SNAS Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, February 25, 2003

¹

1530

The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.))

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau (Associate Secretary to the Cabinet, Deputy Minister to the Deputy Prime Minister, and Security and Intelligence Coordinator, Privy Council Office)

¹

1535

¹

1540

¹

1545

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

¹

1550

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Chair

Mr. Robert Lanctôt (Châteauguay, BQ)

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)

¹

1555

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

The Chair

º

1600

Mr. Robert Lanctôt (Châteauguay, BQ)

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

º

1605

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Le président

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

º

1610

The Chair

Mr. Vic Toews (Provencher, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Larry Dickenson (Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Security and Intelligence Secretariat, Privy Council Office)

º

1615

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Vic Toews

The Chair

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

º

1620

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

º

1625

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

The Chair

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Vic Toews

º

1630

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Vic Toews

The Chair

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

The Chair

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

º

1635

The Chair

Mr. Larry Dickenson

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Larry Dickenson

º

1640

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Chair

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

The Chair

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

º

1645

The Chair

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

The Chair

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

The Chair

Mr. Vic Toews

º

1650

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Vic Toews

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

Mr. Vic Toews

The Chair

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

The Chair

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

º

1655

Mr. Larry Dickenson

The Chair

Mr. Larry Dickenson

The Chair

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

»

1700

The Chair

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

The Chair

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

The Chair

Mr. Ronald Bilodeau

The Chair

---

CANADA

Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

---

NUMBER 004

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, February 25, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹  (1530)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.)): Let's get started.

    Today we have as witnesses Mr. Ron Bilodeau, who is associate secretary to the cabinet, deputy minister to the Deputy Prime Minister, and security and intelligence coordinator, and Mr. Larry Dickenson, who is assistant secretary to the cabinet, security and intelligence secretariat. These titles are somewhat new to us, and so we'll want to clarify some of that.

    I also want to point out to our witnesses that the last time we had evidence from the Privy Council Office, we went in camera, as we thought it would be helpful and more relaxed, but it turns out that the same evidence was presented at an open meeting to the corresponding Senate committee, so our tour in camera was hardly worth the effort. We're in public session today, and we'll make the best of it.

    Welcome. I can see you have a well-prepared opening statement, Mr. Bilodeau. We're looking forward to the meeting and the issues we'll have a chance to discuss. You have the floor.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau (Associate Secretary to the Cabinet, Deputy Minister to the Deputy Prime Minister, and Security and Intelligence Coordinator, Privy Council Office): Thank you.

    Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee on National Security, let me thank you for the occasion to appear before you today with my colleague Mr. Dickenson.

[Translation]

    As you requested, what I propose to do today, in my role as Security and Intelligence Coordinator, is to give you an update on the progress the Government of Canada has made on security initiatives since Deputy Prime Minister Manley appeared before you last April 10, 2002.

[English]

More specifically, I propose to summarize very briefly the main points of Deputy Prime Minister Manley's April update. Following this, I will give an overview of the national and international environment in which we're operating. Then I'll outline some of the progress that was made over the last 10 months and identify some of the work that remains to be done.

    There is no doubt that the impact of September 11 was profound and represents a watershed in how the Canadian Government treats national security issues. As Deputy Prime Minister Manley pointed out last April, Canada's response was immediate and was founded on the following key objectives, which are still relevant today: keeping terrorists out of Canada; detecting, prosecuting, and removing terrorists from Canada; facilitating Canada-U.S. relations; supporting international initiatives, including counter-terrorist measures; and protecting Canada's infrastructure. The government's efforts were and still are guided by the work of the ad hoc committee of ministers on public security and anti-terrorism, PSAT, which meets regularly to review policies, legislation, and regulations across government to strengthen Canada's approach to fighting terrorism and ensuring public security.

    As noted by the DPM last April, the Government of Canada quickly established a solid foundation of security measures immediately after the events of September 11, which included the following: strong new legislation in Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act, which includes significant measures designed to identify, prosecute, convict, and punish terrorists; the investment of $7.7 billion over five years to enhance security, emergency preparedness, and border infrastructure; the Canada-U.S. smart border declaration and the accompanying 30-point action plan, which outlines shared commitments to develop a border that securely facilitates the free flow of people and commerce between Canada and the United States.

[Translation]

    While we continue to make considerable progress in achieving our key objectives, more work remains to be done. The context is such that we can expect Islamic extremism to continue. In our particular case, Canada is seen as a target but probably not a primary target. Last November our embassy in the Philippines was threatened and actually closed temporarily. That same month, a taped statement, believed to have been made by Osama ben Laden, identified Canada among other U.S. allies as potential targets. That was the first public indication of Canada as a target, which increased the possibility of potential threats to Canadian interests world-wide, whether abroad or within our territory.

¹  (1535)  

[English]

    The U.S. security and intelligence community is in a period of change. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security is one of the biggest reorganizations in the history of the United States government. Also, President Bush, in the State of the Union speech, announced the creation of the terrorist threat integration centre, a new centre that will merge and analyse terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad in order to get the most accurate picture of potentially emerging threats. Although Canada has a close relationship with the U.S. in security, intelligence, and defence, the creation of the DHS, as we call it, requires a coordinated approach in dealing with the new department, while maintaining existing relationships between our departments. Canada must ensure that the U.S. continues to view Canada as a full and effective partner in security and defence.

    Let me now provide you with an update on progress achieved since last spring and identify areas of ongoing interest. I will touch on the following six areas, transportation security, border security, immigration, emergency preparedness, international context, and legislative initiatives.

    On transportation security, Canada is making solid progress, we believe. In the spring of 2002 the newly created Canadian Air Transportation Security Authority was announced as the agency responsible for the provision of several key aviation security services in Canada. In December of last year CATSA assumed responsibility for pre-board screening at major airports. This includes training and certification for some 3,000 officers across the country. CATSA is also responsible for the Canadian air protective program, which has armed RCMP officers on selected flights, and for ensuring enhanced policing at airports. It has purchased advanced explosive detection systems and related state-of-the-art electronic security capabilities for deployment at airports. Ongoing work is still required to implement measures related to the screening and control of non-passengers and the actual deployment of explosive detection systems at Canadian airports.

    With marine transportation security, work on these issues has been fairly recent. In January the government announced a comprehensive package of measures to be implemented over the next five years. The package is designed to help protect Canada's marine sector by implementing initiatives to prevent, detect, and respond to marine security threats. Among other things, the package will provide funding for increased surveillance and tracking of marine traffic, screening of all passengers and crew on board large commercial vessels entering Canadian waters, and the installation of new detection equipment at ports to screen containers, and it will include provisions for establishing restricted areas to improve port security, requiring workers who enter those areas to undergo background checks and screenings.

    Canada and the U.S. place the highest priority on ensuring that our borders are safe and efficient, in order to ensure that low-risk goods and people can continue to move efficiently across the shared border. While significant progress has been achieved in all elements of the Canada-U.S. 30-point action plan, critical success has been achieved particularly in implementing key measures related to the pre-approval of low risk travellers and goods, the NEXUS and FAST programs, the former allowing frequent travellers who are not a risk to be identified and processed quickly, the latter allowing pre-identified low-risk goods to travel across the border, and securing the border through the creation of multidisciplinary Canada-U.S. integrated border enforcement teams. The number of integrated border enforcement teams along the Canada-U.S. borders is being increased to 14, and intelligence capabilities are being enhanced through the creation of integrated national security enforcement teams. These teams provide greater capacity for coordinated law enforcement responses and targeting of cross-border criminal activity. Canada and the U.S. have also committed themselves to conducting more counter-terrorism training exercises to test our response plans and to enhance joint response capabilities. The next joint exercise, TOPOFF 2, is scheduled for May 2003.

    The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary Ridge have announced that the smart border action plan will be expanded to include new areas for Canada-U.S. collaboration with regard to bio-security and science and technology. While we have made great strides on the border declaration, there still remains work to be done. While NEXUS is functional at six ports of entry, we need to continue work to expand this program to other volume ports of entry, such as the Windsor-Detroit tunnel, which is scheduled for March of this year, the Whirlpool, Rainbow, and Queenston-Lewiston bridges in Niagara Falls, and the crossing at Lacolle-Champlain in Quebec by the spring. Common service standards need to be developed, including maximum border wait times for low-risk trucks. We need to continue work on the two NEXUS-Air pilot sites scheduled for implementation at Ottawa and Montreal airports this year. While a great deal of work has been accomplished in implementing the Canadian advance passenger information system, we're finalizing the implementation of the passenger name record portion of this program and working closely with the United States to share information on high-risk individuals.

¹  (1540)  

[Translation]

    I come now to immigration. The Government of Canada believes that the best way to prevent terrorists from coming to Canada is to stop them before they get here. A Canadian approach that has been successfully adopted by other countries involved placing immigration control fraud officers overseas to focus on stopping people attempting to travel to Canada with improper documents. We have increased our number of such officers working overseas.

    Two joint passenger analysis units are being piloted at the airports in Miami and Vancouver where customs and immigration officials from both countries work together to identify and intercept high-risk travellers and goods. If the measures prove successful, consideration will be given to expanding them to other airports.

    Improving the security and integrity of documents is another important step. New public security initiatives to improve Canadian identification documents include: a new redesigned Canadian passport containing security features making it much more difficult to forge; the issuance of a new fraud-resistant permanent resident card to all Canadian permanent residents, which has been acknowledged as being one of the most secure documents currently in circulation in the world.

[English]

    Finally, on December 5, 2002, Canada signed the safe third country agreement with the United States, which will allow us to better manage the flow of refugee claimants across the border. Both Canada and the U.S. are currently finalizing the regulations to support the agreement, and we expect that it will be brought into force very soon.

    On emergency preparedness inside Canada, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, OCIPEP, has made a significant contribution to Canada's security. The current environment has meant that Canada must strengthen its emergency preparedness to respond to threats against critical infrastructure such as water, energy utilities, transportation, and communications systems, most of which are not federal assets. The capacity of OCIPEP has been expanded as a central point for coordination of federal activity in this area. Closer linkage has been established with other agencies, such as the RCMP, DND, and CSIS, and provincial and municipal governments and industry to enhance infrastructure protection and emergency preparedness.

    It is also necessary that Canada have the capacity to detect and respond to CBRN, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. Current efforts are aimed at enhancing existing labs to improve the response times and to accelerate the development, availability, and delivery of new technologies. Health Canada has increased its stockpile of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment that could be readily deployed to cope with casualties resulting from a CBRN attack. We're also in the final stages of procuring sufficient quantities of smallpox vaccine to vaccinate every Canadian in the event of an outbreak.

    On international initiatives, Canada works with its allies to deal with a much more difficult international scene and a wide range of threats, to prevent terrorist acquisition of weapons and materials of mass destruction, and to curb the financing of terrorism. From an economic, security, and defence standpoint, our relationship with the U.S. remains by far Canada's most important bilateral relationship. Canada needs to foster the political and security relationship to ensure continued economic prosperity. We need to re-examine Canada's operations abroad and the security provided to Canadian embassies. To complement domestic counter-terrorism strategies, Canada will need to assist other countries in preventing terrorist networks and to cut off the terror threat at the source.

    The Anti-Terrorism Act, Bill C-36, was passed last year, and we now hope to pass Bill C-17, the Public Safety Act, currently in the legislative committee. Bill C-17 contains important provisions that will enhance the capacity of the security and intelligence community to ensure the safety and security of Canadians. The bill also aims, among other things, to deter hoaxes that endanger the public, to establish tighter controls for explosive and hazardous substances, to help identify and prevent harmful unauthorized use of or interference with computer systems operated by counter-terrorism agencies, and to deter the proliferation of biological weapons. If passed, the legislation will need to be implemented through supporting policies and regulation and will require the support of provinces and territories and the private sector.

    Finally, the impact on privacy will require ongoing monitoring. As you all know, discussions about privacy rights versus security have been pervasive in the debate over security-related legislation. Ensuring security while protecting privacy remains a key government objective. The government will continue striving to strike the right balance between security and privacy rights.

    To conclude, Mr. Chair, let me say as a public servant that 9/11 has changed the way we do business in the security and intelligence community. While the frenetic pace has diminished slightly in the last year, the amount of work that remains certainly has not. The environment has changed for good, there is no status quo ante, and the context is such that terrorism will continue to be a threat for the foreseeable future.

    Thank you.

¹  (1545)  

    The Chair: I want to thank you very much. You covered a lot of territory, and you covered it quickly, so we're grateful for that as well.

    Colleagues, I'm going to go to Mr. Sorenson first. Mr. Pratt indicates that he has to leave, and if he has to leave before his turn comes, colleagues could consider accommodating his questions.

    Mr. Sorenson, seven minutes.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance): Thank you.

    Mr. Bilodeau, thank you for coming and bringing your report. Am I correct in understanding that you're fairly new to this position as Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council and that the individual you took over from was Richard Fadden?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: That's right.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Back in April 2002 Richard Fadden publicly asked whether it was time to review and formalize the capacity to gather foreign intelligence towards a better methodology. The director of CSIS would perhaps dispute the concern put forward by Mr. Fadden. We really don't have a very proactive stance right now in gathering information abroad. We depend on other countries, other intelligence gathering services to provide much of that to Canada. Could you give us your idea on our ability to do it?

    Second, you've talked about John Manley in here a number of times. Mr. Manley believes we should do it a little bit differently, that rather than extending CSIS's abilities to do that, we may need another body, much like the United States, to conduct the espionage and the intelligence gathering abroad. Which idea would you favour?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: I haven't formed a definitive view. It's an issue that's been debated considerably. In the media on the weekend there were some comments made that we should have a foreign intelligence agency like the CIA and that most other countries in the Commonwealth, Britain, New Zealand, Australia, have a domestic agency and a foreign agency. The case for that I haven't seen made strongly, sir, though I know there is a case. If we had more capability, we'd undoubtedly gather more information, through human sources and electronic sources, but we do gather intelligence from outside sources through the work of CSIS, through the work of the Canadian Security Establishment, CSE, so we have a fair amount of information that we collect ourselves. Other information we receive from our allies. If we had more resources and a separate agency, undoubtedly, we'd have a greater level of activity, and perhaps that would yield a benefit, but at what cost, and is that the first priority for the security sector? I believe that Mr. Fadden was right in asking the question, and as we form a judgment as to how effective our current work is, it's a question we should look at. I have an open mind about that at this stage.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Are there ongoing discussions specific to changes there?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: Not at this time at a very active level inside the government. There are ongoing discussions in the academic community, as you've seen, and in political parties. I think the matter has not been brought to focus for ministers to consider recently. Mr. Manley has opined that we can do it differently. He kept a door open for that suggestion, but I wouldn't say there's formal discussion.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: A number of security experts have also strongly suggested that the government establish a ministry of national security headed by a single cabinet minister. I think this was done in previous administrations, under the Kim Campbell government. This recommendation has been made in respect to concerns raised in 1996 by the Auditor General that there was within our national security information systems “a pattern of inadequate information to support front-line officials responsible for national security.” In the Hill Times released a couple of days ago the Solicitor General talked about the 17 different federal departments and agencies responsible for different aspects of national security. Do you have any comments in regard to the establishment of a ministry? We've seen it in the States with homeland security. I noticed in your brief that you mentioned we need to re-examine Canada's operations abroad and the security provided to Canadian embassies, as well as domestic security. Do you have any ideas on the development of a department of national security?

¹  (1550)  

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: The American experience warrants careful assessment. I was in Washington two weeks ago, and they're very much in the early stages of bringing together parts of nine agencies into a very large authority under Governor Ridge; I think they'll have more than 160,000 people. They felt that the multiplicity of agencies did not serve them well, and they're looking at that. As you pointed out, Ms. Campbell's government created such an agency, but when the government changed, it was reversed.

    There's no doubt that there are a lot of people involved in the security and intelligence community, and there probably would be better ways of structuring it if we started afresh today. The current arrangement has been in place for some time. I wouldn't say bigger would necessarily be better. If we bring together massive organizations, that can bring other difficulties. It perhaps would allow greater coordination, and it perhaps would save some money if we regrouped all the common services in all the departments involved. There are some key ones. Solicitor General, Foreign Affairs, the RCMP, CSIS, and CSE I describe as the core, and the Privy Council office. In the core departments and agencies there's quite good cohesion at the top and at the middle levels. When you go to the second level, people have functions other than security, as at Citizenship and Immigration, CCRA. Security is not their sole preoccupation, they have other goals, although this is a crucial one. As we, the committee and the Deputy Prime Minister, assess the success and efficiency of that, I'm sure there will be change over time. Will it be in the direction of regrouping like that? Possibly. The question is how far you go. If it becomes too big, maybe you have other kinds of problems. Again, I don't think we have shut the door on that.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sorensen.

    Could we go to Mr. Pratt now? Monsieur Lanctôt, you would be the key party here to consent.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt (Châteauguay, BQ): Not a problem.

    The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Lanctôt.

    Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thank you, colleague, thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you, Mr. Bilodeau, for being here today.

    Your presentation talks about 9/11 changing the way we do business in the security and intelligence community. I think it's clear that there has been a fair bit of money invested in making Canadians more secure, but I would argue, along with my colleague Mr. Sorensen, that there hasn't been any fundamental rethinking of how we do intelligence gathering in Canada and how we coordinate it. One would have thought that post-9/11 there was an opportunity for us to reflect on what we're doing, how we're doing it, and where we want to be in the future with intelligence gathering and making contributions to the pool of knowledge available, not just to ourselves, but to our allies as well.

    You talked about the ad hoc committee of ministers on public security and anti-terrorism. It seems to me that so much of what we have done over the last 20, 30, even 50 years in the area of intelligence gathering has been ad hoc. We added CSIS, of course, in 1984 with the CSIS Act. We changed where the Communications Security Establishment was within the Government of Canada; I think we moved it from NRC to DND back in the seventies. But there hasn't been a fundamental restructuring, a rethinking of our intelligence gathering mechanisms. It seemed to me that the McDonald commission report back in the early 1980s suggested that we do just that, that at some point or other we must have this debate.

    When you look at the various agencies that we have under various ministries, signals intelligence under DND, security intelligence, through CSIS, under the Solicitor General, criminal intelligence under the RCMP, assessment and coordination through PCO, and some elements of foreign intelligence, although it's limited as far as Foreign Affairs goes, is it not time, in your view, that we had this debate, that we took a serious look at what we're doing and how we're structuring it and perhaps at a single agency, like the Solicitor General's department, to bring everybody under the same umbrella and perhaps to politically drive the level of coordination and cooperation that exists between agencies?

¹  (1555)  

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: Following September 11 there was a need to close some gaps. There were some real security gaps in many of the departments and agencies I mentioned, and as a priority, those legal and policy gaps had to be closed, and additional resources have been thrown in. It would have been difficult at that time to change the rules of management and organization, as it was a crisis period. The crisis period, hopefully, will abate and we'll move forward.

    As I said in response to Mr. Sorenson, I have an open mind about this. I've worked in very large departments, and sometimes there is less coordination there when things are separate, so merging per se may not be the answer for all of it, but it could be the answer for much of it. I mentioned the core earlier, and the core security functions could be more closely knit together. I agree with that. At this time Mr. Manley chairs the committee. If he gets the sense that we need to look at that, he'll have an open mind about it as well.

    We've added, I believe, to the quality of intelligence gathering. We've added to the intensity. We've made some legal changes that allow it to be performed more broadly. So I would say on the intelligence front we're getting more, we're sharing it more, and the doors are open between CSIS, CSE, Foreign Affairs, and PCO to a larger extent. There's been more of a preoccupation with security, if I could put it like that. As to the way we do business, I take your advice. There are other ways that it could be handled and perhaps other ways that it could be more efficient. We'd need to look at that.

    Mr. David Pratt: From the standpoint of sovereignty, is there any concern within your office or within the government as a whole you've detected that we don't have a foreign intelligence agency and post-9/11 there seems to be some question as to the utility of some of our signals intelligence? I gather we are picking up quite a bit of information still there from those sorts of sources, but the people we're interested in largely, the really bad people, are staying below the radar with cell-based terrorism, and it's much harder to gather intelligence about their intentions and capabilities, so that we really have to look more, as the U.S. seems to be doing right now, in the area of human source intelligence. The fact that we're relying on other countries to supply human source intelligence in some respects makes us vulnerable, does it not, in accepting their information? Clearly, they're going to give us only information it is in their interest to give us. They're not going to give us information it is not in their interest to give us. Without those capabilities, as a G-8 country, we are at a fairly significant disadvantage, not just from the standpoint of security information, but on the economic side as well.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: We have very good relationships with United States, Britain, New Zealand, and Australia on the sharing of information. We obtain a lot from them, and there are special areas where we offer them valuable information. I have to admit, sir, if we obtained more, we'd exchange more, but I have no sense that we're not relevant or that our sovereignty is being questioned in these groups, quite the contrary. I was at a meeting the other day in Washington with the heads of the NSA and other agencies, and our contribution was recognized as very valuable. I think that would apply to our colleagues in the U.K. and elsewhere. If we chose to give ourselves more resources, we'd have a different dimension, and that could improve our performance. I agree with that.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Pratt.

    Monsieur Lanctôt, seven minutes.

º  (1600)  

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt (Châteauguay, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thought I was going to get two extra minutes, because I had been nice. But I will accept the seven minutes.

    Mr. Bilodeau, it is obviously rather difficult not to make an issue such as this, political not because of what has been said to date, but once again to try to solve problems. I always prefer to look at the root causes rather than picky details.

    In our past activities, we never needed an outside agency, a spy system or any such thing, because we always had a policy based much more on peace and democracy, and we respected what went on in the world, while watching what was happening as well.

    I think it is unfortunate to see Canada's actions and foreign policy at the moment and to realize that today we have to have this discussion about reintegrating outside agencies to carry out spy activities.

    Is that cost-effective? That is the question you raised earlier. I'm not going to try to hide the fact that I'm not terribly pleased about some of the foreign policy initiatives we have undertaken, and I'm sure there will be other such initiatives in the future. Would it not be more cost-effective to go back to a foreign policy focused more on peace, rather than trying to be so interventionist? That is something very new for Canada, and for Quebec as well. Let us forget about politics, because that is not your concern, even though you are involved in politics, we know how the system works.

    That is where we are at. We have to acknowledge that certain events have happened very close by. In fact, you mentioned that Canada may be on the list as a possible future target.

    Economically, we cannot have any security, as we have just seen. We do not have the funds required to have a proper defence or a strong army. Given that, why not at least consider having a security perimeter for the Americas, including Mexico? I am surprised to see that your text makes no reference to a security perimeter. All you talk about is the border between Canada and the United States, but there is no reference to the outside borders. Between you and me, the problem would not necessarily be between the United States and Canada. Of course, people cross on both sides, but the problem comes from elsewhere, and I think it is much more important to look at a security perimeter, than at our common border. I agree with the idea of investing money to make the border more secure, without having a negative impact on trade, I hope, but why not think about establishing a security perimeter that would include Mexico, Canada and the United States?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: Mr. Chairman, it is essentially a political decision to give priority to the security perimeter idea or to a more bilateral approach. I do not think anything has been ruled out. You will agree that the perimeter idea raises a number of complex issues. Things are very complicated where three countries spread over a geographic area the size of North America are involved. Things are complicated as well when two countries—Canada and the United States—are involved.

    There are some issues emerging with respect to the perimeter idea. For example, when we talk about exit controls with the Americans, we have to ask about people leaving the United States and people leaving Canada. The perimeter idea is not an easier subject. It raises some very complex issues both here and in the U.S.

    Europe has a perimeter for customs issues, and other matters. This is part of a European tradition that has been in place for several years now, and it has evolved over time.

    In the short-term, I think we have to start by looking at the security of our border. We started by agreeing, very openly on some 30 measures designed to facilitate travel for people who have a legitimate reason to travel and to stop those who might not have a legitimate reason to travel or who might be travelling for suspicious reasons. So it is always a difficult judgment call.

    As I was saying earlier in answer to Mr. Pratt, we had to start by doing the most urgent thing first. However, the idea of a perimeter or of working on a broader range of measures may also be in keeping with our security objectives. Such considerations may also raise issues about Canada's sovereignty. The result could be greater harmonization around the perimeter as regards either trade or security policies.

    If we have one large area, the policies of the three countries must be compatible. We cannot have national policies if there is a large perimeter in place; we must harmonize our policies. This raises questions about sovereignty and other political considerations. I am not the right person to discuss political considerations, but in technical terms, there are definitely some issues related to the perimeter that could be reviewed in an effective way. Will this be done? I do not know, but I do not disagree with our view.

    However, in the short-term, we must start with the bilateral relationship. Most people who come to Canada go through the United States, in terms of geographic borders. Those who arrive by plane come from all over the world. For example, in 2001, 59% of refugees came from the United States. So it was urgent to deal with this matter, particularly since our neighbours felt threatened and were talking about closing down the border. This would have had an immediate impact on exports from Canada, Quebec, Ontario and elsewhere to the United States. So we have to find a balance between security considerations and economic considerations. The question of a security perimeter might be considered at some point. This is a political judgment call.

º  (1605)  

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I understand from your answer that there have not yet been any meetings or discussions with Mexico and the United States about a security perimeter.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: No, not as part of a formal agenda.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I see.

    As I was saying, we cannot get into foreign policy, but we do know that certain things have happened. This file is new to you, but you had some information about the likelihood of problems in Canada as a result of terrorist activities. Who decided which places should be made secure, such as dams or buildings? And does the information I am requesting come under national security, or can you at least reassure people by telling us what your priorities are? What has already been done, and what remains to be done? And how are you going to establish the security of these building or structures and infrastructures?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: That is a complex matter, as you mentioned. Sometimes, the warnings we receive about a threat are specific, but generally, the warnings we receive through our intelligence methods are not very specific—in other words, the risk may be considered higher, but the place is not mentioned, and of course, there is no reference to the type of attack. So in those cases, governments and administrations have to take a number of measures to protect people. I mentioned what has been done in the case of airports, with police officers onboard aircraft, the security of our ports, transportation in general, and public buildings. I think that at the federal level, and as regards the provinces as well, the concern is greater. These measures are general in nature.

    Even in Washington last week, when the security level was quite high, the authorities were telling me that they felt threatened and that they did not know what might happen. So what do we do in a case like that? We take more preventive measures. Is this effective? I do not know, but I think it helps at least to establish a higher standard of security. I know that some people think that managing security in airports is still not adequate, but we have made a great deal of progress. This is apparent when you move around in airports.

    Other goods transportation facilities, hydroelectric infrastructures, gas pipelines and nuclear power stations are all infrastructures that may be threatened, but since we do not have any specific warnings, we have to take more general precautions. I think that in this regard, we are not different from other countries.

    We see the vast range of terrorist possibilities when a ship is attacked in the gulf or a nightclub is attacked in Bali. I think that terrorists look for weak links, and Canada and the United States are no longer weak links, because security has been stepped up. We are not an easy target, but we should not be too pleased too quickly, because it is very difficult to make such a statement.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: May I have one more minute?

    Le président: Thirty seconds.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: When the United States went up to code orange alert recently, did we get some intelligence as well? And why were we not in a heightened state of alert as well? Did you get any intelligence? If so, did it have to do with specific things involving the U.S. only, or could something have happened here, and yet we had no heightened state of alert?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: We were informed at the time of the mission. Mr. Ridge called the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Manley, and they shared the intelligence with us at that time. Subsequently, they acknowledged that their concerns may not have been entirely justified. They have these codes: yellow, green and red. We do not have a similar system of codes in Canada.

    The Government of Canada has a series of security levels that are in force. However, this is an issue that should perhaps be reviewed, because we do not have a comparable national security warning system.

    But we did received some information, yes.

º  (1610)  

[English]

    The Chair: Merci, monsieur Lanctôt.

    Mr. Toews, we'll go to five-minute rounds now. The parties have had their kick at the cat.

    Mr. Vic Toews (Provencher, Canadian Alliance): Thank you for your presentation.

    Over the past few weeks I had occasion to read a book by Bill Gertz entitled Breakdown. It talks about the American intelligence context. He wrote about the breakdown between the analysis of intelligence information and the operational capacity to respond, in fact, the lack of an operational capacity to respond. He also talked about the breakdown between the various agencies that gather information and the loss of an ability to construct the entire picture because of the differences separating these agencies' capacities to gather information. These problems, he indicates, led to the events of September 11 going undetected in the American context. I don't know if you're familiar with that book, but from that brief summary--

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: I'm familiar with the problem that is being analysed and addressed, but I have not read the book.

    Mr. Vic Toews: Can you make an analysis of whether we're in a similar position? Are we taking steps to address this kind of problem in Canada? I know you've answered part of that.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: There's no doubt that the mandate of the CIA and the mandate of the FBI are complementary, though they're different mandates and they operate at a different level. As I mentioned in my remarks, they announced last week the establishment of a terrorism threat integration centre that will bring together even better the CIA, the FBI, the NSA, the National Imagery Agency, and so on, so everybody will be in the same room, as it were, sharing that information, which is obtained from many different sources and is of very different types. In Canada we're working with CSIS, the RCMP, and other departments to share better. There are steps Mr. Elcock has taken so that we have exchanges of information at the analyst level, and at the senior levels as well.

    The agencies have different mandates. Preventing terrorist threats, if you are CIA, is different from the work of a law enforcement agency, which is to arrest and prosecute. I think everybody has to adjust to the common goals. I can't say in Canada we're perfect, but I think we have a fairly open system of information. We do not have the same quantities of intelligence, but what we do have I like to think we share fairly openly. Sometimes we have information mechanisms. We've got working-level committees--and Larry may want to comment--we have assistant deputy minister committees, and we have sharing at the analyst level. The important thing is that if somebody finds out something, he tells somebody else who can do something about it. It's not just the quality of the intelligence, but whether somebody will actually do something to prevent a terrorist attack.

    I think our agencies are on a high enough level of alert that if something is gleaned through intelligence, we'll rapidly hear about it, and the RCMP will rapidly hear about it, but I'm not going to sit here and pretend that it's perfect. These are large bureaucracies. I think the heads are very coordinated, and I meet with them regularly. We try to coordinate policies and activities, and I think at the working level it's improving as well. But there's foundation for concern in the book, sir, because when you bring together a number of different organizations, or even a large organization that has different components, the blending and the integration are a constant concern.

    Mr. Vic Toews: Perhaps, Mr. Dickenson, you'd like to comment.

    Mr. Larry Dickenson (Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Security and Intelligence Secretariat, Privy Council Office): PSAT was created after 9/11, but there was a lot of machinery in place before 9/11 that kicked into gear at, I would say, a frenetic pace, at the deputy minister level with Ron Bilodeau or at my level, and committees have met very frequently. In one sense it's probably easier to share information in Ottawa than it is in Washington, because of the relative size. The agency heads know each other really well and they work together really well.

    There's another element, I think, that is important to keep in mind. Despite the huge reorganization in Washington, they did not go so far as to create a CSIS. So there's no counterpart to CSIS in Washington. Each country makes a decision as to how it's going to structure iself to deal with foreign intelligence and national security. They have a CIA, we don't, we have a CSIS, they don't. There are different balances in how we structure our relationships.

º  (1615)  

    Mr. Vic Toews: We've noted this problem with the interagency sharing of information, certainly in the American context--Gertz points that out--and I'm sure we don't run a perfect system. What about the American-Canadian context? Are you satisfied with the level of sharing of information?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: As I mentioned, I was there 10 days ago and met with the heads of the NSA, NSC, and CIA. At that level I think there's excellent collaboration. Information is shared. I was told that the partnership is in good shape. We're obviously of a different size, but there are certain types of information we provide to which they don't readily have access. I think Keith Coulter, Ward Elcock, and Commissioner Zaccardelli are very much in contact with their counterparts, and their people as well. I got a good signal on that, sir.

    Mr. Vic Toews: Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Toews.

    Your chairman, of course, has a question or two, but if another member has some questions, I'll recognize for five minutes.

    Monsieur Lanctôt.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you.

    You told us that intelligence moves well between Canada and the United States. I asked a question about this last week, because I am somewhat intrigued by this matter. There was a report on RDI, I am sure you saw it as well, it was on Grands Reportages. I said that the CIA could have obtained all of the intelligence before September 11, but that it had rejected it, because no one took seriously the information coming from abroad, whether from Sudan or elsewhere.

    What I am wondering is whether the United States do the same thing with us as regards intelligence, and do we listen to them? Do you really get all the intelligence, or do they only give you the intelligence they choose to give you? That is my first question.

    My second question is about the $7.7 billion investment over five years. That is an overall amount, and we do not really know where the money is going to go. Will some of it go to CSIS or to the Security Intelligence Review Committee or to the RCMP. I hope you already have some idea about that. As some money already been distributed? What was mentioned in the new budget?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: If you like, Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to send the committee a breakdown by department of the amounts that were announced. I think we could send you that document separately.

    In the last budget, you saw that the government added $75 million over two years to the contingency reserve. It is always difficult to anticipate needs in the area of security, thus it is a good idea to have some funds available immediately, but also to keep a certain amount in reserve to cover contingencies. The Department of Transport has over $2 billion of the $7.7 billion for air safety. There is a breakdown of everything: the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Department of National Defence. I would be pleased to send you those figures.

    As far as intelligence sharing goes, I would say that there is a great deal of intelligence being passed back and forth. Does each piece of intelligence we receive get the proper analysis? I hope so. I have been assured in Washington, as I was saying earlier, that there was excellent cooperation, and that the people there were very appreciative of the information they received from us. I hope that for our part, we are very appreciative of what we received from them and from others, from the United Kingdom, for example.

    Of course, I would also say that between the analysis of a risk and any action or preventive activity, there is a need for coordination. What is the likelihood? Is the intelligence specific enough that we can take action? Can any preventive measures be taken? But we do have a number of individuals who analyze the raw data and prepare reports for the political decision-makers, for the heads of the agencies involved. Everything is directed to the top, and the intelligence is analyzed properly. This is an expensive process that involves significant resources.

    So I do hope that we make the best possible use of the information, sir, because we do have an entire intelligence organization in place in the departments in question. For my part, I find that what I see and what I analyze is very useful in ensuring your protection. That I can guarantee.

º  (1620)  

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Sorenson, five minutes.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: This is my first term as a member of Parliament, so excuse my ignorance of the Privy Council and some of the ways it goes. I'm trying to grasp the function of the Privy Council and the way it functions throughout the many different departments. I know the Director of the CIA in the United States is also the director of central intelligence, and I know he meets daily with the President. As there are risks assessed by CSIS, do they report directly to the Solicitor General, do they report directly to the Deputy Prime Minister or the Prime Minister? Where do you fit in? How often do you meet with the Prime Minister? How often do you meet with those involved?

    Second, to completely change the topic, we have a new debate going on in Canada now in regard to the national identity card. Some have said the national identity card is going to solve a lot of our problems in combatting terrorism and organized crime. They have suggested, in fact, I think our immigration minister has suggested, it could be set up in a very similar way to the social insurance cards--and we know what trouble we've had with those over the last little while. How would the Privy Council then be involved? You say you're non-partisan and you give non-partisan advice. Maybe you could just comment on the national security card. The Privacy Commissioner is absolutely horrified about the prospect.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: The Privy Council Office is the Department of the Prime Minister. Essentially, it advises him. It also serves as the secretariat to the cabinet and cabinet committees. Officials from the Privy Council Office work with the chairmen of the cabinet committees, prepare the meetings, prepare the briefings, etc., and do that with the Prime Minister for the full cabinet. The secretary, my boss, Mr. Himelfarb, meets with the Prime Minister daily and briefs him on the issues of the day. That could include security, it could include foreign policy, it could include anything. It's his job to inform the Prime Minister. In his absence, I or other colleagues will do it.

    The Privy Council Office also is charged with other functions. There's a foreign policy secretariat, there's a security and intelligence sector that I have the pleasure of handling, which involves about $4 million to $7 million and 50 people or so. Larry is the secretary of the public security and terrorism committee, and we also have an intelligence assessment group. So that's the security side.

    We are also in charge of senior appointments, and there are a number of other functions. It's a department that supports the Prime Minister, much like the White House staff, if you want, with all the differences.

    The chairman of CSIS, the head of the RCMP, the head of the Parole Board, and the head of Penitentiary Service report to the Solicitor General. They would inform the Solicitor General of information he needs to know, particularly the RCMP and CSIS, frequently. They also let us know if there are matters that should be drawn to the attention of the Prime Minister, so that I or Mr. Himelfarb or a colleague can brief the Prime Minister. Their normal reporting is through Mr. Easter, but they work horizontally with us. If there's something of consequence, I rely on them to let me know, so I can inform Mr. Manley and the Prime Minister. So there are two lines, the informal one and the formal one. The formal one is through Mr. Easter.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: If there is an imminent threat or an imminent risk and CSIS becomes aware of it, who do they immediately report to? Is it Ward Elcock who takes that risk to the Prime Minister's office?

º  (1625)  

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: Mr. Elcock would normally phone me, and we would inform the Prime Minister. He may come to a briefing if we require one on the issue. He also needs to inform his minister, Mr. Easter. If preventive steps must be taken right away, he'll also inform the RCMP and whatever local police, if it's outside the federal sector. He'd inform those who need to know, and in the Government of Canada that would be the Privy Council Office and the Solicitor General. In practice that works fairly well; it doesn't happen every day, but when it happens, we have good communications with him.

    Concerning the national identity card, I know this is a debate and the citizenship and immigration committee has had some discussions on this. We have in Canada a plethora of identity mechanisms, passports, driving permits, health cards, permanent resident cards, and it's very much an issue that all these cards be valid and be based on the real information, whether it's birth information or Canadian citizenship information. So the government is working to ensure what we call document integrity, so that if I have my baptism certificate, it is not a fraud. In Quebec they're converting from baptism certificates to birth certificates, because baptism certificates are harder to get and perhaps more open to the possibility of fraud. So the whole question of document integrity is one we're working on very much.

    The question of a national identity card raises issues of efficiency and privacy--what would be on the card, would it be biometrics, would it just be a card number with a picture? Certain countries have that. I lived in France, and there'd be a carte grise; you have to show it all the time if you're a permanent resident or an immigrant worker. The Privacy Commissioner has been very eloquent about liberty and privacy and not being asked who we are every time we meet a police officer or go in a building. We have to balance those goals, which are very important and protected in our Constitution and our charter, with security, and that is essentially a political debate. It's up to people to point out the risks and the benefits, and it will be up to politicians to make the decisions. If everybody has the same card and we all know how it's prepared, perhaps there's a gain in security, but at what price to your privacy, and who will use that card? If you're being asked who you are for a security motive, that's fine, but if you're asked who you are for tax purposes or other purposes, it may not be fine.

    I'm not going to take sides. I think the issue requires more work and more discussion and I think it will be with us, because as other countries move in that direction, without copying them, we must be in the position to say our security and our documents are as good as theirs, or else there's a lack of confidence. The Canadian passport's a very important document, it's respected. If it becomes challenged, if it becomes subject to questioning, we lose our credibility. Maybe, if I come back next year, we'll have advanced on that one.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sorenson.

    Mr. Toews.

    Mr. Vic Toews: I remember many years ago being in one of the European countries and standing in a line in the bank, and there was an elderly gentleman trying to cash a cheque. He brought out this card. The card was a picture of perhaps an 18-year-old man, and the bank teller looked at it and the cheque that he wanted to cash. He said, well, sign the back of the cheque. The man said he couldn't write. So then they took his thumbprint with the ink pad, put his thumbprint onto the back of the cheque, he put an X by it, and they cashed his cheque. So there are all kinds of problems with any type of national system of identity, and I'm sure you will be considering all those intricate details.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: And none is foolproof, you know, sir.

    Mr. Vic Toews: And none is foolproof.

º  (1630)  

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: Except now biometrics that aim to identify you with fingerprints, iris prints, and so on seem to be the order of the day and seem to be developing greatly. But so far our cards, as you say, are subject sometimes to questioning, and the question is how much information you've got to provide to the government to get a card and how credible and how valid are the basic documents.

    Mr. Vic Toews: The question then is for what purposes non-governmental agencies will demand it, and it concerns me very much that it's not just government agencies that will use it, but all types of non-governmental agencies. It becomes the standard method of identification.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: That's right, and there's a loss of liberty implied.

    Mr. Vic Toews: It was just an observation.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Toews.

    I have several questions. For the first one I'd like to ask there may not be an answer, but I do want to get it on the record. It has to do with this complex world of managing security threats. Last time I looked we had one person, namely, the Deputy Prime Minister, the member of Parliament for a particular riding, chairman of the ad hoc committee of ministers on public security and anti-terrorism, which we call PSAT, the Minister of Finance. I don't understand how one guy can do all that. I've been around here for 15 years and, Mr. Bilodeau, Mr. Dickenson, I'm sure you've been here many years. I don't have difficulty reaching the conclusion that one person can't do all that. So who the hell is doing the work? Who's got their hand on the tiller here? I would think being Minister of Finance is a full-time job. I'm a member of Parliament, and that's a full-time job. Obviously, Mr. Manley has a whole lot of help from people. Can you reassure me that one person with one head and one brain and only two hands can handle this with all the other jobs there are to do?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: There's no doubt, Mr. Chair, that it's a large mandate. The committee of ministers meets regularly, about every second week, and preparing for that and chairing that is very onerous. Mr. Manley has been very generous with his time. He's available for pre-briefings, he chairs the meetings, and he's very interested in the follow-up. He's carved out the time to manage the committee. He's also carved out the time to meet with Governor Ridge, as you've seen, and he'll be meeting with him soon. It gives us a good relationship with the United States.

    I share your concern on the amount of work a person can do in one day. We try to rely on the responsible ministers for the delivery and the development of our ideas, so we try to keep the Deputy Prime Minister and the chairman at the strategic level and not in the day-to-day management. As I've said in response to other questions, there could be different arrangements at that level, but I think this one works very well for us at this time. There is no end of comment about how good the relationship is between the Governor and Mr. Manley. I'm sure Mr. Manley works in the evening and he'd like to have an hour off now and then, and I would be very much in favour of that as well. Over time perhaps, as I said, the political responsibilities and the organization of government will evolve. At this time I have no indication that it's a problem.

    The Chair: Something tells me he's going to be looking for some more time for other purposes in the near future.

    Let me ask you why it took a whole year to appoint replacements to the Security Intelligence Review Committee. That agency, which is important to Parliament, had to operate for a whole year with three out of the five person committee. Why did it take a year? I realize the resignations of the two prime members was rather quick and precipitous, but I don't feel it was fair to SIRC to let them run for a year with half the team.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: I can't comment as to why it took that time. I can only say, to occupy a function like that, the number of people you're looking at is not large and they have to be available and have to be made members of the Privy Council. So there's a select and small market, if I could use that word. I appreciate the time and the impact. I met with Madame Gauthier, as I think you have recently as well, and I'm glad we were able to make one appointment. I'm quite confident that the other vacancy will be filled very soon. The prerogative to make appointments on that is with the Prime Minister, and we try to help him find candidates as best we can.

º  (1635)  

    The Chair: It's great to have some progress.

    Mr. Dickenson, some of the terms and the organizational chart references here are changed from a year or two ago. Can you outline for us your responsibilities, so we can correct them on the flow chart?

    Mr. Larry Dickenson: To put it in its briefest form, I'm the coordinator's coordinator. In fact, my job is multiple. My office provides the secretariat support to the ad hoc committee on public security and anti-terrorism. We provide all the support mechanism that goes into that particular cabinet process. I chair an ADM committee on intelligence policy and participate in many other committees within my portfolio. Within my office we have three groups, one dealing with departmental security, one dealing with foreign intelligence, and one dealing with national security, and they are the liaison with the various departments and agencies in the community.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Sorenson, on that subject, presumably.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Not quite.

    I want get your opinions on whether or not Canada should be warning the general public in case of a risk or terrorist attack. We saw in the United States over the last week or two the level of risk go from yellow to orange. As far as you know, do we have anything? Do we ever have a case where we would warn the general public? Do we have colour-coded risk assessments? Are we at code taupe, at code pink, where are we? Is there a need for warning the Canadian public?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: It's the responsibility of government to warn its citizens if there are identified and clear risks, there's no doubt about that. As I told Mr. Lanctôt, there is not a colour code warning system we adjust in an ongoing way, as in the United States. Inside the Government of Canada we have levels of security for the physical security of our buildings, and we adjust that as required. If there has been a threat against the Langevin Block, it's my duty to take steps to make sure we're protected. Then there are some risks that apply across all the departments. We do inform Canadians travelling or working abroad. We evacuate employees from missions abroad when the risk is high. If a warning about a specific risk to our country or parts of it were given to us, it would be incumbent upon us to let the people concerned know, or else we wouldn't be doing our duty.

    The concern involves creating alarmism and excessive tension set against not warning in time. I think we would have a duty, it would be our job to do that. Correct me if I'm wrong, Larry, but we haven't had a general, across Canada warning, and we have not elevated the level of departmental security recently, but we're not at the lowest level. Since September 11 we've been at the second level--we have four levels--meaning people going into the buildings are checked. If we move into a situation in Iraq of greater tension and our risk goes up again, we may have to increase the level of physical security. Then we will issue the proper warnings.

    Mr. Larry Dickenson: There's another element I think is quite important here, and it's what I would call the vertical communications. The Department of Health has very direct relationships with the provincial departments of health, and so it is with police, transport, ministries of justice, attorneys general. There are tremendous vertical communications within the various sectors. To come back to an observation Mr. Bilodeau made earlier, if CSIS gets something that is real and credible and needs to be acted upon, they very quickly speak to the RCMP, customs and immigration, or whoever would have some capacity to deal with it. Then they work their vertical streams.

º  (1640)  

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: As to whether we should have an early warning system, Canada being a federal state, some of the security responsibilities are provincial and would need to be harmonized. I think it's very much a question of how we are organized to do security, who's in charge, what kind of formal policy we should have, and whether it should include levels of warning and alertness across the country. This is something I really welcome views on.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Is there an alert we would ever give to a premier of a province, or would that be left up to the RCMP?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: It would normally be left up to the RCMP. As you know, they are the provincial police in all provinces except Quebec and Ontario. It depends on the type of risk and where it comes from. If it comes from CSIS, it's mainly given to the RCMP, who inform their counterparts. It depends how global it is. With a risk for Canada in general, which I have difficulty envisaging at this point, or an airport or a city, you want to inform the people who need to know without creating alarm across the country. We don't necessarily want to buy duct tape and close our windows and batten down the hatches unnecessarily, nor do we want to be caught by surprise. So it's a trade-off.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Monsieur Lanctôt.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I have one last very specific question about Montreal waterways. It's a well-known fact that all drinking water for the city of Montreal comes from the St. Lawrence River. So is there any rapid intervention if ever dangerous toxins were spilled in the river following a terrorist act, and how long would it take? If such a spillage ever occurred, the entire city would be contaminated. So are there any provisions for such an eventuality?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: In the event of a disaster, be it a natural or the result of a terrorist act, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness which is connected with the Department of National Defence, would work with municipal and provincial authorities and at that point there would be two issues: that of damages, that is the financial and physical consequences of such a disaster, and if it is a criminal act, the issue of finding the guilty party. In cases such as floods, forest fires or earthquakes, there are federal programs, as you know, which provide compensation for damages. In the case of poisoning of...

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: It's just that we're talking about waterways here. So of course this would be related to ships, and therefore...

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: At that point, as far as direct federal jurisdiction is concerned, we'd have to determine what kind of disaster it is.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: So intervention is possible, but it would be done through all levels of government.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: Yes, absolutely.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Okay, but has anything specific been planned since 9/11, or do we still have the same system?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: The budget for the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness has been increased in order to provide protection against these kinds of disasters, be they chemical, biological or radiological. This office already has programs in place to compensate for damages caused by natural disasters. So this has been greatly amplified and is...

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: But before paying damages, is there any provision for action to prevent damages in case of a spillage?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: Yes. We begin by responding to the physical damages and after that, we examine the financial implications. We're talking about spillage of pollutants here. That involves the army and so forth. There are programs in place for this, absolutely.

[English]

    The Chair: I'd like to ask a question about the relationship between the RCMP and CSIS when it comes to threats. Since 1984, as a policy matter, we have placed investigation of threats to Canada with CSIS, not the RCMP. Since 9/11 there's been an increase in the work the RCMP has had to do across the country. If I'm not mistaken, there has been added into the website as part of their functions the phrase “threats to security of Canada”. That disturbs me, because it's contrary to the policy. The RCMP does not handle threats to Canada. It does criminal intelligence, it does security for protected persons, a number of things, but it just doesn't, as far as I can see, have a mandate to collect intelligence on threats to Canada. That job belongs to CSIS. Has that come up within your bailiwick as an issue? I'm asking you to keep your eye open for it, but I'm also asking whether it has come up.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: To my knowledge, it has not come up. The RCMP is obviously charged with preventing terrorist threats at airports and places like that. On the intelligence side, I think in practice they work closely with CSIS. They don't have the same intelligence. I'm not in a position to comment broadly on how much they do, because I'm simply not briefed on it, but there hasn't been the suggestion that they're trampling over each other's toes or that one is invading the turf of the other. I met with both the commissioner and the director recently and I reviewed the relationship they have with each other. That has not come up. I'll keep my eye open for it, and I'll be able to comment further if it does come up.

º  (1645)  

    The Chair: I'll make sure it comes up at estimates. It appears to be an issue, just based on what I see on their website.

    Mr. Bilodeau, you mentioned Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act. You indicated that it included significant measures designed to identify, prosecute, convict, and punish terrorists. To my understanding, those sections haven't been used yet.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: That's right.

    The Chair: Okay. I could ask why, but I don't need to at this point. If they haven't been used, they haven't been used.

    I want to talk about the U.S.-Canada border. What we've had up to now are two two-way borders, a U.S. border that has two-way traffic and a Canadian border that has two-way traffic. Has this thought been reduced to writing, that instead of having two two-way borders, we might, as two countries, be just as well off with one two-way border, accomplishing, in effect, the function of a screen, a Checkpoint Charlie? Rather than two independent borders operating a hundred yards apart from each other, perhaps what we really need is a screen. It seems to be the economic goal here to facilitate movement back and forth across the border at the same time as we catch the bad guys, and it seems to me it would be easier to do that if we just had one screen, instead of two borders. Has that concept been reduced to writing or is it being looked at for busy crossing points?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: Not as such, Mr. Chair. We've integrated, as I mentioned in my remarks, some of the border security teams on both sides. At the customs people work jointly and can cross the border to work on the other side if that is required, and we have better intelligence, but we've not moved to the single border. That would represent a level of harmonization of not only our security policies, but our economic policies. Perhaps it would be ideal for other reasons. It would need some political judgments to be made. I agree with you, it would be innovative, but so far we've tried to minimize the impact of having two posts by saying, on a certain number of things we will harmonize the rules, we'll agree to the processes, we'll agree to the identification of people. NEXUS and FAST are systems recognized on both sides. We have elements of a single management, but we still have two border points.

    The Chair: Mr. Toews.

    Mr. Vic Toews: To follow up on some of the things Mr. Sorenson has said, despite the significant degree of integration between the United States and Canada in a number of respects, we see a difference in the approach to things like warning about possible risks. We have a very integrated economy, a very integrated transportation system, and on one side of the border we have officials warning their people, on this side of the border there's virtually nothing. Is this simply a difference in public policy, as one of your last answers would suggest? There are obviously public policy issues here. You don't want to panic your citizens. Or does Canada simply not know?

    I seem to get more information from BBC and CNN and Fox than I get from any Canadian news stations. Have you considered whether it would be in the interest of Canadians to have a briefing session, in much the same way as the American President has officials out giving the press briefings, in a non-political context? They call question period in the House of Commons question period for a reason: there are no answers, it's a question period. I'm wondering whether we should move to that sort of system in order to at least reassure people that our government is on top of these issues.

º  (1650)  

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: It's a very good question. There have been what we call technical briefings in a number of instances in the past. There were some on September 11, some on Y2K by officials. They're not at the same frequency as in Washington. We haven't had the same risk level as in Washington. Why have we not given the warnings? Because we haven't had the threat level that causes us to give a useful warning. That's not to say it won't happen in the future, because the obligation of government is to inform its citizens about the threats that face them. In the event of a war, in the event of a crisis, we do normally go to more frequent briefings, either by military officers or by civilian officers, as required. It's not excluded. There hasn't been a lot of it, I agree with you. There have not been specific threats that would lead us to take those steps at this time, thank God. If there are specific threats facing one sector, one region, or the totality of our country, those approaches would be followed.

    If you feel, as sometimes I do, that we do not have enough information about our own responses on a number of things, it's our duty to provide that information, and the responsible ministers would be there to do that. I don't think there's any objecting to that. It has to be based on something real, it has to be something that is useful for the citizens, not to create an alarm where people are anxious, but can't do anything about their anxiety. There's a judgment there.

    Mr. Vic Toews: We look at CNN, they've got pictures of guys stapling plastic all over their houses, and I'm thinking, and I'm sure my constituents are thinking, if missiles are coming over here, hey, just south of the border they are stapling plastic, why is our government not saying anything? So I'm just wondering if there shouldn't be some kind of formal process by which at least we can say, look, the Americans have certain information that we've also considered, and we don't see the same risk in our context.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: More information, if only to reassure.

    Mr. Vic Toews: Exactly.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: Well, that's an excellent suggestion.

    Mr. Vic Toews: People are phoning me and saying, what do I do? I don't want to send them down to the Canadian Tire to buy rolls of tape and plastic if it isn't warranted. If it is warranted, I'll tell them to go there.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: If it's warranted, the obligation of the government is to give information to protect the citizens. That's based on specific risk and gives them a course of action to follow. It's our duty to recommend that to the responsible minister. I take your suggestion positively, sir.

    Mr. Vic Toews: Thank you.

    The Chair: I'm kind of relieved there haven't been any duct tape warnings. It makes it easier to get in and out of Canadian Tire and Home Hardware.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: Shortages of bottled water.

    The Chair: That's right.

    I'd like to ask a question about OCIPEP. In my earlier comments about the RCMP and CSIS I didn't want to suggest that there was anything going on involving bad faith. The RCMP are, in the utmost good faith, carrying out the heavy demands that have been placed on them, but they also would be involved, in some respects, in liaising with provincial and municipal agencies under the OCIPEP framework. I, as an MP, have been spoken to by municipal authorities saying, this national security preparation business means we have to spend a whole lot of local taxpayers' dollars in preparing our local police, our local medical authorities, but we haven't seen a nickel of federal money. I try to explain that local policing and local medical response are usually locally and provincially funded, but there still is a question, and we, as a committee, may have a look at this later. Can you address the issue of whether or not the federal government is in any way funding, through OCIPEP, the necessary municipal and provincial response to some of these potential new threats?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: I don't know if Larry has some figures, but I'm aware that we're helping to fund some training for police and for local authorities in the event of chemical, biological, and those nasty types of attacks. There's been funding provided in the budget, and we'll provide you with the display of the amounts of the budget that have been announced, including OCIPEP.

    Perhaps, Larry, you have more detailed information on that.

º  (1655)  

    Mr. Larry Dickenson: With all funding, there's never enough, and one has to make judgments as to where it should go, but in budget 2001 $10 million was provided for CBRN, which has been all allocated; 11 out of 13 jurisdictions in Canada took up the call, two in the far north did not.

    The Chair: Can you just clarify that acronym.

    Mr. Larry Dickenson: Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear. They even have a better one, an acronym buried in an acronym, and I always have trouble with it.

    There's money in the budget for HUSRVs, heavy urban search and rescue vehicles, $20 million over six years. That is being allocated. And some of these budgets go on into the future as ongoing funding. There's significant money to be spent on training for first responders, because that's essential, you're quite right. The first responder is usually not a federal official, it's somebody at the provincial and municipal level. A pilot project takes place in New Brunswick next month, and that will be rolled out. That whole training program has been designed in direct cooperation with provincial and municipal governments, maybe not some of the municipalities in every riding, but in general across the country. So there are funds being expended in this area.

    The Chair: Okay. Thank you, that's been very helpful.

    Monsieur Lanctôt.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I have a question about something we don't hear much about any more, but the subject was raised after 9/11 and a few times afterwards by Mrs. Clinton. The United States react immediately by saying that we have a real security problem at our borders, and not only our borders with the United States, but with regard to what happens outside.

    I don't want to come back to the issue of the security perimeter, but the CIA and others spend a great deal of money for that kind of intelligence. So they immediately say that we have a problem and we're continuing. We mustn't disregard the fact that Mrs. Clinton certainly had privileged information at that time. They must be discussing this all the time.

    So my question is should we take them seriously or are they really doing this to force Canada to invest even more money and tell us where to invest this money? Is the aim of these American demands to make us invest more money in security or is this real information they're giving us?

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: There is no doubt that the United States are very concerned, and with good reason, about their security. If you went there,you would know what I mean. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, they have felt vulnerable and they feel that the border is a weak point. Since we have a fairly intense border action program, I think that American concerns will decrease over time, but they will never disappear completely; and that's exactly what I heard the other day.

    I think we have to focus on certain aspects, for instance on the way we manage our refugee system and the fact that many refugees come from the United States. We have signed a third-safe country agreement with them to send refugees back to the United States and so on. It's clear that the media, in some cases, may raise or reinforce concerns. It's always easier to deal with things happening on your own territory which you can address as they come up, rather than things that are happening on your neighbour's territory. But we have made some progress.

    The Americans have not forced us into making certain expenditures or adopting measures which are not in-line with our objectives. I think that our discussions deal with common objectives. The United States have one approach to security and Canada has another. As long as the degree of security on both sides of the border is equal, the type of approach taken does not really matter. I think they're open to that argument.

    But you are right to point out that it is a concern and will remain one for them. We are going to meet with elected officials in the United States. As long as we can inform them of what we are doing and as long as you feel reassured that our approach is valid, I feel that over time communication between both sides will have to be better, because security is something which regularly appears on the radar screen down there.

    As the chairman said a little earlier, if there was only one border and both sides work the same way, things would be simpler, but that would surely give way to other issues. In order to protect our sovereignty, there are certain things we do differently and which we want to continue to do differently. I don't know if this answers your question, but I do agree with you that security is the main issue.

»  (1700)  

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you.

    I have one final question, about the communications security establishment. As I understand the organizational chart, you, Mr. Bilodeau, are responsible to the Minister of National Defence for the policy and operations of CSE. CSE has been happily doing its work, apparently, quite well for 50 years or so, and now we've seen fit to clothe it in a statutory mandate, which is a good thing. How do you know, working where you do, that what comes out of CSE is as much as you need? How do you know that the product coming to you or going elsewhere from CSE is what it should be? Because you don't work there--well, maybe you do work there from time to time. Just tell us how you know what you get from CSE is what it should be, not too little and appropriate to our policy goals.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: I participate, obviously, in briefing the Minister of National Defence regularly on CSE policies and activities and management. Mrs. Bloodworth, the deputy of Defence, assumes the administrative responsibility over CSE, I have the policy, in other words, the oversight of what they are doing and what results they are achieving. So the role is split. I meet weekly, if not more, with Mr. Coulter. I talk to him on the phone, I receive written information, I look at his business plan, I meet with his management team, because as I am the deputy minister, it's my team, in a sense. Like many deputy ministers, I don't know all the projects that are going on in the department, but I'm briefed on the strategy, the funding, and the general orientation. If I need anything, obviously, I'm provided with that information. If Mr. McCallum asks for anything, we meet with him regularly. So I can't answer for all the detailed projects going on day to day, but strategically, with the broad direction, I have the feeling that I have very good information. We could inform the committee further, with Mr. Coulter, at some point, if that would be of interest to you.

    The Chair: Yes, we could invite the chief here at some time. Because CSE has been quite buried for so many years, the accountability linkages are also buried, and most of my colleagues are not fully aware of them.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: The point, if I may, sir, is the extent to which CSE meets the needs of its clients. It works with CSIS, it works with Defence, and so on. So through those contacts, I'm able to assess whether we're on the right page or not. And indeed, I met representatives from the United Kingdom and the United States very recently. The corporate relations of CSE with its partners are very positive. So I try to get my information not just from the vertical line inside, but from other departments, and indeed other countries.

    The Chair: Okay. That's great.

    Thank you, Mr. Bilodeau and Mr. Dickenson, for appearing. I think it's been a very useful meeting.

    Mr. Ronald Bilodeau: Thanks to you, sir.

    The Chair: We'll adjourn now.