SNAS Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, April 8, 2003

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1620

The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.))

Mr. Norman Gardner (Chairman, Toronto Police Services Board, Ontario Association of Police Services Board)

º

1625

º

1630

º

1635

The Chair

Mr. Herb Kreling (Chair, Ottawa Police Services Board, Ontario Association of Police Services Board)

º

1640

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance)

º

1645

Mr. Norman Gardner

º

1650

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Norman Gardner

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.)

Mr. Norman Gardner

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Norman Gardner

º

1655

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Norman Gardner

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Norman Gardner

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Norman Gardner

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Norman Gardner

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Norman Gardner

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

»

1700

Mr. Norman Gardner

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Bob Boychyn (Chair, Durham Regional Police Services Board, Ontario Association of Police Services Board)

»

1705

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Bob Boychyn

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Bob Boychyn

»

1710

Mr. Norman Gardner

Mr. Bob Boychyn

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Bob Boychyn

The Chair

Mr. Bernie Morelli (Chair, Hamilton Police Services Board, Ontario Association of Police Services Board)

»

1715

The Chair

Mr. Allan Magnacca (Vice-Chair, Niagara Regional Police Services Board, Ontario Association of Police Services Board)

The Chair

Mr. Bernie Morelli

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan

»

1720

Mr. Norman Gardner

Mr. Herb Kreling

»

1725

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Herb Kreling

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Bob Boychyn

Mr. Geoff Regan

Mr. Bob Boychyn

Mr. Norman Gardner

»

1730

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Bob Boychyn

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Bob Boychyn

The Chair

Mr. Bob Boychyn

Mr. Herb Kreling

»

1735

Mr. Norman Gardner

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Norman Gardner

The Chair

»

1740

Mr. Bob Boychyn

The Chair

Mr. Bernie Morelli

The Chair

Mr. Herb Kreling

The Chair

Mr. Herb Kreling

»

1745

The Chair

Mr. Norman Gardner

Mr. Herb Kreling

The Chair

Mr. Herb Kreling

Mr. Norman Gardner

The Chair

Mr. Norman Gardner

The Chair

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CANADA

Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

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NUMBER 006

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Tuesday, April 8, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

º  (1620)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.)): I'll call the meeting to order.

    Colleagues, the national security subcommittee is looking at the issue of the position of police service boards in Canada in relation to local and regional police response to what we can call the potential terrorist threat that may be out there, principally with reference to post-9/11 circumstances.

    We have as witnesses today members of the Ontario Association of Police Service Boards. I won't go through the list of names, but we'll lead with Mr. Norm Gardner, who is the chair of the Toronto Police Services Board. He can introduce the other members. We'll have opening statements and then we'll go to questions.

    Welcome.

    Mr. Norman Gardner (Chairman, Toronto Police Services Board, Ontario Association of Police Services Board): That's great.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

    First of all, I'd like to thank you for allowing the representatives from the Ontario Association of Police Services Board to appear here today. With me are Mr. Bob Boychyn, chairman of the Durham Regional Police Services Board; Mr. Allan Magnacca, vice-chairman of the Niagara Regional Police Services Board; Chairman Herb Kreling of the Ottawa Police Services Board; and Chairman Bernie Morelli from the Hamilton Police Services Board.

    We have an organization within the OAPSB called the Big 12 Police Services Board, which meets several times a year, so we are basically not only representing the Ontario Association of Police Services Board but the bigger boards, which include the cities and regions of Durham, Halton, London, Niagara, Ottawa, Peel, Sudbury, Toronto, Waterloo, Windsor, York, and Hamilton.

    We want to discuss the issue of federal funding for intelligence operations and for first responders to terrorist incidents within our communities. Each of our board chairs has sent letters to their respective members of Parliament on this important issue. A copy of the letter was provided to Mr. Rumas for circulation. If anybody doesn't have one, I have some extra copies with me.

    I want to reiterate that we are not here to do any scaremongering, but we want to point out that there is insufficient coordinated planning and insufficient front-line resources to cope with an emergency situation. Paper plans are insufficient in determining a successful response, and certainly when conducting emergency planning scenarios and exercises. Unfortunately, these scenarios are sometimes described as being successful or not successful, but on paper alone it's just not enough.

    I'd like to discuss the role and the effect of our cities as first responders to terrorist attacks. I will use the city of Toronto and area as an example.

    September 11, 2001, caused police agencies to leap into action and be prepared to respond to some known and unknown challenges--mostly unknown challenges. The immediate impact of the events of September 11, 2001, on the Toronto Police Services was the calling together of a joint intelligence group, called JIG, which was housed within the Toronto Police Services intelligence support unit. This initiative brought together Toronto officers with surrounding police services and representatives from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Department of National Defence, the RCMP, the OPP, Canada Immigration, and the FBI. Toronto offered a logical base for operations due to our established communications network, our centralized access to member agencies, the ability to set up quickly, and our proximity to local and regional government operations and concerns.

    Between September 12, 2001, and February 19, 2002, the JIG operation received over 2,300 calls related to 9/11, of which over 600 calls, or 30%, were directly related to the city of Toronto. As time went on, from the information gathered it became apparent that extensive terrorist-related activity and connections existed in areas of Toronto and the GTA. Unfortunately, financial and human resources were not sufficient to follow up investigations by the Toronto Police Services to make any final conclusions regarding these calls, and the information was passed to the RCMP and CSIS for investigation. Of course, everybody was working together at that time simultaneously, all these intelligence-gathering areas in law enforcement.

    If the Toronto Police Services had appropriate funding, it could have followed up on information and the end process would have been much quicker. From September 11, 2001, to December 31, 2001, the Toronto Police Services spent over $1 million in overtime on terrorism-related investigations alone. This amount does not include the added calls for service that resulted after September 11. This was just in the intelligence-gathering area alone.

    Several investigative units were either totally dismantled or had investigators assigned to the joint intelligence group, so there was a disruptive effect on the Toronto Police Service in being able to carry out other police-related activity and investigations. For instance, our auto squad was totally decimated. All the members were taken out and thrown into the JIG group to do intelligence information gathering.

    As a result of 9/11, we've learned that attacks against any large city within Canada would have tremendous effects on the local population and the financial stability of the affected areas in the country. We can see the situation in regard to the SARS scare at the moment. It's indicative of how disruptive and frightening to a community fearing a communicable disease is, or the possibility of facing chemical or biological threats to public safety.

    However, the obvious targets that would exact a similar impact on Canada as the New York attack did on the U.S.A. would be more than likely Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa, Vancouver, and to a lesser degree the other provincial capitals. These cities are not only the most populated areas, but also the financial headquarters of most major corporations. These major cities also house municipal, provincial, and federal government offices and services.

    In a relative sense, the Toronto area is the Canadian equivalent of the New York City area, being the financial and commercial centre of the country. Toronto is an attractive target because over 2.5 million people live in Toronto alone. Over 5.2 million live in the GTA. It's the largest municipality in Canada and the fifth largest in North America. Toronto is the financial centre of Canada and the fourth largest financial centre in North America. The Toronto Stock Exchange is the third largest exchange in North America by volume. Our limited ability to recover from a major disaster or attack could jeopardize the entire country's economy. My figures are that roughly about 42% of federal funding comes from Ontario, so that would have a major economic impact on the country as a whole.

    Toronto is also home to 90% of Canada's foreign banks. Nearly all Canadian banks and the financial sector companies have their head offices located here. There are 75,000 businesses employing 1.2 million people in the city. There are over one million people or vehicles that cross the border of Toronto on a daily basis, in and out. Toronto has the fourth largest airport in North America, and it has the second largest public transportation system in North America, only behind New York, with 6,000 kilometres of routes handling 450 million passengers per year.

    The hub of an effective regional and national transportation infrastructure network that includes road, rail, air, and water facilities is here in Toronto. As a result of all these attributes, in the event of a terrorist attack Toronto is the most likely Canadian target. Nationally, other logical targets include the infrastructure to support oil, gas, hydro lines, and generation facilities, transportation centres such as air, rail, and road, major communication assets, water supplies, and our banking and monetary infrastructures.

    To refer to my neighbours here, in Durham they have half the nuclear reactors in Canada located within its jurisdiction. It has major transmission lines that if disrupted would disrupt a substantial amount of Ontario's power.

    Hamilton is a major industrial manufacturing centre, the steel town of Canada. It has a hospital with nuclear facilities. It has a major bridge. It is also a major transportation hub for rail and shipping and it has an airport as well.

    Niagara has four major bridges, one rail and three traffic: one at Lewiston, the Lewiston Bridge; the Fort Erie Bridge; the Niagara Falls Bridge; and the Welland Canal. It also has a major power-generating station that feeds both Canada and the United States.

º  (1625)  

We have the major automotive production that takes place in Canada located in Ontario. General Motors is in Oshawa, Ford in Oakville, Chrysler in Brampton. This is just the GTA. And there are Windsor and Sarnia. Sarnia is the home of major chemical plants. Windsor has its tunnels to the United States and it has the bridge, and there's also a major Chrysler manufacturing facility in Windsor. So the industrial heartland is basically in the Golden Horseshoe, plus some other major and extensive industrial facilities outside of the Golden Horseshoe area.

    In the aftermath of 9/11, the experience worldwide is that many terrorist groups funded themselves through criminal activity. As large municipalities are easy places for terrorists to assimilate in and hide in, municipal police forces provide the vital functions of detection and prevention through their intelligence operations. Our technical detection and prevention capabilities are currently in dire straits, and we need to move forward in this area. Specifically, the issue of lawful access requires immediate intervention by the federal government to stop the erosion of law enforcement's capability to lawfully intercept communications and to conduct electronic surveillance where authorized.

    In order to be successful in achieving a truly effective national campaign against possible terrorism, local law enforcement agencies must be fully engaged as equal partners, and not as mere tokens, in provincially and federally funded initiatives. Not only are local police agencies on the front line and must be the first to respond to a terrorist attack, they must also be proactively involved in the investigation and prevention of potential terrorist attacks. As a body, we are very pleased to see that the federal government did give the city of Montreal $4 million to do some preparation for emergency preparedness.

    Local police officers often have intimate knowledge of their communities and have a close relationship with a wide variety of people and groups. They have the ability to both hear and track down information related to organizations supporting terrorist organizations. If properly trained in what to look for and in what questions to ask, local police officers can be very significant sources of intelligence respecting terrorism, and can contribute significantly to the overall security of our nation. If properly equipped with up-to-date intelligence information on terrorist activities and if they have access to systems and databases, local police officers can assist with effective intelligence gathering when they are conducting their day-to-day activities.

    The war on terrorism must be fought actively on two fronts: prevention, and incident management. Aside from the intelligence-gathering capabilities, it will be local front-line police officers and other local emergency workers who will be the first responders to any act of terrorism in our respective communities—a reality that we feel has not been fully appreciated by senior levels of government. The two senior levels of government have attempted to respond to the threat of terrorism by basically funding only their respective law enforcement agencies, with little regard for the plight of local police services and the need to put in place effective preventative measures, to acquire safety equipment and training for the first responders, and to develop comprehensive emergency plans to adequately prepare for and respond to the threat of terrorism.

    The catastrophic events of September 11 have significantly changed the focus and priorities of police operations. These events have placed an extraordinary burden on our already scarce resources. For example, in Toronto, the hate crime unit recorded a 66% increase in hate crimes from 2000 to 2001. The terrorist activity of 9/11 contributed to 90% of this increase. The Muslim community in Toronto experienced 57 reported hate crimes in 2001, up from just one in the year 2000, and 45 of the occurrences in 2001 were directly attributable to the events of 9/11. Unfortunately, the Muslim community thus joined other communities in Toronto who have long been the focus of hate activity.

    For the first time, 200 bioterrorism threats were investigated by the Toronto Police Service security section—all related to terrorist activity of 9/11. Responding to many of these incidents involved significant commitments of personnel and equipment, and resulted in serious disruptions to the daily activities of the city, due to the need for proper evacuation and decontamination procedures.

º  (1630)  

    Since 9/11, and continuing into 2002, the hate crime unit observed an increased level of fear among the various communities it serves. There's a heightened anxiety caused by 9/11, which has already translated into the reasonable expectation that the police service will pay greater attention to each hate crime reported to it. Meeting the increased demands for service, along with the added workload resulting from the events of September 11, 2001, has created a very serious negative impact on our ability to meet the many and varied expectations of the public respecting safety, security, and quality of life at the local level.

    I also have some 2002 hate crime statistics that were not in the original material we provided to you. In 2002, the victim category most affected by hate was the multi-biased category, meaning at least two groups. The individual group with the most was the Jewish community, which reported 50 hate crimes within its community. The black community reported 44, the gay community 11, and the Muslim community 10. In the majority of incidents reported, the suspects remained anonymous, and likely committed the acts by themselves. In addition, no precipitating events led to attacks in most cases.

    We are all gravely concerned that the federal and provincial governments have not as yet coordinated their response to the threat of terrorism. In particular, we are disappointed that policy-makers have overlooked the unique value-added role that local police agencies have in any successful anti-terrorism initiatives. Such oversight is basically unacceptable. The safety and security of Canadians, more than five million of whom reside in the greater Toronto area, cannot be left solely to the federal and provincial police agencies, because much of the stuff they deal with is given to them by the local police agencies. It is specifically for this reason that we are appearing here today to lobby you, our senior level of government.

    Local municipal police forces must be supplied with appropriate funding, training, and equipment to deal with these very real threats. We would love to have the ability to talk to you in greater depth as to what our needs are, so that you can be aware of them, because there are all kinds of disaster scenarios capable of occurring. There have been many unlikely areas where terrorist events have taken place. The situation in the Middle East, the war now going on in Iraq, and the calls from some individuals for holy wars, etc., certainly don't help matters, and they certainly put greater and greater pressure on local police in investigating any potential threats that might occur. Therefore, perpetual maintenance in this area is here to stay for an awful long time.

    Mr. Kreling would like to add a couple of words, sir.

º  (1635)  

    The Chair: Go ahead, Mr. Kreling.

    Mr. Herb Kreling (Chair, Ottawa Police Services Board, Ontario Association of Police Services Board): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and members, for this opportunity.

    As Mr. Gardner indicated, I chair the Ottawa Police Services Board. I'm also the president of the Canadian Association of Police Boards, a national body that might have an opportunity at some other time to be before you. We at the CAPB have passed a number of resolutions over the past few years asking our senior government partners to ensure that sufficient funding was made available to municipal police services.

    I'd like to start by indicating to you that what the federal government has done for almost two years now has certainly not gone unnoticed. We recognize that the federal government has made available some $10 million for the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear--which we refer to by the acronym, CBRN--and certainly that has been of assistance. We're also aware that additional moneys will be made available through the Emergency Preparedness College and the research and technological initiative, and those funds will help support those types of things that we are here to speak to you about today that we are interested in.

    But I would suggest to the members of the committee that if we try to envision what we require for national security as a triangle, with one of the arms of the triangle being strategic intelligence and the second arm of the triangle being operational and tactical intelligence, those two arms of the triangle are longer than the third arm, which is security and protection--the final line of defence. When strategic intelligence and the ability to detect or do something with that intelligence on the operational side fails us, it falls to the third side of the triangle, the security and protection, to protect the residents after a catastrophe has hit. That is where the first responders are, and for many of us the first responders are at the municipal level.

    We have a number of issues we'd like to leave with you as well. Finances are always an issue, and that's what we're here to talk to you about so you are aware. At the municipal level, about 80% to 85% of most police budgets goes to salaries and benefits. That leaves about 15% to 20% for operational materials and equipment. That is the current reality. That is what municipal police services across the country are dealing with in their own budgets.

    It is also the reality that in the event our first responders are called to action, it is really the municipal police services and emergency and protective personnel who would provide the response within the first 12 to 24 hours within our communities. We estimate it would take at least 12 to 24 hours to mobilize provincial and federal assistance to municipalities.

    The funding formulas is also an area where some consideration would probably be best addressed by way of a national strategy. It would be developed to permit municipalities, in conjunction with our senior partners, to have criteria under which they would be able to apply for money to help enhance their response and their emergency preparedness. This raises the issue of jurisdiction.

    In policing, as in many other matters we deal with in government, jurisdiction becomes an issue between the municipal responsibilities, the provincial responsibilities, and the federal responsibilities. That leads us to the issue of leadership.

    We are here to suggest to you that the federal government has a role in all of this. It has a leadership role in providing guidelines and standards to help ensure the preparedness of our municipalities, in the event they are called upon.

º  (1640)  

    I would summarize, Mr. Chair, by certainly agreeing with all of the comments Mr. Gardner has made to you. As they often do, the issues really come to the matter of adequate funding and how we access that funding.

    I would suggest to you it would assure the municipalities, the police services, and the emergency response personnel within the municipalities if we had some criteria, some means of access to funding, and the rules were implemented and applied across the country so the municipalities had the opportunity to avail themselves of those funds. That would be a great assistance to the municipalities.

    I go back to my comments on the first responders and the short arm of the triangle. The tools and the training are key for our first responders, in order to provide the type of service in our communities that we expect. Our first responders in our police services, ambulance services, fire services, and other emergency response personnel are going to be the first line of defence that our residents will be looking to, in the event some form of catastrophe befalls our communities.

    I would suggest to you, Mr. Chair, it is in the areas of tools and training that the federal government can provide invaluable assistance to the municipalities in Canada.

    Thank you, sir.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Kreling.

    We'll now go to questions. The numbers would seem to permit a fairly good exchange of views here today. We'll start with Mr. Sorenson, who represents the official opposition, for seven minutes.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance): Thank you.

    I want to thank each one of you for coming and appearing before our committee today. I don't apologize on behalf of the committee, but I think maybe the chairman has already mentioned to you that we're a subcommittee of the justice committee, and they are travelling these two weeks, so many who would sit around the table from many different parties are away. I offer our apologies to you because of that.

    Mr. Gardner, thank you for your presentation. Some of the questions that came out of your presentation were answered later on in your submission. We know that after September 11--obviously we've heard it so many times--the world changed, and I guess it changed for everybody. It changed for politicians, it changed for police forces, it changed for CSIS. It just changed the way we do things.

    What type of responder programs did you have in place prior to September 11, and how did they change? You talked throughout your submission here about the first line of defence or your first responders to a terrorist threat. When September 11 hit, did the plans go into action? Did they seem to work? What plans were in place, and what plans, subsequent to September 11, were changed? How did you adapt through the process of realizing that if this had happened here in Toronto, we would have needed something more than what we have in place now? What changed?

º  (1645)  

    Mr. Norman Gardner: We immediately had to put together a team to respond to some of the calls coming in regarding white powder. There was an anthrax scare in the United States, and we wound up getting a little bit of an anthrax scare here too, because of the envelopes sent around to different addresses with substances in them that virtually scared the heck out of some of the people. So we created a HAZMAT unit in emergency services, made up of medical, fire, and police personnel, who wound up going around on calls. We didn't have a lot of people doing this, so these people ultimately really did a lot of overtime and made a tremendous number of calls, going from place to place to identify substances that had struck fear into the individuals who had received some of them. So we did not have a lot of people to do this. The people were outfitted with suits, which I guess we would call pro-vent biological suits.

    That was our immediate reaction. If some of these things had been real biological weapons, I don't know what we would have done. We certainly did not have the capability of dealing with a large number of calls and doing a very quick response. So it was of a very timely nature that we were able to respond.

    The province eventually came in and wound up giving us 850 protective equipment suits, but when we examined them, the suits were not suitable for the kind of work that needed to be done. So the chief authorized the purchase of a number of chemical protective suits with pro-vent biological capability. So our immediate need was to equip some of these people. Also, we're trying to equip 450 community response unit officers with a level of protection that would enable them to get into an area where potential contamination could exist. We only have about 220 officers who have been trained.

    The equipment issue is going to begin in the near future. So we really still don't have very much. In fact, all we really have today are 31 members of the service who have the appropriate type of first responder kits, which could protect them from chemical warfare agents. We give them a C4 gas mask with a filter, and chemical-resistant gloves and boots.

    While we have over 5,000 officers altogether, only 31 of our 3,000 front-line officers have this kind of specialty. They are located within the emergency task force and the forensic identification services. So in effect, the first responders may get there without the kind of equipment needed to make them as safe as you possibly could going into a contaminated area.

º  (1650)  

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: What you're saying here is that prior to September 11 there was really no protective clothing available. After September 11 the province responded, but the quality of the protection provided wasn't sufficient or would not be effective against the level of contaminant. And now you have gone out and purchased 31 sets, but they are simply not enough against a terrorist attack.

    Mr. Norman Gardner: It's not enough.

    As I say, we will have about 220 people trained, and we will buy some equipment for them. I still haven't got a figure for the responder kits. But I know what it would cost to equip everybody, or the 3,000 first-line responders; it would be somewhere in the neighbourhood of about $3.6 million for Toronto alone. So when you put together just the GTA, to include the Peel Regional Police Service, Durham, Halton, and York, which are on our immediate fringes, you can pretty well double that amount.

    The Chair: Time is up. We'll go to Mr. Regan for seven minutes.

    Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I also want to thank the witnesses for coming today.

    This is an interesting line of questioning; I'm sure we'll get back to it.

    I want to ask you about other kinds of activity you've had at the national level that would be like this. In other words, has there been other coordination of training of any kind? There must be some kind. Can you describe some of the kinds of coordination there have been in the past?

    Mr. Norman Gardner: Some of our officers--and not just ours, but some from other local police services--have gone out to Alberta for some HAZMAT training, HAZMAT being hazardous materials training. The location in Alberta is, I think, among the finest training facilities in dealing with chemical and biological types of weapons. The number of people who can be trained there is limited, but it is perhaps the ultimate in terms of training within the country to deal with these kinds of incidents.

    The other thing, as I mentioned in my presentation, was in the intelligence area. There's pretty good cooperation going on, but the number of people involved in intelligence gathering certainly needs to be supplemented from what it is today.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Then at the moment, what kind of training assistance or other assistance related to this would there be from the federal government, the province, or local authorities, training you're aware of?

    Mr. Norman Gardner: What we're looking for primarily is the ability to get some funding for equipment. Certainly we would like to see some extra money come in for intelligence, but we're primarily concerned about placing first responders at risk and not having adequate protection for them to be able to go to some of the areas they go to. As I said, we have some very major plants in our areas, mainly the nuclear plants and the petrochemical plants within the Toronto area and also out in Sarnia.

    We need to be able to respond to disasters with trains carrying chemicals. I forget how many trains go by, but I know that where I used to have my business, I had 26 freight trains a day going through within a mile of where my business was located, and they were carrying a lot of chemicals.

    We are in a major situation here where we might have to deal with things, yet we don't even know the potential of what we're going to have to deal with or the kinds of resources that are going to be needed in order to safeguard the community.

º  (1655)  

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Is there any assistance now provided by federal departments or agencies?

    Mr. Norman Gardner: There is none to the municipalities.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Then what level of support should there be? How do you see that being divided, and how much would it cost at the national level?

    Mr. Norman Gardner: As my colleague Mr. Kreling indicated, we need some national standards developed and we need some training to be done on a composite basis. If facilities in Alberta can be enlarged, if we can get more people put through them, or if we find some other place where some training can take place, probably expanding existing training facilities.... I think we need to look there and see what could be expanded, because it's very important that in developing a standard, people have similar equipment, whether they're in Toronto or whether they're in Vancouver, Halifax, or wherever. I think that is very important.

    We already have some ideas here as to the type of equipment we would like to see, but again, that's the standard Toronto has accepted as its own. If others want to buy in or if we can make that standard better....

    I think we need a meeting of the minds here from people who are much more professional in this than some of us who are chairmen of police services boards. We want to carry forward the fight, the political fight, to ensure we can get access to make first responders as safe as possible. We do not want to see people who trust us to look after their interests walk into a death trap without giving them adequate protection.

    What happened in New York was a great lesson for firefighters and police, especially the firefighters, who had to go in but should not have gone into certain situations where they put themselves into a disaster scenario. Plenty of New York Port Authority police died as well. First responders need to be protected.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Can you give us an idea of what the cost would be nationally? Do you have some idea of that?

    Mr. Norman Gardner: For Ontario it could be close to $10 million. We have one-third of all the police in Canada in Ontario, not counting the RCMP. Nationally, if you were looking at protective gear, you might be able to get away with $20 million. As I say, I'd have to do some research there. I wouldn't want to be quoted as saying that's exactly what you need.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Well, it gives us an idea.

    Aside from the hazardous material kind of training they have in Alberta you talked about, what other kinds of training do you see being needed? Give us some more examples or expand on that.

    Mr. Norman Gardner: I'd rather have the police chiefs do something of that nature because I think they could identify some of that a little better than I can.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: So your focus is primarily on the hazardous materials and the equipment needed, the suits and things like that, and the methods for dealing with that, Mr. Gardner.

    Mr. Norman Gardner: Yes. The information on the protective materials, etc., could come from a combination of police, firefighters, and ambulance people, because they would be the people I consider to be the first responders to any disaster scenario.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Regan.

    We're back to Mr. Sorenson.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: I just want to go back to part of the question I had asked before. Shortly after the September 11 attack, the Ontario provincial government responded with anti-terrorist legislation--or a plan, I guess. They put in Norman Inkster as a kind of coordinator, if my memory serves me correctly. They seemed to have a plan. We were working on Bill C-36 here and we were developing a plan. But there seemed to be somewhat of a question as to, if there were a terrorist attack, which plan would prevail. Which plan would the first responders use: would it be the provincial plan or the federal plan? That's my question.

    You mention here that not only are local police agencies on the front line and the first to respond to a terrorist attack, they must also be proactively involved in the investigation and prevention of potential terrorist attacks. A lot of what you talk about here really seems to be the RCMP's or CSIS's responsibility.

    However, given the threat or given the risk assessment in your community, obviously you're called upon to do a lot of the investigations. Again, when does it happen that the municipal police or the Toronto or Hamilton or whichever police service is involved brings the RCMP or CSIS on board? What is the plan?

»  (1700)  

    Mr. Norman Gardner: Usually the local police have been the recipient of some information that would initiate an investigation, and they would carry it to a certain degree and then cooperate with the RCMP and/or CSIS. Our intelligence people do meet with the RCMP and CSIS. Now, the thing is, when you're getting into volumes, you need everybody working together, and you need the local people to be able to investigate up to a certain level to see just how real the threat is. They may dismiss it, but they would probably be the first ones to follow up.

    As I said earlier, a lot of what the RCMP and CSIS do is as a result of information they get from local police. Local police for the most part don't have the money or the time to be able to participate to any great extent in intelligence gathering on terrorist activities. Obviously, terrorist activities are criminal activities, but most of the police resources wind up tackling the regular type of organized crime, be it biker gangs, be it ethnic-related gangs in terms of drugs, prostitution, murder, vice, arms smuggling, etc. Our ability to take on more tasks is limited.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Did you want to say something?

    Mr. Bob Boychyn (Chair, Durham Regional Police Services Board, Ontario Association of Police Services Board): If I may be permitted, I think the bottom line is there is no plan. It's very ad hoc and it's dictated as the situation develops.

    I agree with what Norm and Herb have said. A lot of these things we're concerned about within Toronto and the immediate vicinity in southern Ontario, the facilities that are vulnerable, are of national significance. They're obviously important to the province and our communities, but they're of national significance.

    To my knowledge, there has been no national assessment of the vulnerabilities to which these facilities could be subjected, and if we could get an assessment of the vulnerabilities we would be facing, we would be in a better position to start determining what the costs may be to start setting up protection against those so-called attacks, if I can use that expression.

    The problem is what funds have been made available--and I don't mean to be disrespectful to the federal or the provincial governments--are usually filtered through the RCMP and the OPP, and by the time they get down to the front line in municipal policing, quite frankly, there's not very much left over to do anything of any effectiveness.

    I think what we would like to see--and I think my colleagues concur on this--is once this national study is done of the vulnerabilities and cost assessment, that money would come directly from the governments straight through to the local municipalities so that a lot of it wouldn't get syphoned off in bureaucratic administration, for either the RCMP or the OPP, and the money would be put down at the ground level to be used effectively.

    We're talking not only about acquisition of materials, but training is very important, how to use this equipment, because if you don't have training and know how to use it properly, you might as well not even have it

»  (1705)  

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: The problem is the commissioner of the RCMP has come before the justice committee and basically said they have all the money they really need. Yes, they'd love to have more, but they have the resources they need. The government has responded in kind following September 11, and everything is rosy.

    Certainly last week, when the Canadian Police Association came to Ottawa, that was not the message we heard. We heard that resourcing, funding, and dollars were a huge problem.

    On one hand, I think we have to realize there are only so many dollars in the security or the justice envelope and we have to prioritize where those dollars are going.

    So if we have a government that says priority number one has to be a gun registry that's going to cost us $1 billion, that's not going to come out of some other envelope. It's going to come out of law enforcement, out of policing, out of the envelope that deals with security.

    What I'm hearing now is that there are not enough resources, there are not enough dollars made available for very real national risks.

    Mr. Bob Boychyn: I think that's where the conundrum is. The money is given by the government to the RCMP, or in Ontario it's given to the OPP, and that's where it disappears. Yes, those organizations may have adequate funding for what they perceive to be their role.

    But in Oshawa, in Durham region, we have a small detachment of RCMP--I think a half dozen officers. They are not out on the road patrolling. They're not at the nuclear generating stations at Darlington and Pickering, where we've had to develop a significant presence in order to provide security to those facilities. That's coming out, to some degree, of the local taxpayer dollars and to some degree out of Ontario Power Generation.

    Those are the kinds of things.... And if something disastrous does happen, we do our exercises in Durham around nuclear accidents, because that seems to be the most prevalent thing that might go seriously wrong. That's fine. We do those exercises and have lots of practice, and we seem to have a plan in place that will work. It works on paper. If a plant does go up, I'm not sure whether it will work in practice. That's one aspect of it.

    The other aspect is because our agencies are so interconnected, if Toronto has a problem with something, they call on our riot squad to help them, for example, with demonstrations in downtown. We're interconnected. So if our people are committed to doing a nuclear accident at Pickering and there's another terrorist strike in Toronto, they may be overwhelmed, and they don't have anybody to call for help.

    Therefore, we need to have a more coordinated effort, not only among ourselves within the GTA, southern Ontario, and perhaps other municipalities in Ontario, but between the federal agencies, because these infrastructure items that will be subject to attack are of national importance. They just happen to be located in Durham region or Hamilton. They are of national importance. That's why we are looking to the federal government to provide direct funding from the government straight down to the municipality.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Do you see this as an ongoing thing, or are you saying that right now, to get ready for an imminent terrorist attack we need to have certain things in line? Are you calling here for long-term funding from the federal government?

    We know that RCMP and CSIS jurisdiction is federal and there's funding for it. We know the OPP is basically a provincial police force. Funding is in place--

    Mr. Bob Boychyn: If I may be permitted, I think there will be a large initial outlay. There may have to be some ongoing funding for continued training and cooperation between the various levels. I think another important thing, which I've neglected to mention, is the federal government should mandate some standards across the province or across the country. For instance, the big item that came out of the event in New York was the lack of interoperability between fire and police.

»  (1710)  

    Mr. Norman Gardner: Communications.

    Mr. Bob Boychyn: Yes, communication systems. So if the federal government would mandate a standard communication system across the country so fire and police could talk to each other in emergencies.... Right in my own municipality--and I sit as an Oshawa city councillor as well as the chair of the police service board--I can't get our local fire service to cooperate and get a compatible radio system to work with our Durham Regional Police radio system. We have an up-to-date digital system, state of the art, for policing, and the fire service doesn't want to do that.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Is it a cost thing?

    Mr. Bob Boychyn: No. It's a little political thing between police and fire. But the point is, if there were a mandated radio standard across the country, a lot of problems could be solved, even between fire and police. I think there has to be some in-depth look at the overall problem.

    The Chair: Was there another response from one of the other witnesses on that same subject?

    Go ahead, Mr. Morelli.

    Mr. Bernie Morelli (Chair, Hamilton Police Services Board, Ontario Association of Police Services Board): Just to make a few comments, Mr. Chair, I am sure you're going to try to bring some focus to this.

    Let me just say that when we were asked what changed before versus afterwards, I think what changed really was the nature and potential nature of the disaster, as well the magnitude. I think you heard earlier that we have had standard EMS procedures, so obviously they are in place and are being financed. You also heard that we are strapped, that 80% of our responsibilities really flow to salaries and wages.

    So the provision of policing is really under restraint fiscally, and we are obviously looking at ways to improve that situation. In the old days, we threw more people into it, but we're now realizing that hasn't been the answer. We're looking at ways of bringing our costs back, so we're getting into things like video remand and a whole series of issues to try to reduce our costs so that we can achieve more. So the bottom line is that we're being asked to do more, but we're faced with fewer resources.

    Quite frankly, in terms of even emergency response, we're down to what we call priority lists. That device is squeezing down, and we're being asked to do more by more people. And with the threat of the potential larger disaster, we obviously know that we would be called....

    I guess your choices, or our choice, Mr. Chairman, is to either be proactive or reactive. In addition to that, though, is the fact that although there's no official plan other than the normal EMS, the bottom line will become whether or not we are going to be endangering the personnel as we deal with this squeezed or limited resource in responding to a potential danger.

    There's no definition of the responsibility. If we do anything through this hearing, it would be to maybe just give some definition to the fact that there is a need, give it some priority, and then define where the responsibility lies and how in fact we might respond if a disaster occurred in Hamilton or Toronto of a nature similar to that at the World Trade Center, but maybe on a more grandiose basis.

    What would happen? Clearly, the police would respond, but the bottom line is that it would do so with its limited resources with the normal EMS. It would probably have to be looked at in retrospect or after it went down, when there may be some seeking of help.

    But there's no official plan when you talk of the RCMP. I know that our police have traditionally worked together in some respects, but obviously there have been some real voids, which occur in this area as well.

    I would just say to you that when I look at your mandate, and I look at the need for some leadership, and we look at tools for training, procedures, and coordination, maybe this committee can help us in recognizing our position. So I would say to you at the current time that the communities we represent are at risk because of the lack of a defined plan, and obviously because of the lack of financial resources to accomplish it. So we're here today to express that, and to hope that you might assess it in terms of your total picture as well.

»  (1715)  

    The Chair: There was another intervention, from Mr. Magnacca.

    Mr. Allan Magnacca (Vice-Chair, Niagara Regional Police Services Board, Ontario Association of Police Services Board): I have just three very brief points. First, the way we now have to respond to these new events that are coming upon us means that we, as police services, have to take resources away from the things that over the last four, five, or six years have become dominant in our communities: drugs, criminal activity, biker gangs, all those sorts of areas where we've had a focus with special units--sexual abuse, child care. So policing has dealt with those, and as has been mentioned here today, when things have happened over the past year we've had to take service people away from those areas and virtually drop some of those community activities that are mandated under our Police Services Act. But if we don't have the resources, when we get called we get called.

    Our chief tells us that a lot of these things are not our responsibility. We aren't responsible for patrolling the Great Lakes. In Niagara region we have over a thousand miles of shoreline that we have to protect. That's not our responsibility, but we are the first defenders; we are the first to be called. That used to be looked after by the RCMP; that gradually was withdrawn because of funding activities. If something happens, we have to show up.

    The other thing, as the committee member asked, is what were the plans back when September 11 hit? Our police services were trained for natural disasters. We didn't train in Niagara for earthquake because that would be very rare, but our services did train for railway accidents, a lot of traffic issues, and those sorts of things. If there was a chemical spill the firefighters went and they had most of the equipment.

    Now, in training for these terrorism types of activities or the potential, we don't have the funds to equip police officers who are now the first on the scene. So those are areas that have changed dramatically, not in what we want to do, and we need the resources to do what we know needs to be done.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: The point not stated--and I'll go to Mr. Regan--is you are forced to pay for all of this from a municipal tax base that just doesn't leave you a lot of flexibility. I want it to be on the record that municipalities don't tax on another basis; they tax on the realty base, which is kind of a given. So I just want the record to show that. I know you all know that very well.

    Mr. Bernie Morelli: I might just add that as municipal councillors we were told by the arbitrator in a recent arbitration, when we cited municipal fiscal limitations, that policing was to be motivated by the provision of public safety and not by fiscal limitations. In other words, it had nothing to do with the provision of policing. So that even made the vise a little tighter.

    The Chair: Okay.

    Mr. Regan.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Do you have any thoughts on whether this kind of funding should be provided through cost-sharing, through matched federal-provincial funds, or through direct grants? I have a two-pronged question here and that's part of it. The second part's related to that.

    Second, we're sometimes concerned about duplication and overlap when you have more than one level of government involved in policing, for example. We want to avoid that, and taxpayers certainly want to avoid that.

    So have you thought about any mechanism you'd want to have in place to coordinate the training and the equipping of first responders so you could minimize that duplication and overlap?

»  (1720)  

    Mr. Norman Gardner: My first thought would be direct funding. However, perhaps now that you've mentioned giving thought to other, alternative funding, the first thing that comes into my mind, although it's not a dependable source of funding, is a seizure of assets, a forfeiture of assets obtained by crime. That could be one of the areas that could supplement resources or be utilized by the federal agencies as a payback. But you would have to establish some definite funding for the equipment, which for the most part would have its major initial impact offset by reduced amounts in the future.

    The other thing would be the perpetual level of training that needs to take place so we have people available who have up-to-the-minute training to be able to deal with the potential disasters we would have to face. In other words, we do a lot of mandatory training right now and some non-mandatory, but the mandatory must be done on an annual basis to keep up one's skills. I think it's important that the training at least be there. The hit would be for capital right off the bat, some capital but not as much in the future, and as I say, we could be utilizing the forfeiture of assets to supplement any direct funding.

    Mr. Herb Kreling: I think the question is valid, in that we do not have a mechanism presently because we at the municipal police service level don't have that type of relationship we would like to see on this issue regarding the funding with the federal government or with even the province. It may very well be that the type of process would first need to be established by a joint forum, with the coming together of the appropriate municipal, provincial, and federal groups, individuals to cobble together the type of formula and the type of criteria the municipalities could then rely upon in order to come back and apply for equipment and training.

    We're not here to talk to you about a one-time relationship. It is a relationship we would expect or want to continue on into the future. Some of these pieces of equipment have a shelf life, and we might not use them. For example, the City of Ottawa didn't have, to my knowledge--maybe we had a handful--gas masks prior to 9/11. Then all of a sudden it became a requirement that we really should have gas masks. Just for our sworn personnel in the police service, that's a $350,000 cost one time to go out and buy them, but you have to go out and buy them every five years. They only have a shelf life of five years, and then you have to upgrade them again.

    We hope we do not have to use them in the five years they're good for, but after five years I'm sure the chief of police is going to come back to us again and say, well, we're going to have to do this again, ladies and gentleman. because we have to be prepared.

    It's the society we grew up in and it's the set of circumstances we grew up in that have so drastically changed.

    I had an opportunity last year, through the Conference of Mayors in the United States, to meet with some international representatives from European countries. A couple of the mayors from Germany who were in attendance at one forum raised their eyebrows at me when we talked about gas masks. They couldn't believe that we didn't have gas masks for our police officers. They have always, since the Second World War, had gas masks for police officers in European countries.

    We are coming to realize what change we need to be prepared for and the equipment and the training that go along with it. Quite frankly, we are really looking at establishing some type of multi-level governmental task force, committee, or something to establish the formulas and the criteria for the applications for the funding. It is not the type of relationship we have at the present time, but it is one we want to get into.

»  (1725)  

    Mr. Geoff Regan: One problem governments always have, as I'm sure you know, is to try to decide, among the various priorities that are brought forward to them, on the services members of the public want in very different ways.

    In terms of this issue, when we consider the range of kinds of incidents we can imagine, from a minor terrorist attack--relatively minor, let's call it--to the unimaginable, a nuclear explosion in Toronto, for example.... I guess the question is, can you help us in any way with any advice you have about how you determine what the right amount is? Maybe it's never enough for some things, but is there any advice you have about how we figure out what the right amount is in relation to other things?

    Mr. Herb Kreling: I think the right amount of money is something everybody has yet to wrap their head around. I was interested in Mr. Sorenson's comments about the RCMP and CSIS believing there was sufficient funding. We're here to tell you that we're not seeing that translated out into the municipal sector. We're here to tell you that regardless of whether there is a national disaster plan or a provincial disaster plan, if there is a catastrophe in a community, it is that municipality's disaster plan that is implemented immediately. We may require the assistance of the province or federal intervention because of it, but the first line of response is going to come from the ambulance, fire, and police services within our municipalities.

    At the present time, the funding the federal government has allocated to this type of event, to the threat of a terrorist or that type of threat to the country, is not appearing at the front line of defence.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: I guess you might say that we shouldn't worry about what amount it is until we get near it.

    Mr. Bob Boychyn: If I may reiterate, I think we have to establish that list of vulnerabilities for things we may be subjected to, and at that point we will be able to work out or begin to work out what level of protection the public is entitled to and then what the cost is to provide that level of protection. That's where I think you have to start establishing the priorities and determining the cost levels. Until you have the vulnerabilities established, I think.... I'm sorry...?

    Mr. Geoff Regan: How is that done? How do you guys assess vulnerabilities of the kinds you already assess?

    Mr. Bob Boychyn: As I say, from my perspective, the items we've been talking about, that were referred to here today, are of national importance and are not just important to our respective communities. It's going to take some degree of cooperation between the federal, provincial, and municipal governments, where they sit down, look at these things, and establish whether it's protecting bridges or whatever. You have to look at it.

    I understand fully that to try to achieve an absolute protection the cost may just so absolutely horrendous that it's impossible, obviously, but you have to look at providing a reasonable level of protection. I don't think we can imagine every horrible thing that could ever happen in this world, but I think we have to sort of go....

    We grew up in a lifestyle where we didn't have to worry about anything. Our biggest problem was crossing the street. Well, that's maybe one of the big changes that's happened since September 11. I drive down the road and I look at that gas transmission line--what's that? You look at the hydro lines. Those things never crossed our minds before; they were just there and we didn't even see them. We see them now and we see the potential there now.

    Mr. Norman Gardner: As board chairmen, we could probably deal with emergency services within our respective jurisdictions and come back to you with what we feel would be needed in each of our jurisdictions. We would need a few months to do that, analyse what is vulnerable and what the cost would be to protect it, be it sensors, videos, response teams, whatever. So we could deal with the physical aspects and the labour aspects as well.

    I just want to reiterate too, it's not CSIS or the RCMP that would be the first responders in any of our communities. The RCMP may be of help somewhere along the line, but that would mean a lot of RCMP officers who are engaged in other tasks would have to be put into uniform and have the same kind of equipment and training our first responders have to go into contaminated areas.

    I'll give you an example. When the Pope visited Toronto last year, the RCMP, all those people who were working in non-uniformed jobs, wound up having to put on uniforms and supplementing the other police departments that were offering protection for the Pope. Now, some of the skills they exhibited were perhaps not as high as some of the other officers', and I'm not saying that in a detrimental way, because they were not involved in doing a lot of the uniformed duties. They'd been working in areas of vice, customs fraud--plainclothes work--not necessarily crowd control and things of that nature. So there were some weaknesses that were pointed out.

    I'm just saying that because if you're going to thrust them into an emergency situation, a disaster situation, they are going to need to be equipped in such a way that they can be protected as well. But they definitely will not be the first responders.

»  (1730)  

    The Chair: Mr. Sorenson.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: I just want to go back. One of you quoted what I said about the commissioner of the RCMP, and it's true. The commissioner is a great guy; I have a lot of respect for him. But remember, he is also a deputy minister in this government. So when he says yes, everything is rosy, it may be a political statement he gives, rather than realistic. When you talk to some of the RCMP out on the beat, they would certainly debate or argue with what the commissioner said.

    I have two questions. First of all, what impact has federal legislation had on the way you go about your business? For example, the anti-terrorist legislation has given extra responsibilities to some police, and maybe some of that has been passed down to provincial and local responsibilities. Also, as pointed out here, we have Bill C-24, a piece of organized crime legislation that complicates the warrant system and could be an additional burden to the police. Is there anything specific? So far you've talked a lot about the risk since September 11. I'm wondering, in regard to the legislation we've brought down in this place, if you can pinpoint where it has caused added burden on finances.

    Mr. Bob Boychyn: With all due respect, I don't know about the specific legislation that has been recently passed in the House.

    I can speak to the fact that CNSC, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, has specifically mandated Ontario Power Generation to provide certain levels of protection at Darlington and Pickering. That has had an impact on how we do our policing within the region of Durham, vis-à-vis Ontario Power Generation. So from my perspective, that's one specific example of how legislation or regulation has had a specific impact since September 11.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: That would be a provincial directive to you--am I correct there?

    Mr. Bob Boychyn: No, CNSC is federal.

    The Chair: The federal nuclear side has directed the nuclear generators to upgrade their own security, I think.

    Mr. Bob Boychyn: But that's a very specific, very definite, and very costly undertaking that has transpired in Durham region since September 11.

    Mr. Herb Kreling: With respect to the two pieces of legislation that Mr. Sorenson raised, I would suggest to you, sir, it is in the area of training we come back to.

    I'm not passing judgment on the benefit or the validity of the legislation; it is simply that when our police services need to be upgraded because of legislative change it is normally an ongoing issue for us and it becomes a matter of training. So the requirements placed on our police officers as a result of Bill C-36 and Bill C-24 have an initial and ongoing training expense to them.

»  (1735)  

    Mr. Norman Gardner: I'd just like to add that a senior RCMP officer indicated to me that on one occasion, in order to obtain a warrant for a wiretap, his officers had to prepare 6,000 pages of information for the judge. That took an awful long time in officer preparation to get before a judge. Even the judge wasn't too happy about it.

    There have been more demands put on police that involve much more time in terms of putting together information for such things as obtaining warrants.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: You also mentioned in your report here--I'm quoting from it--that “...the issue of lawful access requires immediate intervention by the federal government to stop the erosion of law enforcement's capability to lawfully intercept communications and conduct electronic surveillance where authorized”. I guess what I'm reading into your comments is you're saying that even since September 11, perhaps the burden has been added to surveillance--the paperwork that needs to be done, more resourcing.

    I think the Solicitor General must be finding it that way as well, because we found out in the House of Commons today that according to section 195 of the Criminal Code, his responsibility is to report to Parliament in regard to the amount of electronic surveillance going on within the country at the present time, and he's failed to do that for the last two or three years.

    You're saying the paperwork is an added burden as well, and then ends up being costly.

    Mr. Norman Gardner: We recognize we have to have good protection as far as individual rights are concerned in the country, but I think in certain cases the police usually have enough information to substantiate wanting to do electronic surveillance, etc. The amount of work they have to do now in order to obtain that has increased considerably over the years. It's not something that has happened all of a sudden, but it has happened over a number of years. We need to be able to give a certain amount of protection, but at the same time, we need to take a look at what is and is not feasible in terms of getting the surveillance underway in a timely fashion.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Could I try to summarize?

    I want to recognize that there is a great deal of siloed government activity happening federally, provincially, and even municipally. The events of 9/11 have caused us to rethink the silo structure. We sometimes look to health authorities, sometimes to fire departments, sometimes to police, and sometimes to the military to respond to security issues. I think we're grappling with that federally.

    Correct me if I'm wrong, but I was hoping to summarize on the record the four areas you mentioned. You mentioned planning for potential disruptive terrorist events; equipment for first responders; training of first responders; and intelligence gathering, which is always done in part by local police, who certainly know the streets of the municipalities they police, but which the federal government has taken on in terms of a security threat through its national security mandate.

    Have I summarized the four areas of need that you have brought to us today—planning, equipment, training, and intelligence gathering? I can see that there is a communications challenge out there too.

    It would be useful if you commented on any of this.

»  (1740)  

    Mr. Bob Boychyn: If I may be permitted, I was going to add radio compatibility—unless it is included within equipment. But I think it is such a significant sector that it should almost be its own topic.

    The Chair: Okay.

    Mr. Morelli.

    Mr. Bernie Morelli: I have two items that I think are very important. One, it is very obvious to me that procedures need to be clarified first of all, as well as coordination. Clearly, in terms of communication links, there needs to be coordination of who does what, where, when, and how. That's really the focus that we don't want to lose. Quite frankly, that's what I'm concerned about: if something broke tomorrow, who does what, where, when, and how?

    The Chair: I have another comment or suggestion for our five experienced witnesses. The federal government maintains and is building a program called the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, whose acronym is OCIPEP. If you're not aware of it, I'm disappointed, as this would mean that there hasn't been adequate communication.

    The office of critical infrastructure is intended to plan to deal with threats to critical infrastructure across the country, including power plants, water plants, major transportation systems, airports, bus stations, large city transportation grids, and things like that. It probably wouldn't include the local public library, but would include the Internet and telephone systems. The federal government has invested money for that, and has in fact delivered up some money from the federal budget to some municipalities under the OCIPEP program. They also do training.

    Are you familiar with that program? Have your municipalities had any interface with OCIPEP, either directly or through the province?

    Mr. Kreling.

    Mr. Herb Kreling: We are familiar with the program. I was unfamiliar with the specifics of the funding and am not exactly sure of that part of it. We are familiar that OCIPEP is working with the Emergency Preparedness College for the training modules. I believe that there is contact with our senior officers in the police service with regard to the program. I was unaware of the specifics surrounding the funding of it; if it was in the federal budget, and I missed it, then that's my fault.

    The Chair: It's nobody's fault.

    When I mentioned communications earlier, I wasn't referring to radio communications, but really to government-to-government communications. But we obviously have a job to do here.

    I note that the Canadian Association of Police Boards met with the Minister of Justice to talk about this general area about two or three weeks ago. Mr. Kreling, you're its president. Did this come up in those meetings? Were those meetings successful?

    Mr. Herb Kreling: No, this particular program did not come up.

    You are quite correct, Chair, in your summary of those discussions. The discussion with the CAPB and the minister was more of a general nature with respect to funding. Over the last four or five years, we have probably sent a series of five or six resolutions to both the Solicitor General and the Minister of Justice with respect to funding. In our more recent one, we are probably looking more to the issue of the hosting of international meetings, and the municipalities confronted with the one-time costs associated with those, as well as the intelligence-gathering side of our policing and the funding supporting it.

»  (1745)  

    The Chair: The province has quite a recognizable responsibility in this. You are all from the province of Ontario. I'm a federal member from Ontario, and I see the province doing some or most of the things things it's supposed to be doing, but collectively we may not have put the thing as far down the road as we would like. But there is a joint federal-provincial program, the JEPP program. I know that funds have reached Toronto under the JEPP program. In a meeting with Chief Fantino, I and the member for Toronto--Danforth had a chance to review that about three weeks ago. That doesn't mean that Hamilton, Niagara, Cambridge, and the other Toronto municipalities have seen any of the JEPP funding.

    Are any of you aware of that particular federal-provincial program intended to address the funding needs of emergency preparation?

    Mr. Norman Gardner: I've heard the name before, but the chief hasn't discussed it with me—although he did tell me that he met with you and Dennis Mills.

    Mr. Herb Kreling: With our police services in Ottawa, we've certainly availed ourselves of JEPP.

    With regard to the announcement of the first $10 million that was made some time ago by the federal government, I thought they were using the JEPP formula for flowing the moneys through to the municipalities. This goes further to the question of Mr. Regan about about how we do things.

    The type of relationship we're talking about is putting together a program and the criteria to access it. My understanding is that when some of these moneys were flowing from that first $10 million federal announcement, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness was using the JEPP formula to flow the money through to municipalities. This might be a Reader's Digest version of that, but it is what I thought to be the case.

    The Chair: That may be true, which of course means that it would be a shared federal-provincial or even a shared provincial-municipal program. This means that the municipalities still have to come up with some of the money, or a proportion of it, such as a quarter to a third.

    Mr. Herb Kreling: And we have, sir.

    Again, I think we're not trying to move away from what is required of us, but the reality today in municipal policing is different from what it was two years ago, while the funding sources remain the same. As I indicated, between 80% and 85% of the budget structure is for salaries and benefits, leaving 15% to 20% of our police service budgets in our municipalities available for everything else, including all this new equipment we're to be looking at, and the additional training pieces. And that 15% to 20% is not going to these new demands, but is all-inclusive of what we have to provide to the community in addition.

    Mr. Norman Gardner: In Toronto it is 92%.

    The Chair: So 92% of your budget is salaries and benefits?

    Mr. Norman Gardner: Yes.

    The Chair: If there isn't anything further that our guests wish to add, then I'll leave my last remarks as an attempt at summarizing.

    I think the meeting's been very useful, in that it has pointed out that some of our large cities are, to their knowledge, not accessing federal and provincial programming, federal money and provincial money. In some cases there is money out there, but I'm not saying it's a smorgasbord where you simply call up and get the money. But there is room for more communication. To the extent that we have national critical infrastructure that your municipalities are involved in having to protect and having to plan for problems—should they materialize—the federal government is probably going to have to show a bit more or be a bit more aggressive in communicating through the provinces.

    I'm sure you will all appreciate that the federal government sometimes has difficulty communicating directly to municipalities, because of understandings and constitutional obstacles to direct involvement. But in most cases the provinces appear to be quite cooperative in this particular envelope.

    I'm making these comments because I'm quite sure that individuals on the federal side will be reading and reviewing the meeting's transcript. In other words, I am not just saying this to hear myself speak.

    If there aren't any further comments, I'll thank each of you for attending and for making us aware of this governance challenge. Hopefully, we can improve how we deliver in the near future. Thank you.

    The meeting is adjourned.