We welcome the opportunity to appear before the committee today to discuss the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
[Translation]
This is an issue of continued grave concern to the Department of Foreign Affairs, and I am pleased to have the opportunity to outline some of the many steps we have been taking to promote human rights in that country.
[English]
As requested by this committee, I will be speaking to the evolution of Canadian-Iranian relations; Canadian policy regarding human rights in Iran, including in the post-elections context; Iran's nuclear program; and Iranian actions in the region.
[Translation]
Canadian relations with Iran have been governed by our Controlled Engagement Policy since 1996. We instituted this policy because of the Iranian government's opposition to the Middle East peace process, its support for terrorist organizations, its nuclear program and its human rights record. The policy placed strict limitations on contacts with Iran. For instance, Iran is not permitted to open consulates in Canada, there are no direct air links to Canada and export controls are applied to sensitive goods. All programs of cooperation with the Iranian government were also halted.
On May 17, 2005, Canada tightened its Controlled Engagement Policy as a result of Iran's failure to address the murder of Canadian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi. Mrs. Kazemi was detained and later murdered in Evin prison in Iran by regime officials. Canada took the decision to limit contacts with the Iranian government to three issues: the case of Mrs. Kazemi and other consular cases, human rights, and Iran's nuclear program.
In 2008, we expanded the policy to include regional security issues, given our concerns about Iran's behaviour in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Iraq and Afghanistan. Moving forward, Canada has made it clear to Iran that improvements in bilateral relations are dependent upon progress in these areas.
As demonstrated by our Controlled Engagement Policy, Canada has serious concerns regarding the state of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The government of Iran has continually violated the basic human rights of their own population through pervasive abuse and denial of fundamental freedoms. These violations include the execution of minors, the persecution of ethnic and religious minorities such as the Baha'i, suppression of women's rights, and restrictions on the media and freedom of expression.
As we all witnessed, the already poor state of human rights in Iran deteriorated sharply following the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on June 12, 2009. Allegations of fraud by members of the opposition spurred mass demonstrations, and Iranian authorities responded with violent crackdowns and further repression of fundamental human rights. Opposition members charge that more than 70 people have been killed. There have been numerous accusations of rape and torture of protesters while in government custody; further restrictions on freedoms of expression and association; and unjust detentions without charges of Iranians and foreign nationals alike, including, until this week, Canadian-Iranian Newsweek journalist Maziar Bahari.
[English]
The post-election situation is deeply troubling for Canada. Canada has maintained that the allegations of discrepancies in the June 12 presidential elections are serious and need to be answered. Prime Minister Harper issued two statements condemning the use of violence in the crackdown on protesters by Iranian security forces. The Minister of Foreign Affairs also issued statements condemning the use of violence by Iranian security forces, and has called upon Iran to fully respect all of its human rights obligations, both in law and practice. He has called on Iran to conduct a thorough and transparent investigation into the allegations surrounding the elections. Canada also joined the G-8 on July 8 in expressing its concerns regarding the elections.
Canada has been, and continues to be, a vocal proponent of improving the human rights situation in Iran. In addition to implementing and tightening our policy of controlled engagement, Canada has routinely publicly criticized the Government of Iran for its blatant disregard of basic human rights. Last month at the United Nations General Assembly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs along with the entire Canadian delegation boycotted the speech of President Ahmadinejad in response to his ongoing and inflammatory denial of the Holocaust, his antagonism and hostility towards the people of Israel, and his complete disdain for the human rights of the Iranian people.
Canada has been a leader in international fora. For the past six years, Canada has successfully spearheaded a cross-regional, multinational effort to adopt a resolution at the United Nations General Assembly highlighting the deprived state of human rights in Iran. This resolution holds the Iranian government to account for its systemic and persistent human rights violations; it sets out specific actions to be taken by Iran to rectify its human rights situation; it stimulates debate; and it forces Iran to account for its record. While the Iranian government has shown no improvement in its human rights situation over this period, the successful adoption of this resolution nonetheless sends a clear message that the international community is closely monitoring events in Iran and that the Iranian people are not alone in their struggle to realize their fundamental human rights. Human rights activists have repeatedly told us that this UN resolution is a valuable part of their campaign for greater freedom.
The case of the detained Canadian-Iranian Newsweek journalist, Maziar Bahari, has been a priority for Canada in our current dealings with Iran. On Saturday, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrence Cannon issued the following statement:
It is with great relief that we welcome the release of Maziar Bahari from prison in Iran. The Government of Canada shares in the joy of Mr. Bahari's family, friends, colleagues and countrymen, and hopes that he will soon be able to join his wife for the birth of their first child.
I'm very pleased to inform the committee that this morning Mr. Bahari left Iran and has arrived in London, and is with his wife as we speak.
The Government of Canada has been steadfast in pressing for his release since he was first arrested. His situation was complicated by his dual nationality, which is not recognized by the Iranian authorities. Canada used all diplomatic and other channels available to gain access to Mr. Bahari, to press for his release, and to ensure his legal rights were respected. The Minister of Foreign Affairs met with his Iranian counterpart on August 25 in Istanbul to demand Mr. Bahari's immediate release and for Canadian consular access to him. Department of Foreign Affairs officials once again reiterated this message when we met with Iran's chargé d'affaires on September 22. On September 24, Minister Cannon released a joint statement with his U.S. counterpart, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in which Canada and the U.S. asked Iran to positively resolve the cases of all Canadians and Americans in Iranian custody, including Mr. Bahari. Canada will continue to press for the release of all those who remain unjustly detained.
Finally, the Government of Canada condemns the terrorist attack in Iran's Sistan and Baluchistan Province on October 18. We condemn all political violence and we hope that the perpetrators of this heinous act will be found and brought to justice.
Canada also has serious concerns about Iran's nuclear program. For six years, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported that Iran is not living up to its commitments of transparency and cooperation, particularly regarding unresolved nuclear activities with possible military dimensions.
Canada was deeply troubled by the revelation three weeks ago that Iran has been building a covert Iranian enrichment facility for several years. This revelation is one more example of Iran's continued refusal to meet its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and IAEA requirements, and we've called for the IAEA to investigate.
Iran's actions threaten regional stability and international peace and security. Canada hopes that continued talks between the P-5 plus one, the permanent five members of the Security Council and Germany, building on their meeting in Geneva on October 1, will address the continued dishonesty of Iran's nuclear program as a matter of priority to restore confidence that has been severely jeopardized by the Iranian regime.
As part of Canada's controlled engagement policy and our counter-proliferation efforts, we have stopped active trade promotion with Iran and Export Development Canada has ceased entering into new business with Iran. In addition, Canada has fully implemented its international obligations under the United Nations Security Council resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803 by imposing sanctions against Iran.
These sanctions include an assets freeze against designated individuals and entities; an export ban on designated goods of proliferation concern; an import ban on arms and designated goods; a prohibition on the provision to any person in Iran of technical assistance, financial services, brokerage and other services related to designated goods; and a prohibition on property, financial assistance, and investment related to designated goods.
Finally, Iran is playing a troubling role in the wider Middle East. Its activities in the region, particularly its support for listed terrorist entities such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, have long constituted serious obstacles to peace in the Middle East. Canada continues to underline the need for Iran to support international peace and stability efforts in the region. Iran's regional role is something that Canada is ready to discuss with Iran as part of our controlled engagement policy.
I will end my presentation there and turn it back over to you, Mr. Chair.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for appearing.
Although I'm not on this committee, I have a great deal of interest in this topic. I have four quick questions.
First, we talk about controlled engagement. Can you comment on why the Vice-President of Iran made a private visit to Canada earlier this year? What constitutes a private visit under controlled engagement?
Second, can you outline for us any comments with regard to the Iran Accountability Act, which was proposed by Irwin Cotler in June? We are a signatory to the 1948 Convention on Genocide, which was undertaken to deal with the prevention of genocide and punish those who incite it.
On the Bahá'ís, do you have any comments with regard to the current situation, the systematic removal of Bahá'ís from academic institutions, schools, the armed forces, etc.?
On Russia, it would seem to me that any multilateral approach in this region dealing with the Iranians cannot be successful unless the Russians are on board. Do you see them playing a helping role, whether on nuclear development or human rights?
That's a lot of questions, but I thought I'd get them on the table.
:
On the controlled engagement policy, Iran's vice-president applied for a visa to enter Canada. He qualified under the provisions of entry to Canada. He had no meetings with any member of the Canadian government. That was a specific policy choice made, that if he was coming for a private visit, it would be a private visit. He qualified under our entry rules as any other citizen. There is nothing in the controlled engagement policy that talks about visas or preventing people who have legitimate access to Canada from entering.
I will come back to question number two in a moment.
On the Bahá'ís, this has long been a priority of the Canadian government, to try to protect this community. We have a very close working relationship with the Bahá'í community of Canada. I understand they came before your committee earlier this year. So we work very closely with them.
Their situation in Iran is probably as bad as any identifiable group in Iran. Even Iranians who are of the reformist bent and who believe their country needs to correct its policies have a blind spot towards the Bahá'í. This goes back to their origins as emerging out of the Islamic faith and following a new prophet, which runs counter to the provisions of Islam. That has made them a specific target in Iran. They are called apostates and they are viewed as threatening Islamic society.
All of this, as we all know, is just nonsense. They are very loyal citizens to whatever country they live in. They are excellent citizens when it comes to education and working in the community. They are model citizens both in Iran and in Canada. So that's something we've kept driving home with them.
In the education system they're being blocked from going to universities, which is a tragedy for Bahá'ís, as they see education as being one of the core principles they must abide by.
In our human rights resolutions before the UN General Assembly over the last six years we have always put forward the case for Iran to respect the rights of its Bahá'í citizens. And going forward into the future, the Canadian government will continue to raise the issues of the Bahá'í and to seek that they be allowed the same rights and privileges as all other Iranian citizens.
Concerning the role of Russia, Russia has been a very active partner in the P-5 plus one. They have supported UN Security Council imposition of sanctions on three different occasions. Given their veto on the Security Council, it is essential that the broader international community work with Russia. They have been cooperative to date. There have been differences among Russia and some of the other members about how far to go, but our assessment is that Russia shares the same concerns we do about Iran's long-term nuclear ambitions and the fact that Russia has no desire to see Iran develop a nuclear weapons capability.
Going forward, there will continue to be a lot of negotiations. We're not at the table for most of those negotiations, but our understanding is that there is a great deal of cooperation among the members of the P-5 plus one.
May I just ask you to repeat the question about the Iran Accountability Act?
:
Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today.
I want to say publicly how impressed I am with the services provided by this department on behalf of Canada. It's very easy for us to be critical from time to time. I just would like to do that, because when you look at the files across the world that this department handles, and then you come specifically to Iran itself, it's such a complex issue.
I have a number of questions.
First, sometimes I look at Ahmadinejad as somewhat like the magician who keeps the hand moving up here while he picks your pocket over there. You almost hope that sometimes this rhetoric, this notoriously evil rhetoric, is masking something. In my sense of it, it might be the fact that they're abusing their own people, to a degree, and keeping the focus outside their country. I wouldn't mind a comment on that, because when you look at their elections, it's the supreme leader who picks everybody who runs. I'm not so sure that we have a black cat or a white cat, as Tommy Douglas used to say.
Second, I had a visit to Israel. That was just over a month ago that I was there. We had a couple of folks with us who had been in the IDF, and they were talking about 30 days as some kind of a limit before there might be some form of pre-emptive action by Israel. I'd like your comments on that.
Third, you brought us very good news about the release of that individual today. Thank you for doing that. One of my first questions would have been whether you had any updates for us.
Fourth is about the influence Iran actually has. How would you compare that to others, such as Syria or Jordan, in relation to Hezbollah and Hamas? Is it just the influence of dollars, or is it more comprehensive than that?
I've heard Mr. Ahmadinejad called many things, and magician is not one, but there's a certain element of that.
In the early stages I think much of the western world looked at him as some kind of buffoon and not as someone to be taken seriously and as someone who was in way over his head. He's a much smarter man than the public persona he provides to the west. We cannot dismiss his threats, but sometimes he's trying to whip up domestic support, and saying nasty things about Israel unfortunately is one way to bolster his credibility in the streets of Iran and in some parts of the Arab world. We need to take his comments seriously, but also sometimes the perspective is that it's aimed more at the domestic audience. He knows when he says things like that the western world is going to get angry, and then he can look to his people as if he's standing up to the west. That's part of the domestic play on that.
As for Israel, I'm in no position to make any comments on what Israel's defence strategy will be. We are not aware of any 30-day approach. Israel has publicly stated it is not looking for an attack on Iran; it wants the diplomatic process to work its way out. We have no reason to believe that Israel does not want to see a diplomatic solution.
The influence that Iran has with Hezbollah compared to others.... Iran is probably Hezbollah's most important international ally. Hezbollah was created with the support of the Iranian government back in the 1980s. They are the main supplier of funding and other resources for the Hezbollah organization. I'm straying a little beyond my area of expertise, but it is our assessment that Hezbollah is not simply a tool of Iran; it has its own domestic agenda, its own domestic resources. But Iran is certainly its key partner. Syria is also very important for Hezbollah. It's hard to say which is more. I know more about Iran than I do Syria, so I tend to look at Iran as being key. Jordan is not a partner for Hezbollah; Jordan is a good partner for us. There are no connections that we're aware of between the Jordanian government and Hezbollah. Frankly, we'd be very surprised if there ever was such a connection.
:
Mr. Chairman, I'll try this again.
The 1948 genocide convention has responsibility to prevent genocide and to punish those who incite genocide. On this issue of incitement, Mr. Cotler put forth a bill on June 9, the . I'd be interested in your comments on it—in writing, given the limited time.
The other issue I would like to put on the table is the freezing of assets, one of the ways to get government's attention, and obviously that of the Iranian leadership. What are we doing on the issue of freezing assets, both of the government and of prominent business people who put money through this country?
Finally, on the Jundullah, the Soldiers of God, are there any comments you'd like to make on how you see that playing out, given the sensitivity of the Sunni insurgency in the southeast?
I would like certainly the first two responses in writing, if I could.
Thank you.
:
The allegations of fraud in the June 12 presidential elections are very serious, and we have encouraged the Iranian authorities to conduct a full and transparent investigation to ensure that the votes of all Iranians were counted. At the same time, Canada has made it clear that we will not interfere in the internal affairs of Iran.
The post-election situation has been very troubling for us. We have consistently voiced our concerns and called upon Iranian authorities to fully respect its human rights obligations. The ongoing detention, intimidation, and hostile treatment of opposition figures, academics, journalists, and some locally engaged diplomatic staff and foreign nationals are unacceptable. We have consistently called upon the Iranian authorities to release all political prisoners and journalists who have been unjustly detained. Prime Minister Harper has issued two statements condemning the violence and the crackdown on protesters by Iranian security forces. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has also issued statements condemning the use of violence by Iranian security forces and has called upon Iran to fully respect its human rights obligations.
We have relayed our concerns to the Iranian chargé d'affaires, Iran's top diplomat in Ottawa, on several occasions. In addition to our statements, we also supported a project with the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center to investigate and report on human rights abuses committed against civil society, media, and citizens after the election. We put forward about $60,000 from our Glyn Berry program. The project is documenting the arrests, detentions, torture, and killings of human rights lawyers and activists, leaders of opposition groups, journalists, students, and others. The Iran Human Rights Documentation Center is also analyzing whether the Iranian authorities' censure of the media violated Iran's obligations under international law.
:
Sure. I could speak a little bit on timelines.
I think it's very difficult to come up with any timeline that's very accurate, which is why, as Mr. McLaren says, there's a lot of disagreement. In effect, people use a timeline depending on the exact question they ask.
Ultimately, for Iran to pose a nuclear threat to Israel or to any other country, it would probably have to do three things. One is to make a political decision to develop a nuclear weapon, and we have no indication that they have made such a decision. That is something else to which we're not likely to get any insight; it's something they would hold as one of their most closely guarded state secrets.
The second thing they would have to do is take the nuclear material they have and change it into a form that's usable in a weapon. Right now they have material that they have enriched to a fairly low level. It could be used to make fuel for a reactor. They would have to enrich this up to a very high level, which is something they would do in one of the facilities that are currently safeguarded by the IAEA. In doing this, they would either first be observed doing it, or they would have to kick out the IAEA inspectors, which would set off significant alarm bells and we think would lead immediately to action at the Security Council.
They would also require some amount of time to do this. There's a large volume of material to be re-enriched. It's taken them over a year to create the amount they have, which is theoretically enough to make a weapon if made into the right form. We estimate that it would take them about half a year or so to reconfigure their plant to do this and another half-year or so to do the enrichment, so you're talking about at least a year of activity after they have made a decision that will cause them to be seen or reveal their intentions.
Finally, they would have to actually weaponize this material. We don't have any indication that they've mastered all the proper knowledge to make a weapon. A nuclear bomb is easy to make in theory, but quite difficult in practice. It's an extremely precise instrument, in effect, that you're creating. They would have to take this material, once they've gone through the stage requiring at least the year that I've spoken of, and physically manipulate it. Again many months would be required if they have done all the theoretical work beforehand and have that hidden.
How far along they are in some of this research is the sort of information we're trying to tease out in conjunction with the IAEA. If Iran answers all the questions and meets all the obligations in its relationship with the IAEA that a country like Canada has to meet, it would have to provide information sufficient either to reveal that it has carried out some of these experiments and studies, and thus implicate itself, or provide information sufficient to reveal that it hasn't gone down this way, and we would feel a little more at ease. It's because of our security concerns that we want to know more information about Iran's position, but it's also incumbent upon them to come clean with the agency for their own alleged purpose of only being interested in civilian aspects of nuclear power.