SNAS Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Monday, May 26, 2003

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1535

The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.))

C/Supt Dan Killam (Director General of Operations, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, Royal Canadian Mounted Police)

The Chair

C/Supt Dan Killam

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1540

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1545

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

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1550

C/Supt Dan Killam

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1555

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

C/Supt Dan Killam

The Chair

Mr. Robert Lanctôt (Châteauguay, BQ)

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C/Supt Dan Killam

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

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Mr. Robert Lanctôt

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C/Supt Dan Killam

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

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1605

C/Supt Dan Killam

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

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1610

C/Supt Dan Killam

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

The Chair

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1615

C/Supt Dan Killam

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.)

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

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Mrs. Marlene Jennings

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Mrs. Marlene Jennings

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Mrs. Marlene Jennings

C/Supt Dan Killam

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Mrs. Marlene Jennings

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Mrs. Marlene Jennings

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Mrs. Marlene Jennings

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Mrs. Marlene Jennings

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C/Supt Dan Killam

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

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Mrs. Marlene Jennings

C/Supt Dan Killam

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

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C/Supt Dan Killam

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Mr. Vic Toews (Provencher, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.)

The Chair

Mr. Vic Toews

The Chair

Mr. Vic Toews

C/Supt Dan Killam

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Mr. Vic Toews

C/Supt Dan Killam

Mr. Vic Toews

C/Supt Dan Killam

Mr. Vic Toews

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Mrs. Marlene Jennings

C/Supt Dan Killam

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

C/Supt Dan Killam

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

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Mr. John McKay

The Chair

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

C/Supt Dan Killam

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

C/Supt Dan Killam

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

C/Supt Dan Killam

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

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Mr. John McKay

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Mr. John McKay

C/Supt Dan Killam

Mr. John McKay

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Mr. John McKay

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C/Supt Dan Killam

Mr. John McKay

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Mr. John McKay

C/Supt Dan Killam

Mr. John McKay

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CANADA

Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

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NUMBER 007

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Monday, May 26, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹  (1535)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.)): I call the meeting to order. I see a quorum.

    We are looking at the estimates of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Criminal Intelligence Directorate, which includes the national security investigations section.

    The RCMP is represented today by Chief Superintendent Dan Killam, who is the director general of operations of the CID. Do you have an opening statement today?

    C/Supt Dan Killam (Director General of Operations, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, Royal Canadian Mounted Police):

    Yes, I do, sir.

    The Chair: Okay, that's great. Please continue with your statement, and we'll go to questions when you're done.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: Good afternoon. I'm pleased to have the opportunity to address this committee and discuss with you the integrated efforts of Canadian and international law enforcement, intelligence, and other partners, to address the threat of terrorism in Canada and around the world.

    I doubt there is anyone on this committee who would disagree that the need for us to work together has never been so clear, nor so great. The threat of terrorism is very real, and our increased focus in this area almost daily provides information that reinforces the need to be vigilant.

    The Criminal Intelligence Directorate of the RCMP is at the centre of this initiative, and although we have not achieved everything we want to, we have made incredible progress over the last 18 months. I am personally amazed at the solid, strong partnerships we have formed, the obstacles we have overcome, and the initiatives we have championed. The RCMP has adopted integrated policing as its defining philosophy. Terrorism and national security are central to our key strategic priorities.

    Our major tool is Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act, which has given us a broader mandate to investigate terrorism. When I use the term “broader” I don't mean “changed”. Our mandate was and is that of criminal investigations, collecting criminal intelligence, and ensuring safe communities.

    When the Anti-Terrorism Act was put in place more than a year ago, it enhanced our investigative and enforcement activities in Canada. Through the introduction of new measures and the amendment of existing legislation, we are now better able to work individually and collectively to detect and deter terrorist activity, and to disrupt and prevent terrorist groups from taking action.

    One of the major elements of the act is that it defines “terrorist activity” for the first time in legislation, and criminalizes terrorist financing and related terrorist support activities. A wider spectrum of terrorist activity is determined to be criminal. Although there was initially some concern that this broader mandate might blur the lines between security intelligence and criminal intelligence, in our view the effect has been the opposite. When terrorist-related offences were added to the Criminal Code, the gap between security intelligence and criminal intelligence narrowed. As a result, the gap between the mandate of the RCMP and that of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service narrowed as well.

    For us now, the line between the two is clearer than it has ever been, and because we are working more closely together, both CSIS and the RCMP know more about what each agency is doing. When we are near the line we can address it, and the result of this more effective cooperation is that we are making better use of the resources of both agencies. Our two organizations really do work shoulder to shoulder in keeping Canada and its citizens safe.

    CSIS is a major partner, but not our only one. We have taken some major steps in the direction of integrated policing. The integrated national security enforcement teams, which we call INSETS, and our integrated border enforcement teams, IBETS--which I'll talk more about in a minute--have been formed across the country, and more are under discussion.

    In the Toronto area, for example, a special operations centre has recently opened, and was operational during the recent war in Iraq. This operations centre is contained within the building that houses the combined forces special enforcement unit and the INSET, and brings together the officials and databases of 10 partner agencies under one roof. This means that for day-to-day investigations and for emergencies, we have integrated professional resources with the tools they need to do the job.

    Not everyone has the facilities the Toronto area INSET has, but for all of them we have established central offices with equipment and support staff to make sure they can do the job. These units and the agencies that participate in them, including CSIS and the RCMP, municipal and provincial police services, and the other government agencies such as Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, and Citizenship and Immigration Canada, are daily addressing the challenges of integrated policing and working together to find solutions.

    To make sure these teams and other less formal partnerships across the country are able to make the best use of the information they gather, we are focusing on developing interoperable, real-time secure information management and information technology systems that are based on common standards consistent with our legal framework. We will all use these to share information within the RCMP and with our outside partners.

    This is a substantial task that raises issues from many unexpected quarters, including human rights, privacy, jurisdictional concerns, and data compatibility. We are cognizant of the concerns about the powers that were given to the police in Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act, and to address them the RCMP has implemented checks and balances and oversight functions that go beyond what the bill itself provides for.

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    We have implemented a rigorous training program for any officer who may have cause or opportunity to use these expanded powers. We want to be sure that any action we take in the name of fighting terrorism, or any other form of criminal activity for that matter, is consistent with the privacy and basic human rights of our citizens. It is our responsibility to find the right balance; to find ways to carry out our responsibility to enforce the law and achieve the results Parliament intended for the safety and security of Canadians, versus the responsibility of the state to protect citizens from unnecessary or even dangerous infringements on their fundamental rights and freedoms.

    It is essential that we maximize our intra-governmental and intergovernmental collaboration, but this can only occur when we have developed standards, controls, and processes that allow us to securely manage and exchange classified information with each other, in accordance with the law.

    We must also consider our capacity to jointly assess and measure threats and set priorities, as important parts of our infrastructure. Part of our foundation must be a collective ability to develop long-term integrated strategies based on quantifiable threat assessment and threat measurement.

    In particular, the RCMP has expanded and enhanced its threat assessment capability in the last year to address the specifics of aircraft protection and the physical protection of Canadians. To provide further reinforcement of our capability, two new units were established in CID: the Civil AviationProtective Intelligence Unit, and the Canadian Executive Protective Intelligence Unit. As part of the enhancement, these units, working under our threat assessment section of CID, are responsible for assessing the threat not only to the flying public, but to some high-profile clients including the Prime Minister, other members of the executive, internationally protected persons, and others designated by the Solicitor General as requiring protection.

    Also within CID, and using funding from budget 2001 dedicated to public safety and anti-terrorism, a financial intelligence section has been in place for more than a year. It examines the very crucial and recently criminalized area of terrorist fundraising. The listing of terrorist groups and the deregistration of charities that are used as fronts for terrorist entities that abuse their charitable status are fundamental to our terrorist fight.

    Also in partnership with the RCMP's Technical Protective Operations Facility, CID is developing a critical infrastructure intelligence section to focus on both physical and cyber-threats to Canada's critical infrastructure. This unit works closely with DND, OCIPEP, and CSIS to ensure the best assessment of this emerging and very serious threat.

    Intelligence is fundamental to our goal of being more intelligence-led in the security, intelligence, and law enforcement communities. By this I mean we have to make sure that all our decisions are based on the intelligence that is collectively held by our organizations. This requires a concerted and sustained effort to ensure that together with our partners at home and abroad, we have the best possible information about common threats. More importantly, we have to be able to analyze that information to develop accurate intelligence and then share it with our domestic and international partners. Having the necessary intelligence is one matter; using it to make a difference is another.

    To increase the intelligence capacity of the RCMP, we must enhance our focus on national threat assessments that will hone in on both preventative and investigative intelligence. Under a new secondment program, a management-level CSIS employee heads up the RCMP's threat assessment unit, right within the Criminal Intelligence Directorate, while at the same time a management-level RCMP member from the CID section is seconded to the service's counterterrorism branch.

    One of the goals of the secondment program is, in part, for the respective employees to gain a better appreciation of mutual concerns of the agencies. In addition, we have an RCMP member from CID who is seconded to the integrated national security assessment centre, which is housed at CSIS. This particular centre brings together subject matter experts from across the federal government for the comprehensive threat assessment process.

    To further enhance our information-sharing capabilities, the CID joint management team meets regularly with our CSIS counterparts to discuss operational issues at a senior level. To further enhance our commitment to being intelligence-led, we are putting more focus on the strategic analysis function within CID and our partner agencies, and looking at developing regular intelligence snapshots that can be shared from the senior management level all the way down to the division level.

    Of course, we're also committed to improving how and when we share intelligence with security, law enforcement, and intelligence entities in different jurisdictions and the private sector. I mentioned our close relationship with CSIS earlier, and the measures both agencies have taken to enhance our relationship. CSIS has been and will always be a critical partner in keeping Canada and our community safe.

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    To ensure our capacity to carry out effective investigations, the RCMP, and specifically the national security program, will focus on national enforcement priorities. We determine these enforcement priorities using a sophisticated threat measurement system that was developed in CID and is now being used by law enforcement agencies around the world.

    The system uses the intelligence collected and the subject matter knowledge of our investigators, analysts, and partners to determine where we can most effectively allocate our resources. We have not yet reached the position where we and our partners can say our anti-terrorism approach is integrated on a sustained basis throughout all levels of our organizations. I am not saying we haven't achieved some remarkable successes together in the war against terrorism, but we still have plenty of work to do.

    As I mentioned earlier, an excellent example is our integrated national security enforcement teams, or INSETs, that involve cross-jurisdictional domestic collaboration, and on a case-by-case basis, also leverage the resources of our friends to the south. These units are focused on terrorism and national security, and take advantage of the skills and resources of our partners.

    We also see integrated policing through the integrated border enforcement teams, or the IBETs, that Canada and the United States have set up in strategic locations along our shared border. The IBETs also have a substantial organized crime mandate.

    As a final example--and there are many more--the RCMP has been fortunate to welcome seconded employees from our partner organizations in the United States, including the U.S. Border Patrol; U.S. Customs; and U.S. Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Within CID we have secondments or exchanges with many Canadian agencies, including the Communications Security Establishment, Transport Canada, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, and Citizenship and Immigration Canada.

    We've established some good roots for integrated policing, but it must grow and spread throughout each and every security law enforcement and intelligence agency in the world. Its tendrils should reach far beyond our traditional partners to include non-governmental organizations and the academic community, to name a few. We've established a good foundation, but there are some challenges to enhancing our ability to share information freely, achieving interoperability, delivering our services seamlessly, and maximizing economies of scale under a framework of shared strategic priorities.

    Moving from vision to reality when it comes to integrated policing is not an easy task, and I have outlined many of those challenges here for you today. The progress we have made in the last 18 months and the goals we have set for our future, combined with the seriousness of a responsibility to protect Canadians and the international community from this threat, convince us all that we will not and indeed cannot fail.

    Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you very much. Your opening statement has raised a whole ton of issues, hopefully not a ton of questions, but perhaps so.

    I'll go to the official opposition and Mr. Sorenson. In view of the membership here today, I think we'll take 10-minute opening rounds rather than the seven. Is that all right with Mr. Sorenson?

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance): That's fine, as long as everyone has a chance. There may be more coming.

    The Chair: Please begin, Mr. Sorenson, and we'll see where we go from here.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you, Mr. Killam, for coming in with your report today. It's always good to have someone from the RCMP come to answer questions we may have. This committee deals with national security, and obviously the RCMP together with CSIS--the two agencies you spoke a great deal about--are our front line of defence against terrorism and to uphold our national security. So any time we get a report, we appreciate it.

    You spoke about working shoulder to shoulder with CSIS; you mentioned that two or three times in your testimony here. During and shortly after the attacks of September 11, a lot of media reports fed a concern that perhaps there wasn't a close working arrangement with CSIS, and sharing of information was one of the areas that was of huge concern.

    Since September 11, are you satisfied there is an adequate level of evaluation and accountability to make sure the sharing of information is there? Has there been enough funding or resources to keep those lines of communication open? What evaluations have been done, and has there been any change since September 11?

    You also mentioned cyber-crime. A couple of years ago I read a book--I can't even remember the name of it--by Paul Palango about how in days gone by the government and the commissioner saw fit to cut a lot of the resources the RCMP had to deal with cyber-crime and fraud on the Internet. They had a lot of computer people.

    We've had the commissioner before the committee--more the justice committee--and we've questioned him about the level of staffing in the RCMP. He admitted at one time that after 9-11 some 2,000 officers were taken off certain files and put on terrorism files. So is the funding currently provided for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service sufficient? Do you have the resources you need?

    When I go through the estimates, I don't know if it's part of the general revenue of the RCMP or if there's a certain area I missed that talks specifically about the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. How is the level of resourcing set? Who is constantly asking for more, and is it enough?

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    C/Supt Dan Killam: I'll do my best to respond to the variety of questions.

    First of all, just addressing the partnership issue with CSIS, as I alluded to in my opening comments, we have a management-level member of CSIS working to manage our threat assessment section within the Criminal Intelligence Directorate. I also spoke about the Criminal Code and the new legislation that came to be that has broadened our mandate and has us working closer with CSIS--there's a blurring of the lines. For example, this individual in our office now sees everything we're doing in our investigations on a day-to-day basis. We in turn have an inspector-level member sitting in their counter-terrorism unit within their agency, so they get to see the mechanics of that particular operation.

    Additionally, we have the benefit of speedier and more efficient communications. In the past, you didn't always know who to call at the other agencies to find out if they were aware of a particular situation, and so on. You had normal routes to follow, but sometimes it was a little difficult or took a little bit of time to follow through those routes.

    In this particular system, with one phone call we're getting information in a speedy and efficient way that allows us to do things much quicker. Because we're working shoulder to shoulder on various investigations and files, they see what we're doing, we see what they're doing, and consequently we're seeing opportunities to work together that we never considered before because everybody was working within their respective agency. So from what I've seen, the partnership has only been enhanced since September 11.

    One other critical thing has happened since September 11, and this speaks to all the police agencies we're in touch with. One of the biggest impediments to change is usually a lack of any sense of need, and September 11 generated a sense of urgency. People want to work together, and they're looking for ways to work together more than ever in the past. Typically, people are resistant in any organization, but since September 11 everyone is looking for a way to work together. Therein lies part of the challenge to ensure we share information properly, and respect human rights, privacy issues, and so on.

    On the partnership with CSIS, I have not observed anything with CSIS that I would state is an issue. The papers tend to highlight instances, but I can think of times within our own organization when people were reluctant to do things, and I'm sure you've found that within your own organizations. When you put the spotlight on it, that becomes the issue.

    I mentioned earlier to the chair that I was an investigator on the Somalia inquiry, and during the course of acting as investigator for that commission of inquiry I found that more than 90% of what I saw the Canadian troops doing in Somalia was positive, yet the media's focus was on several incidents, with no mention of the rest of it. So I think at times it gets painted worse than it is. I won't deny there are probably situations that occur, but none that I'm aware of.

    The funding we got from the government after September 11 was very generous. The issue we face within the RCMP is that the individuals who work within those terrorism units are highly specialized and have skill levels that take time to develop. When you put a lot of your resources into that area, it's difficult to get all the right people. It takes time to see the fruits of your labour, so to speak--if I expressed that properly. In terms of funding, we find we're adequately staffed.

    You also talked about cyber-terrorism. Within our section we're creating a particular unit that's going to be working with our technical protective area. They have a number of other elements that are also working in a similar fashion. So we're bringing together all our resources to work in a focused, intelligence-led way, so we can really make some headway in that area.

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    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: I think the third question was on people being taken off the file--the 2,000 who had been taken off organized crime and some of the other....

    C/Supt Dan Killam: You reallocate your resources where there's the greatest need, and clearly right after September 11 that was the greatest priority for the force. However, since that time we have set up a criminal organizations branch within the Criminal Intelligence Directorate that focuses on organized crime. The staff returned to that area quite some time ago. When I say the staff, I mean just a small percentage of them to help the people do the job they needed to do during the emergent situation. The staff is back working on that particular priority.

    My initial thought is that all of these areas are highly specialized. When we receive the funding for it, you can put a lot of money toward it but you don't get a return on your investment immediately. It takes time for these people to get up to speed just in the particular area. In addition to that there's the inset unit we've created with the integrated national security enforcement teams, so it's a little different way of doing business.

    Our financial intelligence branch spends considerable time looking into the fundraising activities of organizations, and that type of thing. There are a lot of different challenges that our members are facing to become proficient at the level we need to get the return on investment we want to see.

    In terms of overall funding, we've been happy. It's just that you can't create subject-matter experts overnight. You have a finite number of them. You alluded to some of the commercial-crime type investigations years ago--fraud and those types of things--and that takes a highly specialized individual. Of course, those individuals are attractive to the private sector as well, so we are losing people in that regard.

    We've made substantial progress in staffing these areas, putting the people in place, and standing up the units. So we're quite satisfied with it.

    I've covered a variety of areas.

[Translation]

    The Chair: You have ten minutes, Mr. Lanctôt.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt (Châteauguay, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The Commissioner was asked the same question two weeks ago when the Solicitor General appeared before the committee. His answer was more or less the same as the one you just gave us, namely that funding levels increased after September 11. However, I didn't get a specific answer. I don't know if the same thing is happening elsewhere, but in Quebec, the number of RCMP officers assigned to handle border smuggling operations is being reduced by 20 per cent. However, it's a known fact that RCMP members are qualified to deal with terrorism associated with smuggling and organized crime. RCMP personnel are wondering what indeed is going on here.

    Apparently, another study calling for a reduction in staff levels will be submitted shortly. I understand that it's your job to decide where officers should be assigned, but staff members do have questions for us. They're wondering why staff is being cut, when funding is being increased. I'd like an answer to that question because two weeks ago, I was told that funding had been increased. I wasn't told why staff levels were being reduced. I understand that many border security operations are being carried out in cooperation with the United States. Your members are wondering, therefore, why staff is being cut, even though funding has increased since September 11. Is it true that a new study will be recommending further staff cuts?

º  (1600)  

    C/Supt Dan Killam: Are you talking about a new RCMP-commissioned study?

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Yes.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: I'm sorry, but I'm unaware of any new study or of a 20 per cent cut in staffing levels.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: We're talking about nearly 100 positions in Quebec. Three individuals in Rivière-du-Loup have already lost their jobs and others have been affected as well. There's talk of approximately 100 positions being slashed.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: And these individuals are RCMP officers assigned to border security operations?

    M. Robert Lanctôt: Correct. Their involved in the fight against smuggling operations.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: I can't say why this particular decision was made, but in order to be effective, the RCMP has to reassign staff from time to time. I'm not sure why these cuts were made, but I would imagine the officers affected were reassigned to other duty.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Since this bears some relation to your position, I think you should be able to give me an answer. I didn't get one from the Commissioner. Someone has to be able to give us an answer at some point because this is a national security issue.

    When staff levels at border crossings are reduced even as budgets are increasing, there something strange happening. Even your members are puzzled. Therefore, I'd like to know the reasons why this action is being taken. Your members also want to know if in fact more cuts are looming.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: These may not be cuts per se. We need to focus on strategic areas, as is usually the case.

    I'm not aware of this particular situation, but it's quite possible that the volume of work at these crossings has fallen off and it's simply a matter of reassigning these officers to other locations.

    I can look into this and get back to you with an answer.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I'd like an answer to be provided via the sub-committee.

[English]

    The Chair: It's quite acceptable, Superintendent Killam, for you to provide a written answer at a later date. The issue seems to surround redeployment or restructuring of the detachment in Trois-Rivières. Monsieur Lanctôt is just trying to chew up, on one hand, the increase of resources and the restructuring taking place there. They may or may not be related but....

    C/Supt Dan Killam: As I was saying, if you're cutting positions to reduce resources, or taking resources and moving them to where they can be used more effectively, I don't have the answer to that question. However, I will endeavour to get the answer.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you very much.

    I'd like to know how the RCMP and CSIS go about sharing intelligence. We've been told that since September 11, relations between the RCMP and CSIS are very good, and intelligence formation is being shared, but this situation poses a problem, at least at first glance. If CSIS collects confidential information with a view to protecting the nation and the RCMP uses that intelligence to conduct other investigations, not to fight terrorism, how then can the information transferred be controlled or managed? In your relations with CSIS, when you're seeking a specific kind of information, who has the authority to approve or reject your request? And if the intelligence requested is passed along, what steps does CSIS or the RCMP take to ensure that the information remains confidential or is used solely for the purposes for which it was initially conveyed? Who can reassure Canadians and Quebeckers that this information isn't used to investigate a crime not actually connected with terrorism? Who is in charge of managing this intelligence?

º  (1605)  

    C/Supt Dan Killam: I'll answer that question in English.

[English]

    It's critical that our organizations share information. We do not direct CSIS to give us information, nor do they direct or tell us to give information. We are working hand-in-glove. Criminal activity is usually associated with individuals who are involved in more nefarious acts, like terrorism, and it's important that we be made aware of information around criminal activities. CSIS determines, when they have information of that nature, what they will give us. The same applies to the RCMP. When we have information that is of interest to CSIS, it's made available to them.

    But we have a member of CSIS within our directorate who is privy to all of the investigations we are conducting, because we really have nothing to hide. As a result, there are times when particular investigations that may not have been of interest become of interest because we can work more effectively together.

    I'm not sure I understood your concerns around the protection of the information, because central to what we do is protect this information, citizens' rights, and anything we learn in that regard. We are a police organization and we investigate criminal activity. If we become aware of criminal activity, then we investigate it.

    Maybe you could clarify your question a bit further. You asked who controls the information. Each organization has their own information. I'm trying to understand what information you think we might be sharing that might be a potential problem.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: It could be very important information. As you know, the United States maintained that intelligence gathered from foreign countries had not been taken into account and that the events of September 11 could have been prevented if the FBI and CIA had taken that intelligence seriously and passed along the information. The same thing could happen here. The RCMP or CSIS might not take seriously certain information or, conversely, may not want to be too forthright with the information they have. That's why I'm wondering who is responsible for deciding whether or not to share the information. You say that if the RCMP is unwilling to share information, then it doesn't, and that the same is true of CSIS. Some of the intelligence they have may be considered harmless, but it could prove helpful in resolving a problem. There is no control over how that intelligence is managed. The same is true in the United States.

    Elsewhere, the United States use a colour code system, for example, code orange or code red, to keep the public informed. Why the total secrecy here in Canada? Is it because there is no indication that any danger may be present?

    If a code red is in effect in Washington and in New York, and if I live close to the border, I'd like to be informed of events taking place. I realize that full disclosure of information is out of the question, given the way in which we operate, but the public should benefit from the same kind of security. Why not adopt a similar system here? Have you considered this possibility?

º  (1610)  

[English]

    C/Supt Dan Killam: No.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: However, you're not about to wait until something happens...

[English]

    The Chair: Monsieur Lanctôt, we've gone way over the 10 minutes, so I'll ask Superintendent Killam to wrap up. Then we'll go to Ms. Jennings for 10 minutes.

º  (1615)  

    C/Supt Dan Killam: Just to wrap up, information is shared regularly and freely among very experienced people who look for every little nuance, every little piece of information, to put together to develop a comprehensive threat assessment for the country, which we share regularly with the appropriate people.

    Canadians should feel secure in the knowledge that we are working hand in glove with not only CSIS, but all our partner agencies.

    The Chair: Ms. Jennings for 10 minutes.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you very much for your presentation and your informed responses to the questions of some of my colleagues. I have a series of questions, and if you're unable to answer all of them, hopefully there'll be a second round and I'll come back to the ones you weren't able to answer.

    On page 2 you talk about the narrowing of the gap between the mandate of the RCMP and CSIS, and how the secondments, different policies, and more integration have meant more effective cooperation and better use of resources. That's anecdotal. Do you have a cost benefit analysis that would show, on average, what a certain type of investigation or profile cost in the past; the kinds of resources that had to be devoted; and the amount of time it generally took? Now that you're integrating, how is that different?

    If you don't have that kind of information, the RCMP may wish to begin looking at that to build long-term solid bases. Usually when you start to integrate it costs more, but over time it shows it's actually cost-effective.

    Second, on page 3 you talk about the powers that were given to the police under Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act, and you say that the RCMP has implemented checks and balances and oversight functions that go beyond--

    The Chair: Excuse me, Ms. Jennings. You are quoting from a document you seem to be relatively privileged among us to have.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: It's the presentation that Mr.--

    The Chair: You just seem to be very fortunate, as parliamentary secretary to the Solicitor General.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I assumed it had been distributed to everyone.

    The Chair: We never make assumptions around this place.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: It was put on the table here, so I just assumed the clerk had passed it out.

    The Chair: So anyway, that's very enlightening to the opposition members. I'm sure they've noticed the care level--discrepancies here. The chair doesn't have one either, so in any event we're listening carefully to your list of questions.

    Please carry on.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I apologize. I assumed the clerk had passed this out.

    On page 3 you talk about implementing checks and balances and oversight functions that go beyond what the bill itself provides for. I'm quite familiar with the bill, so I'd like to know how the RCMP has enhanced the checks, balances, and oversight from the level that's actually provided for in the bill.

    On page 3 you also talk about the Civil Aviation Protective Intelligence Unit that's just been created. Is this the unit that will be applying the new powers for the transportation public safety, where their designated officer will be able to have access to the passenger manifest list from the airlines? Is that where that officer would be located?

    C/Supt Dan Killam: No.

    The Chair: Before you go on, you're compiling a fairly good list of questions, but we may not be able to get them into 10 minutes.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I understand that. I addressed that at the beginning, and you're eating up my time.

    The Chair: You can have your time back, but Mr. Sorenson tends to build the same kind of club sandwich when he asks his questions.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: That's why I want to make sure I get my questions asked.

    The Chair: But you're only going to get 10 minutes.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I understand that. Mr. Killam understands that if he's unable to respond to all of my questions, I'm unable to come back to them in a second round, and the committee adjourns before he's answered all of them, he will respond in writing.

    The Chair: The chair will make a determination on how we do on this.

    Do you have another question. You have three questions on the table now.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: I have two other questions. On page 5 you talk about how to ensure your capacity to carry out effective investigations. You say the RCMP will focus on national enforcement priorities, and determine those enforcement priorities using a sophisticated threat measurement system that was developed in CID and is now being used by law enforcement agencies around the world. Which other law enforcement agencies are using this threat measurement?

    My last question is precisely on organized crime, but it could also be addressed to terrorism threats. With CSIS, etc., you're doing the investigations on organized crime and terrorists, and they may result in actual criminal charges being laid against someone--an actual trial and conviction. If the organized crime figure or figures--because we have mega-trials going on in Quebec right now--are indeed condemned and sentenced to time in our penitentiaries, there seems to be a gap. At one point they're in prison, and we know that sometimes those activities continue, even when they're incarcerated. So where are the correctional services, in terms of providing information and analysis of information that may come to them while carrying out their mandate about criminal activities that are going on that involve people who are either incarcerated or under parole?

º  (1620)  

    C/Supt Dan Killam: I don't quite understand what you're looking for from me on this.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Is there a gap, in your view, given that you do not mention correctional services anywhere when you talk about our response to criminal activity in specific organized crime? We know that if you are successful you're going to have offenders who are incarcerated. We already know that being incarcerated does not preclude the continuation of their criminal activities. If that's the case, that information would be coming from correctional services.

    So where are correctional services included in the term “integrated policing services”, specifically with regard to organized crime and, in future, terrorist activities? We may have people who are convicted for terrorist activities and will continue them while they're incarcerated.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: I'll do my best.

    Your first question related to the cost-benefit analysis. I cannot give you a figure on cost benefits, but certainly it would be something worth spending some time analysing, to determine if there are some cost benefits.

    In terms of investigations, if you're talking about large integrated units...it depends on exactly what we're speaking about here. Certainly in terms of efficiency and getting information quicker, a lot of times investigations take a long time. With the integration we find that when you're working with partners and need a particular piece of information, rather than it working its way through the system, the people working with you can get it to you quicker, which results in perhaps more effective investigations. Usually the whole process takes a long time anyway, but we have no studies I can point to now.

    On training--the second question related to Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act--there are a number of ways we do it. First and foremost, any of the members who are going to be involved in that particular act are given training. We give them Bill C-36 training to familiarize them with all the aspects of it. This is new legislation and hasn't been used as yet. We want to make sure that when it's used it's used properly.

    Within CID we have a strict policy that anybody who is even considering using any of this particular legislation has to come through CID, our directorate, for permission. Once they've put forward their case it's put before the Department of Justice, where a decision is made. So this is not something left to the individual to decide on their own. It's highly contained, if you will.

    On your other question regarding the transportation bill, Bill C-17, the CAPI unit is not where those individuals will be seated. If and when the legislation is enacted, we will be creating specialized positions for specifically designated individuals who will be involved in that. They're very sensitive to the need to make sure this information is kept to a very few individuals.

    On the way we determine our priorities, we pride ourselves on being intelligence-led. An individual within CID by the name of Steve Strang developed a model called Sleipnir, named after the eight-legged horse of Odin. It means nothing more than that. It describes a system where we prioritize certain aspects of individuals, groups, or organizations to come up with a prioritizing list. This particular model has been brought around the world by our directorate, and I would have to get an exact list of who is on it. I could name a couple of agencies, but I want to be 100% sure I have all the names.

º  (1625)  

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Just a couple.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: I'll wait until I get a full list. I don't want to mislead you in any way. I've been told a number of organizations have it. I haven't seen it myself, but I can get that information for you.

    On national security, we are not integrated with correctional services, as you quite rightly noted. However, on our criminal organizations branch side, our field units--the intelligence analysts in the field--work quite closely with the corrections people. Information is shared regularly between those particular organizations.

    We're quite cognizant of the fact that people in jail sometimes continue with crime. You can rest assured we're putting great effort into trying to eliminate that type of activity, but there isn't a gap, if you will. You suggested there was a gap.

    I'm speaking primarily of the national security side of it, and we're finding the relationship isn't as strong with organized crime. But those on our organized crime side of the house are involved in that. They're plugged in with our national security, so they keep us informed on all the activities that may have any overlaps with the national security side. I just want to confirm we have that covered.

    The Chair: Good. Thank you.

    We'll go to Mr. Sorenson for five minutes, Mr. McKay for five minutes, and then we'll alternate.

    Mr. Sorenson.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Right. I know that Mr. Toews has some questions, so when he comes back I'll turn the rest of my time over to him.

    From what I understand, the Auditor General is in the process of probing the extra revenue the government has sent out since 9/11. Part of her report said it was an effort to determine whether the major federal investment in security was really making Canadians any safer. I think she said she was also going to look into CPIC and the overhauling of that.

    Since 1996, through a number of studies, the Auditor General's office uncovered numerous problems with national security information systems and cooperation between agencies. According to the Auditor General, during the course of those enquiries audit teams saw, and I quote: “a pattern of inadequate information to support front-line officials responsible for national security”. Furthermore, less than three years ago the Auditor General's office found that customs officers, including those at airports, had insufficient data to assess the risk that travellers might pose here in Canada.

    First of all, I'd just like your comments on what the Auditor General may find in this probe. Do you think the money has been spent effectively?

    Secondly, what has been done to address the Auditor General's findings regarding information-sharing among all different federal levels dealing with intelligence and security?

º  (1630)  

    C/Supt Dan Killam: I think it's important for the government to have the ability to audit funds it puts out there, to ensure they're being spent appropriately. In my view, a lot of money was spent subsequent to September 11. People put forth their best notions of how the money could be most wisely spent.

    As we move along, it's important that we evaluate each and every one of the systems we have in place, to make sure the money is most appropriately placed. We may find that one particular area that we thought we should put a lot of money into for national security wasn't as effective as another area where we didn't put in quite that much money. So the reallocation process is important.

    My only comment on their report is that I'm pleased they're reviewing it to determine if it's been spent in that regard and that it's going to be spent wisely. I don't know if I can comment beyond that on the Auditor General's situation.

    In terms of sharing, September 11 generated that sense of urgency that we needed to provoke the change in sharing. Many agencies are sharing. There are many issues around interoperability with data systems. There are many issues around privacy that have to be addressed as well.

    With non-law enforcement agencies that want to work with you, there are certain things you cannot share with them because of privacy issues, and so on. We've gone a long way in moving ahead on sharing information, but there are still challenges. It's going to be a long process; it won't be solved overnight.

    The Chair: We have only about a minute and a half left.

    Mr. Toews.

    Mr. Vic Toews (Provencher, Canadian Alliance): I think I'll pass.

    The Chair: We'll go to Mr. McKay for five minutes.

    Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.): I'm not even sure I have a five-minute question.

    The Chair: Do you have a two-minute question?

    Mr. Toews.

    Mr. Vic Toews: I have a meeting, but is there any urgency?

    The Chair: Why don't you take up the issue? I'm sure members would be happy to let you take care of that. I know you've been preparing for weeks to ask this question.

    Mr. Vic Toews: I do have a concern. I've met with individuals who are concerned specifically about Bill C-36 and the definition of “terrorist activity”.

    In that legislation, Canada has adopted a definition that includes references to religious, political, and ideological reasons that motive terrorist activity. It's a pattern the British have followed, but it's one the Americans chose not to. My particular concern about that type of definition is it leads our security forces and police forces into an examination of religious and political ideology, which I find somewhat disconcerting.

    How do you differentiate between legitimate political and ideological differences and terrorist activity? There's bound to be some overlapping on that. I'm just wondering whether the kind of definition we've adopted for “terrorist activity” can be counterproductive in your fight against terrorism and organized crime related to terrorism.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: Within the RCMP we're quite aware that the individuals who are committing a lot of these acts are the exception rather than the rule amongst these particular religions, and so on, as you said. So it's also a concern for us. We don't want the perception out there that we are focusing on people specifically because they have a particular faith.

    We recognize they happen to be the exceptions, or they may interpret some particular religious document differently than the vast majority of people, therefore they're all getting painted with the same brush. We're very sensitive to that. As a result, that is why we base our investigations on intelligence on individuals or organizations that are committing particular acts that draw attention to them.

    We recognize that just because they're of a particular faith, by and large they're usually not the ones we're looking for.

º  (1635)  

    Mr. Vic Toews: That's exactly my concern. If you're looking at issues other than religious faith, ideology, and politics--specifically religion--why do we include them in our definition of “terrorist activity”? The Americans don't do that. I'm just wondering why we, as Canadians, see that as a necessary element in determining what comprises “terrorist activity”.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: I can't speak to the drafting of the legislation or the wording of it. I can only speculate they followed a model that was consistent with other legislation that's maybe been put into place elsewhere.

    We focus on those things that cause interest for us in an individual or an organization because there's some activity going on that suggests something untoward. I can't speak to why we did it that way and the Americans didn't.

    Mr. Vic Toews: Yes. I guess essentially what you're looking at is some kind of criminal activity, rather than religious motivation. Criminals may hang around in a particular place and you may have to go to those meetings, but the religion or the politics is really irrelevant to the criminal action itself.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: That's quite right. I would agree.

    Mr. Vic Toews: Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Toews.

    We'll go to Ms. Jennings for five minutes.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Toward the end of your presentation, Mr. Killam, you talked about how you've spread good roots on integrated policing, and now it's time for the tendrils to grow and spread. You mentioned the NGO community and the academic community. What role do you see for those two potential partners in integrated policing on national security issues and criminal intelligence issues?

    C/Supt Dan Killam: It's always wise to get the points of view of everyone and consult as widely and broadly as possible, because we don't have all the answers.

    The academic community may have information or thoughts on the way events are unfolding in the world that would cause us to redirect our efforts in a more effective way. It's the same with non-governmental organizations. You can't rule out anyone as a potential source of information that could help you do your job more effectively.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: But have you instituted an actual framework so there is that ongoing dialogue you've identified, say with particular NGOs that you think would bring something of interest to the table on that--or is that on an ad hoc basis?

    C/Supt Dan Killam: In my experience it's been on more of an ad hoc basis, but it's something we would like to move toward formalizing. There's more of a desire on everyone's part to contribute in some fashion. In a previous job working for a program that monitored riot troops for Canada, we consulted extensively with the conflict management area of the university here in Ottawa, to get their views and bring together the groups.

    We're trying to do that type of thing as broadly as possible. There are no limitations on what we will consider to get the input from because we know we don't have all the answers, and information is no good if you don't share it. So we're trying to do that to the extent possible, but there are a lot of issues raised around privacy and disclosure, and we have to be very sensitive to those things.

    A lot of non-traditional people want to come in and help out, but you can only share to a certain degree within the law and other areas. I hope that answers your question.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Yes it does, thank you.

    The Chair: Are you going to take the balance of the time, or should we go to Monsieur Lanctôt first?

º  (1640)  

    Mr. John McKay: Now that I'm really worked up....

    The Chair: We'll go to Monsieur Lanctôt for five minutes, if he's ready.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    First of all, I'd like to have the details of the Criminal Intelligence Directorate's budget, both pre- and post-September 11. By how much did this particular directorate's budget increase?

    Secondly, what kind of training do your officers receive? Are they trained by our own intelligence service, that is by CSIS, or do they receive terrorism-related training from outside sources? When did you start providing this kind of training and was the program's profile enhanced after September 11?

    I have one last question concerning the National Security Investigations Branch of the Criminal Intelligence Directorate. Are any of your officers posted abroad? Are you now engaged in some “espionage” activities abroad? First things first, though. Do you have any officers operating outside Canada?

    C/Supt Dan Killam: No.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Do you think that's something Canada might be interested in pursuing?

[English]

    C/Supt Dan Killam: On the budget before and after, I'll have to get the....

[Translation]

    I don't have the pre- and post-September 11 budget figures.

[English]

    I'll have to get that information for you.

    On training for our members, there are courses given. In Regina this week, as a matter of fact, a two-week national security course is beginning. But in terms of finding out how long that's been ongoing and whether or not they've increased the frequency since September 11, I'll have to verify that.

    I believe that after September 11 it was much tougher to run any courses because all our people were gainfully occupied doing a variety of tasks. I would say training probably diminished, but that's without having the benefit of that information, so I will get that for you.

    Do we have people outside of Canada rethinking about doing it? I don't want to comment on our investigative techniques, in terms of national security. It would make them less effective. I'm sure you can appreciate that.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Do you in fact have any officers posted abroad? I'm not interested in knowing where these officers actually are or what they're doing, just if there are any abroad? I think the public would be very interested in knowing that RCMP officers could be working...

    C/Supt Dan Killam: We have liaison officers working abroad, but you might say that they are regular RCMP officers. They are not involved solely with national security issues. We have contacts pretty much everywhere in the world.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you.

[English]

    The Chair: Mr. McKay.

    Mr. John McKay: I can hardly wait for the question I'm going to ask.

    A lot of the Bloc Quebecois are looking for extra work these days. We like to facilitate our Bloc brothers.

    The RCMP has sort of adopted intelligence-led, multi-disciplinary stuff--kind of the talky words of the RCMP. In military terms they say that military intelligence is an oxymoron. I don't know whether that would be applicable to policing, but I'd be interested in knowing what intelligence-led policing actually means.

    How is that different from the way policing used to be done? Perhaps you could give me a hypothetical example of how you approach things now, as opposed to the way you used to do things. Has that changed since September 11?

    My second question has to do with linkages between organized crime and terrorist organizations. When we had the subcommittee on organized crime, one could readily see how you could use that kind of organization to smuggle various things and do various terrorist acts, which people like Hell's Angels otherwise wouldn't care about.

    So I'm just kind of curious about whether there have been, in your observation, any linkages between organized crime and terrorist organizations. Has that milieu or environment changed in the last year or so?

º  (1645)  

    C/Supt Dan Killam: I think your first question was around intelligence-led policing and what that means. I guess the roots of that go back to community-based policing across the country. We work within a community and recognize, “We have only five guys on detachment, so how are we going to address the concerns of the citizens? We can't be everywhere”.

    I think we started by developing community consultative groups, where we brought in the town council and said, “We have a certain basic type of work we have to do, but are there other areas that you want us to police in terms of speeding, drug investigations, or fraud?” The town gave us some sense of where they felt the biggest priority within their town was. So we did our basic policing and put the limited resources into those other areas.

    Intelligence-led policing is a lot like that as well. We can't do everything. Even if you gave us no end of money we still wouldn't be able to do everything. So with this Sleipnir model I spoke about, we have an operations cycle where information is fed from all our analysts, investigations, people, and divisions, and run through the system.

    We develop priorities that we follow, and based on that we determine the priorities we're going to work on. The information is continually fed into it. It's a cycle, so every year we always gain new information to determine if we're on the right track, have the right priorities, and are putting our resources on the highest priority areas.

    Mr. John McKay: That sounds more like intelligent policing than intelligence-based policing.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: At the same time, all our divisions are required to focus on what have been identified as the priorities of the RCMP across the country, whereas in the past they might have worked on what they felt were the priorities. They have always taken direction, but I'm not exactly sure how it functioned before,

    Mr. John McKay: Is that different from how a municipal police force would approach their job? I live in Toronto, so do the Toronto police approach their job differently from what you're describing?

    C/Supt Dan Killam: I wouldn't presume to speak for the Toronto Police Force, but most police forces have adopted the intelligence-led approach, from my understanding, because it's the most effective way to use a limited resource.

    Mr. John McKay: Is this then a generic change in the culture of policing?

    C/Supt Dan Killam: There's always a certain amount of policing that's reactive. You have no choice; you deal with it. But with those resources that are at your disposal to use as you deem fit, you want to get the most bang for the buck. You want to continuously have a method for getting information to make sure that you're on the right path; if you're devoting these resources to that particular priority it remains the priority; you have the information that demonstrates it is; and you're modifying your policing of it consistent with the information you're receiving.

    Mr. John McKay: So if a community is not overly fussed about possession of marijuana, do you reallocate your resources? Another RCMP detachment somewhere else might get “intelligence” from the community saying they were very upset about possession of marijuana.

º  (1650)  

    C/Supt Dan Killam: I think they're all going to get the basic fundamentals of policing, regardless. You're out there stopping vehicles and checking people, as you do in your regular course of business, and you're sensitive to information.

    We continuously receive information from within the community from individuals who identify people who might be selling drugs or doing things like that, and there are certain investigative procedures you follow. Once you've met your basic policing core functions, if members of the community feel a certain area needs more emphasis, such as speeding in the school zone, and want that to be our number-one focus when we're out there, we devote resources over and above what we need to do the core work.

    Have I explained that in a generic way?

    Mr. John McKay: I understand the core work, if you will, includes assaults, Criminal Code offences, and things of that nature. But we get into a lot of grey areas as well, where some people may not want as enthusiastic enforcement of the Criminal Code as other communities.

    I'm curious how you decide on the priorities; what's going to be the best bang for the buck.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: When you speak of the Criminal Code and how we enforce it, we are out there doing our policing 24-7 in these communities. If we run across impaired drivers, people with drugs, family fights, or assaults, they are dealt with as you encounter them. When you have extra optional time--okay, we have a couple of extra people, so maybe we can focus them on a certain area of the community--that provides another layer of protection, over and above what they would normally get.

    I seem to get the sense you're suggesting there's going to be a way for them to manipulate our policing so we don't police our core functions in a way that's appropriate. I guess I'm trying to get across that we'll always do the core policing. When we have an opportunity to use some not necessarily surplus resources, but resources that we can put toward something the community seems to be concerned about, then we focus those resources on those areas.

    Mr. John McKay: I'm questioning whether the core changes from community to community, and province to province.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: My view is no. We are there to ensure the safety of the people; to ensure that people don't speed, or drink and drive; to prevent assaults, and those types of things. We're very aware of those basic core functions. They have to be maintained, or else you have a little bit of anarchy ruling.

    I've policed a lot of small towns myself in Alberta, and there's a certain core function you do there all the time. When you have some extra time maybe you'll go to this area because you've had a lot of complaints from the citizens that there are a lot of speeders in that area. So that brings us to that area, when we might have been in another area of town.

    Those are the types of intelligent uses of resources, when you have information that directs you to apply them in that way.

    Mr. John McKay: In the past, would you not have done that anyway?

    C/Supt Dan Killam: I'm using the example of the very basic speeding part of it, but I think we formalized it more. We kind of fell into community policing just because we worked in the small town with the local community. We had a lot of contact with the officials of the town, and they raised issues. Over time, community consultative groups came together. In a formal way, they spoke of the issues they really felt needed more attention, and as we had the resources available we did our best to address them.

    Mr. John McKay: On the linkages between the terrorist organizations and the...?

    C/Supt Dan Killam: As you can well imagine, there are a lot of terrorist organizations out there and a lot of areas we could cover. It's very extensive. Each of these investigations is very intensive, in terms of resources, personnel, and those types of things. So if you're going to use them on something, you have to pick the one you feel is going to give you the most benefit.

    By using the Sleipnir model, which is a system of grading the information and determining which one is the biggest threat, a lot of variables enter into creating a list of what seem to be the ones that could cause us the most problems, and we work down from there.

    Mr. John McKay: I'm having trouble visualizing that there are that many terrorist organizations. There are a lot of weird people out there, and a lot of people who say things in certain situations are talking through their hats.

º  (1655)  

    C/Supt Dan Killam: You've hit the nail right on the head. I felt it was a little unfair that the FBI seemed to be taking the brunt of the criticism, as we talked about earlier. They didn't tell them about those guys taking those courses in Florida. You have no idea of the volume of information coming in on any number of little points like that. You try to take it all, and if it seems to fit somewhere....

    You talk about being intelligence-led. If you had any idea that this was a threat you would put everything on it. You'd try to take that information, incorporate it into a larger picture, and focus your efforts on that.

    Mr. John McKay: That's what I consider to be intelligence-led policing: pulling in intelligence from a variety of sources and apprehending threats, and things of that nature.

    The Chair: Mr. McKay, your patience has been rewarded with an 11-minute round, and you've done extremely well with it.

    Mr. John McKay: He didn't answer the one about organized crime. I didn't get him on that. If you're using organized crime--to use a Mr. Lee aphorism--as a sort of template.... I can never do it the way Mr. Lee does it. He's utterly brilliant. I've known Mr. Lee for many years, and he can slice baloney so thin it has all nutritional content deleted.

    Is organized crime used by terrorist organizations, or do they not trust each other?

    C/Supt Dan Killam: We find they're involved in a lot of activities like document fraud, illegal immigration, and those types of things. Of course, those are areas where organized crime is involved as well. I'm not going to say we found a direct link between organized crime and a particular terrorist group, but certainly the activities of organized crime are consistent with the types of activities of terrorist groups. They need to get documents to get people into different countries, and get money to support terrorist activities.

    Canada is used quite regularly as a springboard, or as the area where they get their finances to send overseas. That's done through a variety of ways. Sometimes it's through charitable donations. In a lot of cases it's done through crime sprees, crime rings, stealing things, etc. That's where we see a lot of involvement with our friends from CSIS, because they have information along those lines on individuals who may be involved in those types of activities. That's where we intersect.

    I hope that answers your question in a general way.

    Mr. John McKay: Now Mr. Lee has cut me off.

    The Chair: There's a remarkable sense of anticipation, Mr. McKay.

    I have a question. The answer to my question should be obvious, but does the RCMP investigate terrorist threats in Canada? It does.

    In doing those investigations, can you give us an idea of what type of data the RCMP would assemble? Where would it come from and how would you do it? I could walk you through a check-list. Does the RCMP use human sources to gather information in those types of investigations?

    C/Supt Dan Killam: Generally speaking, an investigation is an investigation. We use whatever means are at our disposal to investigate a situation.

    The Chair: Would that include human sources from time to time?

    C/Supt Dan Killam: Yes, it would.

    The Chair: Would that include wiretaps from time to time, under the Criminal Code?

»  (1700)  

    C/Supt Dan Killam: Yes, it could. But as I mentioned earlier, what's really made these productive investigations is these INSETs, these integrated security teams we have, depending on the region you're in. If you're in the Toronto area, you have an RCMP member attending with a Toronto Metro, with an OPP, with CSIS. All the different agencies are involved. They can go back and look through their own databases of information, so we have access to more information to help us move an investigation ahead than we've ever had in the past.

    The Chair: The focus of the committee for a dozen years now has been on both spending efficacy and civil liberties. You've touched on the efficacy issue today, as members have, and your evidence seems to show there have been structural improvements and product improvements. Of necessity, after 9/11 we had to make some improvements,

    But if the RCMP is investigating what are essentially criminal conspiracies to deliver potential terrorist activities in Canada, then I suggest that the RCMP is working the same territory as CSIS, in part, in terms of gathering information. Is that fair? If CSIS is investigating threats to the security of Canada, including terrorist threats, and if the RCMP is investigating terrorist threats in Canada and using the various investigative techniques available to them, then CSIS and the RCMP are on the same investigative ground. Isn't that true?

    C/Supt Dan Killam: We are working hand in glove, but there's a fundamental difference. Our goal is to take these people through the judicial system, whereas they are reporting on the intelligence, bringing it forward. Clearly, the first thing we want to do is to prevent, detect, or disrupt something, but our ultimate goal as a police force is to bring them to court, if that's possible.

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    The Chair: I understand that. We all understand that.

    Not all of the intelligence gathered would be destined for the courtroom either. Your intelligence is calculated to further direct the force in its investigation and pre-empt a terrorist act or criminal act, or investigate a criminal act or a terrorist act where one has already occurred.

    I'm trying to get you to focus on the business of investigating persons or groups for the purpose of gathering information. If you're working in the same field as CSIS, it comes to all of our attention that there are checks and balances present in the CSIS operations, with reference to the Inspector General, SIRC, and the internal checks and balances CSIS has built, including the rule that information gathered must be strictly necessary, but the RCMP doesn't appear to have that infrastructure.

    From a civil liberties point of view, I'm just asking whether we should be looking more carefully at that. I'm not alleging any wrongs, but I'd just like you to provide us some assurance that in doing its work assembling information of the nature we've described here, the RCMP will be as careful as CSIS in protecting civil liberties, or at least a balance of civil liberties.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: In my opening address I spoke to some of the accountability. I'm looking at my notes to get the list of all the various checks and balances we have in place.

    We have the external review committee, and the commission for public complaints against the RCMP. In addition, the RCMP conducts investigations with the objective of criminal prosecution. So when we bring information forward to the courts, it's all exposed to the light of day and the judicial process, to ensure it was all obtained in a way that did not infringe on anyone's rights, and that we have respected all the appropriate laws.

    The Chair: Certainly your wiretaps would be done in accordance with judicial authorization.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: Yes.

    The Chair: Your human source management would presumably be done the way the force has always done it. That was probed at one point by the McDonald Commission.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: That was before my time, Mr. Lee.

    The Chair: I don't have any particular questions about that. I'm just looking for a broader and more general assurance that the civil liberties envelope is somehow adverted to in a reasonable fashion by the force, given the increase in the volume of terrorist threat investigations it's currently undertaking.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: I think you're quite right it's important that people are aware that we're very cognizant of the fact that we indeed respect the letter of the law and people's rights, and don't infringe on them.

    With the system we have in place there's our external review committee and the Commission for Public Complaints, plus the RCMP investigates its members when there have been code of conduct type violations. But more importantly, any time we bring an investigation to court, all the information is disclosed to the defence as well as the court, and everything we've done is scrutinized in extreme detail. That type of oversight is appropriate for the situation. When you talked about wiretaps, there are extensive processes we follow. On the use of any of the Bill C-36 legislation I spoke to before, they have to go through quite a lengthy process to get that approved, to ensure we are not stepping outside of where we should be.

    I guess my short answer is I believe the processes in place are more than adequate to address any concerns of the public that we are adequately protecting people's rights and respecting the law.

    The Chair: If the stuff never gets into the courtroom, the individuals involved will never be aware of that. The intelligence-gathering business doesn't always hit the courtroom.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: No, but we work on a lot of investigations outside of national security, and otherwise. If you cannot put the case together and proceed with it, you can still be aware of people's activities.

    The Chair: A criminal investigation after the fact is one thing; a conspiracy where the acts haven't occurred is another thing. That's what you're dealing with when you investigate terrorism, where there has not been a terrorist act.

    If you were to do the job perfectly and investigate and pre-empt terrorist acts, you would never get to a court case; you would always be chasing and winning. There would never be a 9/11, and the cat and mouse game would continue. There would never be a lot of scrutiny of the techniques used to execute the investigations.

    I don't think that aspect of the envelope has been raised publicly recently, for no other reason than we would like the RCMP to carry on with its good work and get the job done first, with a view to collective security. But this subcommittee likes to keep the focus on civil liberties.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: On something that's a little different in national security compared to the investigations going on all over the country, we have well-trained members who are working on serious murder crimes across the country. They report to us regularly, but not on a daily basis.

    In the Criminal Intelligence Directorate, we centrally coordinate and are involved in all the security investigations that are ongoing in Canada. We are aware of all the situations. They're controlled from a very high level. The commissioner is very aware. Because of the integrated aspect of it and the other partner agencies that are with us, if something occurs in an investigation and a piece of information comes up, that information is communicated quickly through these other organizations to quite high up, and they discuss it at very high levels.

    That doesn't occur in our normal criminal activities. So on the national security side we have to be totally engaged in every investigation, know exactly what's going on, and why they're doing it. All the information comes through us centrally. So there's that aspect of that control and coordination, to ensure that all the information is available, we know what's going on, and people don't do something outside of what they should be doing, as you suggested.

    There's considerable control exerted over national security files, because an envelope with a powder substance found in one area may have implications across Canada, or elsewhere in the world. A murder that occurs in Canada...although usually those are more localized, if you will, and maybe that's a poor example. But a Criminal Code investigation is usually based on a situation in that particular area, but when it's terrorism it could be related to something that has occurred in Canada or anywhere around the world, so we have to make sure it all comes in to the central area where it can be properly analysed and reviewed.

    In terms of being aware of what's going on, you mentioned instances where we may pick up and speak to people prior to having enough evidence to go to court, when we think there might be something they're about to do that's of a terrorist nature. Our first goal is to prevent, deter, or disrupt people from blowing things up or killing people. So we may not go to court at the end of the day, but we don't have the bombs going off either.

    Of course, we're very aware of their rights. Those rights are respected because we're aware that this will all be made public, and we respect the law at any rate.

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    The Chair: That was a good discussion and we've had a good meeting. I want to thank you very much for your testimony. It's been very helpful. There may be two or three issues on which members have asked for an additional reply.

    C/Supt Dan Killam: Will you be providing me with the follow-up questions? Some of the questions were rather long and I couldn't--

    The Chair: Mr. Rosen, will you be able to help out in some way here?

    C/Supt Dan Killam: If I can get the questions that were beyond my knowledge, I will be more than happy to have the answers returned.

    The Chair: It will probably have to wait until we get the blues. We'll make an effort to assist you to assist us. How's that?

    C/Supt Dan Killam: Excellent. Thank you so much.

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    We're adjourned.