:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the committee as well for inviting my colleagues and being here today to talk about Sudan.
Let me begin with a few introductory remarks.
[Translation]
Sudan has been plagued by conflict throughout its recent history. The largest country in Africa, bordering on nine other countries, Sudan is richly endowed with natural resources; however, despite its recent oil-driven economic boom, Sudan ranked among the bottom 30 nations in the 2009 United Nations Human Development Report. Sudan is also host to the world's largest humanitarian operation and two substantial United Nations peacekeeping missions, which together form the largest single UN peacekeeping presence in the world. There are an estimated 5.2 million internally displaced persons throughout Sudan, including 2.7 million in Darfur, and some 430,000 Sudanese refugees in neighbouring states, with more than half of them in Chad.
Despite its enormous potential, Sudan has been locked in a cycle of conflict and under-development since independence in 1956. Since 1956, two civil wars have devastated South Sudan, one has ended in the east, and the ongoing conflict in Darfur is now in its seventh year. Sudan's crises are a chronic source of instability, with regional implications, fueling the trade in light weapons, illicit smuggling, and cross-border conflict. Such instability perpetuates ongoing human rights abuses and human suffering in this region of the world.
[English]
Given the interconnected nature of the security, humanitarian and development challenges facing Sudan, Canada's response is a whole-of-government, whole-of-Sudan approach, aimed at promoting sustainable peace, development, and security throughout the country.
Both the humanitarian imperative and national security interests drive Canada's engagement in Sudan. Canada is pursuing a focused and principled engagement in Sudan based on fundamental values that underlie our foreign policy priorities--namely, democracy, freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.
But today we're here to talk about a critical turning point in the history of Sudan, the final phase of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and its consequences. On January 9, 2005, the CPA was signed by the largest rebel group in the south, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, or SPLM, and the ruling political party in the north, the National Congress Party. The CPA sets out an extremely ambitious number of complex power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and security provisions that were designed to transform Sudan and to make unity attractive before its end date of July 9, 2011.
Although the stated goal of the CPA is to make unity attractive, the agreement contains provision for a January 9th referendum on self-determination for the people of south Sudan and a parallel one for the region of Abyei, which will determine if the state will remain with the north or join south Sudan. These referenda are key elements of the CPA.
We cannot underestimate the challenges facing the holding of these referenda in a transparent and credible manner. Deep political differences and suspicions appear to be hampering progress in referenda preparations. As a result, preparations for the south Sudan referendum are far behind schedule and those for Abyei have not yet begun. The south Sudan referendum commission was only formed last month, and voter registration, originally scheduled to begin in August, will now start in mid-November. However, given the anticipation building towards the January 9, 2011, date among southern Sudanese, many fear that any delay in the holding of the referendum may lead to the outbreak of widespread violence and the collapse of the CPA.
All preparations for the Abyei referendum are currently on hold because the two parties to the CPA cannot agree on the formation of the Abyei referendum commission. At the heart of this impasse is a disagreement over whether a large Arab nomadic group aligned to the north, the Misseriya, can be considered residents of Abyei and allowed to cast a ballot. Whether Abyei will remain in the north or join the south is a highly sensitive issue in Sudan, given that it is a key oil-producing state, is home to prominent founding members of the SPLM, and was denied a similar referendum promised to it in a previous peace agreement.
But the overarching goal of Canada's whole-of-government engagement in Sudan is the promotion of sustainable peace. The government believes that the implementation of the CPA is critical to ensuring that peace. We also consider it essential that the 2011 referenda be credible processes, producing results that cannot be contested and do not in themselves give rise to conflict.
As a result, Canada has been playing a leading role in helping the parties prepare for the referenda. I'd just like to outline for you here a few examples of this work. Canada founded and co-chairs the Khartoum-based donor working group on the referenda and has hired a full-time coordinator to facilitate its work. Canada is funding efforts to upgrade the capacity of the south Sudan police service to provide security during the referendum campaign. We've made a $7-million contribution to the UNDP referendum basket fund that will support activities necessary to hold the referenda, and Canada will be represented on the ground to observe the referenda. We are partnering with the Carter Center, through a $2-million contribution, to observe the referenda themselves, and we are planning to deploy monitors with the EU monitoring mission as well.
In August this year we hosted a very productive referendum study tour in Canada for a joint delegation from the north and the south. We trust that the lessons learned from this trip will be applied by Sudanese counterparts as they organize the referenda. Our team of foreign policy and aid personnel, both here at headquarters and in south and north Sudan, have long undertaken diplomatic démarches with both parties and with members of the international community with influence in Khartoum in order to promote the holding of credible referenda.
Now I will turn to longer-term peace and stability issues.
Regardless of whether the people of Sudan ultimately choose unity or secession, Canada's main desire is for the maintenance of peace and stability in Sudan and the region. The Canadian International Development Agency, the Department of National Defence, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, with strong support from the RCMP and the Department of Public Safety, have jointly pursued that longer-term objective of peace and stability by investing over $800 million in Sudan since 2006, focusing essentially on three key priorities.
The first is working with the Sudanese and international partners to contain violence and enhance security. We continue to deploy highly capable and experienced Canadian Forces personnel and civilian police officers to key training and military observation positions in the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, or UNMIS. Nearly 430 Canadian military and civilian peacekeepers have served with UNMIS since its inception. Canadian funding has played a key role in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, as well as in the support for community safety and arms control initiatives.
A second priority is reducing vulnerability and saving lives. Since January 2006, the Canadian International Development Agency has provided over $448 million in assistance to the people of Sudan, including $233 million for humanitarian relief throughout the country and for Sudanese refugees in Chad and $146 million for early recovery. For example, Canada is making significant contributions to the World Food Programme, which is feeding nearly 11 million Sudanese. Also, over $20 million has been spent to relieve vulnerable populations in Sudan from land mine and explosive remnants-of-war threats.
Finally, as part of its overall goal of supporting sustainable peace in Sudan, Canada continues to build longer-term stability and resilience in the country. For example, CIDA supports increasing subsistence agriculture production and access to basic services such as education and health care for children and youth. Canada's stabilization and reconstruction task force has been building the capacity of rule of law, police, and criminal justice systems in south Sudan and supporting work on land and property management issues. Canada has also been providing technical assistance to Sudan to look past the January referenda and the July 2011 end of the CPA.
Southern Sudan is already highly autonomous, and if the people of southern Sudan choose independence, very few additional powers will flow to Juba, the south's regional capital. Despite this autonomy, the Government of South Sudan still lacks many of the basic capacities needed to effectively meet the needs of the people of southern Sudan. Therefore, whether unity or independence is chosen, it is important that we build up the capacity to meet the needs of the people.
Now I will turn to some of the issues in the post-referendum period.
[Translation]
Neither the CPA nor Sudan's Interim National Constitution provide clear guidance on what happens after the referenda. No matter the outcome of the votes on January 9, there is an urgent need for the parties to reach agreements on such issues as the management and sharing of oil and other natural wealth, the border, debt, and the status of southerners in the north and northerners in the south. These are all highly sensitive issues that could reignite violence if left unresolved.
For the international community, new challenges and issues will also arise post-2011, including revising the mandate for the UNMIS.
Canada is working to support peace and stability in the post-referenda period. For example, Canada has provided technical support to the government of South Sudan referendum and post-2011 task force, a body that is enhancing the capacity of the government of South Sudan to prepare for subsequent developments.
Canada contributed studies on border management and citizenship, at the request of the parties. Canada has also provided to both parties an extensive library providing examples of how others have addressed similar issues in a constructive manner.
Canada is providing staff to the CPA's assessment and evaluation commission, which serves as the secretariat for the post-2011 negotiations. Canada continues to engage in diplomatic efforts to maintain coordinated and concerted international support to achieve progress in the talks.
[English]
I'd like to turn briefly to the situation in Darfur, if I may.
While the implementation of the CPA is a central concern here today, we cannot neglect Darfur. Canada continues to actively support, both diplomatically and financially, the AU-UN Joint Chief Mediator for Darfur. Canada has also systematically called on the Government of Sudan and armed groups in Darfur to take part in the peace process; refrain from targeting civilians; ensure the safety and security of humanitarian workers; ensure that perpetrators of human rights violations are held accountable; and provide full, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access to populations in need.
Canadian Forces and civilian police peacekeepers continue to be active in Darfur. Canada has funded training of and provided state-of-the-art armoured personnel carriers for African police units serving in UNAMID, the African Union/UN hybrid mission.
To conclude, Canadians and the Government of Canada both have a fervent desire to see a sustainable peace established in all regions of Sudan, including Darfur. The integrity and timely implementation of the CPA is a crucial step in fostering long-term stability. As such, Canada is working in a number of important ways to ensure that the upcoming referenda defined in the CPA are held in a credible and peaceful manner, in addition to supporting both parties to define mutually beneficial long-term arrangements. For a country with so much potential that has experienced so much suffering, we must remain committed to helping them find the complex, long-term solutions that will provide a brighter future.
[Translation]
Thank you very much. My colleagues and I would be happy to answer any questions committee members may have for us at this time.
[English]
It will be a pleasure for us to take any questions the committee may have.
Thank you, Chairman.
:
I want to thank you for the briefing, especially looking at the long-term, post referendum. I think that's really helpful to us.
I do have two quick questions. I spent a fair bit of time on the phone this weekend with people from Washington, people who have just returned as part of a Congressional delegation from that region. They had some interesting views. They believe that the referendum will go ahead and that the north will not cause great obstacles to that. There will be other issues around Abyei and other things, but around that, that's what they believe.
They seemed to have great concern that so much emphasis has gone into Juba and not into the regional areas. They say themselves that they have failed on that and that they need to get going with that. The Obama administration is now seized with this issue, and is seeking to move out more to the border areas as well.
Their concern is migration: what happens when a referendum is signed and people come out of Darfur, as well as other areas--the people who are trapped in the north as well.
They were wondering...because CIDA had involved itself a little bit with the Darfur exit coming out into south Sudan a couple of years ago, does Canada have a strategy as to how it might help the IOM with all of the people who are coming back? They fear there might, in the end, be two million, and it will overrun the services.
I would like to link that to a number of months ago when the International Crisis Group was here. They said their major concern was not north-south, it was south-south. Their concern was also with all the exiles and others coming back, that it would overrun these services and therefore exacerbate an already difficult situation.
I wonder if you have any views on what you've discussed there and if you have any plans, as the Americans had hoped, maybe, around the exiles and those who are returning.
Thank you for coming today.
Every year, I think, this has been an issue in the foreign affairs committee: a motion comes up, or a study, or a hope for travel; different things have caused us to take a look at this.
There's a lot of optimism in Juba. There's a lot of optimism in the south. There is all this great expectancy. But there's also remarkable.... Last year was the worst drought they'd ever seen. The harvest was one of the poorest ever.
I guess my question is on what both Mr. Rae and Mr. Dewar asked. First of all, there is the capacity of governance. This, to me, has to be.... I think the referendum, even though it's behind, is going to go. The north will probably do everything to disrupt it. They're going to question the validity of it. They're going to question the people who are taking part in the referendum. Right now they're probably denying that there's much chance that they're going to leave. I mean, they think they have it so good, I suppose. I don't know what the north is thinking, but they'll disrupt the process as it gets closer.
In the south--I don't know if it was in what you read or in another briefing--there is 85% illiteracy. In your talk, Ms. Stirk, you said that southern Sudan is already highly autonomous and that if the people of south Sudan choose independence, very few additional powers will flow to Juba. Could you enlarge on that statement? We would expect that if they choose to separate, we would hope that a lot of extra power and resources would flow into the south.
What would Canada's specific role be with governance, and what would Canada's continuing role, if any, be in the north? I mean governance to the south; how would we help a country with 85% illiteracy build capacity to govern another country that's going to bear the brunt of, not necessarily militarily attacks, but of attacks from many of the countries around, maybe even targeting those who are migrating back to the south? The people coming back and overflowing Juba will be a huge dynamic as well, and no extra powers will be given to Juba.