CIMM Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA CITOYENNETÉ ET DE L'IMMIGRATION

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, November 27, 2001

• 0911

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Joe Fontana (London North Centre, Lib.)): Good morning. I can't see a clock around this place, but my watch says it's 9:10. I wonder if we can get started.

Here's the plan. First of all, you have before you something from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights relating to the convention on the status of refugees. This information I believe was sent to you already at your offices, but it's here. Again, it's just resource material, because I think there was some discussion of what we might include in a report. But everything you ever wanted to know about refugees is in this 20-page document. So that's there for you.

The other thing that was given that we asked for was guidelines by the IRB with regard to detention. I think there was some discussion that we wanted to know what the administrative guidelines were for detention for our own use and review purposes. So that's also before you. It's another 20-page document that is there.

The other thing I have is this 70-page report. We won't get into the title, but it's Bridges and Hands Across the Border: Cooperation, Safety and Security at Ports of Entry. I want to thank Jay and Ben for doing a great job in terms of capturing the essence, I believe, of what the committee heard and what the committee has been talking about. We want to get into the recommendations today and see which ones are fine and which ones need some fine-tuning.

I think the game plan is that if we work today until 11 or 11:30, and get most of it done, we'll come back on Thursday, do the final touches, and report our findings to the House of Commons. On Tuesday we'll all jointly hold a news conference so that we can inform the House and Canadians and so on about the hard work this committee has done. So that's the game plan. I think we should be able to do it. Obviously we want to get this report done before the budget is tabled on December 10.

Let me just say a couple of other things. First, let me thank each and every one of you, because I think the work we've done thus far has not gone unnoticed. Hence the new bill, Bill C-42, on public safety. I think you will note, and perhaps in your briefings you will have seen, that some of the things we've already been talking about, at least in four or five categories, have been covered in that omnibus bill. So I want to thank you, because a lot of the work and a lot of what we had heard obviously saw its way into that new bill. Obviously this report will even go further. That's why I'm half-pleased that some of those things we've been discussing have already found themselves into some pieces of legislation.

The last thing I want to say is that with regard to Washington we should continue to pursue our objective. That is, to get to Washington to have that dialogue. In that spirit, I want to let you know that yesterday, to my surprise, I had a meeting with Congressman Mark Souder, who happens to head up the subcommittee on border security. He happened to be here at the behest of the ambassador, and was meeting with two or three ministers. I happened to be on the list of people he wanted to talk to.

Mark and I had a great one-hour meeting. In fact, he was so interested by the work we were doing and some of the things that I talked to him about that he wanted us to immediately go to Washington and testify before his committee. That's how interested they are in some of the proposals I talked to him about in terms of where we were coming from and what we had heard.

He was very excited about it, and in fact indicated that the United States should hear of some of the fine work and hard work that we've discovered in our travels. So even if we can't get to Washington before this committee report is tabled, he has indicated that it's very important that we get there to talk to our counterparts so that we can put some of this on the record.

He looks forward to our report. In fact, it's in keeping with some of the things he's doing. He was very intrigued about some of the ideas we were talking about in terms of shared facilities and shared responsibility. This whole partnership stuff he was very intrigued about, and he said he would be talking to his counterparts in Congress this morning to see if they couldn't make it possible for us to get there, because, he said, this is dynamite information.

• 0915

So I wanted to let you know that I think there is a great appetite there from our colleagues, but they have been, as Mark indicated, tremendously busy in a number of other areas.

The only thing I should say, and maybe I'll circulate it, is that when he issued a press release on October 17, 2001, “Souder chairs hearing on border security”, one of the things he says, which we talked about yesterday, is that he thinks the northern border is a problem. Hence, after our discussion he says it may not be a problem at all, but it may very well be an opportunity. Again, we talked about myths and realities. I think we're on the right track with regard to that. I'll make that news release available to you.

Having said that, let's start. And rather than going through word by word of this thing, remember—as we said the last time, when we had a brief overview of what it might look like—the introduction, as we all agreed, would talk a little bit about our historical record as a country in terms of immigration and refugees, and also what in fact that border means to us in terms of people and trade, and essentially what September 11 had us all realize. In fact, what Mark Souder said to me was that September 11 did in fact show their shortcomings in an awful lot of areas that in fact they were taking for granted.

As we go through the introduction, chapter one is “Recent Measures—the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act”. I think sections 1.1 to 1.6 talk a little bit about the Geneva Convention on refugees. It talks a little bit about Bill C-11, and reaffirms or talks a little bit about the security measures that in fact are in Bill C-11.

In terms of whether or not we ought to mention Bill C-42 and the recent measures as proposed in the new legislation, I think we should make mention of that in this particular section, just so we don't completely look.... Our report still has to be tabled, but the government has done something on the bill. So we'll add something with regard to Bill C-42, and what's been put on the table by the government so far.

Chapter two talks a little bit about the Canadian border security, and the committee's findings and recommendations. Perhaps the first recommendation that comes from that is on page 8 or 9. That's the first recommendation. By the way, all recommendations are listed separately at the back end. This first recommendation says:

Citizenship and Immigration Canada and other government departments make an effort to educate the public, both here and abroad, so that the unsubstantiated and unwarranted concerns about Canada's border security are refuted. Ongoing and proposed measures must be communicated widely. Such educational efforts should also be addressed to American legislators.

I think that's because some of us believe that there are an awful lot of myths out there and reality checks that we wanted to put on the table. With regard to that recommendation, I think we wanted something that spoke to us informing the public, educating the public and the media on both sides of the border.

Does anybody have any particular problems with that recommendation, or do you want any particular changes?

Yes, Paul.

Mr. Paul Forseth (New Westminster—Coquitlam—Burnaby, Canadian Alliance): In looking at the rough draft for the first time—I'm going to have to read the document—I'm quickly going through the list of recommendations in the back and seeing lots of stuff about which I'd say yes, we agree with this, this is all very good. But it's almost like we should set aside an hour or whatever and go through this, because our discussions will be much more productive if we've gone through the document and in our own way highlighted what we want to talk about. Otherwise, we're blindly walking around.

• 0920

The Chair: I would agree with you, except that part of this draft was tabled last Thursday. That's why I say we have some time to work, and I don't expect everybody to.... This is the first time I've seen it, other than the fact that I've had some opportunity of discussing with the researchers some of the content. But that's why I say let's go through the recommendations to see whether or not the recommendations are in keeping with what we have indicated, because the last time we met we said here are the areas of concern, here's what we heard, let's draft some recommendations around this stuff.

The background information in this report is obviously important, but let's take the time to go through some recommendations, unless you want to go page by page, which we could or would.

Mr. Paul Forseth: At some point we will have to.

The Chair: Yes, I know, and that's why we'll have Thursday as an opportunity to go through the whole document. For now I want to use our constructive time to go through the recommendations.

Jerry and then Art.

Mr. Jerry Pickard (Chatham—Kent Essex, Lib.): In a way I have to apologize to the committee, because I was unable to be here last Thursday and unfortunately I did not see the brief. I don't know if it was sent to my office or not, but my staff certainly didn't get me a copy of the brief beforehand, so I feel totally uninformed.

You've gone through a lot of the background and I know a lot of discussion centred around it. What I would hope we could do for a brief period of time here is have the researchers not necessarily go through page by page, but as on each recommendation I can see there are two or three significant points that are centred to get us to that recommendation, possibly the authors who have dealt with that could point out how point one, two, or three were presented and therefore were the reason that recommendation came down. That would help me.

Otherwise, I feel I have to read this before I can say yes, I agree with it. Probably most of the recommendations I would agree with, but the support material is in the researchers' heads, and they put that support material together pretty well. Can they do that?

The Chair: Sure. It's not a problem. So that will be part of our considerations.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: In half an hour they might be able to cover that material for us.

The Chair: Yes, I could have a full briefing on this. I thought maybe we'd just get on with some of the recommendations. Some people have been here for the whole thing and some people have not, so I can understand where some people might be having some difficulty.

Art.

Mr. Art Hanger (Calgary Northeast, Canadian Alliance): In a way I believe that there's a need to go through it in more depth, but I'd certainly be open to going through the recommendations now. I've noted that there are some comments made in the background material that leave question marks in my mind as to what was meant by them, and I think the only way they're going to get cleared up is if we have a broader discussion of them.

The Chair: Let's proceed on this basis then. Let's start with the recommendations, but specifically the preamble to the recommendations, so the first one is 2.1 and 2.2 of A, which talks a little bit about the effects of September 11, 2001. But 2.3 and 2.4 are the background. It's headed at the top of page 8, “Security Misconceptions After September 11th”.

Jay or Ben, do you want to talk a little bit about 2.3 and 2.4 and why there is the recommendation on top of page 9?

Mr. Art Hanger: Are you going to go now through each section?

The Chair: No. I will let the researchers give us the background on the recommendation and we'll leave for you to essentially read all of the pages between now and Thursday. How is that? In that way we can again talk a little bit about what you might want in that background stuff.

Who wants to do this first? Ben?

Mr. Benjamin Dolin (Committee Researcher): Sure.

The first recommendation is about greater educational effort to communicate what we have been doing and what the department has been doing. It came out of the testimony from the intelligence community officials, the RCMP and CSIS, who both made it quite clear that they felt there were measures being taken to ensure security and that there had been misrepresentations in the media that had resulted in misconceptions on the other side of the border among legislators. That was essentially where that arose from, the recommendation that there be greater communication of what has been occurring in terms of border security.

The Chair: Yes, Art.

• 0925

Mr. Art Hanger: I'd like a little more emphasis on one other point that was brought up clearly in our travels—it was noted elsewhere too, by some of the witnesses who came forward—and that's the flow of people coming from the United States into Canada undocumented.

The Chair: It's further on in the report, believe me, Art. It's very well documented back there, but it's—

Mr. Art Hanger: No, no, I'm talking about the undocumented flow of people.

The Chair: Yes, it's in there.

Mr. John Godfrey (Don Valley West, Lib.): You're saying they're undocumented.

The Chair: Excuse me, John; I'm the chair.

Art, it's in there, okay, but not in this section. Believe me.

Mr. Art Hanger: But I think it should be in this section—that's what I'm trying to get to, Joe. All I'm saying is I think we have to begin an education process with the Americans. The fact that some 20,000 people cross that border into Canada should be part of our appeal to the legislators and the bureaucrats to deal with this matter in a very effective way, and come to some agreement on this safe third country rule.

The Chair: All of that is in there, but whether or not we should highlight it more at the beginning.... Maybe there's a place in the introduction for that. But I guarantee you, the background and the recommendation you just talked about, Art, are further on in the report, in the Canada-U.S. section.

Inky.

Mr. Inky Mark (Dauphin—Swan River, PC/DR): I just wanted to ask a question about point 2.4. It says “...to suggest that Canada is more prone to terrorist activity than the United States is simply false.” Where did that suggestion come from? My own recollection is that Canadians do realize it, and they're not that naive to think it can't happen here. But to suggest we're more prone to terrorist activity than the United States.... I don't know where that comes from. Where does that come from?

The Chair: Just hang on a second, before I get to your question.

Paul, did you have something else?

Mr. Paul Forseth: I was going to try to explain that maybe what Art is trying to say is that the overall recommendation talks about the good story, the good news we need to communicate, but as part of describing the situation of the land, before we get into the recommendations in response to that, we should also outline some of the problems or challenges we face. There are good things we're doing, but we have some big challenges as well.

The Chair: I would agree, and maybe that's what we can do in the introduction, talk a little bit about what you and Art just said. So the first recommendation...I would agree, that's part of the information and education part of it.

With regard to point 2.4, before you get to it, we asked the researcher to give some background on this sentence.

Ben, could you talk a little bit about that?

Mr. Benjamin Dolin: That was from the testimony of Mr. Alcock, who said he had been misquoted in the media as saying terrorists were finding a safe haven in Canada. That's all that sentence, as I recall, intended to indicate.

Mr. Inky Mark: How did we get to the suggestion that we're more prone than the U.S.?

The Chair: We're not more prone. That's what it says: that the statement that Canada is more prone to terrorist activity than the United States is simply false.

Mr. Inky Mark: Who said that?

The Chair: I think both Alcock and Zaccardelli said there were perceptions in the media or in the public that we are more prone as a country. That's essentially what this thing is supposed to say.

Do you agree with that statement? Do you think we're more prone than the United States or less prone?

Mr. Inky Mark: Well, no....

The Chair: Well, that's exactly what this—

Mr. Paul Forseth: We're in the same boat.

The Chair: Jerry, and Steve.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: I think in this part of the process it might be wise to receive comments but have no debate. In other words, say “I don't like this, I'd like it altered”, and then feed it to the researchers and leave it there, let them deal with it. Is that easier than—

The Chair: That's what we did last Thursday. I'm sorry. Right now we're going through the recommendations—

Mr. Jerry Pickard: Okay, I missed that part of the process—

The Chair: That's right.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: I see you have wording, and I was hoping we weren't going to go into debate. We'll go nowhere on this if we debate all the issues.

The Chair: I agree.

Steve.

Mr. Steve Mahoney (Mississauga West, Lib.): The concern I have is that things get taken out of context. The point that Inky makes is maybe we just need to reword that.

The suggestion was made by a number of people who made comments in the American Congress—for example, the one who held up a document that said that Canada's border was a sieve. They asked her where she got her information, and she said from the Canadian media. There were statements by Hillary Clinton. There were statements by the guy from Texas, Lamar Smith.

• 0930

So these statements were made, and I think what we're trying to say here is that those statements have led to a misconception. But when you read this, you know, if somebody wanted to play games with the thing, you could delete the word “false” and you could say the report suggests that Canada is more prone. So if someone wants to—

A voice: It's false.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Yes, it's false, I know. But they could play games with it. I'd rather it be more definitive.

The Chair: Let's rework that particular phrase.

How about the recommendation? I think Steve summarized exactly what the recommendation on the top of page 9 says. Are there any problems with that particular recommendation? No? Okay.

Now, the next one is on page 10, that border practices be guided by the primary objectives of safety, security, and efficiency.

I wonder, Ben or Jay, if you could talk a little bit about paragraphs 2.5 and 2.6, which are background to that particular recommendation.

Mr. Benjamin Dolin: The committee had indicated that in this first section it wanted to deal with the misconceptions and the immediate effects. Paragraphs 2.5 and 2.6 simply point out the problems that have arisen with trade and traffic flow, which everybody saw in the course of the trip. Since we go into much more detail about technology, human resources, and staffing plans later in the report, at this initial point—we have all the background in there—we've just presented a general overview objective as a recommendation.

The Chair: So the mission statement primarily is with regard to border.... This recommendation essentially just recognizes that border practices be guided primarily by the objectives of safety, security, and efficiency—it's just a motherhood and apple pie sort of recommendation.

Does anybody want to add something to that?

Mr. Paul Forseth: If it is motherhood, then is the border currently operating under a different set of rules?

The Chair: Maybe we should restate—

Mr. Paul Forseth: We should maybe clarify, if there is a shift of policy or a shift of emphasis, a shift of personnel deployment, a shift of the tolerance to detain or whatever, it should be in there to give meaning to a motherhood statement. If we're saying this should be guided by safety, security, and efficiency, there has to be some—

The Chair: Yes, I agree. In light of September 11, obviously the practices of the past are not good enough and we want to emphasize that we need to concentrate more on safety, security, and efficiency. So we have to rework that recommendation, okay?

Mr. Paul Forseth: Or perhaps have a comment that previously, there was an emphasis on taxation and goods, and now we're going to look more at people.

The Chair: Yes, a people watch, as opposed to.... Let's rework that one.

Okay, in part B of this report it talks about the impact of the new immigration and refugee protection act, BIll C-11. Paragraphs 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, and 2.12 are the background, and the recommendation on page 12 reads that:

National standards for front-end screening be established and that staffing levels be increased where necessary to ensure that front-end screening is an effective and expeditious process.

I think that's what some of Bill C-42 is all about—that front-end screening.

I don't know if some of you saw the program last night on CBC on border security. It talked about how front-end screening would work. I think this is an excellent recommendation. I think that's what we want, to say you're going to have to put standards across the country, and staff and resources, and in order for front-end screening to be effective, you have to do a number of things.

Does anybody want to beef this one up? What are your comments with regard to this one?

Steve.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Mr. Chairman, I think we should reference training in there. National standards and increased staffing levels are fine, but we have to ensure the standards are being used as closely to a national standard as possible across the country. You will get different attitudes in different parts of the country.

The Chair: We'll add training.

• 0935

I see that technology is.... We talk about national standards for front-end, do you think it might...?

A voice: Don't we have it—

The Chair: We do, but these are global statements, I guess.

Is there anybody else on other than training? Judy.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis (Winnipeg North Centre, NDP): Are the standards for how long someone can be detained implicit in this recommendation?

The Chair: No. These are national standards for front-end screening—the process to determine front-end screening. It includes fingerprinting, the long interview, the five-hour interview, the CSIS report, and the RCMP report. There are all of those things before a determination is made by the person at the front line on whether or not someone will be sent back, detained, or retained.

So that comes a little later; we'll get into that. But I think the national standard for front-end screening doesn't, I don't believe—

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: No, but it has to do with how long the front-end screening could go on before they're satisfied.

The Chair: That's why we're saying national standards for front-end screening should be established. We don't know what those standards are.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: But presumably it means time limits, in terms of how long one person can be kept—

The Chair: I don't know if we want to be that specific. I don't think we're in a position to say that interviews shouldn't take any longer than five hours or two hours. It's important that we set some national standards.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: What are the standards then? I'm sorry, I just don't understand.

The Chair: I don't think we have the standards. We want to establish national standards. I think you also saw, Judy, as we went across the country that there were varying standards at every port of entry. Some had certain technologies and some didn't.

Bill C-11 is yet to be implemented in that, and that's why we have Bill C-42. Front-end screening is part of Bill C-11. We didn't have front-end screening under the old legislation, so we are now saying it's important to establish national standards across the country on front-end screening.

Paul.

Mr. Paul Forseth: We have operations manuals and we are training people to do certain things. I don't want to be unreasonably critical of the ministry. They're doing the best they can under difficult circumstances. To say you need national standards almost implies it's totally haphazard and they're not operating according to any kind of set training. That's a little bit of what Judy was talking about.

The Chair: Some of the things are probably found in the regulations. Unfortunately, we don't have the regulations, but we do have Bill C-42.

Why don't I see if, in keeping with Bill C-42, there are administrative directives on front-end screening from the department? I'll get them here by Thursday. I imagine Bill C-42, which talks about front-end screening, must have certain directives. Maybe we can get them.

Steve.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: I wonder if what we're trying to say here is that best practices should be used. If you think about our tours, in Lacolle they said they had no trouble with 72 hours; they already did that work within that timeframe. In other ports they said they were very concerned about the 72 hours.

So maybe we're trying to say here that we want to develop the national standards based on the best practices currently being used, and bring them all into one so we have some uniformity.

The Chair: Okay. Let's put this on hold.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Well, maybe the researchers can—

The Chair: No, there's training and best practices. I'm going to get something from the department, as they relate to Bill C-42.

Ben.

Mr. Benjamin Dolin: On 2.13, there should be another recommendation. There's a problem with the formatting there.

The Chair: Okay, I'll get to that in a moment.

Inky, you have something.

Mr. Inky Mark: We're talking about staffing level increases, so is this the place to address the issue of information?

The Chair: No, that comes later.

Mr. Inky Mark: Sharing—

The Chair: Again this is a global sort of thing, but that comes later.

Judy, do you have something else on this one?

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: When people call for training on front-end screening, I'm not sure if we're doing it other than in terms of how to best move this process along expeditiously and efficiently, as opposed to training to recognize cultural differences and how people present themselves.

It was clear from that program last night that you can make pretty quick judgments based on how a person looks or acts that might be part of a cultural expression, and not necessarily an indication of a troublemaker.

The Chair: Judy, you're absolutely right. Don't forget that front-end screening was not done to the extent we want it done under Bill C-11, and what Bill C-42 has already said, and what the program talked about last night. That's why you're right. Proper training means training people who are culturally sensitive to the very people they're interviewing.

• 0940

Let's get some directives from the department. We'll leave that on hold until we get some additional information.

Now, 2.13 is essentially supposed to be another recommendation, so why don't we just strike number 2.13 and that will be another recommendation?

Ben.

Mr. Benjamin Dolin: Yes, it's just an option for the committee to consider whether it might be beneficial. I wasn't on the trip, but it would seem that specialized teams directly being used for the 72-hour processing would be of some use.

The Chair: We heard from witnesses and also the committee that in high-volume ports of entry, specialized teams should be established to process refugee claimants. That is to respond to the demand, especially in light of this new Bill C-11 front-end screening. We're going to be talking about a lot more people, obviously, when we get into it a little later in the report.

Art.

Mr. Art Hanger: I find this a bit of a contradiction, in a sense.

If the committee is determined to pursue, or we would like the government per se to pursue, this safe third country rule—

The Chair: We're going to get into that.

Mr. Art Hanger: Let me finish.

Section 2.13, which is the one you decided to strike—

The Chair: No, I said we're making that a recommendation.

Mr. Art Hanger: You're going to make it a recommendation?

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Art Hanger: Then it's contradictory in its position in a way, unless we clarify it broadly. If we're going to beef up the border crossing to accommodate the large flow of people coming in by adding more personnel there, we're in effect saying it's acceptable to have this flow coming through. Whereas if we pursue the recommendation within the report to stop that flow as best as possible by including the third country rule, we won't need that.

The Chair: You're right. We're going to talk about those remedies a little later. But the demand is that if people show up at your border, you need to have people who will determine whether or not they're eligible, admissible, and so on. The specialized teams, the national standards, front-end screening and so on might do that.

You might say “I'm sorry, you're not coming in. You're going back to the United States.” That's the direct-back that's in here, or the safe third country we get in. Those are remedies. This is the service level we expect at the ports of entry. That's all I'm saying.

Jay.

Mr. Jay Sinha (Committee Researcher): If I may just jump in, that idea about specialized teams came from immigration officers in Windsor. They suggested that because they're worried. They say they have problems right now just filling out the basic paperwork for refugee claims.

Mr. Art Hanger: Under the present system.

Mr. Jay Sinha: Yes.

That's why they're worried about the 72-hour system.

The Chair: Paul.

Mr. Paul Forseth: Art was trying to say it's kind of an admission of failure, in a way, that we have to have these teams because we're never going to get safe third countries. Of course, we have to deal with it until we can get there. That's the point. It's kind of undermining our own long-term goal.

The Chair: You're so much more the diplomat than Art.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

The Chair: Jerry.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: I think Steve's recommendation about best practices really zeros in on that. It can be examined, as to pro and con. Does that satisfy your concern, Art?

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes, it does. It would be acceptable to me. I'm just saying we should couch the discussion and even the recommendations and such, to deal with what would be the best solution to the problem.

The Chair: So far, on the 72-hour concern we heard about at great length, there are two recommendations. One is on national standards, training, best practices, and more resources. Two is maybe specialized teams.

There are other concerns we heard—and you were there, Art—from some of the front-line workers. Paragraphs 2.14, 2.15, 2.16, and 2.17 deal with their concerns about this PRRA, the pre-removal risk assessment, which was that so-called appeal.

• 0945

Maybe, Jay or Ben, you can just tell us a little about that and the recommendation on page 14, which deals with the PRRA.

Mr. Benjamin Dolin: We heard concerns expressed, I think particularly by the witnesses from the union, who indicated there would be a massive number of applications under PRRA as soon as the legislation comes into effect. The department has said they are tying it in with removal priorities; in that way they will be able to control, to some degree, the number of PRRA applications being received. At the end of the day we just suggested the committee consider a general recommendation saying sufficient resources should be allocated, because this is an obvious issue.

The Chair: I think at the end of the day you're absolutely right. I think we all want to be convinced it's got resources, and of course resources will be a big part of this whole report. I think we wanted to make sure, if this new appeal mechanism—PRRA—exists, that the department have sufficient resources to expedite and do this particular thing.

That's the recommendation with regard to the PRRA. Are there any comments on that one? Do you want to beef it up? What do you think?

An hon. member: It looks good.

The Chair: Okay, let's move on.

Now, division C of this document talks, really, about Canada-U.S.—“Cooperation, Coordination, Partnerships”—as we start to get into some of the heavy-duty stuff: paragraphs 2.18, 2.19, 2.20, and the recommendation that follows.

Ben or Jay?

Mr. Jay Sinha: First, paragraphs 2.18, 2.19, and 2.20 are a general overview of what we thought the committee was working towards in terms of cooperation. It's a bit of an introduction to that whole section. That's why we brought in the Shared Border Accord, which was concluded back in 1995 between Canada and the U.S. and looks at just that: initiatives to improve practices along the border.

There are a few examples of things we saw along the border. As well, we talk about some of the commitments that come out from the Shared Border Accord, and then some of the specific initiatives that are actually occurring. We go into much more detail about those later on in the section.

The Chair: So the recommendation follows that we ought to continue to implement a lot of those good ideas on the—

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Maybe I missed it, but it's the first time I've seen this Shared Border Accord. Did I miss that?

The Chair: No, we talked about it ad nauseam. It was in 1995, signed by Clinton—

Mr. Steve Mahoney: I mustn't have been here, because I don't remember any ad nauseam debates.

The Chair: The minister mentioned it three times in her remarks about the shared border.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Well, I'm sorry, I must have missed it. I'd like to see a copy.

The Chair: Why don't we get you a copy?

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Great.

The Chair: That's not a problem.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Maybe it should be appended to this.

The Chair: That's a good idea, and we'll get you a copy.

Are there any problems with that particular recommendation? No? Okay.

Yes, I'm sorry, Paul.

Mr. Paul Forseth: Just like Steve, I'd like to be reminded what the Shared Border Accord is.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Paul Forseth: You apparently have some copies of it. You can just do the same process: fire that around to our offices.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: The debate couldn't have been ad nauseam, because we missed it.

Mr. Paul Forseth: Maybe he thinks a lot of our discussions are nauseating.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: It gives the highlights, I guess. Possibly it could be enhanced and everybody will be—

The Chair: We'll provide everybody with a copy. We may want to put it in there. There probably is an executive summary of the “Border Visions” piece that we could put in there.

Section C(i), “Refugee Claimants from the United States”, Art, is where we start to get into paragraphs 2.21, 2.22, 2.23, 2.24, 2.25—which is “safe third country”—2.26, and the recommendation that follows.

Jay or Ben, do you just want to take us through this first section on refugee claimants from the United States?

Mr. Benjamin Dolin: Sure.

This first section is basically an overview of numbers and exactly what the situation is at the border in terms of claimants coming from the U.S.—not claiming there and claiming in Canada—and it leads into C(i)(a) and (b), which are the “safe third country” and the “direct-backs”.

We talk about numbers, about what Peter Showler explained as being the differences between our systems—which give an idea why some of these people are coming to Canada and not claiming in the United States. And then we move into the “safe third country” section at paragraph 2.25 on page 17, and the recommendation there. Then of course C(i)(b) is that pending safe third-country accord, direct-backs be considered—which the committee has discussed.

• 0950

Mr. Paul Forseth: In the paragraphs leading up to safe third country, perhaps there might be a little more on what state the current negotiations are in, or whether there has been a project team identified, maybe, beyond the minister. Has there been a negotiating team appointed? Is there some particular time—

The Chair: I think paragraphs 2.25 and 2.26, without getting too wordy, were trying to bring to the public, as well as to the committee and the House of Commons, that there have been significant negotiations between Canada and the U.S. on safe third country, but in fact they've gone nowhere because the United States had cut off those negotiations or discussions. In fact when I said that to the Congressman and told him a little about some of the information right here, he was really surprised. As Art says, there's a tremendous amount of gap.

Mr. Paul Forseth: Just saying “beyond the country” is very general. Do we have any more information about where the department is at in getting that...? Maybe we could tease that out a little bit.

Mr. Benjamin Dolin: I don't believe there are any negotiations going on right now. The minister when she testified said it was something she was interested in and would consider, but she didn't see it as a magic bullet. She had concerns about the actual effectiveness in terms of decreasing demands on the Canadian refugee determination system.

Mr. Paul Forseth: She used words such as “Well, we have ongoing negotiations; we're talking all the time.” I tried to push that point in committee, and I think I've even asked a question in the House on it.

The Chair: What is it that you would like us to...?

Mr. Paul Forseth: I'm getting a feeling we could sincerely make a recommendation from this committee rather into a vacuum. We need to ask a little bit more about the government and to say maybe the government does have a plan—that they plan to appoint a team to deal with this.

The Chair: I'll tell you what, Paul. Why don't you look at paragraph 2.26, and let's get to the recommendation section of it, because that's where we may want to beef it up as a committee. Paragraph 2.26 says “The committee believes there is merit in again attempting to negotiate such an arrangement with the United States”. If you've got some ideas you might want to insert there—

Mr. Paul Forseth: Maybe we could come back to it a little later.

The Chair: Let's talk about the recommendation, though, because I know there might be some differences of opinion on this safe third country issue as we discussed it last Tuesday or Thursday. Let's talk about it.

Art.

Mr. Art Hanger: I have to carry that point a little bit further. It seems, when we talk about this particular issue, there are vague comments made about just what is being done—you know, “ongoing negotiations”—and even in our report here we're almost doing the same thing: “...cautions that it is not `a magic bullet'.... ” Well, nobody's asking it to be a magic bullet. We figure it will fix some of the problems that exist.

The Chair: It's one tool.

Mr. Art Hanger: It almost looks like a negative against the process being recommended, as far as this “magic bullet” thing is concerned. You've used it several times. I wonder, why don't we get rid of the magic bullet business and say—

Mr. Paul Forseth: It's lowering expectations so much.

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes. Let's go after it.

Mr. Paul Forseth: Let's have good expectations.

The Chair: Well, you will recall last Thursday when we talked about safe third country—and that's why we provided you with a document as to what it is—we also pointed out—I want to be fair—that the world is not sold yet on safe third country. Europe is having a difficult time with it.

Now, whether or not you want to delete some of those words, I want to get to the substance of whether or not this committee believes we ought to have an agreement, not only with the U.S. but with other countries of the world, in terms of safe third country. I happen to believe in it. I know there are some concerns as to whether or not we ought to show balance. There are concerns. This isn't a magic bullet. It's only one tool of many to deal with the problem, as you said.

Judy, and then Steve.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: Based on what we heard and based on the research done by our staff here, I would suggest it's too fraught with difficulties to include at this point. I don't believe we should be making any recommendations on safe third country approaches in the current context. It's too heated; it's too political. It's too insensitive to the different political approaches, especially the U.S. approach to refugees, the lack of due process in that country. The political spin that is placed around decisions in this area suggests to me that we shouldn't touch it.

• 0955

The Chair: The only thing is, I can tell you, that's why we put—

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: I know, I saw that.

The Chair: —into the caveat that it has to respect the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and there are guidelines in the United Nations that support this whole idea of safe third country. It in fact has guidelines, and I think we gave you a copy of what those guidelines might be.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: Right.

The Chair: Steve.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Mr. Chairman, I'm not interested in changing the United States system. I'm not concerned about whether or not their system is adversarial or that it too open or not open enough. I'm concerned about the Canadian system—full stop—only.

I don't think we should be softening this at all. When you have 5,000 people getting off buses and walking across the border at Lacolle, Quebec, claiming refugee status, when they're in the United States with legitimate visas permitting them to be there to either study, work, or visit, I have a lot of trouble with that.

I think if we soften this, we're going to cause some problems for the minister in negotiating it. I understand where the NDP comes from—I really do—that the NGOs are concerned about the impact on the people who are sent back, because they're going back into a country that those NGOs don't see as being as favourable as Canada toward refugees. I fully understand that.

The issue here is safety, though. They are in a safe country in the United States. They might not like the process, or the lack of health care, or the fact that they don't have immediate access to education and other social programs, but that's not our problem.

Our problem is dealing with the flow of humanity that is being generated from the various parts of the world who are not safe. If we can stop dealing with all the people who are safe, it seems to me, we can take our resources and better use them to help the people who are seriously in need of protection.

You cannot argue that the United States is not a safe country. You can certainly argue that it's not as welcoming as Canada and its policies are not as open, but to water this down and say it's not a magic bullet, it's just one tool, says to the minister, “Go ahead and get it, but if you don't get it, it's no big deal”.

The other thing is, adding on to here that the agreements must take into account the guidelines produced by the United Nations is saying to the Americans, either you do it our way or we're not going to sign the agreement. I don't think we're saying that at all.

I strongly support safe third country. It sends a message. We heard it at the border points. We heard from the people who are there doing the work at the border points, who said, why can't we just send these people back? We're not sending them back to persecution, prosecution, violence, torture, or any of that; we're sending them back to the land of the free, to the United States of America. So let's toughen this up and absolutely recommend that we have a safe third country agreement.

The Chair: John, do you have anything to add to that great speech?

Mr. John Godfrey: It would be very hard to, I must say.

The Chair: Okay, thank you very much.

Mr. John Godfrey: I have a question, though, that is quite simply to the researcher.

In discussing both safe third countries and direct-backs, was there any evidence to suggest which way it would net out? That is to say, because it works in both directions—we're a safe third country and they're a safe third country—was there some sense that, when it all shook out, there would be...?

Mr. Steve Mahoney: It would be big time in our favour.

Mr. John Godfrey: Big time in our favour?

Mr. Steve Mahoney: At Lacolle, 5,000 came across from the States; 58 went across from Canada.

The Chair: In fact, I have just handed out a sheet that shows you the flow of humanity that is coming to our Canadian border.

Mr. Paul Forseth: Can you remind us what the 20(1) report is?

The Chair: I knew you were going to ask that, because I had the same question. I'm sure it's the report that's done by immigration officers, some information sheet that is—

Mr. Paul Forseth: Would our researchers remember?

The Chair: Are there any departmental people back there who know what 20(1) is?

Mr. Jay Sinha: We would have to check the act, but I believe it is an inadmissibility report.

The Chair: We'll find that out, but it's probably an inadmissibility report or admissibility report.

• 1000

Mr. John Godfrey: Wouldn't you want to put that data in there, as to which way it netted out?

I'm just saying part of the argument is that the reason we want it is because it actually works in our favour. Wouldn't you want some supporting data? Didn't you say it went in both directions?

Mr. Benjamin Dolin: We had the data in there in the overview section at paragraph 2.2.1 coming north from the U.S. So I think they'd want the other—

Mr. Steve Mahoney: What's the other way, south?

The Chair: I'm not sure you would want to put that in the report anyway. Let the Americans decide whether or not they want.... It's only really about 10%.

Mr. John Godfrey: Doesn't that make the point that in fact we're less of a risk? There are fewer folks coming out of here. That's part of the myth correction, isn't it?

The Chair: But that's all in the front section.

Mr. John Godfrey: I agree.

The Chair: Is there any further debate on this particular recommendation?

Judy, you made your point. I'm asking for any other opinions.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: I've asked that it be amended and strengthened. Delete the agreements of the UN.

The Chair: I'm not sure you can do that.

Mr. Art Hanger: Why not?

The Chair: The United Nations has, and we are a signatory to, conventions with regard to jp. 100 a safe third. If Canada wants to implement the safe third, it has to be in keeping with international law—that is, the UN.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Then why do you have to even say it? Of course it has to be in keeping.

Mr. John Godfrey: We leave it in there to remind ourselves.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: But it doesn't have to be reinforced at this point.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: I don't want to belabour the point, but that's where the research notes are very helpful. If it were a question of the U.S. now in line with the UN conventions on refugees, we probably wouldn't have a problem, but the fact of the matter is, by all the documentation, they are not in compliance and there is no indication that they intend to be in compliance. We're always going to be at odds. So if we aid and abet a system that allows for contravention of the UN Convention on Refugees, we're not doing anybody a favour or a service, and it's not going to help the problem.

So I think first we have to be clear about what it means to be a refugee, what's due process, and then let's work to have a level playing field and then bring in third safe countries, as opposed to the other way around where we're going to lose it all.

The Chair: Judy, I get a sense that practically everybody but you is in favour of a safe third. I haven't heard from the Bloc or Inky, but it would seem to me that there's clear consensus on behalf of the committee that we want something on safe third.

Steve has introduced whether or not we ought to put something about having to be in keeping with the United Nations. Let's just put that on hold until such time as we make sure that we're precise.

I know you want to toughen it up, and I don't know how much more you can toughen it up by saying that we want the minister to pursue agreements between the U.S. and Canada, or—

Mr. Steve Mahoney: If I could just stress the point, Mr. Chairman, by saying the agreement...we're saying negotiate a safe third, and then we're saying this agreement must ensure basically that the United States comes into line with our way of thinking.

Mr. John Godfrey: Or the United Nations' way of thinking, or the world's way of thinking.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Well, it's up to them to set their policy, not us. If you want to say something about Canada supporting the guidelines produced by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, I don't have a problem, but saying that this agreement must force the United States to do it our way or the UN way.... It's up to them.

The Chair: I don't think that's what it says.

Yes, Jerry.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: I would agree that's not what it says, but I would agree with Steve wholeheartedly, because the message sometimes gets lost in other statements. I believe the additional statement isn't understood, but it does somewhat water down the message that we're trying to get, which is to negotiate a safe third. Why not just leave it there and remove the other part, which is not understood anyway?

But going back to Judy's point, I think what Steve is recommending changes nothing in the process. It makes it clear our message is a safe third agreement.

The Chair: Let me suggest this: Between now and Thursday, we'll rework this, especially that second part. It may very well be an (a) or (b), but at the end of the day, I think I hear pretty clearly from most members that they want it tougher and this second part seems to water down the thing.

Madeleine, and then Paul, and that's it. Then we'll move on.

[Translation]

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral (Laval Centre, BQ): Mr. Chairman, I didn't take the floor to address that recommendation because there's a reference to international conventions. I don't see how Canada, during these negotiations... When you negotiate with someone, you share what is fundamental to you.

• 1005

In fact, it says that Canada, during these negotiations, will put on the table the guidelines included in the international legislation. That's the only reason I didn't intervene. It's very clear that if that is taken out, we will present a minority report. We like that.

[English]

The Chair: I would agree that there's a way of being able to say that we want a safe third country, but it has to be in keeping with the safe third country guidelines of the United Nations. We'll rework this thing so that it feels much better, because all of a sudden the consensus is slipping very quickly, thanks to Steve's suggestion.

Go ahead, Paul.

Mr. Paul Forseth: The UN convention from 1951 is fairly brief, but you're now talking about a bunch of other stuff that the UN said about.... Maybe the researchers could provide and send on to our offices what that is.

The Chair: We already did on safe third country. Yes, we did. You asked for it, and we provided you more information than any other committee in the world has with regard to this.

Mr. Paul Forseth: I have something here from the office of the high commissioner for human rights convention relating to....

The Chair: No, no that's today's stuff, but this was last week's stuff.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: “In the world.”

The Chair: Sure.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: I've told you a million times not to exaggerate.

Mr. Paul Forseth: Okay, so that has been provided.

The Chair: Yes, it has been. You might want to refer to it, but let's leave this. We're going to rework it, but there seems to be much more support with regard to keeping a United Nations compliance in there. I think we can do it.

The chair, Madeleine—

Mr. Jerry Pickard: You?

The Chair: —Sue, John Godfrey—

Mr. Jerry Pickard: Where's the opposition?

The Chair: —David Price....

Mr. Jerry Pickard: Who's looking for keeping it in?

The Chair: I'm more worried about the Liberals, Jerry. There are four Liberals here who like the United Nations part, including me.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: I thought you were worried about...[Inaudible—Editor].

The Chair: No, not at all.

Paragraphs 2.27 and 2.28 talk a little bit about the other tool we want with regard to the United States and it's a direct-back. Maybe you can tell us a little bit about that, Jay and Ben.

Mr. Benjamin Dolin: Pending the negotiation of the safe third country agreement, the committee had discussed the use of these direct-backs to ensure that the initial screening could be accomplished expeditiously. So when resource demands make it unlikely, members of the committee had suggested the possibility of sending people back to the United States, pending completion of....

The Chair: Well, if I'm not mistaken, I think we already have the authority to direct back on the existing legislation, we've just never implemented.

Mr. Benjamin Dolin: It has been used.

The Chair: Well, it has been used. I don't want this to be an either/or—it's safe third country, but at the same time we ought to implement direct-backs. I think most committee members, when we discussed this before, had indicated that people coming from the United States, if we can't get.... Safe third country is one tool, but a direct-back is another one, and we might want to be able to use that tool.

Mr. Art Hanger: They are either/or. We use it already—every year.

The Chair: Very seldom, though, we've heard, for a direct-back.

Mr. Art Hanger: Go to Fort Erie—the highest human traffic port in the country. They direct back all the time.

The Chair: But we want to make it a policy, not discretionary. I think the committee wants to use this particular tool, and I think Steve gave us the overview.

These people coming from the United States—they are legally in the United States—over half of them come to this country wanting to declare themselves refugees. There are two things we can do. We can in fact take their application, do the fingerprinting, start the security process. Then we can say, “By the way, we'll call you back when we're ready for you in an interview, but in the meantime, you're not coming into the country; you're staying in the United States, where obviously you've been for a year or two so far, so you can't be in an awful lot of trouble.”

Paul.

Mr. Paul Forseth: I would just like to see a little bit of clarity here of what is a direct-back, so that a person who's not involved in the jargon could understand that basically what we're saying is go back to the hostel across the river, and you now have an appointment for next Thursday—the department is now giving so many appointments a day. How does that system work practically? What is a direct-back? We don't want to talk in euphemisms. If we're going to recommend something, it must be plain and simple.

Mr. Art Hanger: I explained it.

Mr. Paul Forseth: But that's not clearly....

The Chair: Okay, well, let me get from the department any administrative paperwork with regard to direct-back, if I could.

Yes, Art.

• 1010

Mr. Art Hanger: It's already on the books, and it's already exercised at whole areas—

The Chair: In some cases.

Mr. Art Hanger: And I don't see what advantage there would be of making it a policy. Again, negotiations for safe third country should take precedence above all of these things, I think. Why make it a policy if it has already been enacted at the points of heavy traffic?

The Chair: I might be wrong, but I never received the impression that it was being used an awful lot. If this committee believes this is one tool, we might want to use it. It's up to you.

Steve.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: We heard it was being used where there were concerns of security, if they had serious doubts. If they weren't sure, they would process. But if they were seriously concerned, it would be used.

Mr. Chairman, you said you don't want this to be an either/or. It is absolutely an either/or. If you have a direct-back as a policy, you don't have a safe third. In effect, safe third says you are ineligible to apply here, not we'll consider it, not go away and come back on Thursday. You are not eligible, because you are already in a safe third country. It's definitely either/or. If we don't get a safe third agreement with the United States, then what we want to do—and this would go to best practices and national standards—is wherever there is a security risk or concern, an individual would be sent directly back to the United States, pending notification of a further appointment.

The Chair: Let me find out whether or not.... I think you made a good point on the either/or. I'm not convinced, but we'll get some information from the department as to whether or not it is an either/or.

John.

Mr. John Godfrey: For somebody reading the report for the first time who wanted all the information, it might be helpful to have a more precise contrast and compare what the exact distinction is both in legal and practical terms between the two. I've read the sections a couple of times, and I'm still not quite sure what the different practical and legal basis is. If you're getting the same effect by just sending them back, what does it mean?

Mr. Art Hanger: It's a matter of convenience. They can't line up an interpreter for somebody running across the border who speaks a certain dialect, and so on. They tell him, go back to the States, here's a piece of paper, give it to the immigration officer over there, stay there for three days.... That's all it is. It's a matter of expediting the process, but the process still continues.

Mr. John Godfrey: I think it should actually be clearer in the text, that's all.

The Chair: Inky.

Mr. Inky Mark: Could I just make note that the Americans do exercise direct-back at the border?

The Chair: I'll tell you what I'll do. First of all, we did provide the committee with safe third, whether or not we add it to the report, because we are trying to make this report an educational tool for everybody. So we may want to consider. We'll get some paper on the direct-backs. Perhaps paragraphs 2.25 and 2.26 can be a little bit more informative with regard to what direct-back is. You may want to essentially say what I think Inky and Art have said—one, that the United States uses direct-back to us, and two, that in fact we want to get clarified that this is a practice we are using now.

Mr. Art Hanger: Mr. Chair, are we going to remove this as a recommendation? It should be.

The Chair: No, not yet. Let's wait until we get some information. We'll discuss that on Thursday.

Paul.

Mr. Paul Forseth: Just in support of safe third as the priority, perhaps a direct-back would be seen as an interim measure. It's a recommended practice, but it's an interim policy pending eventually....

The Chair: So far I'm asking what direct-back is. Are we using it? How many times are we using it? The department can provide us with the rules, Art, so that we have that information. If it has to be an either/or, that's fine.

Mr. Paul Forseth: It's the idea that we don't want to slip into saying we're going to fall back on direct-backs and abandon safe third.

The Chair: That's right.

John.

Mr. John Godfrey: I asked this previously about the safe third. Is there data on direct-backs, or is that a more informal arrangement, so they don't keep such good statistics in both directions?

The Chair: One of the things we found out, unfortunately, John—and you haven't been to six or eight of the meetings—is this. We're not very happy about an awful lot of this statistical information. I think one of the recommendations in this report is that we want better statistics taken by the department, as it relates to how many people are here, how many are we deporting, how many are we detaining. We have rough numbers, but obviously we have to do a better job of getting those statistics. But you are absolutely right.

David.

• 1015

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Mr. Chair, talking about direct-back, I don't even know if you'd call it direct-back in this one place. I think it was St. Stephen where the guys were telling us they'd come to the border and if they knew they couldn't get through they'd just automatically say “Look, we don't want to do any paperwork here, so just go back and we'll forget the whole thing”. We'll never have stats on anything like that.

The Chair: Once you tell them that you might do this, they might not even apply or even try, you're right.

Anyway, I'm going to get some information. Let's put that recommendation on hold for a moment.

Part (ii) of this section was to coordinate visa requirements. The American congressman was really interested in that. When I pointed out a couple of differences, he didn't even know we had different visa requirements, so all of this was really news to him.

Let's move to 2.28, 2.29, 2.30, and the recommendation. Jay, Ben, do you want to take us through those three sections and the recommendation?

Mr. Benjamin Dolin: Certainly.

Essentially, Canada has a list of these exempt countries, and the U.S. has a list, and they're not the same. There are situations, as we heard in testimony, where, for instance, people from Argentina do not require a visa for the U.S. but they do for Canada. They entered the U.S. and then fairly significant numbers from a particular region in Argentina were making refugee claims in Canada. IRB statistics suggested that the acceptance rate for these people was quite low. So in terms of controlling flow, working towards instituting a common visa requirement so that sort of flow doesn't occur....

There were also suggestions from Peter Showler that visitor visas, where they were required, might be easier to obtain in the U.S., which also contributes to the northward flow of refugee claims.

The Chair: Paul.

Mr. Paul Forseth: It certainly wouldn't hurt to have two columns, all the fine print.

The Chair: Did we have the Canadian list, the American list?

Mr. Paul Forseth: The present list is right in the report.

The Chair: Okay, we'll get that.

Art.

Mr. Art Hanger: I have a point on the visa issue, and I think that should be included in this negotiation package.

It's clear that the visas that the Americans issue are much more lax probably than ours, but the problem down there is that they also have a removal process that's much more stringent than ours. And those that come in on visas south...head up to the Canadian border. That's my understanding from some of the conversations that took place over those border crossings, and that is where the problem lies for Canada. Because of our “I am a refugee” opportunity claim, once they hit that Canadian soil they're fairly much accepted as a refugee.

How do we stem that problem? Either there are the same visa requirements on both ends, where removal is easier, or we stop the flow at the border. So this is all coupled with the safe third country thing, but it still should be part and parcel of the education program and the harmonization of our policies.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Steve Mahoney): By the way, while Joe's out of the room, I'll entertain a motion to approve the report.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: If you remain in the chair, the rest of the committee would support you staying in the chair until the report is done.

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Steve Mahoney): Good, fine, all in favour, carried. You just doubled my pay; thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

One of the problems, Art, is I'm not sure we will ever get unanimity on that, because the Cuban situation is one.... Are we now going to require a visa for Mexicans? They happen to be a NAFTA trading partner, yet there's a visa requirement in the United States, which is quite interesting. So I don't think we'll ever get it.

There are examples such as the one the staff has quoted here of Argentina, where only 22% of the applicants are deemed to be refugees and there's no visa requirement. I think we can do the best job we can, but we'll never get 100% agreement on that.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: Harmonize as much as possible....

The Vice-Chair (Mr. Steve Mahoney): Judy.

• 1020

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: I probably should know this. Has this list developed historically by happenstance, or is there a rational basis for Canada's list of countries that does not require visas? Is there a reason for it in terms of major allies, trading partners?

Mr. Benjamin Dolin: Basically, it comes down to the concern about refugee claims being initiated from these particular countries. For instance, the Czech Republic was visa-exempt for a while, then there was a large run on refugee claims, particularly on the Roma gypsies, and the visa requirement was put back on.

That's the departmental take on it, as far as I'm aware.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: So the visa gets used, in a way, as another obstacle to refugee flow and to block as much as possible people who need to come to Canada for safety, but who have another hurdle to get through.

The Chair: Don't forget, people can apply from overseas to our government embassies.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: If they're anywhere near them.

The Chair: For refugees, or anything else, it doesn't preclude that option. We use visas. When you get the Canadian list, I think it might be helpful. Sometimes it is to prevent.... You will recollect the Roma gypsy situation from before. Sometimes you use visas precisely for some migration challenges or problems.

We'll get that list. Who else was on the list, speaking about a list?

A voice: We're not telling you.

The Chair: Okay. Any problems with this recommendation with regard to coordinating visa requirements?

Yes, Judy.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: Is there any country that has a blanket requirement for every person coming in from any country requiring a visa?

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes—Russia.

The Chair: Perhaps we can find that out for you.

Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis: Perhaps we can get a sense of that.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: I thought we had agreed that we would not, just from the nodding heads, succeed in 100% harmonization. Cuba is obviously a problem, and I cited Mexico. So I wonder if it shouldn't read more like “wherever possible”, as opposed to “where necessary”?

The Chair: Are there any problems with that one? Okay. And we'll get that list, Judy.

The third part of this section was the pre-clearance of people and goods. Paragraphs 2.31, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34 talked an awful lot about people, goods, technology.

Ben, Jay.

Mr. Jay Sinha: One thing we heard a lot on the trip was that there needs to be more facilitation of low-risk traffic so that more resources can be focused on high-risk traffic. So what we've done here is outline some of the initiatives currently in place.

One is CANPASS at land borders. Another is CANPASS at airports, and that's just in place in Vancouver. Another is NEXUS at land borders. So we've gone through those a little. The basic difference at land borders is that CANPASS identifies the car, whereas NEXUS is more specific to the person. At airports, however, CANPASS is specific to the person, obviously.

The Chair: We also referred to American technology. INSPASS used the biometric stuff too.

Mr. Jay Sinha: It's also important to find out that these programs are in place, but they've all been put on hold since September 11. It comes out in the recommendations as well that those should be reinstated.

The Chair: Paul.

Mr. Paul Forseth: Without reading through, there appears to be some kind of confusion, because there were three or four different programs. There was the program for truck drivers, there was the CANPASS and the American one, and then the one at the airport, the INS, where you put your hand on a thing. So the solution I thought we should say is we would recommend one program—we would recommend NEXUS for everybody, for the truckers, for the airports, for the land.

The Chair: If you read the recommendation, I think it says that.

Mr. Jay Sinha: NEXUS is not for commercial traffic; it's for travellers. There are separate programs for commercial traffic, which are dealt with later in the report.

Mr. Paul Forseth: That's what we recommend, though. Instead of having two, use NEXUS for the commercial travellers as well, for the truck drivers, for the whole thing.

Mr. Jay Sinha: That gets complicated, though.

The Chair: Reading the recommendation, it tries to have the best of both worlds. If you look at the two recommendations, that's exactly what it is saying.

• 1025

Mr. Jay Sinha: With commercial traffic there are other issues, because you're dealing with the goods that have to be cleared through customs and with individual drivers—and that's another issue, as well, that comes up in the report. The driver may be inadmissible, but the goods are cleared, so there's talk about systems to check both.

Mr. Paul Forseth: I get back to my conclusion that for the clearing of people, regardless whether they're drivers or whatever, we use one system for the clearing of people—and that is NEXUS—and not confuse it with all these other things.

The Chair: If you read the recommendation again, it says: “Emphasis should also be placed on the full implementation of the NEXUS program at all high traffic land ports of entry”. So if you look at those two recommendations—

Mr. Paul Forseth: Okay, that fuzzes it, because then it's qualifying it for only “high traffic” areas.

The Chair: So what's your recommendation?

Mr. Paul Forseth: The recommendation is that between the Canada and U.S. there be one program at every single border, and that anybody—any Canadian, any American—if they decide themselves they want to be a frequent traveller, will go through that one program, regardless whether they're a trucker, a salesman, a business person, whatever. There's just one program between the two countries. Then we can pour the resources in to fine-tune that program, to raise the standards of that particular program—not continue to mess around with different programs.

The Chair: Are you then suggesting in the recommendation—because I'm on the bottom of page 22—that we get rid of CANPASS and PORTPASS programs and everything else that's there while NEXUS is still being developed? I don't know if NEXUS is still fully—

Mr. Paul Forseth: It's how it worked before: with one system.

The Chair: Well, I think that's what it says. Do you want time to work on this recommendation?

Mr. Paul Forseth: Okay.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Jay Sinha: Just one other thing: CANPASS airport is very similar to the NEXUS system. It is based on hand geometry. It's already there; it's just a different name. It's the CANPASS land border thing that is different from NEXUS, and it makes sense that NEXUS should be at land borders for travellers. But, yes, I see what you mean—for commercial traffic as well. It brings up other issues, though; that's my point.

Mr. Paul Forseth: Well—

The Chair: Paul, hang on a sec. Inky.

Mr. Inky Mark: Just as a point of information, CANPASS has been going on for five or six years now. I can't see any reason to change the CANPASS program. NEXUS, from what I understand from Windsor, is in place; it's just that it's been put on hold. It looks to me like a pretty good program.

The Chair: Okay, Art.

Mr. Art Hanger: I was just recalling several of the conversations we had down south, where the problem posed with the commercial side is that if it were to be implemented on the same level, about one-quarter of all the truckers in the trucking industry would be prohibited from entering Canada or even going south.

The Chair: It's in here.

Mr. Art Hanger: Yes.

The Chair: Anyway, let's take a look at it. I see consensus on both these recommendations. I don't think you're that far off, Paul. You want to take us to one single technology platform, NEXUS. I think the reality is there are a number of other technology platforms—CANPASS and all those things—that in the interim are going to have to do their trick, until NEXUS is fully implementable.

I think they're okay, but if we can, let's just take a look at those recommendations between now and Thursday. I don't see a great number of people who want to change this, Paul, unfortunately.

Mr. Paul Forseth: I have one question. Do you want to remove those words “high traffic” in the recommendation and make it applicable to all land ports of entry?

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Mr. Chairman.

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: The way I read paragraph 2.33, it says NEXUS has some advantages over CANPASS and PORTPASS and that it is also an initiative led by CIC. We're trying to lead this and develop it and work with it, and the Americans are cooperating, and we're heading toward it. So it seems to me that, ultimately, we will arrive at the point where NEXUS will take over and be the one system Paul wants to see.

The Chair: Okay, then, that's fine. Let's reword this recommendation and everything else to show that NEXUS is the ultimate technology we want to implement, okay?

Let's move onward to paragraphs 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, Ben or Jay. Again, this is the facilitation of commercial traffic.

Mr. Jay Sinha: It's what we were were just talking about: getting into the fact that you're looking at the goods and also the driver. There are possibilities of preclearance systems. There's one that's called a Customs Self-Assessment, where particular companies will be able to apply beforehand to have the goods approved before the trucks arrive at the border. But then there is also this problem of inadmissible U.S. drivers.

• 1030

The statistic we heard on the trip was that, on average, based on a survey done in May, 18% of U.S. drivers are inadmissible to Canada. It's often for very minor charges, but it's an issue.

The Chair: We're talking about the implementation of a joint commercial driver registration program as a way as being able to bridge those differences.

Mr. Paul Forseth: What that means is we're going to have lower standards for drivers.

The Chair: Well, no, it all depends whose standards we adopt. Do we take the Canadian standards, which are a little higher than the American standard, I guess?

Mr. Paul Forseth: Well, we go for NEXUS, but then, if you're a driver on a truck, it's lower standards.

Mr. Art Hanger: It's the same as in the United States. Anybody convicted of a drug offence in Canada is inadmissible down there. That's it—end of it. I don't care if it's—

An hon. member: That's the rule.

The Chair: Hang on just a second. Jerry.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: Mr. Chair, I've heard very clearly that minor offences can be in the criminal act, and therefore a minor offence at 18 may affect a driver at 50. A lot of the inadmissibility could be expunged in reality if we looked at common sense. I think defining what we're doing is more important to the process—and making sure the proper number of drivers are allowed to go back and forth.

Paul, I don't really think it's lowering standards. I think it's applying a rationale that would be common sense.

The Chair: I'll take the second part of that recommendation. It talks about working, again in partnership and cooperation. It's something Canada and the U.S. are already doing—respecting each other's sovereignty, jurisdiction, and so on.

Mr. Paul Forseth: I just think these are operational issues that would be taken into account to make NEXUS work.

The Chair: But don't take anything for granted. If this committee feels this is what should be highlighted or taken into account, I don't think there's anything wrong with saying, “Listen, a joint-registration commercial program might be another tool by which to pre-clear people so you can devote a lot of your resources to the high-risk and not the low-risk people.” It's like pre-clearing goods. Now we're pre-clearing people in so many different ways, and NEXUS is one example; this may very well be another one.

I don't think we should put all our money on one piece of technology. I have yet to see one piece of technology that solves anything totally.

All right. On paragraphs 2.38, 2.39, 2.40, go ahead, Jay—talk a little about sharing information.

Mr. Jay Sinha: Another thing we heard throughout the travels was that there's already a lot of information-sharing going on between Canada and the U.S., especially on the ground. The idea of this section is to bring that out to some extent and also talk about some specific initiatives, in particular under the Border Vision program, which, I should mention, is an initiative that came out of the Shared Border Accord. It comes up in paragraph 2.39, where you have cross-access to databases between Canadian Customs and Immigration and the U.S. INS.

The Chair: Are there any comments on these two recommendations? Again, we heard this loud and clear: we need to make sure our databases are integrated, that information is shared between both countries and all departments in both countries.

Mr. Jay Sinha: There is an issue that also came up once. Many people on the ground talked about concerns over privacy and disclosure laws as a reason why information might not be flowing across the borders. One thing heard from a justice department official was that, in practice, there really aren't that many legal restrictions. It's more a question of each government being more pro-active.

The Chair: So that's what the second recommendation's all about.

Paul.

Mr. Paul Forseth: I was just looking on page 26. It says the governments of Canada and the United States should “seek new ways of sharing information”. We keep talking about it, but the problem is the formal ways: it's written; it's part of memoranda of understanding; it becomes true operational policy rather than the catch-as-catch-can, make-it-up-as-you-go arrangements we see now. It's trying to get more official sharing of information that we actually get into each other's computers—rather than arranging things over coffee.

• 1035

Mr. Jay Sinha: My understanding was that the committee didn't want to get too much into emphasizing the formal arrangements for fear of jeopardizing informal arrangements. That's something you'd have to decide. We can easily change....

The Chair: I think that when the preamble talks a lot about formal and informal things, we definitely need a lot more formal arrangements, but we don't want to cause the higher-ups to say that what's happening on the ground is not acceptable because it's informal. We want the best of both worlds: both more formal and more informal things will probably work better.

Art.

Mr. Art Hanger: I agree. I don't think we should hurt the action of this taking place on the ground right now in any way. At least some things that are positive are being accomplished. It's this upper end that has to be smoothed out. I think the recommendations hit the nail on the head, really, if we can move it along on that level. If it's privacy that interferes, let's change it.

The Chair: Yes. I think that's where the second recommendation was headed.

Paragraph 2.41 and the recommendation to “actively pursue the development of formal partnerships with other agencies to facilitiate”, etc., were again just to formalize a lot of the things we have been talking about. This might have been what you were referring to, Paul.

Mr. Jay Sinha: If I could respond, that's specific more to internally within Canada, between Canadian departments, or the binational as opposed to the national.

The Chair: Are there any problems with that one?

In the fifth section of this report there's “Joint Enforcement in Investigation”, paragraphs 2.42, 2.43, and 2.44, and the recommendation that results from that.

Jay.

Mr. Jay Sinha: Again, another thing we heard a lot of positive feedback on during the trip was the use of what are called “integrated border enforcement teams”, which include enforcement personnel from both Canada and the U.S. working on both sides of the border. They work together literally as teams. They may actually be in the same vehicle, or they may be on either side of the border communicating on the same radio frequency. They patrol parts of the border, often at late hours, when there may be less staff at ports of entry. So that's the idea.

The Chair: Are there any comments on that one, any problems with that recommendation?

Jerry.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: I know it's not spelled out here, but there was again talk of sharing U.S. and Canadian facilities, of coordinating....

The Chair: That comes next.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: I'm sorry. Thank you.

The Chair: The next one is “Joint Facilities”, paragraphs 2.45, 2.46, and 2.47, and a recommendation.

Mr. Jay Sinha: This, again, is something that comes up under the Shared Border Accord. At this point, there are three facilities that have been earmarked to become joint facilities, actually in the same building or very close together. They're mentioned there: Coutts, Alberta; Little Gold Creek, Yukon; and Osoyoos, British Columbia. The recommendation is to consider more facilities like these.

The Chair: Jerry.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: I was referring back to the teams going back and forth, which I can recall comments about. The Americans have helicopters that run up and down, and they do various types of searches. We don't have that facility available to us, so we use land teams.... Timing and all that was quite an issue in our trying to coordinate the efforts of those special teams across western Canada. It seems to me that's what we heard at Emerson.

The Chair: Can you just go back to paragraph 2.44 or the recommendation after 2.44? It talks a bit about sharing technologies and perhaps technological aids.

The other thing too is where the American congressman said that they're putting 1,000 more border patrol people into the United States for the next five years. Border patrol enforcement is under the jurisdiction of the RCMP, but it's not as if the RCMP places an awful lot of priority on it, as I understand it, because it takes manpower.

That's also what we're talking about, and maybe you can incorporate what Jerry just talked about, that there may be some operational coordination between the Americans and our law enforcement people as part of this recommendation on joint teams and so on.

Mr. Art Hanger: Jerry was also mentioning, though, that the issue of having the flexibility—and you mentioned that earlier in your description—of enforcement teams moving about.

• 1040

The Chair: I think it's coming up; I don't think we've covered it yet. It's coming up in another section. Maybe we can repeat it here for Jerry and Art. We're talking about flexibility.

Mr. Art Hanger: I thought that's what—

The Chair: You might be right. It's in the preamble.

Mr. Jay Sinha: If I could, I'll just clarify one thing, Mr. Pickard. Are you saying that there should be more sharing of equipment or more coordination of people? It's just not clear what exactly you're getting at.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: Well, when they talked, obviously it was not available. Certain equipment that is not available on one side may be available on the other. Our special land forces that run back and forth and teams that do border checks can do one aspect of that work, while the helicopter can do another. They can do a much broader surveillance, and if we coordinate those efforts, we have a much safer border. That was the point they were making.

The Chair: When we talk about coordinating equipment and resources on both sides of the border, we essentially do what your recommendation talks about. I think it makes sense.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: That, rather than work totally independently and not be effective.

The Chair: There's some aviation stuff there that is available and that's probably being used now by the U.S., maybe even by our own people. Anyways, I think we can beat that up.

Let's go back to joint facilities. Are there any problems with that recommendation on joint facilities, that we look at sharing facilities where in fact we can?

Paul.

Mr. Paul Forseth: I just mention for the information of the committee members that on your schedule today it says that at approximately 10:15 the government will move time allocation for Bill C-36. This is the new rule about the report stage at third reading. Under the new rules this will cause a 30-minute question period on time allocation for the bill, and there's a great component that's of interest to us. At approximately 10:45 the question will be put and the bells will ring for 30 minutes, so we may be wondering what in the world is going on and whether we have to run over to the House. At approximately 11:15 there will be a vote on time allocation on Bill C-36. At three o'clock the bells will sound briefly for deferred votes on Bills C-10 and C-35 and on motions 241 and 8.

A voice: What's the point?

The Chair: I'm impressed with your technology, that it can tell you all that. What is that, a blueberry, blackberry, raspberry, or whatever?

Mr. Paul Forseth: It's a BlackBerry.

The Chair: Inky.

Mr. Inky Mark: I heard you mention the word “aviation”. Will that be one of the recommendations?

The Chair: Yes.

Paragraph 2.48 and its recommendation are pretty simple: that “More information exchanges and coordinated intelligence activities be pursued with like-minded governments for the screening of travellers”. This refers now to Canada and the world, section D, overseas interdiction. This is just one of those first global motherhood-and-apple-pie sorts of recommendations. Are there any problems with that one?

Paragraph 2.49 talks about immigration control officers. The committee recommends that more immigration control officers should be hired. You know what? I think we should say at least how many. Just for your information, we presently have 48 ICOs, and the minister is already committed to doubling the number of international immigration control officers.

Mr. Paul Forseth: Is that in the report?

The Chair: It's not in the report, and that's what I want to talk to you about. I think this committee has been very impressed. That's a great investment. If we can get more people internationally, we'll probably solve an awful lot of our problems. I think that hiring more immigration control officers is a great thing, but we ought to set a guideline. The minister has already put forward that the number be doubled, from 48 to 96.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: I thought we had 204.

The Chair: No. You're talking about other people. Those are not immigration control officers. There are only 48 ICOs internationally. I'll get a clarification, but I'll—

Mr. Paul Forseth: Paragraph 2.49 says there are 44.

The Chair: The number 204 refers to some other group of people, but they are definitely not ICOs.

Madeleine.

[Translation]

Ms. Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral: I'd like to make a bit of a recommendation. We should point out that these are agents abroad, because if we write the text that way—

[English]

The Chair: Yes. We can make sure for educational purposes that we're talking about overseas people. I just think that saying that we ought to hire more people is not a strong enough statement by this committee. Either we're going to say at least double, or in my opinion we should say triple—I don't care. We believe this is one good measure of stopping the problem before they actually get to our border, and this statement just isn't strong enough for my liking.

• 1045

Paul, and then Steve.

Mr. Paul Forseth: It says there were 44 instead of 48. I'm looking at paragraph 2.49. It says “there were only 44 ICOs”, and you were saying 48?

The Chair: I thought 48. I might be wrong.

Mr. Paul Forseth: So you're saying the minister has made a commitment to double?

The Chair: I think she's already indicated so, if not publicly. I think she said publicly that she would.

Mr. Paul Forseth: Maybe we can verify this so we can say that the minister made a commitment that within the next year or two it's going to be doubled. At least—

The Chair: I'll get a clarification.

Steve.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Mr. Chairman, there are numbers that I was confusing; and frankly, if I did, I think someone who hasn't been exposed to this would as well. We say earlier on in the report that we're talking about the people who work at the airports looking for false documents and working with the airline staff, and this is a program that Canada has led the world in. What I'd like to see is maybe we can strengthen that we're saying—

The Chair: So 2.49, yes, will be—

Mr. Steve Mahoney: —that Canada is leading the world in it.

Also, in terms of the recommendation, I don't think it's appropriate for us to pick a number, but I quite agree that we should put very serious emphasis on the fact that this program needs to be expanded, not only by hiring and training more Canadian ICOs to work overseas, but by encouraging other countries at various ports to join the program.

The Chair: Yes. Good point.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: But I don't think you can pick a number. The way the system works here is that the minister has to go and fight for her request, and I wanted to be supportive of that.

The Chair: I'm only saying that the minister already committed to doubling, from 44 to 84 or 96. That's what I'd heard.

Jerry, and then Art.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: I would go along with what Steve says and what you say, Mr. Chairman, but I think if we highlight that as a very high priority and suggest it.... I don't think remaining with the status quo with the minister saying double is where this committee wants to go.

Somebody might read this report a year from today and say we effectively have saved huge dollars by doing this. I think the minister has said that this is one of the most effective programs we have, and I think all committee members agree. So why don't we state that this must be one of the higher priorities in making sure our screening process works, and spend the resources required or that are possible at this point? This is where we should be spending money.

The Chair: I get the sense that we all want to beef it up, Jerry, and make it that much more forceful in terms of expansion and anything else.

Art.

Mr. Art Hanger: When I was over in the Ukraine I decided to stop by the immigration office. It was a NATO affair we went to, but I decided to go over to the Canadian embassy there and talk to them about their process. There was a waiting list of 2,000 and some applicants for refugee status sitting in the Ukraine, and the screening process was going on. Some have been on the list for two years. I found that rather interesting.

The issue at hand in terms of the screening was that none of it was done through any specific person designated there. They had to go to Russia, or they had to go to I think it was Geneva, to get the process complete, which is going to be normal anyway. But that's where there were RCMP officers and CSIS officers. I think it was somewhere else—it was in Europe. So there may be more officers assigned—and I think we should be careful on numbers too, but emphasize the program—to do this job, but is it going to fix the problem if there is a bottleneck somewhere else when it comes to getting that information back and forth? That seems to be the crux of the matter.

The Chair: I think that might be coming next. That's a good question, but it's one tool again in this whole package. We'll expand that one.

In paragraph 2.50, Art, I think this deals with what you just talked about, because it says “Greater intelligence resources be made available by the RCMP, CSIS and the Communications Security Establishment to our visa posts abroad”, so that in fact the bottlenecks with regard to this information can be dealt with, and security screening and criminality checks can be done.

• 1050

Is that a good enough recommendation for everybody? Good.

Paragraph 2.51 is with regard to locally engaged personnel at our foreign posts. I think the Auditor General had pointed out certain problems. We have talked a little bit about this. The recommendation is that we want to make sure locally engaged personnel be required to undergo enhanced security screening. I think this goes without saying. Are there any problems with that recommendation? No.

Paragraph 2.52 talks about using digital technology and all of the new technologies to make sure the travel documents are scanned prior to boarding, particularly for flights identified as potentially problematic. We're starting to talk a little bit about what we do about the requirements for airlines, as you know, and scanning of documents, pouching of documents, airline manifests and passenger lists. That's what all of these recommendations are about.

How about this first one, that “Travel documents be scanned digitally prior to boarding, particularly for flights identified as potentially problematic”? Are there any problems with that particular recommendation?

Paul.

Mr. Paul Forseth: It's recommending the scanning versus the pouching request, so is that the consensus? I thought maybe we should look at a variety of things instead of just going with one, because of course pouching might be an interim measure on particular problem flights until scanning equipment can be installed, and that kind of thing.

The Chair: I agree. Remember the last time when we started getting into pouching it didn't seem to be a clear sort of thing. I'd like to see it as a pilot project, personally, but that's beside the point.

Steve.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Mr. Chairman, I raised concerns about the pouching situation because whatever we implement, we have to recognize that it's implemented for everybody who travels to this country, including all of us. Certainly it is. People start using documentation and I think the potential for delays is phenomenal. We should have, and I believe we do have, the capacity technologically to scan documents. I think there was—maybe someone can check it out—a pilot project that was done at an airport, and we do have that technology available. It seems to me to make much more sense.

The Chair: Inky, and then Art.

Mr. Inky Mark: I agree we need to scan documents, but my greater concern is the determination of the validity of the documents. As you know, the Canadian passport is one of the more often used fraudulent pieces of paper, so how does this technology help us in determining validity?

The Chair: Any other comments? David.

Mr. David Price: To follow up on Inky's comment, he is right there, but there again we're talking about more ICO officers in the airports, and that's their job. If there's any doubt at all, they go right to the airline desk and do a verification of those documents; therefore, automatically, we're going to have to have more officers. So that's why it's difficult for us to determine a number. I'm going back a bit, but—

The Chair: But we're talking now about whether or not we ought to do some pouching.

Mr. David Price: I know, but I'm simply saying—

The Chair: But you're right, a lot of that might be caught by ICOs or whatever.

Mr. David Price: I'm with Steve, in the sense that I can't see pouching all the documents. We're waiting long enough now, and that's going to be a bigger tie-up.

The Chair: The thing we discussed last week is that pouching will at least take certain documents, false documents or whatever, out of circulation, because if there are people who didn't accept them on their way off the airplane, at least then they would be in the hands of...we'd take them out of circulation. I think that's the only thing I like about it. I know that it inconveniences an awful lot of people, perhaps, but it will take out of circulation some fraudulent documents and who knows what else.

Jerry?

Mr. Jerry Pickard: I thought the scanning idea was to resolve where they came from and who they are. People obviously aren't identified, and as a result it does deal with that question. It may not, Inky, deal with the fraudulent documents as much as it identifies how they got there, who they are, and where they came from. That was the point.

The Chair: Inky.

Mr. Inky Mark: Maybe one solution with pouching is perhaps that it could be done randomly, so that every flight isn't pouched.

• 1055

The Chair: At least say that. Maybe it would be a deterrent, to let people know we might be pouching—

Mr. Inky Mark: It's a solution that could be exercised. I agree with that.

The Chair: All right. Let's move on.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: I wouldn't want to be the person doing that on some flights.

The Chair: Give everybody some thoughts. Scanning is one.

Inky, if you want to put forward something and build a consensus for pouching, be my guest. I don't see one right now.

On disembarkation teams, that's a good suggestion, a good recommendation. Are there any questions on that one, at the end of 2.53?

Paragraph 2.54 is on passenger lists. That's in the new bill, Bill C-42. It's something we've been talking about for a long time.

Mr. Benjamin Dolin: Should we add a reference to Bill C-42?

The Chair: We were going to do that in the introduction—we should.

What is paragraph 2.55 all about? It says “we seek access to the information provided in the course of their exit control processes.” Are there any questions on that?

David, you were saying any information other countries have with regard to their exit control processes, without getting into one ourselves—I hope that's not inferred by any of this discussion—would be useful.

Are there any problems with that recommendation? None. Okay.

The big part, section E, is on enforcement and program delivery. There are paragraphs 2.57, 2.58, 2.59, and 2.60. There's the preamble, and the recommendation at the bottom of page 35 is that the immigration department might take a greater role at the primary inspection line. I think we heard that.

Jay.

Mr. Jay Sinha: The possibility of consolidating customs and immigration is a suggestion that came up a few times.

The Chair: We talked an awful lot about training. Steve, that's in here—cross-training of immigration and customs or possible consolidation of two bodies into a single entity.

Does everybody like this recommendation? I don't hear anything negative, so okay.

On 2.61, Jay.

Mr. Jay Sinha: This is focusing on seaports. It's sort of a general recommendation just ensuring that there are sufficient resources at seaports to deal with mainly commercial traffic, but also inland.

The Chair: I agree. Having one immigration person at the Vancouver port was absolutely idiotic, as far as I'm concerned—plus giving them the technology they want. This essentially says we need some more immigration people at seaports.

Are there any problems with that one? None.

Okay, paragraphs 2.62, 2.63, and 2.65 all talk about what we learned about streaming. Perhaps air travellers—low-risk, high-risk, where they came from.... It's an expeditious way of being able to look at people and move them through the system in a much better way.

Do you have anything to add there, Jay?

Mr. Jay Sinha: It sort of builds on what we talked about earlier with CANPASS and NEXUS, but it broadens the issue a little. It includes the situation in airports, in particular the pilot project at Dorval, where they actually have a separate line for people arriving with visas from overseas.

The Chair: Are there any difficulties with this recommendation? I think it's pretty good. Are there any objections? I'm not taking votes right now, okay.

Section E(iii) is on national standards for port of entry. I think we've talked a lot about national standards throughout.

We'll hear from Jay on paragraphs 2.66, 2.67, and 2.68, and the recommendations at the bottom of page 39.

Mr. Jay Sinha: We heard from immigration and customs people, at least in a couple of different places, who were concerned about the security measures at the actual ports of entry. There was a suggestion about, for example, bullet-proof glass.

Another issue that came up, only at airports, was the fact that at certain airports people who worked in the departure area did not necessarily have to go through a security check, which could be a security problem. So there's a recommendation based on that as well.

One suggestion was that threat assessments be done at ports of entry, to determine what safety issues needed to be addressed.

The Chair: Because every port might be a little different.

Are there any problems with those three recommendations?

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Just make sure they don't use the standards at the Ottawa airport.

• 1100

The Chair: Yes, I know. By the way, do you know what Ottawa's problem is? Because it is probably the worst...yes, it's staff. They can't seem to keep enough staff at the screening place. It is the worst airport in the country. Even Pearson does a better job with people than Ottawa, if that's believable.

Are there any other comments on that one?

We go to E(iv), protective tools for officers. Paragraphs 2.69 and 2.70 relate to whether or not we should arm our people, what tools or equipment they need to protect themselves and their facilities. I know we've heard this from a number of different sections, and on the top of page 41 is a recommendation that deals with this.

The key line, I think, is that there should be greater armed presence at ports of entry in the form of uniformed RCMP or police officers. Are there any comments on that particular recommendation?

Mr. Art Hanger: You say there should be a greater armed presence at ports of entry in the form of uniformed RCMP officers or police officers. Why are we tying up the police again? They're already stretched to the limit.

The Chair: But we're talking about giving them more resources. We believe there ought to be a greater presence, not only of security people—

Mr. Art Hanger: I don't disagree with that. I think there should be somewhat of an armed presence, and I don't see why we couldn't move in that direction with immigration officers or even customs officers.

The Chair: I think that's what is looked at, except it doesn't go quite as far as obviously you would like to go, but—

Mr. Art Hanger: But I think we've heard that, and it's necessary.

The Chair: That's why I thought we'd use diplomatic language on the top of page 41, but....

Yes, Mark.

Mr. Mark Assad (Gatineau, Lib.): What is that based on?

Mr. Art Hanger: Based on the increasing threat at these points of entry and the growing number of people who are moving about now, organized criminals or whatever the case may be. There is deep concern on the part of a lot of the enforcement officers on the front line, and even non-enforcement officers—immigration officers. That has been increasing on a substantial level.

Mr. Mark Assad: That must be relatively new, because we had a meeting with officers from the department. We didn't get that at all.

The Chair: Mark, we did hear that.

Mr. Art Hanger: You do on the front line.

The Chair: We did hear that a lot, Mark, in our travels out west.

Jerry, then Inky.

Mr. Jerry Pickard: Mr. Chair, I think when we were discussing this and looking at the ports, there were some ports that had security concerns, and we heard about them at the various ports. Detroit-Windsor was one of them. The tunnel has a hire-a-cop process. They hire off-duty police officers to patrol the area.

I believe it is the responsibility of the federal government to make sure there is armed security where required, but I don't believe it is necessary at every port across the country. And I think Mark's point is well taken—where did you hear it?

I think we should look very carefully at each port and see where it should be implemented.

The Chair: Inky.

An hon. member: There should have been a briefing on that.

The Chair: I know, but we're briefing you too, about what we've heard.

Is this a point of order, Paul?

Mr. Paul Forseth: Yes, it is. We have an objection from the member down there. Answers are being provided, and he doesn't listen. So let's get the background. The point was made to us that they're hiring policemen. They want maybe RCMP officers or city police to be there to fulfil a role. Mr. Hanger's suggestion was maybe instead of hiring those police and asking them to come out, customs and immigration should take that role by itself, with their own specially trained persons, who would be police equivalent or something.

The Chair: Hang on. I have a list. This is not a debate between you and other people who have differences of opinion. You made your opinion, now let the other people express theirs.

Inky and then Jerry.

Mr. Inky Mark: Chair, I would suggest we move the period to after the word “entry”.

The Chair: Pardon?

Mr. Inky Mark: I would move the period to after the word “entry”, and just delete...and then it's general.

The Chair: Thanks for that constructive thing, but let's put that on hold until I hear from some more members.

Jerry and Steve.

• 1105

Mr. Jerry Pickard: I think I did make my point, Mr. Chair. Thank you very much. It was that there are other areas that voice concerns. We should look at independent crossings, ask whether they require security or not, and deal with it in an appropriate way.

The Chair: Steve.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Mr. Chairman, I think this is an attempt to compromise for some of us who are strongly opposed to immigration officers having side arms. The compromise says there should be a greater armed presence, but it should be in the form of people who are fully trained—skilled and knowledgeable—in the handling of firearms. To simply say that you can take our front-line immigration officers—who at this stage are bureaucrats who process papers, deal with issues of legislation, etc.—and turn them into armed peace officers, police officer equivalents, is I think a very dangerous and slippery slope. In the attempt to—

An hon. member: [Inaudible—Editor].

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Yes, you are. If you're saying our immigration officers should be issued side arms, that's exactly what you're saying.

An hon. member: No, I didn't say that.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Well, I don't know what the hell you're saying then, because that's what I hear from the opposition.

The Chair: We'll let him explain it. Let's not get too excited right now.

Mr. Steve Mahoney: Anyway, I think this is a compromise that allows us—at least up to now—to avoid a minority report, which is why I would support it.

The Chair: Mark.

Mr. Mark Assad: I follow the same line as Steve. I heard a report from a group of responsible people from the minister's office who went across the country. She asked the question, and there weren't really any threats of any kind. We were adamantly against arming.

I'm left with the impression that's what you are suggesting, that we arm these officers. We're totally against the idea—

The Chair: Who's we?

Mr. Mark Assad: The department in general. And quite a bit of the information received was anecdotal. There were no dates. Nothing was very precise.

The Chair: Okay. There are two schools of thought being represented here before the committee.

We're going to go and vote. Those are ten-minute bells, and I know you all like to run fast, but just to make sure, because it's five after eleven, we're going to adjourn until Thursday morning. Be prepared to go three hours on Thursday. We'll finish the rest of the report and give everybody an opportunity to read the rest of the report.

Thank you.