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# Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development

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EVIDENCE

**Tuesday, October 19, 2010**

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**Chair**

**Mr. Dean Allison**



## Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development

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• (1530)

[English]

**The Chair (Mr. Dean Allison (Niagara West—Glanbrook, CPC)):** I call the meeting to order. Pursuant to Standing Order 108 (2), we'll commence our study on the implications and the ramifications of the referendum in Sudan.

I want to thank our guests for being here today. They are all from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We have Douglas Proudfoot, who is the director of the Sudan task force. We have Jillian Stirk, who is the assistant deputy minister of the Europe, Eurasia, and Africa bureau. We also have Donald Bobiash, who is the director general of the Africa bureau.

Once again, thank you very much for taking time as we embark on two or three or four meetings on the subject of Sudan and the referendum that's coming up in January.

I don't know who will make the remarks, but I will turn it over to you to get started. You've been here before. We'll have you make your opening remarks, and then we'll go around the room and follow up with some questions.

Ms. Stirk, thank you very much for being here. I'm going to turn the floor over to you.

**Ms. Jillian Stirk (Assistant Deputy Minister, Europe, Eurasia and Africa Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade):** Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the committee as well for inviting my colleagues and being here today to talk about Sudan.

Let me begin with a few introductory remarks.

[Translation]

Sudan has been plagued by conflict throughout its recent history. The largest country in Africa, bordering on nine other countries, Sudan is richly endowed with natural resources; however, despite its recent oil-driven economic boom, Sudan ranked among the bottom 30 nations in the 2009 United Nations Human Development Report. Sudan is also host to the world's largest humanitarian operation and two substantial United Nations peacekeeping missions, which together form the largest single UN peacekeeping presence in the world. There are an estimated 5.2 million internally displaced persons throughout Sudan, including 2.7 million in Darfur, and some 430,000 Sudanese refugees in neighbouring states, with more than half of them in Chad.

Despite its enormous potential, Sudan has been locked in a cycle of conflict and under-development since independence in 1956.

Since 1956, two civil wars have devastated South Sudan, one has ended in the east, and the ongoing conflict in Darfur is now in its seventh year. Sudan's crises are a chronic source of instability, with regional implications, fueling the trade in light weapons, illicit smuggling, and cross-border conflict. Such instability perpetuates ongoing human rights abuses and human suffering in this region of the world.

[English]

Given the interconnected nature of the security, humanitarian and development challenges facing Sudan, Canada's response is a whole-of-government, whole-of-Sudan approach, aimed at promoting sustainable peace, development, and security throughout the country.

Both the humanitarian imperative and national security interests drive Canada's engagement in Sudan. Canada is pursuing a focused and principled engagement in Sudan based on fundamental values that underlie our foreign policy priorities—namely, democracy, freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.

But today we're here to talk about a critical turning point in the history of Sudan, the final phase of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and its consequences. On January 9, 2005, the CPA was signed by the largest rebel group in the south, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, or SPLM, and the ruling political party in the north, the National Congress Party. The CPA sets out an extremely ambitious number of complex power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and security provisions that were designed to transform Sudan and to make unity attractive before its end date of July 9, 2011.

Although the stated goal of the CPA is to make unity attractive, the agreement contains provision for a January 9th referendum on self-determination for the people of south Sudan and a parallel one for the region of Abyei, which will determine if the state will remain with the north or join south Sudan. These referenda are key elements of the CPA.

We cannot underestimate the challenges facing the holding of these referenda in a transparent and credible manner. Deep political differences and suspicions appear to be hampering progress in referenda preparations. As a result, preparations for the south Sudan referendum are far behind schedule and those for Abyei have not yet begun. The south Sudan referendum commission was only formed last month, and voter registration, originally scheduled to begin in August, will now start in mid-November. However, given the anticipation building towards the January 9, 2011, date among southern Sudanese, many fear that any delay in the holding of the referendum may lead to the outbreak of widespread violence and the collapse of the CPA.

All preparations for the Abyei referendum are currently on hold because the two parties to the CPA cannot agree on the formation of the Abyei referendum commission. At the heart of this impasse is a disagreement over whether a large Arab nomadic group aligned to the north, the Misseriya, can be considered residents of Abyei and allowed to cast a ballot. Whether Abyei will remain in the north or join the south is a highly sensitive issue in Sudan, given that it is a key oil-producing state, is home to prominent founding members of the SPLM, and was denied a similar referendum promised to it in a previous peace agreement.

But the overarching goal of Canada's whole-of-government engagement in Sudan is the promotion of sustainable peace. The government believes that the implementation of the CPA is critical to ensuring that peace. We also consider it essential that the 2011 referenda be credible processes, producing results that cannot be contested and do not in themselves give rise to conflict.

As a result, Canada has been playing a leading role in helping the parties prepare for the referenda. I'd just like to outline for you here a few examples of this work. Canada founded and co-chairs the Khartoum-based donor working group on the referenda and has hired a full-time coordinator to facilitate its work. Canada is funding efforts to upgrade the capacity of the south Sudan police service to provide security during the referendum campaign. We've made a \$7-million contribution to the UNDP referendum basket fund that will support activities necessary to hold the referenda, and Canada will be represented on the ground to observe the referenda. We are partnering with the Carter Center, through a \$2-million contribution, to observe the referenda themselves, and we are planning to deploy monitors with the EU monitoring mission as well.

In August this year we hosted a very productive referendum study tour in Canada for a joint delegation from the north and the south. We trust that the lessons learned from this trip will be applied by Sudanese counterparts as they organize the referenda. Our team of foreign policy and aid personnel, both here at headquarters and in south and north Sudan, have long undertaken diplomatic *démarches* with both parties and with members of the international community with influence in Khartoum in order to promote the holding of credible referenda.

● (1535)

Now I will turn to longer-term peace and stability issues.

Regardless of whether the people of Sudan ultimately choose unity or secession, Canada's main desire is for the maintenance of peace and stability in Sudan and the region. The Canadian International Development Agency, the Department of National Defence, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, with strong support from the RCMP and the Department of Public Safety, have jointly pursued that longer-term objective of peace and stability by investing over \$800 million in Sudan since 2006, focusing essentially on three key priorities.

The first is working with the Sudanese and international partners to contain violence and enhance security. We continue to deploy highly capable and experienced Canadian Forces personnel and civilian police officers to key training and military observation positions in the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, or UNMIS. Nearly 430 Canadian military and civilian peacekeepers have served

with UNMIS since its inception. Canadian funding has played a key role in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, as well as in the support for community safety and arms control initiatives.

A second priority is reducing vulnerability and saving lives. Since January 2006, the Canadian International Development Agency has provided over \$448 million in assistance to the people of Sudan, including \$233 million for humanitarian relief throughout the country and for Sudanese refugees in Chad and \$146 million for early recovery. For example, Canada is making significant contributions to the World Food Programme, which is feeding nearly 11 million Sudanese. Also, over \$20 million has been spent to relieve vulnerable populations in Sudan from land mine and explosive remnants-of-war threats.

Finally, as part of its overall goal of supporting sustainable peace in Sudan, Canada continues to build longer-term stability and resilience in the country. For example, CIDA supports increasing subsistence agriculture production and access to basic services such as education and health care for children and youth. Canada's stabilization and reconstruction task force has been building the capacity of rule of law, police, and criminal justice systems in south Sudan and supporting work on land and property management issues. Canada has also been providing technical assistance to Sudan to look past the January referenda and the July 2011 end of the CPA.

Southern Sudan is already highly autonomous, and if the people of southern Sudan choose independence, very few additional powers will flow to Juba, the south's regional capital. Despite this autonomy, the Government of South Sudan still lacks many of the basic capacities needed to effectively meet the needs of the people of southern Sudan. Therefore, whether unity or independence is chosen, it is important that we build up the capacity to meet the needs of the people.

Now I will turn to some of the issues in the post-referendum period.

● (1540)

[Translation]

Neither the CPA nor Sudan's Interim National Constitution provide clear guidance on what happens after the referenda. No matter the outcome of the votes on January 9, there is an urgent need for the parties to reach agreements on such issues as the management and sharing of oil and other natural wealth, the border, debt, and the status of southerners in the north and northerners in the south. These are all highly sensitive issues that could reignite violence if left unresolved.

For the international community, new challenges and issues will also arise post-2011, including revising the mandate for the UNMIS.

Canada is working to support peace and stability in the post-referenda period. For example, Canada has provided technical support to the government of South Sudan referendum and post-2011 task force, a body that is enhancing the capacity of the government of South Sudan to prepare for subsequent developments.

Canada contributed studies on border management and citizenship, at the request of the parties. Canada has also provided to both parties an extensive library providing examples of how others have addressed similar issues in a constructive manner.

Canada is providing staff to the CPA's assessment and evaluation commission, which serves as the secretariat for the post-2011 negotiations. Canada continues to engage in diplomatic efforts to maintain coordinated and concerted international support to achieve progress in the talks.

• (1545)

[English]

I'd like to turn briefly to the situation in Darfur, if I may.

While the implementation of the CPA is a central concern here today, we cannot neglect Darfur. Canada continues to actively support, both diplomatically and financially, the AU-UN Joint Chief Mediator for Darfur. Canada has also systematically called on the Government of Sudan and armed groups in Darfur to take part in the peace process; refrain from targeting civilians; ensure the safety and security of humanitarian workers; ensure that perpetrators of human rights violations are held accountable; and provide full, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access to populations in need.

Canadian Forces and civilian police peacekeepers continue to be active in Darfur. Canada has funded training of and provided state-of-the-art armoured personnel carriers for African police units serving in UNAMID, the African Union/UN hybrid mission.

To conclude, Canadians and the Government of Canada both have a fervent desire to see a sustainable peace established in all regions of Sudan, including Darfur. The integrity and timely implementation of the CPA is a crucial step in fostering long-term stability. As such, Canada is working in a number of important ways to ensure that the upcoming referenda defined in the CPA are held in a credible and peaceful manner, in addition to supporting both parties to define mutually beneficial long-term arrangements. For a country with so much potential that has experienced so much suffering, we must remain committed to helping them find the complex, long-term solutions that will provide a brighter future.

[Translation]

Thank you very much. My colleagues and I would be happy to answer any questions committee members may have for us at this time.

[English]

It will be a pleasure for us to take any questions the committee may have.

Thank you, Chairman.

**The Chair:** Thank you, Ms. Stirk.

We're going to start our first round of seven minutes with Dr. Patry and Mr. Pearson.

[Translation]

**Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.):** Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank our guests.

I just have one quick question, and then I'll turn it over to Mr. Pearson.

Sudan is one of the top three recipient countries of Canadian aid in the world. However, that aid, as you mentioned, doesn't really go to the south. It goes mainly to the vast Darfur region. For the January 9 referendum to be valid, the turnout will have to be 60%. Last week, there was a meeting in Libya, and Col. Gadhafi stated that Sudan's independence would spread like a sickness to other African countries, and that the continent needed foreign investment and stability. He added that with this precedent, investors will shy away from investing in Africa.

In Sudan, there are nine neighbouring countries. Will they accept a positive referendum result on the creation of a new country in southern Sudan? Will the other neighbouring countries accept the decision?

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** Thank you for your question.

[English]

There are a number of important issues that the honourable member has raised. In the first instance, I just would like to say that Canada's assistance has been directed all across Sudan, in all parts of the country, so I don't think we've tried to favour one region over another. But I think the honourable member makes a very valid point that the results of the referendum will be critical. In a sense, it's what happens in the aftermath. That's why we've been working so hard with all of the parties to encourage them to work out arrangements in advance to negotiate all of these issues related to resources, citizenship, sharing of debt, and these kinds of questions so that whatever the outcome of the referendum, these things can be managed in an organized way.

It would be very difficult to speculate on what the reactions of some of the neighbouring countries might be post-referendum, but certainly our sense is that clearly the neighbours are also concerned about the outcome and that they too will want to see solutions that contribute to peace and security in the region, rather than the opposite.

I don't know if my colleagues have anything to add to that.

• (1550)

[Translation]

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot (Director, Sudan Task Force, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade):** I can add a couple of words.

The referendum is part of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The countries in the region support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It's only natural for neighbouring countries to hope it succeeds. The goal of the agreement is unity.

At the same time, they have undertaken to respect the results of the democratic decision of the people of southern Sudan. That is where the international community—including Canada—must support the process for it to be credible and workable.

[English]

**The Chair:** Mr. Pearson.

**Mr. Glen Pearson (London North Centre, Lib.):** I want to thank you for the briefing, especially looking at the long-term, post referendum. I think that's really helpful to us.

I do have two quick questions. I spent a fair bit of time on the phone this weekend with people from Washington, people who have just returned as part of a Congressional delegation from that region. They had some interesting views. They believe that the referendum will go ahead and that the north will not cause great obstacles to that. There will be other issues around Abyei and other things, but around that, that's what they believe.

They seemed to have great concern that so much emphasis has gone into Juba and not into the regional areas. They say themselves that they have failed on that and that they need to get going with that. The Obama administration is now seized with this issue, and is seeking to move out more to the border areas as well.

Their concern is migration: what happens when a referendum is signed and people come out of Darfur, as well as other areas—the people who are trapped in the north as well.

They were wondering...because CIDA had involved itself a little bit with the Darfur exit coming out into south Sudan a couple of years ago, does Canada have a strategy as to how it might help the IOM with all of the people who are coming back? They fear there might, in the end, be two million, and it will overrun the services.

I would like to link that to a number of months ago when the International Crisis Group was here. They said their major concern was not north-south, it was south-south. Their concern was also with all the exiles and others coming back, that it would overrun these services and therefore exacerbate an already difficult situation.

I wonder if you have any views on what you've discussed there and if you have any plans, as the Americans had hoped, maybe, around the exiles and those who are returning.

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly share the view that we're very hopeful the referendum will proceed as planned. I think it's very important that all of us continue to deliver the message to the parties concerned that the referendum stay on track. I think that's very important in terms of contributing to stability.

In terms of the post-referendum issues, citizenship and provisions that are going to be put in place to hopefully prevent some of those movements of population are very important. This is one of the areas we've been trying to help the parties deal with in terms of preparation for that referendum, to try to address some of these issues before the referendum takes place and to minimize transfers of population.

I'm going to ask my colleagues whether they have any specific comments on what we might have been doing to help prepare for those eventualities.

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot:** Even assuming that the citizenship issue is resolved satisfactorily, there is a possibility there could be large movements of populations after the referendum, either from south to north or from north to south.

CIDA has had a number of programs dealing with the return of IDPs, and did particularly after 2005. I think they found that it was

more effective to address the kinds of services needed for returning IDPs at the community level rather than targeting IDPs specifically. The IDPs coming back, even if there were resettlement or reintegration packages aimed at those IDPs, were very often not resettling and were turning back to Khartoum or wherever they'd been, because the community in which they were supposed to be integrating simply wasn't ready. There was no employment; there weren't services and so forth. CIDA therefore, as part of its activities, is broadening that to a wider pool of public services, through the Basic Services Fund and other things.

I believe the member also asked about south-south violence. This has been a real problem, and it has been a problem throughout the conflict—the civil war and after. The year 2009, which was a year of peace, saw 2,500 people killed in southern Sudan in inter-ethnic violence. This year it's been somewhat better, but it's still disturbing.

This is one of the reasons we feel it's so important to build up the capacity of the southern Sudan police force through training, and to build up and support UNMIS in its stabilization law.

•(1555)

**The Chair:** Thank you.

We're out of time, but please go ahead and finish off.

**Mr. Donald Bobiash (Director General, Africa Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade):** I just wanted to add that within two weeks, my colleague Mr. Proudfoot and I will actually be travelling to Juba and the south, and we will be looking at these kinds of issues. We'll be discussing them with NGOs and we'll be visiting CIDA projects to bring us up to speed in regard to these sorts of questions on the ground.

**The Chair:** Thank you very much.

We're now going to move over to Mr. Dorion from the Bloc.

[Translation]

**Mr. Jean Dorion (Longueuil—Pierre-Boucher, BQ):** I'm going to ask a quick question and then turn the floor over to my colleague Madam Deschamps.

I always have the same question about Sudan. We know there has been a civil war in the south between the central government and the local organizations and population. We also know there is a civil war in Darfur and that the ethnic composition of the north is essentially Arab or Arab-speaking, and relatively white. It is black in the south, where there are Christians and animists. In the north, they are Muslim.

How is it that, in the various settlements that have been reached, Darfur has not come under a settlement providing for a referendum or possible secession? Is it because of the ethnic composition of the population, or religious factors? What's the difference between Darfur and South Sudan?

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As the member indicated, it's a very complex question, especially when it comes to ethnic composition and conflicts between various groups. If you don't mind, I'll switch to English to be more specific.

[English]

I think...not that there aren't serious tensions between Darfur and the central government as well, but rather that we have this Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the south. That has kind of allowed us to move on to this next step, which includes the referendum.

As it stands, the peace process under way with respect to Darfur has been aimed at resolving those tensions within the context of a united Sudan. But that's not to say that these tensions aren't serious, and of course we see a manifestation of that in the violence, the refugee movements, and so on that we have there.

Again, we're also following closely the peace process with respect to Darfur. We had a representative from the Department of Foreign Affairs participating in those talks just last week, so we follow those issues closely as well.

*Merci.*

**The Chair:** Madame Deschamps.

[Translation]

**Ms. Johanne Deschamps (Laurentides—Labelle, BQ):** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to come back to something Mr. Bobiash said a bit earlier. You indicated that you would soon be travelling to South Sudan to meet with NGOs and members of civil society.

Last week, the committee heard from a woman named Zaynab Elsawi, who described the situation to us. She represents a group of women from all over Sudan, north and south. According to Ms. Elsawi, they participated in the peace process. She told us that civil society was virtually ignored in the process leading up to the referendum.

What you're proposing to do—to go there soon and meet with members of civil society and NGOs—isn't it a bit late on the eve of a January referendum?

• (1600)

**Mr. Donald Bobiash:** This isn't the first time we've contacted NGOs and representatives of civil society in Sudan. The process may not get much coverage, but we will be keeping in touch with these representatives in the weeks to come.

**Ms. Johanne Deschamps:** On another occasion, Ms. Elsawi made a speech, and some participants let it be known that they were getting very little in the way of diplomatic services from the Canadian embassy, given the lack of staff there.

In your presentation, you say that Canada continues to engage in diplomatic efforts to maintain coordinated and concerted international support. Could you give us some examples of how that is being done on the ground?

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot:** Canada's diplomatic engagement is multi-faceted: in Sudan, obviously, through our embassy's interaction with Sudanese authorities in Khartoum, as well as with southern Sudanese authorities in Darfur. It is an ongoing effort. The political section in Khartoum and officials in Darfur are in constant contact with local authorities and NGOs, civil society and other political actors.

But our diplomatic efforts are not confined to Sudan itself. The situation in Sudan is a major international issue. So we are focusing our efforts on international forums, like the United Nations Human Rights Council, but also on our interaction with other countries that have some influence in Sudan or that are stakeholders, and on our contacts with rebel groups in Darfur, and there is our participation in the Doha peace process, the Darfur peace process.

I should also mention an outreach effort with the Sudanese community in Canada. A number of meetings in Toronto, Winnipeg, Calgary and elsewhere, where the Sudanese and Sudanese Canadian communities are concentrated, led to a conference in Winnipeg last month to create a dialogue with Canadians of Sudanese origin, who have very relevant opinions.

[English]

**The Chair:** Thank you very much. That's all the time. We'll try to get back for another round.

Mr. Lunney, sir.

**Mr. James Lunney (Nanaimo—Alberni, CPC):** The first question I had was just a general one, about the populations there. What is the population of Juba, the capital, for example? Do you have any idea of how many people we are talking about in Juba?

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot:** There aren't very good figures, but the best guess we're hearing is about half a million. It doesn't look like a city of half a million; its infrastructure is very rudimentary.

**Mr. James Lunney:** So that's sort of a concern about the whole question. When there are so many things that are not yet agreed upon between north and south—about citizenship, about borders, about a whole range of issues there—should the referendum actually go ahead, when those questions are unsettled?

I hear the message that we're all staying positive and that it should go ahead. But how is it going to work out, if there's no agreement on these things? It will be a sort of free-for-all of negotiation afterwards, will it not?

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** Thank you, Chairman.

Given the extraordinary efforts that were put into developing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and the fact that the referendum was a central part of that peace agreement, to question whether or not it should proceed at this stage would have quite a destabilizing effect on the overall situation on the ground. South Sudan has gained a great deal of autonomy during this period while the peace agreement has been in effect, and they have begun to establish institutions. In fact many people believe that even if the referendum were to come out in favour of independence for south Sudan, the powers flowing to south Sudan post-referendum would not be significantly greater than they are today. So some of this work is already under way.

The honourable member is quite right that the capacity in both south Sudan and Sudan writ large is quite limited. As you may recall from the beginning of my statement, I emphasized how this is a country that has been rocked by violence and instability for a number of years. There is very basic infrastructure, and whatever the results of the referendum, the road ahead is not likely to be easy or straightforward and of course will require significant support from the international community. But I think to question the validity of the referendum at this stage would be not helpful in terms of the stability of the region.

• (1605)

**Mr. James Lunney:** Yes. I guess the question was more about the governance capacity. I think I saw a remark go by that said there are only 100 kilometres of paved roads. We're talking about a region with very limited capacity, I gather. Some members here have actually been in Sudan. We haven't all had that privilege. I'm sure it would help us; you're going to be there shortly—members at the end of table—within a short time.

Well, look, let me take it another way. We know that in the north, in Khartoum, we have a leader against whom charges have been laid from the International Criminal Court, or at least there's a warrant, I guess, for his arrest. It hasn't seemed to impede his international travel, at least; it seems he's been still moving.

What is your take on how he and the regime in Khartoum are going to react to a successful referendum? Are they in survival mode right now politically? Do you think they're willing? We heard a remark about the Americans. Is it your assessment that the Khartoum regime is willing to peacefully accept a withdrawal, or a successful referendum, if it takes place?

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** Thank you, Chairman.

It's difficult to speculate about what the reaction of the government in Sudan will be to the results of the referendum. We're encouraged by the fact that some interlocutors have indicated that they will respect the results of the referendum. That's what we've been focused on: encouraging both sides to stick to the terms of the CPA to carry out the referendum.

We've certainly been encouraging the Government of Sudan to avoid any actions that would predetermine the outcome of that referendum, to avoid a rhetoric that is inflammatory or that is not helpful in terms of demonstrating their commitment. To be quite honest, we've seen mixed messages from the governments of Sudan about how they propose to deal with the results, but the messages we've been passing to them have been very clear: that we expect that they will abide by the terms of the CPA and the results of the referendum.

**Mr. James Lunney:** I wanted to say, before a final question, that we appreciate that the Government of Canada has invested a lot of time, resources, and money in trying to help set the proper stage for these events through governance capacity. Since 2006 I think we've made over \$1 billion in investments down there in the region.

But let me take it another way, with a final question on Darfur. I noticed that there was an article in *The New York Times* not long ago—I think it was in August 2010—that noted the increase of violence in Darfur. Is there a sense that the regime in Khartoum is trying to really soften up resistance in Darfur so that they don't get ideas about

being the next to try to separate? Or is it that they're trying to suppress what might be a more problematic region in a smaller country afterwards?

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** I think it's difficult to speculate about what exactly the motives are of the Government of Sudan at this stage, but one of the reasons I mentioned Darfur in my opening statement, although we are focused largely on the referendum process here, was that I think it's very important that the international community keep its eye on what is happening in Darfur. The situation there is of serious concern. We've been concerned by some of the recent developments, over the course of the past year, and we have certainly underlined those concerns to the government. Of course, we've had people present there, both providing humanitarian relief and through the peacekeeping operations.

Again, I think it's very important that the international community continue to remind the Government of Sudan about its obligations with respect to Darfur. Whether there or in south Sudan, there is a linkage between peace and stability. Instability in one region is bound to have an impact on the other.

• (1610)

**The Chair:** Thank you very much, Mr. Lunney.

I'm going to mix up the rotation a bit. Mr. Dewar will come back for his seven minutes, but what I'm going to do is move to Mr. Rae for five minutes and come back over to the other side. We'll get to Mr. Dewar when he comes back.

**Hon. Bob Rae (Toronto Centre, Lib.):** I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to the members of the department.

I'll just say that it appears there's a potential for a whole variety of serious challenges: in the north, in Darfur, in the east, between the north and the south, and within the south. This perhaps is not an easy question for you to answer, but is this now a priority for the department and for CIDA in terms of looking at what the potential risks are? Creation of refugees, potential for violence: the issues are really quite serious when you look at the potential challenges going forward.

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** Yes, I would agree that we are at a critical point in terms of the situation in Sudan. I perhaps alluded to that in my statement. A number of elements are clearly of concern, whether they're around the referendum process, or relations between the north and south, or the situation in Darfur.

One of the indications of the seriousness with which the government takes this issue is the fact that we have three-year funding for our work on Sudan. We continue to have a significant degree of involvement both on the development side and on the diplomatic side, in terms of support for both the peacekeeping operations for the police work that's going on and the kinds of investments we're making around the referendum. The fact that we do have funding for our efforts confirmed for between now and 2013 is perhaps an indication of the seriousness with which we view this.



**Hon. Bob Rae:** Would the funding include real assistance with respect to the governance issues in the south? One of the things we've heard a lot about—I think Mr. Proudfoot referred to it, and we've certainly been reading a lot about it in our background work—is the degree of inter-ethnic violence and inter-tribal violence in the south, the regional issues in the south, and the need to clearly look at, dare I say it, federal arrangements or some other kinds of arrangements that will look at devolution. I mean, Kenya has just been through a long process looking at devolution there. It seems to be a concept that's gaining a lot of support within a number of countries in the region.

Maybe that's a role that Canada could contribute to in looking to that. I think we're really going to have a governance, state stability issue in the south that's going to emerge very quickly as we go forward.

Is that a fair comment? Because it looks like it.

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** I think it is a fair comment. We're certainly very concerned about the realities on the ground in the south, the potential for instability.

Maybe my colleague would like to say a few more things about the specifics.

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot:** First, I'd note that the potential is already there. Whether the south chooses unity or independence, the governance issues will be there regardless.

And that's why, for some time, both CIDA and START, within DFAIT, have been investing a fair amount in the governance area. It's the third area of concentration for CIDA, supporting the Government of Southern Sudan's indigenous governance capacity through a series of capacity-building programs. And likewise for START in areas such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, community security, and arms control, and the like.

• (1615)

**Hon. Bob Rae:** This is kind of a stupid question, but have we got enough money in the bank to deal with the potential for a real crisis in the winter of 2011? Let's say you have a couple of million people moving from one part of the country to another, and several issues have not been resolved. It seems to me you've got a lot of potential for real trouble if we don't begin to anticipate. It's not just us; it's the AU and it's everybody else in the region that has to come to grips with it.

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** If I may, Chairman, I think certainly the government is seized of the seriousness of the situation, of the potential for instability. At this juncture we're certainly very focused on trying to support the processes that are in place.

I think the international community is also very much seized of the issue. It certainly has been a topic for discussion in a number of different international forums. Certainly in the bilateral consultations that I have with a whole range of countries on varied issues, Sudan is often one of those issues of common concern that we raise.

My own personal sense, if I may, is that the international community is seized of this issue and that, as Canada, we stand ready to support, in whatever way we can, some of those things Mr. Proudfoot has talked about.

And in terms of predicting what the outcome might be, I think we have to wait and see what the results of the referendum are and then be ready to respond as required.

**The Chair:** Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Rae.

We're going to move over to Mr. Van Kesteren for five minutes.

**Mr. Dave Van Kesteren (Chatham-Kent—Essex, CPC):** Chair, I will be splitting some of my time with Ms. Brown.

I'm just going to ask you a couple of bullet questions. A couple of things came to mind. You talked about the Sudanese debt. Do you know what the total national debt of Sudan is at this point?

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** I don't. I don't know if my colleagues do.

Do you know the total debt of Sudan...?

My colleague says he believes it's somewhere around \$30 billion. It's very large.

**Mr. Dave Van Kesteren:** Is that going to be split evenly between the south and the north?

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** This is one of the issues that is under negotiation, and it will, of course, be a very sensitive issue.

**Mr. Dave Van Kesteren:** You talked about some of the work you did in disarming some of the rebels and such. Was most of that done in the south or in the north?

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** It was both, I believe.

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot:** The DDR programs are in both the north and the south, because the combat during the civil war was in both the north and the south. There are groups both in southern Sudan and the border areas...

**Mr. Dave Van Kesteren:** Obviously they're going to need policing. They're going to need an army. Have you thought about those things? Do we have in place something to assist them with that?

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot:** The Government of Southern Sudan has an army, the SPLA. Canada is not providing support to either army, either north or south.

**Mr. Dave Van Kesteren:** You talked also about outside forces. Are you concerned about China's influence on the region in the north—especially, I should say, specifically with respect to the oil?

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** China has been an important investor in Sudan, and like other members of the international community, we hope that they will play a constructive role in whatever peace process emerges.

**Mr. Dave Van Kesteren:** Thank you.

Ms. Brown.

**Ms. Lois Brown (Newmarket—Aurora, CPC):** Thank you, Mr. Van Kesteren, and thank you, Mr. Chair.

I have two what may seem unrelated questions, but I think they wrap into each other.

First of all, how porous are the other borders around Sudan? Nine countries are touched on.

Second, when I was in Benin just recently, about a month ago, we had a conversation with their elections process agency. I asked them what form of identification they used for their election process. They really don't have one. Anybody who contributes a list of names, they go on the election list.

My question was, "How do you know whether people have voted in one jurisdiction or another; do you keep a record?" Well, they don't really know. They don't have that sophisticated a system yet, nor do they register births, so they don't have either a national identity card or a birth registration card, because they're not sure if babies are going to live to their fifth year. We're working hard to combat that.

When I was also in Zambia last year, they told us that Elections Canada was working with their election process to build capacity in the country and to ensure that fair and open and transparent elections took place. Are we providing that same kind of support in Sudan? Is that something we're moving towards? I know that you said here that the preparations for the south Sudan referendum are far behind schedule. Is that an area where Canada can really help and really help build capacity?

• (1620)

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** Thank you, Chairman, and thanks to the member for, I think, some important questions.

First of all, I'll touch on the border, then I think my colleague would like to add to that.

These borders are porous, both between north and south Sudan and with the neighbours as well. This is a reality in much of Africa, I would say. In some cases, the notion of citizenship is also much looser than we might think of here in Canada.

I think I pointed out that with respect to the referendum in Abyei, this issue of registration for voting and who is entitled to vote and citizenship has been quite an issue, because many of these people are nomadic. So the question of residency is an issue as well.

Canada has been involved in supporting preparations for the referendum. The intention is that we would participate in an EU-led monitoring mission that would oversee the referendum.

Perhaps my colleagues would like to add just a little bit more information.

**Mr. Donald Bobiash:** I just wanted to give a little update on the border situation.

As the ADM pointed out, the borders of Sudan are very porous, and this is a major issue going forward. However, there are some positive developments in the case of Chad, which I think has one of the longest borders with Sudan. About six months ago, there was a rapprochement between the governments of Chad and Sudan for the first time in probably many decades. This peace agreement I think has helped stabilize the flow of refugees across that border.

I just came back from Eritrea about 10 days ago. This is quite interesting: there are now refugees flowing from Eritrea into Sudan at the pace of a few hundred a day. So conditions must be pretty bad if people are moving to Sudan as a place of refuge. This will be something interesting to watch over the next few months.

There are very interesting developments in the Central African Republic. The LRA, the Lord's Resistance Army, which actually was started in Uganda, has spilled over to Sudan and to the Central African Republic. That's an example of how these guerrilla movements spill over from one country to another.

But the short answer is that, yes, porous borders remain a problem and a concern.

**The Chair:** Thank you very much.

We're going to move back. Mr. Dewar is back for seven minutes. I think there are still a couple of questions that other people want to ask as well.

**Mr. Paul Dewar (Ottawa Centre, NDP):** Thank you, Mr. Chair, for your accommodation.

Thank you to our guests today.

I just had a couple of questions around the monitoring of the referendum. I want to be clear here. The Carter Center, I am aware, in the EU is doing the monitoring. So essentially, we're going to provide funding for that as well as personnel, is that correct? Maybe you could help us. How many people are we looking at sending and about how much money are we going to be investing?

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot:** For the Carter Center, it will be \$2 million in cash. I don't know how many Canadians will be part of that exercise. There are a few who've gone already as long-term monitors who are going to be monitoring the registration as well as the actual...but as to what it will be, I don't know exactly.

**Mr. Paul Dewar:** No, you're in the planning of that, I imagine.

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot:** In case of the EU, it will probably be around six .

**Mr. Paul Dewar:** Six?

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot:** Six in the EU mission. And the reason we're teaming up with the Carter Center as well is that we felt that we wanted to have a bigger presence than was allowable simply through the EU mission. We've partnered with the Carter Center for that reason.

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** And if I may add, Mr. Chairman, in addition, we have made a significant contribution to the UNDP basket fund of approximately \$7.1 million in preparation for the referendum.

**Mr. Paul Dewar:** Which is a good segue, through you, Mr. Chair, to how much we're looking at investing in total for the pre-referendum period and during the referendum.

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** Well, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I think we've indicated the amounts that we've contributed specifically to activities around the referendum. Of course, there is a whole range of support that we're providing that I think contributes to stability around the referendum, whether it's support for policing or indeed some of the support for issues around citizenship or constitutional issues.

**Mr. Paul Dewar:** So it's not one envelope, in other words.

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** Yes.

**Mr. Paul Dewar:** Fair enough.

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** It's very difficult to kind of put a figure on it.

•(1625)

**Mr. Paul Dewar:** That's a fair point.

I think most people would agree that the scenario of having separation is the most likely one. I'm hoping that what my colleague Mr. Pearson heard is correct, that the north will allow it to go ahead.

That said, I have some concerns that this might not happen. And I guess you hope for the best and plan for the worst. So in that, I'm wondering if we've looked at scenarios like that—in other words, that the north either contests or interrupts or disrupts the referendum. I'm wondering what we're doing about that. That's the first question, then, on a contingency plan, if you will.

Secondly, how much are we looking to invest in post-referendum independent south Sudan? Or have we gotten to that point yet?

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** First of all, our objective is to impress on the south Sudan government the need to proceed with the referendum. As I think I mentioned before, I think it's quite important that the international community speak with one voice on that score—

**Mr. Paul Dewar:** I agree.

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** —and that we continue to press them to meet their obligations in that respect.

That said, we recognize that there are challenges. While I understand that it's important to recognize what is, in fact, happening on the ground, I think that perhaps for me to speculate about delay of a referendum is not necessarily helpful in terms of keeping our focus on the objective.

Certainly, I think any signals that the Sudanese might get that this is somehow one of the options out there can only contribute to an increase in the tension on the ground.

**Mr. Paul Dewar:** Maybe I can just say that I'm sure it's something that is being looked at and considered as opposed to something that is...well, being planned for.

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** I think we always try to look at all the options and consider what the best response might be.

**Mr. Paul Dewar:** With reference to Abyei, there is some concern around what I'm going to call a "proxy" inducement of the Misseriya peoples into Abyei that is conflating the real number of citizens in Abyei, which will, of course, benefit the north. I guess this is the hot spot right now. Do we have any recent information on what's happening there in terms of migration into Abyei, particularly of this nomadic tribe, and is there anything new you can tell us about that?

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot:** I'll answer this question in two parts. One is on the process of negotiation between north and south over Abyei. This enclave has been subject to an international law case in the Hague that in effect awarded, for the interim period, most of Abyei to the south, but the ultimate status of it will be determined in the referendum.

Unlike the southern Sudan referendum, for which preparations are under way, even if behind schedule, preparations have not begun for the Abyei referendum. It's because of this issue of north and south not being in agreement on voter eligibility. Negotiations have taken place in several rounds, one near New York City two weeks ago, and then in Addis Ababa about a week ago. Another meeting is supposed to take place in Addis Ababa. Up until now they have not been

successful, so there's a deadlock, which means there's a stalemate. Meanwhile, tensions are mounting. There was a serious shooting incident a couple of days ago.

The status of the Misseriya, this nomadic tribe, is perhaps the biggest issue at play. The settled population are southern-identified. They're the Dinka. The Misseriya, which have always migrated in and out of Abyei, are northern-identified and Arab-speaking. The question is, how many of them can be considered residents of Abyei for voting purposes? They simply haven't come to a conclusion on this, and it becomes extremely sensitive and perhaps inflammatory.

•(1630)

**Mr. Paul Dewar:** Your ear is to the ground on this.

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot:** Yes.

**Mr. Paul Dewar:** I appreciate that.

Thank you.

**The Chair:** Thanks, Mr. Dewar.

We're going to now move to Mr. Sorenson.

**Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, CPC):** Thanks.

Thank you for coming today.

Every year, I think, this has been an issue in the foreign affairs committee: a motion comes up, or a study, or a hope for travel; different things have caused us to take a look at this.

There's a lot of optimism in Juba. There's a lot of optimism in the south. There is all this great expectancy. But there's also remarkable.... Last year was the worst drought they'd ever seen. The harvest was one of the poorest ever.

I guess my question is on what both Mr. Rae and Mr. Dewar asked. First of all, there is the capacity of governance. This, to me, has to be.... I think the referendum, even though it's behind, is going to go. The north will probably do everything to disrupt it. They're going to question the validity of it. They're going to question the people who are taking part in the referendum. Right now they're probably denying that there's much chance that they're going to leave. I mean, they think they have it so good, I suppose. I don't know what the north is thinking, but they'll disrupt the process as it gets closer.

In the south—I don't know if it was in what you read or in another briefing—there is 85% illiteracy. In your talk, Ms. Stirk, you said that southern Sudan is already highly autonomous and that if the people of south Sudan choose independence, very few additional powers will flow to Juba. Could you enlarge on that statement? We would expect that if they choose to separate, we would hope that a lot of extra power and resources would flow into the south.

What would Canada's specific role be with governance, and what would Canada's continuing role, if any, be in the north? I mean governance to the south; how would we help a country with 85% illiteracy build capacity to govern another country that's going to bear the brunt of, not necessarily military attacks, but of attacks from many of the countries around, maybe even targeting those who are migrating back to the south? The people coming back and overflowing Juba will be a huge dynamic as well, and no extra powers will be given to Juba.

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** That's a complex question, but let me try to give you some of the answers from our perspective. Perhaps I'll ask my colleagues to join in as well.

When I say that, post-referendum, if the south chooses to secede, there would not be significant new powers, what I'm really saying is there is a great deal of autonomy already. Already the government of south Sudan region are...or have responsibility for a whole range of governance issues. That's not to say that the governance is necessarily very well developed.

So these are areas where Canada is already providing support, in terms of helping them build capacity to deal with policing and with all of the tools of government.

In terms of post-referendum, my expectation is that the Government of Canada would continue to provide humanitarian assistance, capacity-building, and security assistance right across, both in Sudan as it is today and in any other new entity. We would not focus on one necessarily to the detriment of the other. We have programs right across the country now, and I would expect that those would continue.

But the honourable member is quite right; the level of capacity is quite limited and will require, I think, considerable resources from the international community. Indeed that's already happening, and I would expect that there will be more support required, particularly as they try to negotiate some of these issues like resource sharing, or debt, or citizenship. That may be perhaps a new area of focus post-referendum.

•(1635)

**Mr. Kevin Sorenson:** Is there a government in waiting? Do we have a group of people that we—

**Hon. Bob Rae:** Kevin, it's over here.

**Voices:** Oh, oh!

**Mr. Kevin Sorenson:** Yes, well, I mean one where there's some hope of actually being able to succeed. We tried that, and that didn't work.

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** I think I'd better be careful how I answer this question.

Yes, sir, there is a government in south Sudan, and indeed they have representative offices around the world as well, already. They are quite active in the international community. In some respects, their collaboration with the Government of Sudan is quite well advanced. So it would not be a question of starting from the bottom up.

**Mr. Kevin Sorenson:** I have just one other very quick question.

**The Chair:** Yes, very quick.

**Mr. Kevin Sorenson:** Very quick.

We're all optimistic with the referendum. You know, it's something that's...or it's one of these benchmarks, at least, where here we have a referendum—even though we may be behind and even though there are lots of issues around there.

But are you really optimistic about the success?

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** That's a difficult question, Mr. Chairman.

I think we remain very hopeful that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is the best way forward, and that includes the referendum. I think we're also very realistic that, whatever the outcome of the referendum, there will be enormous challenges that the international community will need to respond to.

So I wouldn't want to minimize our concerns about whatever the post-referendum scenario might be.

**The Chair:** Okay.

I know that Mr. Pearson wanted to ask a quick question.

Did the Bloc have any more questions at all?

Let's just try to get them all in. I'll go with Mr. Pearson if there are a couple of quick ones, then we can wrap it up.

Mr. Pearson.

**Mr. Glen Pearson:** Thank you, Chair. I appreciate your leniency.

I have just a quick question on a particular situation. Mr. Proudfoot and I have already discussed this, going back a few months.

CIDA had funded an IOM project in the area close to southeast Darfur, in which they came out of Darfur. Many people were Dinka and Nuer and others who'd been up there during the wars. There are a few hundred thousand of them who ended up coming down into that region. The IOM had applied for funding. It received \$3 million of CIDA funding to help so that the local communities would not be overrun. That was a very successful program. I was there and saw it myself, and I appreciate what the government did on that.

The IOM—because more are now coming in, and way more are expected to come in as a result of the referendum—applied for a second round of funding to expand those services and were turned down by CIDA just a short while ago.

Now, I'm not asking you to comment on that particular situation. I realize you might not know. I would like to know how you arrive at that decision as departments. Because it seems to me what the Americans have been saying, and what many have been saying, is that will be a key area in which this migration of humanity will come down. I would just like to know how you as a department, working with CIDA and your counterparts there, arrive at a decision like that. Do you meet with all the different departments to talk about it?

I'm just looking for some clarification. I can't figure out why it was turned down.

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** I don't think we would be in a position to comment on a decision that was taken by CIDA. I'd certainly be happy to pass that question on and see if we can get you a little more clarification.

**Mr. Glen Pearson:** Do you have group meetings together?

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** We certainly work very closely on a whole range of policy issues with CIDA, the Department of National Defence, the RCMP, and Public Safety. This is very much a whole-of-government approach to Sudan, so we have very good collaboration.

I don't think it would be proper for me to comment on a CIDA funding decision, but I'd certainly be happy to pass the question on.

**Mr. Glen Pearson:** I understand.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

**The Chair:** Monsieur Dorion.

[Translation]

**Mr. Jean Dorion:** I'd like to come back to the issue of borders, not Sudan's external borders, but the internal ones. We know that they are still disputing them.

Have the parties given a clear idea of the border they hope to achieve? Has the central government, in particular, stated what principles its decision on the border between the two states will be based on? Are the criteria ethnic, economic, historical or something else? What kind of issues can we expect on that score?

• (1640)

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot:** The north-south border was established in 1956, but the border line has not been demarcated. Over the course of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, both parties have been working on this issue. To date, they have demarcated 80% of the border. The remaining 20% is the problem area where there are populations on both sides of the border. The work is in progress. We have encouraged the parties to complete this work before the referendum, because the part of the border that remains to be defined could clearly cause conflict. And yes, there are ethnic, historical and geographical criteria that enter into the border definition.

**Mr. Jean Dorion:** Thank you.

**Ms. Johanne Deschamps:** Do I have time for a question?

[English]

**The Chair:** Go ahead.

[Translation]

**Ms. Johanne Deschamps:** Knowing as we do that everything is more centralized around Khartoum, in terms of development assistance, do you have a very different strategy as between the north and the south, or is it one strategy for the entire country?

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot:** The strategy is geared to the local situation. We have a cross-country approach to Sudan, which doesn't mean that we have projects in each state, but we have decided not to focus on Darfur or the south or the centre.

In Darfur, most of the programming is humanitarian, given the current situation, whereas in the south, it's more a matter of postwar reconstruction. So the strategy is geared to the current situation.

[English]

**The Chair:** Thank you.

Does anyone have any further questions?

Go ahead, Mr. Dewar.

**Mr. Paul Dewar:** I have a couple of quick questions, but a comment first.

I want to underline the work that had been done with training women in security. I think we should highlight that as something that was successful. Having met with some of the policewomen who were involved in that, I think it's a great model for Canada to export, not just to other parts of Africa, obviously, but also globally. This is something that members should look into if they don't know, and it was under...with this government.

Have you heard any concerns—I don't want a reaction, because I understand where you were situated—about UDI, unilateral declaration of independence? I heard about that from someone recently, a Canadian who is plugged in there. That scenario would be of concern, because it would say that the trust has been broken between the south and the north. I just want to know if you've heard that.

Second, the protection of minorities in the north has been a problem before. Has there been any planning or consideration for protection of minorities in the north following the referendum—or actually just any protection of minorities in the north, period?

**Ms. Jillian Stirk:** The honourable member is right, I think, that there is a lot of rumour right now, a lot of speculation, about various outcomes. We see a lot of commentary in the press. We certainly hear a lot of different theories from some of our sources as well. But as I said, I think that just as a decision to postpone the referendum would be destabilizing, likewise any kind of unilateral declaration would also be extremely destabilizing. That's one of the reasons why we're remaining so focused on encouraging the parties to stick to the agreement.

If I may, the honourable member talked about building trust between the parties, and that's really what is at the foundation of all of this, trying to use the CPA to keep them on track and to use the kinds of discussions and negotiations that are going on around post-referendum issues, whether it's citizenship or debt or so on, to build that level of trust so that ultimately they can reach agreement on some of these important issues.

On minorities in the north, perhaps I'll ask one of my colleagues if he might like to comment.

• (1645)

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot:** There are many minorities in the north. Sudan is a very diverse country. In our dealings with the Government of Sudan, we put a premium on human rights. We keep stressing to them, through programming but also through our dialogue with them, that a *sine qua non* for a better relationship with Canada is an improved human rights record. And obviously, the treatment of minorities in northern Sudan is an important part of that.

We're also working with some of the civil society groups to foster more democratic space.

**Mr. Paul Dewar:** Okay. I appreciate that.

**The Chair:** Before we go in camera to look at committee business, I have a question.

You gentlemen said you're heading over to Sudan in a couple of weeks. What's the timeframe? Is it the first part of November?

I guess my question is whether you'd be willing to come back to committee after you go there.

To committee members, would you want them to come back or perhaps to submit something? I mean, it would make sense, since we've been talking about that.

So would you be free to come back after break week, after the Remembrance Day week? Are you going before then or after the 11th?

I'm simply trying to get a sense of timing.

**Mr. Douglas Scott Proudfoot:** For the most part, it's during that week. We'll be back the week after the break week.

**The Chair:** Okay, so you'll be around that week.

To the committee, would that make sense?

**Some hon. members:** Agreed.

**The Chair:** Okay.

We'd appreciate hearing how you're making out, since we're committing a few meetings to it right now.

We'll work that into the schedule, if that's all right with everybody.

Again, thank you to our guests for taking the time to be here.

*[Proceedings continue in camera]*

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