FOPO Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FISHERIES AND OCEANS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES PÊCHES ET DES OCÉANS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, May 3, 2001

• 0911

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Wayne Easter (Malpeque, Lib.)): Could we call the meeting to order? We are missing a few members, but I think we'll start with evidence. The evidence will be documented, so we'll call the meeting to order.

We only have two hours, and we have people from both the west and the department. In the first hour we'll deal with Mike Forrest and Ian Todd, as individuals. As I think everyone knows, the meeting today is on the Adams River and Fraser sockeye salmon.

The way we want to proceed is to have Mr. Todd and Mr. Forrest outline their point of view, where they see the problems. Then the Department of Fisheries and Oceans will respond, and after that we'll determine whether we write a letter to the department.

Welcome, gentlemen. We appreciate you coming on reasonably short notice. On this committee we like to be pretty frank, and call a spade a spade. The floor is yours.

Mr. Ian Todd (Individual Presentation): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'll lead off, if that's all right with Mr. Forrest.

I'd like to bring the committee into the general picture on Fraser River sockeye. If you'll bear with me, I have a few minutes of background.

The total Fraser River sockeye run comprises over 30 individual stocks. For management purposes, they're loosely aggregated into four groups, based on their chronology of arrival. There's the early Stuart group, the early summer group, the main or mid-summer group, and the late runs.

My comments will bear entirely on the overlap between the summers and the late runs. In the summer runs, the main stocks involved are the Horsefly-Quesnel and the late Stuart. Of the late runs, the one that's the topic of the agenda is the Adams. There are other stocks involved in that same complex—notably Weaver and Cultus Lake, which I'll refer to later.

The peaks of these various groups are usually separated as they migrate towards the Fraser River, but there is significant overlap during their migratory behaviour. A singular feature of Fraser River sockeye is called cyclic dominance. This is also important in the context of the year 2001.

For the world-famous Adams stock, the year 2001 is the lowest point in its four-year population lines; 2002 is the maximum, or dominant, run; 2003 will be called the subdominant run—it's next in abundance; and 2004 would be second-lowest on its cycles of return.

For the summer runs, the Horsefly and the late Stuart, 2001 is their dominant return. They will be at the maximum of their four-year cycles in 2001; 2002 is subdominant; and modest and low as they proceed through the other two years. Then the cycles repeat themselves.

I believe this combination—of the lowest return expected on Adams in 2001, against the highest returns of the summer runs—is an important factor to take into consideration when looking at management plans for 2001.

What is the problem? The normal migratory behaviour of these fish is that all the summer runs approach the mouth of the Fraser River without delaying off the mouth. They proceed upstream and maintain their chronology.

The late-run fish arrive at the mouth of the river just slightly later than the summer runs, but their normal migratory behaviour at that point is to stop their migration and delay for four to six weeks off the mouth of the Fraser while they mature and get themselves physiologically ready for their final migration up the river.

• 0915

What we have seen since 1995 is an abnormal component of the late-run migrations. The summer runs are still behaving in their normal fashion, but the late runs have suddenly abandoned their normal delay behaviour off the mouth of the river, and they've been proceeding upriver without delay. The result has been a very significant mortality during their travels up the river before spawning.

Of the two main runs of the Adams that have come back during this period since 1995, mortality levels before arriving at the spawning grounds have been between 40% and 60%, approximately. On Weaver, I believe it's run between 60% and 90%. There seems to be a correlation between how early they go up and the level of mortality: the earlier they go, the higher the mortality. But the cause isn't known.

In February there was a very serious meeting of many scientists from both Canada and the United States, under the auspices of the Pacific Salmon Commission. They have identified research areas to explore the causative mechanisms behind this unfortunate phenomenon. One outcome is that they hope to be able to predict future events. But in terms of short-term solutions for 2001, I don't hold out much hope that they'll be able to come up with anything that will help this year.

In terms of implications to the resource users, so far it's estimated that 2.5 million late-run sockeye have died unspawned and unharvested. In dollar terms, if those fish were all worth $10 to the fishermen, that's $25 million—double for wholesale value. So you're looking at a significant loss of income—and for these fish, certainly the potential for reduced production in the future.

I pointed out that 2002 is the dominant run for Adams. Based on preliminary forecasts for that run, if we assume this situation of a continued 50% mortality rate will prevail, that could mean no fishery in 2002 or 2003, in order to ensure that these dominant stocks do make it to the spawning grounds in the numbers needed to ensure survival and good production four years hence. In my view, if this situation prevails, these management restrictions for those two years are necessary and appropriate.

What about 2001? Using the point estimates for returns, the summer runs are forecast to return at about 11.7 million, whereas the total late-run complex is only at roughly half a million. Of that late-run complex, about 200,000 are bound for Weaver, and 6,000 for Adams.

That sounds like a disaster in the making, but if you look at the production of Adams going back to 1949, the maximum number that ever returned to the spawning grounds was something like 12,000. The average was around 3,000 or 4,000 per year. So this is not out of the norm.

The newspaper article I read suggested that the only management action that could be taken in 2001 would be to close or severely restrict the fishery. I don't agree with restricting the fishery to protect that small a number of fish. Now, I know I'm running the risk of sounding like a pillager of the resource here, and that's the furthest thing from my mind. Conservation is still there. But to me, conservation means wise use.

• 0920

To me, it would be very short-sighted to focus solely on the late-run problem and ignore the potential catch of five million or more summer-runs that are perhaps co-migrating. Letting those fish go up the river to the spawning grounds on the Horsefly and late Stuart runs would, in my view, overcrowd the spawning grounds and result in reduced production of those very important runs four years hence.

So the managers are in a difficult position. Obviously they don't want to drive any stock to extinction, but I don't think there's any reason why that should happen. There are techniques available, in use by the department, and there are programs currently under way under the aegis of the Pacific Salmon Commission to provide short-term enhancement to endangered runs.

For the late runs we're talking about, there's already a facility in use in the Adams area to bolster the upper Adams run. I believe it would be available for use this year, if eggs could be taken from the small numbers of fish that would return to Adams in the scenario I've painted.

For Weaver Creek, I don't see that it's necessary to do anything—it already is a spawning channel. To underscore that point, the escapement in the brood year—the parent year for 2001—was about 20,000 fish, and they were not tremendously healthy on their own. But the forecast of a more than ten-to-one return this year is pretty significant. So I don't see that they need any particular protection—nothing needs to be done there.

Cultus Lake is another small run, probably in the worst condition of any in this late-run complex. DFO has a lab there, and there's already a weir to count the fish into the lake. It seems to me it would be a relatively modest expenditure to add an egg take and some hatchery rearing.

Putting all that into context, it would be a very minor expenditure to ensure that the fishing industry and other resource users would have access to between five million and eight million fish in 2001. Personally, I would not like to forgo that, because it would have future implications of reduced productivity for at least one full cycle on that very important stock.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Todd. I failed to give a bit of your background. I believe you're the executive secretary of the Pacific Salmon Commission.

Mr. Forrest, I understand you're the former member of the Fraser River panel at the Pacific Salmon Commission. Did you have anything you wanted to add?

Mr. Mike Forrest (Individual Presentation): Thank you.

Ian has given you most of the information I had regarding salmon management. I'll go over some of the points. Maybe at the end of this, if there are questions from the committee on information we weren't able to bring out in the first go-around, you can ask us.

Early Stuart, early summer, summer run, and late run is the structure of the sockeye salmon migration to the Fraser. Ian has gone over that process.

The issue we're here to speak about, as a result of newspaper articles and things, is certainly the Adams situation. Ian has described very well what would be expected normally in 2001. This is an off year for Adams; it's not the dominant cycle year. That's next year. And we should be cautious about what we do in trying to get some knowledge about the early migration of late-run fish.

• 0925

Ian has spoken of this overlap in the month of August, where we're trying to go out in season and harvest the dominant stock, which is Horsefly and late Stuart, and we have the early entry of Adams and late-run fish into the mix. We have a concern about whether we would overfish one while we're fishing correctly, if you will, on another.

In this specific cycle year, historically the Adams River and the late Shuswap complex of fish, plus all late runs, have gone along for the ride, if they have been in the mix. Historically, also, they have separated from the mix because of their own timing. They come to the gulf, they sit there, they wait, and they go up later. So because of their time differential, it has been possible in the past to harvest them discretely.

The problem we're seeing now, in the past five years, is, as Ian has described, that there's some reason why those fish are coming in four to six weeks early.

In terms of the early entry of those fish, there is some indication that the group of fish that does come in early is not successful at spawning. The potential therefore is the possibility of catching those fish instead of letting them die without spawning anyway. The science isn't up where it should be, I don't think, in that regard. We need to do some more work to prove that this is in fact happening, but there is certainly an indication of that. The Weaver, for instance, last year had 400,000 counted into the river, and 20,000 spawned successfully in the channel. That's an indication, though it may not be the only one, regarding where we're at with this early entry to the Fraser and the possible death of the fish before they spawn.

The issue for the Adams is the same. In the past six years we've had early entry, the coming into the river early of a late-run stock—that is, it comes in in August instead of the end of September, and therefore mixes in with other stocks we're trying to harvest discretely.

The 11 million or so total stock of Horsefly and late Stuart in the midsummer complex is where our fishery would happen this year. It would be probably a two-week to three-week scenario of fishing time, a focus fishery on those stocks in excess, and we should be able to proceed with that fishery based on the knowledge we have of this being the off-year of Adams. Adams should not be a concern for closing that fishery.

In the past I think we've had too much knee-jerk reaction to these kinds of things and haven't dealt with good science. Wherever science is available, we should be dealing with that. I would suggest to you the scientific process of the history of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission plus the Pacific Salmon Commission has a pretty substantial bank of data and a pretty substantial group of individuals, headed by Jim Woody, who are scientists, pure and simple. These people are not swayed by the political changes in various U.S. or Canadian governments.

So we should go with science where we can, and in this year I would hope that we have the ability to support research into the causative factors, if there are some that we can find, regarding why the fish are entering early and deal with that hopefully on a scientific basis.

There isn't, I think, a scientific basis that says closure is the only management function. In the past, there was a knee-jerk reaction that said we'll just close the fishery. That seems rather simple. It's not what I would call management. It is a reactionary stance. In many cases in the course of a year, of course, we use the closure of the fishery as a standard management tool, but not the closure of the whole fishery, and certainly not the closure in this case of the possible catch of six million or eight million sockeye salmon at a time when we would be saving an off-year Adams cycle.

That's not to say that we're going to decimate the Adams cycle in this year. It's gone along for the ride in all other years, as quoted by Ian Todd. Certainly the numbers are available to you; it's been a 3.7 million or so average and it's been as low as 560. I mean 3,000 average—I said 3 million. It's a 3,000 to 4,000 average, and it's been as low as 500, for the Adams River and late Shuswap set of fish that are spawners. That's the spawn count.

So I would say we need to go cautiously, for sure. Conservation is the single most important item to us who have been involved in this process. My family is the third generation into it now. And certainly we support the research requirement that we have to do a better job in knowing, or finding out what we can find out, regarding this late entry issue and the fact that it is a problem in season.

• 0930

There are a couple of other issues I would bring to your attention. Certainly one of them regarding management in the system is that from a fisherman's point of view, we are tending toward a process in B.C., in the west coast fishery, where the management process is getting split up among too many groups. We need to get back to a situation, in my opinion, where we get to one group in charge of the management process. We presently have three: the aboriginal community, the DFO, and the Pacific Salmon Commission.

In season on sockeye, we have to get to a position where we have one group managing. We have a treaty, we have an agreement with the U.S. There's some involvement of the U.S. process in this management scheme, and there's a definition of where Canada is and where U.S. is within the treaty. But in sockeye management in season, I think you only have to turn back to the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission and the successes that happened over many years of bringing fish along from the sixties—there were very low years in the sixties—to very successful years in the eighties and nineties, to tell you that we have had a change in the last ten years and we need to go back to one-group management.

So I'll leave that with you, and certainly entertain questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Who wants to start? Mr. Cummins?

Mr. John Cummins (Delta—South Richmond, Canadian Alliance): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: We'll let you on next, Sarkis. I know you have to go.

Mr. John Cummins: I'm prepared, if Sarkis has to go, to let Sarkis go ahead.

The Chair: Go ahead, Sarkis.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much. I really appreciate that.

I'm not from B.C., but I'm aware of the importance of the Fraser River to the B.C. economy.

My question has to do with the motion I brought in here on Tuesday regarding the proposed sale or diversion of river water to the U.S. If I can go to the point, if river diversion took place to the U.S., say of 15%, what kind of impact would that have on the fishing industry, logging, commercial transportation, what have you, on that river, and what would be the overall impact on B.C.? In general, if possible, can you tell us if it would be beneficial to fishermen and the B.C. economy to divert the water, or would it be detrimental and damage the economy?

The Chair: I don't know if that's your area of expertise, gentlemen, but if you want to answer, you can. It's not on the topic you were brought here for.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Mr. Forrest was on the Fraser River panel, I think.

Mr. Mike Forrest: I was, but I'm not any more. I was on the panel for fifteen years.

The diversion you're speaking of?

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: The diversion of the river water to the U.S., or selling it as bulk water.

Mr. Mike Forrest: The diversion of river water to the U.S.?

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Yes.

Mr. Mike Forrest: The sale of water?

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Yes, reducing the level of the water in the river—would that have an impact on the fisheries?

Mr. Mike Forrest: It will. It can. That's a matter of degree at all times. We've had situations in the past when we've had diversion of water in the Nechako system and other places. Ian's a lot more directly involved in its history and that knowledge base. I don't know that it's something we necessarily have all of the science we need to have in order to know the effect of, but it would have to do with the degree, how much of this we deal with, in my opinion.

The Chair: Thank you, Sarkis.

Mr. Cummins.

Mr. John Cummins: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I probably should preface my remarks by advising the committee, if they're not aware, that I do have a vested interest in this fishery, as I am the owner of a vessel licensed to harvest fish in the Fraser area. I say that for your information.

A voice: A conflict of interest.

A voice: We won't hold that against you.

Mr. John Cummins: No, but I thought I should make the secretary aware, because I'm sure he would be looking for every lever that he could find.

Mr. Chairman, with all respect, I think you've probably understated the significance of the two witnesses we have here.

Mr. Todd, you are certainly viewed as one of the foremost experts on Fraser River fish. As you said, you had 25 years with the international commission. I wonder if you could maybe give a little bit of a background, and the same with Mr. Forrest.

• 0935

Mr. Forrest, as he indicated, spent a lifetime on the Fraser River, and he combines a knowledge that he acquired as a kid growing up on the river with a broad-based science background after 15 years on the commission.

Mr. Chairman, I think it might be appropriate if the gentlemen gave a brief background so that people would understand that any recommendations they make are science-based recommendations and made by people who have a deep background and history in the management of the Fraser River fishery.

The Chair: The floor's yours, gentlemen.

Mr. Ian Todd: Well, thanks for the kind words about my expertise.

I hold a master of science in fisheries management from the University of British Columbia. I worked as a fisheries biologist with the Department of Fisheries in excess of 20 years and participated in Canada's negotiating team that ultimately led to the creation of the new treaty in 1985.

I spent almost eight years in the commercial fishing industry as general manager of a small fishing company based on the west coast of Vancouver Island, and when the Pacific Salmon Treaty was finalized in 1985, I was invited to throw my hat in the ring for the honour of becoming the first executive secretary of that commission. Much to my surprise, as well as that of a lot of other people, I won that competition, and I've spent the last 13 years and one month of my career in the position of executive secretary at the Pacific Salmon Commission.

In that capacity we had the responsibility to provide secretariat support to the commission, but the main part of the staff and the main function was to operate as an international scientific group on in-season management of Fraser sockeye.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Todd.

Mr. Forrest, do you have anything you want to add?

Mr. Mike Forrest: Well, I'm not as old as Ian is.

At other forums, Ian and I have been sort of on the sparring partnership side of this process because of my involvement with the Fraser panel.

I grew up on the Fraser River, at the mouth of the Pitt River at Douglas Island, if anybody knows the real estate there, and third generation, doing all of the things that kids do on the waterfront and growing up into the fishery. The fishery was part of my life and part of my family's life throughout my upbringing, something that is near and dear to my heart, and is in fact a very sore point at this point because of it having been taken away from me and reallocated.

In any event, Monsieur Roméo LeBlanc was the person who first got me involved in something official, and that was to appoint me to the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, IPSFC, the commission that was previously there before the Pacific Salmon Commission that now exists. I was there from 1981 to 1985, all the time being involved in the commercial fishery on the Fraser River and various points on the coast at that time. Then I went into the Pacific Salmon Commission, Fraser River panel, as a member for Canada until 1999.

I've been trying to be involved in the salmon fishery of course, and the salmon fishery for us, in area licensing and what have you, with respect to the Fraser River has been pretty dismal over the late 1990s. You won't find many people who will disagree from a conservation point of view—they'll tie their boats up and stay on the beach from a conservation point of view. But when those fish get reallocated for somebody else to catch, that's where the trouble starts.

In the Fraser there are many problems like that. I certainly would like to go over a couple of them with you if we have a chance, but suffice it to say I am very involved and interested in what goes on with the salmon resource in the Fraser. We have a vested interest from a family point of view as well as, I would say, a national point of view in making sure that run is maintained.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Forrest and Mr. Todd.

Mr. Cummins.

Mr. John Cummins: Yes, I just thought it important, Mr. Chairman, that we understand the experts that we have in front of us here certainly are well regarded on the west coast.

I bring that out because recently—and Mr. Todd, I believe you referred to it—in the press it said that Canada and U.S. authorities, including the American Secretary of State, Colin Powell, were warned in a letter earlier this month from the Pacific Salmon Commission “to prepare for sweeping closures of the Fraser River fishery this year to conserve what's left of the Adams River sockeye run.” The quote is taken from an article in the Vancouver Sun by Scott Simpson.

• 0940

You might like to emphasize or restate your point on that. It seems, Mr. Todd, that you're in conflict with the advice the commission is giving now, or perhaps that advice comes from DFO. Could you expand on that, please?

Mr. Ian Todd: I read the same newspaper article, and that's what gave rise to my concern. On the surface at least, it appears that only sweeping closures are being considered. What I tried to bring out in my brief review was that those sweeping closures may be necessary in 2002 when the Adams dominant run appears, but in my opinion they are not essential in 2001, and could in fact be counterproductive if they were to have a negative impact on the co-migrating major summer runs that are dominant in 2001.

Mr. John Cummins: Could you just elaborate on that, because I want people to understand, when the DFO witnesses come after, your rationale. I wonder if you could just restate it. You say it may be necessary in 2002, the reason being that 2002... Well, why don't you tell us again, please.

Mr. Ian Todd: I have to say I'm not current on what the Department of Fisheries and Oceans escapement policy might be for Adams in 2002, but in the past it's been roughly two million fish—you want to have two million arrive and be successful on the spawning grounds in that dominant year. Contrast that with the spawning populations that have occurred in the parent years of 2001, which range between 6,000 and 12,000, and you see the magnitude of the difference and the magnitude of the problem. In 2002, obviously you don't want to reduce that stock to 6,000 fish or something of that nature.

The 2001 population line has never been productive. This is the peculiar characteristic of cyclic dominance, which is a phenomenon that isn't well understood. There are theories about why it occurs. But it's dangerous, in my opinion, to fool with mother nature when for all recorded history, even prior to heavy exploitation by man, the Fraser had peaks of cyclic dominance. Cyclic dominance exists in some of these major stocks. That means you're going to have one very strong year, one not quite as strong year, a third very modest year, and the fourth line is the bottom. Almost no matter what has happened, that has not really been significantly disturbed.

The Chair: Your question, John.

Mr. John Cummins: Basically what you're saying is that in 2001, the Adams is at its lowest, but the summer runs are dominant.

Mr. Ian Todd: Correct.

Mr. John Cummins: So if you allow in 2001 the dominant runs to proceed to the spawning grounds without harvesting, you're going to create problems on the spawning grounds. But in 2002, Adams is dominant and the summer runs are—

Mr. Ian Todd: Subdominant.

Mr. John Cummins: —subdominant.

Mr. Ian Todd: In 2002, I don't believe there is any choice. If this situation prevails in 2002, then you would have to go the sweeping closure route and forgo some catch of the subdominant summer runs in order to ensure that good escapement levels to the late runs actually occur.

The Chair: Mr. Forrest, you're welcome in here as well.

Mr. Mike Forrest: There are two items here. I don't know how much people understand about the fisheries management and the science regarding excess spawners on the gravel and what have you, but that's what we're referring to.

The cyclic dominance issue is one that's been explained a little bit. There are things you might associate as being similar to farming. In my opinion, my simplistic opinion, you have a nutrient requirement in a lake—all sockeye salmon stocks are associated with a lake, they spend a year in the lake—and if you have a certain nutrient level in a lake it will sustain only certain kinds of populations. As you increase the number of fish going to those lakes, you have the potential of having some of them starve, if you have too many. In a four-year cycle process, if you do it every year, obviously you reduce the nutrient level potentially.

• 0945

This is a simplistic argument. It isn't necessarily as scientific as it should be, but from a fishing point of view, that is what has happened in history. Maybe it's the reason Mother Nature does what it does. However, in those other years we're looking at what's called a fallow crop in farming. You have a buildup of nutrients in the river, and you have a dominant and a subdominant run in the Adams River.

I think overspawn is maybe a misnomer people use for late Stuart and Horsefly, which is the main portion of this year's run in the summer. If we don't fish those stocks and we have this sweeping closure this year, two things will happen: the fishermen will not make any money for the third year in a row; and, the more important factor, we may in fact cause some problems for that dominant run four years hence.

The Chair: Just before I go to you, Mr. Roy, my question really was if you close this year, what's the implication of overcrowding on the spawning ground? Is there any history or science on that?

Mr. Mike Forrest: There is some history. Ian might be able to pick out the individual years better than I can because he did a lot more study on it. There certainly is history in places where we have put excess fish up and had a problem four years after that, with the returns per spawner being very low as a result of the digging up of the redds and other spawn, that sort of thing. There are not a lot of data to help us in this regard. Ian could better answer your question with regard to the specifics.

The Chair: Ian, do you have anything you want to add?

Mr. Ian Todd: It's a difficult question to answer. The current dynamic population theory, which I'm not up on, is that, generally speaking, there is a point at which a spawning escapement will produce a strong fishable surplus. If you're well below that point, you don't get the same results. If you go well beyond that point, you don't get those results. If you put five million fish on a spawning ground that is capable of producing highly at two million, the production will inevitably go down. Four years later you will not get the same rate of return from the five million as you would from the two million, and your harvest will commensurately have to be reduced.

The Chair: Thanks, Mr. Todd. There's one thing about this issue on the west coast, and that is, if nothing else, it's complicated.

[Translation]

Mr. Roy.

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy (Matapédia—Matane, BQ): Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Personally, I have three questions to ask you. I was listening to you, and at one point, the Chairman's question led to details about certain matters. Among other things, you said that the returns are mixed. There was discussion of several different types of salmon and it was mentioned that the returns were mixed. This makes it very difficult to control the fishery and the returns of certain species.

In your outline, you spoke of 16 hypotheses that could explain early returns and the resulting mortality rate. Could you go into more detail about the 16 possible hypotheses with respect to the current situation, meaning the problems being experienced in the rivers in question? That is my first question.

Mr. Todd, unfortunately, cannot hear me, but...

[English]

The Chair: We're having a few technical difficulties. Perhaps you could briefly roll through that again, Mr. Roy.

• 0950

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Basically, I had three specific questions to ask you. I will begin with the last one because I had already got there. One of the things were saying was that there were too many players. You mentioned the Department of Fishery and Oceans, Aboriginals of course, and the Pacific Salmon Commission. I thought I understood that you had already been a member of the Pacific Salmon Commission and that you appeared to be partial to having only one player, namely the Pacific Salmon Commission to control the current situation effectively. That is one thing.

Here is my second question. You spoke about 16 hypotheses that might explain the early returns of the salmon in question. Could you go into more detail about the 16 hypotheses? I know that you mentioned a few. In connection with the mortality rate, for example, you mentioned diseases, parasites, predators, etc. But what are the hypotheses under consideration? Why is it that salmon are returning earlier today than before? You said that it might be attributable to water temperature, etc. Has it ever occurred in the past on such a large scale? That is the other question I wanted to ask you.

Lastly, according to you, can we expect the stocks to recover in the short term? If I understood properly, you were raised, and lived, on the banks of these rivers. So my question is the following: can we expect in the future that the stocks will recover? Is the damage being caused at the moment so irreversible that the decline in stocks will continue? Those are my questions.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Roy.

Who wants to start? Mr. Forrest.

Mr. Mike Forrest: Let's try to deal with the first one. You said there was the issue of too many players. I'm not sure I understand that. Can you rephrase that for me?

The Chair: You mentioned earlier that there are too many people involved in management. There are the aboriginals, DFO, and the Pacific Salmon Commission.

Mr. Mike Forrest: My own history is one where the success of the management system has been predicated on one group being in charge. The development over the past 10 years has been more and more toward three people being in charge. More recently, there has been the aboriginal entry into that process.

In the Fraser panel of the Pacific Salmon Commission, in season we have to make decisions about catching fish or allowing fish to go to spawn and dividing numbers up among multi-user groups, and the primary focus has to be the delivery of spawners. We have to have the conservation of the run. If we have various entities fishing and in control of various groups of fishermen and they're not tied to a singular entity for management, then you can have—and it has happened in my history—certain groups fishing stocks they shouldn't be fishing. We need those stocks to go to spawn.

Because we now have the scenario of a management that is required to do all kinds of allocation to various groups, including seiners, gill-netters, trollers, U.S. and Canada, aboriginal, non-aboriginal, upriver aboriginals, lower river aboriginals, coastal aboriginals, we need to have a singular entity in charge for sockeye salmon management, and in my opinion that should be the Pacific Salmon Commission under the Pacific Salmon Treaty.

The Chair: Are there any responses to the other questions? Mr. Todd.

Mr. Ian Todd: I'll take a run at Mr. Roy's second and third questions. I'll defer to the DFO witnesses I think you'll be hearing from later on in terms of the theories for the cause of this change in behaviour.

The third question dealt with whether it has ever happened before and whether it will continue. I don't think there is any recorded history of this sort of change in the migratory behaviour of the fish we're talking about. In fact, I'm sure that has not happened in the past. It began to happen perhaps as early as 1995, and certainly it has happened every year since 1996.

As to the future, I don't know that there's any way of predicting whether or not it will continue.

• 0955

There seem to be some changes in the Strait of Georgia I would view as being positive. I've heard reports that coho, for example, which have not been present in any significant numbers in the Strait of Georgia at this time of the year, are turning up in good numbers this spring for the first time. Perhaps there is an environmental change going on that isn't being measured that well at this stage, but who knows? At the same time, we can't go on hope alone, and you must prepare for this situation to continue.

The Chair: Mr. Roy.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Mr. Todd, you are a biologist. What is your hypothesis about the current situation? You certainly have an idea of what is going on, by which I mean that you no doubt have an opinion about what is happening in the rivers. What is your personal opinion? That is what I would like to know.

[English]

Mr. Ian Todd: I don't have one. I have no idea why this is happening. I really don't, and I don't believe that any of the scientists who have been involved have any real idea yet as to what's happening. That's why this forum was put together, bringing scientists from both Canada and the United States to talk about the issues and to identify areas of research. Apparently it was a very successful meeting. They have come up with a series of proposals for studies, and I wish them well in their endeavours.

The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Roy.

Mr. O'Brien. Lawrence?

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien (Labrador, Lib.): My question—I think Mr. Roy has asked it to a degree—is about jurisdiction, but I'd like to go a little deeper into this, Mr. Roy.

First of all, I was sort of reminiscing when you were talking about growing up on a river. I grew up on a river as well, in Labrador in Atlantic Canada. It was a great pleasure for me as a child to be able to go down and fish and get a feel for it.

You have obviously seen a lot of change going on, from your days as a child to where you look at it now, both of you, with the knowledge you've developed. Mr. Todd, you have an immense store of scientific as well as very practical knowledge.

The issue of jurisdiction leaves me somewhat perplexed because you have three jurisdictions. It has to be extremely confusing. I'd like you—I know you've done it already a little, but now maybe in a little more comprehensive way—to bring us through from where it was under a single jurisdiction to, subsequently, two jurisdictions. Obviously I've heard what you said in terms of where it should go with the Pacific Salmon Commission. To me that's a very compelling discussion, one that warrants a common-sense approach and ultimately getting down to a final decision maker. That's basically my concern.

Mr. Mike Forrest: Is that one for me? I brought the issue up, I guess.

The bottom line is that we have to propagate the resource; we have to maintain the resource in the end. If we have a bunch of managers doing various different things for different interests, we will put the resource at risk, in my opinion.

Heretofore, back in early eighties, the 40 years of history of the IPSFC... There are terrific success stories from some of those times: the bringing back of the stock in Horsefly—I think it's Horsefly—from a thousand spawners to 2.2 million and things like that. There are all kinds of success stories from situations where people had the ability to control the fisheries in order to deliver spawners to the gravel.

More recently we've had a lot of trouble—at least from a fishing person's point of view. During my involvement in managment in the Pacific Salmon Commission's Fraser panel in season, we have continally had this argument going on as to who's in charge, DFO or PSC.

We shouldn't be there; that shouldn't exist. We sign a treaty, we turn the management of that system over to the treaty people—Canada and the U.S.A.—through the panel, and we get on with it.

• 1000

More recently than that, of course, we've had the entry of pilot sales programs in the Fraser River. We've also had the claims by DFO that they control all those things to do with aboriginals in the Fraser. Though we don't want to give the authority to a foreign nation—certainly that's a domestic issue in Canada—the control of the fishery overall needs to be comprehensive and in one unit. It's getting to be less that way, in my opinion, instead of more that way.

As to in-season management, we might have a scenario where we would sit around just this kind of table in Richmond, British Columbia, to plan and arrive at a set of rules for next week's fishery. However, we find we have planned this fishery with our U.S. counterparts only to find that in another room down the hallway—and we have had situations like this—DFO has been planning the fishery with aboriginals in another room. What we have just planned is going to be superseded by the aboriginals' fishery agreement, so we have to scramble back into the room at the last minute, bring our U.S. counterparts back in, and renegotiate an arrangement for the fishery the following week because we didn't have everybody implicated in managing that stock in the same room.

John Fraser's investigation in 1994-95 resulted in a recommendation that there be one manager. It only makes common sense that there should be one manager. In my opinion again, co-management as it has been done in the U.S.A. is very expensive, and in the end it doesn't work as well as one person's being in charge.

Back in 1994 a singular thing came out of Brian Tobin's investigations, which I was involved in as well. With all the users who took part in that process on the west coast with Brian Tobin, the first thing everybody around the room said was that there should be one manager.

We haven't gone there. We need to focus on that. As we go down the road with respect to treaty settlements—and we need to go there—the problem I see is that we're going to have separate groups of people trying to manage and deliver allocations of fish that in the end are not deliverable. If they are delivered, in my opinion it will put the stock, the conservation of the resource, in jeopardy.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Forrest.

On the Tobin process you mentioned, is there a report or a series of recommendations available?

Mr. Mike Forrest: There is. It was a revitalization strategy—I can't remember the term—and it involved all the people I know about on the west coast. It certainly focused on the industry's recovery and on fleet revitalization. We restructured the fleet as a result of Mifflin's plan and so forth over the following years. It brought all the commercial users from all over the coast together to try to come up with a plan that made sense.

We went there, we bought into it, and we moved in that direction, but in my opinion we don't have the management aspect solved.

The Chair: Thanks. We'll have to get that.

Mr. O'Brien.

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: How much of this jurisdictional problem or the treaty jurisdiction...? Did this come about as a result of the Sparrow decision?

Mr. Mike Forrest: It came about as a result of the pilot sales program that was brought forward in 1992. After that program came into effect, we then had two commercial fisheries, one aboriginal and one non-aboriginal. We didn't have this prior to that. We had fished together as we should, in one commercial fishery for Canada. The reality is that after that process, as that starts to get more and more...if we go down the road into treaties and propagate that again, we are going to get to a place where we won't be able to deliver the allocations we're telling people we can deliver, at least not without putting the resource in jeopardy.

The Chair: Thank you, Lawrence.

We are starting to run out of time. In fact, we already are running out, but we'll go through our series of questions.

Mr. Lunney.

Mr. James Lunney (Nanaimo—Alberni, Canadian Alliance): I appreciate the very clear statement by Mr. Forrest regarding the confusion in authroity because of multiple levels of authority. It's certainly something that needs a solution.

The question I want to throw out is something I haven't heard addressed yet, and it concerns the impact of the low snow pack this year on the water levels. What is the prospect of that affecting the fishery? Is that something you'd like to comment on?

Mr. Mike Forrest: I can react to it in terms of history and what we've seen. I can give you one example, and it is that—you could probably pick the year, but it seems to me it was 1997-98—we increased the spawning requirement in season because we had very little water. We knew we had hot water in the Fraser, and we stopped the fishery to a large extent. We increased the spawning escapement 35% or something like that, and took all of the fish, basically, out of the catch and put them all to spawn, because we knew we were going to have pre-spawn mortality due to hot water, low water, and lack of snow. So that's an example of what has happened in the past. It does happen and it is a concern.

• 1005

The Chair: Mr. Todd.

Mr. Ian Todd: I don't really have anything to add. It's hard to predict at this time. The snow packs have improved a bit in the last month or so, it's my understanding. It's a combination of summer weather. If you can predict what the summer's going to be like, then maybe I could come up with a prediction as to what will happen. It's hard to assess at this point.

The Chair: Mr. Lunney.

Mr. James Lunney: Could you comment on the release from the Nechako and whether that will be impacted by the water levels or the snow pack?

Mr. Ian Todd: I'm not familiar with what's happening in the Nechako these days.

Mr. James Lunney: Thank you.

Can you comment on that, Mike?

Mr. Mike Forrest: Not specifically. We just know that the issue is there, that's all.

The Chair: I did want to come back to something you'd raised earlier. You'd made the point, Mr. Forrest, from your own personal experience in terms of allocation, that there's no problem for fishermen with conservation sitting on the shore. But when the resource is reallocated, that basically is a different matter.

Now, I know we're getting into aboriginal affairs here, but you know the situation we have on the east coast, which is not easy to deal with, as a result of the Marshall decision. Personally I certainly agree that you need one manager of the resource, but we seem to be getting farther and farther afield from that. Would you expand on that a little bit in terms of your own personal experience? I guess the Department of Fisheries and Oceans—the Government of Canada—has a responsibility to manage this resource. In the context of all the various court decisions that have come down, how do we do it?

Mr. Mike Forrest: If I knew how to do it, I'd be able to sell my product pretty well on the west coast.

The Chair: There are two questions there—one, in terms of your own personal experience and on the allocation being delivered elsewhere not for conservation reasons, and two, where you think we should be going directly.

Mr. Mike Forrest: We certainly should be going—I'll reiterate—to a direction of one person and one group in charge. We have gone in the wrong direction here with respect to treaty-making from a sockeye salmon point of view. I understand the Marshall decision in the east, but I certainly understood it a few years before with respect to Sparrow and company.

My experience is certainly that we should have one commercial fishery. There should not be two. If you understand salmon management and how the train of fish has to happen and go up the river, there aren't enough days in the week for us to put increments of spawners through the system. You have outside fisheries that have to happen and survive—both aboriginal and non-aboriginal in various places. Then you have fisheries through the river system. You have the U.S. fishery.

As various portions of fish are taken from the train of fish coming to the Fraser River—and this is a Fraser management issue, but it also happens in the Skeena River—those portions of fish taken away obviously reduce the potential of us delivering spawners. So somewhere along the line, you have to have a window where you are going to deliver spawners through the entire system. That means through the aboriginal system as well, in the upriver areas. You have to deliver food—ceremonial fish—as the first priority. I don't think there are very many fishermen who disagree with FSC—food, social, ceremonial—section 35 delivery. That's something we feel fairly strongly is a good thing to deliver. We have to do it according to the Constitution, but we should do it.

Those fisheries would never, in my history, have given us any problem with respect to conservation, but add that to the pilot sales program and a sale of those same stocks, and now you're talking about an insatiable demand. Now you're talking about something where you can't deliver enough fish to do that, and you don't have control. So what we end up with, in my opinion, is a fishery that doesn't have the controls that we need in order to deliver our spawning stock upriver, and that's sacrosanct. We have to have that, if we're in this for the long term.

• 1010

As we have made arrangements, for instance, in the lower Fraser with various groups of the aboriginal community, we have certain allocated numbers that people feel are to be delivered. Whether they're deliverable or not will depend on what the stock size is.

If in fact, as it says, “food, social, ceremonial, and treaty” is the priority after the conservation, after the spawners, and if we sign treaties that we now have—for instance, in the pilot sales program, a couple of million sockeye, 600,000 Musqueam-Tsawwassen-Burrard, a million Sto:lo, maybe as high as two million, maybe 1.5 million... We have that now as a pilot sales program. If we put that into a treaty scenario, and we add something, increase that number in terms of making a treaty with aboriginal people—we're certainly not going to go down from that number, as far as I can tell—we could potentially have all of the total allowable catch of the Fraser River sockeye in various years prioritized, prior to anybody, recreational or commercial or anybody, going fishing.

I don't think that is where we want to go. I don't think that's reasonably where various of the aboriginal community want to go either. But that's where we're headed, if we don't deal with this in some fashion that makes some sense—put one entity in charge of that stock, know what we have for delivery, and be able to deliver it to those people.

The Chair: Thank you.

John, I'll take one short one. We're well over time, but this is an extremely important issue. There's no question about it.

Mr. John Cummins: I have just a quick comment on what Mike said.

The year 1999 was the first year in history that there was no commercial fishery on the Fraser River, largely in my view because of management problems. Over the last number of years, if you had two or three days fishing commercial fleet in the Fraser River, you were doing well. Not too many years ago, you probably had 20 or 30 days and more.

I want to get back to the issue of the day, and that is the early return of the Adams. I think the problem we may be facing with the low snow pack... Mr. Todd, you had mentioned, and again we talked about it, the notion that the fishery on the summer runs should go ahead, and that there were ways we could mitigate the impact on the Adams River. You suggested taking eggs, and then developing that and growing those in a hatchery facility. There's also this notion of perhaps fertilizing the lakes.

Could you just give us a brief discussion of ways of mitigating impact on the Adams, if that fishery goes ahead? Would you just review those ways we could mitigate the impact of a fishery?

Mr. Ian Todd: Well, I think I covered it to about the depth of my knowledge. But to repeat, there is a technique available that is in use in other areas. In fact, I understand it's being used in the Shuswap area. Eggs are taken from the spawning sockeye and reared in a hatchery, which increases their survival over what occurs in natural conditions. The fry are then fed for a brief time, and then released back into the lake. This is an augmentation procedure that I believe is fairly well documented.

It's been used for quite a few years now on the Stikine on a joint Canada—U.S. venture, which has produced some spectacular successes. I believe that it's been used, as I say, on the upper Adams, which is a completely distinct stock. To give you an idea of the resilience of that stock, it was one that was virtually extirpated in the 1920s. On its dominant run for the past several cycles, there have been 4,000, 5,000, 3,000 a year until 1996, when it jumped to 25,000 successful spawners, increasing to 70,000 in 2000. That run is now at the point where it could be self-sustaining and could produce some spectacular results sometime over the next twenty years. Enhancement augmentation procedures have been used to assist that run in re-establishing, and now in expanding.

• 1015

So the techniques are there. What I'm suggesting is that they should be looked at for application, where needed, on the late run segment in 2001. I believe they could be conducted at a very modest cost when compared to the potential loss to the economy of the value of five million to eight million fish.

Mr. John Cummins: Is there any point—

The Chair: John, we will have—

Mr. John Cummins: Very quickly, though, is there any point in fertilizing the lakes? Would that be helpful at all in this circumstance, or not?

Mr. Ian Todd: That has been used in some cases. I'm not qualified to comment on whether that would be appropriate in these particular instances, but it's something that should be looked at.

The Chair: Thank you, gentlemen. We are going to have to move on to the next witnesses. I wish we had more time, though, because this is a very thorough discussion.

Thank you very much for coming, gentlemen. I think good information has been provided.

Could we turn quickly to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and Dr. Richards and Ms. James, and any others accompanying you?

Welcome. We know you had very short notice. In fact, I believe one of you was on the plane, not realizing you were going to have to come here today. I don't know who it was.

Who's leading off? Dr. Richards?

Ms. Laura Richards (Regional Director, Science, Pacific Region, Department of Fisheries and Oceans): Yes, thank you.

The Chair: Welcome, and thank you for coming on short notice. I know you were scrambling.

Ms. Laura Richards: Thank you. I have a text that I'll go through. Some of the issues I would have spoken about have already been covered by Mr. Todd and Mr. Forrest. I think they have provided some very valuable background to understanding the overall situation with the biology of salmon, but I will go through the text that I've prepared.

To begin, just to set the problem, what we have found is that the late run Fraser sockeye stocks have migrated upstream progressively earlier over the last six years, starting in 1995. This early upstream migration has been associated with high mortality rates prior to spawning.

The management actions to conserve these late run stocks have had significant impacts in terms of short-term loss production and longer-term impacts on the stocks, reduced commercial and recreational harvests, and impacts also on first nation dependence on the returning of the sockeye.

As stated very nicely by Mr. Todd, there are four major components of Fraser River sockeye that we typically group by run timing: the early Stuart, the early summer, the summer stocks, and the late runs. Fishery management and escapement targets are set separately for each of these run components, but there is considerable overlap in the run timing of these four groups. Consequently, we have fisheries on mixed stocks.

As I said, for the past six years, the late run of the Fraser River sockeye has been returning to the river very early. This means the fish are in fresh water for longer periods of time, resulting in an increased risk of pre-spawning mortality.

Last year the Pacific Salmon Commission estimated that 90% of the Weaver Creek component of the late run died before spawning, and that the Adams River run was also affected, as it was part of the late run. Some of this mortality, we know, was attributed to parasitic infection.

Conservation measures to protect the late-run sockeye also then reduced fishing opportunities for the summer run because of the overlap in timing.

• 1020

In 2000, Canada and the United States implemented a variety of management responses to meet the spawning escapement targets. Commercial, aboriginal, and recreational fisheries in both countries were closed. But despite these measures, escapement targets were not met in all cases, due to the very high pre-spawning mortality of the Adams and other late run Fraser sockeye. These reduced spawning escapements then resulted in reduced juvenile production, and at least one minor stock is approaching a critically low escapement level.

We don't know precisely, but there is a likelihood that the early upstream migration behaviour that was observed over the last six years will continue. At this time, however, we don't fully understand the cause, and that complicates the choice of how we're going to move forward.

In February, the Pacific Salmon Commission brought together leading scientists from the United States and from Canada to focus on this concern and recommend some actions. This panel of 21 scientists, representing disciplines that included oceanography, water contaminants, disease and parasites, predators, and physiology, then proposed 16 hypotheses that might explain the early returns and related mortality, and they recommended carrying out a number of studies, beginning this current year. Following from this initiative, Fisheries and Oceans Canada scientists will be determining potential research studies to understand why fish are entering the river early, and what the causes of this mortality might be.

In mid-April, the chair of the Pacific Salmon Commission wrote to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and the key departments and agencies in the United States to alert them of concerns over late run Fraser sockeye. We're entirely in agreement with the commission's views, which stress the need for both countries to continue to manage the Fraser River sockeye in a risk averse and precautionary manner.

Looking forward to this current year, the preliminary estimates for Fraser sockeye suggest a strong run, and one better than those in the last few years—and Mr. Todd has gone through some of that. This should allow for significant catches in Canadian fisheries. Fishing restrictions may nevertheless be required if the late run stocks enter the river early. The department has been releasing regular salmon updates, and this is one of the issues that has been stressed in those salmon updates.

The estimates suggest that the total number of sockeye salmon returning to the Fraser River will be in the range of 6.8 million to 12.8 million sockeye. Mr. Todd did talk about the 12.8 million—which is the mid-point of the cycle—when he gave his presentation, but, for management purposes, we've been using the lower number as a planning target. For that lower number of 6.8 million, there's a 75% probability that the run will then be 6.8 million or greater. We've then given the break-out for these different run components, based on the 75% probability level: for the early Stuart, 258,000; early summer, 109,000; summer, 6.2 million; and late run, 274,000.

The Adams River portion of the late run, as we've discussed, is in a subdominant year, with a dominant year in 2002. The peak of the Adams sockeye will not be affected for this year, 2001. The summer sockeye group, however, is expected to return in high numbers relative to long-term averages, and surpluses to spawning requirements are expected to allow for fishing opportunities for all sectors. These opportunities will be limited, however, by the presence of other weaker stocks, such as the late run, whose timing overlaps to various degrees with that of the summer run.

For the 2001 fishing season, both Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Pacific Salmon Commission will monitor the timing, abundance, and stock composition of sockeye returns to the Fraser River. In March, the department identified the potential for low water levels and resultant higher temperatures in the Fraser River that could result in higher salmon mortality. Fisheries and Oceans Canada will continue to consult with first nations, the recreational and commercial fishing groups, about the potential impacts of this and other factors, such as the potential low water levels and high temperatures.

At this point, the integrated fisheries management plan has not been approved, but it is expected to be released later this month. If there is in-season evidence of early returns of the late run component of Fraser sockeye, Canada and the United States will address this issue jointly, through the Fraser panel of the Pacific Salmon Commission.

Mr. Chairman, I do have a few overheads that show some of these timings. Would that be useful, or should we bring it up later?

The Chair: How long would it take?

Ms. Laura Richards: Not very long.

The Chair: Okay, then let's see it. We might as well have all the information out there.

• 1025

Ms. Laura Richards: I think this will show some pictures that might help to clarify some of the points Mr. Todd also raised.

This first graph shows you an example of the timing days and the return. I apologize, as we do not have these translated. We only have English versions available, given the short notice. In blue we have the timing of the summer run and in red the timing of the late run. That gives you some sense of the typical overlap in the returns of those two different groups.

This next graph shows the relationship Mr. Todd referred to earlier. On the XY axis we have the mortality rate prior to spawning, relating that to the date of upstream migration, in this case for the Weaver sockeye. As you can see from this, there is a relationship between the mortality prior to spawning and the upstream migration date. In recent years we have had a higher mortality prior to spawning in correlation with this earlier return date.

The next graph shows the same picture for the Adams sockeye, and again you can see there is a change in the pattern with the early migration, the timing of the migration relating to the mortality rate prior to spawning for the Adams River sockeye.

The last graph we have here gives you some sense of the predictions for the last fish year and the next two years. It demonstrates some of these cyclical patterns we see in returns of Fraser sockeye, where the blue on top shows the returns for the late run component and the green is the remainder. So you can see from this that the late run component in 2000-2001 is relatively small, but we're expecting a big return in 2002, which is going to be the dominant year for the Adams, and somewhat smaller, but still large in 2003.

So that puts some pictures to some of the things we've discussed.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. James, Dr. Richards.

Who wants to start with questions? Peter, you missed the last round, so we'll give you first crack this time. Go ahead.

Mr. Peter Stoffer (Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NDP): Okay. I had to go introduce a private member's bill that's going to help all of you guys out in the future.

An hon. member: Sincerely?

Mr. Peter Stoffer: No worries.

I was going to ask Mr. Todd this question, but maybe I can ask you. An awful lot of people were talking about a singular management authority for that. He talked about spawning being the priority in conservation, but I've always said before you can spawn, you must have a proper habitat for those fish to return to. So obviously, that in a lot of ways relies on the province as well, in matters of mining, road construction, tourism, and so on.

My question would be—maybe you can answer this for him, I know it's not really fair—what role would you see the Province of British Columbia playing in the management of the future of this stock? Or would they have any role? The reason I say that is that when the Pacific Salmon Treaty was negotiated, the province was left out of the discussions. So were a lot of the commercial fishermen, and they were very upset about this. In fact, the day the announcement was made I happened to be in Vancouver on the way to my Dad's funeral, and I heard it on the radio. So we went down to the Pan Pacific, I think it was, where it was being announced, and nobody could get into that room, except Minister Anderson and a whole bunch of Americans and Terry Milewski. I managed to sneak in, more or less, but the commercial fishermen weren't allowed in. So there's a lot of distrust over this process.

So when they speak of singular management systems, the commercial fishermen, at least the ones I speak to, and the province want to part of that management process. If it falls under one umbrella, I think that would be good, in order to redefine who has the final authority. But where do you think the province fits in this, or do they at all?

• 1030

Ms. Laura Richards: You're certainly correct that the province and even the municipalities have some role in the habitat management and the water management. So it isn't just the federal government. There are other players in this. The federal government does have a policy for habitat that was released a couple of years ago. You're certainly correct that the habitat component is an important one.

This broader issue of how everything fits together is not one I'm really prepared to talk specifically to—it's not exactly the question on the table—but I certainly appreciate where you're coming from. I think we recognize that the federal government certainly can't do this alone, and we do need to have others come in and be players in the whole picture.

We are looking at integrated management. We are looking at the overall watershed and how that watershed is important. And we're looking much more broadly now at the whole ecosystem focus of the department in general. I think there's a much greater recognition that we must think about all systems on an ecosystem and, in this case, on a watershed basis, to be able to put the whole story together. There certainly are other jurisdictions and players when you look at it on that kind of scale.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: I agree with the previous two gentlemen who said you can't have a meeting with the Americans, while in the same building DFO's negotiating fishing agreements with the aboriginal people that contradict their discussions, so they have to go back and do it all over again. It makes us look like a bunch of fools, at least on the international side. So what is DFO doing to prevent that from happening, if indeed what he says is correct, which I assume it to be? What is DFO doing to ensure that this doesn't happen again, that you have coordinated talks at the same time?

The Chair: Ms. James.

Ms. Heather James (Chief, Pacific Operations, Resource Management Directorate, Department of Fisheries and Oceans): We weren't prepared to discuss that, but I know the department is looking at consultation mechanisms, and there's the improved decision-making paper that was released as a discussion paper a couple of months ago. So the department is working on how to consult better. That's part of the process, but I don't think I can speak in any depth on that particular process today.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: You've shown on the graph that 2002 looks like it's going to be the good year for the return. What if you're wrong?

A voice: DFO have never been wrong, Peter.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: No, they've been wrong before. If indeed they're wrong, what is DFO going to do in order to alleviate the financial concerns of the fishermen in the aboriginal communities who will rely on this? Because they're all being told it'll be a poor year this year, but it'll be a good year next year. What if you're wrong? What's DFO going to do in order to look after those people?

Ms. Heather James: I don't have any specific plans at this point. I don't think the department has specific plans to deal with compensation. I think some of the processes that we're starting with the research projects are going to be really important in seeing if we continue to have the same kind of mortality problem this year or if there are some changes, and it seems there are a lot of environmental water condition issues that are in a state of change. So it's really hard to predict. If the mortality issue were not so bad this year, that might make you think the situation is changing. If we can get some of these science things under way, that might help to point the direction. Trying to get some of the science stuff under way now is really important for dealing with 2002.

The Chair: Thank you, Peter and Ms. James.

I go to Mr. Cummins. John, before you start, I have one question.

I know Dr. Richards is regional director, science, and Ms. James is chief for resource management directorate, and therefore there are certainly some other areas of the department we probably want answers on that neither of you is in charge of. But my question relates to the fact that there's been a lot of discussion about, as the previous witnesses said, who's really managing the resource and who's in charge. It was said you have DFO, the aboriginals, and you have the Pacific Salmon Commission. From your perspective, how difficult is it for you, in your capacity on science and resource management, to make decisions when you must question who's in charge of the store?

• 1035

Ms. Laura Richards: Well, I can clarify that the role of science is to provide the best possible objective advice we can in order to help with the management. That's really our role. And we provide that advice as impartially as we can to whoever requests that advice. So from the perspective of science, it's not so much an issue of who manages the fishery; the concern is that we can get the information as best we can and try to help out in any way we can to move that issue forward.

The Chair: Mr. Cummins.

Mr. John Cummins: I wonder if the witnesses wanted to advise the committee of their background in the Fraser River fishery, just as a point of interest. We allowed the previous witnesses and we didn't allow you that courtesy. I thought you might like to do that.

Ms. Laura Richards: Okay, thank you.

I have a master's and a PhD from the University of British Columbia in animal resource ecology. I have been working with the department since 1982 in the area of stock assessment. I have a scientific background, with over forty papers published in the international peer-review literature, and a number of other publications. I don't have a lot of specific background and I can't speak as eloquently on the Fraser River. My background is more in the general area of stock assessment.

Ms. Heather James: I have a bachelor's and a master's degree in economics. I studied resource economics at Simon Fraser University and I've been working with the department since 1980. I worked for quite a long time on some of the Pacific Salmon Treaty issues, negotiating the 1985 treaty and subsequently working in the department on some of the implementation of the 1985 treaty. During the last two years, instead of working in the international area of fisheries and oceans, I have been dealing with the domestic side of resource management.

The Chair: Thank you, ladies.

Mr. John Cummins: On page 5, the bullet at the top of the page, you refer to the Adams River run this year, in 2001, as subdominant. Your graph shows 2003 to be subdominant, so I presume that's a typo.

Ms. Laura Richards: This is, as Mr. Todd said, the low year on the cycle.

Mr. John Cummins: But it's not the subdominant year.

Ms. Laura Richards: When we were doing this, I think they were assuming that subdominant was everything that wasn't dominant. I think that was the way this was done.

Mr. John Cummins: That's a little sloppy, I think.

Let's get to the nub of the question here, the question that probably is first and foremost on our minds this morning. I'll just repeat the statement that was made by the Pacific Salmon Commission, where they advise that we should prepare for sweeping closure of the Fraser River fishery this year to conserve what's left of the Adams River sockeye run. You heard Mr. Todd's assessment of that. I just wonder if you'd care to comment.

The Chair: John, so we're all under the same interpretation, what was Mr. Todd's assessment?

Mr. John Cummins: Mr. Todd suggests that it's not necessary, and in fact it would be hurtful, to not adequately harvest the summer runs, because you would end up with too many spawners and it would be harmful to the summer runs if they weren't harvested. Yet the Pacific Salmon Commission is suggesting that there be closures on this summer run to allow what's left of the Adams River sockeye run to proceed to the spawning ground. So there's this conflict here between harvest or not harvest, and I'd like your opinion on that.

The Chair: Thank you.

Dr. Richards.

• 1040

Ms. Laura Richards: First I'd like to make a clarification. The newspaper article to which you refer did not quote exactly the letter from the Pacific Salmon Commission. Those words about sweeping closures were not part of that letter. What was actually said was that the parties need to continue to manage the late-run Fraser sockeye group “in a very risk-averse and precautionary manner”. Those were the words that were actually used. So there was some licence taken in actually writing the article in the newspaper.

Mr. John Cummins: Well, you do talk in your article about risk-averse, but you also say that fishing restrictions may nevertheless be required in late-run stocks, if the late-run stocks enter the river early, which is what they say in the Vancouver Sun article, that there are going to be fishing restrictions. The Vancouver Sun article says it, and you say it. So give us the full monty on this deal, please.

Ms. Heather James: At this point we're forecasting a run size that's larger than last year's. Last year was in the range of five million fish. We're talking now of a forecast that's in the range of six million to twelve million fish.

The department released pre-season forecasts in January and again in April that indicated that there should be commercial opportunities in 2001. The next stage in the process will be the announcement of the integrated fisheries management plan, which we expect to be coming later this month. So at this point we are planning for commercial fisheries on Fraser sockeye, managed on a precautionary basis.

Mr. John Cummins: We've heard your nonsense on precautionary basis. You use that and hide behind that all time. But I'm asking you, specifically, to respond to your statement in your document, which reflects the statement in the Vancouver Sun that there are going to be fisheries closures. Mr. Todd made it very clear that fisheries closures to protect Adams River fish could be counterproductive because it could be damaging to summer runs. Would you answer the question, please?

The Chair: John, to be fair to the witnesses, they quoted from the letter, which differs substantially from what the newspaper article alleged. We all know that happens every day.

Mr. John Cummins: They're talking about fishing restrictions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Could you put that statement on the record? Is it possible to get a copy of that letter? If you could, if it's possible, then we'd like to have a copy of that letter. Then we can clearly look in documented print at what was really said.

Mr. John Cummins: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like the witnesses to provide us with their rationale for their statement, page 4, the second bullet under “Prospects for 2001”, where they say “fishing restrictions may nevertheless be required if the late-run stocks enter the river early”, which is substantially what is said in the Vancouver Sun article.

I would like to know the rationale for it. Mr. Todd has provided us with expert advice that it could be damaging to summer-run stocks. That's why we're here this morning.

The Chair: On that point, go ahead.

Ms. Heather James: Fishing restrictions don't necessarily mean a total closure. The Vancouver Sun article was talking about extinction and widespread closures. DFO isn't talking about extinction and closures. You have an article that has painted a fairly colourful picture, and that's not what DFO has been saying in its news releases up until this time. We're planning for a commercial fishery.

Mr. John Cummins: How widespread are the closures you're anticipating?

Ms. Heather James: I can't say that at this point. I think that part of the issue will depend on when the fish show up on the river, whether they show up early and go into the river right away, and the relative abundance of the stock.

I think there will be in-season management related to this particular issue, as there always has been. This isn't a brand-new problem that's going to happen for the first time in 2001. It happened last year, and we had a fishery last year. We didn't shut everything down. So this year we're forecasting larger runs, and we're anticipating a commercial fishery.

• 1045

Mr. John Cummins: Do you intend to allow a harvest of the summer runs that allows for optimum escapement of those summer runs, or are you going to put restrictions in place that are going to allow an overabundance of spawners to protect the Adams River run?

Do you understand the question, or would you like me to repeat it?

Ms. Laura Richards: I think one of the issues here is that, as you know, we have to look at the situation in season as things develop.

Mr. John Cummins: I understand that.

Ms. Laura Richards: At the moment, we don't know what the situation is going to be in terms of the run timing. We don't know if the pattern we've seen in previous years is going to continue this year. We need to be able to plan—

Mr. John Cummins: I understand, but the issue here is, do you intend to allow an optimum escapement—in other words, allow a commercial fishery so that there will be an optimum escapement to the grounds, or are you going to allow an overabundant escapement to protect that Adams run? What's the policy here? That's what I'm trying to get at. You have to have a plan before you go in. You have to have a policy, and I want to know what that policy is.

Ms. Laura Richards: Okay, we are in the process of developing the integrated fisheries management plan, which has not yet been released, so your question is a little bit premature in that context.

But the point here in terms of the situation with the late summer run is that we don't know whether or not we're going to have the same problem that we've seen in the past. So we need to be able to plan various scenarios about what might transpire that can then be determined in season.

The Chair: Do you have a date on the integrated fisheries management plan?

Ms. Laura Richards: We're hoping to have it released later this month.

The Chair: Mr. Roy.

Mr. John Cummins: Mr. Chairman, the point here—

The Chair: Is this a point of order?

Mr. John Cummins: Yes, Mr. Chairman. The point is—

A voice: Take away his time.

Mr. John Cummins: —if you're going to develop a management plan, you develop that based on certain principles. What I'm asking them is what are the principles?

The Chair: But they have answered that question, John.

Mr. John Cummins: No, they haven't.

The Chair: There will be an integrated management plan coming.

Mr. John Cummins: I don't think so.

The Chair: Dominic.

Mr. Dominic LeBlanc (Beauséjour—Petitcodiac, Lib.): Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, I am new to this committee. I just joined Parliament six months ago. I'm surprised that we as a committee invite witnesses to appear before us, we refer to their testimony as nonsense, and then it looks like an episode of Law and Order here.

I don't know if this is the way we normally invite witnesses to attend a committee hearing. They make a presentation on behalf of a department, we dismiss their testimony as nonsense, and then we interrupt them.

The Chair: Dominic, the committee has not dismissed their testimony as nonsense. John has made his personal point of view known, and he has asked some very good questions as well. There is some balance here.

Mr. Roy.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: Thank you Mr. Chairman.

You told us—and I can understand it very well, because it follows what was said earlier—that your responsibility is to supply data that will make it possible for stocks to be managed effectively in the rivers concerned. I would like to know what was done in the past. You spoke about an integrated management plan. How come we know so little? Based on what I heard this morning and what I heard from you, we know very little about what is really going on in these rivers, particularly the Fraser.

For my second question, I will return to a question I asked Mr. Todd earlier. You mentioned 16 hypotheses that might explain the early returns and related mortality of salmon, but you are going to study these are 16 hypotheses. Does this mean that we did not have any knowledge about this area in the past, and how long are these studies going to take? Will these studies be over two years, four years, six years? It might be important to know how long, because if we want to be able to manage effectively, then we will need to have that knowledge. My question is the following: how come we have not yet reached this level of knowledge, a shortcoming which would force us to react in that way if a disaster were to occur?

• 1050

[English]

The Chair: Dr. Richards.

Ms. Laura Richards: On the first question, why do we have so little data, in fact we have a lot of data. As Mr. Todd explained, we have been studying sockeye in the Fraser River for a long time. We have a tremendous amount of good data to look at that.

What we've seen in this case is a change, something different happening, starting in about 1995. That was something new and unexpected, something we hadn't seen before.

Usually when you see something new, it takes a couple of years to realize that this is actually a shift, because as you know, it can flip one way or another. You need to have some certainty that there is a continuation of the problem before you invest a lot in trying to explain it.

[Translation]

I can describe the 16 hypotheses.

[English]

I have a list here, and if you can indulge me, I will go through that list. It's not particularly detailed. This was a short meeting where some scientists were brought together and really did some brainstorming around these hypotheses.

The first one was that it was related to oceanography or the fisheries, that it had something to do with some change in the ocean ground.

The second hypothesis was that there might have been some kind of shift in the migration mechanism, the biological clock of the salmon, that was then leading them to do an early migration.

A third hypothesis was that the salmon acquired the infection prior to the Fraser River entry, so their behavioural change is related to the infection.

The fourth was that the adults approaching the Fraser River were exposed to some kind of chemical contamination that then triggered the early entry into the Fraser River.

The fifth was, again, that the fishing behaviour has changed due to oceanography.

The sixth was that there was a relationship between the parasitic infection and the mortality of the host, that is, the salmon.

The seventh was again a parasite disease issue, that the smolts themselves are infected near the mouth of the Fraser River.

As you can see, these are pretty loose, and they weren't particularly detailed by this group.

The Chair: If I could interrupt for a second, I think the committee would like to hear them, but I do want to underline the fact that I would hope nobody goes out of the room taking one of these quotes and saying that's what the scientists said. I want to put it on the record that what they're saying is any one of these possibilities, or a number.

Ms. Laura Richards: Right.

The Chair: So we're clear?

Go ahead.

Ms. Laura Richards: The eighth one was that there was some change in the movement of the water in the Strait of Georgia, so then the exchange mechanisms of the water might have altered or delayed the behaviour of the late-run fish.

The ninth was that there was a change in the vertical distribution of the late-run sockeye in the ocean, which would then cause them to experience certain physical conditions, again altering their behaviour.

The tenth was that the early migration was triggered by a low stored energy reserve. They were getting low on energy.

The eleventh was that there was an interaction of the diversion rate. The diversion rate is whether they enter the Fraser River from the north or come around to the south through the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and interaction of that with physical ocean conditions that affect the late-run up-river timing.

The twelfth was that the choice of river entry was related to conditions in the year of ocean entry, so there was some kind of linkage between the conditions when the smolts first entered the ocean and coming back.

The thirteenth was that they're fleeing into the Fraser River to avoid predators.

The fourteenth was that there was some change in diet that might be responsible for their behaviour.

• 1055

The fifteenth was that predation by harbour seals and killer whales has increased.

And the sixteenth was that the juvenile salmon that are outmigrating are exposed to chemicals that then reduce their ability to remain and hold in the Fraser River as adults.

As I said, these are very loose hypotheses. These were just ideas that were put forward. I don't think there was any agreement on any of these particular ones. Clearly, from what I've read, there needs to be more work done to further explain these possibilities.

The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Richards.

Mr. Roy.

[Translation]

Mr. Jean-Yves Roy: You have all these hypotheses now. At the moment, what direction are you likely to take with your research? You will no doubt have choices to make. Where do you intend to place an emphasis? When do you intend to begin your studies and how long will it take before we have some answers?

[English]

Ms. Laura Richards: You're asking a scientist when we expect to have answers. I think you know science does not always proceed as quickly as one might like. We know we don't have answers for solutions to cancer yet, and some of these questions are equally difficult to solve. But we can make some progress, and I think there are some things we can do.

Our intent here is to try to develop these a bit further. This was just a preliminary, short meeting that was held as a brainstorming session. We need to be able to flesh these out and understand them further. We certainly intend to start looking at some of these questions this year. There are some things we can do. We certainly intend to do some more work in the Fraser River in order to understand the parasitic infection and what happens in the process of that within the Fraser River. We also would like to do some more work on the oceanography.

These details aren't yet finalized, but that is our intention. What we would like to do is some more pilot work this year, because that would then help us to determine where we should really put our efforts in developing more complete proposals for study in future years.

As I said, we don't know if we can get answers to these things quickly. With a scientific study of this nature, normally we would make proposals that would go for three to four years. That's the typical kind of timeframe in which one would undertake this kind of study.

The Chair: We have time for two quick questions, on of which is from myself.

How is the decision going to be made in terms of fishing on the Fraser River this year? You people are involved in the science, I know, but what is the process used to make that decision?

Ms. Heather James: I think there will be more specific announcements related particularly to the commercial plan, when we announce the IFMP, which should be in mid- to late May. The memo will be going out to the minister shortly on that particular issue. The details on the anticipated management arrangements will be outlined later this month.

That would be our best guess at what we can do, and then we will be managing in season. We'll be monitoring when the run returns, and we'll be looking at the stock composition and timing in season, to decide whether or not we need to make further in-season changes to the management regime.

The Chair: Do the scientists who are involved make a recommendation to the minister on whether it should be closed, open, stock catches, a quota, etc.?

Ms. Laura Richards: In terms of what the scientists do and what their role is, they do the forecasts. They then make predictions as to what the return level will be. From that, we have to work with the fisheries managers to determine what the catch will be from that return.

• 1100

The Chair: Peter.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: You mentioned the fact that there will be a commercial fishery. I assume it will be a limited commercial fishery. For example, if next year there are an awful lot of fish coming out the river, obviously there will be more commercial activity, whereas this year it will be a lot more reduced. Would that be correct?

Ms. Heather James: There are a number of mixed stock problems on the Fraser River. Thompson coho is another conservation concern there. I think that probably in any scenario you're not going to be able to harvest the most abundant stock to its fullest potential without doing damage to co-migrating weaker stock. Part of the management issues is making some of those kind of offsetting adjustments.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: If indeed the Vancouver Sun article was correct—it's perceived to be anyway—if you look at it objectively, there could be mass closures of commercial fishing. If indeed it was partially correct, how would that affect the pilot sales? If you close the commercial fishery off to the non-aboriginal community, but allow the aboriginal community, through their pilot sales program, to maintain fishing, that's going to cause a lot of friction. If you are going to have a limited fishery, are both sides going to have their numbers reduced, or will one side have an advantage over another, if indeed you have to reduce the fishery?

Ms. Heather James: The pilot sales arrangements will be covered off in the IFMP when its decided, but conservation is always the first priority. So if conservation is at issue, obviously the pilot sales fishery would have to be constrained as well.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: You mentioned further work and you're right, there's no question. But in your estimatation, will DFO give you the resources required to maintain the current studies that are needed?

Ms. Laura Richards: Additional funds have come into the department in conjunction with the Pacific Salmon Treaty. The department received an additional $11 million last year to implement the new measures in the Pacific Salmon Treaty. Certainly some of the issues in that area will be related to the issue we discussed, and some portion of those funds can be directed to issues like this, which are joint issues that we'll be dealing with. In addition to that there has been a small allocation given to the Pacific Salmon Commission to look at this issue directly. There's $50,000 available from that.

Our intent this year is to try to use some of these funds to further develop these hypotheses and come up with proposals. There are other sources we can look at that are external. In particular, we'd want to try to use some of these opportunities to leverage other kinds of resources, such as working with universities, for example. This work doesn't all have to be done by the federal government. There are other people and other players who are interested in participating in some of these issues.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Richards, Ms. James. I know it was very short notice for you people. Thank you very much for coming and providing the information.

Before we adjourn—Mr. O'Brien, you're parliamentary secretary. The revitalization strategy, a paper of Tobin's, was talked about earlier from nineteen whenever—in nineteen what?

Mr. Lawrence O'Brien: 1994.

The Chair: Would it be possible for you to get a copy of that paper for the committee?

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Is it possible to ask for a copy of those sixteen hypotheses?

The Chair: They are on the record. You can get the minutes of the committee.

Mr. John Cummins: And the graphs?

The Chair: We have them. The graphs have been handed out. Just pick up the minutes. We can get a copy if you want, I'm sure. It's been read into the record. It will be in the minutes. It's not a problem. If you want a copy, I'm sure Dr. Richards will provide you with one. You probably want it for the Halifax meetings, Peter.

Mr. Peter Stoffer: Right.

The Chair: Thank you very much again, ladies.

The meeting is adjourned.