FISH Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FISHERIES AND OCEANS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES PÊCHES ET DES OCÉANS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, November 6, 1997

• 0853

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. George S. Baker (Gander—Grand Falls, Lib.): Order. Under our order of reference, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), today we're dealing with the science branch.

Before we request Dr. Doubleday to respond to the recent criticism of the scientific branch, there are just a couple of matters that the chair wants to bring up to the committee.

As to our request to have representatives from this committee be a part of the Canadian delegation to the meeting concerning tuna and the catching of tuna in Canadian waters by Japan, we have been refused permission to be a part of that delegation.

The second thing concerns the request the chair made, at the instruction of members of the committee, to assemble information regarding the amount and types of fish that are caught off the east coast by foreign vessels under licence from Canada. Verbally given to me, the answer was that this is privileged information and could not even be obtained through access to information, because it would violate the matter of privilege in that the companies and the nations don't want to release their own industrial information to anybody else.

• 0855

We have these two matters for consideration of the committee.

Mr. Matthews, did you want to intervene?

Mr. Bill Matthews (Burin—St. George's, PC): Yes, Mr. Chairman, pertaining to the requests for information on foreign vessels and so on. Is it true the committee has the power of subpoena and may pursue court action or legal proceedings?

The Chairman: We certainly do, Mr. Matthews, have both those powers. We also have lawyers available to us.

Mr. Bill Matthews: Well, if such is the case, would the chair entertain a motion?

The Chairman: What would the motion be?

Mr. Bill Matthews: That the chair be authorized to once more request the information and, if refused by the department, that legal proceedings be undertaken to access this information for the committee.

I really don't think it is good enough that we can't be given that information. If it's an individual company or an individual vessel catch that has some confidential privilege because of business undertakings, to a degree I can understand it, but from a total catch point of view—commercial value, catch value, and so on—I think someone is stalling here and this committee should not in any way tolerate it.

Mr. Gary Lunn (Saanich—Gulf Islands, Ref.): I will second that motion.

To keep this very brief, it's absolutely unacceptable this information is not being provided to this committee. This is an all-party committee, and we are the ones who are elected and accountable to the people. I absolutely concur with what he's doing, and I think we have to push very hard on this. I would second that motion and give it my full support.

The Chairman: Why don't we deal with it this way? We do have a witness whose testimony is very vital to the committee, and I think Mr. Duncan wants to bring up one other short matter. How about our instructing our staff—our researchers—to contact DFO immediately, probably in writing under signature of the chair, to request this information and to point out that if we do not get the information we could pursue legal action to get it?

Mr. Gary Lunn: I think it has to go one step further, Mr. Chairman—not “could pursue legal action”, but that you've been instructed by the committee that if we do not get this information, we will pursue all other avenues, including legal action, to get it. That would make it stronger.

The Chairman: Okay, we will ask our staff to do that and move on to the other matter.

Our request to be a part of the delegation has been refused, so obviously we would have to request that the delegation to this meeting concerning tuna within Canadian waters report back to this committee, present a report to this committee, and be open for cross-examination by this committee. We'll make that request. We'll instruct the clerk to get in touch with DFO to have those representatives appear before the committee.

The clerk is pointing out to me that we don't have the quorum to pass a motion, but the chair is using its discretion under the rules, just as we would in the steering committee meeting to effect the same procedure.

Now there's one further point to be brought up by Mr. Duncan.

Mr. John Duncan (Vancouver Island North, Ref.): I'm not really happy that we don't have quorum here, Mr. Chair, but I guess the eight of us who are here can't do a lot about that.

I want to bring up the issue of the will of this committee about the appointment of Mr. Fewchuk to the Freshwater Fish Marketing Corporation.

We discussed this previously, and I've been informed that until the order in council has been tabled in Parliament this committee cannot move. The order in council cannot be tabled until it has been in the Canada Gazette for a period of five days. It has not yet appeared in the Canada Gazette.

• 0900

The appointment, according to the press release, becomes effective November 28. We have a break next week. The following week is the only week we are here prior to November 28, because we are travelling in the Atlantic region. The only conceivable way this committee will be able to exercise its jurisdiction in bringing Mr. Fewchuk before this committee prior to the start of his posting would be if that were published in the Canada Gazette tomorrow.

I fail to understand why this has not occurred, other than that there may be an attempt to subvert the ability of this committee to call in the appointee, Mr. Fewchuk, to talk about his credentials and so on. I was hoping the parliamentary secretary would be here to respond to whether there's the political will to make this happen tomorrow.

On the basis that we don't have the assurance, as far as I'm concerned this committee can call Mr. Fewchuk before this committee without the order in council being tabled in the House if we want to use our subpoena power. I think we have that ability and I don't think we want to carry it out, but I think it's the only leverage we may have in exerting pressure on the government to table the order in council. Obviously they have it well in hand; they put the press release out weeks ago.

Once again, I would like to make that motion, but we don't have a quorum. I think the message needs to be passed on. Perhaps we can have further discussion at the end of this meeting. I feel this committee is being taken for a ride on these issues.

The Chairman: Mr. Duncan, as you pointed out, it has not been tabled in the House—

Mr. John Duncan: It hasn't been published in the Canada Gazette.

The Chairman: It has to be tabled. It has to be published in the Canada Gazette before it takes effect. The break is next week. We come back here for a week before we go on the road. So why don't we put it off—the point well taken—until our steering committee meeting the week following next, when we're back in session? Perhaps by that time it will have been tabled in the House.

Mr. Lunn.

Mr. Gary Lunn: Mr. Chairman, the point that's being made is that there's no question it will be tabled in the House by that time, but to put it in one sentence, the government is playing games here. They're tabling this at the very last moment. This appointment was made and the order in council, my understanding is, was signed, but they're playing games, because they know once that order in council is signed we can bring Mr. Fewchuk before us.

They're going to table it at the very last minute, just days before this appointment takes effect. That's what is frustrating us. There's not much point in questioning him after the appointment takes effect. That's the point that's trying to be made, and I appreciate your comments.

The Chairman: Mr. Lunn, as a lawyer you know that perhaps they're not playing their games; perhaps there's a reason for this. So why don't we, as a committee, put it off until we return following the break next week, at which time we will deal with it?

Mr. Gary Lunn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Now we move on to our witness today and a very serious subject. We're going to ask Dr. Doubleday to make an opening statement and, if he could, to respond specifically to the criticisms made of him by scientists from British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland. These criticisms were published in the Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, with very specific condemnations of the way the science branch operates regarding quotas.

• 0905

Dr. Doubleday, would you make an opening statement, please. Then we'll have questions from the floor.

Dr. William Doubleday (Director General, Fisheries and Oceans Science Directorate, Department of Fisheries and Oceans): Mr. Chairman, honourable members, I understand the committee wishes to hear my testimony on issues related to fisheries research and the provision of scientific advice for fishery management in Canada, particularly for Atlantic groundfish.

My opening statement is intended to put into perspective the scientific advisory process for fisheries in Atlantic Canada, which has evolved from an international commission to a rigorous Canadian peer review process open to fishers and academics as well as DFO scientists.

In order to put this into context and show the evolution, I have to go back quite a bit in time. I'd like to start with what I would refer to as the ICNAF period. ICNAF is the acronym for the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. It came into effect in 1950 and managed the groundfish fisheries of the northwest Atlantic until the late 1970s.

Peer review of scientific assessments and collective scientific advice were provided to the fisheries commission by its standing committee on research, which was composed of scientists from member states.

Prior to the 1970s most of the marine fisheries research within Canada was done by the Fisheries Research Board of Canada. The research board was reviewed by the Glassco Royal Commission on Government Organization in 1963 and then again by the Science Council of Canada in 1970.

Both these groups recommended combining the research board laboratories with the fisheries department, which also had a modest scientific program at the time. They made these recommendations mainly because of problems with the co-ordination of research and a lack of responsiveness of the board to the needs of fisheries management.

The board was criticized for putting little emphasis on the repetitive observations needed to provide annual conservation advice. The research board laboratories were merged with the then Department of the Environment in 1973.

This isn't to say that the research board didn't do very good research; they did. It was primarily research project oriented. They would study something, publish a paper on it, and then move on. They didn't have monitoring programs and processes to generate advice again and again, as was becoming needed for the management of the fisheries.

ICNAF, the international commission, recognized that groundfish stocks were over-exploited and in serious decline. You start to see this in their reports, actually, in the mid-1960s. They looked at various ways to deal with this and began to introduce catch quotas in 1972. This supplemented controls on fishing gear, controls such as minimum mesh sizes, which was the main conservation tool previously in place.

These quotas were initially based on achieving the idea of maximum sustainable yield—that's the largest catch that could be sustained from each fish stock—but by the time 1975 arrived it was clear that MSY was an elusive goal that really wasn't being achieved in practice. A special meeting was held that year to examine more conservative guidelines. It adopted one that's called FO.1, for setting the catch levels.

Unless the committee wants to get into a lot of technical detail, I'm not going to explain FO.1. I will indicate that for cod, which was the most important groundfish species in Atlantic Canada, using this new FO.1 guideline meant aiming to catch about 20% of the fishable ages as opposed to 40%, which was the previous goal. That's 20% each year. This was a more conservative level. It had a margin of safety that would leave more fish in the water to spawn and sustain the fishery in the future.

• 0910

Canada extended fisheries jurisdiction in 1977, assuming management responsibility for stocks within 200 miles of our coast. The continental shelf on the east coast extends out 350 miles in some areas. So there are fish stocks that are outside the 200 miles and there are also fish stocks that overlap the 200-mile limit.

The Canadian management process was set up to manage those within 200 miles. This included a scientific committee, the Canadian Atlantic Fisheries Scientific Advisory Committee, which everyone has always referred to as CAFSAC. This committee was modelled on the scientific committee of ICNAF and it had a similar function. It carried out a peer review of stock assessments of these Canadian stocks, recommended collective scientific advice and then documented the process.

Canada adopted the FO.1 guideline for setting catch levels for groundfish and also other species like herring so that CAFSAC would estimate the abundance and then forecast what the catch would be in the following year, according to that FO.1 guideline. The scientific information was communicated by advisory documents and more technical research documents and by presentations to the Atlantic Groundfish Advisory Committee, AGAC, and correspondingly smaller regional committees.

Stocks generally increased from 1978 to the mid-1980s, but then levelled off and in some cases began to decrease. The FO.1 guideline was amended in 1988 by the introduction of a “50% rule”, which meant that changes in catch quotas, which at that point were often reductions in catch quotas, were phased in rather than adopted all at once. This responded to concerns from the fishing industry that large adjustments made all at once were disruptive to the industry.

Throughout this period stocks outside 200 miles had been managed by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, NAFO.

I apologize for having all these acronyms. It's part of fisheries.

NAFO operates in a similar way to the way ICNAF operated in the past. It has a scientific council that corresponds to the old standing committee on research of ICNAF. So this scientific council, which is composed of scientists from the member countries, reviews stock assessments that are submitted by scientists from the member states. It does a peer review and recommends catch levels and it provides advice on other management measures to the fisheries commission.

The NAFO scientific council also assesses stocks on the request of coastal states. For example, in the far north, Canada and Greenland share some stocks in Davis Strait. They request advice from the scientific council and the scientific council does a peer review for those assessments.

Fishery management, which by 1979 had become the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, consulted fishers through AGAC, the Atlantic Groundfish Advisory Committee, and similar committees. They would take scientific advice from CAFSAC and the department scientists and consult with the fishermen. They would then draw up a fishing plan that was typically announced in December, or sometimes in the first week of January each year. This plan was drafted by a working group primarily from the fishery management staff of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, but with one or more members from DFO science.

• 0915

CAFSAC considered that they were providing advice following established guidelines or in response to specific requests from fishery management.

CAFSAC rarely made specific recommendations; however, the fishing industry, the provincial governments and the public nevertheless considered that the CAFSAC advice was effectively making recommendations for catch levels.

The situation changed quite dramatically in the 1990s. CAFSAC provided scientific advice until 1992, when the closure of the northern cod fishery began a series of moratoria on fishing groundfish.

In 1993 CAFSAC was replaced by a new regionalized scientific advisory process instead of one for the entire Atlantic. In response to the criticism that CAFSAC met secretly, the meetings that reviewed the scientific assessments and formulated stock status reports were open to fishermen and scientists from Canadian universities.

In 1993 the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council, FRCC—yet another acronym for which I apologize—was also set up as an arm's length body that included university-based scientists and fishers. The FRCC was set up to make conservation recommendations simultaneously to the public and the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.

The FRCC took over and expanded through open public meetings the role of AGAC, which was the Atlantic Groundfish Advisory Committee, to consult on the scientific advice from DFO science. So AGAC was disbanded in 1993 and the new resource conservation council took over that consultative role.

DFO fishery management continued to develop fishing plans. They consulted fishermen on management issues through regional advisory committees.

Also, during the 1990s the FO.1 guideline is no longer the key foundation for the scientific assessments and advice. Increasingly, assessments incorporate analysis of risks associated with a range of conservation options. More attention is given to the probabilities and expected extent of stock increases, rather than the proportion of the fishable ages being caught each year.

So instead of just saying, you catch 20% of what's there and here's what your quota will be, scientists are saying, if you do this the stock will increase, if you do that it'll be stable, and if you do something else it'll decline.

The scientific peer review and advisory process has evolved over the past 25 years and continues to evolve. In 1996 we began distributing stock status reports on the Internet. We distributed videos explaining the groundfish assessments to community television stations and fishers associations, which allowed the scientific information to be seen by more individuals than previously.

Mr. Chairman, over about 25 years there's been a reasonably steady evolution in the way stock assessments have been done and the way the scientific information is used to develop fishing plans and so on.

I've concentrated on Atlantic groundfish because I think that's what the committee wants to concentrate on. There's a similar story, although it differs in detail, with respect to the Pacific fisheries and with respect to Atlantic salmon and so on. I'd be quite happy to go into that if the committee wishes, but this is essentially the story for Atlantic groundfish.

The Chairman: Dr. Doubleday, before I go to the questioners, I would ask you for a short answer to this question.

• 0920

In the Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, three prominent biologists—J.A. Hutchings, Department of Biology, Dalhousie University; C. Walters, Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, Vancouver; and R.I. Haedrich, Department of Biology, Memorial University of Newfoundland—published an article in which they claimed, just as an example, that “bureaucratic intervention has deleteriously influenced the ability of scientists to contribute effectively to fisheries management” and that “fisheries science is inextricably linked to and affected by a political bureaucracy in Ottawa”.

Furthermore, they claim that you could probably be called “the silencer”, because they claim here that “scientists are explicitly ordered, even today, not to discuss politically sensitive matters”—for example, the status of fish stocks and so on, with anybody outside of the department.

What do you have to say to these very prominent scientists, who have really made some very serious charges against your department? Then we'll go on to questions.

Dr. William Doubleday: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I of course read the article by Hutchings and co-authors, and I had the opportunity to respond to the article with a comment that appeared in the next issue of the Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences. I've made copies of that available to the members today.

Very simply, I would say there are perhaps three main elements to the paper by Hutchings and his co-authors.

One is that he examines a series of examples, particularly related to Atlantic groundfish and northern cod, and suggests from quotations of documents that changes were made in scientific advice and distortions were introduced. I went back and examined the various cases that he gave, and they really didn't stand up to close examination. All the chapter and verse is in the published response.

The Chairman: And the B.C. case as well, where he criticizes your decisions in British Columbia—do you also make the same assessment in British Columbia, with the evidence that they presented in their paper?

Dr. William Doubleday: With respect to the B.C. example, I'm not as familiar with the details of that—

The Chairman: Pacific salmon.

Dr. William Doubleday: —but this is on the Kemano completion project and the diversion of water in the Nechako River.

I didn't go into very much detail in responding to that one, but I did point out, I think, a rather important omission in Hutchings' paper, namely that there was a major inquiry by the B.C. Utilities Commission in 1991 and 1992, and at that point we provided a very large volume of documentation and made available all the witnesses who wanted to testify or were requested to testify. It was actually, I think, using that documentation that they developed their example in the paper. The situation is quite different in the 1990s than it was in the 1980s.

Coming back to your original questions, Mr. Chairman, I don't think the detailed examples stand up very well when you look at them closely. The quotations in Hutchings' paper were very selective—sometimes part of a sentence. In responding, I indicated that a more complete quotation would show that in fact the department stock assessment documents were balanced and complete and correctly presented the scientific knowledge.

One of the examples they went at was that in 1995 there was a draft stock status report for groundfish in the southern Gulf of St. Lawrence that mentioned seals, and the final version didn't mention seals. He looked at that and analysed it and suggested that it had been manipulated in order to give the impression that we were blaming seals.

• 0925

When you read the stock status report, it's impossible to get that impression. The statements were very clear that the decline of southern gulf cod was due to overfishing, discarding and practices like that. The impression he had from looking at the documents is not what one would get reading them objectively and completely.

So these examples are one aspect.

The second aspect is when he criticized the department for not including risk analyses in the stock assessment documents from the 1980s. Risk analysis, which is looking at the probabilities of things going wrong and the consequences of that, has become a very significant research topic in the 1990s. Increasingly, our own stock assessments and those elsewhere in the world are explicitly including risk analyses and diagrams to show the probabilities of things happening.

Nobody was doing this in the 1980s. For example, if you look at the United States and Europe, when they published their stock assessments during the 1980s, which is the period for which he was criticizing us, nobody was doing this. So it's a bit like criticizing the automobile manufacturers for not making mini-vans in the 1960s. It was just something that came later and it is increasingly being used.

The third aspect is the issue of speaking to the public and speaking to the press. It's important to make a distinction here between a scientist who is asked about his work, who is called up by a reporter or whomever and who is expected to respond factually, and the situation where the department is asked for its view on an issue. When the department is asked what its view is on an issue, we have to have a spokesperson. You can't have 15 different people saying what they think. Our media guidelines are such that if any scientist is called up by a reporter and asked about his area of work, he's expected to provide factual information, not speculate about policy or about the future.

Hutchings' paper suggests that scientists are reprimanded for doing this. We had an access to information request this summer about all the reprimands that had been given to scientists for basically speaking out publicly. We went back in our files and there's only one that I can find, and that's the one covered in Hutchings' paper.

As I pointed out in responding to Hutchings' paper, the scientist who was reprimanded wasn't reprimanded for giving factual information. In fact, it was quite the opposite. When he was interviewed by the Globe and Mail about a paper that had just been published in the journal, Science, he said that one of the conclusions of the paper was that the environment and the seals had nothing to do with the decline of northern cod.

If you read the paper, it says no such thing. This statement is unrelated to the paper that was the subject of the interview.

Hutchings and his co-authors justify the statement about the environment and the seals having nothing to do with the decline of cod by referring to 14 other papers, of which 10 were published one or more years after the reprimand was given.

• 0930

I find it rather hard to explain and justify a statement as being factual when it's being justified by a reference to things that happened years later.

The Chairman: Thank you, Dr. Doubleday. I know you want to be thorough in your answers, but I wonder if you could keep the answers a bit shorter, given our time constraints.

Mr. Duncan, British Columbia.

Mr. John Duncan: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

All is not well, despite your assurances. I'm actually astounded with your statements about how things have evolved over the last 25 years.

We're not talking about things that need to evolve. We had one of the largest and the most important fish inventories in the world, the northern cod. That inventory was decimated.

We had the largest lay-off in Canadian history. Not one person has apologized and not one person has been held accountable for any aspect of that. When we're talking about science, what we see is an organization that's more concerned with political consequences than scientific consequences.

We have evidence of that. One of our members, our fisheries critic in the last Parliament, made some appointments to visit some scientists in Newfoundland. To get to Newfoundland and be told that you can't talk to those scientists, you have to talk to the assistant deputy minister of science in Ottawa...if that isn't paranoia and exclusionary, I don't know what is.

We don't need something to be evolved. We need something to be reinvented. We need to separate science from policy. The tone of conversation I've heard here today reminds me of someone talking about what colour of linoleum we're going to buy for the floor when the foundation is actually crumbling. We have a major concern here.

Right now we have 20,000 licensed anglers in the province of New Brunswick. Their spokesmen are saying that reasoning with DFO on behalf of the resource is useless.

The Saint John River was closed to hook-and-release fishing. We have DFO going out and killing fish in order to give them to the aboriginal community. They are placing conservation second in priority to the aboriginal fishery. We all know that the aboriginal fishery comes after conservation.

The lack of confidence in what DFO is doing is reinforced month after month. I don't understand how you can take the approach that all is well and that somehow the world is evolving as it should.

This is a very critical exercise.

Given the statements you made, I don't believe that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans is capable of reinventing itself from within. It needs an external influence. It needs a separation of science from policy and possibly from the whole organization.

Perhaps you can respond to my statements, because I do know they're strong statements.

Dr. William Doubleday: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm not sure what I can say in response. It's more of an assertion than a question. I would like to point out that we had two independent reviews of the northern cod situation during the 1980s. One was the task group for the northern cod led by Dr. Alverson from the United States. The second was the independent review of the state of the northern cod stock, which was led by Professor Harris who, at that point, was president of Memorial University. Both these groups reviewed the scientific advice and information.

• 0935

The first one, which was the Alverson review, considered that our advice was within the range of what could be supported by the data but that we were probably overestimating the abundance. The Harris report, which was a couple of years later, after we had indeed found that we had been overestimating the abundance, reviewed all our scientific data and assessments and concluded that our estimates were in the right domain.

The idea that the collapse of northern cod and other stocks was foreseeable and was indeed foreseen—in my view, that's not the case. All the “forecasts” of the collapse that I've seen were made after it happened. If you look at the Harris report in detail, you'll find they were anticipating a gradual rebuilding of the northern cod without closing the fishery.

The causes for the collapse of Atlantic groundfish have been looked at twice: once by the study on incomes and adjustment that was led by Richard Cashin, and then again by the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council. These two different groups looked at the issue over a period of about three year. They both concluded independently that a number of factors contributed to the decline, one of which was overly optimistic scientific assessments. Other factors were poor fishing practices, reduced productivity of the stock themselves, and quotas being set too high. So a number of factors contributed, science being one of them.

With respect to the Saint John River, I think we're talking there about the 22 male grilse that were taken a week or two ago for aboriginal use. My understanding is that there are sufficient males delivered above the dam at Mactaquac to fertilize the eggs from the females that have gone through.

Mr. John Duncan: We had a net fishery. When hook and release was closed, they took 300 adults. Now they've done the same thing again by closing the hook and release. Those adults are not surplus. They may be surplus to hatchery needs, but they're not surplus to the river needs. You're losing the stewardship of that angling community by your actions. That's the whole point here.

The Chairman: Mr. Duncan, I'll allow Dr. Doubleday to answer your question. You're splitting your time with Mr. Lunn, so your time is up, Mr. Duncan.

I wonder, Mr. Lunn, if you could put your question. Perhaps Dr. Doubleday can come back if he wishes to make any reference to what Mr. Duncan mentioned.

Mr. Gary Lunn: Dr. Doubleday, first of all you made some comments—and I have huge problems with them—that it was recognized in the mid-1960s that the stocks were in serious decline. We're talking over 30 years ago. Then you suggested that there's been a steady evolution over the past 30 years in how stock assessments have been done. I want to suggest to you that there's been a steady devolution, not evolution.

Then I hear other statements—and I wish I had this down correctly—that the collapse of the stock is not really the issue or the case. I don't want to quote you, but there was some reference to that and to other examples of poor fishing practices.

To suggest to any of the people in the fishing communities in Newfoundland and these other countries.... We have the head of the scientific community from the department here suggesting that part of the problem is poor fishing practices. I'm sitting here listening to you defending your position. If it hasn't been politicized, you've absolutely failed miserably when you look at the results of the fishery and what's happened out there. There's no accountability.

• 0940

As Mr. Duncan said, you stand here and you defend your position. That's absolutely, totally unacceptable. It's a total disgrace what's happened. We can go out to the west coast, and you're now in the process of destroying the entire west coast fishery. I'm beside myself listening to you defend your position.

We've heard time and time again from so many scientists that they're absolutely silenced, that there's fear of job repercussions. There's evidence of that. We know it, but you just gloss over it and carry on. It's shameful what I'm listening to.

The people of Newfoundland and Atlantic Canada have every single right to want every single one of you hauled up on the carpet and held accountable for what you've done to the fishery industry and to suggest that they're even partly responsible.

My question directly to you is this. Will you agree that we can have access to any single scientist, to be brought before this committee, whether in Newfoundland or British Columbia or Ottawa, to absolutely say anything that scientist wants to talk about? We have to get to the bottom of this, because what's being said here today is absolutely unacceptable. We have to get to the bottom of this. You've been a huge player in destroying the Atlantic fishery and you're about to do the west coast. We can't let that happen. The people out there deserve better.

The Chairman: Dr. Doubleday.

Dr. William Doubleday: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I believe what I said was entirely factual. The northwest Atlantic fish stocks were at a relatively high level in the 1950s and early 1960s. They declined very steadily and very dramatically until about 1976 or 1977 and then recovered substantially in the late 1970s and early 1980s. I think that's a pretty well-established fact.

Now I've lost my train of thought. You had four or five different points.

Mr. Chairman, could you please refresh me on what the key points were.

The Chairman: I think the general point, Dr. Doubleday, concerns your scientific advice to the government and a blanket statement that it's the science branch that should be held accountable for what's happened on the east and west coast of Canada.

I think, Mr. Lunn, that is what you want.

Mr. Gary Lunn: I also want your commitment that this committee can have access to any single scientist at any time. If we go out there as a committee or as an individual from this committee and want to speak to a scientist...these scientists had better not be silenced, or we're going to be bringing you back here and wanting to know why.

Dr. William Doubleday. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On the point about the poor fishing practices, I'm not quoting myself. This is in the reports of the review on incomes and adjustment and the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council. It's well known, for example, that a lot of dumping and discarding was going on during the late 1980s. This is nothing new, and it's not my opinion. It's a pretty well-established fact.

With respect to witnesses, the science sector of the department will co-operate fully with the committee. We're prepared to make available anyone you want to have testify.

Mr. John Duncan: I've a question if we still have time.

The Chairman: I'm sorry, but you don't have any more time. We're now going to go to Ontario, Mr. Provenzano.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano (Sault Ste. Marie, Lib.): The chair referred to an article and then you referred to your response to that article. In your conclusions I think you pointed to three factors. Am I correct in understanding that one of those factors is the way scientists approach the science of the fisheries? I think your point is that the approach is fragmented as opposed to holistic. Would you comment on that, please.

• 0945

Dr. William Doubleday: The way assessments are done has changed very substantially over the last 20 years. Previously each stock was looked at individually, and more recently they are seen in the context of a broader ecosystem. Now we tend to have teams of scientists, oceanographers and ecologists, as well as the stock assessment specialists who participate in these assessments. We're more sensitive to changes in the marine environment and in the abundance of related species that would affect these stocks.

Also, the experience of the last 15 years has basically changed our understanding or attitude with respect to the resilience of these stocks. During the 1980s scientists in the department, myself included, along with just about everybody in fishery science in the world, felt that stocks such as cod were very robust. There hadn't been a collapse of a cod stock in living memory. You could overexploit them to some extent without real risk. We've learned this is not the case, that all fish stocks are potentially fragile and can decline rapidly under some circumstances.

We've gone from an approach of recommending specific, drastic measures only when the situation was very bad to erring now on the side of the fish and being much more precautionary. This is also a view that's being adopted elsewhere in the world. So we've changed our attitude and we've changed our approach.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: I'm specifically referring to your comment that fishery scientists could begin studying fisheries as complete systems rather than as disintegrated, disciplined specific bits.

Dr. William Doubleday: We had a more compartmentalized situation back in the 1980s. The oceanographers would focus on the ocean, the ecologists would study ecology abstractly, and then the stock assessment specialists would look at an individual stock and how it was increasing or decreasing. We've brought these people together to share their knowledge and bring their skills to bear on the problems.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: My last question actually has a couple of parts. It relates to the article we're referring to. You've said that there's not an incompatibility with government information control and scientific inquiry.

In the summary regarding the problems with the Atlantic cod, the authors of the article—Hutchings and others—gave five points. I think you've responded to some of them. I haven't seen anywhere in your comments that all of these have been covered. There have been questions here this morning that relate to some of these items.

There were five things: government denunciation of independent work; misrepresentation of alternative hypotheses; interference in scientific conclusions; disciplining of scientists who communicated publicly the results of peer-reviewed research; and misrepresentation of the scientific basis of public reports and government statements.

What I want to ask you as a witness who can speak only for himself in a definitive way is whether you have ever been asked to distort or change scientific data in your capacity as a government scientist.

Dr. William Doubleday: No, I've participated in a lot of stock assessments. Actually, at one point I was the chairman of the committee CAFSAC, during the 1980s. Never was I asked to change any data or to change any interpretation or advice during that period.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: Have you ever been subjected to any kind of a gag order?

Dr. William Doubleday: No. Sometimes I wish I were, but no, on the contrary.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: Did you want to make any other comments with respect to those five items that perhaps you didn't elaborate on in your article?

• 0950

Dr. William Doubleday: Yes. To some extent Hutchings was addressing a situation of ten years ago, which has changed dramatically. To some extent also people have perceptions that don't correspond to reality.

We had a series of meetings last summer to discuss Hutchings' paper in the region. I looked at the reports from some of them, and I didn't see any example of anyone saying he'd been tampered with or interfered with. There were some people who had heard rumours about somebody else who may have been interfered with, but to my understanding nobody said he'd been asked to distort or change any of his scientific results.

The Chairman: Thank you, Dr. Doubleday.

Now we'll go to Quebec, Mr. Bernier.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Bernier (Bonaventure—Gaspé—Îles-de-la-Madeleine—Pabok, BQ): I'm sorry I missed the beginning of Dr. Doubleday's presentation. I was meeting with fisheries people this morning. Five representatives of the Alliance des pêcheurs commerciaux du Québec are here this morning and a slightly larger delegation was here yesterday. They will be holding a press conference today to outline their position. They are also taking the opportunity to find out more by coming here to listen to Dr. Doubleday and to attend the committee proceedings.

I understood that I was to keep my questions brief. I have three of them and I will put them quickly.

This series of hearings now getting under way will focus on the scientific side of the fishery. I have to admit that I'm tempted to look forward, not backward. However, in order to know where we are heading, it's good to look back a little.

My first question concerns the communication between scientists and fisheries managers. I would like to know what kind of relationship exists between these parties since the primary users of your scientific knowledge are managers. What feedback do you get from them? You also need information after the fact.

I would also like to draw your attention to the following point. Like everyone else, I too have heard some people say that no one is listening to what biologists are saying. Furthermore, I would like to know if all of the data on fish catches is passed on to you. I'm not talking only about the data conveyed through normal channels. How do you estimate catch levels? As biologists, you sometimes argue that the fishery is not managed as it should be, but do you use a particular method to calculate catch levels and waste, and to determine when the catch quota has been exceeded? Do you use an empirical method to determine the potential impact on stock management? I don't know if my question is clear enough.

Dr. William Doubleday: Your question is very clear. However, the answer is somewhat more complicated.

Scientists normally use official data collected on catches. We realize that the system used to collect this data has some shortcomings. Occasionally, we conduct specific studies to estimate the amount of fish thrown back into the water and also to estimate catch shortfalls.

In some instances, scientists have used figures that differ from official catch levels and have modified the make-up of the samples taken when the catch was landed so that it corresponds to their scientific sample. However, as a rule, we must use existing data, which is usually official statistics.

Mr. Yvan Bernier: Shouldn't it be part of the scientist's work, not only to study stocks, but also to take samples to ensure that the fishery is being managed as managers say it is?

Let me give you an example. Tell me if you think the following situation could ever occur.

• 0955

I know for a fact that in a particular sector, namely the northern Gaspé region where turbot is fished in zones 4R and 4S, the global quota in terms of fish landings allocated to a plant was reached in August, say in August of 1990. How is it that a manager only ordered the closure of the plant a month and half later?

Do you find this statement plausible and do you think such a situation could occur? What impact could such poor management possibly have? Finally, how could scientists be so off in their estimates?

Dr. William Doubleday: Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I cannot comment on that example as I'm not aware of the specific details.

Mr. Yvan Bernier: Can this happen?

Mr. William Doubleday: You're asking if similar situations have occurred elsewhere. For instance, with respect to the Atlantic turbot fishery, the uncertainty over the data on catches taken by foreign vessels has had a rather marked influence on stock assessments. Normally, scientists conduct research on stocks. We have ways of estimating trends toward increased stocks and so forth. However, we must establish a correlation between scientific indicators and actual catch levels.

By assessing many catches, we can calibrate our abundance indices. If the data on catches is incomplete, this directly impacts on our ability to assess stock levels.

Mr. Yvan Bernier: I have two brief questions concerning the future of the fishery and the possible areas on which the committee could focus.

Do scientists at Fisheries and Oceans observe a code of ethics when it comes to their work? If no such code exists, would they like to see one developed? I have the feeling that your boss is both judge and judged. I would be interested in hearing your opinion on this.

As far as the future is concerned, do you believe that stock management could, rather than be based on estimate of stock levels conveyed to managers...?

As you know, different fishing gear is used to catch fish at different stages of their life. For the uninitiated, I will try to explain it a little better. For instance, a trawl net is used to catch four- to five-year old cod, a gill net for six- to seven-year-old cod and a longline for eight- to ten-year-old cod. Do you think this information should be made available, along with the mortality rate for each age group so that...?

The fishery is going to reopen. What criteria will be adopted? What type of fishing gear will be used? Do you think that this would be an acceptable approach to take?

Mr. William Doubleday: It's a little complicated, but I think I can answer your two questions.

As far as a code of conduct is concerned, while there is no written one, scientists do adhere to one in practice. We scientists deal with such issues as resources, ecology and so forth. It is not up to us to set catch quotas.

My work consists of estimating catches based on the age of the fish and each type of fishing gear used and this data is available. As a rule, catches taken with the various kinds of fishing gear are catches of mature fish. The weight of the fish has little bearing on catch levels based on the gear used. However, there are some differences and we can supply these figures if someone requests them.

• 1000

As a rule, scientists deal with the fishery resource as such, and do not concern themselves with catch quotas.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you, Dr. Doubleday.

We are now going to go, in this order, to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland—members from those provinces—and then back to B.C.. Mr. Stoffer from Nova Scotia.

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Eastern Shore, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Doubleday, I have a quick question to start off. How long have you been with the DFO?

Dr. William Doubleday: Well, I've been involved in what's now—

Mr. Peter Stoffer: No, just the years.

Dr. William Doubleday. It has been 24 years.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay, thank you. We're running short of time, and the quicker the answer, the better.

I am about to ask you something, sir, and I say it with all due respect. Don't take it personally.

So you were there when John Crosbie was the Minister of Fisheries, and you were there when Mifflin was the Minister of Fisheries. We have evidence that both these people, both from different governments at that time, overturned scientific evidence in quota management to suit their political needs.

Under questioning from Mr. Provenzano you were saying that you had not ascertained any sort of gag or suppression order. Yet—correct me if I'm wrong—you were the head, the top guy, in the science branch of DFO. Is that correct?

Dr. William Doubleday: That's correct.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay. So the responsibility—this is what Mr. Duncan had said.... The reality of life is that we have 20,000 fishers and their families who, come the end of May, are going to be on the short end of the stick. They're looking for answers now, and nobody—not one minister, not one official from DFO—has actually gone down there to apologize, to actually tell them what the facts were.

You can say the facts are here, you can say Dr. Hutchings said this, I'm saying this, and back and forth. Yet fisheries on all three coasts are suffering greatly because of this.

Now, if there's not a gag or suppression order, and you're the top guy, why would you not have spoken out against Mifflin and what he did on April 7, 1997, when he increased the turbot quotas? Why would you not have said something? Unless you were under....

My supposition and my belief is that you did not say something because you feared for your job or your reputation. You knew very well—we have it in black and white—that Mifflin overturned the scientific evidence, and from the deputy minister, and yet you and your department remained silent.

Now, as you answer your question, you're not answering it to me; you're answering it to over 20,000 Atlantic Canadians and their families who would like an answer to that, please.

Dr. William Doubleday: Well, I'll respond to it, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I have been to Atlantic Canada many times since 1992. Most recently I was in St. John's at the Summit of the Sea in September. There was a whole afternoon spent discussing this science issue.

I've also travelled across Newfoundland and met with fishermen. I've been there, and I don't hesitate to explain my understanding of events that happened in the past.

Second, when I said that I was acting assistant deputy minister for science during part of that period—not in the most recent period—I did not intend to give the committee the impression that scientific advice is always followed automatically. All I was saying is that the scientific advice is there, it's open, it's recorded, and to my knowledge, it has not been tampered with.

Thank you.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay. Thank you for that.

Now we have a bit of a thing. Mr. Hindle, who represents PIPS, the 35,000 people in the institute of professional science, totally disagrees with everything you've just said. He's said it publicly, he's said it time and again. Dr. Paul Brodie, who is with DFO from Nova Scotia as well, would totally disagree with everything you're saying, and we have Dr. Hutchings and many others who we can come up with.

I find it absolutely astonishing, sir, that in your tone.... I say this with all due respect. According to you, everything's just fine; there's not a problem in the world. We're just hunky-dory, and everything else.

You also failed to mention, sir, that, as Mr. Lunn had mentioned.... You say the “evolution” of these things. I like the word “devolution” because that's exactly what has happened.

• 1005

You failed to mention the merger of the coast guard with DFO, which I think has been completely disastrous. I don't know the last time you've been down to the Bedford Institute of Oceanography in Nova Scotia. That used to be one of the finest institutes in the world for science and for understanding our oceans and our fish stocks, and the span of a few short years has destroyed it. You walk there, you talk even to the janitors who clean the building and to the scientists who work there; the morale of people in that building is at an all-time absolute low.

Instead of doing their job, what they're paid to do...you have people going around trying to protect their butt from the next round of cuts that are happening. I submit to you that this is completely unacceptable.

I know you don't do the cuts, but I believe that in your position of science you should be standing up like we are, and like the fishers on all coasts are. You should be standing up to the ministers and those in the inner cabinet and saying that what they're doing is wrong. I'm asking you in your capacity, sir, to please do that in the future.

We go back to the past. It's extremely frustrating for me as a representative from Nova Scotia with many fishers in my riding. The average income is $22,000 a year. That's with or without a TAGS supplement. They're completely frustrated at what they hear from the scientists who live on the coasts. The information they receive and send off to Ottawa comes back a year later completely different.

I submit to you, sir, that a person who's been fishing for over 30 years on the coast of Atlantic Canada, with a grade 5 education, probably knows more about fish stocks and what's going on than you do. I say that with all due respect, sir. I say that also with respect to the ministers we have now. They may be fine gentlemen, but I believe they've completely missed the boat in this regard.

My final statement to you, sir, is that I have been quite adamant about asking for a judicial inquiry into the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and their practices and policies. Would you say here now that you would agree to a judicial inquiry into everything you've said and everything that the department has done over the years? Would you be in favour of a judicial inquiry?

The Chairman: Dr. Doubleday, you obviously.... Do you wish to answer that? You know the rules of the committee, and you also know your position.

Dr. William Doubleday: Well, Mr. Chairman, I don't think I should comment on whether, in my view, there should be one form of inquiry or another. All I can say is that I'm here, and I'm giving you the full benefit of my knowledge. I'm not holding anything back. I'm co-operating with the committee to the best of my ability.

I certainly agree with the member that I don't know everything about fisheries. I personally feel quite humble about it. I know less now than I felt I did 10 years ago. But I don't think that's really very relevant.

Our stock assessments are not done in Ottawa; they're done in the regions. I think we've greatly improved the communication and contact between scientists and fishermen, particularly with the sentinel fisheries program we've had in place in recent years.

We don't plan to have all the answers. I certainly don't.

The Chairman: Thank you, Dr. Doubleday.

In view of what you were saying, Mr. Stoffer, I think Mr. Lunn wanted to put a motion to the committee very briefly.

I think there will be general agreement with the motion you want to put concerning November 18.

Mr. Gary Lunn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: You'll be very brief?

Mr. Gary Lunn: Yes. I would like to put a motion to this committee that we bring the minister before the committee to respond to the estimates on November 18.

The Chairman: By “the estimates”, you mean the motion is that we request the minister to be here on November 18?

Mr. Gary Lunn: That's correct.

The Chairman: The witnesses we had planned, who were the very people Mr. Stoffer referred to as criticizing the department, the scientists in general, the paper writers, and so on.... If the minister is there on November 15, we then call the scientists who are criticizing the science branch before the committee at the following committee meeting during the same week. Is that the understanding?

Mr. Gary Lunn: Yes.

The Chairman: If we can't get the minister on November 18, then we put the scientists in that slot.

Mr. Gary Lunn: Either way, you're talking about the minister that week.

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. John Duncan: The minister has to be made a priority in that week as soon as possible, whatever day it is.

• 1010

The Chairman: That's the motion. The clerk is trying to be correct here. So that is the motion before the committee. Those in favour, yeas; contrary, nays. Carried.

Mr. Yvan Bernier: I didn't really hear the clerk.

The Chairman: The clerk—

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Bernier: Could you repeat that for me? He didn't speak into the microphone.

[English]

The Chairman: The clerk is simply pointing out.... Yes, Ms. Leung.

Ms. Sophia Leung (Vancouver Kingsway, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I wonder if are there other witnesses we should hear after the scientists. There's other opposition. Perhaps we should hear more.

My suggestion is that after we finish all the witnesses, we invite the minister.

The Chairman: Yes, I think, though, that the minister wishes to come before the committee on the afternoon of November 18.

What if we leave it up to the minister? We can't order the minister; all we can do is ask the minister.

Ms. Sophia Leung: Sure.

The Chairman: So your point is well taken. After we hear the criticism, then we call the minister. And the motion we just approved is that the minister be asked to appear on the afternoon of November 18, 1997.

Ms. Sophia Leung: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

An hon. member: It's on the estimates.

The Chairman: Well, you say the estimates, but in effect, Mr. Lunn, it's about science and everything else. You say the estimates; obviously you want to question him on the science thing as well.

So we'll go now to New Brunswick, to Mr. Hubbard.

Mr. John Duncan: Did we get a recorded vote or something on that?

The Chairman: Yes, it did pass with those in favour, yeas; contrary, nays.

An hon. member: I didn't hear the call for a vote.

An hon. member: Mr. Bernier said he did not hear—

The Chairman: Oh, you didn't hear.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Bernier: I don't understand how we can take a vote without following the rules.

[English]

The Chairman: Okay. The motion is that we request the minister to appear before this committee—

Mr. Yvan Bernier: Slowly, slowly.

The Chairman: —on the afternoon of November 18. That is the motion before the committee. According to the rules, it does not need a seconder.

(Motion agreed to)

Mr. Gary Lunn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: This is with the understanding that the scientists who have been so critical of the department be called that same day if in fact the minister cannot appear, and immediately following the minister for the remainder of that week, whatever period is available. That will be our priority for that week. That is the general understanding of the committee.

Mr. John Duncan: Before you move on, are you going back to questioning?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. John Duncan: While we have a quorum, I'm just wondering about a couple of things. Do we need to give effect to our earlier discussions on the tuna and on the Fewchuk debates, or those motions.

The Chairman: No, because that—

Mr. John Duncan: Okay, I'll accept that.

But the other thing I wanted to bring in is that if we're going to have scientists, particularly the scientists who have made these allegations, then I think this committee would want to ensure that we have Dr. Doubleday on a return visit afterwards.

The Chairman: That's a good point.

Mr. John Duncan: I would make that motion. I think that's a reasonable motion to make.

The Chairman: The motion is that following the calling of the scientists—not just the three scientists who wrote the newspaper...but other scientists identified by members of the committee or any scientist who wishes to appear before this committee—following that evidence, we shall once again request that Dr. Doubleday appear before the committee. That is the motion made by Mr. Duncan.

Mr. John Duncan: Yes.

(Motion agreed to)

The Chairman: We now go to New Brunswick, to Mr. Hubbard.

Mr. Charles Hubbard (Miramichi, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Dr. Doubleday. I was impressed by your presentation, because not only are you a scientist, but apparently you're a bit of an historian.

Of course, on the west coast when we talk about fish today we think of the salmon. On the east coast it seems to be mainly cod. I'd like to spend a little time this morning on salmon on the east coast, because in terms of my own river, the Miramichi, some 200 years ago salmon brought the first settlers to the Miramichi.

They came there, and that was their industry. It was the first industry in the area and remained an industry for almost 200 years. In fact, looking back at it, we find that we had quite a considerable commercial fishery on the Miramichi until the late 1960s and early 1970s.

• 1015

With that, as early as the 1860s, the people of the Miramichi and the fishermen saw the need to establish a salmon hatchery. While the salmon fishery was a very important part of our Miramichi bay and of that area, we had a hatchery that spawned about 3,000 fish each year and provided a very important resource in terms of that fishery.

Now, since that time, and in fact in the 1970s, DFO reduced the salmon hatchery to the point where it was spawning about 150 fish. At the same time, even our anglers.... Mr. Duncan mentioned anglers in New Brunswick. During that time DFO had seen it necessary to reduce the angling catch. In fact, for more than 10 years, no angler in New Brunswick has been allowed to keep a fish longer than 24 centimetres.

This year the salmon runs are about 20% percent of what they have been for the last 15 or 20 years. There's been a tremendous decrease in the salmon runs in New Brunswick. The rivers have been closed in terms of the Saint John, which had a hook-and-release....

I'm bringing this up because science is an important part of DFO. It's my understanding that it was your branch of the DFO that some three years ago recommended that the Atlantic salmon hatcheries on the east coast be divested or closed. Is that true, Dr. Doubleday?

Dr. William Doubleday: In 1995 we considered a number of options to make reductions in our program in order to reflect a lower budgetary allocation. One of the recommendations wasn't that the hatcheries be closed but that they be divested to interest groups. If that was not possible, they would be closed.

Now, if I can have a little—

Mr. Charles Hubbard: Yes, that's very good, then, Dr. Doubleday.

In terms of Mr. John Ritter, who was responsible in Atlantic Canada for divesting or closing, at the Miramichi hatchery we have a deal like this...not happy with the hatchery deal in terms of the group to which it was turned over. They say they don't have enough money to operate it.

It would have cost DFO about $170,000 a year to maintain that, the only resource we had that might have continued the Atlantic salmon in terms of enrichment or enhancement. Now, the DFO ADM on policy said that enhancement is no longer a priority of the department. Is this true or not?

Dr. William Doubleday: Well, I wouldn't quite answer in those terms. When did this decision, Mr.—

Mr. Charles Hubbard: I would like a yes or no, Dr. Doubleday. Is it a priority of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans in terms of the Atlantic salmon that only conservation—no longer enhancement—is a priority of your department?

Dr. William Doubleday: Well, if you have to say yes or no, then I guess I would say yes.

Mr. Charles Hubbard: Yes. Those on the west coast started a fishery some 50 years...probably bigger than those in terms of the Atlantic salmon on the east coast. Your department may eventually devolve to the point in terms of the salmon fishery on the west coast, which is also affected—not by Canadians but by other countries—where you say we'll close their hatcheries and we'll turn our back on the salmon on the west coast as well.

I only have five minutes. I guess it was my friend from Quebec who asked this. Back in Newfoundland or New Brunswick, we say do people have intestinal fortitude, do they have any backbone? Salmon have backbones. But it appears that the scientists within your department don't have many backbones. How many have quit, left the department, because their recommendations were not being followed? Have you any information for this committee to indicate that people...? There are certain ethics, certain responsibilities, there is certain professional conduct. How many have quit in desperation and frustration with what's been happening?

Dr. William Doubleday: Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that question, as posed, is really unanswerable. I mean, there have been retirements, and there have been some early retirements, in the department in recent years, but I don't know what went on in the minds of various people who have retired or left the department.

Mr. Charles Hubbard: It appears, for example, in the great province of Newfoundland, at a time when you reported to this committee, in the period between 1986 and 1991, that there were concerns with the cod fishery. In fact, there were 500 new licences issued during that period. Is that true or false?

• 1020

Dr. William Doubleday: Groundfish licences?

Mr. Charles Hubbard: Full-time groundfish licences to fishermen in Newfoundland increased by 500 during the period between 1986 and 1991. Now, you sat and watched that as a scientist. What observations did you raise in terms of what was happening in Newfoundland?

Dr. William Doubleday: I don't know whether it's true or not, Mr. Chairman. I know that the number of fishers in Newfoundland increased dramatically in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but I don't have specific knowledge about—

Mr. Charles Hubbard: So you're saying, Dr. Doubleday, as a scientist who has great information on the...that you sat and participated for 23 years in the department and watched a fishery declining in numbers, and today you've risen up the ranks to become the assistant deputy minister—

Dr. William Doubleday: No, I'm not.

Mr. Charles Hubbard: Okay, ADM Science; I'll get the correct title. You watched all this happen, and you were satisfied to continue working in the department without trying to find some job somewhere else? Is that true or false? I think it's true, because you're here today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. William Doubleday: Mr. Chairman, I think that question is based on a premise that if one feels that everything is not right in the world, then one should go and do something else.

Mr. Charles Hubbard: I would think that's a very important professional standard.

Dr. William Doubleday: I think I should explain my perspective on this. Throughout my career, my goal has been the conservation of fish stocks, maintaining them in a healthy state, and I do what I can with the means I have available to do that. The world is not perfect. Sometimes one's goals are not always achieved. I don't think that's a reason to—

Mr. Charles Hubbard: Mr. Chairman, might the witness indicate to our committee that perhaps it would be better to devolve? You divested the hatcheries on the east coast. Maybe we should divest science so that we could have outside sources under contract who would report to DFO. The Americans do some of this in terms of their fishery along the east coast. Would you recommend that as the possible solution to the problems that have resulted from the difficulties that science has brought us in the last 25 years?

Dr. William Doubleday: The United States has a National Marine Fisheries Service, which is somewhat similar to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Their program is primarily carried out in government labs, the same as ours.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Hubbard and Dr. Doubleday. To Newfoundland—Mr. Matthews.

Mr. Bill Matthews: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Doubleday, I listened very carefully to your presentation, and I think you mentioned—was it the Alverson report?

Dr. William Doubleday: Yes.

Mr. Bill Matthews: And that year was what?

Dr. William Doubleday: It was 1986, I believe.

Mr. Bill Matthews: The Alverson report said in essence that you were overestimating the abundance of biomass.

Dr. William Doubleday: It said that our estimate was within the range of possible values but that we were probably overestimating, yes.

Mr. Bill Matthews: Consequently, you set quotas based on an overestimated biomass. Having been in the department for 24 years, how many years do you think you overestimated the biomass and consequently set quotas higher than they should have been set?

Dr. William Doubleday: For northern cod alone?

Mr. Bill Matthews: Yes.

Dr. William Doubleday: Well, looking back now, I think you would conclude that the biomass was overestimated probably from about 1979 or 1980 to about 1989.

Mr. Bill Matthews: So for 10 or 12 years—

Dr. William Doubleday: Yes.

Mr. Bill Matthews: —we took too much fish out of that resource.

I don't want to dwell too much on the past, as important as it is. We should take lessons from the past, but what we want to deal with is the future.

Can you indicate to the committee what the level of research activity has been in the last couple of years at DFO, compared to what it was, say, 10 or 12 years ago?

Dr. William Doubleday: In the past three years we've had approximately a 30% reduction in funding. Some of that has been compensated by partnerships—we're increasingly working with universities and so on—but it's lower than it was five or ten years ago.

• 1025

Mr. Bill Matthews: I appreciate that answer. I think you know what I'm leading to.

Here we are at a time when we're talking about the fishery of the future and we are still making management decisions today. How in the name of God can the minister, the government, make management decisions on a fishery of the future when indeed today—as you've just admitted and confirmed for the committee—we have less research activity in fisheries in the Atlantic than we had a few years ago?

What are your thoughts on that in the position you hold? Shouldn't we be having more research activity today? If we're ever going to bring the Atlantic back, isn't an increase in research activity and investment in the future of Atlantic Canada consequently a wise investment for the Government of Canada so that we can bring those stocks back to levels we want? We can then keep those people working productively in their communities so they can contribute to the federal treasury. Wouldn't that be a fair analysis?

Dr. William Doubleday: More research, of course, would always be a benefit from the point of view of the scientist. Nevertheless, there have been some positive events in recent years. We are now having a number of co-operative projects with fishermen where they're providing good data that contribute to stock assessments that compensate for reductions in our own program.

I can't really speak against more research.

Mr. Bill Matthews: To me, the government is making counter-productive decisions on this whole aspect of the fishery.

The federal minister of fisheries, the provincial ministers of fishery—we all talk about a fishery of the future. To me the most important ingredient right now is adequate, sufficient research activity and data. And here we are decreasing that, Mr. Chairman. To me it's totally astounding.

In Newfoundland we say it's an arse-up way of doing things.

I want to ask you, Dr. Doubleday, has there been any research done on migratory patterns of fish? Why I ask that question is that over the years I've talked to a number of trawler captains who fished northern cod stocks and fished the southern zones. These people keep logs. They're very intelligent fishers. They're very successful. I suppose some days you could argue that perhaps they are too successful, but they want to make a living.

Has there been any research done on the migratory pattern, say, of northern cod? I've talked to a number of those skippers who've logged their trips and their catches. They indicated to me that their logs show migratory patterns that have taken northern cod stocks outside of 200 miles. Has anything come across your path that would indicate this?

Dr. William Doubleday: Yes. Northern cod is not an homogeneous body of fish. There are stock components. Tagging studies have been carried out for at least 50 years that show the general patterns of movement.

Typically, northern cod stay within 200 miles, but some years, particularly in the winter, they are vulnerable to fishing on the nose of the Grand Banks. This happened two or three times in the last ten years.

Mr. Bill Matthews: That's interesting.

The Chairman: You can have another question, Mr. Matthews, and then we'll go to Ms. Leung.

Mr. Bill Matthews: Dr. Doubleday, there seems to be a regeneration in the southern zones. The area I'm most familiar with is the southern part of Newfoundland, 3Ps, those areas. There seems to be some interesting, encouraging signs. As a matter of fact, fishermen tell me that the catches there this summer in the limited fishery were better than they've seen for the last 15 or 20 years. In the northern zones there doesn't seem to be any regeneration.

What's your observation on the difference in the regeneration in both areas? I know perhaps warmer water would be a factor. What's the scientific analysis and assessment of why the northern zones are so slow or there's no regeneration and in the southern zones there seems to be significant regeneration?

Dr. William Doubleday: Mr. Chairman, the the south coast of Newfoundland didn't go as low in abundance as northern cod did. So it was in a better position to start recovering. It's certainly warmer there. We didn't have the dramatic changes in the ecosystem that we had off Labrador, where capelin were virtually absent. They still are virtually absent off Labrador.

• 1030

With respect to northern cod, the components I refer to, the so-called “bay stocks”, seem to be the ones that are coming back. We're not finding much sign of cod offshore. It used to be that the offshore spawning components were the major elements of the fishery, and those seem to be still at a very low level.

The Chairman: Mr. Matthews, I know exactly what you're about to ask. There's loads of fish in the bays in the north.

We have to wind up.

Mr. Bill Matthews: When he referred to bay stocks I was wondering about the French fishing. We have St. Pierre and Miquelon that are now utilizing Canadian trawlers. They are fishing out and beyond the French islands of St. Pierre and Michelon and they are bringing in loads of fish.

So it goes further than bay stocks after all. That was my point.

I don't want to take up any more time, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: We'll go to Ms. Leung for the final question. We're going to ask Mr. Doubleday to be very brief in a response to this entire meeting.

Ms. Leung.

Ms. Sophia Leung: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Dr. Doubleday, I am very interested in your presentation. I think I learned a lot. My impression is that so many groups have been involved through the years and you have obtained very diverse and varied data and assessments. How is the DFO finally to use the data to really apply it to the policy and planning?

Dr. William Doubleday: That's one of the changes of the 1990s. The Fisheries Resource Conservation Council was put in place. They receive the scientific information and advice from the department. They consider it, they consult publicly with the fishing industry and others, and then they make the conservation recommendations.

Once those recommendations are made the minister decides whether to accept them or not. Then they are translated into a fishing plan by fisheries management in consultation with the fishing industry.

We provide the information on groundfish to the conservation council. They sometimes ask follow-on questions. We give them presentations and we elaborate to answer their questions. The process is quite different now from what it was 10 years ago.

Ms. Sophia Leung: Do you take account of the local fishermen's recommendations or suggestions?

Dr. William Doubleday: Yes. Fishermen participate in the process in two ways.

One is in the stock assessments themselves. We now have a practice, typically, of meeting with the fishermen after the fishing season and before the assessment. We review their experience and their interpretation of events in the fishery in the previous year.

We also have fishermen who participate in the stock assessment review meetings. After the assessment is complete, the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council carries out public consultations, typically in about 10 locations across the Atlantic. Anyone who has any information or a view can come and present that to the council. Those views are reflected in the council's recommendations, and you can see that in their reports. They produce a report that summarizes the consultations as well as their recommendations and reasoning.

Ms. Sophia Leung: Since 1993 FRCC has been very actively involved. Do you think we should have some representation from them? We don't know anything about them.

Do the recent increases in the seal population have any reflection in or bearing on the depletion of the cod? I understand cod is the major food for seals.

Dr. William Doubleday: This is controversial. There are large numbers of harp seals on the Atlantic, about five million or so at this point in time. They eat a lot of food. Not very much of it is cod; however, we've estimated that they consume over 100,000 tonnes of small cod each year. It varies from year to year, and the estimates are not precise. Nevertheless, it's a substantial amount of small cod.

• 1035

The seals didn't kill off the adults. The decline from 1989 to 1992 is not due to seals eating adult cod, as far as we can tell. The question is whether they are reducing the number of young cod that survived to rebuild the stock. We know that there are large numbers of young cod consumed. We are doing research to determine to what extent that's reducing the recovery.

Ms. Sophia Leung: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Dr. Doubleday.

I want to bring up a point we have to deal with before the committee meeting is over. Would members prefer that we did it in camera, that we have Dr. Doubleday say a few words and then clear everybody out? Is that what you prefer?

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Bernier: I've nothing to hide. We don't need to sit in camera.

[English]

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I think he just wants to know whether Dr. Doubleday wants to go now.

The Chairman: Do you want the committee meeting to go in camera concerning the trip?

An hon. member: It doesn't matter.

The Chairman: It doesn't matter? Leave it open. We'll allow Dr. Doubleday his statement.

Dr. Doubleday, would you like to wind up matters?

Dr. William Doubleday: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think my last few words should put in context what I said earlier. Some members thought I was rigorously defending everything that science has done in the period I've been in the department. I think I may have given somewhat of a false impression.

I don't want to say everything we've done has been perfect, but I do want to say that we've been trying to do our best to conserve the fish stocks and to ensure that there are fish tomorrow to support a fishery. We've overestimated some stocks, we've underestimated others, and it's all on the record. I'm not saying we're perfect, but I'm saying that we try to do our honest best to conserve the fishery and provide the best information we can for its management.

The Chairman: Thank you, Dr. Doubleday. Of course we'll be asking you back following evidence by the scientific community, who have expressed an interest in this. We want to thank you for appearing here today. If you want to stay and listen to where we're going to go in eastern Canada, you're free to.

[Editor's Note: Proceedings continue in camera]