:
Thank you, Chair, and good afternoon to you and to the committee members.
Senior Deputy Governor Wilkins and I are delighted to be before you today to discuss the bank's Monetary Policy Report, which we published just this morning.
Taking a look back to the last time we were here, which was in October, at that time I spoke about the factors that were causing us to downgrade our outlook for the Canadian economy. Some six months later, I'm very pleased to say that I can discuss the factors that have led us to upgrade our forecast for the Canadian economy.
For some time, we've been talking about how the oil price shock that began in 2014 set in motion a complex series of adjustments throughout the economy, including a significant restructuring of the oil and gas sector. What we're seeing now is that energy-related activity has stopped declining and is transitioning to a new level commensurate with the current level of oil prices.
Now, because that large negative force is now essentially passed, it's no longer masking the sources of strength that have been at work for some time, particularly the growth in output and employment that is being driven by the service sector.
The expansion over the past six months has exceeded our earlier forecast, and we have revised up our outlook for average annual growth for this year, 2017, to a bit over 2.5%. That's half a percentage point greater than we were projecting in the January Monetary Policy Report. We project growth of just under 2% in 2018 and 2019.
A crucial question for the bank now is whether the stronger economic data we've been seeing recently are signalling increasing momentum. Some of the strength is coming from factors that are unlikely to continue at the same pace. For example, the very strong growth in consumption in the first quarter was supported by a temporary boost from the Canada child benefit.
Housing activity has also been stronger than expected. While we've incorporated some of this strength in a higher profile for residential investment throughout our projection, we're still anticipating a slowing over that projection horizon. The current pace of activity in the greater Toronto area and parts of the Golden Horseshoe region is unlikely to be sustainable, given fundamentals. House price growth in the GTA has accelerated sharply in recent months, suggesting to us that speculative forces are at work.
In terms of the labour market, recent data have been more mixed. Job growth has certainly been firm, but both wages and unit labour costs have grown very slowly. The data suggest that material slack remains in the Canadian labour market, in contrast to the U.S. labour market, which is close to full employment.
At the same time, Canadian exports and business spending are still weaker than you would expect to see at this stage of the business cycle. Companies are telling us that while they plan to raise spending, the planned increases are modest or tied to maintenance rather than expansion. In short, the economy is not yet firing on all cylinders. In addition, Canadian companies are dealing with heightened levels of uncertainty related to U.S. tax and trade policies.
We still do not know what tax changes are coming, or when, and the range of potential trade measures under discussion is even wider now than it was in January. This list includes, first, a border adjustment tax; second, increased tariffs aimed at specific industries or countries; third, non-tariff barriers; and fourth, even broader multilateral measures.
[Translation]
We do not know which of these measures will be enacted; their timing is uncertain and each would affect the global and Canadian economies through a different, complex set of channels. With all this uncertainty, we cannot reliably model the impact of changes to US trade policy. Instead, we have built in an extra degree of caution in our forecast for exports and investment relative to our January projection.
Total inflation has been close to 2% and is expected to dip to about 1.7% in the middle of the year before returning to near its target. However, our core inflation measures are all in the lower half of the target band and have been trending downwards.
This supports the view that the economy continues to have significant excess capacity. Our current base-case forecast calls for the Canadian economy to absorb its excess capacity sometime in the first half of 2018, which is a bit sooner than we projected two months ago.
[English]
We are certainly happy to see the recent strength in the economic data, and we want to see more of it to be confident that growth is on a solid footing. We judge that the economy still has material room to grow, and we remain mindful that significant uncertainty continues to weigh on the outlook. Given all of this, we judge that the current stance of monetary policy is still appropriate, and we maintain the target for the overnight rate at 0.5%.
With that, Mr. Chairman, Senior Deputy Wilkins and I will be happy to answer your questions.
Thank you both for being here today.
I want to start by asking a question on a statement of yours that was quoted in the media at the latter end of last year with regard to your thinking that one of the most dangerous risks to the economy was high household indebtedness. We just completed a study on housing looking at high household indebtedness.
If you believe that the recent federal measures will deal with that or if you have any overall thoughts, I wonder if you could elaborate, including if you've seen any trends, or if the policy has been working from the time you made those comments, which I believe was last December.
That occasion in December was when we published our financial system review, which is a biannual exercise. The next one is in June. It's absolutely true that a major risk that we face is that indebtedness in households is at the highest level ever and is continuing to move higher. This is closely associated with imbalances in the housing market, because indebtedness is incurred primarily to buy houses. We are confident that the moves made by the federal government, in about the same time frame, are having the desired effect. That means that people are qualifying for mortgages at a higher interest rate now, and therefore have more of a cushion in their financing plan, should there be either an interruption of employment or a rise in interest rates. There is more resilience in the system, and a growing amount as each new bit of debt is subject to those higher criteria. That's the primary change that's been made.
From the Bank of Canada's standpoint, our primary mission being inflation targeting, that implies bringing the economy back to full capacity. That causes more jobs and income growth, which improves the denominator of the ratio of debt to income and makes the whole situation less risky.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair and colleagues.
[Translation]
Mr. Poloz, Ms. Wilkins, welcome to your House of Commons.
First of all, I would like a little clarification. At the outset, you mentioned the price of oil, which has clearly been major concern in the last four years in Alberta, especially if we consider the terrifying effects we have seen.
You say that we are transitioning to a new price that is commensurate with the current price of oil. In your opinion, does that mean that, in the next year, the price of oil will be stable? Or are you forecasting an increase? If so, what do you see as the target price for a barrel of oil?
You mentioned a possible rise in the price of oil. We can understand that this is something that our Alberta companies, and all Canadian companies depending on oil, are hoping and waiting for.
Before I go any further, Mr. Poloz, let me thank you and congratulate you for the quality of your French. We appreciate it greatly.
In terms of interest rates, people are always a little nervous when they are in debt and when deficits are being run. I will not make a political speech such as we have become used to for a year and a half, but, in your opinion, should the interest rate remain stable? Do you foresee any fluctuations in the coming year?
:
When we did our analysis, we saw a number of possible scenarios. As a result, it is difficult at the moment to provide a precise answer to your question.
In our report on monetary policy, we tried to identify the channels of change that could affect the Canadian economy. If there were tariffs, for example, the impact would certainly be felt more on the industries directly involved. If a tariff affected some industries specifically, it would have a different effect across the country. Actually, that is what we can see at the moment in forestry.
There are also other channels of change, like the oil price shock, which has implications on broader sectors. For example, workers may have to move in order to find jobs in other provinces or other sectors. There are also capital investments in other industries. Changes like that will require an adjustment that could take time and, basically, result in productivity rates that are lower than they are at the moment. This is because of the global value chains that have been built during all these years of globalization. Those chains are effective, but if they start to become unravelled, we will once more have production chains that are less productive.
That is why we are saying that, if it happened, the effects would be very negative, but at the moment, it is not possible to say specifically whether it will happen.
Thank you both for being here today.
First, I am going to ask a question that perhaps you were not expecting today.
Some time ago, a number of observers and even economists said that the mandate of the Bank of Canada changed in 1974 and, since that time, it can no longer lend money to the Government of Canada. I would like to give you the opportunity to reply to the questions that have been raised many times in public debate, as to why the Bank of Canada no longer lends money to the Government of Canada. Perhaps that would enlighten all those who have written about the subject.
:
There are two factors. First, we went through a period of slow growth, starting in 2008. In that period, there was quite a wide output gap, particularly in the labour market. That is what explains the long period of stagnation.
As well, the price of oil fell. That is the second factor. Just when the economy was growing strongly, we received that second shock, which required a major adjustment to the economy. That is a long process. Specifically, it represents an annual loss of income of $60 billion for the country. An impact like that does not just affect the people in the sectors that are directly involved. It affects almost the entire economy.
For those two reasons, there were downward pressures on the inflation rate and also on wages. We are expecting that the output gap will close again in the first half of next year and that wages will eventually see a little more growth. That is a sign of progress. At the moment, it is clear that growth has not really taken hold. It’s a little uneven. The foundation is not solid. According to our forecasts, however, it will become stronger and more stable.
Welcome, Governor and Senior Deputy Governor. It's always a pleasure.
Reading through the Monetary Policy Report this afternoon, I note two great things. One, obviously, is the stronger than expected growth, as you revised up this year's growth. The other is the output gap closing earlier than expected—although from reading it, I understand there is going to be some remeasurement or re-examination of how we look at and measure output gaps.
One thing I wanted to talk about quickly is exports and business investment, the two points of contribution to GDP that haven't recovered as strongly as we would have expected from an economic crisis or in a cycle. Could you give us some more detail on what the bank looks at in those two areas of contribution to the economy?
:
These things pretty well go together. At the root of this is that during the strong dollar period, followed by the global financial crisis and the global recession, we lost some 8,000 to 10,000 exporting companies that went out of business.
When the conditions for recovery were in place, with the U.S. economy getting stronger and the Canadian dollar easing back, that combination would normally have produced a much stronger export recovery. In fact, what happened was that many of those companies were no longer there, so they didn't respond to that stimulus in the way our models would have predicted.
We have been busy during this period, remodelling the sector at a more micro level. There is plenty in there to encourage us. There are sectors that are emergent and are growing faster, so that's a good thing, and there are others, of course, that are not.
Together with that is the investment side. What we were expecting was that exports would grow to a point where companies were fully using their resources and then would expand through new investment. That natural sequence has not really gotten under way, for the reasons I've just said.
If I may say so, one last thing is the cloud of uncertainty coming from south of the border, which is causing companies to hold back on those investments.
Just changing tangents to the regional housing market, and I say “regional” for a purpose, the GTA in my understanding is probably growing at a 4% to 5% clip a year. You commented recently about some of the fundamentals supporting the housing market, but with the caveat that you see levels of speculation.
Many of us hear from our constituents all the time about the affordability or unaffordability, but mostly the unaffordability, of housing in the GTA. You've also commented, Governor, and please correct me if I'm wrong, about some supply issues.
If we were going to rank the reasons for the rate of price increases we're seeing, what would your comment be on those? Can you add some colour there, please?
:
If we begin at the most basic, a price change is always a question of demand or supply, or both. Demand, as you say, has been growing in the GTA, but the economy has been growing at 4% to 5%. It's being fuelled by immigration and job creation. That creates a very basic demand for more housing. Supply has been growing but has not kept up with that demand, and so there's a natural tendency for prices to rise. Those are fundamentals.
However, there's no fundamental story that I could tell that could justify price rises of 20% or 30%, so without being specific about just how much of it is due to speculation, it's obvious to me that a growing amount is due to speculative behaviour, which means people buying housing not to live in but to flip, etc., for investment purposes.
That of course is a more risky phase of any cycle. It means that it's time to remind people that house prices can go down as well as up and that they should be doing their own risk assessments, fundamentally asking, for example, “Why am I buying this house”, and “Could I withstand a 10% correction in prices?” Many ordinary people could; they would just continue to pay their mortgage and live there. The speculators, however, would not be able to do that, and so it's financially risky.
Thank you to our guests for being here, and for the work you do for Canadians every day.
We're obviously in a period of divergent policy, in which the U.S.... I take the point of the senior deputy governor that while the Bank of Canada is an independent institution, many people would cite the equally true fact that we're in an interdependent and integrated economy with the Americans. We're holding steady, with interests rates at least. I'm not going to ask you to comment on where they might go, but what does it mean in practical terms for our dollar, etc., if the American rates are going up? What has your modelling shown?
:
It's true that the Canadian-U.S. economies are highly integrated, and we're to a lesser degree integrated with lots of economies, but the one kind of disturbance that breaks that integration is the one we came through, which is the oil price shock. The decline in oil prices is fundamentally good for the U.S. economy, because it's a net importer of oil, and fundamentally negative for the Canadian economy, because we're a major net oil exporter.
That difference caused a divergence between the two economies, and it's the reason that our progress in reducing our unemployment rate stopped at the time of the oil price shock. In the U.S., progress in reducing theirs actually picked up speed, and so their economy has reached full employment far before we have. This is a divergence in levels or of point in the cycle, and not necessarily of growth rates.
In that context, it's very important that we be clear that we are conducting independent monetary policy. We can't just follow the U.S., because if we did, we would for sure undershoot our inflation target, because we would have excess capacity. That is one of the reasons we have a flexible exchange rate: to give us that policy independence. If we had a fixed exchange rate, we wouldn't have any.
Governor Poloz, Senior Deputy Governor Wilkins, thank you for joining us. The quality of your French is extraordinary. I would also like to recognize the collective work you have done to make sure that the Canadian economy is functioning well.
I feel that all my colleagues around the table will agree that, when the economy is going well, it has very positive effects on our immediate political situation. Of course, that is not a concern for you.
In the “Monetary Policy Report—April 2017”, published today, you say that the economy performed better at the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2017 which could partially be attributed to the Canada Child Benefit.
In whichever language you choose, can you give us a brief overview of the effect the program has had on the Canadian economy and tell us why you forecast that the effect will not continue through the coming months?
[Translation]
The real effect of the program was to increase parents' disposable income. That means that parents must then decide whether they want to spend the money, save it, or use it to pay down their debts. We projected that parents would choose to spend a little and save a little, and that is exactly what we observed.
However, we were surprised to see the effect was much more concentrated in time than we would have thought. This kind of change increases income levels once, but it continues to another level. The effect on the level of consumption is permanent, but, unless the amount continues to increase, the effect on growth disappears. That is the basic arithmetic of growth.
In a nutshell, a one-time increase in income level is very positive, but it cannot continue if the amount of the increase remains the same.
:
We don't form a view in the way you describe. In fact, the Canadian dollar is most correlated with the price of oil because of the importance of oil in the economy. When the price of oil was around $100, the Canadian dollar was in the nineties—actually around a hundred cents.
We have models that try to capture the historical relationship between oil and the dollar. The dollar does have some other things to it. Not just oil, but other commodities matter, and the interest rate differential between Canada and the U.S. matters. But that's about it. It's a pretty simple model of how the exchange rate is determined.
In real life, everything that moves affects the market's estimate of what interest rates will be some day, because it interacts with what inflation will be. That means that anything that moves can affect the dollar, because it changes that expectation.
In economists' models, really, anything that moves in the model, the exchange rate reacts to. It makes it very hard to ever form a view of what the appropriate level is. It all depends on the forces acting on the economy at the time.
There simply is no hard and fast rule. As I said earlier, that's exactly why we have and why we need a flexible exchange rate. We can't be forcing it to be somewhere or expecting it to be somewhere. So many other forces can act on it. We need to focus on something that is of general use, and that is the inflation rate, which thereby clarifies decision-making both for businesses and for households. That's something they can count on, that we're going to keep inflation close to target.
:
In the U.S. case, everybody in the marketplace knows that the U.S. economy is at full employment and that they have begun to normalize interest rates. Everybody also knows that the Canadian economy is in a different spot and that we're likely to strike an independent course. Those two understandings are built into the marketplace and are in the prices that we see today.
Assuming that those two things unfold as people expect, I would not expect large movements in the Canadian dollar, but if something else changes, such as the price of oil, for example, then it would.... It's why we can't make some sort of firm prediction. It's really the market that drives it, and we appreciate that, because the market sees everything, and all those transactions, billions of transactions, are driving the dollar around. It would be wrong for us to try to offset those things.
Finally, is a low dollar always a good thing? Well, it is selectively good. It is good for a company that has mostly Canadian content in their business. That would be, say, in agriculture, but not necessarily, because equipment may be imported.
Thank you, Governor and Deputy Governor, for being here. I really appreciate it.
There was an article in The Globe and Mail, just before you sat down, that said you were commenting on speculative risk in the Toronto housing market. This committee studied housing and is about to present a report to Parliament. The housing question is obviously a regional problem. There are different issues in different parts of the country.
In my neck of the woods in Brampton, it's just gotten out of hand. In , the month-over-month price increases are $30,000. It's very much speculative in nature, with people owning four or five homes.
What type of risk does this present for the Canadian economy? In your opinion, would an interest rate hike help slow down the speculative nature of the housing market?
:
We've discussed this at length in the financial system review. What we see is a combination of very elevated prices that may not make much sense if you look at the fundamentals combined with a large amount of debt. And it's not just aggregate debt. If you look at the different neighbourhoods where prices are high, you see that the people living there and have the mortgages are also the most indebted. They may have debt-to-income ratios over 450%.
That combination creates a vulnerability. We call it a vulnerability because what it needs is a trigger to make that vulnerability turn into a risk that materializes. Of course, this would be a big drag on the macro- economy, depending on how big and widespread the event was. In the worst case, it would be an issue for financial stability. If you read our FSR, however, you know that that would take a really big event for it to get to that point.
Yes, we think about it, but the factors that might lead to these big price increases often are not treated as well as they could be by an increase in the interest rate. An increase in the interest rate would affect the whole country, including whole provinces where this isn't an issue at all. It's quite a widely spread instrument when we use it, and it's very effective. At the same time, you could look to other policies that are actually much more effective and more targeted. We saw some of them in action last year in Vancouver.
Another point we've made is that if you think you're investing and you're going to get a 20% or 30% return, it's not clear to us that raising the interest rate—a difference in an interest rate of 50 basis points or 200 basis points—is really going to change your mind on a rate of return that's really that lucrative. You combine this with the fact that, if you look at our credit numbers, it's actually not a credit-driven price cycle at this point.
I would say that the monetary policy tool would be the wrong one at this point.
:
Thank you very much for your comments on that.
You mentioned the debt-to-income ratios of Canadians. There is obviously a lot of concern when Canadians are stretching themselves a bit too thin. It's happening a lot in our neck of the woods. If a middle-income family has a home in Brampton East that they probably bought for $550,000 to $600,000, that home might be worth a million dollars, and that's only in the last four or five years. Now they've taken out the equity and put down a deposit on two or three homes. At the same time, they have two SUVs they have financed, and they might have a kid they're paying tuition for in college or university.
To me this is the biggest risk to the housing market, because people are then going into the secondary market to close on these deposits they've made on homes that haven't been built yet in order to close on the mortgages, and they're paying 12%, 13%. We don't have the data, and this never shows up in your debt-to-income ratio.
In your report you mentioned that it would be catastrophic to get to that point, as though we're now far from a housing crash. In certain regions, however, if that were the scenario, would it not present legitimate risks for the Canadian housing market? If something happened in Brampton or Toronto, wouldn't there be ripple effects all across the country?
:
It's difficult to speculate. “If something happened“ is very general terminology. As to how much it would ripple across, it would be very unfortunate for the people in that area, and I don't want to minimize that at all.
What we've seen when you look at past housing price cycles is the amount of contagion depends on a couple of factors. One of them is just how big the price adjustment is in that particular area and how important that area is to the rest of the economy. If it's relatively small, then contagion is probably a low risk. If it's quite large, however, particularly in an area like the GTA and Brampton, I would say that the chances are higher that there would be contagion to other markets, because it would affect price expectations in other markets. It really would just depend.
Whether or not this would lead to a very large macro-economic cycle, a recession, would again depend on what else was going on in the environment. If the economy were still growing and benefiting from growth in the U.S., that would be one case. If, at the same time, there were some negative events from outside that amplified that price adjustment, then it could create some macro-economic problems.
My thanks to the witnesses for coming to the committee today. It is kind of you.
The Bank of Canada is responsible for monetary policies, financial systems and financial management.
[English]
I was just wondering what tools would be available to the Government of Canada and the Bank of Canada if there were a major disruption in our economy, for instance—not the American economy, but our own economy. If there were large unemployment, what would you be able to do in addition to what you're already doing with a low interest rate, in order to get more people back to work, for instance?
:
Thank you both. I'll turn to Mr. Albas in a minute. I have a couple of questions and then we'll come back for one more question on the government side.
Just before you start, Dan, I have a couple of questions relating to the discussion with Robert. We did a pre-budget report called, “Creating the Conditions for Economic Growth”. I think it's fair to say that we'll be building on that theme, as we look forward to the pre-budget consultations for next year. Some people have suggested that productivity should be part of that focus, so we'll be interested to see the work that you do on productivity.
You've mentioned that fiscal policy could be part of a suite of policies that might help with economic growth. Do you have any other suggestions for enhancing economic growth? Maybe it's beyond your purview, but productivity is certainly one.
:
Just to be clear, the earlier question posed was that if something bad happened in the Canadian economy, what tools would we use to try to create more employment. The question you're framing, I think, is a little different, so I'll answer it differently.
I think what you want to look for are things that we call the “third leg” of the policy suite, namely, structural policies. These are policies that are, in effect, intended to enhance the ability of the economy to grow, usually by removing impediments to growth rather than somehow trying to boost them.
A good example would be CETA, and another one would be CFTA. These are explicitly designed to remove impediments to business growth and job creation. As is often the case with structural policies, they are literally free money. It's not as if it costs money to do these things. It's changing rules or adapting programs that already exist so they're more effective.
What happens then is, let's say you do something that enhances the labour force participation of women. That increases the labour input for the economy and the potential output of the economy, giving us more room to grow. That would be a structural policy, not fiscal per se, and certainly not monetary policy.
It can work in much the same way as a free trade agreement works to enhance the ability of the economy to grow on its own. There is no end of examples that one could come up with.
:
Thank you for that. I think that gives us some food for thought for our fall hearings.
The last question I have, and I think the elephant in the room for our economy, as you mentioned in your submission, is where the United States may go in its trade policies, border adjustment tax, etc.
On a trilateral or global basis, do you have discussions with the U.S. Federal Reserve, and do they talk about how dangerous some of those policies might be to the North American trading relationship and how it might affect all three countries in NAFTA going forward?
I chair the Canada-U.S. committee and that's partly why I ask the question. What happens south of the border, and the great uncertainty that's there now, could really have an impact on our economy and theirs, going forward.
:
The central bankers of the world meet every six or eight weeks at the Bank for International Settlements in Switzerland. Those meetings include Mexico and the United States. We have an almost continuous dialogue about these kinds of issues. In addition, those people meet together with the finance ministers at the G-20 or G-7 meetings a little less regularly.
There's a pretty strong consensus around the things you mention. I argued in a speech a couple weeks ago that much of the world's progress over the last 150 years for Canada, in terms of growth and prosperity, have been in periods that you could characterize as open: open to trade, capital, and immigration. All of the periods in which we were not open were very distressed periods here in Canada. It's an easy correlation to see.
The last time we were closed was just prior to Confederation. Confederation and the free trade agreement implied in it was a response to the closing of international markets—any port in a storm.
In the end, I think there is a strong consensus around these things. I'm hopeful that, as we have dialogue and understanding grows, many of these things that we hold dear are preserved.
:
Indeed. Let met offer a few broad comments, and then I think Ms. Wilkins may have a few details.
In fact, I gave a speech on this at the C.D. Howe Institute back in the fall. There's a whole speech on our website about where the sources of strength are. I'll just mention a couple of the highlights.
The important thing here is that the economy is already transitioning into a much higher percentage of services than goods, and that's primarily because the highest productivity—the new machinery, the new technology—makes the goods sector more efficient. You have supporting businesses being created in the service part of the economy, and they're the ones that are actually very global and, conveniently, have high Canadian content. They benefit the most from a lower Canadian dollar. The situation is very strong in that sector at this time. An example that is really moving hard is IT services. These are very well-paying jobs. Tourism is a big one. Other examples are education services—universities—and health care services.
What have I missed?
:
For the most part, we are.
One of the reasons services are given less of a profile in the media and in general conversation is that we get the trade data each quarter, whereas the monthly report is only about goods. That, I know, is something that StatsCan is working on to improve.
Imagine if the report, every month, included all services. I think we'd all chat about what's going up, what's strong, and so on. When the quarter comes, well, we get the national accounts. Everybody is excited about that, and services take a back seat whereas they actually should be in the front seat.
I'm confident that they're doing everything they can to improve that. For us, it's about those longer trends, anyway. It's not a month-to-month thing that matters.
:
Yes. What I mean by that is that the quality of the outstanding stock of debt is improving through time because of the changes the government has put in place.
If today there is this much debt, the person who goes into the bank tonight and negotiates a mortgage has to qualify at a higher rule level, and so when they get their mortgage, that adds to the stock of debt, but we know that they're more sustainable than someone who qualified for a mortgage, let's say, a year ago or two years ago. That's what I meant. It's a little more resilient because they have to qualify at a higher interest rate. That means that, if interest rates were to go up in the way we described, if U.S. interest rates go up, and five-year mortgage rates drift up, they would already be prepared for it because they've already qualified at that higher rate.