:
I will give you time to find the interpretation channel, Mr. Chairman.
[English]
It's not an urgent matter.
[Translation]
Mr. Chairman, first allow me to congratulate you on your election. As we have all seen over the past few days, assuming the chairmanship of a committee is no easy task. On behalf of the Bloc Québécois, and, I would imagine, on behalf of the other members of the committee, I would like to wish you every success in your new position.
Our research staff were asked to provide us with a document, which they have done. Now we have to do our homework, and by that I mean, we have to fill in the said document. The plan is to send it to your offices. I know that this is not on today's agenda, but I would suggest that each member of the committee send his or her list of priorities to the clerk. The clerk will compile a master list of your priorities, numbered from 1 to 19. He will share the results with us at the next meeting; doing it this way will save us a lot of time. That is my first suggestion.
My next point is not on the agenda either; however, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development will be making a statement in the House today concerning a final settlement on the matter of residential schools. I think that members of this committee ought to recognize the government's efforts, and thank the minister who has worked diligently to resolve this matter, which has been in limbo for too long. We ought to congratulate the government, and, once again, ask it to issue the cheques to the former students of the residential schools, who are now elderly, as quickly as possible. This being done, we will be able to turn the page on this shameful episode in Canadian history.
Once we have dealt with these points, we can hear from the departmental officials. Thank you.
:
As I mentioned, there are many topics, and the ones we will be discussing today are just a few that I've selected, based on invitation. Many of them are quite basic but fundamental.
First we're going to talk about the aboriginal people and the standard information on definitions, size, age structure, and geographical distribution--very useful but fundamental. Also fundamental but basic is information on population growth and components of that growth. Finally, about half of the presentation focuses on the well-being of the aboriginal peoples.
The Constitution recognizes three groups: Indians or first nations, Métis, and Inuit. The Indian population could be subdivided into two groups. Status Indians or registered Indians are those individuals who are eligible under the Indian Act. Then you have the non-status population, which consists of individuals who self-identify as Indians or first nations but are not eligible to be registered under the Indian Act.
The Métis are persons who have mixed ancestry but have also developed their own customs. Their identity and customs are recognized as separate from Indian and Inuit.
Finally are the Inuit, or persons whose ancestry can be traced back to the original inhabitants of the Arctic.
I just want to point out two aspects of identity that are implied in this definition. There's an aspect of self-identification, but there's also a notion of recognition by others--other communities and government. So there are two aspects that are part of one person's aboriginal identity.
Now these definitions, groups, and boundaries are clear-cut, but the reality is far more complex. In this diagram, each box represents a particular dimension. Statistics Canada uses four concepts to measure the notion of aboriginality. These concepts are aboriginal ancestry, aboriginal identity, status Indian or registration, and a fourth one that is not represented here, first nation band membership. The only reason it's not represented here is because when you deal with four dimensions, it's difficult to represent that on a plane. So each box, each colour, represents a dimension.
In everyday thinking, we like to approach things in very distinct, clear-cut categories and boundaries. As is illustrated here, individuals don't necessarily display the three dimensions of ancestry, identity, and status. Some have one dimension, some have two, and some have three. In the case of aboriginal ancestry, there are 1.3 million individuals according to the 2001 census, and this number should grow with the census that's going to happen next week.
The aboriginal identity category shows just a little below one million. The status Indian category shows a bit more than half a million.
The subsets are not symmetrical either. The one that includes the three dimensions is the largest, with around half a million people. Then you have subsets that are really small, like the one with 8,775 individuals. Those are individuals who only have legal status as Indians, but no ancestry or identity. Some might find that confusing and awkward. The previous version of the Indian Act allowed non-first nation women who married first nation men to acquire legal status, so most likely those women are represented here.
Here I'm only talking about aboriginal ancestry and aboriginal identity. I could have broken it down further into three ancestries, three identities, and different combinations. When we start really digging into these ideas of boundaries and definitions, we find out that it's a very complex and dynamic concept. I just want to illustrate here that we're not dealing with clear-cut definitions and boundaries.
How will this translate in your work? Sometimes you'll see numbers about the population, and the next document you read contains another number. Then you start getting confused about all these different numbers because very often they relate to different concepts. So I want to alert you to that situation.
Yes?
:
This particular slide illustrates the geographic distribution—again based on the 2001 census.
Very quickly, most of the aboriginal population resides west of the Great Lakes. First nations and Métis are in the western provinces and the Inuit are in the northern regions. The province with the largest aboriginal population is Ontario as of the 2001 census. Things might change with the 2006 census, because provinces display different growth rates of populations, and there's also interprovincial migration, which obviously plays out in how the population distributes over the entire country.
Again, focusing on geography, this time we're looking at the distribution of population on and off reserve. For the off-reserve portion, we distinguish between rural population, urban non-CMA, and urban CMA. CMA means census metropolitan area. Another way of looking at this is that CMA means large city and non-CMA means small city.
So there's great variation in terms of residential distribution across aboriginal groups. For the registered Indian population, while acknowledging some undercounting of the reserve population, about half of the registered Indians live on reserve. For the non-status and Métis populations, 70% are in cities. For the Inuit, it's about 70% again, but in northern rural communities. For the non-aboriginal population, or other Canadians, about 60% live in large cities. So there are quite significant differences here in terms of where people live.
It is interesting and important when one starts highlighting results from the census, or any data sources, especially when one uses a national picture, because if I'm going to give an average for the education of other Canadians and then for registered Indians, these two populations live in quite different circumstances, so I'm often going to be comparing apples and oranges, to use an overused expression. There's a need to really break down geographically the analysis and data to understand the differences and disparities across the country between aboriginal group, and even amongst aboriginal groups. That's a point I wanted to make here.
:
I have to apologize, because in my previous life I was accused of being overly focused on statistics to make some arguments and advancements.
Now, on this Canada slide, aboriginal population in Saskatchewan is showing 130,000. Yet when we look at the registered Indian population put together by the membership clerks and held on the Indian registry, that's almost the entire number. So the true demographic reality of Saskatchewan is about 200,000 aboriginal people. There are more than 100,000 status Indian people there. It's commonly accepted with Indian Affairs in the region that there are approximately a little over 100,000. That leaves maybe only 20,000 or 25,000 Métis--that's not true as well--and other categories of aboriginal people.
The point is that these numbers are, I think, under-representing the actual. Again, perhaps it's because of the census problems, although improvements have been made.
On the next slide, I think the on-reserve population in the registered Indian population is much higher as well. The previous statement was that 30 aboriginal communities were missed, all of them first nations, plus the multi-community ones, which raises the number. The percentage, in my opinion, would be much higher than 50. There have been statements made politically about the on- and off-reserve population, and there has to be a better understanding of that population.
:
The next slide gives you an idea of the distribution of first nations reserves--it's again based on census data according to population size, all the reserves according to census geography, and how they distribute according to their size. Seventy-five percent of first nations reserves have fewer than 500 inhabitants--so we're dealing with really small communities--and well above 300 of them have fewer than 100 residents.
The second topic of this presentation: population growth. On this particular slide we have two pieces of information. Let's first focus on that blue line. What is this blue line? It's the evolution of population size as illustrated by the census. I recognize there are issues of undercounting and qualitative data, but these issues tend to be constant over time and will not necessarily distort the shape of the curve, which I'm interested in here. It's based on ancestry data, the only data we can have an outlook of 100 years.
So what does this graph tell us? At the start of the previous century, around 130,000 individuals reported aboriginal ancestry; in 2001, 1.3 million, ten times the population of 100 years ago. Now 100 years can be broken down into three distinct periods of demographic growth: one of slow growth, 1901-1941; one of rapid growth--it doesn't seem so rapid here, but I can tell you it is--from 1941 to 1971; and then 1971 on, and that's an explosion. The curve is looking at the ceiling right now, and it's going up fast.
If I compare it to Canada overall, in terms of overall growth for those 30 years, 1971-2001, Canada increased by 37%, again based on census data: the aboriginal ancestry population increased more than 300%--that's eight times the rate.
So this is very important. Definition is an important aspect of our work, and also an important aspect for people who do work in programming and policy development, but population growth is also an extremely important aspect; it's an important driver. For those who have read David Foot's Boom, Bust and Echo, 60% is explained by demography. Well, that's a lot of demography.
Moving on to the next slide, growth again, I'm focusing only on the last 15 years of the 100 years I just showed you. Now we're talking about data. Each bar represents an annual growth rate for a five-year period--each bar--so we have it for each group, registered Indian, non-status, Métis, Inuit. For example, the bar on the far left, the red one, for the registered Indian, indicates an annual growth rate of about 6.5% during the period 1986 to 1991. That's what each bar means. If I look at the entire chart, these growth rates vary a lot from group to group, from period to period, significantly.
What's that blue line across that I just put there? It's a reference for you to better appreciate how exceptionally high these growth rates are. This is what I call the maximum natural increase.
At the national level--forget about migration from the outside that would contribute to the growth of the aboriginal population--there's nobody coming from the outside, or very few, so the only way this population should be growing is through births, and then minus deaths: that's what natural increase is, births minus deaths--the theoretical maximum that the population can display is 5.5% a year. That's why you see that bar across at 5.5% a year.
What does that mean, 5.5% a year? It means 10 kids per woman. That's impossible right now--in first nations, Métis, or the Inuit population. That's not what we're seeing.
Just to illustrate, we see rates that are in excess of that 5.5% a year for the registered Indian, for example, in the first period, likewise for non-status Indians, and for the last two periods for the Métis. Another way of illustrating how extraordinary this growth is would be to say at 5.5% a year, the population would double every 13 years. At 5.5% a year, over 100 years that population would be 200 times its initial size. That's unsustainable, by the way; it won't last.
Just to illustrate again how extraordinary the growth has been for some of these populations, for some periods, I want to point out that for the Métis population, the rates are really high--they're higher and higher--from one period to the next. I'm looking forward to the 2006 data to see if it's still on the rise.
I just said earlier that it's a good idea to break it down by geography sometimes, because the national picture hides a lot of disparities. Here I've broken it down by reserve, off-reserve rural, and off-reserve urban. Again, these are annual growth rates--the same as the previous slides. What do we see? Where's the demographic explosion? It's off reserve and it's primarily in urban areas.
What are the components of this growth? Well, there are four.
The first one is the national increase, which I've already spoken to. In reality, the fertility rate for first nations women is around 2 to 2.5 children per woman. The Inuit would be around four. The Métis and non-status would be probably around two or a little below. That doesn't explain the growth rates we've seen.
So, yes, the national increase contributes to the growth of the populations, and we've seen it on the pyramid. There are a lot of kids. But that's not the only explanation.
Now, when I talk to colleagues who are not really versed in aboriginal research, they say, “What about migration?” Well, nationally, obviously, that's not a component. Subnationally, the provinces, territories, cities--it might be a component. But it's not. It's not a big driver.
In fact, when it comes time to explain urban aboriginal growth, migration is a myth. When you look at census data, there are questions on migration, where you were living five years ago, so you can have an idea of migration--to and from. Reserves have more individuals going to them than leaving.
The blue bubble that you see on the screen and in your printed decks indicates almost plus 11,000. That means there are 11,000 more people who moved to the reserve than left. As a consequence, you have people leaving the rural off-reserve area going back to the community, or leaving the city--3,000--going back to the community. So this mass exodus is a myth.
The urban areas have been losing population to migration since 1986. I have colleagues that have far more experience than me in looking at this. If I remember well, it goes back to the seventies. The reserves have always displayed a positive net migration--always. There are always more people coming than leaving.
It's important to emphasize that point here, because when people start thinking about designing policies and programs for aboriginals and they think these folks are coming from Indian reserves, it biases how they approach these individuals.
It sets their minds, in terms of what their characteristics are and what the issues are. That could affect policy development significantly.
:
You touch on a few aspects here. The first one is the consistency in the definitions.
Yes, I agree with you, there have been changes from 1871, the first census, to right now, 2006, but since 1986 there has been relative consistency in the way that data has been captured by Statistics Canada in their censuses. There are improvements, and these make the numbers fluctuate, but for these improvements to make a really strong impact they would have to be spectacular. There's no indication, from the work done at Statistics Canada on the quality of data, that shows either spectacular improvement or deterioration in the quality of data. In my own studies at the university, I've done some simulations with regard to this. You would have to have spectacular improvement or real deterioration of data for there to be a big rejigging of the counts.
In the last point you made, you were referring to the Métis and to the fact that now the data's better. We have more people declaring that they're Métis. However, just looking at the next slide in your deck, you can see the fourth component of the demographic growth, of the explosion, a phenomenon that has been called “ethnic mobility”. Basically it refers to changes in self-reporting for those periods that we're looking at. It also refers to children born in multicultural families. The father could be first nation, the mother could be European, and perhaps the child could be declared Métis. It could be.
So ethnic mobility refers to changes for an individual through time. If an individual has multiple ancestries, for whatever circumstance he'll change his declaration of identity. It could be through intermarriage, with people of different cultural backgrounds having kids. That will have an impact. Ethnic mobility is the big component for first nations and Métis, especially in urban areas.
There's another way to illustrate the impact of ethnic mobility. If I'm a first nations child in a closed first nations community, obviously I need two first nations parents. Outside the reserve, a first nations woman might be with a non-first nations man, but the child might be first nations. This first nations man might be with a non-first nations woman, and they can have a first nations child. In communities, people will not intermarry but “in-marry”, so two first nations individuals for one child. Outside, you can create two families with the same two individuals, and then two kids. So intermarriage can potentially double the growth.
In cities you have a lot more intermarriage, as illustrated by a lot of the reports on Bill C-31 that we were referring to earlier. There's a lot more intermarriage, hence rapid growth. Then on top of that you have people who have multiple identities who, for one reason or the next, will change how they report themselves. That's a very big contributor behind the growth. If ethnic mobility didn't exist through the generations, could we be talking about Métis today? No.
There are no definitive answers. I'm sure some of you, maybe even all of you, are already thinking, how can that happen? What's the explanation behind ethnic mobility? There's no definitive answer. There's no data. I cannot ask people who've changed their reporting through the census: why did you do that? But there's work that has been done in the U.S. and Australia. These phenomena have also been observed for the aboriginal populations there.
There are three factors, predisposing demographic factors. First, there is age. Until I'm about 18, it's my mom or my dad who's going to fill out the census, so they'll report me in a certain way. When I start filling out my own census form, I might change the way I report. So that's age.
There is multiple ancestry. There are also social factors. When there are events, there's media, which increases awareness. That also increases pride, very often, and will push people to--pardon the expression--come out of the closet about their aboriginality.
And then there are legal factors. There are different pushes to define who has access to certain programs and benefits. These pushes will trigger movements of individuals, who will try to position themselves relative to what's there or what's not. Bill C-31 was a good example. I don't know if anyone noticed, but there was a bar going in a negative direction for non-status Indians. That was most likely because of Bill C-31. Some individuals tried to reposition themselves. They were non-status and then they became status, so there was movement. For those who were non-status before, there was a suspicion that they might be Métis now, because they were non-status because of their mixed ancestry, and some interpret mixed ancestry as a direct connection to Métis. So you see, that's a legal factor at play here in terms of how people report themselves.
So that's a big one, ethnic mobility. It's not often studied in demography courses. It's a little on the margins, on the fringe. Sometimes people have thought I was a bit on the lunatic fringe in talking about it.
Okay, the third topic is well-being. This chart presents the human development index. What is this index? It's an index developed by the United Nations Development Program to measure the quality of life of countries and compare them. We've heard through the years that Canada ranks among the top countries in the world. And it still ranks really high. In fact, for a few years, Canada ranked number one.
The methodology is relatively simple and allows for calculations for the registered Indian population and Inuit, which we've done. The HDI is made up of three elements. It's simple. One element is health, which is measured as life expectancy. The second element is education. We want to have an idea of knowledge. This has two subcomponents: one is functional literacy, and one is higher levels of education, which is measured as graduation from high school or higher. The third component is the measure of access to goods and services, and here we use income per capita. The index goes from zero to one. So the blue line on your chart represents the HDI for other Canadians, the red one is registered Indians, and the green one is the Inuit.
The first observation--it's obvious--is that well-being for registered Indians and Inuit is significantly lower than for other Canadians. But there are two other messages that this graph conveys. First, well-being of registered Indians and Inuit is not stable or going down, and this is another persistent myth. Second, over the entire period, the gap relative to other Canadians has been closing, but not as much in the last five years, the 1996 to 2001 period. In fact, for the Inuit, it seems to have widened a little bit. We're at the third decimal place, so we might just be within the margins of error there, but it's safe to say that there haven't been huge improvements over the last five years.
So there are three messages. The gap, relative to other Canadians, is improving, and it's improving faster than for the rest of the Canadian population. Therefore, the gap is closing.
What's the driver behind these improvements? It's education--not health, or life expectancy, or income, but education—albeit education at the lower end of the spectrum. You have more and more people who have grade 9 education, which is a measure of functional literacy.
That's about it. So that's the national picture for the HDI.
:
It's because we have no measures of life expectancy for the non-status or the Métis, and that's one of the components. We can't measure it, but we're working on it. We're putting a lot of effort into it with our Health Canada research colleagues and also with our Statistics Canada research colleagues. So there are ways of dealing with that, but there's no direct data.
Life expectancy is based on vital statistics. Vital statistics are collected for all Canadians, but in the vital statistics there is no aboriginal identifier, so you can't distinguish who is aboriginal—meaning first nation, Métis, or Inuit—and who is not.
For registered Indians, the data come from the Indian registry. For the Inuit, we use a different approach, what we call an “ecological approach”, where we identify the areas where Inuit are 95% of the population, and then we grab the data for all of that area, including the 5% who are non-Inuit. Yes, it's not perfect, but if we didn't do that, we wouldn't have anything to show. We're trying to apply the same technique for the Métis, but it's a lot more difficult because they don't live in dense, concentrated areas like the Inuit.
But based on the other indicators—functional literacy, grade 9 plus or high school plus, and income per capita—I think it's safe to say non-status and Métis are positioned between the registered Indians and the Inuit on one side and other Canadians on the other side. They're somewhere in the middle. So when we get the life expectancy measure and we do calculate the HDI, I expect the HDI for the non-status and Métis to be somewhere in-between.
:
Both. Women are more educated, but this does not translate into higher incomes. Nevertheless, I think that's another issue.
[English]
I mentioned earlier that looking at the national picture hides huge disparities. This is the HDI for the registered Indian in 2001 only--for the on-reserve population, the off-reserve population, but also the other Canadians, the other residents in these provinces or territories.
The first observation from this chart is that it varies from coast to coast. The lowest figures in terms of HDI for the registered Indians are in Manitoba and in Saskatchewan--on reserve. It's also in Manitoba and Saskatchewan where there is the largest gap relative to the rest of the population and where we have the largest proportion of the population that is aboriginal. If I had broken it down by gender here, which I did on the previous slide, you would see that the men in Manitoba display a very, very low HDI. Again, it's education and life expectancy.
So this highlights the need to really break down the data geographically, to identify specific disparities, specific issues. The national picture masks important differences.
We also have done it for the Inuit by regions where they live, so in Newfoundland, Labrador, Nunavut, Northwest Territories, and Quebec. Again, we see important variations across regions, and Nunatsiavut and Nunavik show the lowest level of HDI for the Inuit.
:
We cannot have data from the census about where they get their education. The issue of tracking students is one the department is looking into in terms of better data, because we have the provincial system, which is off reserve, and then on reserve. So there are efforts being made there in terms of bringing the information together so we will have a better sense of the students' progress.
I was just saying it's important to drill down geographically. In our unit, we've used the HDI methodology and expanded it a bit so we can apply it at the community level. That's the community well-being index, which is very similar in terms of methodology--similar, not exactly the same.
Again, it's an index that goes from zero to one. It has components. It has an educational component, exactly the same as the HDI. It has an income per capita component. But we cannot indicate life expectancy at the community level.
We're talking about small communities. In some of these communities, in certain years, there are going to be zero deaths. Zero deaths means infinite life expectancy, and we know that's not the case. It's because we're dealing with small populations, small numbers.
So we've replaced this health indicator with one of housing, which is an important aspect of living conditions in aboriginal communities. This housing component is made up of two elements: one of quality and one of quantity--quantity being crowding. We measure crowding. In terms of quality, there's a question on the census that asks about major repairs. So those aspects were factored into the measure, similar to the HDI, the same kind of methodology.
The last one is labour force participation, and we have four components in this case. This is mostly a socio-economic indicator. The HDI included a health component that we cannot build in here. The community well-being index is a socio-economic well-being index of communities. From the HDI nationally to the provinces, we're now drilling down to the communities.
These yellow bars represent other Canadians. I'm going to build up the complexity of this chart so you'll see. That's why it looks a little empty right now. The yellow bars represent Canadian communities that are not first nation or Inuit, based on their score. The score runs across, and you have a proportion of these communities.
By the way, we've calculated this for all Canadian communities that have a population of at least 65 individuals--not just first nations or Inuit, all communities. These are the other Canadian communities, their distribution. You'll notice that they're mostly towards the top end of the scale. They have high scores.
On the next slide I've added first nations, the red bars. The first observation is that these communities have lower scores. Okay, we knew that from the HDI anyway. What more do we learn here? We learn that there are huge disparities between first nation communities. In other words, the difference between the lowest score and the highest score is bigger than the difference between the average first nation and the average other Canadian community. There are more disparities across first nation communities than between first nations and other Canadians. That's a finding.
If you look at the bottom 100 communities, 92 are first nations. Only one first nation community ranks among the top 100, and that's Burrard in B.C.
On the next slide we add the Inuit. For the Inuit, there are far fewer communities. As indicated on the chart, “N = 51”, meaning the number of communities. They're mostly concentrated towards the middle of the scale. You have some that are towards the upper level, but they're mostly concentrated, more densely grouped, similar to other Canadian communities. There's a little less disparity than we saw with the first nation communities, but also we're dealing with a smaller number of communities: 51.
When I got the invitation, I was told that participants, members, really like maps, so indulge. I'm a demographer; I'm not a geographer. But I do recognize that when people start thinking about why there is such a huge difference between first nations communities, the first answer that most people give is, “It's because of geography, because of where they are." And I say, “And what else?”, and they respond, “Oh, it's because of where they are. "Okay, I get it. And what else?" They respond, “Because of where they are." There is a fixation on location.
This map shows high-moderate level of CWB, community well-being, for first nations. The blue stars indicate a high level of CWB.
Yes, a lot of them are in the south. There are a lot of them in southern B.C. Some of them are around the Great Lakes. Some are between Ottawa and Quebec. The one north of Quebec is not exactly south, by the way. It might look south based on where it is on the screen, but it's not exactly south.
You will also notice blue stars right in the middle of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, northern Alberta, Yukon, northern British Columbia--and I can go on like that.
It's not directly associated with where they are. There are some communities that do fairly well.
Just to illustrate again the disparities that we saw on the previous chart...I was saying that the difference between the lowest and the highest is really big.
There is a tribal council in Alberta. There are two communities, same tribal council, same band. They can see each other from across the river, these two communities. One ranks among the top 10 first nations in the country; one ranks among the bottom 10--same band. They can see each other from across the river.
So these disparities we saw nationally, when we look at all the communities, we even see them at the band level or tribal council level. I just wanted to point that out.
We thought the data was not good. We actually sent one of our researchers there to look and the person came back--yes, the data was good. There are huge differences between these two communities.
:
I will conclude my presentation with the last slide.
Before I start explaining this chart, in any exercise, when you look at the past, you look at old reports like Hawthorn, and RCAP. When they tried to assess differences between first nations and other Canadians, Métis and other Canadians, or Inuit and other Canadians, they would base it on education. Then they would come up with an indicator, for example, proportion of university graduates. They would look at the labour force and the percentage of unemployment. They would look at income. They would use income per capita--usually they would use median income. Then they would look at housing and use a measure of crowding. They would compare the populations to the rest of the Canadian population. Then they would identify a gap in terms of well-being for that particular dimension of well-being.
But because we're using different measures across dimensions, we're unable to assess where the biggest gap is. Is it in education, health, housing, and so on? We're using different scales. We're using Fahrenheit and Celsius. Measure variations in Celsius; measure variations in Fahrenheit. If I don't have the equivalency table, I don't know. I can't compare.
The CWB, because it re-scales everything from zero to one for all dimensions of well-being that are included in the index, allows for these inter-dimensional comparisons. In other words, here I'm better able to see in which dimension of well-being the gap is the largest between first nations and other Canadians, and Inuit and other Canadians.
Two-thirds of the gap can be explained by housing and income. Personally, I think one should focus a little bit more on housing, because income is a measure of income per capita, and the gap is to some extent driven by differences in fertility. First nation and Inuit families have more kids, hence more dependants, which lowers their income per capita. But these differences in fertility are acceptable. There's no well-being issue there per se--just in the number of kids.
There is also the fact--you saw the age structure--that the aboriginal population is entering the labour market. Other Canadians are exiting the labour market. When you enter the labour market, your expectations in terms of wages are not at the same level as when you're leaving. In other words, you make a lot more money before you leave the labour market than when you just come in. So there are differences there in income that are related to differences in age structure, and we shouldn't necessarily read the income gap here as being discrimination in the labour market.
Housing is a lot clearer. There's crowding and repairs. The gap, as illustrated by the chart, is important. It's much larger than education. For registered Indians, it's three times the gap in education. But I'm not saying that the gap in education is not huge. The gap in housing is three times larger. This is relative. We're working with relative scales here. To have a true measure of the education gap, I suggest you go back to the education measures. How many kids come out of high school? How many kids come out of university? But in assessing where it's the largest, this is possibly the best attempt so far.
With that, I conclude my presentation, and I thank you.
:
Once again, it is a matter of quality as opposed to a demographic explosion. Could the issue of quality not explain the demographic explosion in part?
Regarding variations in the non-participation of some communities, I took this factor into consideration while evaluating the impact of ethnic mobility. Also at issue was what we demographers refer to as undercount. It is inevitable that certain segments of the population would not be included in the census. For the overall population, this undercount hovers between two and three per cent. I took all of these factors into account while estimating the effect of ethnic mobility.
The value or validity of a declaration cannot be measured. I would find this fact very perplexing if it occurred in Canada alone. However, as I was saying earlier, for the same periods, the same phenomenon has been observed in the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand, to a lesser degree. Ethnic minorities are also undercounted in China and the former Soviet Union. This phenomenon is widespread.
Earlier, I identified three demographic factors that are predeterminant, including social and legal onces. For example, China has a one child per family policy. Families belonging to the ethnic majority in China can only have one child. Very small minorities can have two or three children. In the past, people tended to identify themselves as members of the majority, because this gave them access to certain jobs. The same people are now saying that they should perhaps go back and declare themselves as members of their minority group, something they didn't do before. In other words, they are coming out of the closet because this gives them the right to have two children.
In the former Soviet Union, passports were identified as the probable source of these variations. Here, past events like Oka have drawn a lot of attention. In fact, when we count the number of times the words “aboriginal”, “first nation”, “Métis” or “Inuit” appeared in newspapers over the years, the highest numbers correspond to peaks in growth rates during the 1990s. There are also factors that are legal, or political in nature, such as the introduction of Bill C-31.
I do not exclude opportunism as a motivating factor for some people who make declarations. However, as this occurs among aboriginal minorities in other countries around the world, I believe that this phenomenon is indeed present and very real.
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You made a comment, which I agree with more than 100 percent, that the current methodologies and current data that you take and work with sometimes bury the real picture in different regions of the country—and even more deeply in different tribal councils, and even more deeply in different communities. So what you end up having after you take the highs and you take the lows is a below-average figure, and then you paint the picture of the conditions, because that's the way the data works. Politicians tend to take that and, unfortunately, may not use it in the best way, or take it too literally without understanding its depth.
A bigger issue that is related to the parliamentary secretary's question is not what you need, but what we can provide to the aboriginal communities to do their own research and development. Right now they do not get research and development dollars.
I'll give you an example. We did this education indicators report of our tribal council of 33 schools, who are almost 50% of the on-reserve population in Saskatchewan, and there was no money anywhere to do it, so we took money from health and from another program and another program to actually do what was important. We came up with some demographic pictures, but not until we got done did we get some funding for it. It's important at the end of the day, because then communities take ownership of their research suggesting what they need to do to come up with solutions for their own issues.
Another example is the Northern Inter-Tribal Health Authority, which established a surveillance unit in northern Saskatchewan that talked about TB rates and immunizations. Once the 50 or so communities there realized they had the lowest immunization rates for newborns, having that data in hand, they designed a response because they took ownership and responsibility. Now those northern first nations communities have the highest rates of immunization in the country, even higher than the province of Saskatchewan.
So it's not what we can provide, but that we provide the first nations, Métis, and Inuit communities the ability to come up with their own solutions once they have developed the data. Then as a data geek I'll take that data and do much more wonderful things with it and get much more accurate pictures.
So research and development funding is absolutely critical. Without that, you never get to see the best practices, because they're always buried so deep.
:
I'm very pleased to hear that you're looking at different ways of analyzing the data you get because when you ask who defines “well-being”.... I was just telling Todd we like to say we didn't know we were poor until someone told us we were poor. We like to say that in the north because technically that's true. As long as we were healthy, happy, and the caribou didn't bypass us and we could get a good living off the land, that was okay, until someone came in and decided that because we didn't have grade 12 diplomas, because we didn't know how to do this, this, and that, and we didn't have social insurance numbers, we were like a third-world country. So you really need to be careful about what conclusions you come to because of data.
We've seen studies like these many, many, many times. I have to say, and maybe out of disrespect, I call them the Globe and Mail doom and gloom types of statistics. That's what I've seen before, and it paints a very dire picture.
Yes, we need a lot of help in the communities, but it always fails to really bring out the hope and optimism of the people, the people who are working so hard to improve life. You don't get that in statistics and data, and that's why I always say, as Gary said, you have to be very careful. It's good for us to get statistics so we can then use them to get better services, better health care, better education, and understanding, but it really depends on how you present the data.
I'm very thankful for what you gave me, and some of it I'll probably have to digest a little more because some of the terms...if you're not using them all the time, you're not sure you're getting the actual picture. Anyway, thank you for the information.