to be shorter than that one, if we tried to put in a combined review.

But, from that, I do want to assure you.... Mr. McCallum often says that defence is derivative of foreign affairs. And we accept that, I think, and most parliamentarians accept that. On the other hand, we also accept, I believe, what I say to him, which is that foreign affairs is to some extent dependent on defence, because without a robust defence capacity our foreign affairs options are inhibited or enhanced, depending on where we are. We recognize that they're linked, but I don't contemplate at this time doing a linked review. We're doing our reviews and recognizing the linkages, but not actually bringing them together as a process. And I think that's mainly because of time constraints and the complexity of that challenge.

¿ (0925)

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Minister. We will now give the floor to Ms. Lalonde, who will share her time with Mr. Bergeron.

Ms. Lalonde.

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Welcome, Mr. Minister.

Mr. Minister, I appreciate the last answer you gave. But I would like to say that the review which is being carried out is a sort of interim review, because, given unfolding events, we are witnessing a transformation of the world situation. This transformation directly affects Canada because depending on what the United States does next with regard to this crisis and the war in Irak, they may permanently alter the nature of multilateralism, if I may put it that way.

But I have a specific question this morning which bothers me. When I read the Globe and Mail, I saw that you had made a statement which changed Canada's position. When the Prime Minister decided that Canada would not participate in this war, which to his mind is not justified, he greatly insisted on the fact that the United States was seeking regime change. He repeatedly spoke to the various dangers such a policy represented. But based on what I read this morning, you say, or seem to say, that it is all right for the United States to seek regime change in Irak.

So, there are two parts to my question. Is your position different from that of the Prime Minister, or did you announce a change in the government's policy, based for the most part on the fact that Mr. Chrétien said that the regime was dangerous for international order. The Prime Minister asked: "Who is next?"

¿ (0930)

Mr. Bill Graham: No, my position is not different from that of the Prime Minister, Ms. Lalonde. Canada has always looked for a feasible resolution with regard to disarming Saddam Hussein.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Yes.

Mr. Bill Graham: We worked very hard on that issue. The Prime Minister has been clear. That is why we did not join forces with the Americans and the British. It is because we believe in the multilateral system and in the importance of the role played by the Security Council with respect to protecting global security. Nothing has changed as regards those matters.

But one thing has completely changed and that is the fact that despite all our efforts, the war has started. We are now witnessing a war.

In the long-term interests of the world, and those of Canada and even of the United States, it would be best for this war to end as quickly as possible, with as few victims as possible. I think you would agree with me that this conflict has to end as quickly as possible.

So, what I was saying is that although we had a different position at the time, now that the war has been started, Canadians cannot be indifferent to its outcome. Perhaps that is why I expressed myself as I did in the interview you referred to.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: I simply want to point out, Mr. Minister, that your answer still seems strange to me, because what seemed to be a position of principle has disappeared, although the Prime Minister had been very clear on it.

I will now give the rest of my time to...

Mr. Bill Graham: To give you an example of what I mean, I could ask you a question. Do you think that the Americans should lose this war?

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Of course not.

Mr. Bill Graham: I feel the same way. The war has started and I should add, if you will, that Canadians have a very close relationship with the United States. We are their allies and we are fighting with the United States against terrorism. We are also working side-by-side with our American friends in defending the North American continent. Therefore, there are many issues which bring us close together.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: But those are two different things, sir.

Mr. Bill Graham: Of course, that was not the case with regard to finding a resolution to this issue, but now that the war has begun, we are telling our American friends that we hope it will end as quickly as possible.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: But saying that you hope it will end as soon as possible, with as few casualties as possible, is not the same as changing one's position or being perceived as having changed one's position. That's the issue I want to highlight, Mr. Minister.

Mr. Bill Graham: All right, but I just want to assure you that I did not mean to give the impression that I had changed my position. No, I never changed my position; we are obviously in a very different situation today.

The Chair: Mr. Bergeron.

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron (Verchères—Les-Patriotes, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Given the many questions asked by Mr. Martin and the question subsequently asked by Ms. Lalonde, I feel, Mr. Minister—please correct me if I'm wrong—that the review, or the dialogue, which you have initiated is not to completely review Canada's foreign policy, but rather to update it.

Given the deadline you set out, don't you think that the update will be, at the very least, premature, since current events may lead to a complete upheaval of the existing international order, and that its outcome will determine—several people have mentioned this, including Ms. Lalonde—how much flexibility Canada will have with regard to the emerging hyperpower, namely the United States?

Mr. Bill Graham: Many people have talked about shifting tectonic plates. Obviously, this is affecting NATO, our relationships in the northern Arctic and those with our European allies. Many things are being called into question because of the ongoing conflict, and we must talk about them.

That being said, Mr. Bergeron, let me assure you that having the dialogue at this time is very useful to Canadians. The people who are participating really want to be heard; they want to be consulted, they want to express their feelings about our future relationship with the United States and what they expect from Canada in the future. A great deal of focus has been put on the third pillar, which you and I have discussed at length, in the course of our first review, which deals with Canadian values and how they shape our attitude towards prosperity and the other two pillars, including security.

Despite the problems created by war, I think the timing is good. I'm not saying that this is an interim process, since we will learn some lessons.

That being said, however, significant change is happening. We will adapt. For instance, we will consider our role with regard to the Muslim world, an issue which this committee will study and which is so important, given the current situation.

Therefore, there are issues such as these which cannot be postponed indefinitely, at least to my mind. Let's do the job. Let's carry on with the dialogue. Allow me to present a report on Canada's foreign policy, in this context, at the end of the year. Afterwards, we can decide how we will deal with the fact that we are living in a time which, in my opinion, is fairly turbulent and unstable.

So, I don't necessarily disagree with you on the fact that we cannot set the course for the next 20 years; that would be asking a bit too much. But I still think this is a valid and important exercise at this time.

¿ (0935)

The Chair: Thank you, Minister.

Mr. Eggleton.

[English]

Mr. Art Eggleton (York Centre, Lib.): Minister, I appreciate that you're here on the broader question of a foreign policy dialogue, but obviously Iraq is top of the mind, and I have some questions on that. If there's time, I also have a question on the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

Let me start with Iraq. The government position is one that I heartily applaud. I believe it to be the right one. We should not be in Iraq. It was an unnecessary and the wrong decision, I believe, by the United States and the United Kingdom to launch military action when there still was an opportunity to bring about disarmament through peaceful means. Unfortunately, however, Mr. Bush's agenda is more related to regime change than disarmament.

Let's move on, then. The war is under way. We all hope it will be quick, and so far it has been going rather quickly, but we don't know what kind of resistance will happen when they get closer to Baghdad.

Let me ask you about where we go from here and the United Nations role in all of this as well. The United Nations has been cast aside at this point by the coalition. How do we get the United Nations back on track? How do we save the Security Council? How do we deal with the issue of what happens next? How do we deal with the issue of containing this conflict? In containing this conflict, how do we prevent either a widening of further instability in the region or a broadening of the Muslim versus west situation that we hope does not further develop in that direction?

And in the next step with Iraq, when the military operation is over, it strikes me that the war might be easier to win than the peace. What will happen then? What are you proposing will happen in terms of the governance of Iraq? The United States is probably going to put a military governor there. What role do you think the United Nations should play in that? What role should Canada play in rebuilding a civil society and hopefully a democratic society in the region?

Mr. Bill Graham: Obviously, these are important questions in relation to Iraq, but they're also important questions in terms of the whole idea of foreign policy dialogue and what we're trying to achieve as a long-term foreign policy. I think it puts in relief a lot of the issues we have to look at.

Clearly, we're going to have to see now how we can revaluate, if that's a good word, the international institutions, which we believe are so important, the Security Council foremost. The thing about the United Nations, of course, is that it's not just the Security Council. It has a lot of other aspects to it, such as the High Commission for Refugees, which will inevitably be engaged in the Iraq issue. There are UN agencies and others that are already engaged. Kofi Annan has called upon us for humanitarian aid.

I believe there is an important role for the United Nations to play in providing humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people and the region and in the reconstruction of the region. I believe that the United Kingdom is also strongly of that view. I believe there's a debate within the U.S. administration as to exactly what that role should be. There are some people in the U.S. administration who believe strongly that it should be largely a U.S.-led effort, and there are others who believe that it should be with UN and multilateral support.

When I spoke to Secretary Powell last week, I mentioned this to him. I talked about President Bush's reference to the United Nations in the Azores speech. He said he felt that was one of the more substantive aspects of the Azores declaration, the recognition of the role of multilateral institutions in a post-conflict era. I have spoken to several of my other foreign minister colleagues in Europe, who are strongly of that view. So there's a strong constituency for establishing an important role for multilateral institutions, particularly the United Nations, in the reconstruction.

We have attended a couple of meetings in Washington at the diplomatic level that have been organized to discuss this. I wouldn't say that a consensus has been reached among everybody there, but I would say that the consensus among Canada, the United Kingdom, and various other countries is that we must work to build for a proper multilateral, United Nations-led role. As you say, it's easier perhaps to win the war than the peace. It's only by a multilateral and broadly based approach that we're going to successfully deal with the aftermath of the conflict in such a volatile region of the Middle East, with which you're very familiar.

¿ (0940)

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Do I have some time left?

The Chair: No.

Everyone wants to ask questions.

We'll go to Mrs. Redman for one question. Then we'll go to Ms. McDonough.

Mr. Bill Graham: On the commission, were you going to ask me about--

Mr. Art Eggleton: I've written you a letter on the subject.

Mr. Bill Graham: Okay.

The Chair: Mrs. Redman.

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Minister, for coming.

We've had several very enlightening interventions, some from NGOs and some from academics, talking about the current situation in Iraq. It was Professor Sigler from Carleton who said that part of the reputation that Canada enjoys internationally is really predicated on the activities of our non-government institutions and that it was under one of your predecessors, Lloyd Axworthy, that we changed the kind of interface Canada enjoys between the non-government agencies and the government. I'm wondering whether as part of this dialogue on foreign policy we're specifically looking at that.

As members of Parliament, we speak to community groups and children in our ridings. I'm always struck by the appetite on the part of young people to join the non-government movement more readily than they see themselves becoming part of the government as a viable, effective way to impact not only domestic issues but indeed international issues.

I'm interested in hearing your comments on the way we interface with the non-government bodies and how you see that being part of this discussion on foreign policy.

Mr. Bill Graham: I totally agree with you about the interface with NGOs. Obviously they are all making important contributions to the dialogue process. They are better organized than the general public in terms of making sure they present a document. So in addition to the town halls, the Internet, and all of these other things, we are getting position papers.

For example, as I said in my introductory comment, I was at Banff on Saturday giving a speech to the Council for Business and the Arts in Canada about the role of the foreign policy in terms of culture, and they already presented a brief to me.

I attended a meeting of the Public Policy Forum recently here in Ottawa at which we discussed the role of NGOs versus government. I talked a little bit about the tension sometimes between parliamentarians, who represent civil society, and other civil society groups, and the way in which we have to manage that very important relationship in a modern democracy.

I personally believe that interface is very important. I agree with Professor Sigler. I think that is something we are more actively engaged in than ever before. I certainly, personally, will continue to do that.

We have, for example, in the department certain programs like diplomatie ouverte or the human security agenda, which have extensive links with, and take a lot of guidance from, civil society organizations as to how we should be delivering those programs. We have a working relationship. It's sometimes a tense one, because sometimes we take policy decisions certain groups don't like, but that's the nature of the thing. The important thing is we have an active and respectful dialogue with one another.

¿ (0945)

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Minister.

[English]

Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you.

Mr. Minister, I had the opportunity to attend the foreign policy dialogue session in Halifax. I think you will agree there was virtual unanimity in that session about the importance of Canada, in the context of the Iraqi war, maintaining a principled stand for multilateralism, standing firm for peace, and playing the humanitarian role Canadians want to see their government play.

Consistent with that--and I congratulate the government for it--the Prime Minister staked out exactly that position in the decision to not participate in the war in Iraq. Parliament voted to reinforce that.

I would ask you to comment briefly on the amount of dismay that is felt, I think, by a great many Canadians about what seems to be a weakening and a waffling and a wobbling on that principled position in the last couple of days with such statements as we respect the American government's decision to engage in regime change, we wish them well in winning the war, and so on.

The second thing, flowing directly from that, and picking up on your comments, with which I agree, that the interface between government and humanitarian agencies is very important, particularly in the context of the monumental tragedy that is unfolding in Iraq today, you will know this committee passed a motion, which was reported in the House, calling upon you, as the foreign affairs minister and the minister responsible for CIDA in international development, to ramp up, to step up, to accelerate efforts around addressing the humanitarian crisis in Iraq that is unfolding.

I'd like to ask two questions. Could you report specifically to the committee what measures have been taken to ramp up the response? It's worrisome that we're hearing from Minister Whelan comments like we're waiting to see, and we're expecting.... I think you've mentioned that $6 million has been allocated, which is peanuts compared to what Canada should be doing.

Secondly, in relation to that, and consistent with your acknowledging the importance of the humanitarian agencies, the NGOs, will you agree to convene urgently a forum, a summit, a meeting with the Canadian NGOs to talk about how Canada can play the most effective possible role in dealing with this tragedy?

Within one week people have no idea how 16 million Iraqis are going to be fed. Already there are indications in Basra, and it's certainly about to unfold in Baghdad, that there is a severe crisis with respect to food, with respect to water, and with respect to the infrastructure, sanitation, the wiping out of electricity, and so on. There is a human tragedy beyond anything that I think the Canadian government has begun to really fully acknowledge, let alone address, unfolding as we sit here around this table.

My question, quite specifically, is will you take the leadership, as Canadians want this government to do, in bringing together the Canadian NGOs to come up with the most effective proactive strategy of which Canadians will be supportive and I think want their government to undertake?

Mr. Bill Graham: Perhaps I can take the last question first. Clearly I agree with most of your analysis, Ms. McDonough. I think, however, I have to be obviously clear that this is largely my colleague Ms. Whalen's responsibility to organize, and I support her in that. We work carefully together to make sure that the political aspects are correct, but ultimately she will.... I will take your recommendation to her that perhaps a meeting with certain groups would be worth while. You're thinking of specialists like Oxfam Canada--

¿ (0950)

Ms. Alexa McDonough: NGOs provided very excellent testimony before this committee. They gave rise to our motion from the committee.

Mr. Bill Graham: --the CCIC and other groups. I understand the groups would be.... And I'll certainly recommend looking at that; it's a helpful suggestion.

On the actual amounts, as you say, $6 million clearly is not going to be all that Canada is going to provide. But as you'll recall, the original United Nations call was for something like $35 million from all countries, and we put up $1.7 million, which was our appropriate amount in the general scheme of things. Then Mr. Kofi Annan upped that and requested more and we came up to the $6 million, or $5.5 million, wherever we are today. We know now that the Secretary General will be coming back with another request, and I am discussing with Ms. Whalen and we're considering what is the nature of our response in what we would be doing.

So I don't disagree with you; they're going to be huge demands, and Canadians will want to be responsive, generously, to those demands. But I think we want to see what the demands are, to see how we can best respond to them, rather than jumping in and making a specific offer, which we then find doesn't correspond with what the United Nations are trying to do.

We want to work with them, and we are. I know that Ms. Whalen is working with them in consultation, and I'm sure this matter will be discussed in cabinet this morning when we have an opportunity to decide what we should be doing.

We're certainly aware of it. We've met the request to date with the generosity that Canadians expect, and I know that Ms. Whalen is determined that we will be both generous and active in the humanitarian and reconstruction area.

On your first issue, I really can't accept that there is any, as you qualified it, weakening and wobbling on our position. We worked awfully hard to prevent a war, and I agree with you, the Halifax meeting clearly indicated Canadians were really concerned and really wanted us to do that. And I was pleased that the government policy from the very beginning was that. It was what the Prime Minister started out with when he went to see Mr. Bush way back before this got anywhere near where we are today.

We worked hard on a peaceful compromise that we thought would bring the Security Council together, and we're very disappointed.... I was interested to see a commentator as knowledgeable as Joseph Nye, the author of the book The Paradox of American Power, say in an article he wrote, which you may have seen in the Globe and Mail on the weekend, that the Canadian proposal actually had the seeds, had it been given more time and opportunity, to bring the council together.

We've always been in favour of disarmament through the peaceable means. That's why we took the policy decision we did not to engage in the process. But I do have to say that now that war has begun, let us consider, in terms of humanitarian considerations for the Iraqi people, do we want a long, drawn-out war? Do we want a war with countless victims? Do we want a war around Baghdad where a whole city could look like Stalingrad or something? Is that what we want? No, we don't want that.

We as Canadians want to see this ended as quickly as possible, with as few victims, as few casualities, both civilian and military, as possible. We have to take the fact that it was Saddam Hussein's policies on weapons of mass destruction that got us there in the first place. We had different means that we would have pursued, but we believe strongly that now that the war is engaged, we can't be indifferent to its outcome. We can't be indifferent to its outcome because we are allied to the United States in the war against terrorism and the security of North America, and in many other ways. And we can't be indifferent to its outcome because we believe that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people require a short end to this terrible conflict so that they can return to their lives with as little destruction as possible.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Minister.

Now we'll go to Mr. Casey.

Mr. Bill Graham: I'll answer that question, then I really have to go.

¿ (0955)

The Chair: Just a quick question, Mr. Casey.

Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC): A quick question. I have a lot of questions.

Obviously, our most important relationship is with the United States. We've certainly run into some stresses in that relationship recently.

On the weekend, I saw on CNN that Canada refused to evict Iraqi diplomats. I was surprised to see that. It didn't say who asked us to evict them, but I thought it was strange that somebody would ask us to evict Iraqi diplomats. So I wonder, did somebody ask, who asked, when was it, and why would they make it public who they asked, and then that it was refused?

Mr. Bill Graham: My understanding is that the United States made a public announcement to the effect that they would like other countries to expel Iraqi diplomats, and this was circulated. It didn't come to my personal attention and it wasn't a specific request to the Government of Canada. It was a statement in Washington to the effect that it would be desirable for countries to expel Iraqi diplomats. There was no specific request from the American embassy here in Ottawa that we should expel the one Iraqi diplomat who is present in the country.

We already took a step last December to ask Iraq to remove an individual who we believe was conducting himself in a way that was not compatible with his diplomatic functions. We are watching carefully to make sure whether the present rather second-level official in their embassy is conducting himself in a way that is consistent with diplomatic responsibilities and principles, and we'll take the necessary action if any action is necessary to be taken. That's where we presently stand.

Mr. Bill Casey: The CNN--

Mr. Bill Graham: I think that the CNN report is unfortunate, in the sense that it leaves the impression we're refusing to do something. Many countries have looked at this and said they have to take some action, and they've either done or not done. I think that's all the United States wants us to do. They don't expect us to just jump up and push everybody out. What they want us to do is make sure we're being vigilant, and believe you me, we are, and we will continue to do that.

Mr. Bill Casey: So we weren't asked and we didn't refuse.

Mr. Bill Graham: We certainly didn't refuse, because as I say, I know that officials were aware of the statement that was made in Washington, but that's not the same as a démarche where they would come and say will you please do this. That was a statement of American policy, which once we became aware of.... We're certainly looking at it. We're capable of looking at this issue from a Canadian perspective and determining, as I say, what comportment to follow and whether it's in our interests to do this.

We clearly indicated that last December when we did request and insist on the removal of an Iraqi diplomat who was not carrying on his functions consistent with his diplomatic status.

Mr. Bill Casey: I have one last little comment.

I thought that given the way they did it--I don't know how they did it, but it was on CNN, so I'm assuming CNN got that information somewhere--it seemed to me like they were trying to send a message about Canada. It's a reflection on the stress of the relationship and how important it is that we try to work with that relationship and improve it. I took it as some trying to send a message maybe to the American people about Canada. I think it's such a crucial relationship that we should deal with it.

I have one more question.

Mr. Bill Graham: I certainly agree that it's our most important relationship, but I hope that neither you nor I will depend upon CNN to determine the nature of our relationship, or we might be in serious trouble in a lot of areas.

Mr. Bill Casey: Somebody told CNN.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister, for having appeared before the committee this morning.

[English]

I know now that you need to go to cabinet. Thanks again.

We're going to suspend for five minutes.

Mr. Bill Graham: I apologize for having to leave so quickly, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much.

À (1005)

The Chair: Colleagues, we're going to start back.

Now we're going to keep going with the dialogue on foreign policy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

As witnesses this morning, we have, from Concordia University, Mr. Peter Stoett, who is a professor of political science. Mr. Stoett wrote a book regarding recent human and global security and exploration of the terms.

Also, we have, from Carleton University, Mr. Andrew Cohen, who is a professor of the School of Journalism and Communication, and who participated in a North American study.

Welcome, both of you.

We're going to start with your remarks, Professor Stoett.

Mr. Stoett, please.

À (1010)

Prof. Peter Stoett (Professor of Political Science, Concordia University): Thank you.

I'd like to begin by thanking the standing committee for inviting me to speak on the ongoing questions with which it is faced.

This is, indeed, a most difficult time to assess Canadian foreign policy, given the magnitude and pervasive nature of current events. However, the immediacy of the Iraqi crisis will pass, and Canada remains in need of a broader foreign policy direction. So while I would be pleased to address any questions related to the current state of war, a war I have strongly opposed--and incidentally, I commend the Prime Minister and his government for the decision to refrain from active military involvement--I will instead turn to longer-term but obviously related issues.

The terms of reference for this discussion are sufficiently wide that I risk exceeding my time limit in the process, so I'll limit myself to a few chosen themes.

Foreign policy is a reflection of both internal and external constraints and possibilities, and the line between the two is increasingly blurred as globalization continues in its often interruptive path. While the opportunities globalization presents are both enticing and realizable, never before has the accompanying question of global inequality burned so brightly on the political landscape.

There's no need to reiterate its many manifestations, although our own Prime Minister has done so in controversial televised interviews. While the temptation to simply overlook the growing divide between rich and poor is strong in the face of current events, it would be both detrimental to national security and, I would argue, ethical priorities to do so.

In this light, I would urge Canada to abstain from the urge to abandon multilateralism and to continue its commitment to a human security agenda. However, this needs to be done within the context of an articulation of Canadian strengths and constraints.

On the question of our three pillars--security, prosperity, and values in culture--I would suggest that the third pillar, which operationalized in the foreign policy context can only mean the effort to spread Canadian values, is the most problematic, expendable, and ultimately replaceable.

It would be a disservice to Canada's diversity to argue that a uniform set of values even exists, let alone determines foreign policy, except to say that we should encourage the acceptance of similar diversity abroad, which is not to say much beyond a rather conventional human rights agenda promoting democratization and toleration. That we need a pillarization, if I can use that phrase, to tell us this is quite embarrassing.

Further, this emphasis on the Canadian value of humanitarian efforts is somewhat misleading, because these are not solely Canadian concerns; they are fairly universal in scope. To cover the human security agenda under the umbrella of Canadian culture and values smacks of the type of evangelical multilateralism that irritates both the self-proclaimed realists on the right and the cultural relativists on the left.

While it's admirable to promote human rights and the multicultural consequences of freedom of speech and, I would add, social equality, there is no need to dress this in the Canadian flag. Rather, actions speak louder than words in this regard, and if we are concerned about a truly reflexive anti-Americanism--I know it's a big topic in Ottawa today--as opposed to sophisticated criticism of American domestic and foreign policy, of which I'm in favour, then we should be careful about teaching Canadian children through moral pontification associated with the equation of spreading Canadian culture with what are essentially basic humanitarian concerns.

I would suggest dropping this pillar altogether, while continuing to promote multiculturalism abroad and engaging in cultural exchanges facilitating mutual educational experiences.

Overall, it is unrealistic to raise expectations regarding Canada's role in the world. Simply put, we are not built for multilayered leadership. Often the pressure to compensate for middle-power status so closely integrated with a superpower results in a Canadian fix-it-ism. The Pearson legacy and other mythologies push expectations further in this regard. This is a direction away from enhanced credibility, recent successes aside.

However, this need not resign us to the pursuit of whole areas of so-called niche diplomacy. We need an encompassing theme, one that cuts across the humanitarian, ecological, and human rights orientation of the human security agenda, but which also permits us to capitalize on obvious areas of strength in terms of human and physical resources.

It is easy to forget the fears of global ecological collapse that permeated much of the international debate a few years ago, but they are unmistakably part of the future policy dilemma context, as scarcity spreads and pollution further impoverishes millions.

Indeed, I would suggest that sustainable development, rather than providing a short-term niche opportunity, should constitute a third pillar in and of itself, both tempering and promoting the remaining two.

Though it is obvious that many will refute the validity of such a focus, concerned perhaps that it may conflict with the security and prosperity themes, it is time Canada sharpened its commitment to the human security agenda it has painstakingly developed with realized commitments to these areas within the realm of fiscal prudence.

À (1015)

This is not against Canada's self-interest. We can supply limited leadership in many related areas and there is in fact serious overlap with the other pillars.

For example, the development of renewable energy sources should be a national priority, not only because of our Kyoto commitment, but because there is no need to rely on foreign energy supplies. And it is argued here.... I have a recent publication with which I'm quite happy. I'd like to give copies to you after, if anyone would like it. We suggest strongly in this publication that, in point of fact, renewable energy sources do enhance security, contrary to the popular mythology that we need to rely on fossil fuel energy in order to enhance security.

It's a business opportunity of the highest order, as well. We risk falling behind the Europeans and Americans in this sector without expanded effort. It's a foreign policy question, since Canada continues, through CIDA, the EDC, and other instruments, to promote the development of highly centralized energy infrastructures in the southern hemisphere.

The most recent white paper on foreign policy, Canada in the World, makes repeated reference to sustainable development, including a pledge to “ensure that Canadian foreign policy promotes sustainable development globally through the careful and responsible balancing of trade, development, and environmental considerations.” But the needs and benefits of elevating this to pillar status, if I might coin such an awkward term, are apparent to many today.

There is of course a problem with employing such an imprecise term to policy direction, though I would argue it is no less precise than security, prosperity, or Canadian values, of all things. The term demands that we focus on the consequences of present activity and consider the ecological and social impact of globalization and particular government activities. This translates into responsibility, the need to grant our children's children a fighting chance to enjoy their lives in peace and prosperity.

While we might believe Canada can escape the problems caused by environmental harm and social inequality elsewhere, this is misguided thinking. An explicit ethic of sustainable development can carry on the important task of convincing Canadians today to worry about the Canadians of tomorrow.

When the Iraqi dust settles--and let's hope it does soon--and after we have made a small but significant contribution to the humanitarian crisis, we will still face the serious problem of environmental decline at home and abroad. We will rediscover the urgent task of coordinating the activities of different governments engaged in the same struggle.

Global environmental governance, I would argue, is a misnomer. There's no such thing. It's a catch academic phrase. But a loose network of agreements dedicated to averting environmental destruction does exist, some of which are headquartered in Canada, and all of which involve some measure of Canadian participation.

Our commitments to multilateral environmental agreements, and our productivity within them, have had decidedly mixed results. But here is an area where Canadian expertise is booming, where new educational programs have invested Canadian youth with enthusiasm, where new markets for products are emerging around the world. At the same time, such a pillar would hardly exclude the more rudimentary elements of Canadian self-interest. For example, we cannot properly address sustainable development without an active program to protect from over-exploitation our resources, including fish, forest, and water. These are not simply domestic policy concerns in the age of globalization.

In terms of multilateral commitments, here is yet another opportunity to look beyond American dominance and to emphasize the significance of the commons, indigenous peoples, the Arctic, and global biodiversity. While many humanitarian concerns, such as emergency relief, children's rights, land mines, and refugee protection, have been forced under the security rubric, they too contribute to the overall sustainable development framework.

This pillar would imply Canadian willingness to make certain sacrifices, but these are often exaggerated. This would involve actively advocating environmental and social considerations in our trade agreement participation, emphasizing the potential role of institutions such as NAFTA's Commission on Environmental Cooperation.

Contrary to rumours, incidentally, the United Nations is still alive, and the United Nations Environment Programme could be a further point of contribution for Canada.

There are other elements of this program, of course, involving southern states being given better access to Canadian markets, corporate responsibility, including codes of conduct that integrate social and environmental priorities that can be encouraged in the private sector. Although this has been a problematic area in the past, it's still worth pursuing, in my mind.

This pillar would also embrace the significant role of non-governmental organizations. And I'll abstain from the blanket coverage of such groups offered by what I consider a somewhat misleading term, “civil society” organizations.

À (1020)

However, the rise in public opposition to not only military adventurism but also to the problematic differentiated impact of globalization sends a strong and clear message to states everywhere that governments are but part of the political equation. Without active NGO participation in public review processes such as this one, there would be a legitimacy issue to contend with. This is not to suggest that facile efforts to co-opt marginalized voices are to be encouraged, but rather a genuine effort to continue the embryonic dialogue taking place between state and non-state actors at a multitude of levels of interaction.

The growing sense that governments are impotent in the face of globalization or American domination cannot be countered with a paragraph or two in a foreign policy statement reflecting the wishes of the disenchanted, but only with a serious demonstration of the significance of their concerns. As was suggested earlier today, there is a wealth of Canadian talent in the NGO sector. It should be recognized in any long-term planning, within reasonable limits, of course.

I'd just like to comment on a couple of other factors, including a brief word on Canada's armed forces. It's a sad reflection on the current state of affairs that a peacemonger like me can lament the lack of appreciation paid to our armed forces. While I see no need for a strong offensively oriented military, I value the contribution that Canada has made to peacekeeping operations. I also respect the need for adequate homeland defence—though not, I would argue, through increasingly pervasive security measures, but a strong military.

While recent budget appropriations toward defence and foreign aid spending move in the right direction, they are both short of what one would expect from a state with a robust foreign policy and multitudinous commitments around the world. We need to spend more money on decent but not extravagant military equipment, and most importantly also on the men and women who have committed their lives to the Canadian military, including adequate salaries and, where necessary, post-traumatic stress treatment.

With regard to foreign aid, the African initiative is indeed a promising beginning, but pales in comparison to what is needed to make a solid Canadian contribution to mitigating the AIDS pandemic, which is the greatest health security threat of our time, along with chronic malnutrition. Again, there are limits to what we can do, and a feasibility study would be appropriate regarding the Canadian response to the AIDS pandemic. But there is an ethical obligation, as Stephen Lewis reminds us, to help those who are suffering and are within reach of our aid.

Similarly, Iraq is an understandable focus, but we should not forget the other humanitarian crises taking place in the world today, such as Afghanistan, Eritrea, Burundi, Liberia, and Guinea—and I could go on. In more structural terms, though there's some understandable resistance to these ideas, third world debt needs to be reduced. And I think that the amount of Canadian aid tied to the purchase of Canadian products and services remains problematic.

There are of course many competitors for focus. Naturally, continental relations are a reasonable obsession for Canadian foreign policy analysts, students, and politicians. It would be chimerical to argue that Canada has the freedom of maneuver to avoid increasing interoperability on continental defence, but this does not necessitate full-scale integration. Indeed, I would argue it is important to avoid the latter in all respects—be they military, economic, or political—to preserve a distinct Canadian foreign policy and polity.

There is no reason why this is not possible, save perhaps the fear that our star is so tightly in orbit around the American one that a separate identity has become unimaginable. I would argue that this is not the case, and fear of American punishment for lack of cooperation in the present context, or in future cases, is largely ungrounded. Despite regrettable diplomatic blunders of late, and small sources of rhetorical heat on both sides of the border, in the future we will deal with a situation similar to that of the past. We are a northern state, bordering on an economic and political behemoth, and have strong multilateral and transnational links and a major identity problem. Despite the latter, there is no need to abandon the reputation—troubled as it may be by certain shades of hypocrisy in places—that we have built as a state attuned to the humanitarian impulse and open to the cosmopolitan spirit.

In today's global context, sustainable development remains the greatest challenge we face. Canada is poised to make a limited but inspired and responsible contribution in that regard.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Stoett.

Given that you mentioned him, Professor Stoett, I just want to remind my colleagues that we'll have Mr. Stephen Lewis before our committee next week.

Mr. Andrew Cohen, please.

À (1025)

Prof. Andrew Cohen (Professor, School of Journalism and Communication, Carleton University): Thank you.

I want to thank you for the invitation to appear before this committee. It's the second time I've done so.

In the fall of 2001 I was invited here to discuss the future of Canada and North America after the terrorist attacks of September 11. My argument then was that Canada has allowed the three principal arms of its foreign policy, its military, its foreign aid, and its diplomacy, to wither. I suggested that Canada was no longer as strong or prominent in the world as it was a generation ago. As John Manley, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, warned at the time, we're drawing on our reputation and refusing to pay the cost of being the international player we imagine ourselves to be.

I argued that our military was ill-equipped and undermanned, our international assistance was too broad and too miserly, and our diplomacy was less effective and less influential. We sit in international councils today by virtue of our economic power, which is itself in question today in relation to other countries, and by virtue of our past. We no longer have a foreign policy worthy of our history, our geography, or our diversity. In a word, Canada is in decline abroad, a gentle but persistent decline. And it has paid a price—it has lost its place in the world. That still remains my view.

Today, however, I thought I would try to address the government's dialogue on foreign policy. I commend the committee for its interest in this question, and I hope I can make a contribution. You're right to be involved in this process, though my understanding is that it's not a formal involvement, as the minister described in his dialogue paper.

My argument today is both about the process, or how the government is approaching this exercise, and the substance of what we might do to regain our place in the world.

First, to be honest, I'm not really sure what the foreign policy dialogue means. In its Speech from the Throne, the government made this promise:

In the face of rapid change and uncertainty, the government must engage Canadians in a discussion about the role that Canada will play in the world. Before the end of this mandate, the government will set out a long-term direction on international and defence policy that reflects our values and interests and ensures that Canada’s military is equipped to fulfill the demands placed upon it.

As you also know, it has been promising this kind of an exercise for some time. But having made that announcement, I was surprised to hear the minister play down the exercise. He told the CBC immediately after the throne speech that, no, in fact it wasn't the highly anticipated review. In fact, we heard nothing until January, when we learned that the review was not a review, because we had reviewed foreign policy in 1995 and 1994, and that those assumptions still remained valid. It's all very puzzling. But I was pleased to hear the minister say that he would seek advice from Canadians and report his findings later.

So now we have these public consultations across Canada, and the Internet is buzzing with conversations. It's encouraging. My understanding is that Canadians are turning out to these town hall meetings, the minister is attending, and the government is learning what's on people's minds—which largely seems to be Iraq today. So that's fine. The consultations will end in May. The minister will report in September, and it all sounds wonderful, topical, and relevant—but it's not necessarily what it seems.

With great respect to the minister, who brings enormous interest and expertise to this portfolio, as this committee knows better than anyone, I think the government is wrong here. Its dialogue asks too few questions. I had hoped we would have a process that would, in its little way, inspire and encourage Canadians to debate how to order our priorities in the world, and how to make significant choices. Instead, it seems to be something far narrower. The big problem with this dialogue is that it's what I would call “review lite”, without the depth, analysis, and thought that a real bona fide review would suggest.

Under Pierre Trudeau, such an exercise took almost two years, between 1968 and 1970. In 1994-95, under Jean Chrétien, it took almost a year—or perhaps it was a year or more. This dialogue seems to be something the government feels it must do because it promised it would, even if its heart isn't really in it. It seems to be something to be disposed of quickly. So the questions are not as broad and the assumptions are not as searching, meaning that the exercise is less imaginative, less ambitious, and ultimately less valuable.

To begin with the terms of the review, the review is about foreign policy—not really defence policy, and not at all about aid policy. This is a critical weakness. If we're serious about rethinking foreign policy, how can we examine it without examining defence or aid policy? Defence and aid are not accessories to foreign policy; they're central to it. It seems to me that what we have here is fussing on the fringes.

À (1030)

It is true, we are told, that the Minister of Defence is supposed to be re-examining the priorities of his department, although that exercise seems rather vague. His review in fact seems to be missing in action. It is also true that the Canadian International Development Agency has in two recent reports reassessed how it goes about distributing aid. The trouble is that review is about ways and not means, where “means” means money. Without money, it's very hard to have an effective aid policy today.

Now, true, in both cases the Minister of Finance has recently increased their budgets--that is, of aid and defence--which has silenced only some critics, but it is nowhere near enough. Even if there were unlimited money, we would still not know how to spend it, because we wouldn't have thought it through, which is why we need to consider this more broadly and more fully.

Ideally, we should be looking at all elements of our foreign policy at the same time. In other words, we need a comprehensive review fitting the independent parts of our internationalism together. As we determine the country we want to be in the world, we must understand that these elements are diplomacy, which largely means the clubs we join and the diplomats we deploy, our military and our aid and how they each relate to each other. Once we determine it, we must find the ways to draw on all our resources to bring it to life.

For example, if our vision of Canada in the world is that of the good governance nation, for purposes of argument, a people committed to peace-building, it would involve stabilizing conflicts, sending in peacekeepers, policing ceasefires, reconstructing war-torn societies, establishing legal institutions, writing constitutions and codes of law, designing federalism, and drawing on our abundance of language and ethnicity. In that case, wouldn't we have to think beyond foreign policy?

Having decided that, would we not have to design the kind of military we want, one presumably without threefold services, one with less armour, fewer airplanes, fewer ships, but one perhaps with a rapid reaction force, more airlift capacity--we have almost none today--and training in communications? Moreover, we would have to rethink our priorities in international assistance, not necessarily in building dams, digging wells, and providing micro-credit in more than a hundred countries--not that there's anything wrong with that, in and of itself, as they are noble ideals--but perhaps in teaching law or monitoring elections in just a few nations, rather than reducing poverty in many.

On process, I think we're addressing only a part of the challenge before us. It isn't enough to ask Canadians whether they accept the three pillars of security, prosperity, and cultural values, however important. Incidentally, in the 1970s we had many priorities, including national identity and national sovereignty. It seems to me our temple of internationalism has many pillars, or ought to have many pillars.

We ought to ask more philosophically and more pointedly what kind of a nation we want to be. We want to ask ourselves, as Winston Churchill said, what kind of a people we are. We want to consider, as Charles de Gaulle had a particular idea of France, if we have a particular idea of Canada. We ought to ask, what, if anything, is our mission abroad? Do we have a projet de société? Having asked those existential questions and perhaps answered them, we must then determine how we match our rhetoric and our resources, or what we can do with what we have. We don't need a dialogue, we need a review, which is really a watchword for reappraisal, a re-examination, a fundamental rethinking. With it, we need a national debate on means and ends.

Practically speaking, the government should not only examine foreign policy and the kinds of resources we need for our diplomats and our diplomacy, but of course also our defence and aid policy. At the same time, we should also look at other arms of our foreign policy, such as the distribution and balance of our trade, which goes overwhelmingly to the United States; the impact of immigration and how it will change our priorities as the country becomes increasingly more diverse; and foreign intelligence gathering, of which we have virtually none, the only nation among the G-7 that does not have an independent foreign spy agency.

To do this, I suggest that the government establish a highly publicized commission comprised of one or more eminent Canadians, not unlike perhaps what Keith Spicer did on national unity in the early nineties, or what Roy Romanow has done recently on health care, travelling the country, holding hearings, gathering opinions. Its purpose should not only be to consult, though it must, but to generate a long overdue debate on the roles Canada can play abroad and how we can find ourselves in the slipstream of a changing world. Fundamentally, we must ask how big our army, how generous our aid, how expansive our diplomacy.

À (1035)

It is only after review that we can come to terms with what we want to be in the world or what that vision of ourselves is. Frankly, I don't know yet. In the past we've been so many things--warrior, peacekeeper, benefactor, builder, honest broker, helpful fixer, social worker to the world. We've been everything to everyone. We still see ourselves as everybody's nice guy--a people without enemies, generous, and kind. As Anthony DePalma of the New York Times said, Canada's the Danny Kaye of nations, for those who remember the mild-mannered comic actor--and by the way, none of my students do.

Of course, as I've argued here before, this is something of an illusion. We're practising pinch-penny diplomacy, as one scholar put it, or foreign policy on the cheap. We no longer do all those things because we no longer pay for them. We think we're influential, but to me it's a great national delusion. It's a facade--what I call a Potemkin Canada.

This, by now, is not unconventional. In fact, it is the conventional wisdom in a number of communities. As a soldier, we're incapable of sustained fighting, as we saw in Afghanistan last year. As a peacekeeper, we're 31st among the nations of the world in terms of our contribution to UN missions. As a donor, we are no longer as generous or as effective. As recently as last December, OECD reported that our aid, as a percentage of our gross national product, had fallen to 0.2% in 2001--19th of the 22 donor countries of the OECD. This is the lowest in 37 years. If Lester Pearson were here today, he would recognize the level to which our aid had fallen, because it was at that point that he began to increase it.

The OECD, incidentally, suggests that our underfunding is a “paradox at the heart of Canada's internationalism.” At the same time, the OECD found that Canada runs the broadest program in the world, present in 100 countries, which Jeffrey Simpson, a columnist at the Globe and Mail, called a program of Cadillac pretensions on a Pontiac budget.

As to our diplomacy, few people talk about the Department of Foreign Affairs as the best and the brightest any more. Last summer, the Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers, a very conservative group, came as close to a strike as it ever has in its history, and it isn't hard to see why. Its members are the lowest-paid professionals in the public service. No wonder they're leaving. An internal report commissioned by the department called the 1990s “a calamitous decade.” The department is losing senior staff; it's having trouble recruiting. Most of its officers are foreigners engaged overseas or contract employees engaged at home, who have not met the exacting requirements of admission or training. One of the finest foreign services in the world, which it was in the 1950s and the 1960s, what was called the aristocracy of the bureaucracy, is now simply ordinary. It is Norway, not Canada, that brokers peace as the world's most active mediator, whether it's in the Middle East or in Sri Lanka.

I can't tell you today, with any kind of certainty, the kind of Canada we should be in the world. I do know that we are a shadow of what we were because we've stopped investing in ourselves. I do know that the way we must consider the question is we must stir a national debate, which is what this committee can do to seek to rebuild our presence in the world. The time is right. This is 2003, not 1993. We have the money today--our budget is in surplus. The question is, do we have the will?

In defining a purpose in a mission, the impact of the process can be to engage Canadians again at home and abroad. In this great enterprise, we don't start from nothing. We don't have to reinvent the world in Canada as much as we have to reintroduce it. It begins with recognizing our comparative advantage in languages, culture, communications, and experience.

At the end of the day, we can have the world's best small military, its most efficient and generous aid program, its most imaginative foreign service. We can reject the mediocrity that the culture of decline has forced upon us. We can decide to assume meaningful roles for ourselves, some of which have been described by people before you--in mediation, in peacekeeping, in reforming the United Nations, in alliances with like-minded nordic countries on regional environmental questions, in bringing ideas and innovation to international financial institutions, as we already have. Then, when we know what we want, we can give ourselves the tools. We can make choices--most of all, the choice to be excellent, to be engaged, to matter.

What we do abroad will enrich us at home. For a people forever wondering if they have a future, indeed doubting sometimes that they do, the new Canadian internationalism could become an instrument of pan-Canadian unity, creating a post-linguistic Canada, drawing on all elements of a truly diverse society--our diplomacy, our aid, and our military. In time, with courage and will, the world will become our mission again, and it will give us pride and purpose again.

Thank you.

À (1040)

The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Cohen.

Now we'll go to questions and answers. We'll start with Mr. Day, for five minutes.

Mr. Stockwell Day: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm sure both presenters are aware that in these committees we ask questions. Our positions are often camouflaged as questions, of course, hoping you'll spot the right target, zero in on it, make our questions look brilliant, and like a flare in the night, you will illuminate our positions for us and cause us to be seen as wise.

Given that understanding, I have some serious questions that will also reflect some uncamouflaged positions. Either of you can respond to these.

The Westphalia concept of respect among nations and non-intervention was certainly appropriate in 1648 and for most of the last 350-some years, but it's not workable in today's global society, the Iraq situation being the case.

Have you considered criteria under which some kind of new formation can act to prevent genocide or the most extreme violation of human rights when you don't have the Security Council supporting that? Are we moving into an era when there can be some body or group that defines criteria to legitimately move on another nation? That's the first question.

Mr. Cohen, I happen to agree with you--I won't camouflage that--in terms of Canada's perception globally about our influence. The only place it is vaunted beyond reality is, frankly, among the present government. It's most clearly reflected in the fact that we have not been invited to be part of the group of nations that's been working for some months on reconstruction and building the elements of a civil society in Iraq. What can we do to offer what Canada really does have? We do have some good things to do there.

Mr. Stoett, in your book you talk about genocide, ecocide, and refugee displacement. Some of it is long-term--for instance, the effects of sea levels rising and populations being displaced. But how does the world community deal with the Palestinian refugee situation? Israel is a country of some five million people, but their absorption rate of refugees is incredible--900,000 alone that were expelled over the years from Iraq. This is subject to argument, but there seems to be a wilfulness by Arab nations, with a population 60 times greater than Israel's, to not accept or absorb refugees that are there. I don't think you commented on that directly in your book. Can you comment on that?

The Chair: Mr. Cohen.

Prof. Andrew Cohen: The first question I think Mr. Day asked was on Westphalia and the breakdown of the world as it was once organized. I would agree that we've entered a new era when we've elevated the concept of humanitarian intervention and perhaps reduced the importance of national sovereignty.

We in Canada have something to say on this. In 1999 the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, actually commissioned a group of eminent people, including Canadian Michael Ignatieff and the former Foreign Minister of Australia, and financed a report in which we discussed and investigated what national sovereignty meant and what humanitarian intervention might mean. We gave this to the United Nations. Unfortunately, September 11 intervened, and it was delayed.

The name of the report escapes me, but it is available. It's very provocative. My understanding is that we wanted it to come down far harder on the side of humanitarian intervention than it actually did, but nonetheless it's a blueprint. Typically or predictably it's sitting at the UN. A number of nations at the UN are not ready to be that bold, but we certainly have something to say on this.

The United States is in Iraq today for a number of reasons, largely what it considers to be its links to international terrorism and its fear of weapons of mass destruction. But I often wonder, what if the United Nations had made the argument for going into Iraq--which it has made only secondarily--on the grounds of humanitarian intervention, and we had had guidelines at the UN from the report we tabled on what constitutes legitimate intervention?

Is it just a Rwanda where there's a near and present threat of genocide, or is it past genocide? People like Baroness Emma Nicholson in Britain, who is a champion of the Marsh Arabs, have said there has been genocide in Iraq for a long time now. It may not be on the scale of Rwanda, of course, but nonetheless it exists.

So this is an area where, if we were to crystallize our thoughts, we could provide not only the intellectual foundation but the means--the right kind of military that would be good at this, and the right kind of aid program that would be able to reconstruct that kind of a society. I think we'd have something to say on that.

The second question was on reconstruction in...?

À (1045)

Mr. Stockwell Day: What can we do to overcome the reality that we've lost our influence? We haven't been invited in this, and that's just a sign of our lack of influence.

Prof. Andrew Cohen: The NGO community says we have indeed lost our influence. It comes with falling levels of aid, which we all know about, but it's also the manner in which we have conducted our aid program.

There are those who will challenge this, but we are in something like 100 countries. We do concentrate on fewer, but the Danes, for example, who normally give more money in aid as a percentage of their gross national product, have made a decision to cut their number of recipients from 30 to 15. They have very strict criteria on who they give aid to. For perhaps political reasons or just because of the weight of tradition, we are much more diverse, and I think it has come at a cost.

I do think there is another opportunity for us in Iraq. As someone said earlier, we could well be putting a detailed plan in place now, bringing all the elements of our expertise on how we could rebuild Iraq. First we'd have to provide emergency assistance, but after that I think there would be an opportunity for us if we took it.

The Chair: Thank you.

Now we'll go to Madame Lalonde.

[Translation]

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Good morning to both of you. I would like to thank you for your well-argued presentations. I only need five minutes, Mr. Chairman. I hope we can come back for a second round after.

Mr. Stoett, at the end of your brief, you say:

There is no reason why this is not possible, save perhaps the fear that our star is so tightly in orbit around the American one that a separate identity has become unimaginable.

Could you please expand on this, since it seems to be a major factor with regard to this problem.

Mr. Cohen, you say that we need to know what kind of people we are and that we need a blueprint for our society.

How can we achieve this and how does Quebec feature in this equation?

[English]

Prof. Peter Stoett: Okay. Am I to respond to Mr. Day's questions as well? Has he left?

The Chair: Please respond to Mrs. Lalonde's question, if you don't mind.

Prof. Peter Stoett: On the question of Canadian identity, it's an old maxim that Canadians identify themselves as not Americans. As time passes and our societies become increasingly integrated, this becomes more and more difficult to sustain as a common focal point among Canadians.

There are large splits in how strongly Canadians feel about whether or not Canadian fate is tied irrevocably to American fate. It would be rather foolish, of course, to deny the obvious. We have strong economic links. That's putting it mildly. We are to a certain extent on the periphery of the American economy, and this is a fact of life we face. Historically we have supplied the United States with resources, and increasingly a good solid and strong market. That shouldn't be overlooked.

I wouldn't go so far as to say the Americans are in as great a need of us as we are of them. That would be disingenuous of me. Nonetheless, there is a mutual need there, a mutual vulnerability.

I think the current concerns about the border and other issues that are being linked to our refusal to explicitly go along with American policy are largely ungrounded. The borders will be tightened any time the United States goes to so-called “code orange” from now on. That's a fact of life, and we'll have to deal with it. It's not necessarily a reflection of any particular disregard for current Canadian policy.

On Iraq and reconstruction, I have heard otherwise, that Canadians are going to be involved, but I can't justify that in empirical terms. I've simply heard that Canadian companies could be involved, for example, in supplying Iraq with water and getting its water system running again, and so on.

Canada has a wealth of expertise in these areas and others. The States would be foolish not to take advantage of it, and so would the United Nations.

À (1050)

The Chair: Professor Cohen.

Prof. Andrew Cohen: In response to Madame Lalonde's question, when I talk about a projet de société, I would hope we would consider who we are and what we would like to be. I present it just as an idea. It's not my idea. Michael Ignatieff has talked about this, about the good governance nation, a nation that helps to teach other nations about pluralism, about treatment of minorities, peacekeeping, peace-building, writing constitutions, legal codes--we already do some of this, and were very influential in South Africa--and aid.

It's interesting that we talk about Quebec. At CIDA, for example, for years--and this still may be the case--the majority of people were francophone. It was of enormous interest to francophones to be at CIDA.

The value of foreign policy, it seems to me, is that it moves us beyond the confines of our domestic world. We can absorb higher ideals and perhaps leave disputes at home and pursue a larger vision of Canada abroad.

I think Quebeckers, as much as any other Canadians, would agree with writing codes of law, would understand the value of federalism--or some elements would, I suppose--and the need for respect for language, all issues that some societies have to deal with.

So I think one of those things that Canada might do is the so-called good governance nation. I think this would appeal to all elements of Canada, and we would perhaps find in what we do abroad something of an identity for us at home.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Cohen.

Now we'll go to Mr. Calder.

Mr. Murray Calder (Dufferin—Peel—Wellington—Grey, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As far as I'm concerned, our strength as a country has always been multilateral, and anything less than that, we just don't see.

The thing that concerns me that I am watching right now within the United States is that it seems to be that neo-conservative circles within the current U.S. administration have gained an awful lot of influence. The project for the new American century, for instance, calls for the coalition of the willing, led by the United States, to perform policing duties in regional conflicts, which seems to suggest to me would be the circumvention of the United Nations, of which I am a strong supporter.

I have three questions.

How can Canada and other nations right now be more proactive in promoting the United Nations?

What should the United Nations be doing to help developing countries, further than what they're doing right now?

And Peter, on your point, how can the UN right now promote renewable energy on an international scale?

À (1055)

The Chair: Those were good short questions.

Mr. Stoett.

Prof. Peter Stoett: In this case, there are some mechanisms the Kyoto Protocol calls for, including the clean development mechanism and international joint implementation, which involves giving northern states carbon emission credits if they are in fact contributing to technology in the south to deal with moving towards renewable energy.

When I first looked into this issue, I thought this would be happening, and it is slowly beginning to happen. I think we are still very much in CIDA--and I have some evidence to give, if you would like to see it--and CIDA is still moving towards promoting fossil fuel consumption abroad and setting up energy infrastructures that are based on oil or nuclear, uranium-mining, and so forth. But the mechanisms are there. It's a question of putting money where our mouth is and putting some focus into these issues.

I will comment very briefly, because Andrew probably has something to say on this, but regarding the neo-Reaganite perspective, I think it is true that there is a certain circumvention of the United Nations in that agenda, but that's nothing new, if we go back to Jesse Helms and other people who have been saying this for years. The presidency, of course, now is in the hands of someone sympathetic to that position. That might pass in two years, or it might not.

On the question of strengthening the United Nations, I'm involved with people with the United Nations Association of the United States of America, and they're having a big problem right now, of course. But they're still quite determined that once this present context passes and the UN is called on to help in reconstruction efforts, in order to legitimize what has occurred, there will be an opportunity perhaps to get Americans to look at the United Nations again as a friend, instead of some sort of French-driven foe.

The possibility is there for a renewal of the United Nations, and I'd refuse to give up on it at this stage.

Andrew.

The Chair: Mr. Cohen.

Prof. Andrew Cohen: How can we promote the United Nations? As we know, the United Nations has been the ark and covenant of our internationalism for a long time. We see our identity in multilateralism. We have long been supporters of the United Nations. The report I just talked about was done for the United Nations and paid for by us. Unfortunately, the United Nations hasn't acted on it. We have talked about a rapid reaction force at the United Nations for some time. It doesn't seem to have gone anywhere.

This may seem heretical, but I wonder whether, as part of our review and our rethinking, we ought to rethink where we are at the United Nations and the effectiveness of it, which doesn't mean giving up on it. I think there's good reason to be disappointed in the United Nations. It's not just on Iraq. It's on Rwanda and Bosnia. It's the failures the United Nations has had. I would hope that as part of our review we would not in any way retreat from our commitment to the United Nations, but rather examine what other role we might play in strengthening it.

I'm not so sure what that role is. We've always liked to see ourselves as a moderator of American behaviour. I think one of the reasons the United States went as far as it did in the United Nations is because Britain was there. I think that Tony Blair has an enormous commitment to the United Nations and multilateralism. We also have that commitment. Were we to have much influence in Washington, which I don't think we have any longer, we might be pressing the United States to give greater credibility and commitment to the United Nations. That might be one thing we can do.

What was the second question?

Mr. Murray Calder: In promotion of itself, what should the United Nations be doing for developing countries that it's not already doing?

Prof. Andrew Cohen: Probably more.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Martin.

Mr. Keith Martin: Thank you very much.

Professor Cohen, you have given us, in my view, one of the finest interventions we've had in front of this committee. I hope that your words can be put into the form of a treatise. I think it would be a seminal work for this committee to review. It was taut and specific and dealt with enormous challenges we have in our country.

I would agree with you that we are a shadow of what we have been, and indeed what we could be, as a nation. You gave us hopeful signs that there are things we can and ought to be doing as a country.

Royal commissions are only as good as the willingness to use them. From Romanow to the aboriginal affairs commission and so many others, their reports generally end up taking up space in a warehouse somewhere and collecting dust. How can we as a committee impress upon the government and the Canadian people that there is a desperate need to deal with this now, and for this commission, which is a great suggestion, to be implemented and listened to?

My second question deals with our relationship with the U.S. Given your past experience as the Globe and Mail correspondent in Washington, perhaps you could give us some view of what we can do specifically to get better traction in the U.S. as a country, given our diminished relationship both with the U.S. and internationally.

Lastly, how much we spend on foreign aid is important, in my view, but perhaps what's more important is how we spend that money. Perhaps, Professor Cohen, you can suggest whether or not we ought to be in fewer countries and whether CIDA should have a forensic audit as to what their expenditures are. I don't believe that their internal auditing process will enable them to be as effective as they could be in how they spend our money.

Á (1100)

Prof. Andrew Cohen: Taking the last question first, on foreign aid, I do believe we are in too many countries. We are a friend and helper everywhere. We have a number of goals, from the reduction of poverty to the enhancement of women's rights to industrial development, micro-credit. We do many, many things.

It isn't just a question of spending more money, as you've noted, Dr. Martin. It's a question of how we spend it. I've mentioned Denmark, which has one of the most effective aid programs in the world. The Norwegians do as well. They have made a decision. Of course, they live in a more homogeneous society, so they don't have a great diversity. The great diversity of this country has, I think, driven us in many ways to be in countries reflecting who we are at home. I think that's probably a mistake.

We ought to pick, it seems to me, one goal, such as the reduction of poverty. We ought to pick 15 countries and apply criteria to those countries. We want to ensure they have the prospect of good governance; otherwise, money is just sent down the drain. That is ineffective aid.

So it's not just a question of spending more. The first thing is to make it effective, and the second thing is we ought to be spending more. If we have a more effective program, the increased money.... And the government is increasing the percentage every year, but it will still take some ten years to get to 0.35%, which is half of the 0.7% that was laid out as a goal for this country by Lester Pearson 32 years ago.

Regarding relations with the United States, my sense, having spent four years in Washington, is that we are increasingly nowhere in Washington. A lot of it has to do with the erosion of our capacities. We've talked about that. I don't think the United States cares much about our foreign aid, but I think they do care much about the nature of our military. There have been a dozen reports on that in the last two years. That is all there. We all know what the state is.

We are also under-represented in the United States. As part of the cutbacks at the department, we closed consulates, we closed offices in the United States. We were far more active there in the 1980s than we are today. I would suggest we need to...the word that is used particularly is “re-brand” Canada, take a higher profile in the United States than we have now. One of those is through a more active, spirited representation.

We had an ambassador in the 1980s who was very influential, Allan Gotlieb. I don't think we've had one as influential since. I think we have to take care who we send to the United States. I think the appointment of Pamela Wallin in New York is a terrific appointment. In New York you have to have a certain cachet, a certain panache. She has it. In Washington you have to get the attention of the United States, but you also have to have something to say. I think it's important that we think of what we want to say and think about our relations with the United States, which is one of the things this foreign policy review will address.

Your first question was on royal commissions. I agree that some royal commissions are allowed to gather dust, but some aren't. Donald Macdonald chaired a commission on the economy in the mid-1980s, I think, and the government listened to what he had to say at the time. I don't think that because we form a royal commission it is destined not to be listened to. It's one element of raising interest in what is, I think, an educational process in who we are.

We have to start teaching history again. We have to start offering more courses on foreign policy. I think we need the kinds of think-tanks that are sponsored by government in the United States on democracy and human rights. We have some, but I think we can do more on that.

The Governor General and her husband have shown us how a state visit can be used strategically to promote Canada abroad. There are all kinds of things we can do to engage Canadians in a discussion of who we are, and to move forward.

Á (1105)

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Cohen.

Now we'll go to Mrs. Kraft-Sloan.

Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan (York North, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

My first question is essentially directed to Professor Stoett, but Professor Cohen could jump in.

I understood from your presentation you had concerns around the framework for organizing the foreign policy goal under three separate pillars. I'm wondering if you would care to comment on a reconceptualization of this particular framework.

The other indication I'm getting from both of the witnesses is that it may be too early in the process to put a framework together.

My other question is to Professor Stoett. In your presentation you mentioned the idea of having a separate pillar for sustainable development. I'm wondering if it might be better that sustainable development be integrated into the other two pillars. I would like to hear your comment on that. Often the concern is with why you would separate this sort of theme. It becomes marginalized.

The other question I have as a final comment is I think it's very good that the minister is conducting a dialogue. It's always good when ministers are talking to Canadians and hearing what their concerns are. I think it's going to be framed within the current Iraqi situation; there's no avoiding that.

My fear is that the Americans will continue on with their list of “axis of evil” countries. Are other countries like Canada and the UN going to be playing a role of cleaning up the horrible mess that is going to ensue? “Mess” is not an appropriate term to talk about the devastation of lives.

I'm wondering if both witnesses could comment on those.

Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Stoett.

Prof. Peter Stoett: I think that's a definite concern. However, I don't think Canadians should fool themselves; we're not in a position to actually stop the Americans from doing anything. We might be able to encourage them to go about whatever military adventures they engage in with as much respect to the humanitarian side of the question as possible, which we might be able to contribute to, but the question is whether this makes you complicit in the act. Here, of course, we'll have sharp differences in opinion as to whether or not this action is legitimate in the first place. If you accept the proposition that it is, then this isn't a big issue; but if you don't, then it is.

Ultimately, we can still maintain an independent voice pushing for the humanitarian resolution of these conflicts. Unfortunately, we have to be realistic about just what Canada can actually do in these situations. In the grand plan for Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and China, no one can predict what is going to materialize. People have made grand foreign policy designs in American foreign policy before, but they don't always see them through.

Regarding the other question of whether or not creating a third pillar for sustainable development would further ghettoize the concepts, I don't think it would. I am certainly sympathetic to and aware of your argument that sustainable development should ultimately be fully integrated with economics and security, but it just doesn't work out that way. We've tried for years to make that argument, as have people in the environmental movement. You are promised that this will take place, but it doesn't.

It seems to me that if we going to use the pillar framework, then it would be beneficial at this point in time to capitalize on the obvious strengths Canada has in this issue area, in terms of what it can offer the world and also to actually symbolically recognize sustainable development as one of our main priorities on the international stage. You're not going to do that by having a couple of paragraphs under the section on economics or prosperity stating “Oh, yes, by the way, we have to care about the environment too”. That's not going to give the sort of message I'd like to see Canada give to the rest of the world as part of the identity formation process.

Á (1110)

The Chair: We'll now go to Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to apologize for my long absence. I don't know whether anybody explained that there were representatives of several of the parties who were stuck waiting for the end of George Bush's speech before we were able to do a Newsworld interview panel, which had been set up in advance.

I want to thank both of the presenters for their truly superb presentations. Even though I missed a good deal of the second, I have been filled in about it. I'm very, very struck by the compelling arguments in favour of sustainable development being one of those pillars.

I'd like to explore a little further the possible notion of a fourth pillar, which I think is reflected in some of the focus and emphasis of both of your presentations. I don't know what the right word is for it, but the best words we can come up with would reflect the notion of reducing the gap. I think, Professor Cohen, you referred clearly to the eradication of poverty. I'm wondering if that would round out the pillars in a way that would clearly express a sense of what we see our foreign policy and international development policy being about.

My second question is on the issue of the huge shortfall in Canada's meeting the now internationally accepted goal of 0.7% of GDP, established originally by Pearson. I think it is estimated that it would be the year of 2040 before we reach that goal at the current rate of development assistance.

In addition to the shortfall, one of the concerns that we hear more and more is that far too many of CIDA's policies are becoming increasingly corporatized. While the minister was before the committee earlier this week saying that there is concern about and interest in untying Canada's aid, at the very same time there seems to be increasing corporatization of many of our actual programs, to the point that 20% of the Africa fund, for example, is clearly earmarked for corporate purposes. These have to do with enhancing Canada's wealth and the corporate sector's well-being, not with real overseas development assistance.

I wonder if you could comment on this.

Prof. Andrew Cohen: I'm not so sure how many pillars of our foreign policy we would have. The temple of our internationalism could have many pillars, but if it were a means of raising the importance of foreign aid to make it a pillar, I would say wonderful.

I think we have not wanted to talk about aid because we've not wanted to fund it. In defence of CIDA, there is some very interesting work going on there now, talking about making aid more effective. I just don't think it's going far enough. It's a beginning.

As you've said, we have essentially given up on reaching 0.7%. This issue returns at every election like a bad footnote, but it comes back. We honour it and we put it in party platforms, yet we don't move on it. Now I think we have an opportunity to move on it. There are a number of critics who have been very hard on Canada for allowing ourselves to fall to the levels we have.

In response to your second question, I think we could find ways of making our program effective and targeted. We could be in far fewer countries; we don't have to be in 100, but could be in 15. We could identify one thing that we do well, such as the eradication of poverty. We do many things now. We could do things like untying all aid. Britain has moved this way, and other countries have said “We will simply not tie aid any more, because it distorts the market and because it is more about us than about them. There is something wrong with forcing countries to buy our goods, when in fact they might get them more cheaply on the open market.”

So these are things we can do. There are lots of things we can do, if we have the will.

Á (1115)

The Chair: Mr. Stoett, do you have any comments?

Prof. Peter Stoett: I would certainly agree with the last statement.

On the tied aid question, the old rationale was that it benefits the Canadian economy to tie our aid abroad. This might be true in terms of short-term infusions, but often in the long run you'll see that tied aid brings diminishing returns. It becomes more and more difficult to sustain the argument that we're actually benefiting Canadian corporations, though there are some exceptions to this. Massey Ferguson was one example of a company that tried to move in this direction, and it didn't work.

In terms of the number of pillars, I would also argue that we may be running the risk of having too many pillars and can no longer recognize the temple. There has to be some sort of limit here. I don't know why three was the magic number chosen last time. It could very well be four, five, or whatever—though three makes some sense.

Prof. Andrew Cohen: There were more in 1970.

The Chair: Thank you.

Now we'll go to Monsieur Harvey.

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey (Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank our two witnesses who, like us, are trying to define what we are calling the pillars of our future foreign policy.

I would like to give our witnesses the opportunity to clarify the following two points.

Every country says that there has to be consistency among the various departments. I would like you to give us a couple of examples to help us better understand what you mean, especially in the area of agri-food. This represents our biggest challenge, which is to feed everyone in the world.

What would it mean for us to be more consistent?

I would then like Mr. Stoett to tell us about the Commission for Environmental Cooperation's record within the framework of NAFTA. I would be curious to find out what it has done until now, bearing in mind, Mr. Chairman, that the United States refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol. They are, after all, a major player.

Thank you.

[English]

Prof. Andrew Cohen: I'm not sure that I understand your question on consistency and agrifood. I don't see the....

[Translation]

Mr. André Harvey: If, within the framework of foreign policy, farm aid policies continue to be applied, particularly the European and American ones—in the United States, each farmer reportedly receives a subsidy of $47,000 even before the year begins—it will be difficult for countries which receive foreign aid to compete and to sell us their products. There are surely other examples to illustrate the need for consistency between foreign affairs, international aid, defence and international trade. That's what I mean by concrete examples to help our fellow citizens understand, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chair: Professor Cohen.

Prof. Andrew Cohen: In terms of helping the third world, we have, for example, forgiven debt to Africa--which we did last June after Kananaskis. We have moved in some areas to lift quotas and tariffs on some goods. We have moved increasingly, although not enough, to liberalize trade.

Many people now believe Oxfam did an excellent study on the value of liberalizing trade with the third world, rather than just providing aid. So one area we might move to, to perhaps honour the goals of our foreign policy or validate them, is to liberalize trade, not simply worry about increasing aid or how it's done, but allow countries to trade their way to prosperity.

Prof. Peter Stoett: I'm assuming your question refers to the NAFTA environmental commission. This is known as one of these multilateral institutions with a moderate to loud bark and no bite. In other words, it doesn't really have the teeth to inflict any serious punitive measures on states if they aren't upholding the agreement that NAFTA basically calls for, which is that none of the three states will in fact lower their environmental standards.

There's very little in NAFTA, incidentally, or for that matter, in the mandate of the commission, to suggest that there's an active program of improving environmental conditions or policies. It's simply a promise that it won't be lowered.

In cases where it has been, or where NGOs and other groups have charged that this has been the case, the commission has had a mixed record in terms of whether or not it wants to actually enforce its own mandate. At the same time, they have put out some very good studies, which are beneficial to us as a whole, so that we get a better sense of continental environmental problems.

In terms of the U.S. refusal to sign Kyoto, that is not really related to NAFTA's agenda or the agenda of the commission. I would say I often think the concern over Kyoto and America has been subsumed by this broader concern about unilateralism in the current administration. That's understandable, but I don't consider it the end of global environmental multilateralism that the U.S. has yet to sign Kyoto. There are many American states, for example, that are making strong efforts to move towards renewable energy, and in fact have superseded what the Canadians have done, in some cases.

Overall, I think the large American corporations realize that Kyoto is eventually coming, it's just a matter of time. So I'm not as concerned about that refusal as I am, for example, the U.S. unilateral activity on the military front. But I'll leave that.

Á (1120)

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Eggleton.

Mr. Art Eggleton: Thank you.

Gentlemen, I want to clarify a couple of remarks you made.

Professor Stoett, in talking about the three pillars, you suggested that we drop the third pillar, which is values and culture. I can understand that we don't want to be imposing, in every aspect, our way of life on people in other parts of the world, but surely things like human rights, rule of law, and democracy are things we should be promoting. So I'd like you to clarify that.

Professor Cohen, you went on initially at some length decrying the fact that this is not a full review, both in the foreign affairs or in the defence sense. But this is called a dialogue, and in defence they refer to it frequently as an update. Given the fact that this government has already done full reviews and has already determined what fundamentals it wants to follow--it did that in 1994--why do you feel that a full review is needed at this point in time? There are, of course, changes that have happened since 1994, but is it not arguable that the fundamentals are still sound and we need an update to take into consideration how those fundamentals relate to the changing circumstances in the world?

Also, much of what you have talked about in terms of things you think are wrong, a lot of them, have to do with funding, not with the policy itself but whether or not there are sufficient funds provided to implement the policy. Indeed, maybe there's also some separation here between policy and administrative follow-up--should there be nine countries in this, or should there be a broader spectrum or a narrower perspective on this? It raises the question, where does the policy in this administration kind of thing come in? How much detail do you put in the policy in dealing with those issues?

I'd appreciate both of you commenting on those matters.

The Chair: Mr. Stoett.

Prof. Peter Stoett: Absolutely. Human rights, cultural exchanges, all these things I think could be subsumed under the heading of sustainable development. I define that not simply as environmental protection. It also involves, in a deeper sense, the participation of civil society. So absolutely, democracy and human rights would fall within that, I think, just as well as they do within Canadian values.

I find that term problematic, and this to some extent follows from a senior colleague, Denis Stairs, who came to Concordia and gave a good talk about this. He disagreed with everything else I said, by the way, but on that issue he'd probably agree that there is an element of presenting a false image when we talk about a unified Canadian value that we can then transport to the international stage.

Á (1125)

The Chair: Professor Cohen.

Prof. Andrew Cohen: As the former Minister of Defence knows far better than I, we of course did review this in 1994, and there have been some changes. And one could argue that maybe those changes haven't been substantial enough. The Cold War was over then. But we haven't funded, as you pointed out, and as a result we have been left with three full services, what I call the all-singing, all-dancing army, which is of no disrespect to those who are part of it.

But my sense is that we could, in the absence of resources that I don't think are forthcoming.... Now perhaps the government is ready to fund our military at levels close to those of the average of NATO, but I haven't seen it yet. I know we're increasing this year, but still the level, as you know better than I, of erosion is so great that simply stabilizing it will take some money, and then rebuilding will take some more.

In the absence of that commitment, I think we have to rethink what we do with our military. Do we want, as I say, three full services? Do we want submarines? What kinds of helicopters do we want? We have virtually no airlift capacity now. So if we would like to go to places like Afghanistan, we need the right uniforms, which we didn't have, and we need the right transportation, which we didn't have. We were waiting for a ride from the Americans.

We at one time had that kind of airlift. When Lyndon Johnson called Lester Pearson and said “We need people in Cyprus--would you send them?”, Pearson was able to put peacekeepers on a plane before Parliament had even debated it. But we had the airlift to do it. Parliament later approved.

So my sense is that as part of our reassessment of who we are, unless we're willing to commit money, we need to rethink what our armed forces ought to do. And there are many roles we could play. I've just mentioned, en passant, the good governance nation and perhaps rebuilding peacekeeping and that kind of thing. But we also have to ask ourselves what kind of a role we would like to play in something like, were we able and had we decided to, in Iraq. We decided not to, but even if we had, we wouldn't have been able to, or at least not much.

I think we have to reconsider the level and the breadth and the size of our armed forces and make choices.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Cotler.

Mr. Irwin Cotler (Mount Royal, Lib.): This is a question to Andrew Cohen, and Mr. Stoett is invited to respond as well.

Would Canada have a distinguishable role in the rethinking, if not reconstituting, of an international justice system, a kind of projet de société, as you mentioned, société internationale, which would call upon our distinguishable expertise and experience in this regard?

Let me give very quickly some examples. The first is you referred to a matter of humanitarian intervention, but that commission's report also related to the duty to prevent, as well as the duty to intervene and the duty to rebuild, so this might even relate to what has been mentioned earlier about the role we could have in prevention.

The second is on bringing war criminals to justice. We've had a role in the International Criminal Court, but we ought to perhaps think more imaginably in this regard as well.

The third would be the rethinking of international law doctrine, again arising out of the Iraq experience, notions of rights of self-defence in a post-9/11 universe, the role of UN Security Council, and finally, combating state-sanctioned hate speech, which has been responsible for many of the major conflicts, from the Nazi genocide to the Rwandan genocide.

Prof. Andrew Cohen: Professor Cotler has said it better than I could, coming as a former professor of law at McGill. All those things are things we can do.

It's interesting today, as we talk about Iraq, and we've made our decision on Iraq where we're not going in and we don't believe the American case necessarily of the threat of weapons of mass destruction, or the link to international terrorism. But what I would ask is why, as a nation of decency, we haven't made any statements about the plight of the Iraqi people. Why haven't we spoken to them? There was a proposal from the Canadian Alliance talking about reconstituting an international tribunal where we would say now we will propose holding accountable those leaders of Iraq, and we will bring them to justice later on.

There was also discussion here earlier about the expelling of Iraqi diplomats. It seems to me that in a number of ways, having chosen to stay on the sidelines in this conflict, we could express some solidarity with the Iraqi people, and we might begin taking measures such as you've described. Those are things we can do. Those are things we do well. We build upon our comparative advantage. We build upon what we do well. It seems to me that is where we can be enormously effective. So all those things I think are things that I would hope your committee and this review would consider.

Á (1130)

The Chair: Mr. Stoett.

Prof. Peter Stoett: This talk of war crime tribunals is, for one thing, heartening, and it's certainly something that a lot of us have pushed for in the human rights community, I would argue. At the same time, it's very complex. Are we talking about a tribunal that is going to try the surviving members of the Baath Party in Iraq for crimes they committed during wartime, or during so-called peacetime? They are two fundamentally different things. If we're going to have an international tribunal that tries someone for crimes against their own people, outside of the context of wartime, we're moving into a troubled area. This is something the International Criminal Court could deal with, but it's different to set up an ad hoc tribunal with that explicit purpose. Even in the Rwandan case, there was in fact, you could argue, a war-like situation, because the Tutsis were coming back from Burundi in the Rwandan Patriotic Front.

Furthermore, if it's during wartime, then the international community is obviously going to make a call, if it's going to get Security Council approval in particular, that Americans can be tried as well, and that they could be prosecuted for any sort of what could be deemed excessive military force that's used. We all know this is a door the Americans would refuse to open. So I think it's going to be very interesting, if in fact they do move ahead with war crimes tribunals, how this could work out in this particular case.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mrs. Redman, then Mr. Kenny.

Mrs. Karen Redman: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I have a couple of questions for clarification. Thank you very much for your interventions. They've been very enlightening.

Professor Cohen, I have to ask, as much as the human rights issues in Iraq are very compelling, surely that is not the main reason there is a war in Iraq as we speak. So I think one has to be careful about how you characterize those two things and that they not be blended together. Clearly, the initial effort at the UN with 1441 was looking at weapons of mass destruction. I think we need to be clear about that.

Professor Stoett, on globalization, can we stop it? If we can't, can we contain it? If we can contain it, how? Is that something the international community needs to attend to, in your view?

The Chair: Mr. Cohen first.

Prof. Andrew Cohen: I know it was cast in the form of a comment, but could I reply to the human rights issue?

You're right, the United States and Britain are not in Iraq primarily because of human rights. All I'm saying is that a number of eloquent people have made the argument for intervention on the grounds of human rights. I know we're not there yet, and I know that's not the reason we went in. I'm simply saying that given that this country commissioned a report before the United Nations that talked about humanitarian intervention, I would have wondered if we might have explored the grounds at some point of going into Iraq on humanitarian grounds. We're not there yet, and I know that isn't the reason, although Tony Blair has made very eloquent arguments--and I agree with you, they're secondary arguments--for the moral case for going in. I think we've been rather, as a government, perhaps insensitive or absent in that and shown very little empathy for what has gone on there.

The Chair: Mr. Stoett.

Prof. Peter Stoett: Globalization is one of these things for which there are a million definitions. And ultimately the physical manifestations, such as the increases in trade, the spread in capital, foreign investment, yes, these things can be stopped with government protectionism and so on, but that's not necessarily what we want.

I think what we want is to make sure that the impact of the external world is in some way mitigated by local cultures so that it's not the case where we have a bulldozer approach, basically, where the west is spreading its values, because it doesn't typically work. There's a socialization process that's inherent in the accepted definition of globalization by cultural theorists and others, and this is where you see a lot of resistance to it, in terms of non-western people and religions and so forth, indigenous peoples and other groups. And yes, they can, I think, play a significant role in maintaining their own identity, and I don't see why Canada can't do that either, incidentally.

I don't equate globalization with Americanization; that's very simplistic. Nonetheless, the main media sources, the main corporations that have been involved in this process, have been American, with some distinctions. So for me it's one reason why I think it's important that Canada maintain an independent polity and so forth.

To say that globalization can be stopped implies that we know what the hell it is, and we don't. But there are certainly pockets of resistance to it, to the spread of western culture, and we see those every day in the papers.

Á (1135)

The Chair: Thank you.

Make it very short, please, Mrs. Redman.

Mrs. Karen Redman: I was very interested that you highlighted the environment. I just finished in December being the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Environment, and I had an opportunity to participate on his behalf in the Commission for Environmental Cooperation. It was interesting to hear you say it didn't have teeth, but in terms of multilaterism, an awful lot of what we do on the international stage is finding spheres we have commonality on in moving forward. I would hope that whoever is viewing this doesn't feel that it is without value, because I certainly think that it does have value for all three of our countries.

The Chair: Thank you.

We'll go to Mr. Kenney for one question and then to Mrs. McDonough for the last question.

Mr. Kenney, please.

Mr. Jason Kenney (Calgary Southeast, Canadian Alliance): I have a quick comment I'll make and then I'll ask my question.

Mr. Cohen said that the United States and the United Kingdom are not in Iraq primarily for the humanitarian reason. However, I think one could argue that the U.K. would not be there at all were it not for the humanitarian reason. While their primary stated purpose is disarmament, the majority of Labour MPs I think found very persuasive the humanitarian argument, and they have been engaged on this issue for a very long time.

Ann Clwyd, who is a Labour MP, has been chairman of the international committee for the indictment of Saddam Hussein, and there's a large group of labour MPs who have been very active on humanitarian issues in that country for a very long time, so I think that was a critical part of their political decision.

My question, principally for Professor Stoett, is that I was a little unclear on why you are skeptical about the use of a special tribunal to prosecute officials in the Baath regime post-conflict. And you referred only to war crimes, when in fact a special tribunal would be created to prosecute crimes against humanity generally, including genocide, war crimes, and others.

It seems to me that there are three possibilities in terms of bringing these people to justice: we leave it to the Iraqi people themselves, post-liberation, to do what they will with these people, perhaps in a Ceausescu manner of swift and brutal justice; or we allow the occupying powers to use the Nuremberg precedent and therefore jurisdiction in Iraq to establish their own court of justice; or the United Nations, through the Security Council, passes a resolution similar to those affecting Rwanda and Yugoslavia for the creation of a special international criminal tribunal.

It seems to me that from the Canadian perspective the latter is preferable. Ought we therefore not advocate it?

The Chair: Mr. Stoett.

Prof. Peter Stoett: I would agree. Well, I'm not sure I agree totally. I would have liked to have seen Milosevic, for example, tried in Bosnia before he was sent to the UN. I think it sends a message to the Iraqi or the Bosnian people that the international community can do this better than they can, and I'm not sure that's always the case.

That being said, in a choice between Nuremberg and a special tribunal, I would choose a special tribunal, definitely. Nuremberg sets up all the victors' justice accusations that we want to avoid in this case. But I would argue, if it is a special tribunal and it's going to include war years, the years in which the United States and other coalition partners were engaged in war with Iraq on Iraqi territory, then it's going to have to involve them as well in order to gain international legitimacy. Otherwise, people are going to make the same argument they've made with regard to the Rwanda tribunal, which essentially is that the Hutu have been tried for this, even though it's quite clear the Rwandan Patriotic Front did commit acts of atrocity when they came in. Those acts might have been justifiable, given the context of the genocide that was occurring. Nonetheless, they occurred, and so far the Rwanda Patriotic Front, which now rules the country, has not been prosecuted.

This opens up a question of legitimacy. But you can understand the immense political gymnastics we'd have to go through to get the Americans to agree to have possible Americans tried. It just isn't going to happen. This is why I see a big debate coming up about how we can actually bring, as you say, quite rightly, these people to justice, and how do we do it.

Á (1140)

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Stoett.

Now we'll go to the last question with Mrs. McDonough, please, without any preamble.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A quick question to Professor Stoett. You referred to the HIV/AIDS pandemic as the greatest health security threat to the world, and Canada's response, to date, being woefully inadequate. I wonder if you could comment on what you see as the appropriate measure or the indices that ought to determine Canada's response.

The second one is not so much a question to yourself as it is to the committee, really. We've heard many, many references to the Rwandan genocide and response that has followed, and I wonder if it wouldn't be very advisable, for a variety of reasons, for us to agree to bring in some witnesses to talk about the Rwandan genocide and the follow-up because of how often it does arise from various perspectives.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Stoett.

Prof. Peter Stoett: I'd be happy to recommend some people if you'd like, regarding that.

As far as the question of AIDS is concerned, I did mention that beyond chronic malnutrition, I think it's the greatest health threat. Access to clean water remains the number one problem for most Africans, for example.

That being said, there is a wealth of medical personnel--NGOs in Africa, people who are committed to dealing with the trade in prostitution, people who are willing to deal with children with AIDS. They are there. There isn't an infrastructure in the sense that we might think of it. That's not the way Africans do things. Things are done, very often, at a very sub-governmental level. There is a lot of potential there, I think, to take advantage of the structures on the ground, but they need funding. They need the money. It comes down to that.

I have no over-expectations for Canada, as I mentioned previously. We can't go and give them $30 billion or something, which is what they need. They need money in that sort of magnitude. But the international community can, and maybe we can help to continue to push other administrations and multilateral agencies, such as UN AIDS, of course, into receiving that kind of funding and putting the money where it should be. I don't think it's necessarily beyond getting some sort of medical assistance. It's not a job for pharmaceuticals. It's a job for the people who are on the ground and deal with the victims of this ravaging disease.

In that case, Stephen Lewis is quite right, I think, that there is an ethical obligation that we have. George Bush has said that this war will cost $75 billion in its initial stages. We could spend that and certainly we could do something for a disease that's killing 20 million people and upwards.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

I just want to thank both presenters, Professor Cohen and Professor Stoett, for their appearance here this morning. It was very interesting and really helpful for the work of our committee. Thank you, again.

Now, I just want to make a comment, not regarding you, but regarding the committee, on Canadian relations in the Muslim world. We have a slight problem regarding the budget that was accepted by the subcommittee. One of the leaders of the five parties didn't agree on this, because we were not visiting any Muslim countries. I have discussed it with a few members, and, if you all agree, we're going to skip Brussels, the third city in Europe. We're going to London, Paris, and instead of going to Brussels, we'll go to Casablanca, Morocco, if you all agree and give me the authorization to go back in front of the subcommittee if it's necessary because we're doing that change.

[Translation]

Ms. Lalonde, briefly.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Does that substitute for the second...?

The Chair: No.

Á (1145)

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Then I agree.

[English]

The Chair: It's just for the first phase.

[Translation]

It's for the first phase.

[English]

Are all agreed? Okay, all agreed.

[Translation]

Thank you. I simply want to add, following a request by the clerk, that

[English]

we're going to look at whether there are any different budget implications because of that, and I'll come back to you if it's necessary.

Merci beaucoup. The meeting is adjourned.