NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, October 18, 2001

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[English]

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

Ladies and gentlemen of the standing committee, I'd like to take this opportunity to welcome Ms. Margaret Purdy, Associate Deputy Minister of the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, as well as her colleague, Mr. James Harlick, Assistant Deputy Minister, Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness.

Ms. Purdy, we were very pleased to have you before the committee last spring as part of our study of the operational readiness of the Canadian Forces. Obviously much has changed since you were last before us. In light of the events of September 11, it was felt rather appropriate that we bring you back in front of the committee to talk about the whole issue of emergency preparedness.

Without any further delay, Ms. Purdy, you have the floor. We look forward to getting your comments.

Ms. Margaret Purdy (Associate Deputy Minister, Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, Department of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.

You're right. Mr. Harlick and I were here earlier this year, I think in May, to discuss the role of this still relatively new Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness. I'm going to call it OCIPEP, because that's quite a mouthful to repeat.

We have made in OCIPEP significant progress in fulfilling our new mandate. I'm going to use this meeting to update you on that progress. Since we last met, the security environment in which both we and other parts of the government operate has indeed changed significantly.

I personally spent many years in the counterterrorism business, first in the RCMP and later in CSIS. Despite that, I was shocked by September 11, by how quickly and how fundamentally those horrible events altered our understanding of the nature and the impacts of terrorism.

When I was working in the RCMP as an intelligence analyst on the Air India and Narita airport investigation, I thought that was the unimaginable terrorist act, with 331 people, most of them Canadians, killed on a single day in June 1985. It was the most serious act of international terrorism ever in terms of the numbers of casualties. September 11 has irrevocably changed my sense of the imaginable and the unimaginable.

Just as I felt a deep sense of duty to be part of the RCMP and CSIS teams responsible for addressing terrorist threats in the 1980s and 1990s, I feel an even greater sense of duty today in the job that lays before me as the official responsible for OCIPEP. The government has made a clear commitment to Canadians, to the United States, and to our other allies to do whatever is necessary to fight terrorism at home and abroad. The government has also committed to ensuring that Canada remains one of the safest countries in the world and to maintaining Canadians' sense of personal safety. Everyone is focused on addressing this important new challenge.

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The government is moving ahead, as you know, with a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. We've already seen concrete action and announcements on a number of fronts with regard to military, security, legislation, and funding.

The minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff have appeared before you in recent days to talk to you about the contributions of the department and the Canadian Forces. I want to elaborate today, in the same context, on the role of OCIPEP.

I'm not going to repeat the presentation I gave to you in May, but I do want to remind you briefly of why OCIPEP was created and what it does. I'm then going to move on to describe the work we've undertaken since September 11. I want to finish with a few thoughts on lessons learned from that experience and the challenges before us as an organization.

We are a civilian organization within the Department of National Defence. The Prime Minister created OCIPEP about eight months ago and assigned it two key mandates. The first is to provide national leadership on a new modern and comprehensive approach to protecting Canada's critical infrastructure in the key physical and cyber-components of energy and utilities, communications, services, transportation, safety, and government sectors. The second mandate was to be the government's primary agency for ensuring national civil emergency preparedness for all types of emergencies.

Put simply, OCIPEP acts as a catalyst. We seek to enhance the capacity of individuals, of communities, of businesses, and of governments in Canada to effectively manage risk to their physical and cyber-environments. We are an all-hazards, all-risks agency. We recognize that vastly different events can have similar impacts. This is key. For example, an important facility can be disrupted by a tornado, a terrorist bomb, or a malicious cyber-attack. A massive earthquake can cause similar physical devastation and mass casualties to what we witnessed in New York City on September 11.

We have programs in place in OCIPEP to prepare for, to prevent, to monitor, to respond, and to recover from the impact of that full range of hazards and risks. These programs include training at the Canadian Emergency Preparedness College in Arnprior, research programs, outreach programs, and financial assistance programs.

When I appeared before you in May, you inquired about my budget and whether I had enough resources to fulfil all parts of my mandate. Nothing had been finalized then, as I recall, so I couldn't provide you with specific answers. Today I'm pleased to report to you that the government has increased my total operating budget from just under $10 million in February to about $21 million today.

In addition, as part of the recent package of counterterrorism investments, I've been allocated an additional $5 million this year to undertake some key projects immediately. These include enhancing the operational capacity of our headquarters and our regional offices across the country, establishing joint operation centres with some of the provinces, and improving our capacity to monitor and analyse intrusions or attacks on government computer networks. This new money will also allow us to increase our workforce from about 80 to about 150, both here and across the country.

Let me summarize some of OCIPEP's activities since September 11 to illustrate our role and our contribution.

[Translation]

The Office was placed on a heightened state of vigilance immediately after the attacks in the US—and we remain there today. Additional staff were assigned to the Government Emergency Operations Co-ordination Centre to enhance our existing 24-hour, seven-day monitoring capabilities.

Within hours of the attacks, we had compiled an inventory of resources available in Canada for humanitarian assistance to the United States (medical supplies and expertise, construction equipment and engineers, telecommunications equipment, the Canadian Forces Disaster Assistance Response Team, etc. This information was communicated immediately through our Canadian ambassador in Washington to the US government.

Working with many others, OCIPEP helped organize the transfer of support and resources to help local authorities—in places like Vancouver, Whitehorse, Gander, St. John's and Halifax—accommodate the thousands of passengers diverted to Canada.

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We used our Web site and our well-established networks of contacts across Canada to issue specific alerts and advisories as well as general information—for example, on the terrorist threat to Canada's critical infrastructure and on specific cyber threats.

[English]

We've also accelerated our work on the national critical infrastructure protection program, a revitalization of a program some of you may have known as the Vital Points program during the Cold War years. The aim of this program is to compile detailed information of value to those who actually own, operate, or regulate this country's critical infrastructure, and of value to emergency planners at all levels, first responders, or police investigators.

When a specific threat appears, the program will assist those who must react and who must take decisions—for example, decisions on which facilities need special attention, and why. Since September 11 we've been in direct contact with critical infrastructure owners and operators to advise them to exercise increased vigilance, to exchange information with them, and to determine appropriate protective measures with them. Minister Eggleton mentioned, for example, a recent meeting we attended with representatives of the energy industry in Alberta.

Since September 11 we have accelerated collaborative work already under way with our Solicitor General colleagues on the Canadian response to chemical, biological, and nuclear terrorism. We are co-chairing consultations across Canada this month that are aimed at ensuring that all jurisdictions work together to maintain and improve our national response capacity.

While there is currently no known specific biological or chemical terrorist threat to Canada, we cannot afford to take the safety and security of Canadians for granted. Canada has response plans and skilled personnel in place to deal with both threats and incidents. The Canadian response includes police, firefighting, ambulance, and hazardous materials experts. It also includes hospitals, medical staff, and world-class laboratories, including the one operated by Defence Research and Development Canada in Suffield, Alberta. It includes specialized response teams, including the one operated by the Canadian Forces and the RCMP from Borden. Finally, it includes emergency measures organizations at all levels and the kind of coordination that OCIPEP provides.

In relation to the current situation involving the anthrax threat, OCIPEP is working closely with Health Canada and others to ensure that Canadians are kept well advised of the facts and are provided with clear information on what to do if they encounter a suspicious package or correspondence or situation.

Cyber-security also remains a priority for us. The cyber-threat is real and serious. Attacks on web servers doubled in 2001 as compared with 2000, according to several surveys. At the same time, companies and governments are regularly facing intrusions from worms and viruses and denial-of-service attacks. Computer networks are so essential to our personal and business lives that these types of disruptions and failures have a direct economic and social impact. We continue to monitor potential threats to our cyber-infrastructure, especially any new threats associated with terrorism.

Let me move on to share with you some of the preliminary lessons learned from an OCIPEP perspective.

At a general level, September 11 reminded us starkly of the need to avoid complacency, constantly reassess the threats to our security, and ensure our readiness to deal with them. The first specific conclusion we've reached is that we all have to take emergency preparedness seriously, every day, as individuals in our homes, our communities, and our governments. This doesn't mean we have to live in a constant state of anxiety—quite the opposite—but it does mean we have to be more vigilant about new or emerging threats, and we have to act accordingly.

With good emergency plans ready and tested, with skilled staff in place to monitor and respond, Canadians can go about their daily lives with confidence and a sense of personal safety. Canada has a strong and proven capacity to deal with disasters. That capacity was significantly tested during the ice storm, during serious flooding in Quebec and Manitoba, during Y2K, and during the Swissair disaster. It proved to be robust and competent. We can do more, but let's not minimize or undervalue the capabilities we have.

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[Translation]

Second, emergency preparedness is a shared responsibility. This is a strength but also a challenge. We only need to think of New York City. We have witnessed the heroic, professional response of the emergency management organizations and personnel of New York City, New York State, the U.S. government, industry and many NGOs.

In Canada, the federal government, provinces and territories, municipalities and the voluntary sector all play an important role. We have seen in recent days the rapid and capable responses of hazardous material teams, medical, police, laboratory and other personnel. First responders play a key role in dealing with disasters. They must have the tools and the training they need.

[English]

But there's also a role for specialists, for those who can provide backup support, for those who can handle legal and jurisdictional issues, and for those who can reach out to other jurisdictions, to other countries for help. Success does not depend on having a single individual or a single organization in charge of everything. It depends on excellent planning, full understanding of roles and responsibilities, and finely tuned coordination.

The third lesson is we've been reminded of the importance of preparing for the full range of disasters: those affecting people and property; those affecting physical structures and the more invisible cyber-connections; weather-related disasters; accidental disasters; and finally, those that are malicious, whether it's terrorism or the kind of cyber-attack we experienced this summer with CodeRed.

OCIPEP's all-hazards approach positions the government well in this regard, and I know it's a model that many foreign colleagues envy in its simplicity. Our core strategy, in my view, is sound.

The fourth lesson from September 11 is the importance of thinking ahead and planning ahead. We can learn from the last major weather event, we can learn from the last terrorist act, but emergency planners must be sure their plans are flexible enough to deal with the unpredictable and the unthinkable. They need expert advice from scientists and intelligence agencies.

The fifth lesson is that the events of the past five weeks have illustrated the importance of public awareness and communications. It's vital that government communicate the need for vigilance and awareness in a way that doesn't engender panic or a siege mentality. As many have observed, this is precisely the result those who want to destroy our way of life are after. That's why one of OCIPEP's priorities is to develop innovative public awareness and education programs that are active 356 days a year, and not just during crises.

[Translation]

Let me conclude. In the days since September 11, the government has taken action to ensure heightened vigilance, readiness and response capacity. We have in place the institutions, expertise and strong domestic and international working relationships we need to deal with the current situation. OCIPEP is one of those institutions.

[English]

While we are less than a year old, I'm confident that we have the capacity to help Canadians and Canadian communities with a full range of emergencies. I'm also confident we're making an important contribution to the current counterterrorism effort.

At the core of the OCIPEP mandate is assuring the health, safety, security, and economic well-being of Canadians. Everything we do is focused on those goals. We have a solid base. We now need to apply the lessons we've learned from recent events, to continue to strengthen that core base in the months to come. We're a dynamic organization that is evolving to meet the needs of Canadians.

We appreciate this opportunity to be with you today, and we'll be happy to answer your questions.

Thank you.

The Chair: Ms. Purdy, thank you very much for that informative presentation.

Before we proceed to questions—and I was somewhat remiss in not pointing this out earlier—I would like to indicate the presence in the room of a former Minister of National Defence, former Solicitor General of Canada, the Honourable Jean-Jacques Blais, who is with us here today. Welcome to the committee, Jean-Jacques.

Mr. Benoit is next, for seven minutes.

Mr. Leon Benoit (Lakeland, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Ms. Purdy, for your presentation today, and Mr. Harlick, for being here today.

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Your job is an extremely difficult one, with a new department to deal with and the situation as it is. I have to say I am somewhat amazed that it took the actions of September 11 to really wake this government up about security. So many people have been saying for years—including CSIS for the past three or four years—that terrorist threats were very real.

For the eight years we've been here as the official opposition, some academics have been saying, “It's a threat. We don't know when it's going to happen, but surely as we're here it will happen.” So I'm somewhat shocked it's taken that long for this to happen. I guess all we can do now is go on from here. Your department, hopefully, will help us do that.

I'd just like to start by asking you what capabilities Canada has to respond to any type of biological or chemical attack there might be in this country. Do we have resources to provide medical support immediately? What if it's a long-term thing? Do we have antidotes and that kind of thing, and equipment? Could you just explain what is available now?

I was quite shocked, when there was a threat on the Hill and some people were contaminated, how it really pointed out how ill-prepared we are, even right here in Ottawa, which I understood had the best protection, and on the Hill, which you'd think would have the best resources to deal with things. Yet I understand there weren't even enough protective suits to deal with that situation.

These things certainly point out the need for some rapid movement here. So perhaps you could just tell me what you have and what your immediate plans are.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Right.

I think every conversation on this topic should start with a reminder that there is no specific threat of biological or terrorist attack against Canadians or Canadian interests. I heard Minister Rock describe the risk today as remote, and that remains the accurate assessment.

However, there have been incidents across North America, and indeed across the world, in recent days that have been brought to the attention of various local authorities. Certainly in Canada none of these situations have resulted in any confirmed cases of anthrax. So I think that's an important place to start.

That being said, as a country we have response plans. We have skilled people in place to deal with both threats and incidents. The Canadian team, if I can describe it as that, or the Canadian response is really at many levels. Obviously, the important first response is with local authorities—police officers, firefighters, ambulance drivers, and so-called HAZMAT teams, the hazardous material experts. Critical components are also hospital personnel, medical staff, and laboratory facilities. The level four lab in Winnipeg, for example, plays a really critical role.

In terms of events or announcements that have been made and things that have been done since September 11, I didn't catch Mr. Rock's announcement today, but I know he was planning to announce that some new money has been allocated to his department for stockpiling of more counter-measures, such as more vaccines. I think he's going to roll out some additional training across the country for medical personnel, as well as some new equipment. So some things are being done immediately, as a result of September 11.

You may recall that a Senate committee on counterterrorism, chaired by the former Senator Bill Kelly, issued a report, I believe, in January 1999. I believe this had some public coverage long before September 11. One of the recommendations out of that Senate committee was to take a more comprehensive look at Canada's capacity to respond to biological, chemical, and nuclear terrorism.

Within the government, we took up that recommendation. The Solicitor General has the lead on a review of Canada's capacity to respond to these kinds of incidents—the consequence management of them, as it's known in my business. That work was well underway. A consultation paper was put out, I believe, in May of this year to the provinces and the territories. OCIPEP is co-chairing right now, as I mentioned in my opening remarks—

Mr. Leon Benoit: How many people are working in OCIPEP itself?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Today there are 150.

Mr. Leon Benoit: How many were there before September 11?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: We were on our way to 150. We started in February with about 78. With the new money that was forthcoming several months ago, we started to grow to 150. We haven't had a huge surge since September 11. We are on a steady growth pattern, as a result of new money that was forthcoming to us.

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We have received, as I mentioned, $5 million new dollars in recent days. That is not going to be used to increase staff, but to make some enhancements to equipment, and so on.

Mr. Leon Benoit: If there were a major attack of some kind—a bomb attack on an American or British embassy—how fast could the Canadian response teams respond to that? How fast could you have people right there on the ground at the scene, ready to deal with particularly a biological or chemical attack?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Let's take an example in Ottawa. You mentioned embassies. The RCMP has responsibility in this country for the protection of embassies and diplomatic personnel. They are on steady patrol on the streets of Ottawa. They would be there on the scene within minutes. Depending on what information they had, they would immediately contact and mobilize the Ottawa police service, the Ottawa firefighting department, and the Ottawa medical community, if they had a suspicion that it was biological or chemical. So it would be immediate.

Mr. Leon Benoit: What would they have to deal with the situation, in terms of medication, antidotes, equipment, specialized equipment, and those types of things?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I don't have it for every city in the country—

Mr. Leon Benoit: I know Ottawa is the best protected, I understand—

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Ottawa is in very good shape.

Mr. Leon Benoit: —so let's talk about the best protected, and we can work with the rest.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Let me tell you why Ottawa is in particularly good shape. We have a pilot project that has been operating in the city of Ottawa for some time now. It's funded by my office and by the provincial government in Ontario. It is focused on the first responders and gives them some extra money to plan, buy equipment, and develop protocols, so they have a standard working plan.

Mr. Leon Benoit: What do you have in Ottawa to respond to a biological or chemical attack?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: We have all the resources of the Ottawa Fire Department, the police department, and the hospitals in this area. We have laboratory facilities in other parts of the country, where samples can be shipped by air immediately. So there are protocols, there are plans.

Mr. Leon Benoit: How big a situation could they respond to?

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, your time has expired.

I would ask members of committee—just again a gentle reminder—to direct their comments through the chair, please. This is not a conversation between the witness and members.

Mr. Bachand, you have the floor.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have questions about the mission of the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection because I gather that it now includes civil protection.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Yes.

Mr. Claude Bachand: For instance, what happens if an embassy is attacked? The RCMP will intervene quickly, but what specific role does the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection play?

I can see in this flow chart that you report directly to a deputy minister, but what role does your office play? Who is in charge of crisis co-ordination? Is the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection in charge of it? Or is co-ordination done when the Minister of Health announces that he will invest $12 million in the war against bioterrorism and that he will buy many pills against anthrax? Does the Office have anything to say in the matter? In other words, do you co-ordinate departmental activity, or do the ministers do their thing and then go to see the Office?

While I have the floor, I would like to put a few more questions. It is not clear to me what critical infrastructure is. Can you define critical infrastructure? I saw in your mandate that you are in charge of preparing a complete plan for the protection of critical infrastructure in Canada. Is this plan ready as we speak right now? Is it available to MPs? Could we know what the plan is?

You also say that the OCIPEP will provide national directives and that you must work with the provinces, territories and municipalities. These are also entities. Does that mean that you can issue a national directive to the Government of Quebec, for example, to explain how it can protect its power plants? I am wondering if the OCIPEP can go that far. I do not know the answer. I would like you to start by answering these three questions.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I have taken note of the three questions. The first dealt with the role of the OCIPEP. I believe that I mentioned the two key roles of the OCIPEP during my presentation. The primary responsibility is organizing and revitalizing the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Program.

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Your second question dealt with the definition of critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure exists in five or six key sectors: energy, communications, services and the government sector, for example. These services and facilities are critical to the health of Canadians, their security, their economic well-being, the things that are the most important in the lives of Canadians and Canadian communities, things that are critical to life in this country.

[English]

Energy, telecommunications, financial services, and government services are examples. That's the definition: things that are essential to health, safety, security, economic well-being, or the essential functioning of governments, for example.

Mr. Claude Bachand: Can I ask just one more question, maybe a more precise one, on that?

The Chair: You still have three minutes, Mr. Bachand.

[Translation]

Mr. Claude Bachand: Ms. Purdy, you are saying that critical things are the economy... Do you have a list that includes the Toronto Stock Exchange, for example? Do you have a government list that includes the House of Commons? Do you have not only a complete list of the major sectors, but also specific lists, with for example nuclear generating stations or power plants? Do you have lists like that?

[English]

Ms. Margaret Purdy: We are developing a list now, and we are focusing on the essential elements of this critical infrastructure. I think I would ask you not to focus just on lists, however. The relationships and the protection of this critical infrastructure involve more than developing lists and focusing on this bridge, that pipeline, this stock exchange, or that stock exchange. That's critical; emergency planners, police, and first responders need to know what is the most critical in a community or a province.

But it's a much more global program than that. It ensures that we have good communications across sectors, for example, and that we understand what this critical infrastructure in this country looks like in the year 2001 in its physical dimensions and, importantly, in its cyber-dimensions. It's not the infrastructure that kept this country together in the Cold War years. It's changed dramatically since then, and we need to understand that better.

When I was here before you in May, I mentioned that this is one of the things we needed, a better understanding. What does that stock exchange need to keep functioning? Does it need electricity? Yes. Does it need telecommunications? Yes. Does it need other essential services? Yes. What's the impact if some of those essential services are disrupted or destroyed? What's the cascading impact?

Certainly, the lists are important, and we're putting a high emphasis these days on developing and understanding the essential components of the infrastructure. We have a preliminary list we're going out to discuss with the provinces and territories and the infrastructure owners this month.

But this program of protecting our infrastructure is much bigger than the list. An important component is the shared infrastructure with the United States. The electricity grid, for example, in North America, is very much managed in a very shared way. We need to understand that. We need to understand each other's protection posture. We need to understand what the response plans are, and we need to work together to the extent we can.

As to your question about issuing directives, it's not the intention of my office or this program to issue a directive and say that you must do this, you must do this, you must do this. We're building a partnership here; we're not setting up a regulatory agency.

Our response to date from those infrastructure owners has been nothing but positive. They want to work with us. They want to use us as a facilitator to bring all the sectors together, to have a partnership, and to have a discussion about keeping this country robust and assuring that critical infrastructure.

[Translation]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

[English]

Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert (Oak Ridges, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Since September 11, we as government have been reacting to the events and responding to areas that obviously need to be dealt with—except in this particular case I would say, Mr. Chairman, that OCIPEP, established in February by the Prime Minister, was the result of a very proactive decision. Unless Mr. Benoit uses a different calendar than I do, February comes before September, so I would suggest that we did not react in this particular case. In fact, the United States established the Office of Homeland Security, and I would first of all ask Ms. Purdy, through you, Mr. Chairman, what are the similarities and differences in terms of what the Americans have established post-September 11?

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Secondly, through you, Mr. Chairman, unless my memory fails me and we have already had this, it would be helpful if we could have assembled for all members of the committee a background package on OCIPEP covering many of the issues we have been dealing with. For example, it would seem to me that aside from the list, we are very much dependent on the information—or lack of information—we receive from municipal governments and the provinces in this country. Given the nature of the attacks of September 11, the unpredictability of what could occur in the future, and the vulnerability of—certainly, based on my own past years in municipal government—water plants, sewage plants, and, though not under municipal jurisdiction, nuclear plants, what are we developing in coordination with our municipal and provincial colleagues in that regard?

Finally, through you, Mr. Chairman—I realize this is being televised, so you probably can't be as candid as I would like—in terms of the capabilities of our counterterrorism facilities in this country, how would you assess them at this point and how are we working with other international bodies and/or states in terms of better coordination in that regard? I have a couple of other questions, Mr. Chairman, but since you also include the answer time when you give me seven minutes, I thought I'd get those out first.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Wilfert.

Ms. Purdy.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I heard four questions there. You asked about the new office under Governor Ridge in the United States, the Office of Homeland Security. As in many other parts of U.S.-Canada government relations, there's no perfect match between the U.S. and Canadian machinery of government, so to speak. I've read the directive that gave the mandate to Governor Ridge, and as I understand it, looking at the words in that directive, he's very much a coordinator. It's a huge job in that country. It's a significant job in Canada, but in the United States, with the numbers of agencies involved, his main role as I read it is to regularly bring together those 46, 50—or whatever the number is—agencies who have some role to play in public safety, security, and counterterrorism and to make sure they're working to a single set of priorities. That's my understanding.

In terms of who does similar jobs in this country... certainly, as you know, the Solicitor General is the lead minister for public safety and counterterrorism, so he and his officials play many of the same roles Governor Ridge and his organization will. In addition, in this period, certainly, Minister Manley and the new ad hoc committee of ministers looking at public safety and antiterrorism are also playing a coordinating role and a review role similar in some ways to Governor Ridge's role. I heard Mr. Manley say that he's spoken to Governor Ridge; they plan to meet soon. So certainly there are similarities there.

In our case we have close working relationships with many of those agencies Governor Ridge is going to pay attention to—the Federal Emergency Management Agency you saw on the ground at ground zero in Manhattan and at the Pentagon site as well. There are equivalents on the emergency management side; they're not going to report to Governor Ridge, but they certainly will be one of the key players on his team.

Importantly, in the cyber-security area, we've had very close relationships with the cyber-security coordinator in the United States. He's been kept on by this administration; he was just appointed by Condoleezza Rice of the National Security Council to be the new coordinator for cyber-security. He'll also report to Governor Ridge. I've spoken with him by phone this week to talk about ways we can continue to work together. All this is to say that we have long-standing partnerships with the FBI, with FEMA—the Federal Emergency Management Agency—with the cyber-security people, and with many others in the U.S. administration. I think we'll find ways to work with Governor Ridge and his team, and we look forward to doing that.

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In terms of a briefing or a briefing package, we'd be happy to provide you with that. I'd also commend you to our website. We've put a lot of effort into this website since February to provide a way of describing to Canadians the whole breadth of our mandate and role as well as some specific activities. We've also used it regularly to issue alerts, advisories, and information notices. You'll see some that are related to September 11 on the cybernetic side and on the critical infrastructure side, that is, advice to critical infrastructure owners.

In recent days we have put on our website the Health Canada information on anthrax and the Canada Post information on handling packages. We want to continue to enhance that website. I certainly recommend it to you, and we'll be happy to organize documentation or any kind of briefing you'd like.

In terms of cooperation at the local level, we're a small organization, but we do have regional offices in each of the provinces across Canada. We work very closely with emergency measures organizations. Some of the new money I'm getting, the $5 million I'm getting under the counterterrorism package, I'm going use to explore setting up joint emergency operation centres with some of the provinces. We work so closely together when the kinds of events Mr. Benoit described happen that we need to work as a team. Certainly, I think we have excellent relations with those local authorities. That partnership is probably the most important one to us.

In terms of counterterrorism capabilities—if I understood your question correctly—you asked, what are the capabilities in this country? We've had our own experience with terrorism. I mentioned one of those experiences in my opening remarks, the Air India and Narita episode. Certainly, the approach to counterterrorism is focused through the national counterterrorism plan. Again, the Solicitor General has the leadership in that, but there are roles for lots of other players: Health Canada, Agriculture Canada, Environment Canada, and others. In relation to that plan we are the agency in OCIPEP.

Going back again to an earlier question, one of our main roles is to mobilize and coordinate federal government support to local authorities who are handling the incident, whatever it may be: the ice storm, the flood, the terrorist bombing—any incident that goes beyond the ability of the local authorities to respond to. Our role comes into play when the handling of the incident rises from the municipality to the province and specialized help is needed: expert help, special equipment, or special services only the federal government can provide. Our job is to know where it is, how to get it, how to mobilize it, and how to get it to the scene as quickly as possible.

The Chair: Ms. Purdy, I think I'm going to have to cut you off there in deference to the opposition members who want to ask questions. Since you did mention your web address and since this meeting is being televised, could you give us your web address?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Certainly. It's www.ocipep.gc.ca.

Mr. Bryon Wilfert: May I just ask this, Mr. Chairman? I know my good friend Elsie won't mind if I ask this, but if it is the pleasure of the committee I would certainly appreciate a briefing on OCIPEP with appropriate documentation. Further to that, I'm sure there may be from time to time the need to call you and your officials back with regard to updates; I think that might be very useful.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I'd be happy to do that.

The Chair: Mr. Stoffer.

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First, I want to give congratulations to Mary Kirby, who is the Minister of National Defence's assistant in Atlantic Canada, for doing a great job in organizing yesterday's event for the crews who were leaving and their families. For all of us who were there—and I know Elsie was there in heart though not in body because her plane couldn't be there—it was a very emotional event but one handled well by everyone who was there. I give kudos to the minister's staff for organizing all that.

I'd like to start off by saying that it's good to see a fellow Nova Scotian again, Madam Purdy.

I just gave the news release to Mr. Harlick here regarding what Mr. Rock said today, and I'm surprised that you said you weren't aware of what he had said. I had assumed that if you're in charge of the critical infrastructure protection and emergency preparedness program, you would be at least briefed as to what Mr. Rock was going to say, yet you indicated you were unaware of it. I'm rather surprised by your lack of knowledge as to what Mr. Rock announced today. I would have assumed that you would have been advised first, before the public was. Could you explain why? I'm confused on that issue.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Right. When I said I wasn't aware of the details, it was because these announcements have been coming out and the timing is often a last-minute thing. I wasn't sure whether he was making his announcement in combination with those of some other ministers, nor did I know what the exact nature of it was. I was, however, aware of the plan for this money to be spent on these particular measures.

• 1615

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I also gave you a copy of a press release from Mr. Art Eggleton, the minister. About three weeks before the terrorist attacks, on August 21, he had indicated in the release that the government will be putting $250 million into the program for bioterrorism and chemical and biological weapons attacks over the next eight years, which works out to about $30 million a year.

Minister Rock today announced $12 million for the program for this year. So I'm asking, why the difference? It's one-third the amount that was allocated or indicated by Minister Eggleton. I was wondering if you could again assist me in indicating where the additional funds have gone to. Or is it indeed going to be just $12 million that's allocated, which by all perspectives certainly wouldn't be far enough to meet the concerns of all Canadians?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: This was a news report, and I stand to be corrected, but my recollection of the situation was that this particular news item of August 2001 was in response to an access to information request. It generated a release of an internal review that was done in the Department of National Defence of our military capacity to deal with biological, chemical, and radiological agents. I believe the $250 million expenditure that Minister Eggleton referred to was for a particular set of equipment for the Canadian Forces to upgrade their own capacity within the Department of National Defence. It was not geared to domestic security situations or uses—although, as you know, that team in Borden is dual use. It can be deployed in Canada to support local authorities.

As I say, I stand to be corrected. I believe Minister Eggleton was referring to the internal review services report in the department and was indicating that money had already been set aside to address some of the deficiencies for the Canadian Forces, particularly for that team in Borden.

If you'd like the details, and if you want me to confirm that, I'd be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Sure.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: A lot of the staff members on my floor in the Confederation Building are concerned about why no one has come to them to appraise them or give them advice on how to handle envelopes, packages, or whatever.

I'm quite surprised at the fact that the government has actually not gone to the staff members here, especially with what's happened in the United States, to indicate to them how to handle envelopes that are bulkier packages.

I told them all to get latex gloves. If they suspect a suspicious envelope, either call security and get them to open it for them, or if they're going to do it, at least use gloves for that protection.

I'm just wondering why the government or your department hasn't yet approached staff members on that.

The Chair: Mr. Stoffer, with respect, that question might be better asked to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Commons. That's a question that requires a level of detail that Ms. Purdy might not necessarily be familiar with in terms of the internal procedures, safety, and health protection of workers here.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Mr. Chairman, I didn't mean to get that specific here. I'm thinking about schools, other facilities across the country dealing with provincial concerns, and you had indicated municipal concerns. How quickly is that person...

The Chair: I think you're on firmer ground with that question.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Okay.

Accelerating the process to inform all organizations, such as, for example, schools, various clubs, you name it, where people gather to protect themselves against this type of concern...

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I agree with the chairman. I'm not familiar enough with the way this facility is managed and administered to know what is in place, or what should be in place, or whom you should go to.

I will say, however, that the Government of Canada has put a significant amount of information in the public domain. I'd refer you to the Health Canada website, or you can get at it through ours.

I believe Health Canada last Friday put out an excellent background information sheet that explains what anthrax is, what it isn't. It explains what individuals should do if they get something in the mail that is suspicious, who they should call. It discusses the impact of vaccines, where vaccines are effective, and where they're not.

It was an excellent piece. I believe they're planning to update it later this week, based on the experience of the past week.

The Canada Post website has an excellent piece that I looked at today as well on what to do with mail you receive. I also looked at the Ottawa-Carleton Regional Police Service website, and for people who live in this area, they again have excellent information on their website.

• 1620

There is a good amount of reliable information from reliable sources in the public domain. Certainly in the Public Service of Canada, our employer, the Treasury Board Secretariat, has provided information to all departments and agencies to help with their staff and any worries their staff may have.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Mr. Chair, the final question—

The Chair: Very quickly, yes.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: You mention the websites, but unfortunately a large number of Canadians, especially in rural parts, don't have access to computers or websites.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: No. I agree.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I would assume that the old, traditional way of informing everyone in their mailbox on what should happen would be an appropriate measure as well.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: That's good advice. I should add that we don't rely just on websites. I was looking for a quick fix for you and your staff to go to.

When the Health Canada information sheet was prepared on Friday, Mr. Harlick and his team got on the phone immediately to the RCMP to make sure they were sending it out across the country. He also got his staff in all the regional offices to contact provincial governments to make sure they knew that it was there, to deliver it to them in nice hard copy as well as pointing to the cyber-copy.

So we're making every effort we can to make sure people know where to go for reliable information. There's such a mass of unreliable information out there that it's important to know who has the expertise and who we can trust.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. Stoffer, in answer to an earlier question you had with respect to the procedures in the House of Commons here, I've been advised that an e-mail was sent to all employees in the House of Commons and that they were made aware of the proper procedures to follow if there was any suspicious mail.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I see. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Mr. Chair, on a point of order on Mr. Stoffer's subject, I met with the Speaker and the RCMP today. There is training on how to open mail and how not to open it. Basically one should err on the side of caution and make sure that if anything is totally sealed with tape, doesn't have a return address on it, and looks suspicious... just put it in a box and call security and they'll come and take it away and bring it back. That's standard procedure. With any piece of mail, just make sure you err on the side of caution.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: I'm sorry, we've forgotten Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Wayne, you have the floor.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC/DR): How could you forget me?

The Chair: My apologies, Mr. Benoit.

For seven minutes, Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you very much.

As Peter, our colleague, just said, I was on the runway yesterday and the brakes let go on the plane as we were on our way to Halifax. It was really very sad because the plane was filled, every seat, Mr. Chairman, going over to Halifax. But anyway, I had an opportunity to be with the veterans back home at the Legion. They were all gathered together to watch on TV and on video the men going. That is what happened, just so everyone knows.

Madam Purdy, about a month ago, Brian MacDonald, a security consultant and former executive director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, looked at what has happened in the United States and he said, “Quite frankly, we're defenceless.” That was his statement. He said the view that Canada does not have an adequate grasp of where it is exposed and is not ready to deal with a major biological, chemical, or radioactive materials attack is also bolstered by government reports and statements.

Then he refers to OCIPEP being put in place and he refers also to the Solicitor General's office, in a paper distributed in April to local and provincial officials in a bid to enlist cooperation, conceding that the government's authorities are not ready to respond to a major chemical or biological attack. He also referred to another statement that we are not ready.

I have two or three major concerns. One is that I am the representative of the area where Point Lepreau is located, and also the largest privately owned oil refinery there is in Canada. given the fact that our city, my city, is the closest city to the U.S. border and that we supply the U.S. with a great deal of the energy that comes from Point Lepreau. I need to have someone clarify for me what are the facts when people say there is no threat. Just yesterday we sent ships to the Arabian Sea and we are part of this coalition. None of us likes to refer to it as war, but that is what Bush and Tony Blair referred to it as—war with the terrorists.

• 1625

I wonder about our Minister of National Defence saying there is no threat. Yet there is anthrax at CBS in the U.S. today.

We're the third largest country now in the NATO force. Certainly the troops we're sending, Madam Purdy, don't come anywhere near the troops that are being sent by the others, but we are the third country in NATO. That is being recognized by bin Laden and the rest of them, I'm sure, and I can't understand why we are defined as not a target, yet the other two are.

What I'm wondering is, what measures do we now have in place, as opposed to several weeks ago, before what happened in the U.S.? We haven't had much time, I know that, but it is a major concern, and it's a major concern to all of my people back home.

I know when I was mayor we sent our firefighters and our police department to Arnprior—they all went to Arnprior. Many of us went to Arnprior, as well as members of the local government.

I am really concerned, particularly for my area, because when they say the CF-18s are flying over Ontario because they have a nuclear power plant... take a look at my city; take a look at my area. There are no CF-18s flying over, yet we're much closer than they are in Toronto to the U.S.A., I have to tell you. My location, and what we have there, is a major concern right now.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: When I say there is no specific threat, and those are the key words, “no specific threat”, we have no information indicating a specific threat; that remains true. That doesn't mean we shouldn't be concerned, and it doesn't mean we shouldn't be doing things with more vigilance, with more care, with extra caution all around, and we are doing that.

You asked what we are doing differently now on the counterterrorism front than we were doing on September 10. I think you've heard the RCMP commissioner say that he has his police force on a very high level of alert and vigilance. Certainly, I can assure you that the staff of organizations like CSIS, the Security Intelligence Service, the intelligence community within the Department of National Defence—we have a lot of intelligence experts in the Department of National Defence—are working around the clock. This is the priority in government of everyone who could play a role in this campaign against terrorism in Canada.

Health Canada as well is making not just the announcement that Minister Rock made today, but meeting with chief medical officers from across the country to answer their questions, to talk through what extra vigilance they and hospitals and those on emergency wards should be exercising. We responded I think immediately. We went into a high state of vigilance and a high level of concern.

That being said, there still remains no specific threat. You do different things when you are specifically threatened. You put extra measures in place at an even higher order. Let's hope we don't get to that situation in this country. The intelligence is critical, of course, to give you warning, to tell you what those who may do damage to you and your citizens are up to, what their plans are, to give you advance notice and early warning so you can do something. I know we have the capacity in this country, and we have terrific relations with the U.K. and the U.S. in the intelligence area, so I'm confident we are well placed in this regard.

Certainly, in OCIPEP we went immediately into a higher level of vigilance; we brought extra staff in. We already have a 24-hour operation centre, but it now has more people working there. We're doing more communications with those people and organizations that we know look to us for information, for advice, for help, for early warning, so to speak. Our staff are tired, but they're dedicated and they know how important this is. When you work in an organization whose job is the safety and security of Canadians, there is no greater stimulation for a public servant.

The Chair: Thank you, Madam Purdy.

Actually, your time is well over, Mrs. Wayne.

• 1630

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Is it? I'm sorry.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, five minutes.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to follow up a bit on what I'd started with my first questioning. First, I'd like to refer to Mr. Wilfert's comment on OCIPEP; the establishment of it shows great foresight and shows how proactive the government is. Yet Ms. Purdy has said, I believe, that you have about 150 people in OCIPEP and you had about 80 in Emergency Preparedness Canada. Before I can judge how proactive all of this was I'll have to understand a bit better just what you can provide.

You stated when you were here at the committee in May that the way we manage emergencies in this country is that local authorities take care of it when local authorities can and then they ask for specialized help. What I want to know is what specialized help would be provided. The city of Lloydminster in my constituency, where I was raised, which has a population of 20,000, has an oil upgrader, an oil refinery and pipelines, and obviously it has a large power requirement for all of these things and for the people. If something were to happen to disrupt all of that and cause serious problems in that city, what would your organization be able to do to provide the extra that the local government can't provide?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: The main extra that my office provides is coordination of all the federal resources and expertise and support and equipment that could be made available to your city.

Mr. Leon Benoit: And what are those?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Instead of your city going to 26 or 27 departments and going 26 or 27 times and asking, do you have this and do you have that, you or your province can come to OCIPEP and say we need structural engineers, or this kind of search and rescue capacity, we need heavy urban search and rescue capacity, for example, we need more medical staff, we need counsellors to help people—victims, families—that sort of specialized help. It could be the whole gamut of specialized assistance, resources and simply just staff sometimes. In big disasters like the one in New York City you might need the Canadian Forces, for example.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Where would the urban search and rescue come from, for example? This is the kind of thing I'm trying to get at. That could be an early requirement. It could be needed extremely quickly, and for a small city like that, which is a long way from most places in a lot of people's view—not in mine, it's the centre of the universe to me, but to a lot of people it's a long way from anywhere—how would we get these first emergency teams in there quickly?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: If your city was damaged and was going through that kind of crisis, obviously the provincial government would be engaged and our people on the ground in your province would be talking to your provincial officials, finding out exactly what are the gaps and deficiencies, and we would not only look for federal resources to fill those gaps but we're also aware of where those heavy urban search and rescue teams are. There are I think five or six of them in Canada now. Two of them are highly developed in Vancouver and Calgary.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Where would the closest one to Edmonton be, let's say? Is there one in Edmonton?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: There's one in Calgary, I believe.

Mr. Leon Benoit: In Calgary.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Calgary. There are five cities that are in various states of building up these teams, using resources partly provided by—

Mr. Leon Benoit: How would you move a team from Calgary to Lloydminster, which is five hours by road? If you're hauling heavy equipment, by the time you got a load and everything, it would be ten hours. How would you move that equipment?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I don't know the local circumstances. Each of these teams has arrangements with either ground transportation or air transportation to get it within its own province. Presumably it would use those same arrangements to get it to your province, or certainly one of the things we could do is arrange a Canadian Forces airlift if that seemed to be the way to get a team that was absolutely needed.

I'll give you an example.

Mr. Leon Benoit: What kind of an airlift? I know the military has a certain amount of airlift. I guess it would depend on how heavy the equipment is, but we certainly have no heavy-lift capacity in the Canadian military. It's one of the great gaffes—

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, could I ask you to direct your comments through the chair. And Ms. Purdy wanted to respond with an example and I think we should try to let the witness respond to the question in full.

Thank you.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Mr. Chair, I did let you know up front that any question that I ask is through the chair.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: The example I wanted to give you is that I believe on September 12 or 13 we received a request from the United States for a heavy urban search and rescue team, the one in Vancouver, to go and help in the rescue operations at ground zero. Our office made all of the arrangements with the Province of British Columbia and the City of Vancouver to get Canadian Forces aircraft... As a matter of fact they were in the air, on their way, to pick up the team, which consists of people, equipment, dogs—K-9 teams—for example... The City of New York told us exactly what they needed. The team was being assembled. But at the very last minute, the assessment on the ground was that they didn't need that particular team at that time.

• 1635

That same kind of quick response—it was in just a matter of hours that the team was assembling and getting ready to move to New York City—would happen in this country if that team in Vancouver were needed in Halifax or Saint John, or wherever.

The advantage of having an office like mine is we know where these resources are across the country, particularly in the federal government. We have the capacity to be one-stop shopping, if you want to put it that way, to mobilize and facilitate and get these resources where they're needed, to get the right capacity to the right place at the right time.

The Chair: Thank you Ms. Purdy. Thank you Mr. Benoit. Your time is up.

Ms. Beaumier.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier (Brampton West—Mississauga, Lib.): I feel we're getting into a real bunker mentality here, and I'm not really sure why. I remember the Cuban crisis and everybody wanting to dig a hole in their backyard, and I fear this is what we're beginning to dialogue about.

We keep talking about biological attacks, chemical attacks, and potential nuclear attacks; however, the attack on September 11 was not sophisticated, not high-tech. It was a very bold, well-planned operation. And I don't believe this attack would have been successful had it not been just recently, had it been, say, just after the Air India bombing or the PanAm jet coming down. I think this was a case of us all letting down our guard and our responses.

However, I'm pleased to see we have your department in operation, because you know, out west, when they had oil wells being blown up, it was done by angry local residents, and that's just as deadly as a terrorist attack.

There is one thing that bothers me, and I wonder if, in retrospect, you've thought about anything different here. We took those planes from the U.S. very willingly—and I'm very proud that we did—but in retrospect, we didn't know what was on any of those planes. We had no idea what we were dealing with when those planes landed. I'm wondering what your involvement was. I don't believe the U.S. would have done the same for us. I think they would have been more cautious.

In retrospect, what do you think of our actions? Were you involved in that at the time? Were you ready for almost anything you might have found on these planes—because we didn't know we'd find just box cutters—and if not, would we do it again, and are we more prepared?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: We were involved in that operation. I think it's a good example following the previous question. When we heard these planes were being diverted, our people—particularly in the maritime provinces, because so many of those planes were sent to Newfoundland and Nova Scotia—were particularly active working with the local authorities who were going to have to accommodate the people, find space for them, give them services, food, and so on.

My office, the Canadian Forces, and certainly Health Canada played a huge role here in Ottawa, finding the beds, blankets, and other supplies, getting them from here to Trenton, and airlifting them, particularly to Gander and to Halifax. I think those were the two big airlifts from here. So we were very active in what you could call humanitarian assistance, knowing where the needed materials were and working with partners to get them where they were needed. I'm going back to my previous answer—knowing where the right capacity is and getting it to the right place on time.

Regarding your question about security, I'm not totally familiar with what happened on the ground, but I understand the RCMP, CSIS, and immigration officers were dispatched to all of the locations to which planes were diverted. The Canadian Forces I think helped to provide some air transportation to get them there quickly, so those passengers could be processed. They were processed with great care and caution. Their credentials were checked; the material on board the aircraft was checked. It was a concern, because it meant waits of hours in some cases for some of those diverted passengers who were in a high state of panic, but it was an important precaution that had to be taken by Canadian authorities to, as you say, know who they were dealing with and to make sure all safety and security measures had been followed. I think we did an outstanding job on a humanitarian front and in a high-risk, high-threat, high-anxiety period.

Ms. Colleen Beaumier: Okay. I have another question.

• 1640

We have many nuclear plants in this country—we have two quite close to where I live. When you realize that box cutters could bring down airplanes, you wonder what a canoe could do to the nuclear plant in Darlington. It wouldn't take a great deal of sophistication there either.

What do we do if someone happens to penetrate some of that nuclear plant? What do you do?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Certainly, in this country, we take nuclear safety very seriously. Ms. Wayne mentioned nuclear plants as well in her area. We have the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, which is a regulatory commission. It took action immediately after the events of September 11 and was in touch with all nuclear facilities across Canada. They implemented enhanced security measures. That commission has the authority in their legislation, in emergencies, to insist on a higher level of security, for example, tighter controls on access to the facilities—people, trucks, and so on. Those measures, as I understand it, are still in place. I believe the commission is meeting with the operators of nuclear facilities from across the country this week. They're in very close touch with the local operators.

In OCIPEP we have very good relations with that regulatory agency. We share any information we have on the threat or vulnerabilities with them. In addition, in the wider energy sector, which includes nuclear, we've set up, post-September 11, a special working group to bring together people who are responsible at the government level in gas, oil, electricity, and the nuclear industry to work in a coordinated way on the threats to the energy sector in this country and what we can do about them.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Purdy.

Mrs. Wayne, you have five minutes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I had concerns of course. I guess all of us did. I don't think even some of my colleagues are aware, Madam Purdy, that I got up this afternoon after question period and asked the House leader, through the chair, if he could bring in supplementary estimates to give you more money to help you out. They're going to bring in supplementary estimates probably by December 12. We feel we need to step it up just a little bit, because I know many of our young people now, because of what happened on September 11... I have a granddaughter in high school, and she asked my husband where her nanny was. My husband told her I had gone to Ottawa, and she said “She didn't fly, did she, grampy?”

It has affected everyone across our nation, from all walks of life, so I think the most important thing here for us is to make sure our people feel the operations that need to be put in place up here in Ottawa to look after everything are in place.

Have your people been working, and have they been down to Point Lepreau to meet with them privately? I don't want to know all the particulars, because I don't want bin Laden to know all the particulars of what we're doing. But I want our people—and the workers there as well—to feel safe and secure that the proper security is in place at our nuclear power plant.

Also, the oil refinery I referred to is privately owned, and I don't know whether our people have been in touch with them to discuss the type of protection it requires as well.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Right. I appreciate your support, first of all, today and in the House. Thank you.

In terms of whether we have the institutions, the people, and plans in place, I recommend you tell your constituents and your family members that we do. I can't imagine any more attention in those parts of the public service that are responding to this incident. We are working flat out on this, doing everything we can, and doing it in a highly coordinated and collaborative way.

In relation to nuclear security, for example, I mentioned the regulatory commission, which I'm sure has been in direct contact with the managers at Point Lepreau. I expect the RCMP has been as well. They're another one of our key partners. They're now exercising extra vigilance at nuclear facilities, for instance, making sure the owners and operators know they can call the RCMP at any time, with any concern, because they are the local police of jurisdiction, certainly.

• 1645

I'd like to go back to your comment about your grandchild. I read yesterday the testimony that the head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the United States gave before a Senate committee. He did a bit of a “lessons learned”, as I did. He mentioned that one thing they learned was that in such a catastrophic event, one that had never occurred in the United States, or anywhere else, it was so important to have counselling services. That was one of the contributions his office made.

I think it's a lesson learned for us as well. If we ever face such a horrible tragedy, yes, you have to have the equipment to move the debris and to find the people, but you also have to have personal counselling services. They brought hundreds, if not thousands, of religious and other counsellors to New York City, just to be there and to talk to people—the families, the victims, the friends of victims.

So it is a concern. You do have to address the emotional as well as the physical security of people. I think you raise an important point.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, Madam Purdy and Mr. Harlick, for coming here.

I want to go into the technical part a little bit. I'm a former firefighter, so I know that most first responses are by the local fire departments. I was on a rural fire department in a town about the size of Mr. Benoit's, so I'll follow along on some of his questioning.

If a local fire department encounters a chemical fire, there has to be some type of coordination through, first of all, the emergency response team that is mandated sometimes by the province, sometimes by the municipality, and in some places by the federal government. The technical knowledge and the experts are usually available only in major cities.

A firefighter's response time from an alarm is usually around four minutes, sometimes longer in the rural areas. It depends on weather and other circumstances. The dangers that exist here are similar to those in the cities. There are manufacturing plants, farms, sometimes huge operations, hydro facilities, dams, and so forth. I want to know, how can rural Canada best access these facilities through that first response team?

As well, there is a concern from the International Association of Fire Fighters that they are not included in the planning phases of critical response, particularly of your office.

So I want to address those problems that exist. I know you are a coordinating body. Some people think you have a bunch of equipment and you're going to run out and save the world. Even in the city of Ottawa, in this precinct right here, we lack a good response in certain areas to certain circumstances just because of the layers of people that exist in the government. You know, when you have a parliamentary precinct with six different security systems within it, none of them on the same radio length—and this is a fight I've been having for a long time, so I'll go public with it now—I worry about the coordination. Here, if I were to call 911, I'd get the Ottawa police department. They wouldn't know whether it was from the Senate or the House of Commons or wherever. They wouldn't be able to respond to it because they would have to go through the security system that already exists.

So we sometimes lack this coordination. I hope your office is the coordinating body that will... not clear up the problems in the House of Commons and the Senate, as that's beyond anyone. I don't want to call on too much.

I guess my question is, how can rural Canada take advantage of and have access to your knowledge and your department's knowledge?

• 1650

Ms. Margaret Purdy: We don't have skilled hazardous materials people that we send out to the scene of an incident or accident—you're right—but we do work with the provinces and territories to find out on a national scale what are the gaps or weaknesses or vulnerabilities in such areas as chemical terrorism or chemical spills or whatever the case may be.

The best information is in the kind of organization you were affiliated with, the firefighting department, and the police department, and others who encounter these kinds of events and know what they lack in terms of protective equipment or detection equipment. Those are important elements in the overall response. Decontamination is another issue as well.

These are all the kinds of response areas we are looking at right now, today, in these cross-country consultations we're doing. Our office is co-chairing, with the Solicitor General, some work we started well before September 11. We're out there talking to first responders, including firefighters, as well as the provinces and territories to get a fix on what are the weaknesses, including in rural Canada, not just urban Canada. We'll come back and make recommendations to the government in the next few weeks on what extra is needed.

That's not to say there's nothing there now, but I do know it's inconsistent from community to community, province to province. We want to get a fix on what are the current limitations and what we at the federal level can do, either through funding or through more and better information.

Certainly in the chemical area, the Department of National Defence facility at Suffield, one I think you're familiar with, plays a critical role. Some of the world's best chemical defence experts are at Suffield. They play a really key role in this detection of exactly what it is and what you do about it once you have it identified.

So I think there's a role for the department, certainly, and there's a role for us in terms of understanding the big picture and developing a big-picture response to those gaps and vulnerabilities.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. O'Reilly.

With the indulgence of the committee, I'd like to ask a quick question of Ms. Purdy with regard to the situation faced by the United States and by New York City in the aftermath of September 11.

I think one thing that stuck in the minds of a lot of people was that huge pile of rubble at the end of it, at ground zero, and the efforts that had to be made, first in search and rescue and then in the removal of rubble. My question really relates to the role of the private sector in emergency preparedness.

Obviously in that type of situation in the United States many private companies had to be called in to do what was necessary to remove the rubble at ground zero. That process is ongoing, as we know.

My question is, what arrangements do we have in place, if there are any, in terms of contacts your agency has had with the Canadian Construction Association and various unions so that we have an inventory of skills and equipment within the private sector to assist and so that we're in a position to deal with these situations at what might be described as fair market prices?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: When a catastrophe is as significant as the one in New York City, you can't cope with that with government resources only; you're right. Even if you brought all the resources of all the States, you'd still need some private sector help and assistance. They have some specialized equipment and people not generally available in government circles.

As I mentioned in my opening remarks, one of the things we started doing immediately after September 11 was to develop the kind of inventory you mentioned. We did that to provide it—and we did that in a few hours—to the United States. It was an inventory that included such things as the DART team, which you're familiar with, within the Canadian Forces, but it also included construction equipment. I think it was the Construction Association of Canada who came forward, or we reached out to because of our contacts. They told us what they could provide through their members. That was an important piece of the inventory we pulled together.

A lot of private sector supplies and equipment and expertise made their way onto that inventory that went to the United States, including telecommunications equipment, remote-sensing equipment, medical staff, medical equipment, and emergency room nurses who were prepared to go to New York City.

• 1655

So we have that inventory and we've made a commitment to keep it evergreen, either for use in a catastrophe in another country, where we could offer the same kind of specialized support, or if it happens in our own country, we know quickly who's available in the private sector and in some of the NGOs—the Red Cross and others who play an important role in responding to these kinds of catastrophes.

What I'd say about the value of an OCIPEP in that kind of scenario is, as I mentioned in response to an earlier question, you have to bring some order to this; you have to bring some coordination to this. You can't have the people trying to deal with the incident on the phone trying to track down various bits and pieces of equipment or various kinds of specialized expertise.

The value we can bring is we will maintain that inventory. The local responders, the provincial governments will know who to call at the federal level when they need that level of support, whether it's search and rescue equipment and personnel or trucks and truck drivers. So I think the private sector plays a big role. We have this inventory in Canada; we will keep it up to date.

On the fiscal side, I don't see an answer to your question, Mr. Chair. We need to address that question in terms of compensation. In scenarios like New York City, most of the support, at least in the early days, was volunteered. It is an issue that we would have to address in terms of whether or not we would share the costs involved, the salaries, whatever that may be. In that kind of scenario there would be an inclination to do the right thing.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I've done a fair bit of study to try to learn what OCIPEP was about before I came here. I find though, from what I did look at for information in the questions here, I'm not getting a good picture of it. I understand your organization is a coordinating organization, but I'm trying to get a good picture of what those you coordinate can provide. That's what I'm having some difficulty with, so perhaps I'll approach it a little differently. If you could pick two or three gaps in our current system in terms of emergency response, not just in OCIPEP, but in all of those bodies you coordinate, what would those gaps be?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: If you look at the sorts of things we are paying attention to now and where we are using, for example, some of the additional funds we've been granted just in the last few days in this area, that gives you some indication of where we think enhancements can be made, either in our own operation or across the country. We're using some of that money, for example, to enhance our operation centre. You have to have a smooth-running, well-connected, well-equipped operation centre, not only in my office, but you also need to have that across the country.

One of the things we're using our money for, as I mentioned earlier, is to develop joint operation centres. Instead of having two in your province, perhaps we should have one that includes the federal and the local emergency measures organization to absolutely guarantee seamless operations during an emergency.

Mr. Leon Benoit: So you've seen a gap then in the coordination of communications—

Ms. Margaret Purdy: And we filled that gap.

Mr. Leon Benoit: A second one?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Another area, and it has nothing to do with the New York City kind of scenario, is in the cyber area, in our reliance on computer systems in this country. And I mentioned in my opening remarks that a malicious attack on a computer system can cause great devastation, can cause great disruption, failure, stopping of business, stopping of government. It's very important that we have good computer security in this country, and I think that's an area where we can make improvements. Some of the money I'm using is to be able to better detect and monitor attacks or intrusions on government computer systems, for example.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Are you talking specifically about computers being used in coordinating between the various bodies or are you talking generally?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: No, I'm talking about computers that are used in this facility to help you deal with your staff and your constituents, about computers that are used in every sector of Canadian business.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay. I'm asking about the gaps that you see and what's most urgently needed in terms of all of the various emergency response groups that you coordinate.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I'm telling you that in the future we have to look at new threats and we have to look ahead and plan ahead, not just for the...

Mr. Leon Benoit: So are you looking at back-up communication systems or are you looking at the harm done to the economy and to the operation of the military and so on resulting from an attack on computers?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Attacks on computers, I think, need more attention. They need more attention at the federal level and they need more attention in the private sector in terms of understanding those threats, the damage they can do, and putting good defences and good security practices in place. We're using a lot of our effort and some of the money we've been given recently to improve our capacity to coordinate within the Government of Canada, for example, our computer security defences. I think that's very important.

• 1700

It's easy to get distracted during a time like this to either chemical or biological terrorism—that's what we're dealing with today as a concern—or to the major kind of terrorism we saw on September 11. I think one of our jobs is to take care of that kind of business, but also to look and plan ahead—to look to the next phase of threat that may affect Canada and Canadians and make sure we work with others to be prepared for it as well.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I don't know if I'm understanding exactly what you're saying. I asked specifically about the gaps you see in the various organizations you coordinate in terms of emergency response. Instead of telling me about that, I think you've just been telling me about another possible area of attack.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: No, I'm telling you that—

Mr. Leon Benoit: It's both. Okay.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: —“emergency measures” does not mean what it meant in the Cold War. Emergency measures now have to deal with more than just physical attacks and physical infrastructure. This infrastructure has changed. It now has a cyber-dimension, and that needs attention as well—plus the gap that I mentioned.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay, thank you.

A third gap that you've seen that is—

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I wouldn't say a gap, but I think we're using some of our new money, for example—and some of you have mentioned this to me, and I've taken it on board—to get good information out to Canadians, in their homes and in their businesses. Public communication, sharing of information—particularly during crises, to make sure people know the facts, know what they should be doing in their own homes or businesses to respond, and know where to go for help. I think all emergency measures organizations, including ours, have a responsibility for public awareness and public communications.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Okay now, you're—

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit. You're over your time.

Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to ask Ms. Purdy if the bill presently before Parliament that actually went to committee this afternoon, Bill C-36, has in it a section on the Communications Security Establishment. I'm sure you're aware of it, because you're a senior person there. Do you have any comments on that particular bill or on the necessity of that particular part of the package? Were you missing some authority before this bill was brought in, or does it broaden your authority? Is it going to help your department operate? Is it going to give it a broader mandate?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Are you speaking about OCIPEP—

Mr. John O'Reilly: Yes.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: —or are you talking about the Department of National Defence?

Mr. John O'Reilly: Basically, within the Department of National Defence there are various functions that this legislation brings more in line with the Criminal Code, but there are sections in there dealing with the Communications Security Establishment and so forth.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Let me say three things. One is, I know the chair has invited officials from the Communications Security Establishment to appear before your committee, and they're the best placed to answer these questions.

The second thing I'd say is that in terms of those of us who are managing this crisis and trying to deal with it—and particularly to understand what the next phase may be—intelligence is critical, including the kind of intelligence we get every day from the Communications Security Establishment. I think the minister has mentioned that, and he's mentioned that other countries, particularly the United States, have been very grateful for the help the Communications Security Establishment has provided since September 11.

The third thing I'd say, speaking as the Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence, is that the particular provisions in that bill relating to CSE are primarily intended to overcome a current deficiency, which is their inability to intercept communications where one end of the communication ends or begins in Canada.

CSE always focuses on foreign-intelligence targets. In the course of doing that kind of targeting, they may come across a conversation... The example that's often given is, if bin Laden has an associate in Canada and were to call that individual, currently CSE has no capacity to intercept the communication or do anything with it. This is a shortcoming, certainly. So that's the rationale behind the main provision. It also establishes and comes into the open about that organization's mandate.

• 1705

But I think, if I understand correctly, Mr. Chair, you've sought the appearance of CSE—

The Chair: Yes.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: —representatives or the minister on their behalf. I think that's the best place to go into the details of that part of the bill.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Okay. Ms. Wayne, did you have any other questions?

Ms. Elsie Wayne: No, I don't. I just want to thank Madam Purdy and Mr. Harlick for being with us today. Thank you very much.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, do you have a question?

Mr. Leon Benoit: I do indeed, yes, thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ms. Purdy, getting back to the question I was working on before, your responsibility is coordinating various other response teams, from the defence response to provincial to local government response. In that capacity, seeing what's available and knowing what you have to coordinate, you must see things you think have to be improved, that are simply not adequate to perform as well as you would expect in a country like Canada.

The first responsibility of government is the safety and security of Canadians. That's the first responsibility, not something put off to the side and something you only pay attention to after some incident happens. With that in mind, you must have thought, as you're doing your job of coordinating, there really are some things that have to be improved here and there.

Let's start with the Department of National Defence and the DART team. You talked about the quick response, I believe, of the DART team. How many hours did it take for that team to actually arrive in Vancouver? Let's just start with that and work from there.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I don't think the DART team has ever been deployed—

Mr. Leon Benoit: They never did...

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I think they were deployed to Turkey and to Haiti, or Honduras. I can't be—

The Chair: Honduras, I believe.

Mr. Leon Benoit: You said there was a team that actually went to Vancouver. Did they not get there? They weren't—

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I'm sorry, Mr. Benoit, I was explaining a situation that developed shortly after the crisis on September 11, where U.S. authorities asked for one of our municipal heavy urban search and rescue teams, the one the City of Vancouver and the Province of British Colombia manage. What I said was deployed, from the Canadian Forces perspective, was an airplane to go and pick up that team and take them to New York City. That was the response. The plane—I think out of either Ottawa or Trenton—was in the air in its effort to get those folks to New York City.

Mr. Leon Benoit: If our complete DART team was needed, how long would it take for it to be deployed?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I don't have that information, Mr. Benoit. I would be happy to get it for you, or you could direct that question to the Canadian Forces.

The Chair: With respect, Mr. Benoit, that is really the responsibility of the Canadian Forces. They manage the DART team. Ms. Purdy, as I think she's explained, is more of a coordinator with respect to the operational capabilities of all of the agencies and organizations she works with. I think it would be well beyond her mandate to try to explain what those capabilities might be.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: But if you have a particular interest in the DART, I can certainly get that answer for you, Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: This is one example, but with respect, Mr. Chair, I would think Ms. Purdy would have a pretty good understanding of all the various teams she'd be coordinating.

The Chair: Yes, but not necessarily response times. I think she's more than aware—

Ms. Margaret Purdy: It also depends, Mr. Benoit, on what the disaster is that the team is going to—whether it's a tornado, a humanitarian situation of a different kind, or a terrorist putting a plane into a high-rise building. It really depends, because the team will take different things and different members of the team depending on what the situation is. Is it a flood? Is it a windstorm, or a tornado? When we went to Honduras and to Turkey, those were two quite different scenarios.

I'm not trying to avoid your question, but the answer really depends on the disaster and on what has been asked for as well. Sometimes a city will have part of the kit, but they won't have the other part, and they just want you to provide...

Mr. Benoit, I know you're interested in what the gaps and weaknesses are, and I understand that. I think, at this time of crisis, it's important to focus on the strengths we have as well. I've worked in this whole area of national security and disaster response for about 25 years in the Government of Canada, and we have an excellent response capacity. We have skilled and dedicated people; we have good equipment; we have good planning. I think we've proven that in the Swissair disaster, the ice storm, the floods, a number of recent incidents—

Mr. Leon Benoit: But you understand, Ms. Purdy, that as the defence critic for the official opposition, I'm going to ask you questions to try to find out what capability we really have—because I think Canadians deserve to know, and I think it's important that they do know—

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Right.

Mr. Leon Benoit: —and what you don't have, and where maybe some of the weaknesses are, and—

• 1710

Ms. Margaret Purdy: In response to your question about the Canadian Forces, the Chief of the Defence Staff has been with you in recent days. He's talked about his interest in looking at a team at Borden that has capacity in chemical, biological, and nuclear. He's talked to you about looking at Joint Task Force II and its capacity in light of this changed security environment.

The answers to questions today are different from the answers to questions on September 10. In some cases, we need the time to look at this changed threat environment in order to think through what kinds of scenarios we might be called into the next time—next year and the year after that.

It's a reason I mentioned cyber-security, for example. We're doing that now. The Manley committee—the ad hoc committee—is in place. Mr. Eggleton and all other ministers will have the opportunity to go forward to that committee to say the world has changed and our capacity is this. We need to look at arranging things differently—working together differently perhaps. We've already looked at legislative changes that had to be made in order to make our authorities' package more robust in this changed threat environment.

Certainly there are weaknesses. We're not perfect in this country—in every aspect, in every corner of our response—but I don't think we should undervalue or underestimate the capacity we have. It's not an unproven capacity, Mr. Benoit, in the cases I've given you. I've been proud of the way the Canadian government and local authorities have responded to that whole range of incidents that have...

Mr. Leon Benoit: Yes, I'm looking, of course—

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Benoit, you're well over your time.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I'll go another round.

The Chair: Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you very much. I didn't want to get into a one on one with Leon here, but maybe we will.

The Chair: Let's try to stay away from that, Mr. O'Reilly.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Oh, no, don't worry.

The Chair: We have a witness here who has some important information for us.

Mr. John O'Reilly: In following Mr. Benoit's line of questioning, of course, the point is trying to find out at the bottom of all of this whether you are satisfied the various intelligence agencies you are coordinating, which feed information into your office—all of those basic agencies—are responding well to your Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness. Do you feel that every agency in the government is responding in a capable manner? Is there something this committee could take under advisement to investigate to help your job, to help make sure your coordination is advancing smoothly, and that you're getting all the help you need?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I appreciate your offer. To answer the two parts of your question, first, are we getting the cooperation and o we have the capacity in the agencies that help us, I'd say the answer is yes, we're getting excellent cooperation. The flow of intelligence as well as information into our office to help us do our job is first rate. We have lots of mechanisms in place. I'm at meetings everyday with the head of CSIS, the head of the RCMP, and others, and the cooperation has never been better among all those really important agencies.

In terms of the work of this committee, one thing I've said to colleagues in government is when you consider dealing with crises like this, you really do have to consider the full spectrum. Although we're focused now on anthrax, or we're focused on New York City, let's remember the whole spectrum of disasters that can affect a country. Let's make sure we pay proper attention to emergency preparedness and to crisis response capabilities as part of that spectrum, not just the police response, not just the response on the scene.

It's important that you help us promote preventive action, preparing, making sure you're supporting the emergency measures organizations in the provinces where you live and where you work and the constituency you represent.

It's easy in quiet times to downsize or to forget about emergency preparedness, but that is a wrong approach to take. We haven't taken that in this country. I'm proud that the office I lead was set up well before. It was set up in quiet times really. It was set up when it was not a response to a crisis. It was just a good thing to do for the country to bolster its protection of its critical infrastructure and to give high attention to emergency preparedness.

You can join with us to make sure that we continue to give high priority to all of these issues, to intelligence gathering, to crisis response, and to emergency preparedness for all kinds of emergencies, because we will be faced with severe weather events in this country. Imagine the catastrophe associated with earthquakes, even tidal waves in the future years perhaps. It's important to keep a holistic approach to all these matters and to draw attention when you have the opportunity.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Thank you, and thank you very much for appearing. I've certainly enjoyed your—

• 1715

The Chair: Ms. Purdy, I have another quick question for you. We spoke very briefly before the meeting about the federal-provincial consultations that were going on in terms of the national disaster mitigation strategy. I was wondering whether you could provide us with a bit of an update on that, as well as what the end result is going to be. Is it going to be a memorandum of understanding between the federal government and the provinces? What do you expect is going to occur?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: For members who aren't familiar, the minister announced—I believe it was in June—that he had been to cabinet and received authority to begin developing what we're calling a national disaster mitigation strategy. Let me describe what mitigation means.

Mitigation means that whole range of things that you can do in advance to diminish the impact of a disaster when it happens. It can be as simple as changing building codes so that if you're in an earthquake zone you have to build to a certain standard to prevent the damage from earthquake. It can be a dam. It can be flood plain mapping. It can be building dikes or floodways. It can be not allowing people to build homes on the banks of rivers that flood every year—that sort of activity.

We have the authority now to consult with the provinces and territories on what we could do nationally, what kind of approach we could take to disasters to try to reduce the price tag, because these disasters—ice storms and floods and so on—cost an enormous amount to the economy of all levels of government. What can we do to reduce the cost of disasters? And, importantly, what can we do to reduce the human cost of disasters as well—the impact on communities, on families, and so on?

This strategy is aimed at trying to identify a whole range of measures with the provinces and territories, but not just with them. We're also meeting with the Red Cross, with others who are in the non-government sector who have strong views and have expertise to bring. Iona Campagnolo used to lead the Fraser Valley basin flood control authority. We're meeting with that organization, which she has recently been associated with.

So there are a number of stakeholders. To answer your question of where we are, we've done a discussion paper, which is out now with the provinces. We'll be going out and talking to them and with stakeholders and all of the regions of the country, and we'll be developing a strategy. What form will it take? I hope it'll be a cooperative arrangement with all the key parties. I hope it's not too formal. But I hope it's a meaningful partnership with those partners and stakeholders.

We're going to be doing that over the next number of months. It's one of those things. When a crisis happens you have to realign. But it's a high priority for us, as are the consultations we're doing on the disaster financial assistance arrangements, which I'm sure some of you are familiar with as well.

The Chair: Ms. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I was pleased to hear about the flood plains and that you are there, because the reason I'm sitting in this chair has to do with the fact that I live on a flood plain. That's how I got involved with politics. It was Romeo Leblanc who assisted me at the time to get a trilevel agreement to try to correct that situation.

Right now there is another major situation. Perhaps I should try to meet with you or your staff, because we have the highest tides in the world, Mr. Chairman, in Saint John. The tides are eroding a part of an area where a great many—I shouldn't say a great many; probably ten or fifteen homes now are on the embankment, on the verge of going over. They're all senior people, and we need some form of cooperation with regard to that. The province is looking at it, but we also need the feds to help us as well—we truly do—because their homes are going to go over the embankment. There's no question. You would not believe how close they are to that point.

So I will be in touch with you, Ms. Purdy, to see just exactly where we could go with that. I'm very pleased to hear...

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I grew up on the Bay of Fundy.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: So you know all about it.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Yes, indeed.

You mentioned that you had brought that to the attention of the New Brunswick Emergency Measures Organization.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, I have.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: We have somebody in New Brunswick, so Mr. Harlick will alert him to your interest and we'll be in touch.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Wonderful. Thank you.

The Chair: Mr. O'Reilly, do you have anything further?

Mr. John O'Reilly: I just want to ask whether you could just go over your budget again.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Sure.

Mr. John O'Reilly: I knew what the initial budget was. There was a supplementary amount added and then another supplementary amount added.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: The figures I'm giving are operating budget. We also have grants and contributions. I've mentioned some of the programs under which we can give money to local officials to improve their training, or to the heavy urban search and rescue teams. It doesn't include that.

• 1720

When I first came into the organization, we had inherited a budget of just under $10 million from the former Emergency Preparedness Canada. More recently, the government injected an additional $11 million into that operating budget, to bring it to $21 million per year. Then recently, as part of the $250 million package, we received an additional $5 million for specific projects with a counterterrorism focus, to be started immediately. If my arithmetic is any good, that's a total of $26 million.

Mr. John O'Reilly: When you talk about grants, is that part of funding for, say, the JEPP program in Ontario?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Yes. It is the JEPP program.

Mr. John O'Reilly: So if, for instance, a municipal police force or a local radio station needed a backup generator system to be able to operate and give directions during an emergency, that program ensures they wouldn't be shut down if the hydro were shut down?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: That's right.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Are there any other examples of what's available under parts of that program?

Mr. James Harlick (Assistant Deputy Minister, Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, Department of National Defence): Yes. Under this program, the province puts forward requests for assistance of that nature. Sometimes it can be in the form of training to impart new skills to first responders, or it could be sharing the cost of the kind of essential equipment you mentioned.

It's a very wide-open program, albeit with limited funding. These program proposals are all worked up through the province's emergency measures organization, so the province gets to prioritize where it wants to put the money it's allocated. The proposals come up to us from all the provinces, and we share out the rather limited funding. But this funding has made some very significant contributions to improved emergency measures capability, at the provincial level and especially at the municipal level.

Mr. John O'Reilly: So will more funds be channelled into that? For instance, in rural Canada in particular, a generator is vital to keep basements from flooding, septic systems working—all those necessary things. We witnessed that during the ice storm. The greatest sale of generators ever was right after the ice storm, I believe. People bought them because power is essential to a cattle dairy farm. They have to have them as part of their business plan.

But the ordinary house, small radio station, or local police department may not have that type of thing. So I just want to make sure it's on record that they are available, and that more funding will be coming—or should be.

Mr. James Harlick: Well, I think we can only take part of that for the record: the program does exist, and it has $4.7 million at present. Given the priority for the limited funds Ms. Purdy referred to, there has been no increase in that program so far. That's something we're keeping under review. It may well be that if Christmas comes early, we would certainly see augmenting that as a high priority among the grants and contributions.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Mr. Chairman, having worked in the house-building business, I know that some builders are now looking at adding a small generating system to houses, in case of a power failure. But when you start building in two electrical systems, that adds humongously to the cost of a house. But this might be an area you could look at—builders could get some type of subsidy for that work, if people buy or renovate a house. You could include a system that would allow people in rural Canada to have a more stable source of energy.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Going back to the chair's question about the strategy developed to mitigate disasters, that's the sort of thing I expect we'll hear when we're out talking to the provinces and local authorities. I think it's something that might fit under this particular strategy as well.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Ms. Purdy, there's something you pointed out in your answer to another question that I think is important: we don't know what the next terrorist threat or attack will be. Right now, we're looking at anthrax and chemical attacks—they certainly could be part of it; we don't know.

But something the chair said earlier really concerned me. He said you wouldn't know what specific capabilities the various response organizations you coordinate would have. I want to ask you specifically, would you, or someone in your department, know that? Is there someone in your branch who would know the response capabilities of the military, other federal government bodies, provincial and local governments?

• 1725

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Absolutely.

The Chair: Mr. Benoit, I think it's important to clarify my comment. What I said was that in her testimony, Ms. Purdy referred to both public sector and private sector organizations across the country. I think it's probably beyond your purview, Ms. Purdy, to have intimate knowledge of what everyone is capable of doing on any given day for any given disaster.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Right. But that being said, Mr. Benoit, I can assure you that of the 150 people in the OCIPEP organization, some are in provinces at the local levels, and they know the local scene, they know the local resources. Those who work for Mr. Harlick in Ottawa know the national scene, and they also know who to contact for help internationally. So collectively, we know what resources are available for any kind of crisis.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Would you know response times for the various...

Ms. Margaret Purdy: We'd have a good idea of response times, because in some instances we've probably called upon those resources in the past. But I think the chair's point is important. As I mentioned before, response times depend on where they're going and what's needed there.

I mentioned the inventory we have and the close relations we have with the providers of that assistance. I assure you that we do know what is available, we know who to call, and we have excellent relations with all those people. As a coordinating body, that's what you need to know: who has the capacity and who do you ask to get it to the right place at the right time.

Mr. Leon Benoit: Just to follow up on that, is there anyone in particular at OCIPEP who we should maybe have before our committee, someone to give us a better idea of the capabilities in terms of response times so we can get a really good picture of what's available now and what we have to improve?

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I think one of your colleagues asked for a more detailed briefing of our operation, and we'd be happy to organize that. But instead of starting with a blank page, it might be useful if you have a couple of realistic scenarios, by way of a briefing. You could say, if this occurred in Canada, what would our role be, who would we turn to for help, roughly what would be the response time, and what would be some of the constraints? For instance, in this country, weather is a big constraint in terms of response time.

So we could walk through a couple of different scenarios with you, to show you what role we play and give you a sense of the diversity of resources available across this country to help Canadians in times of distress. If you want to paint a couple of scenarios for us, we would do our best to respond to that.

Mr. Leon Benoit: I would really appreciate that. And I'd like to thank you very much for appearing here today and for trying to give us an understanding of what's available and what's going on.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Thank you, Mr. Benoit.

The Chair: Ms. Purdy, I have another question for you, and it's actually a rather sensitive question. It deals with the media and how the media respond to—

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Did you notice in my resume that I was a journalist?

The Chair: In fact, I did.

My question is whether your organization ever works with the media in terms of how best to respond to natural disasters, terrorist attacks, etc. The reason I raise this point is that I've heard—and I'm not sure this is accurate—that well before September 11 and the events that have changed our world in many respects, there was anthrax circulating in the mail in the United States. After September 11, of course, this took on a new prominence—to the point where I suppose you could say that some quarters of society are bordering on hysteria.

I wonder if you have any thoughts on that whole issue in terms of guidelines—of a dialogue with the media on how best to handle this sort of situation.

• 1730

Ms. Margaret Purdy: I think the best way to handle this kind of situation is to make sure that those who have reliable and factual information are the ones in contact with the media and who supply that information to them.

In this current scenario, there are a lot of rumours and incomplete stories being told by individuals. It's important to have experts available to speak to the media and to provide up-to-date information. Certainly in this particular situation, I know that our office, Health Canada, and others, are making themselves available to the media. That's critical.

We have a fairly large team for public communications and media relations, and I think that's really important. We tested it during the CodeRed episode this summer—that terrible computer worm that was making its way through computers around the world. We actively pursued the media. In the course of two days, I think we did about 70 different media encounters.

The media were extremely helpful, and I think the reason we were not touched by that worm was to a large extent because the media did such a good job of getting the facts out in newspapers and newscasts. They said, “This is what it is, this is what it isn't, this is what you should do about it, and this is where you call for help.”

I think that's the biggest contribution we can make: ensuring that we have excellent, constructive dialogue and relationships with the media in this country. I think we do, and we'll continue to cultivate that.

In terms of sensitivity, I know that in criminal investigations, some information might hinder the investigation if it were revealed publicly. The RCMP and other law enforcement agencies sometimes speak to the media and get their cooperation, even for a short time, to allow them to do their job. I'm not familiar with those arrangements or how regularly they happen in this country. But there are scenarios when doing the right thing for the public good also involves cooperating with the media.

The Chair: Mr. O'Reilly, one quick final question.

Mr. John O'Reilly: When talking about the media, Mr. Chairman, I just want to remind you of the words of Winston Churchill: “Never make an enemy of someone who buys paper by the ton and ink by the barrel.”

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chair: On that note, Mr. O'Reilly, I want to thank our witnesses, Ms. Purdy and Mr. Harlick, for being here today. It's been most helpful with respect to our work. Thank you.

Ms. Margaret Purdy: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: The meeting is adjourned.