On Clause 141,
Pursuant to the order adopted by the Committee on Tuesday, May 7, 2013, the following amendment, submitted by Elizabeth May for the consideration of the Committee, was deemed moved:
That Bill C-60, in Clause 141, be amended by adding after line 18 on page 72 the following:
“(8) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (6), the factors to be taken into account by the Minister in making a determination whether an investment could be injurious to national security include
(a) whether the non-Canadian making the investment is a state-owned enterprise;
(b) the domestic production needed for projected national defence requirements;
(c) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defence requirements, including the availability of human resources, products, technology, materials and other supplies and services;
(d) the potential effects of foreign control of domestic industries and commercial activity on the capability and capacity of Canada to meet the requirements of national security;
(e) the potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on sales of military goods, equipment or technology to a country that supports terrorism, a country of concern regarding the proliferation of missiles or of chemical and biological weapons, a country that poses a potential regional military threat to the interests of Canada or a country that is listed on the nuclear non-proliferation special country list;
(f) the potential effects of the transaction on Canadian international technological leadership in areas affecting national security;
(g) the potential effects related to national security on critical national infrastructure, including major energy assets;
(h) the potential effects related to national security on Canadian critical technologies;
(i) whether the investment is the result of a transaction controlled by a foreign government;
(j) in the case where the non-Canadian making the investment is a government or agency thereof, the adherence of the non-Canadian to non-proliferation control regimes, the cooperation of the non-Canadian with Canada, specifically in counterterrorism efforts, and the potential for transshipment or diversion of technologies with military applications;
(k) the long-term projection of Canadian requirements for sources of energy and other critical resources and material; and
(l) such other factors as the Minister may determine to be appropriate, generally or in connection with a specific review or investigation.”
Debate arose thereon.