FISH Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FISHERIES AND OCEANS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES PÊCHES ET DES OCÉANS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, November 24, 1998

• 0912

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Charles Hubbard (Miramichi, Lib.)): We'd like first of all to mention to everyone that this morning's meeting was moved here because the industry committee were asking for our regular room. They have an all-day meeting, and rather than having them move to two locations I did ask our clerk. I certainly want to apologize to our guests for the small room.

I'd like to welcome this morning Senator Robichaud from my constituency, who is also very much involved in the fishery.

Pursuant to an order of reference of the House dated Tuesday, May 5, 1998, consideration of Bill C-27, an act to amend the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act and the Canada Shipping Act to enable Canada to implement— I won't read any further.

We looked at that before. A very brief announcement before we begin is that we will be having various shippers in, in terms of the navigational aids and ice-breaking. Mr. Rocheleau submitted a list of names. We've dealt with the Chamber of Maritime Commerce, and I think we've tried to see that the various groups who plan to come will be represented either by the chamber or be looked at independently.

With that, I think our clerk has pretty well concluded that list, but if there are concerns that any member has for that future meeting, I'd ask you to check with Bill or myself to make sure all our interests are covered.

Yes, Mr. Bernier.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Bernier (Bonaventure—Gaspé—Îles-de-la- Madeleine—Pabok, BQ): When will we be hearing witnesses from the Coast Guard and the Chamber of Commerce? I didn't understand.

[English]

The Chairman: Just a minute now. I'll get all this to make sure I'm getting it right.

Mr. Yvan Bernier: When are the hearings supposed to be held?

The Chairman: Maybe Bill can just outline those for us.

The Clerk of the Committee: On December 1 we're going to have about 10 or 12 groups coming in. Mr. Rocheleau's people are covered under that group on December 1. Nancy Karetak-Lindell had three people she wanted to hear from, so we're probably going to hear from them on December 3. Those are the two days that have been set aside right now to deal with the ice-breaking coast guard study.

The Chairman: Mr. Stoffer.

• 0915

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Eastern Shore, NDP): Yes, I have two minor things.

First of all, I was disappointed you weren't chosen to the cabinet yesterday. I thought you would have been a great choice.

Secondly, I'd like to move a quick motion, because I understand that today at 12.30 p.m. you and the clerk have to go and submit your estimates for future travel. I've already discussed with the official opposition that we give a date of February 4 to our Iceland-Norway trip.

The Chairman: Peter, we do have a problem with that. We don't have the nine people here to— I would entertain that at the end of the meeting if we do come up to quorum—if Carmen comes back. I'd ask Mr. Lunn if his party agrees with that date.

Mr. Gary Lunn (Saanich—Gulf Islands, Ref.): I've already explained to both Wayne and Peter that's the first week of Parliament, and there are definitely rumours out there that there's a possibility we could end up having a throne speech. So that's my concern with that week. I appreciate that nothing is carved in stone, but there are enough stories going around that the possibility exists. That is the concern I have with that week.

If the rest of the committee want to go without me, that's fine. I have no problem with that.

The Chairman: Mr. Lunn, before we get involved in any difficulties between the two groups, I'm not sure about— The motion has been made and—

Mr. Gary Lunn: If you don't need 48 hours for a notice of motion, then vote on it if you want to do it with that route.

Mr. Yvan Bernier: Good question.

The Chairman: Mr. Lunn, unless I'm overruled by the committee, I have to determine, in terms of your position on this, that I will not take that to the committee today and we will review—

Mr. Gary Lunn: I have no problem with putting out a motion today.

The Chairman: I think you have too many difficulties with it, and unless your party agrees to to have either you or a replacement go, we'll be wasting our time before that committee.

So I would, Mr. Stoffer, indicate first of all, in terms of the 48 hours, that it hasn't been given. And secondly, even with that I'd have difficulty in getting back to the House committee to request that visit.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay.

The Chairman: Turning now to the department in terms of our— Mr. Bernier.

Mr. Yvan Bernier: This is my last question.

[Translation]

I have a final question before we start to hear this morning's witnesses.

You told us that the hearings with the industry concerning the new Coast Guard fees would take place on December 1 and 3. I would like to have your assurance, and I would like the clerk and the researcher to confirm—

The Nunavut report concerns a trip that we did last spring. It is almost December and the report still hasn't been finished. I know that the new fee structure will come into effect on December 21. I would like the committee to not do any other work between December 1 and 3 and that we make sure to present our report concerning the new fee schedule. We know that the House will rise on December 11. That is why I was expecting to have the hearings with the industry on the new fee structure much sooner.

Mr. Chairman, can you and the clerk assure me that we will table something before we leave on December 11? It is rather disappointing for the witnesses to appear when they know that the new fee structure will come into effect on December 21.

[English]

The Chairman: Again, Mr. Bernier, our steering committee would consider that, but I think I don't have to remind the committee that in deference to your absence at our last meeting we put off the approval of going to report to the House on the Nunavut report. You indicated you would like us to telephone you back in your constituency, which we did. And even at the conclusion of that meeting, you seemed to indicate you might have a minority report.

We have our own agenda, and if you want that agenda changed, I would suggest you make a motion, which would be considered by the steering committee. But as chairman, in terms of what we've done so far, I would have difficulty seeing us writing a report on the hearings during the first two or three days in December and having that tabled in the House before we leave.

• 0920

I think you have to remember that all of us don't agree. When Mr. Baker was here we had unanimous reports, but since then we've had members indicating that they have great concern with particular aspects of it.

So you can table that motion, but as chairman I'm not sure that we can concur in the long run to guarantee you that this would be completed before the House adjourns in December.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Bernier: If I cannot be given this assurance, will the committee, in view of the importance of its work, agree to write a letter to Minister Anderson, to ask him to suspend the implementation of the new fee structure until the committee has had the time to examine it?

As for me, I am willing to work during the holiday period, if necessary, to help with the drafting, but I would like the industry to have the time to be heard before the new fee structure comes into effect. If we cannot change our work agenda, will the committee agree this morning to write a letter to Mr. Anderson to ask him to suspend the implementation of the fee structure until we have presented our report? I would also like us to set a realistic date, because I don't want this to drag on. This is my motion. I don't know if I have a second, but I think it is important that the industry representatives know that they will have the time to be heard, and that it's not just window-dressing to hear them on December 1 and 3.

[English]

The Chairman: Are there any other comments?

Mr. Wayne Easter (Malpeque, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, I don't think it's a shell game. We are certainly bringing in witnesses, those who have some concerns about ice-breaking, as early as we can. We heard from the department already. We heard their side of the argument. To counterbalance that, we're bringing in these witnesses. If they indicate some extremely serious differences between what we've been told is happening in consultations with industry— There have been consultations over four years in this matter with industry, and at some time you have to make a decision. Certainly then I think the committee would be willing to look at it. But we have to hear what they have to say first. I don't think we can prejudge this based on what some have said who are opposed to the fees. I don't think we can prejudge, as a committee, what we're going to do until we hear them out. We can make a decision then.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Bernier: Therefore, I take it for granted that the committee agrees to reserve some time at the end of the two days of hearings to briefly review whether it would be appropriate, as Mr. Easter has said, to ask the Minister to suspend implementation of the new fee structure until such time as we can present more detailed comments.

As Mr. Easter has just said, in view of what we hear from the industry, if there is a big difference, we will ask the Minister to suspend the implementation until such time as we can provide our input.

I know that we have to carry on, but it is important to raise the question here, this morning, so people understand what's happening.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Bernier, for your input.

With that, we'll go to Mr. Wiseman. Are you the lead on this to brief us on the bill and the amendments to it? You've been here before. You know that we look for about 15, 20, or 30 minutes of explanation, followed by questions from the group. Welcome, Mr. Wiseman.

Mr. Earl Wiseman (Director General, International Affairs Directorate, Fisheries Management, Department of Fisheries and Oceans): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good morning. We do welcome the opportunity to have a chance to come back to the committee to present a briefing, provide some overview, and respond to some questions and issues that have been raised concerning Bill C-27.

There are some new members on the committee and there are some who have participated in discussion before. I'll try to keep the initial presentation brief.

We have prepared a revised deck, which you have copies of. The intention of this is to provide what we hope is a clear overview of what UNFA is, which is the United Nations Fisheries Agreement, and what Bill C-27 is about.

• 0925

UNFA is really a multilateral cooperative approach to managing fish on the high seas, particularly straddling stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. The first page of the deck gives you the full title of the United Nations agreement. In Canada, we've shortened it to simply the UN fish agreement, which we call UNFA.

I'm here today with two people who will get involved in answering questions. I should just introduce them before I proceed. With me is Madame Nadia Bouffard, who is with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and she'll be here with expertise on domestic law. Also here is Mr. Howard Strauss, the director of the legal bureau at Foreign Affairs, and he's here with expertise on international law. I have expertise in neither.

Just to give you a bit of background on the issue and the reason for the bill, this committee has spent a lot of time looking into and researching questions of problems of foreign overfishing. I think people here are aware of the history of foreign overfishing, which really goes back to the early 1950s. It's when the whole problem of what to do with large ships that come fishing very close to our shore really started. Canada always had difficulties in finding ways to put limits on the activities of these foreign vessels fishing and, even when limits were eventually put on, how to make sure those limits were being abided by.

Since the 1950s we've attempted to establish an international legal regime to put controls on activities on the high seas. This culminated, in various forms of international law, with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. That put in place for the first time a fairly good framework for the management of fish resources and other resources in the seas. However, for Canada, UNCLOS, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, was ambiguous in a few areas of concern to Canada. Those were particularly in dealing with straddling stocks, the stocks that extended and lived not only in Canadian waters, but just beyond our 200-mile zone.

We tried other routes to succeed in getting greater management controls on those stocks so that we could be assured that they could be protected. We found it extremely difficult with the existing United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Through a three-pronged initiative, which started in late 1989, including a diplomatic initiative, a public relations initiative, and, more importantly, a legal initiative, the Government of Canada moved forward to try to put on the world stage the problem of straddling stock fisheries. Members of the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans at the time and throughout the period were involved in this process. UNFA, the UN agreement, became the centrepiece of the government's strategy to combat the foreign overfishing on the Grand Banks outside 200 miles. We did it from this legal initiative. Part of it was how to create an international consensus to do something.

Canada was not alone in having problems with straddling stocks. We found that there were others that had problems with highly migratory species, and we formed an alliance, which basically dealt with the problem of fleets fishing on the high seas, causing damage to the interests of coastal states. Through the building of alliances, we were able to move this agenda forward by getting it on the agenda at the United Nations commission meeting on environment and development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

From there, there was an agreement that the United Nations should consider how to deal with the problems of straddling stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. Canada was able to succeed in moving this along through a UN agenda, not just to being some kind of recommendation, but in fact the establishment of a United Nations agreement, which was UNFA, which was adopted in August 1995 and signed by Canada and others when it was open for signature on December 4, 1995. There are currently 59 signatories. We have 19 ratifications in the deck—I've been told there may be 18, but there are 18 or 19 ratifications to date. It takes 30 ratifications to come into force.

The European Union is in the process of moving towards ratification. When they ratify, there will 15 signatures, and they will do it en masse. So when that happens, it will clearly bring it over the 30, and UNFA will come into effect 30 days after the 30th ratification has been received.

• 0930

It has been a government priority. The adoption of a bill to provide the legislative authority for Canada to implement its obligations under UNFA was part of the Speech from the Throne in 1996. There was a predecessor bill, Bill C-96, introduced in the last session of Parliament, which died on the order paper. We now have before you its successor, Bill C-27.

Bill C-27 really is a breakthrough in international law. It provides the most significant deterrent that has existed for dealing with fisheries on the high seas. The purpose of UNFA—and the name of the bill sort of reflects this—is to implement certain provisions of UNCLOS, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

There was great ambiguity there, and there was a need to clarify that ambiguity, to fill in gaps and to really give some content, some meaning, to what the UNCLOS call for cooperation really meant. UNCLOS called for nations to seek to cooperate, but it didn't say how they would do it, and it didn't say what would happen if they failed to cooperate. UNFA goes a little further in providing a framework on how to cooperate, and it provides for binding dispute settlement should they fail to find a way to cooperate.

UNFA deals, though, with just two classes of fish, shall we say, two parts of UNCLOS; that is, straddling stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. The agreement itself provides for the steps on how to cooperate, by coming forward with guiding principles for conservation and management, that management should be based on scientific principles, and that the precautionary approach should be used. How the precautionary approach should be used is actually spelled out in the UN agreement. It also provides the details on the steps on how regional fisheries management organizations should be, it encourages their formation if they don't exist, and it encourages them to adopt the appropriate principles for the management of straddling stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.

Bill C-27 focuses more on the part of the UNFA agreement that deals with monitoring and control, the enforcement scheme of UNFA. The UNFA bill deals with giving Canada authority to assert certain powers over participating state vessels, fishing on the high seas in areas covered by regional management organizations such as NAFO, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, which is an organization that deals with straddling stocks, for example, or ICCAT, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, which is an organization that deals with highly migratory species in the Atlantic. Canada is a member of both of these organizations.

A major accomplishment is the compulsory binding dispute settlement mechanism. We believe this will be a major deterrent to any overfishing activities.

For clarity, on page 4 of the deck, the UNFA agreement does not cover salmon. Salmon is another section of UNCLOS and was not a section that was dealt with in the development of the UN Fisheries Agreement.

It also doesn't deal with any abilities to modify or change levels of jurisdiction, both in extension of any jurisdiction in addition to what now exists for Canada over the continental shelf, or in changing the 200-mile zone. Those again are other sections of UNCLOS that were not affected at all by any discussions about UNFA.

On page 5 we get into talking about what the bill we have before you is intended to do, and it really is fairly simple. It is to implement the agreement, and to implement the agreement so that we'll be able to carry out our obligations under the agreement, we have to amend primarily the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, and make a small amendment to the Canada Shipping Act as well. The primary areas of amendment—and these amendments are really additions—are in the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act.

The Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, as it now is drafted, stands. It remains as is. What we're really doing now is adding to it additional authorities, or we're extending authorities in the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act to apply beyond 200 miles so that we can fulfil obligations that ratification of UNFA will give Canada.

• 0935

The other aspects of UNFA can be handled through policy, but in order to give our enforcement authorities the legal right to take actions on the high seas they must have domestic legislation. That's really what the UNFA bill is about. It will enable Canada to implement UNFA by providing the authority to our enforcement authorities consistent with the UNFA agreement.

When we ratify UNFA we'll be able to take powers on the high seas we cannot legally take now. But without domestic authority our officers do not have the legal protection to take these actions, so we have to give them the domestic legal authority. That's the intent of UNFA.

It also has some clauses that will give authority for Canada to provide its officers, again, to act on the high seas to implement other international fisheries agreements. There are a few bilateral agreements that we do have with other countries. We actually have a couple of them in place right now, but legally we can't act on them.

We have memoranda of understanding with the Baltic States, for example, whereby they have given us the authority to board their vessels and if need be seize their vessels and perhaps even hold their vessels before turning them over to the Baltic officials should they choose to take responsibility for the vessels. But we can't implement that because we don't have the legal domestic authority for our officers to act on the high seas. The amendments to the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act through Bill C-27 will give us those authorities.

The bill will apply to vessels that are from participating states. Those are vessels from countries that have ratified UNFA when it's in place, from states party to other international agreements, those bilateral agreements that I mentioned or memoranda of understanding, should those states not also be participating states.

It also applies to stateless vessels. Here is another one of these anomalies that under international law for a very long time states could take action against stateless vessels fishing on the high seas. There has always been that authority under international law, but Canada has never had the domestic authority to protect our enforcement officers to go out and take action against a stateless vessel. So we need to put in place amendments to give us that authority.

We have some limited authority to do this under the former Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, but on a very narrow basis. This will give us much broader authority. We can apply it to these vessels and we can apply it on the high seas. These high seas areas are ones that are covered by international organizations such as NAFO and ICCAT or covered by whatever definition we may have in one of our other agreements.

Further, the bill will allow us to provide new rules through regulations on what exactly will be prohibitions and what will be violations of internationally agreed conservation measures. We'll be able to incorporate in our regulations what the quota limits are, for example, in the NAFO regulatory area. And when those quotas are exceeded, or if a vessel fishes without proper authority, without proper gear, fishes in a closed area at a closed time, and so on, we'll be able to then take action to determine that those are violations and we'll be able to spell out processes as well as to how we will act in the regulations.

The bill also has certain powers and procedures. In terms of powers, it basically takes what exists in the current Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, the powers of inspection and search and seizure that we use inside 200 miles, and it now makes it applicable outside 200 miles consistent with the UNFA agreement that we hope to ratify.

The procedures that we'll take are the UNFA processes. We will follow the appropriate notification or other procedures that are consistent with UNFA for participating states. And if we have other procedures that we've worked out in any bilateral agreement we'll follow those procedures as well.

The regulation authority, as I was saying, is expanded to include the implementation of UNFA and other agreements. It gives us the power to board foreign vessels on the high seas also for violations that have occurred inside Canadian waters. This was an issue that came up in our previous discussions. What UNFA has done is it has simply referred to customary international law, but it has made it a greater obligation to cooperate by, in article 26 of UNFA, stating that with the consent of the flag state Canada will now be able to board a vessel that has been seen fishing inside the Canadian zone and to take appropriate action should there be a violation found.

• 0940

I can answer that perhaps in a little more detail later on, if people have some questions. But the basis of UNFA is to take some existing provisions of international law and to clarify them. And there are some new and innovative provisions of international law, and our intention is to try to get them reflected accurately in our legislation, Bill C-27.

Another aspect of Bill C-27 is the mirror effect of this legislation, the reciprocity of this. While Canada is taking on these new powers to be able to take action against vessels that are parties to UNFA, other parties to UNFA will have the same authorities to take those powers against Canadian vessels fishing on the high seas. This is the mirror effect of the legislation.

Canada also feels that we have to try to do what we can to control our nationals to ensure that, where possible, where we have legislative ability, our nationals comply with international rules. And therefore for any Canadian master or seafarer who is on board an UNFA participating state's vessel that may contravene UNFA, there may be avenues through the Canada Shipping Act to have their certification suspended or cancelled.

So the new regulations, as I mentioned earlier, will be applied to specific areas of the high seas; they will extend the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act powers to those areas of the high seas. The focus is on conservation and management measures, which will be defined in the regulations that will constitute offences. The regulations will outline the procedures to be followed. They'll deal with such things as recovering of port costs as well, and ensure that any other international agreement is reflected in the regulation.

There is a quick overview on page 13 of the procedures that can be followed in taking actions on the high seas under the UN agreement. These actions can be undertaken by any UNFA party on the vessel of any other UNFA party in an area managed by an international regional fish management organization. That's a mouthful, but as an example, Canada can take these actions against any party that fishes in the NAFO regulatory area that's a party to UNFA. We can board and inspect those vessels; we can determine if there's a violation on those vessels. If there is a serious violation, we then notify the flag state that we've caught this vessel and we have evidence that it has committed an offence. The flag state then has three days to respond. While we're waiting for the flag state to inform us of what it intends to do, we can have our inspectors remain on board the vessel and they can continue to search and to seize any evidence that they need to make the case.

The response of the flag state can be one of three. First, the flag state can say “Thank you, Canada, we appreciate this. We're going to take responsibility for this vessel. We're going to take the evidence that you've gathered and we're going to act promptly to deal with this vessel.” And they would also have an obligation to report to us promptly the outcome of any action they may take against the vessel. In that case, we would turn the vessel over to the flag state authorities. We would provide them with the evidence and we would expect them to take the appropriate actions.

If they did not take appropriate actions, we can consider whether we have a dispute and this is a matter that could go to dispute settlement. On the other hand, if there is no response at all, or an unsatisfactory response within three days, we can then bring the vessel into port and continue our inspection and investigation to determine the extent of the offences in order to ensure that the vessel is dealt with properly.

• 0945

This bill is really the culmination of the efforts of many people working together to achieve a major Canadian objective.

When I started out, I did mention how there have been people in Canada worried about the problem of overfishing off our coasts since the 1950s. There have been a number of steps in the development of international law. Canada has taken the lead in moving forward in the development of this UN agreement, which we believe has taken us a long, long distance towards reaching the objectives we want to reach and towards resolving the problems we identified.

The development of this legislation has involved participation from provincial governments, the fishing industry, and NGOs, all working very closely together at various stages from the late 1980s, when this idea was in the minds of very few Canadians, right through to getting it adopted at the United Nations, and now to hopefully having it ratified by Canada. A number of members of this committee at various stages have been involved. As a matter of fact, the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans went to New York twice in, I believe, 1995—maybe once in 1994 and once in 1995—while this UN agreement was being debated in New York, and they actively participated in the development of this agreement.

The ratification of UNFA will satisfy the expectations, I think, of many people for Canada to be seen to be taking action to deal with foreign fleets fishing beyond 200 miles. We would expect that there would be a strong deterrent effect to any type of problems we've seen in the past through ratification, and we would expect that there would be strong support in Canada for this legislation.

That, Mr. Chairman, is a brief overview of the UN agreement and the bill before you.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Wiseman.

Mr. Lunn.

Mr. Gary Lunn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Wiseman, and your colleagues. Welcome to our committee.

As you pointed out, people have been bringing forward fishing concerns since the 1950s. It has been a concern of Canadian fisherman, having access to the resource. Hopefully, with some amendments, this legislation will help solve our problem.

I want to ask you a question about something I've just been made aware of myself in the last week or so. I think it's relevant to Bill C-27 because it also deals with foreign overfishing. I understand that you and your department have made a decision with respect to the Canso plant in Nova Scotia. You're going to allow it to remain open. In fact you've saved 300 jobs in this fishing plant.

I also understand they've waived the requirement to have Canadian fishermen fishing these turbot quotas for a year. I am just wondering why the Canso plant will be using foreign fishermen to catch this fish for the next year. What's the rationale for having the plant requirement waived for Canadian fishermen for the Canso plant?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: This is really a domestic question, but I can perhaps just provide a little clarification.

Mr. Gary Lunn: Please.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: The northern turbot development program has been in effect since the early 1990s. This was a program to develop Canadian interest to fish and to take advantage of the Greenland halibut, the turbot that's found between Baffin Island and Greenland. This is the northern turbot area. We were having great difficulties encouraging Canadian vessels to go up north to explore such fishing possibilities. As we've done with some other fisheries, the government allowed certain licence-holders to charter foreign vessels that would catch the quota for them and then land it in Canadian plants for processing.

Over the last few years, 90% of the catch, at a minimum, had to be landed in Canadian plants for processing and creating jobs, and the jobs in Canso were just one area where that program had a beneficial effect. It allowed Canadian plants to get familiar with handling the product, producing the product, finding markets to sell it, creating a demand and a need for the product, and then encourage them to buy the product from Canadian fishermen. Therefore, it also encouraged Canadian fishermen to take the risk of trying to fish there and deliver fish to the plants as well.

• 0950

Look at what has happened over the years. It started out being almost all a foreign fishery. There was very little of a Canadian fishery. As the Canadian fishery developed, the foreign fishery went down. Until this year, it was felt, as a result of consultations at the end of last year, that in 1998, all the fish could be caught by Canadian vessels, so there would be no need to charter foreign vessels any longer. It has always been the objective of the Government of Canada for any activities of foreign vessels in our waters to get them out in order to Canadianize the stocks to the advantage of Canadians. But when you had a stock such as the northern turbot, which wasn't being fished by Canadians, it was of no value to Canadians. By allowing foreign vessels to be involved, it created jobs and value for Canadians and a pull to get Canadian fishermen involved.

The same thing is happening—

Mr. Gary Lunn: Specifically, my question is this. They now have foreign crews going out, and they've waived the requirement. They've got foreign crews going out to catch the turbot in this northern zone to keep this Canso plant open while we're paying Canadian fishermen to sit at home.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: From what I understand of this situation, Seafreez, which is the company that owns and manages Canso, has a quota. I don't know exactly what the number is. It was able to charter Canadian vessels to fish two-thirds of its quota, most of its quota. But as the year went on, it was unable to find any Canadian company that was willing to fish its quota. It had to ensure the department that it has sought to seek all possible avenues to get a Canadian to fish. There were no Canadians who were willing to fish that quota. So that left a small part of their quota left in the water for the remainder of 1998. My understanding is that this waiver is only for the quota in 1998, not for 1999.

So there's a small amount of fish left in the water that would be fished in 1998, and I think this decision is simply saying that for the remainder of 1998, Seafreez, the Canso operator, can charter one foreign vessel to catch that amount of fish to bring it to the Canso plant. So it's just to not leave that small amount of fish in the water—nobody is going to fish it—so as to allow this plant to operate.

Mr. Gary Lunn: Well, if that's your explanation, I'll leave it at that.

Can this foreign vessel fish these fish cheaper than Canadian vessels can do it?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: Well, I'll put it this way: Canadian vessels weren't prepared to even bid on it.

Mr. Gary Lunn: Okay. Let me just go back to Bill C-27. I've made this argument before. Again, my concern is about when they're aware of an offence under proposed section 16.2. It says:

16.2(1) After boarding a vessel of a participating state, a protection officer who believes on reasonable grounds that the vessel has contravened section 5.3 shall without delay inform that state.

Again, this is where I have great difficulties concerning any action they want to take against a foreign vessel. You even alluded to it. Once it has been seen to be in Canadian waters, we still can't take any action. These same concerns have also been raised by the Premier of Newfoundland, who wanted to come before the committee last year to raise these identical concerns.

We have to get the consent of that flag state once we've boarded it or taken any action. The flag state has total discretion over deciding whether they wish to take that vessel back to the flag state and pursue action. That left us essentially powerless.

You pointed out in Bill C-96—this was introduced in this House back in April 1996, prior to the last election, under Fred Mifflin—that in fact we did not need to get permission of the flag state. So with the enabling legislation for the identical fisheries agreement, the same UN fisheries agreement, we didn't need to get consent. Under the current minister we've watered down the enabling legislation to give all of the power to the flag states, yet under the previous enabling legislation that was not required.

• 0955

I would like to know why there is a difference between Bill C-96 and Bill C-27. Why have we taken the teeth out of this legislation now, when we didn't in the enabling legislation, Bill C-96, in 1997?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: The answer is really very simple. Bill C-27 is much more transparent, much clearer and much more accurately reflects what UNFA is. In the former bill we were going to put that in as part of the process in regulation. In this bill we followed the UNFA regime. We're consistent with UNFA, and it's transparent and clear. We're talking about vessels that fish on the high seas. We're talking about where flag state control has been historically sacrosanct. We're talking about situations where in the past under only very narrow conditions would a flag state allow—

Mr. Gary Lunn: But does it not also include vessels that were inside the 200-mile limit that go outside?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: That's a different issue. I'll deal with the outside one first, because you referred to section 16. Then I can refer to section 7, which deals with vessels inside.

I think it is important to have this clarified. The UN agreement has now provided much greater authority than ever existed before for states that are party to the agreement to actually board and take action onboard vessels that are fishing on the high seas. There's no prior notification needed to approach a vessel and board a vessel. There's no prior notification needed to inspect that vessel. You must be given the right to have access to the holds, the log books, and everything you need to conduct an inspection, otherwise you are being interfered with in conducting your inspection, which is an offence as well under UNFA.

So there are significantly greater authorities. It's only where you have evidence that a serious infringement has occurred that you must inform the flag state because it is their responsibility. I'm sure Canada would not appreciate a Canadian vessel being boarded by another state at sea, that state finding evidence that the Canadian vessel had violated an UNFA rule, and that state taking our vessel into port, arresting it, charging it and treating it under its judicial system. We might have some concerns about that.

In Canada we have our laws and are serious about the enforcement of our laws. If a Canadian vessel were found to have committed an offence by an inspector elsewhere, we would take over that evidence, take the evidence provided by that state and act seriously and responsibly. We would want to take that vessel back into our jurisdiction, as it would be a Canadian flag vessel. It's our responsibility and we would take appropriate action in Canada to charge the vessel and apply appropriate sanctions. That's responsible and that is what a flag state should do.

Under the UN agreement we should expect other flag states to be equally responsible in fulfilling their obligations. If they're not going to be responsible, we have the dispute settlement process. If they're not going to respond at all or respond in a totally unsatisfactory manner, we'll hold onto that vessel while we work things out. Don't forget, as long as we're holding onto that vessel it isn't fishing. If a vessel is brought into port and tied up for two weeks, that's a big sanction that has not been given by a court. Because there's a failure to cooperate between states, the vessel is being sanctioned for its activity.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Lunn. We'll now move on to Mr. Bernier.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Bernier: Good morning, gentlemen. We have already met to discuss this issue.

My first question deals with the United Nations Fish Agreement. Has Canada ratified it? Can the Governor in Council ratify it without an act having been passed in Parliament? Yes, he can.

• 1000

Secondly, what is the difference—I have already heard it but I would like it repeated here for the benefit of all members present—between Bill C-27 in its present form, with the provisions concerning conservation and the UNFA regulations, and the former Bill C-29 that we passed in great haste with Mr. Brian Tobin, and which amended the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act? It was under that legislation, which is still in effect, that the Estai was boarded.

I merely want to know if we are working for nothing, or whether this is a public relations exercise.

[English]

Mr. Earl Wiseman: Yes, Canada can ratify conventions. The Government of Canada can ratify them without having to have legislation, but it's not the normal way we proceed, to ratify if we don't really have the authority to implement. So in Canada we need the authority of Bill C-27 to give the powers to Canadian enforcement officials to be able to implement the obligations we take on through ratification. We want to get the authority first and then ratify.

Bill C-29 is part of the existing Coastal Fisheries Protection Act. As I said in the opening statement, the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act as it now exists, including C-29 provisions, stays. It is not amended in any way. It exists. What we are doing here is adding additional powers, much broader powers, in different areas. The C-29 provisions applied only to the NAFO area and were very narrow in their application. This will apply throughout the world, anywhere Canada fishes.

Mr. Tobin was very much involved in and led the negotiations that took place in the development of the UN agreement. He was the person who signed this UN agreement on behalf of Canada in December 1995. He was the minister who was fully supportive of UNFA, and, as far as I understand, is still fully supportive and is actively encouraging the ratification of the UN agreement.

One other factor that I think is important is that the C-29 provisions were meant to apply in urgent situations requiring action. They were emergency situations. C-27 will provide a framework for, shall we say, the normalization or regularization of actions that parties to UNFA can take on the high seas.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Bernier: You said that you wanted to seek authorization before the ratification. This applies throughout the world. The only exception is salmon, because it is not within Canada's exclusive economic zone.

Were the provinces, particularly British Columbia, consulted with respect to this bill? Was the Government of Newfoundland consulted? Was it published anywhere? I haven't heard anything about it. When you say that you are seeking authorization or want to increase your moral authority, I want to be sure that everybody has been consulted, but there has been no feedback. I could we get feedback on these consultations?

Secondly, I would like—

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Bernier, your time is almost up. If you want an answer—

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Bernier: That's fine. I have other questions, but I will wait for the next turn.

[English]

Mr. Earl Wiseman: When you talk about consultations with provinces, in many respects one can say that provinces were very much in the forefront of pushing the federal government and working with the federal government. It was the people living in the coastal communities who saw and felt the problems of the foreign fishing fleets. It was those people, through provincial and federal governments, industry associations, and NGOs, who recognized and helped enunciate the problems and helped work on the development of solutions. So there was extensive involvement in consultation with the provinces.

• 1005

On the west coast there was not, because there are no straddling stock issues on the west coast. When Canada moved into this, when Canada developed what we called our legal initiative in the late 1980s, our concern was straddling stock problems. Those are the stocks that live within and outside 200 miles, normally on a bank, shallower waters. That was the problem; that was the issue we were trying to resolve. That's what our focus was on.

As we started developing alliances in the international community, it got broadened to include highly migratory species, which were also of concern to us but weren't our primary focus. There are some highly migratory activities of interest to people in British Columbia. There's a tuna fishery developing, but it isn't as major an industry as the straddling stock concerns.

The Chairman: I'm going to have to cut you off here in order to give other people their time.

Turning now to the Liberal side of the House, Paul, you have—

Mr. Paul Steckle (Huron—Bruce, Lib.): I have two questions.

When we base a judgment we would have against a foreign community overfishing whereby we could have a dispute, whose scientific data is used in establishing the quotas? We're talking straddling stocks. Is this an international community of scientific knowledge, or how is it based?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: The straddling stocks in the western Atlantic are managed by an international organization, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, NAFO. NAFO has a scientific council that is made up of scientists from all the contracting parties who wish to participate. Those scientists review data provided by any scientists from any of the countries that happen to have done research on the relevant stock.

They review the data, and they develop a consensus report—and it has been a consensus report virtually throughout the history of NAFO—on what they see as the state of the stock, and they respond to questions that are asked to them by fish managers on the level of fishing mortality that can be safely taken on the stock. So they provide the advice to this other body in NAFO, called the NAFO Fisheries Commission. The fisheries commission are the managers. They take the scientific advice, and they are to then turn it into the establishment of quotas.

In the past, just as there has been in other jurisdictions, when you establish quotas, there has been very large weight given to socio-economic factors, the desire of fishermen to fish more, or fleets to keep operating, or for provincial governments to want to have more employment through fish plants, and these pressures exist in many countries around the world. In the past, the scientific advice may have been sort of put aside, saying, well, the scientists aren't quite sure; they're iffy on their advice, so we'll put the TAC a little higher because we need the jobs, our people need to work.

The agreement says and the evolution in the international community is that fish managers in these international organizations now have to use the precautionary approach. That means they have to err on the side of caution. They have to err on the side of the fish, because a short-term fishing opportunity could lead to long-term failure to work at all. Long-term fishing opportunities will come about through taking some short-term, perhaps difficult, decisions.

That has been the policy of the Government of Canada. That is why we strongly promoted its inclusion in an international instrument, and it is in UNFA, and all parties that ratify this agreement will be bound by it.

NAFO is already working to apply the precautionary approach. Work has been going on for the last two years in developing mechanisms to do that. We're also working in other international organizations to promote the adoption and development of the precautionary approach.

So that is the way one hopes that TACs will be set in the future: the scientific advice will be taken. If we say we need more scientific work, we're not going to say therefore the TAC should be higher; we're going to say we need more scientific work, but we're going to be cautious and we're going to accept a lower level of TAC.

Mr. Paul Steckle: The second question has to do with the dispute settlement mechanism. I know with our agreements with the NAFTA and GATT there is a protocol whereby the disputing parties are party to those people who ultimately become the settlement panel. How do we decide who those panel members are? How and where is this engaged in? Perhaps you can give us some background on that so that we can more clearly understand that.

• 1010

Mr. Earl Wiseman: There are actually three options parties can choose. Maybe I'll ask Howard Strauss, who has some expertise not only in dispute settlement under UNFA but also in some of the other areas, to comment on this.

Mr. Howard Strauss (Director, Oceans, Environmental and Economic Law Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you.

When ratifying this agreement, the parties have to determine before what forum they wish the disputes in which they're involved to go. One is the International Court of Justice, which has existed for many years. The second is the law of the sea tribunal, which was established a couple of years ago. It has heard a couple of cases and is based in Germany. Then there is a possibility for establishing an ad hoc tribunal, to which the parties would then nominate members. There is a default mechanism, so that if the parties don't agree on which forum to go to, the case goes to the law of the sea tribunal, I believe.

The Chairman: We have a little bit more time on this side. Are there other—

Mr. Paul Steckle: I might just want to expand on this. If the parties in dispute cannot agree on which mechanism to proceed with, your last statement was basically that there is a procedure in place that would dictate that there's an international panel that then would intervene, and they would be the deciding body. Is that correct?

Mr. Howard Strauss: That's right. There's a default mechanism, so there's no lacuna.

Mr. Paul Steckle: Thank you.

The Chairman: Back to you, Gary.

Mr. Gary Lunn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to back up on this Seafreez situation in Nova Scotia. I want to clarify three quick points. First of all, Mr. Wiseman, you told us you were unable to get any Canadian fishermen to go up and get the last little bit of this quota. How much of that quota that you're talking about is in fact left?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: I don't have the exact number.

Mr. Gary Lunn: Could you get that for me and get it to my office? That would be wonderful if you could. Let us know which quota is left and if there's only a little bit.

My understanding also is that it was a one-year exemption from its Canadianization policy, and you have told us that in fact they're only allowed for the remainder of 1998. You're telling us it's not a one-year exemption; it's only for the remainder of this year. Is that correct?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: Again, those were all domestic decisions, from what I understood, and I may be incorrect. We can get you the right information. I believe it was waiving the Canadianization for this year.

Mr. Gary Lunn: For 1998.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: That's right. It's quota that exists this year.

Mr. Gary Lunn: But they would have to catch it in 1998, obviously.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: That's correct.

Mr. Gary Lunn: So it's not for one year then; it's only for 1998.

My last question is, because I've been advised by many fishermen who would like to have access to this quota, if they come to the department, to yourselves specifically, and say they want that quota, will they have access to that quota? Will they have priority over that fish over foreign vessels?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: I think the issue here—and again, I am stepping a little further from where I should talk. There is a company quota that is held by Seafreez.

Mr. Gary Lunn: That's right.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: It is its quota, and it can choose to fish it with its own vessels or by chartering Canadian vessels. That's the existing program. However, it's been found, in this transition from the developmental program to Canadianization, that certain companies that said they would fish for it have reneged and have cancelled. They were left with no one to fish part of their quota. Therefore, they asked, for various reasons, to protect these jobs, if for this year only they would be able to revert to using a foreign vessel.

• 1015

In my view, it's a transitional measure to make up for a difficulty that occurred. What you're suggesting, and maybe this will happen in the future, is that if Seafreez can't use its quota, it has to lose it. It will be reallocated to other parties in the Canadian fishery. That's a domestic allocation decision that would have to be—

Mr. Gary Lunn: Again, I only come back to this because we're paying Canadian fishermen who want to fish, who want access to this resource, to sit at home. I hope you're right that absolutely none of these Canadian fishermen has requested any access to it, because I think it's absolutely unconscionable that we're giving this to foreigners again, when we have Canadian fishermen sitting at home. My understanding is that you've stated they do not want access to this resource—that they couldn't get Canadians to go.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: It was that Seafreez couldn't find a Canadian charter to do it. Again, I think it's 90% plus. I don't know what arrangement Seafreez has, or whether they even have arrangements for their foreign vessels, but that fish is all being landed in Canada for processing.

Mr. Gary Lunn: By foreign fishers.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: The catching is by foreign fishing vessels, but the processing is being done by Canadians.

Mr. Gary Lunn: That's nice.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: Many of the Canadian vessels that are fishing will sell a different product, which they will actually treat on board the vessel and is sold in that form when it comes off the vessel—

Mr. Gary Lunn: Yes, I understand that.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: —creating no jobs in Canada at all. So there is a balance there.

The Chairman: I know that our good member from Nova Scotia— We do have an order here that we're trying to follow. In case anyone in the room is misled, we have two Liberal members sitting to my left here—

Mr. Lou Sekora (Port Moody—Coquitlam—Port Coquitlam, Lib.): We've been sitting here for two minutes and already I'm concerned with the way they talk.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

The Chairman: I'll now recognize Mr. O'Brien from Labrador, where some of this is going on off his north coast. Larry.

Mr. Lawrence D. O'Brien (Labrador, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity.

I wanted to pick up where Mr. Lunn left off. I know it's not making you very comfortable, but it certainly fits into the scheme of things in talking about the United Nations, when we're talking about foreign boats coming into Canadian waters to fish for a Canadian product.

I want to back up here. This could be a question the parliamentary secretary might want to take note of as well and bring back to the minister. I notice the minister's staff are here too; maybe they could likewise do it.

I come from a riding that's a very large fishing riding in Labrador. I also come from a riding where the turbot reside. But I come from a riding where, as nowhere else on the planet, you see 160 tonnes of turbot allocated to a riding adjacent to the resource, when 1,900 tonnes go to Seafreez, and the list goes on upward to 6,000 tonnes in 0A and 0B. We have 160 tonnes in all of Labrador. Now where else in this country, in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, P.E.I, or B.C., or in the United States or anywhere else around this world would that happen?

Really, folks, I'm saying the people in Labrador, right from one end to the other, are truly being unfairly treated on the adjacency side of the issue. You have Mr. Barry, who lives up in Corner Brook and he's bringing fish to Canso and Port aux Basques. That's not a reflection on these people; that's not my argument. But I think some fairness should be put into place. The point is—

The Chairman: With this now, we're looking at international—

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: It's international enough to me when we're talking about foreign boats and Canadian fish. I mean, quite honestly, you can take this agreement and tear it up as far as I'm concerned. It's all the same.

Mr. Lou Sekora: Do you want to sit here?

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Sure, I feel comfortable there. I can tell you that.

The Chairman: Are we on the bill? That's the question.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: I'm finishing up, Mr. Chairman, now that you gave me the opportunity to speak.

My point is that two years ago the Labrador Fishermen's Union Shrimp Company had a 750-tonne quota, and the minister at the time, Brian Tobin, took that quota away from them because they couldn't catch it with Canadian boats. The point I'm trying to make is if you can take it away from the Labrador Fishermen's Union Shrimp Company if they can't catch them with Canadian boats, why the hell are we giving it back to Seafreez to catch with foreign boats? That's the question.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: That is really getting into domestic fishing policies.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: It's chalk of one and cheese of the other in DFO, which is generally the point anyhow.

• 1020

Mr. Earl Wiseman: I could talk about the developmental program and the use of foreign vessels in our waters in general. I have tried to do that. I think it is important— When you talk about adjacency, area zero is up here. This is area zero plus one. It's Baffin Island and it's Greenland. Labrador is—

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: It's not adjacent to Labrador 2, sir. That's the tip of Labrador. That's not adjacency; that's what they call closest to.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: The line is north of the tip of Labrador.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: And there's also a 2GH area of turbot as well there.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: There is another turbot stock there, that is correct. That's another stock. There's the 2 plus 3K turbot, which is—

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: We get zero and 2J, 2H and 2G and a little bit up in zero. Don't try to make nice words sound gentle when really it's as crooked as Christ is straight, if you wish.

The Chairman: When you talk about crosses, I don't think anyone—

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Call it what you like. You heard the straight talk, anyhow.

The Chairman: I think your five minutes are nearly up.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Thank you.

The Chairman: Now we're going to hear from Canso, Nova Scotia.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Canso is actually in Pictou—Antigonish.

First of all, I've given Nadia some questions I would like answered on the recent NAFO decisions. Not now, because this isn't the time or place, but if those can be done at a later time I would greatly appreciate it.

I have several questions. One, we spoke to the professional fish harvesters yesterday at the convention they had this weekend. The P.E.I. Fishermen's Association is talking about a 20% reduction of tuna for Canadians. That's the first question. Two, in your legal opinion, can we extend our seabed limit past the 200 miles, an additional 150 miles, to have seabed jurisdiction to 350 miles?

The last point is, I'm going to try to speak as a fisherman who has just been arrested for illegally fishing off southwest Nova Scotia. I'm 20 miles offshore. I'm illegally fishing and I know it. In comes DFO, guns ablazing—well, not necessarily, but they're on their hips. They arrest me, and rightfully so. I am in full agreement that when someone's illegally fishing they should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. My boat, my truck, everything that is around me is taken away. Everything. That's what Canadian enforcement officers do to Canadian fishermen who are fishing illegally.

Here's my problem now. If that's a foreign vessel, we then have to stop, pause, and contact the foreign nation. It says right here:

A protection officer who believes on reasonable grounds that a fishing vessel of a participating state found in an area of the sea designated under subparagraph 6(e)(ii) has engaged in unauthorized fishing in Canadian waters may, with the consent of the participating state—

We have to ask permission. Yet if I'm a Canadian illegally fishing, they don't have to call my mom and dad or Alexa. You don't have to call anybody. You just go ahead and do it. I have a problem with having to ask for permission to do anything, to first notify.

I would think, sir, and I say this with all respect, if anybody is illegally fishing in our waters and we suspect they are, haul their ass in and do the right thing.

Lastly, if we're in pursuit of a ship within our 200 miles that's fishing illegally—say from China, which I don't believe is part of UNFA—and we chase them past the 200-mile limit, can we continue to pursue them, or do we have to stop right there? And if we do get them, what are the ramifications of that?

Thank you.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: I appreciate these questions, because they come up in so many forms and they come up in different ways.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: And here it is again.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: No, I hope I can clarify it.

First of all, if a foreign vessel is fishing in Canadian waters, we're going to arrest them. We will use our guns if we need to. We will mount the guns, which we will not use against a Canadian. We will stop a Canadian vessel illegally fishing in Canadian waters. There is no doubt. We will stop it. We don't have to inform anyone. If you see that in the act, I don't know where it is.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Foreign vessel.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: Foreign vessel. What you may be referring to is proposed section 7.01.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Yes, sir.

• 1025

Mr. Earl Wiseman: But before I get to that, I just want to go to your other example of the Chinese vessel.

If we see a Chinese vessel illegally fishing in our waters and start chasing it, that's called hot pursuit. We can chase that vessel back to three miles from the coast of China. We once chased a Spanish vessel to the Azores. Hot pursuit, as long as it is not broken, gives us the right to stop that vessel whenever we can on the high seas. As long as that hot pursuit is initiated within our 200-mile zone and is not broken, we can chase that vessel anywhere we can take our enforcement actions, as if the vessel were in our waters. We can arrest that vessel and bring it home.

I want to make it clear that in our own waters we don't have to consult anybody. We don't have to consult or get permission for hot pursuit.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: It states clearly, “has engaged in unauthorized fishing in Canadian fisheries waters”.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: That's correct.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: It says right here you have to have the consent of the state.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: I'll explain that situation by using the map. Here we have a foreign vessel.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I knew those things were handy. I need to get a map like that too, by the way.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: The last one we had cost about $300 and was taken by the former chairman. We haven't got it back.

The foreign vessel is inside our waters. We have an aircraft that flies over. It sees that vessel, but it can't enter into hot pursuit because it can't stay out at sea for days because it needs to come back to refuel. We don't have a patrol vessel nearby.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: They're tied up for the winter.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: That vessel can't enter into hot pursuit because it's not close enough. But if a few days later we see that vessel outside and we happen to have a patrol vessel outside, that's where this proposed section 7.01 comes in. We can now say to the flag state we want to board this vessel because we believe it may have committed an offence inside Canadian waters. We want to board it, inspect it, and determine whether an offence has been committed.

Under international law, as I mentioned earlier, the flag state has full jurisdiction on the high seas. The UNFA agreement basically tells parties they must work and cooperate more closely. They have to work together to ensure conservation measures are applied on the high seas and appropriate actions are taken to ensure that violations don't occur by their fishing vessels. Therefore, when we approach that flag state we expect it to give us permission to board their vessel. We can then determine whether there is evidence it was fishing inside and then take action with the consent of the flag state.

It's only in that very narrow situation where a vessel is on the high seas not doing anything wrong, but we believe it may have committed an offence inside. We weren't able to get it inside, we weren't able to enter into hot pursuit, but in that circumstance we can now, with the consent of the flag state, board that vessel. In the past, we could have boarded it with the consent of the flag state as well, but the flag state would have probably told us to jump in the lake and just leave them alone.

Ms. Nadia Bouffard (Senior Counsel, International Fisheries/Bilateral Relations Division, International Affairs Directorate, Department of Fisheries and Oceans): We didn't have the domestic authority.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: That's true, too.

Ms. Nadia Bouffard: This is just giving us the authority to be able to board with that consent—

Mr. Peter Stoffer: But we can't board without the consent.

Ms. Nadia Bouffard: —but only where there hasn't been hot pursuit.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: If I could just—

The Chairman: I'm sorry, but we have to follow our rules. If we don't, we won't have any rules.

Carmen, do you have questions?

On the Liberal side now, Wayne, do you have some questions?

Mr. Wayne Easter: Yes. What is our authority if we don't get consent relative to Peter's question?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: To a vessel that's on the high seas that has not—

Mr. Wayne Easter: If you ask the foreign flag state for authority to board, based on your suspicions, and you don't get it—in other words, they're not cooperating under the agreement—what are our rights then?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: I would say we would have a dispute with that flag state and we can go to compulsory binding dispute settlement.

Mr. Wayne Easter: Then UNFA gives us that authority.

• 1030

Mr. Earl Wiseman: Yes. Binding dispute settlement provisions I think are the strongest deterrents as well as being an encouragement for parties to cooperate.

Mr. Wayne Easter: Okay.

The other question I had, Mr. Chairman, was about when we seized the Estai. There were quite a number of costs to us as a country from being involved in that seizure by the time all was said and done. If UNFA were in place, what would happen in that case? I understand the vessel or the flag state has to pick up those costs. I'm not sure which it was. Maybe the vessel has to pick up those costs.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: You mean the port costs. If we bring the vessel—

Mr. Wayne Easter: Could you draw a comparison between the Estai and what would happen under this?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: Well, they're not really that good as examples because of the part that will apply in UNFA. If we bring the vessel into port, there are costs for that vessel in port fees, servicing costs, or any maintenance costs. Because we seized the vessel, it's our responsibility to maintain that vessel. We can't let it just sit idly and rust or deteriorate.

As for all the costs to maintain the vessel and hold it in port, if we have evidence to show that the vessel has violated an UNFA measure, these will be recovered before that vessel is released. It would be part of the release of that vessel.

Mr. Wayne Easter: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: When you sit here as a member of the committee and you have to wait, like Mr. Matthews, for an hour and a half before you can— He's a patient man. Anyway, Bill, go ahead.

Mr. Bill Matthews (Burin—St. George's, PC): I'm a very patient man, like all Newfoundlanders and Labradorians, especially when it comes to foreign overfishing and taking action to deal with that.

I think the biggest problem we have in Atlantic Canada—I say this to Mr. Wiseman and his guests—is that we don't trust the Spaniards and Portuguese. You can enter into all the agreements you want. We still have great difficulty believing that they're going to be trustworthy signatories to these agreements and that we're going to benefit as a consequence. But having said that, we have to try to improve this.

I guess there are not many more questions to ask. I was going to ask the question of why the Estai cost us anything, but I think you answered that indirectly.

We have to get consent to board the vessel, whether we chase it outside— You said that if we suspect a violation inside our zone and then find the vessel outside it afterward, we still have to ask the flag state for consent to board, as I understand it. If we suspect a violation with a vessel outside our zone that wasn't inside, we still do the same, which is to call for the consent to board. Do we do that?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: No.

Mr. Bill Matthews: We don't. So we can board without consent.

Say we notify the flag state that we're aboard, that they're suspected of a violation, and that we're inspecting. We have three days for the flag state to respond. If the flag state calls back and tells us to go to hell, then what happens? If we don't hear back from them in three days and then we take the vessel to St. John's or Halifax and inspect it further, what's the final process? Where does it end?

Say you take it to port to inspect it and you find a violation. If you do prove a violation, what happens if you haven't heard from the flag state when the three days have expired?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: First of all, I think it was Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev who talked about “trust but verify” in terms of their relationship. I think we may have to be thinking about that in terms of our relationship with the European Union, Spain, and Portugal.

While there clearly is this sense of mistrust, the facts are that since 1995 there has been a significant change in behaviour because there are deterrents. There are observers on every Spanish and Portuguese fishing vessel, who make it extremely difficult for them to cheat. There are comprehensive inspections that take place at sea and in ports, which make it extremely difficult for them to cheat.

Our estimates show that these people are complying with the rules. They may be doing it grudgingly, but they are doing it because the opportunities to cheat are no longer there.

• 1035

With UNFA, there will be even fewer opportunities. And there's the fact that ultimately there's a dispute settlement mechanism when there really is a conflict. That's where I think we get into the issue of how what happens depends on the reaction you get from a flag state.

Just before I get to that, you asked the question about consent. There's no need to get consent to board a vessel if the vessel is in Canadian waters. There is no need to get consent to board and inspect a vessel if the vessel is fishing in the NAFO regulatory area, for example, when we want to inspect that vessel.

The only place where you need to have consent to board is if your purpose is to deal with a possible offence the vessel may have committed inside Canadian waters when it is now found outside Canadian waters. So it's a very narrow and small circumstance. As Nadia pointed out, it's there so our officers have the authority to take action to deal with this vessel in this situation. This is something that has been in international law for a long time, but we haven't had the domestic authority to do it. It also provides the flag state with the obligation to cooperate.

Say we're on board a vessel, and we don't need consent to board and inspect. By the way, if we find there's nothing wrong, we just get off the vessel. But say we find a serious violation. You've given us two examples. What happens if the state says go to hell or you don't hear from them? We don't then turn the vessel over to the flag state. They haven't given us a demonstration that they're going to be responsible to take authority for the vessel and fulfil their obligation as a party to UNFA to control their vessel. So we would probably bring that vessel into port and continue our inspection.

What happens? We would continue to try to talk to that flag state. You know, there are not many flag states that I think would give up a boat and just say the hell with it. If they're responsible and will want to be seen to be responsible, they'll enter into discussions with us. I would think we would be able to work out an arrangement whereby they would be prepared to take that vessel and sanction it.

But the longer they don't do this, the longer that vessel is sitting in a Canadian port. Say it sits there for a year. That's a huge cost. There are very few sanctions you're going to get that are going to be anything like that. They're going to want to find a way to resolve this before we have to take any additional measures.

So I'm pretty confident we're not going to find ourselves in situations where states are just telling us to go to hell and not doing anything. They will take the responsible action they're expected to take.

Mr. Bill Matthews: Mr. Chairman, I have one final question, if you don't mind, because I probably won't get to ask another one until next year at this time.

What comfort do we have under this agreement? Say we go through the exercise we just talked about. You board a vessel. You end up taking it to St. John's. It stays there for a month, three months, five months, or six months. How do we know that we won't end up doing what we did with the Estai, which was to give back the vessel, give back the bid bond, give back the fish, and put the crew up in a hotel in Newfoundland? It cost us in excess of $100,000 at the Hotel Newfoundland. I would think the poor Spaniards would want to come to Newfoundland to be arrested. I would think it was the best time they've had in their lives. What comfort is there in this agreement that we won't end up in the same situation again?

Again, I'm being perhaps very suspicious, but I have to ask the question because I can see us going through this whole exercise again, Mr. Chairman. Someday it may not be the Estai, but it'll be another vessel. I see members looking at me. Well, that's exactly what happened with the Estai, by the way.

So what comfort can I take in this? I represent a fishing riding around the south coast of that province that's been decimated, for one reason or another, but mostly because of overfishing, foreign and domestic, but mainly foreign. What comfort can I take for my people that this won't happen again and that we're going to see some improvements? That's my question.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: In your earlier question you raised the root of the current question, which is in putting forward the term “trust”. This agreement really isn't built on trust, but on enforceability. It maintains the tradition that the flag state traditionally has exclusive responsibility with respect to managing its vessels on the high seas. Primary responsibility is what now exists. There is also a significant amount of responsibility devolved to other states that are parties to this agreement. In our case, it's the coastal states.

• 1040

If there's a lack of agreement between the states as to what should happen, there is a recourse for dispute settlement of going to court. The recourse to the court is quick and effective. It has already operated under the Law of the Sea Convention. It worked very quickly and it did what it was supposed to do.

So it's not a question of just trust. There's a real sanction out there. It becomes more akin to a domestic kind of situation whereby when the two parties disagree on an issue, they can go to court and get a judgment.

Thank you.

The Chairman: That question was in deference to Newfoundland. Larry is going to come back again with another Newfoundland issue.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Of course it's along the same lines as the discussion. I'm not going into the agreement discussion this time.

The Chairman: Okay, it's yours.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: I'll just recap for a second or two on the Estai. It's my understanding—correct me if I'm wrong, because it has been a little while since it happened—that this ship was deemed to be in violation. The Canadian fisheries patrol officers took up the chase, caught the ship, and brought it into St. John's. We saw lots of media attention when it docked. It sat there for a few days while we worked between Canada and the appropriate country, Spain. Finally we got into the “Captain Turbot” war. The then Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, Brian Tobin, had quite a campaign going in New York and so on with the turbot. He ended up being called “Captain Canada”.

From there, my view is that we gave back the ship, the catch, and everything, and there were no charges or anything. We ended up putting foreign observers on foreign boats inside Canadian waters. That was the great breakthrough we made. If that's not called putting the dogs in charge of the meat, I don't know what is.

If those are the kinds of regulations we're starting to look at relative to protecting Canadian waters, Canadian fishermen, and so on, I have great problems with that. I may have been off base on some of the points, but I think generally you got the thrust of what I'm trying to say.

The bottom line is that if we're going to control fisheries inside of our zone, I think we ought to do just that: control it. Howard said it would be enforceable, and that's what we need to do. It's not going to be gentlemen's agreements with countries; it has to be enforceable agreements. We have to make sure we're there with our feet on the ground to deal with it. I have big problems with any agreements that Canada has with foreign observers being on foreign boats anywhere and in any way related to the NAFO zones of the Flemish Cap, the nose and the tail of the banks, or any points inside the 200-mile limit

Mr. Earl Wiseman: First of all, we have full sovereign control over fishing activities inside the Canadian 200-mile zone. There are no foreign observers on foreign vessels inside that zone. The observers—there is 100% observer coverage on foreign vessels inside the Canadian zone—are all Canadian.

Second, the way you describe the result of the arrest of the Estai is perhaps a little unbalanced. As for the arrest of the Estai, we have to be careful in talking about it, because the owners and captain of the Estai have sued the Government of Canada. So I'd rather not get into a lot of detail about that.

What was the basis of the dispute? The basis of the dispute was the share of the turbot resource in the NAFO regulatory area. The European Union wanted to object and set a unilateral quota that was six times higher than the one NAFO gave it. If UNFA had been in place, that would have been a dispute and we would have gone to dispute settlement. That would have resolved the issue. A court would have determined whether they had a right to do that or not. That's why UNFA is an important tool for Canada to avoid these problems in the future.

• 1045

But what else happened? There was a major agreement negotiated between Canada and the European Union to strengthen NAFO significantly, and in fact many of the principles of UNFA were agreed to bilaterally and were put into NAFO and then into UNFA. They were evolving at the same time. That conservation agreement we had with the EU was what Canada's objective was. We got agreement not only to have observers on board vessels, but to have dockside inspections, introduction of satellite tracking, clear definition of major infringements, and actions that were required to follow up on those infringements, very significant new conservation measures that we agreed to bilaterally between Canada and the EU and then were able to bring to the NAFO fora and have adopted to apply to all NAFO contracting parties. In parallel to that, much of those same factors were also included in the UNFA agreement.

So that was really what Canada's objective always was. Our objective wasn't to arrest a boat, but to achieve cooperation on conservation beyond 200 miles. We could not get the European Union to come to the table to negotiate, and we managed to get a negotiation at the same time that this was all happening. The Attorney General, who had the authority to decide what to do with charges, made a decision to stay the charges, in what he thought was the best interest of Canada. That was a decision that was taken by the Attorney General.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Why couldn't we as Canadians—and I suggest this to the committee more particularly than I do Mr. Wiseman—why couldn't we as a committee take the bold move and suggest that the nose and the tail and the Flemish Cap become part of the Canadian waters?

I saw Mr. Baker making that point last week in a presentation to the St. John's Board of Trade, or Rotary, or whatever. We would solve an awful lot of problems. We wouldn't have to deal with foreigners in the way we're doing now, and the flipping back and forth over the nose and the tail and the Flemish Cap and the excessive fishing we're getting there, and so on.

It's on this side of the Atlantic. It's a very major fishing ground we're talking about. It's something very unique in most of the rest of the world, and I think Canada should start looking at ways and means of applying the same tools and the same rules to the same fishing grounds. I for one, as a member of this committee and as a parliamentarian in Canada, would like to move forward and start taking the bold move in making this one and the same in terms of an issue.

The only thing is—

The Chairman: Lawrence, I've given you extra time, and I'll give you another half a minute.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: Okay. The other point is—

I've lost my train of thought there.

The Chairman: Sorry.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: I did actually, so I'll close it.

The Chairman: Mr. Lunn.

Mr. Gary Lunn: I'll follow up and continue on Lawrence's train of thought.

I also agree, and I believe we have jurisdiction and we can take control over the nose and the tail and the cap. I've studied this from a constitutional point of view, and I think it can be done. I agree with Lawrence that it's something we should be pursuing.

But let's come back to the Estai. It's my understanding that the Estai was a hot-pursuit situation. Is that correct?

It did not start in Canadian waters?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: It did not start in Canadian waters.

Mr. Gary Lunn: So it was not a hot pursuit.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: Correct.

Mr. Gary Lunn: Okay, if it was not a hot pursuit, under UNFA we would go out and say to Captain Estai, sir, can we please come aboard your vessel? He would tell us to go jump in the lake, because, as you stated, they're trying to take six times our quota.

It was not a hot pursuit outside of Canadian waters. We have to get consent of the flag state before we can board.

It says right here in subsection 7.01(1):

A protection officer who believes on reasonable grounds that a fishing vessel of a participating state found in an area of the sea designated under subparagraph 6(e)(ii) has engaged in unauthorized fishing— may, with the consent of the participating state, take any enforcement action that is consistent—

Sections 16.1 or 16.2 will go on that after boarding the vessel— You can board it, but then you have to inform the state without delay. But the whole question is, you couldn't have brought that vessel back. You would have had to go to the flag state and ask for permission. Is that not correct?

The Chairman: I'm not going to play into the record today the answer on that—

Mr. Gary Lunn: I think we should.

The Chairman: —because that's being looked at by much higher authority than us.

Mr. Gary Lunn: We'll call it hypothetical.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: I don't think you can get higher authority than us, Mr. Chairman; we are the parliamentarians.

• 1050

Mr. Gary Lunn: I think it's a very legitimate question.

The Chairman: I think it would be in the best interest of Canada not to deal with that right today. You can overrule me as a committee, but I'm suggesting we shouldn't ask for that to be put into our record today.

Mr. Gary Lunn: I think it's a very legitimate question.

The Chairman: You have an opportunity to make a motion on his answer.

Mr. Wayne Easter: The question, Gary, is before the international court in The Hague.

Mr. Gary Lunn: Watching everybody duck for cover here, it would appear we know the answer.

The Chairman: I always have great respect—

Mr. Gary Lunn: That's what Brian Tobin brought up. We brought in the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act under Tobin to allow him to go out, board the Estai, and bring it back. Mr. Wiseman has told us this doesn't change anything. The Coastal Fisheries Protection Act is still there. This just adds to it. But now we're learning that's not quite true, and in fact we couldn't have done what we did. We couldn't have brought it back. We wouldn't have got that evidence. Those are real questions.

That's why I'm saying maybe we need to have a look at this legislation. It's the consent provisions that have been brought forward by my colleagues on both sides of this table on which we've had numerous discussions. In fact Brian Tobin brought the same concerns forward as well last year. That's what we're having a problem with—legitimate questions.

The Chairman: I have given you your time. I'm not a lawyer, but I have great respect for the law, whether it be national or international. I would hope they will give us the answer on that some time soon.

Carmen, we'll turn to you now.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano (Sault Ste. Marie, Lib.): Just a comment, Mr. Chairman.

We've listened to all the questions posed to Mr. Wiseman by the members around the table, and I've always maintained and still maintain my respect for each and every member of this committee. But I would suggest the questions in the main ignore the complexities of international relations.

Really what we have here—Mr. Wiseman, I wonder if you agree—is the international Law of the Sea that provides nations, including Canada, with remedies under certain circumstances. Then we have a convention, UNFA, we're attempting to implement that would relate to straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.

In effect, does this agreement not provide a remedy under international law conditions that keeps you one step further from committing what could escalate into an act of war? Is that really what it is? You have one additional remedy that's a recognized remedy, a procedure you can take to keep you from committing an act of war against a sovereign nation. Is that not correct?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: I wouldn't go as far as to call it an act of war, but it is an additional step to ensure our objectives are being met.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: Why wouldn't you call it an act of war when you commit an act? Do you not agree, Mr. Wiseman, that certain actions can be committed against foreign nations that escalate into an act of war?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: Issues can escalate into war, there's no doubt.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: That's when you act without the authority of international law or without the cover of an agreement such as the one we're talking about here. They're incidents that have the potential to escalate into either broken relations with a nation or an act of war. Am I way out of line there?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: That potential could cause difficulties in relationships, there's no doubt.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: I would challenge—

The Chairman: Carmen, again you've made your point.

Mr. Carmen Provenzano: I would challenge any member of this committee to negotiate a better provision.

The Chairman: If the committee agrees, I would allow Mr. Bernier, Mr. Matthews, and Mr. Stoffer to have about a minute or two each, looking toward 11 o'clock.

Yvan.

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Bernier: I shall be brief. This is a subject that was not raised this morning.

• 1055

In Bill C-27, there seem to be details on the enforcement on boarding and definitions of terms in the bill, but they always refer to the United Nations Fish Agreement, the UNFA.

I'm wondering whether passing Bill C-27 will oblige us to live with all of the articles of the UNFA. If that is the case, Mr. Chairman, we would have to have a discussion with someone who could answer our questions on all parts of the United Nations Fish Agreement. For example, Article 5, Part II specifies how the Fisheries are to be managed and what types of equipment can be used by various types of fishermen. I don't have a fixed opinion at this point, but I want to know what Canada is going to do with that. Until such time as I have some answers to these questions, I will not decide how to vote on this.

[English]

Mr. Earl Wiseman: May I answer?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like a bit of time to respond to some earlier questions that came up as well.

As I mentioned in my overview, the act is to provide enforcement authorities with the ability, the authority, to take action on the high seas consistent with UNFA. But there are many policy aspects of the UN agreement that can be adopted without legislation in Canada, and those are issues that will be dealt with on a policy level as part of our domestic management of fisheries.

The purpose of the bill is only to deal with the aspects that require legislative authority to provide officials with authority.

If I could, Mr. Chairman, this came up several times—

[Translation]

Mr. Yvan Bernier: I would like to make a quick comment. If the purpose of Bill C-27 is to enable Canada to sign the Agreement, we will have to discuss all parts of the Agreement. If that's not what we're going to do, I can tell you right away that I will vote against it. They only want to discuss what suits their purposes, namely the rules for boarding and such things, but there are other things in the Agreement. Don't let them tell us that they need our agreement on C-27 to ratify that Agreement. This is my objection.

[English]

The Chairman: Maybe we'll just hear a few concerns then, and we'll allow Mr. Wiseman to sum up at the end.

Bill, do you have something further? And Peter?

Mr. Peter Stoffer: May I again have just two more questions?

Regarding the ICCAT agreement for next year, there's talk of reduction for Canadian limits, as well as the question of whether we can extend our seabed another 150 miles if we ratify the Law of the Sea convention. And if that happens, if we can, what will this mean to that new regulation? You don't have to answer that now.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: No, I'd like to, particularly the last question. I could be very brief.

The Chairman: Mr. Wiseman, you have five minutes now to sum up. It could happen that our committee may want to meet again with you at a later date. So the floor is yours to conclude this morning's hearing.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gary Lunn: I'd like to make a motion that we approve funding to go to Iceland for a date to be determined, sometime in February or March 1999.

The Chairman: Are we all in favour of waving the 48-hour notice requirement?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chairman: All right. Then I will meet at 12.30—

Mr. Gary Lunn: The date to be determined.

The Chairman: Mr. Wiseman, I'm sorry to have interrupted.

Could we have some order?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: Regarding the question about the extension of jurisdiction over the continental shelf, we keep hearing about this in relation to ratification of the Law of the Sea. Canada has full jurisdiction over its continental shelf up to 350 miles, and maybe beyond. We've already asserted it. We have legislation in effect; it's in the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act. It's already there.

We've arrested vessels fishing on the continental shelf beyond 200 miles—two U.S. vessels in 1994. We have full authority for the seabed, what resides below the seabed, and the sedentary species that live on the seabed. We have had that authority and we've asserted that authority.

There's nothing we need to do. We don't need to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to get authority to do it. It's there and we're asserting it.

• 1100

An hon. member: Where did we get it?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: We got it from the Law of the Sea. You don't have to ratify— The 200-mile zone is in the Law of the Sea. Most of the fisheries measures in the United Nation's Convention on the Law of the Sea are customary international law. Most countries extended jurisdiction to 200 miles in 1977-78; the Law of the Sea wasn't concluded until 1982. So these things were part of evolving customary international law. We have the full jurisdiction we need for the continental shelf out to 350 miles. There's some fine-tuning, but basically we have that continental shelf jurisdiction.

Now, Mr. O'Brien raised a slightly different question. He raised a question about extending jurisdiction, and I assume that's over the fish that swim above the continental shelf, because under international law we have full jurisdiction for what lives below the surface and what's on the surface, but not the water column above the surface. That ends at 200 miles, as a result of the Law of the Sea agreement.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Canada pushed the approach that Mr. O'Brien is suggesting. It was a species-based management approach: that a coastal state could manage the species wherever they existed, and if they extended beyond 200 miles or the extent of the continental shelf, we would manage that. We failed to get that agreement in the United Nations. We were not able to do that. There was no support for that type of approach, and the consensus to arrive at the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was that 200-mile limits would be established.

We had hoped that with those and with the cooperation clauses in the Law of the Sea, we'd be able to control fishing activities not only inside, where we had full authority, but outside. We found it was weak outside, and that's why we moved to tighten that up, with greater enforceability, and we moved to UNFA, which is the next step, as Mr. Provenzano has pointed out, towards achieving our goal of being able to solve the problem that we have known from the 1950s.

That is where we are now. We are at the point of putting in place this additional mechanism. But the ratification of the Law of the Sea won't give us any additional authorities in terms of fishing, and we already have full jurisdiction over the continental shelf.

Maybe Mr. Stoffer will be pleased to hear that the ICCAT meeting concluded late last night, and Canadian quotas are virtually unchanged.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Can you get that in writing?

Mr. Earl Wiseman: There may be a press release within a day or so.

The Chairman: I have a reminder to committee members. Tomorrow at 3.30 p.m. in Place Promenade there will be a meeting with the minister to look at the supplementary estimates.

This morning we'd like to thank Mr. Wiseman, Mr. Strauss, and Ms. Bouffard for coming to us. It's a very complex issue. I don't think everyone is satisfied so far. Maybe we'll never be satisfied, to hear all of us. But in any case, we did have a good meeting, and thank you all for coming.

Mr. Earl Wiseman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: The meeting is adjourned.