:
I will call the meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting number six of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance.
Pursuant to the motion adopted by the committee on Thursday, November 19, the committee is meeting for its study on government spending, WE Charity and the Canada student service grant.
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of September 23. The proceedings will be made available by the House of Commons website. Just so that you are aware, the website will always show the person speaking rather than the entire committee.
To ensure an orderly meeting.... I would normally outline a number of rules, but I think the committee today knows the rules. Also, I'm sure the Clerk of the Privy Council knows the rules.
We will start with our first witness. I'd like to welcome, from the Privy Council Office, Ian Shugart, the Clerk of the Privy Council and secretary to the cabinet. Mr. Shugart, I'm not sure if you have an opening statement. If you do, we'll allow you to make that. Then we'll go to questions.
First up on the questions list, just for the committee's information, is Mr. Poilievre, followed by Ms. Dzerowicz, Mr. Fortin and Mr. Julian.
Mr. Shugart, the floor is yours.
:
Thank you very much, Chair. I am glad to be here again.
The last time we went straight into questions, but given the subject matter, I do have a statement to begin with, which I hope will be helpful. It has been provided to the committee in the two official languages.
I was asked to discuss generally the cabinet confidence exclusions to public disclosure. I intend to lay out the fundamental principles underlying cabinet confidentiality.
As you know, democracies similar to ours have long recognized the need to safeguard the confidentiality of what is said at cabinet and what comes before cabinet, and the documents prepared for those discussions. The reasons are clear. The process of governance in a cabinet-style democracy works best when cabinet members charged with government policy and decision-making are free to express themselves around the cabinet table unreservedly, free to discuss all aspects of the problems that come before them, and to express all manner of views. Confidentiality ensures candour in cabinet discussions and full and frank exchange.
Deliberations among ministers of the Crown and the documents that reflect the content of those deliberations are protected by the constitutional convention of cabinet confidentiality. It performs a vital role in our cabinet-style democratic system of responsible government. In a system of responsible government, cabinet is openly and collectively accountable to Parliament for the decisions it makes during the time it governs.
If ministers are to make decisions collectively, the privacy of their opinions and views in developing government policy must be protected. Otherwise, the collective responsibility of ministers to Parliament, which is essential to cabinet government, would be difficult to maintain.
Along with other constitutional conventions, cabinet confidentiality also serves to uphold the constitutional principle of the separation of powers between the three branches of the state. In doing so, it protects the integrity of our constitutional structure.
Canadian constitutional law has long acknowledged that sovereign power in this country is divided not only between Parliament and the provincial legislatures, but also among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state. Although there are limited areas of overlap, each branch plays a fundamentally distinct role.
In a recent unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Canada reasserted that each branch must be able to perform its constitutionally assigned functions without undue interference by the others. Several doctrines work to prevent undue interference by one branch into another. This includes the secrecy afforded to judicial deliberations and the recognition of the privileges, powers and immunities enjoyed by the Senate, the House of Commons and the legislative assemblies.
In August the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the executive, too, benefits from a degree of protection against undue interference. The court specified that the deliberations among ministers of the Crown, and the records supporting and reflecting those deliberations, are protected by the constitutional convention of cabinet solidarity and confidentiality.
Of course, the constitutional convention protecting the confidentiality of cabinet deliberations does not exist just for the cabinet of the day. It exists for all cabinets: for those that came before it, and for those cabinets that will come after it. The constitutional convention and the protection it affords is for the benefit of our system of democratic governance, both the concept of cabinet solidarity in responsible government and the ability of the executive branch to do its job.
Recognizing this importance, Parliament resolved that access to cabinet confidences is extraordinary. Parliament chose to exclude cabinet confidences from a right of access under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act. It did not grant to its agents of Parliament a statutory right of access to cabinet confidences; nor, as a matter of federal law, did Parliament allow our courts access to cabinet confidences.
The committee's July 7 motion stipulated that cabinet confidences were to be excluded from the production of documents. This is in keeping with the House of Commons' long-standing practice of respecting the confidentiality of cabinet decision-making. The former Speaker of the House of Commons, the Honourable Roland Michener, said in November 1957:
...the decision of the government is one and indivisible. Inquiry into how it is arrived at and particularly inquiry into the cabinet process is not permitted in the house.
It is also the way the Supreme Court understands the practice of the House of Commons, as noted in the fundamental decision of Babcock.
The and members of cabinet appeared before committees of the House to provide answers to questions about their decisions on the Canada student service grant. The Prime Minister and cabinet chose to make public their confidences on the CSSG because of the questions raised about the delivery of the program. This is a recognized exception in law to maintaining cabinet confidentiality.
As the Clerk of the Privy Council and custodian of cabinet confidences, I directed that a principled approach be taken to the treatment of cabinet confidences in this case, to ensure a non-selective application of the protection of cabinet confidentiality. As a result, and in keeping with the public disclosures made by members of cabinet, considerable information on the grant, which otherwise would have constituted cabinet confidences, was provided to the committee.
This was one case, Mr. Chair, in the context that I have attempted to lay out, of the doctrine of cabinet confidences. I hope this is useful to the members of the committee.
Thank you very much.
On the matter of the redactions, I gave general direction to departments, supported by staff in the Privy Council Office well trained in this area.
There were two principal aspects. Documents that normally would be cabinet documents, covering material the or members of cabinet had already publicly commented on, anything answering that description, was to be released even though it was in the form of a cabinet confidence.
The second thing is that, as I committed to the finance committee in July, because the question was at the heart of discussions in cabinet, I would be as transparent as we possibly could be with relevant information, even if it were contained in cabinet confidences.
That direction was given to departments, to deputy ministers and to the people in the departments who do the actual work. They reviewed their documents and made the redactions.
Sometimes there is a question that an official in a department will be uncertain whether or not to redact, and that will be referred to their counterparts in the Privy Council Office for advice. That's what occurred in this case.
What was provided, then, in this case is a very large number of cabinet documents, either because they were in the public interest going directly to the matter before the committee and the public controversy at the time, or because the and ministers had already commented on those matters and, in a sense, cabinet confidence was already waived.
To answer your second question, we do this with an absolute conviction about applying the law and the principles in the law. Whether it is convenient for a minister, on the basis of any partisan consideration, does not enter into it.
I have to say that in my experience, whether working for Conservative or Liberal ministers, whether answering questions from New Democrat or Bloc or government members, we are trained to do our work without regard to partisan interests. We work very closely with politicians, the elected branch of government, but our conviction in Canada, our values in our public service, are to do it without regard for the partisan interest of the government of the day.
That, I can affirm to the committee, was how we went about our business in this case, and I would say in every case.
:
I apologize. I didn't want to shout in anybody's ear.
Since we have about 1,500 pages substantially or completely redacted, it's disturbing, quite frankly, to me that you don't have the ability to answer more fulsomely the questions we are asking you. That, of course, was the objective in bringing you here—not the theoretical approach, but rather to have a sense of why things were redacted so substantially.
I have two questions flowing from that.
First off, when you testified on July 21 to us, you stated that there were two cabinet discussions about the WE Charity. Can you confirm that those two discussions were subject to the cabinet confidences?
Secondly, a disturbing number of pages are marked “not relevant”, including references directly to the Canada student service grant. Can you confirm with us how many pages that were marked as “not relevant” were redacted before they were sent to the law clerk? To an untrained observer's eyes, they are very relevant.
One can imagine that if there were not any application of principles at the outset of the exercise, even neutral public servants might be inclined to look at one document and say: “Oh, this will be awkward, and we won't release it, but this one will be all right, so we'll release it.”
That is not the application of the principle of cabinet confidentiality, and it can't be allowed to stand. I therefore gave direction, as every other clerk before me has, to apply the redactions, if there were to be any, on a consistent basis, so that if there was anything that the Prime Minister or ministers had already spoken to, they were to be released. If they went to the core of the issue about timing, about the advice that had been given in this particular case, our bias was to release them.
Now, there might be other principles, such as national security—I don't think it would have applied in the WE Charity case, but it would in others—by virtue of which a public servant might say, “we need to think about this one” or “we need advice on this particular issue”, and such a question would be examined from that point of view.
This is what I meant by a principled approach at the outset.
:
Thank you, Mr. Shugart, for being here today. What you're indicating to us, though, is disturbing: that the executive branch basically can turn its back on very clear committee direction.
I have three questions coming out of that. First, can you provide us with detailed information about the classification for each of the redactions that were done in the month of August, including information on the issue of documents that, according to some people's criteria, were not relevant? If you could provide us with that information, I think it would be very helpful.
Secondly, are you not saying, then—I don't want to put words in your mouth—that the executive has the right to do the same redaction for documents that go to the law clerk this time around? If the executive can expand its exclusion far beyond the committee's mandate, is that not a concern?
Thirdly, could you explain the uneven distribution of redaction or cabinet confidences by the fact that different public servants may have applied differing criteria when they were excluding some of the documents on the basis of cabinet confidence?
:
Chair, as to the first question, I am happy to provide further information. I propose that it be in written form, but that was the offer to the committee, and I'm happy to follow up with further information on that.
With respect to the third question, no, I don't believe that there was differentiation between different departments and public servants with respect to the principles applied to the redactions. That's why we set out the direction to departments at the outset. We've done the same with respect to the current request for documents for the health committee. We've provided direction on what should be included in order to do our very best to meet this monumental task that the House has given us.
With respect to the second question, yes, I'm afraid that it is a fact that if the executive branch were to give all of the documents of cabinet confidence or commercial sensitivity or solicitor-client privilege or national security to the law clerk, it would be, in a sense, waiving that privilege, because the law clerk is a servant of the legislature, not of the executive.
That is not a reflection at all on the law clerk, who is a professional, experienced, highly qualified individual. It's a function of his being a servant of the legislature. The executive has a responsibility to preserve its ability to do its job as the executive, and frequently, that requires not divulging cabinet confidences, solicitor-client privilege or other kinds of information.
Now, we want to be as co-operative in this matter with the law clerk as we can. Meetings have been held, but at the end of the day, this does come down to our system of governance and this dynamic tension between the executive and the legislative branches of government.
I would like to thank the Standing Committee on Finance for inviting me here today to speak to a matter that has already generated a great deal of attention at many parliamentary committees. I have obviously followed the committees’ work with interest.
You have asked me to speak about documents that I have already received within the framework of examinations related to the WE Charity matter. You probably wish to know if they contained redactions, omissions or exclusions. In particular, you have asked me to discuss “Cabinet confidence” exclusions.
As we have already received a large portion of those documents, I believe that I might be able to help.
[English]
First of all, however, I'd like to explain to members of the committee how the examination process works in order for the office to obtain documents. Examinations may be initiated by the commissioner himself, or through a member of Parliament or a senator. There are two ongoing examinations in the public domain, requested by several members of Parliament who have brought me before you today, involving the conduct of the Prime Minister and the former minister of finance.
The first step we go through in any examination—they are called “examinations” under the Conflict of Interest Act—is to seek documents, which we ask be in writing. We seek documents from organizations and individuals and ask that they be shared with us. As always, we ask to be provided documents without edits or redactions. It is expressly mentioned in the letter that we send each individual or organization. We do not want information to be redacted, and that is made clear in those letters.
In our view, to ensure a proper examination that is fair and impartial, we need to be the arbiter of what is and what is not relevant to an examination.
Since my arrival almost three years ago, there has only been one instance in which I did not receive the information I requested, and I explained that situation in the “Trudeau II Report”, which was just discussed with the Clerk of the Privy Council.
The second point I would like to make, however, is that there are strict confidentiality provisions under subsection 48(5) of the Conflict of Interest Act that severely limit my ability to share information collected in the course of an examination. We ask; we get, and we examine, but I am working under some constraints under subsection 48(5) of the act, which says that unless otherwise required by law, the commissioner, and every person who works with me, may not disclose any information that comes to their knowledge in the performance of their duties and functions under this section, unless the disclosure is essential for the purposes of carrying out my powers to examine, or in order to establish the grounds for any conclusion contained in a report. Then there is another exception, which is not applicable to the situation we are discussing today.
On cabinet confidences, we seek all information. We say, “Please do not send us redacted, excluded, exempted material. Do not exempt material. Do not exclude material.” On cabinet confidences—and my position is based upon my reading of the relevant parts of the act—my view is that we have a right to have access to all needed information for an examination, including cabinet confidences.
In Part 4 of the act, under Mandate and Powers of the Commissioner, subsection 44(9) reads as follows:
The Commissioner may not include in the report any information that he or she is required to keep confidential.
So the protection is there for cabinet confidences.
Former commissioner Mary Dawson addressed the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics on the topic of cabinet confidences, as did I in the “Trudeau II Report”.
In her submission back in 2013, regarding the five-year review of the Conflict of Interest Act, she said:
It must be clearly understood that the Commissioner has the authority to access any document needed to conduct his or her investigations. Moreover, these documents must be provided directly to the Commissioner and not vetted by any other party, so as not to compromise the integrity of the investigative process.
We've talked about the “Trudeau II Report”. I have made the observation that to avoid potential delays in examinations and to carry out my proper investigative mandate, I must have access to all information I consider necessary to carry it out.
I've mentioned some sections. There are some further other obligations under section 51 of the Conflict of Interest Act that pertain to recusals when a matter is under cabinet confidence, as well as under section 90 of the Parliament of Canada Act.
They are a vital component. I must see those cabinet confidences, and they are properly protected by the office, both in preparing the report and in making the report public. As an independent officer of Parliament, I must have unfettered access to that.
[Translation]
Since your committee began its study last summer, there have been dozens of hours of witness testimony. If only I could use this testimony, I would be able to finalize my reports more quickly and avoid wasting the time of the many witnesses involved in the matter. From a legal point of view, I am not able to refer to it at the moment as it is protected by parliamentary privilege.
The Speaker of the House of Commons informed me about 10 days ago that he did not have the sole authority to grant my request. I actually asked if I could use the testimony given before the Standing Committee on Finance. He therefore suggested that I direct my request to the Standing Committee on Finance. I am doing that this afternoon.
Therefore, for the purposes of the Office’s two ongoing examinations that I have mentioned, I respectfully ask, Mr. Chair, that you recommend that the House waive the privilege associated with witness testimony before the Standing Committee on Finance in the context of its study on WE Charity and the Canada Student Service Grant.
Mr. Chair, those are my remarks. I would simply like to remind members of the committee that there are considerable limits to how open I can be in answering your questions here today as I must be mindful of the strict confidentiality obligations set out in the Conflict of Interest Act.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I'm happy to receive this question in order to clarify something that's not clear to everybody involved. The Conflict of Interest Act only applies to the most senior levels of government. We're not talking about the public servants at large. We're talking about Governor in Council appointees, ministers, exempt staff, period. We're not talking about directors, directors general, and up to and including assistant deputy ministers. They are governed by something different, by the code developed under another authority.
I'm not responsible for offering educational activities aimed at public servants. It's the responsibility of the Treasury Board and of each line department. My role is to focus on the people I've mentioned: the Prime Minister, the ministers, the secretaries of state, the Governor in Council appointees and such senior people, as well as the exempt staff.
We have 3,000 people, not the 400,000 people who are governed by the other authority.
:
We may invite you back at that point.
That said, Mr. Dion, I'll focus on the theory of the issue. I want you to speak about the responsibility of people who redact a document. I understand that a process requires documents to be redacted to protect cabinet confidences and confidentiality. That's fine.
Earlier, with Mr. Shugart, I saw that between 12 and 25 individuals, not including some supervisors, see all the documents. Mr. Shugart is ultimately responsible for the redaction. From an ethical standpoint, given the disclosure obligations resulting from the committee's July 7 motion, and given the restrictions on redactions, what's the level of reliability? How can we verify that the redacted material was redacted correctly? If there was a redaction error, for example, if an individual decided to redact a section that shouldn't have been redacted, how would the committee know?
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Dion, for your presence here today. We certainly hope you and your family and loved ones are staying safe and healthy during this pandemic.
You're getting a bunch of questions in part because this committee was shut down in August. At the end of July and in early August, we had important testimony on ethical considerations, and then the entire Parliament was shut down in mid-August, as you know, with prorogation. Subsequent to that, the finance committee has been held up for the last two months because Liberal members didn't want these documents discussed. So, it's been four months since the finance committee has actually been able to question a witness on these important things.
I guess I apologize on behalf of the entire committee. Because of all this shutdown and basically the committee's being suppressed, we now have a bunch of questions to ask.
My questions relate to the 's testimony before us on July 30 and Mr. Shugart's on July 21. Mr. Shugart testified just before prorogation that there were two cabinet discussions around the issue of the WE Charity and the substantial funding that the federal government wanted to put. He also testified that the Prime Minister had concerns—and the Prime Minister testified about this as well—around possible conflicts of interest.
I want to ask you, first, if the or the Prime Minister's Office contacted you or the Ethics Commissioner's office around a potential conflict of interest? Would you expect that they normally would, if there were potential conflicts of interest, actually reach out to you? Have you received the cabinet documents that reference the two discussions that cabinet had around this program?
:
Thank you, and thank you to Mr. Dion for joining us as a witness today.
During Mr. Shugart's testimony earlier in this meeting, he explained the process that was employed to make certain redactions. I'll remind committee members that the reason we've asked each of you to come here is to discuss redactions of cabinet confidences.
If I can summarize, Mr. Shugart explained that they established a process and a set of rules that would be employed, and the responsible deputy ministers had their staff then execute the redactions according to those rules.
In your testimony, you explained that your rules apply to senior officials within government, and Monsieur Fortin, during one of his questions today, raised the issue of what would happen if a civil servant did things the wrong way. What if they made a redaction they shouldn't have, for example?
This has been the current that has been underpinning the last number of meetings that we've had on this particular issue. The allegation that no one has made explicitly, but that seems to be hanging over everyone's head, is that some civil servant would have been directed by the government to redact this or that, and that it would have been inappropriate, given what the committee had asked it to do.
If Mr. Shugart's testimony today is true—and I believe it to be true, as I I believe him to be a man of integrity, and, more importantly, that the person who holds that position must be beyond reproach—that there was no consultation with ministers or the Prime Minister, and in fact the deputy ministers charged the civil servants beneath them to execute these redactions in accordance with the rules, do you think there could be an ethical violation?
:
Thank you. I appreciate that.
Very quickly, before I hand it over to my colleague, I note that you mentioned moments ago that full disclosure had been made, with the exception of the disclosure of documents that did not pertain to what had been asked for, and that this satisfied you that you had the information to do your work.
On the issue of those particular redactions that do not pertain, I used to run into this issue in my career before politics, when we would deal with disclosure in litigation. There was no real difference, to my mind, between things that were not relevant but were included in an otherwise relevant document and other documents that just had no reference whatsoever.
In your view, does the obligation to disclose change at all because an irrelevant portion is contained in a document that may have some relevant material, or is it similar to that of the millions upon millions of documents that are within the custody of the Government of Canada, which the government just chose not to produce because they're not relevant?
In your initial remarks, you said, “Therefore, for the purposes of the office’s ongoing examinations, I respectfully ask, Mr. Chair, that you recommend that the House waive the privilege associated with witness testimony before the Standing Committee on Finance in the context of its study on WE Charity and the Canada Student Service Grant.”
I'm kind of in the position of “I don't know what I don't know” that you mentioned earlier. I know how that happens, but I have a question for you myself, and this is what I don't know:
It is public testimony. Can you not use that public testimony?
:
Even when it's public? That's news to me. In any event, if that's what it is, that's what it is.
For committee members, we'll have to think about this. Here's how we would waive the privilege on committee evidence. First, as a committee, we would have to adopt a report to recommend to the House that it waive its privileges regarding the specific evidence. Second, we would have the report tabled in the House. Third, there would have to be a motion to concur in the report. Somebody would move a motion to concur, and if we concur it in the House, then it would be done and available.
It's a little bit of a complicated process, but that's how we would have to do it. The committee will have to give that some thought. I always thought public evidence was public evidence. I've certainly learned something new today.
With that, we're out of time.
I want to sincerely thank you, Mr. Dion, for coming forward and providing what answers you could within your responsibilities to Parliament. On behalf of the committee, thank you for the work that you do as Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. Maybe we don't always seek your advice often enough, but when we seek it, we're a little wiser as MPs—I can tell you that.