INST Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE L'INDUSTRIE, DES SCIENCES ET DE LA TECHNOLOGIE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, April 24, 2001

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[English]

The Chair (Ms. Susan Whelan (Essex, Lib.)): I'm going to call the meeting to order.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the committee proceeds to the statutory review of the Lobbyists Registration Act.

We're very pleased to have with us today three witnesses. We have, from ARC Publications, John Chenier, who's editor and publisher. From Alternatives North, we have Ms. Suzette Montreuil, the coordinator. And as an individual, we have Mr. Sean Moore, public policy and public affairs adviser, Gowling Lafleur Henderson.

What I would propose is for everyone to make their opening statement and then we'll move to questions together. If the question is not directed to you, but you have something you wish to add, just try to indicate, and we'll try to ensure that everyone has a chance to participate.

I would propose we begin in the order you're listed, unless you have a different idea. So we'll begin with you, Mr. Chenier.

Mr. John Chenier (Editor and Publisher, ARC Publications): Thank you, Madam Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me here today to address this issue.

I will start off by asking, what is the role of the Lobbyists Registration Act? What purposes does it serve and how well does it serve these? It seems to me that there are two streams in a review of the lobbyist legislation. The first, more narrow, stream deals with the mechanics of the act itself. Is the legislation functioning as intended? Is it bringing to light all the activity legislators thought it would? What is the degree of compliance? What problems, if any, are there in wording or enforcement? Have loopholes emerged that seem to threaten the integrity or the effectiveness of the act?

The second and broader stream examines the reasons why we have the act in the first instance, namely, maintaining public confidence in the integrity and workings of government. It deals with questions such as whether the Lobbyists Registration Act enhances public confidence in the decision-making process. How does it fit in with other ethical concerns of fairness, objectivity, prudence, and probity? How does it relate to other acts, such as post-employment guidelines or conflict of interest?

Let me speak to the narrow issue first, since that seems to be the mandate of the committee, as communicated by Mr. Tobin's letter of March 9. When I look at the legislation in various jurisdictions, where there is such legislation, it seems there are several types. One type attempts to identify the major government relations people and the lobby campaigns under way. More recently, these kinds of legislation involve a component to identify the expenditures involved in lobby campaigns in order to provide some measure of intensity of the campaign, as well as who is involved.

Other types of legislation seek to capture all efforts to influence public policy by requiring the registration of all lobbyists and all lobbying activity. Various logs usually exist and form an essential part of this legislation. I would place our current laws closer to the first kind, as an attempt to identify the major players in government relations and the companies they represent. It should in no way be assumed that the current act captures all the lobbying activity that takes place. Without the benefit of research, we have no way of concluding, as per Minister Tobin's letter, what the level of compliance actually is with the act.

As an aside, in the parliamentary reform vein, it was nice when the American Senate decided to examine its lobbyist legislation. It could turn to the GAO and ask them to undertake a six-month study of what was the compliance and what were the problems out there with the legislation before moving forward.

On the matter of compliance, however, you have the testimony of two previous witnesses. After 11 years, we seem to have a law that is neither enforceable nor for that matter enforced. Previous efforts to enforce the act have come up against time limitations in the statute—Jack Horner, for example, in the Air Canada case because of a six-month provision. Current cases apparently would have trouble because of the wording of the legislation.

I note the views expressed by the ethics counsellor, who said that although the current law uses a definition of lobbying very similar, if not exact, to that of Ontario, most jurisdictions in the U.S., and Nova Scotia's proposed lobby legislation—that is, communicate with an attempt to influence—it is considered by justice lawyers as not enforceable.

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With respect to enforcement, I refer you to the testimony of the lobbyist registrar before this committee on the same day. According to her testimony, those who choose not to register but whose activities, through the vigilance of public servants, are brought to her attention need only profess their ignorance to the registrar and belatedly submit a registration to escape sanctions.

I was surprised, to be honest, since I was in the room that day, that no members asked the registrar the number of times this has occurred or whether she felt these were sufficient remedies under the circumstances.

Frankly, I find it very difficult to imagine how anyone who can make a living selling his or her expertise in government relations can be ignorant of a statute—a highly visible one at that—that has been in effect for 12 years.

With respect to Minister Tobin's specific suggestions, I offer the following. In my opinion, establishing the same reporting rules as organizational lobbyists for corporations would be a mistake. Organizations—typically associations—are smaller, more centralized, and aware of who is charged with government relations responsibilities. Corporations, on the other hand, are larger, more geographically dispersed, more heterogeneous, and do not have reporting relationships and structures in place to ensure that all lobbying activity could be or would be funnelled through a single channel.

With respect to consultant lobbyists, I agree it would be good if they were required to reconfirm their filings on a regular basis. This might also assist in the collection of data that if added would be beneficial, namely, the amount spent on lobby campaigns over the period. On that score, I recommend that the committee might want to look at the forms used in Washington to collect information on an ongoing basis from lobbyists.

With respect to the broader issue, I wonder whether it makes sense to only look at the mechanics when reviewing the Lobbyists Registration Act. The act, which emerged in the late 1980s, admits widespread public concern that paid lobbyists were becoming much more active in the policy decision-making realm and that they were having greater—perhaps even undue—influence in the decisions of government.

The LRA was to shine light on who was involved, when, and on what decisions. It has been said that sunlight is a great disinfectant. That may be true. However, one of the outcomes, in my opinion, has been that people don't necessarily like what they have seen in this brighter light. One of the messages it has brought home is that the locus of policy-shaping and decision-making in parliamentary governments is not Parliament. I don't want to go down that track, but I do want to suggest that sometimes when you shine light on activities, you cause more problems than you solve.

I'll use a private sector example here. Does the dismissal of yet another senior official from a major trading house for unethical behaviour increase or decrease our confidence in financial markets? On the one hand, they're finding them, but on the other hand, gee, they're finding them.

With that caveat in mind, while it is beyond the purview of the committee's review, I would suggest that the current conflict of interest guidelines in the public service, particularly as these apply to gifts and favours, leave much to be desired.

In the absence of concrete specific values, the acceptance of a gift is very much left to an individual's sense of smell—if I can use the term. Basically the rule is that if in your opinion a gift would not affect your future decisions, then you may accept it. I find such a vague standard deplorable and unacceptable—a scandal waiting to happen, which could and should be averted.

I also note that this government, along with many other jurisdictions, has the occasional problem of the revolving door syndrome. How does this relate to lobbying? Well, lobbying and lobbyists are frequently at the centre of post-employment guideline problems, also known as the revolving door, and lobbyists are generally the bearers of gifts to public officials.

When you combine these features with the continued growth of government relations activities, as Hugh MacLennan would say, “the barometer is rising”.

Let me conclude by looking just briefly at the future and what seems to be happening. Lobbying will continue to grow and it quite possibly will intensify. The development and use of new technologies will be a factor. In the U.S., which I look at considerably, where there is little party discipline and legislators are more involved in the policy process, the application of technology to new and better ways to inform and mobilize voters is growing monthly. If this technology should spill over into Canada—and I grant that it is a big if, but if it should—it could produce measures for sweeping changes to the role of MPs, parties, and Parliament.

Why? Well, MPs in Canada have seldom, if ever, been forced to react to a bombardment of thousands of faxes, phone calls, and e-mails from their constituents on particular issues. Nor have they been made specific electoral targets to any degree. That could change.

I'll refer to this as the other side of the coin—the populist side of the coin—to citizen engagement. I am curious to see where future government efforts to engage citizens and citizens' efforts to move government intersect in a new cyber-world.

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On that score, I refer you to the conclusions of the Ekos survey on rethinking citizen engagement, which said:

Despite efforts made by many government departments and, more recently, by the federal and provincial governments with the Social Union Framework Agreement, Canadians express relatively high levels of scepticism about the extent to which governments are taking into account citizens' views and interests when making decisions.

I skip across to several others that seem to say “they seem more certain, however, that government listens to the views of organized others.”

I'll end with that. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Chenier.

I'm now going to turn to Alternatives North. Ms. Montreuil, please.

Ms. Suzette Montreuil (Coordinator, Alternatives North): Thank you. Good afternoon. I'm here today representing Alternatives North, which is a wholly volunteer social action coalition based in the Northwest Territories. I'd like to thank the committee for the opportunity to address you on this very important issue.

First, let me commend the government for undertaking a review of this act. As you know, the act was last amended in 1994, and at that time the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Jean Chrétien, is reported to have said that the revisions to the act would put an end to backroom deals and bring lobbyists from the shadows out in the open. This continues to be a laudable goal and one we hope this current review will be successful in accomplishing.

As I'm sure the committee members know, lobbying has become an incredible growth industry in our nation's capital. At a conservatively estimated $250 million in annual revenues, the industry has more than doubled in size in the last five to six years. When you take into consideration the revolving door between government and lobby firms, public service is now seen by many as a stepping stone to more lucrative private sector postings. From our perspective, as citizens living in a more remote part of Canada, it seems only a slight exaggeration to say that lobbyists, largely concentrated in Ottawa, run our government. It is because of our belief in and valuing of an open democratic system that we have taken an interest in this issue.

We want to use the opportunity of this review to ensure that the rules for lobbying activities result in ethical conduct by all those involved—politicians, public officials, and lobbyists. In particular, we want to ensure that moneyed interests do not have inappropriate influence on our elected representatives.

During the course of our research into this issue, we came across the work of the government ethics coalition spearheaded by Democracy Watch. We were pleased to join this coalition to help promote stronger lobbying and ethics rules and ethics enforcement in Canada. Furthermore, we support the recommendations of this coalition. Although you may already be familiar with this work, I would like to take this opportunity to review the recommendations and to explain why our coalition thinks their implementation would result in a more ethical lobbying system.

The broad goal of the first eight recommendations is to ensure that all activities of lobbyists that relate to their ability to influence government decision-makers are tracked and that any means by which they may exert undue influence are restricted. To achieve this goal, ministers and senior public officials should be required to disclose their meetings and other communications with lobbyists, to ensure that all lobbying efforts are tracked and publicly disclosed. It is incumbent upon the elected leaders and government officials to assume their share of the responsibility for keeping this process as open as possible.

The current system, under which paid lobbyists are required to register their lobbying efforts with federal government departments and agencies, should be improved. For instance, lobbyists should be required to register even if they receive a written request by a public official to lobby. Currently this requirement is waived by subsection 4(2) of the act. In addition, lobbyists should be required to register if they are obtaining or providing information not readily available to the general public and if they spend a period of time lobbying that exceeds a prescribed threshold. Currently the act reads “a significant part of whose duties”, without giving an actual threshold, although the ethics counsellor has advised that it's 20%. We point out that a prescribed threshold is outlined in the act in various U.S. jurisdictions.

Lobbyists should be required to disclose how much they and their clients are spending on their campaigns, as is required in 33 U.S. states. This measure would allow the public to judge more accurately the influence of those who finance lobbying activities.

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The next three recommendations deal primarily with trying to restrict the role of lobbyists in political campaigns. Many northerners believe that lobbyists who work on political campaigns are placing themselves in a situation of being able to collect on favours once the political campaigns are completed. To this end,

—Lobbyists should be required to disclose past or current work with governments, political parties, or candidates for federal public office.

—Lobbyists should be prohibited from serving in senior positions in the campaigns of political parties or candidates, as is prohibited in Maryland and New Mexico.

—Lobbyists should be prohibited from doing work with government departments they are lobbying. Currently, the Lobbyists' Code of Conduct only stipulates that “lobbyists shall not represent conflicting or competing interests without the informed consent of those whose interests are involved”. However, the ability of lobbyists to work for corporate clients as well as government on the same issues muddies the line between the public interest and those of the lobbying industry and decreases public confidence in the objectivity of government.

The business tax deduction for lobbying expenses should be eliminated. It is estimated that through what can only be seen as a distortion of the democratic system, taxpayers subsidize corporate lobbying to the tune of over $100 million.

Federal lobbying and ethics rules will also be made stronger by implementing the following measures:

Post-government employment restrictions for ministers and senior public officials should be increased from two to five years, and for other public officials from one year to two, as in the United States. This would help to close the revolving door through which public officials are allowed to profit from their expertise and inside knowledge when they leave public office, possibly at the public expense.

The government should put in place an open, arm's-length and merit-based process for government appointments and awarding of contracts.

Parliament should pass a code of conduct for all members of Parliament and senators, including strict ethical rules such as the requirement to disclose, and in some cases, divest from, investments and interests that they, their spouses, and their dependants hold. I note with some disappointment that this has been attempted on five previous occasions. I would note that every province, including the Northwest Territories, has an ethics code that applies to every member of its legislature. There is no reason why the federal code should be restricted to cabinet ministers. Applying the code to all members of Parliament would prevent them from acting as lobbyists for private interests.

All codes of conduct should contain stringent restrictions on gift giving to public officials and employees, especially by lobbyists.

Federal lobbying and ethics rules would be more effectively enforced through the following measures:

The current ethics counsellor, who reports to the Prime Minister, should be replaced by an independent ethics commission of three people who report to Parliament. The commission should have strong powers to investigate government officials and lobbyists, and if a violation of a lobbying or ethics rule is confirmed, to recommend penalties to Parliament in a publicly available report. In a recent statement on the existing reporting relationship, the current ethics counsellor stated that his reporting to the Prime Minister was a matter of “constitutional convention”. I would ask the members of the committee, is constitutional convention more important than public perception of the impartiality and autonomy of the office?

Lobbying and ethics rules should include a general anti-avoidance provision to prevent people from exploiting any loopholes. This would be in keeping with the statement contained in the Lobbyists' Code of Conduct that lobbyists should conform to not only the letter but also the spirit of the code. It would also be in keeping with similar provisions in the Income Tax Act.

Anyone covered by a federal government code of conduct should be required to report to the ethics commission any lobbying or ethics rules violations about which they have evidence.

Any person who, acting in good faith, reports a violation of lobbying or ethics rules to the ethics commission should be protected from retaliation or disciplinary measures of any sort, or the reporting of abuse will simply not occur.

If a person files a complaint of a violation of lobbying or ethics rules to the ethics commission, the commission should be required to investigate within a specified time period—for example, 60 days—and failing to do so, the individual should have the right to go to court to obtain an order requiring the ethics commission to investigate.

An appeal to the Federal Court should be allowed for all ethics commission rulings.

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Finally, I would like to emphasize the importance of giving citizens better access to government decision-making while at the same time decreasing the power of lobbyists. One need only look at the recent Summit of the Americas on the free trade agreement to see how things should not be done. In Quebec City, while civil society was kept out of the vicinity of where meetings were held, Canadian corporations were allowed to buy the right to attend networking events at the summit and in some cases even to choose priority seating at summit events.

This cash-for-access scheme is not only undemocratic, it is completely unethical. A true democratic spirit would ensure that all government consultation processes would provide meaningful opportunities for citizen participation.

The invitation to Alternatives North to present to this committee is an example of the participation and decision-making processes that Canadians have the right to expect, and I thank you again for the opportunity.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

I am now going to turn to Mr. Sean Moore.

Mr. Sean Moore (Individual Presentation): Thank you, Madam Chair and honourable members, for inviting me here today. This is the second time I have appeared as a witness for a parliamentary committee reviewing the Lobbyists Registration Act.

As was the case in 1993, I'm fascinated by the discussion and welcome the opportunity to chime in, however briefly.

I should also point out that I'm here today speaking entirely personally, not as a representative of the firm in which I'm a partner and certainly not on behalf of our clients.

I am fascinated because I strongly believe that the sorts of things that get raised in hearings such as this are the real stuff of democracy: government, politics, public policy, and how public decisions are made in this country. That's why how these issues are discussed and explored is very important.

The quadrennial review of the Lobbyists Registration Act is one of the few opportunities that exists for any sort of broad public examination and discussion of how government really decides.

I've reviewed the transcripts of some of the recent meetings of your committee. Aside from some discussion of what are, for the most part, relatively minor proposed amendments, the following is my sense of the topics that have been raised in one way or another: the real de facto and modest role of the legislative branch in Canadian government; access to information and public disclosure; delegation of decision-making to bureaucrats; access to policy and decision-makers; the role of interest groups; electoral finance and party fundraising; the relative role of the financial resources in lobbying; and the spectre of bribery, corruption, graft, and conflict of interest.

Now these are compelling subjects. Indeed, they sound like the story outline of an Oliver Stone movie. I believe these subjects have to be part of any discussion about how governments, and specifically our federal government, make decisions and the various inputs to that decision-making. They're all linked, however tenuously, and associated with many of them are both facts and myths that are very damaging to the effective, responsible, and fair operations of any society.

Granted your specific mandate for this committee is to review the terms of the Lobbyists Registration Act and whether they're achieving the purposes for which it was established more than ten years ago. But I believe such a determination can only be made by considering the context in which lobbying activity or public policy advocacy, to use the fancy word for it, is conducted in Canada.

There's a healthy market out there for advice and assistance in dealing with government, and not just among corporations but among non-profits, charities, professional associations, and even other levels of government.

For the purposes of today's discussion, we'll call them lobbyists, though given the legal definition of lobbying contained in the act, most are more appropriately termed government relations consultants, whose role is more advisory than that of actually making representations to government.

So what exactly do these people do? Like me? What is it that we do for clients that they can't or don't do for themselves? I endeavoured to deal with these questions recently at a seminar I conducted for the Library of Parliament entitled “What a Lobbyist Tells his Client”. It was attended by a couple of dozen Hill staffers and researchers. I'm frankly not sure if there were any MPs or senators in attendance, but I'd be very happy to do it again for you or for other MPs if there's an interest.

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I think it's very important not just to speak in vague generalities about what lobbyists or government relations consultants do, but to have as concrete a sense as possible of what is done, and why, and what it says about the nature of government and public policy today.

I look forward to our discussion.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Moore.

We're now going to turn to questions. Mr. Penson, please.

Mr. Charlie Penson (Peace River, Canadian Alliance): This is an intriguing area, and I've had difficulty trying to figure out what we should do. It seems to me that unless you want to outlaw lobbying altogether, what is the problem? Why do we have a Lobbyists Registration Act at all? We have the act to identify people who are lobbying—but so what? Now we know they're lobbying.

If I phone a forest company that's affected by the softwood lumber deal, that's information I need to help people in my constituency. And unless we intend to outlaw it altogether, I'm not quite sure why we should even have a Lobbyists Registration Act.

So I put that question to you first of all, and I'll follow it up with a question. Ms. Montreuil, I think you were the only one to suggest that measures should be put in place to require cabinet ministers and government officials to keep records of their meetings and disclose the contents if necessary. I would like to ask the other two gentlemen there what they think of that proposal.

The Chair: Mr. Chenier.

Mr. John Chenier: Well, I think there is a need for a Lobbyists Registration Act. I think the mere presence of a considerable group of people who earn their livings trying to advise people on how to influence government decisions suggests that we should probably have some rules to prescribe what information has to be made public.

The question then becomes, what rules are necessary? What we're trying to do with the Lobbyists Registration Act, it seems to me, is maintain public confidence in our public institutions—maintain the appearance, as well as the substance. I think the purpose of the act is to ensure that the decisions coming out of this are based on something other than just the ability to hire people who know their way around government, who know how to get certain decisions out of government.

Now, how much information do you need to show the public who's acting on whose behalf? How open a decision-making process do you need? I think that line is constantly shifting, as the growth of lobbying—and probably the sophistication of governance—increases.

Mr. Charlie Penson: But, Mr. Chenier, you said that the act as we have had it for the last 11 years is neither enforceable nor enforced. So I gather you want to move beyond what we currently have, in order to have that better transparency.

Mr. John Chenier: I think there are two components to this. I think the vast majority of the government relations community complies with the spirit of the law. There's no doubt about that. You can look in the registry and see that. But the issue is that if people choose not to comply—and there are some of those—then the avenues seem to be there.

So the question arises: do you want your law to close those avenues, so everyone has to play by the same rules? Some lobbyists would abide by them because they choose to, and others would be forced to. That's what I'm getting at when I say our current law has problems.

In terms of logs, I sift through information all the time, and too much is just the same problem as too little. But I do agree with what seems to be a general trend in lobbyist legislation: trying to get at the amount of money spent on a campaign within a given time.

Right now, you can see 50 companies lobbying to get a certain decision—but some might be spending $1,000 over six months, and others might be spending $300,000. Does that matter? Again, that's a double-edged sword. Perhaps people will say “Wow, they spent $300,000, but they got the decision they wanted!” That just isn't good government.

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I guess what I'm saying is that most jurisdictions that have lobbyist legislation are now moving to thinking not in terms of disclosing what fees are paid, but rather in terms of how much companies are paying in a given period for their government relations effort.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Moore, do you have any comments on those questions?

Mr. Sean Moore: I agree entirely with John about the need for a lobbyist registration act. As John noted, there are lots of lobbyists, and not just the commercial-type consultants. Virtually every type of organization you can imagine has someone who serves as a lobbyist—I know of practically not one that doesn't. I believe that individuals involved in that sort of activity should have some responsibility to publicly declare it. I don't think there's any question of the need for that.

In terms of enforceability, I'm not a lawyer myself, even though I spend my days with lawyers, so I can't give you any sense of whether the language of this act is enforceable. I will say this: as with many laws in federal, provincial, and municipal jurisdictions, this one acts almost entirely on a complaints basis. But most laws on the books in every legislature in the country don't have people out proactively enforcing them, so it's not that different.

My last comment, sir, is on the log. This is not a new idea—it's commonplace for regulatory agencies in the United States. Their nuclear regulatory agency, for example, has to log every phone call, every piece of paper, virtually every encounter on the street. That would be an enormous burden on our public service, which is already anorexic.

I believe one of the biggest reasons there's such a demand for advice and assistance in dealing with the government is that there are ever fewer people on the other end of the phone in government who can deal with you on an issue.

Mr. Charlie Penson: But having supported the idea of a registration act, to show that the Canadian public is confident there's an open, transparent system—well, I guess we're at that stage now, but what has it accomplished? We know people are lobbying, and somebody said the amounts of money they're spending should be registered. So now I guess we ask, “So what?”

Mr. Sean Moore: Let's not expect too much of it. A disclosure law is all it is. It's the Lobbyists Registration Act, not the Lobbyists Regulation Act. It's just a disclosure law.

Mr. Reg Alcock (Winnipeg South, Lib.): Are you suggesting a new name?

Mr. Charlie Penson: That's exactly my point, Mr. Moore.

Mr. Sean Moore: I've often said that this country needs a consumer protection act for the clients of lobbyists more than it needs a lobbyists registration act.

Mr. Charlie Penson: I think you've got at my point. Where does it essentially stop being lobbying if it becomes too—

Mr. Sean Moore: I don't think we're anywhere near that, though I think some issues raised in this committee have tilted in that direction.

I agree with you, we couldn't outlaw it. Basically it has constitutional protection. In the democratic tradition, individuals have the right to petition the government. You couldn't outlaw it.

The Chair: Thank you.

Ms. Montreuil.

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: I want to comment on the reason we're saying government ministers and officials should take some of the onus here. I think the public is more interested in their activities than in the activities of lobbyists, although they are interested in that as well. That shifts the onus onto the ministers themselves, because they're of greater public interest.

The preamble to the act says it quite well: it's desirable that public office holders and the public be able to know who's attempting to influence government. Bringing up issues like how much money is spent on campaigns gives the public some chance to gauge how influential a certain part of society is.

The Chair: Ms. Torsney, please.

Ms. Paddy Torsney (Burlington, Lib.): Mr. Moore, what in fact do lobbyists do?

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Mr. Sean Moore: I'm going to hand you my outline so I won't bore everyone with the details.

One of the biggest challenges for people when they're faced with a public policy issue is defining what the issue is from the perspective of people in government. I think the main thing a client should be looking for in a lobbyist or a government relations consultant is for help to think the way people in government have to think when they're looking at an issue. It's the only way you're going to win the day on an issue.

I can barely contain myself when I think of the language used by Democracy Watch in characterizing government, politicians, and bureaucrats. I think it's way over the top. It's an organization I belong to, by the way. I took out a membership a while ago so I could learn a little bit more about what they're doing. I can see no impact whatsoever by corporations in hiring someone to get a decision made for them in Ottawa.

The reality is there are usually two sides to every issue. The vast majority of issues in Ottawa are not public interest versus private interest. There is some titanic struggle between two corporate interests and both of them have partisans working for them. I don't see any favours being provided. I do see the effect of a lobbying strategy that includes a careful analysis of what the government is trying to do.

What are the public policy and political objectives of government? What are the roles of the different ministries that play a role in what we hear of horizontal decision-making in government? What are some workable alternatives to what the government has proposed?

That, ladies and gentlemen, is very labour-intensive stuff. You've been in this business, Paddy. You've seen what's done. There are some who provide a sort of very big picture. You've got to understand the political dynamics of this. The vast majority of people who do government relations work do stuff that would bore you silly in terms of both the volume and the detail of analysis required.

Again, I'd be happy to file with the chair an outline of some of these things that detail the different levels of service and analysis provided by some lobbyists to some of their clients.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Okay, thank you.

I think there is a great deal of misunderstanding about the process. Certainly we want our different organizations that use lobbyists or government relations consultants to go off and do what they do well, in the same way they hire tax lawyers to deal with tax issues and accountants to file their income tax because they're experts in different fields.

You need to have people who advise you on what's happening in government. There are times when there is a mismatch with what business would want. They need to understand a good government relations consultant is often telling them what they're asking for is completely impossible at the time they're asking for it.

Mr. Sean Moore: Absolutely.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: I guess my question is to you, Mr. Chenier. Sorry, it's not to you. It's to Madam Montreuil.

The issue about what people are paying for various things and whether or not they should be tax deductible is a bit like going out and educating government officials about your business so government people can understand how their decision-making process affects your government. In a way, it's a bit like a marketing or an advertising campaign to your client. I'm not sure why you think it would necessarily be such a bad thing for businesses to let government know about what they do. Arguably, if things are going well, lots of jobs are created or continue to exist in various areas.

For instance, I love it when a company will tell me what they're doing so I can look out for things that might help them do their job. I can have a dialogue with them if there are things coming before us that could seem to have a negative impact, because it wouldn't be in the interest of my constituents who happen to work there.

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: We're not saying it's a bad thing when they inform you about what their business is doing. We're saying it shouldn't be subsidized by taxpayers. The recommendation was that the tax deduction be eliminated. You have no control over how much they're spending on the activity. If I spend $100 million, do I get a bigger tax deduction? That doesn't seem to be quite right.

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There's nothing wrong with them educating you about what they do. We wouldn't have a problem with that. It's just the whole idea of it being subsidized.

Mr. John Chenier: I think part of that issue is dealt with in terms of that nebulous concept called the “even playing field”. You may or may not know that lobbying expenditures are not tax deductible in the United States simply because of this concept. The reason is that charities are only allowed to spend 10% of their revenues trying to influence government, because that's a tax-deductible expense. Therefore if you want to maintain your charitable status, you can't get into the public affairs business.

If, on the other hand, charities decide not to become charities—in other words, just become public policy advocacy groups like Greenpeace—you can donate to them, but they are after-tax dollars.

In a sense, what they're saying is that most lobbying should be after-tax dollars, and that's the level playing field concept. I'm not arguing for or against it; I'm just explaining that this is the rationale behind it.

The Chair: Ms. Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: The other issue that was raised was about donations to campaigns and what have you. Are you aware that all that information is public? Certainly the last issue of the Hill Times published all the information on who's spending what, and lots of big numbers are out there for people to look at if they're interested.

An hon. member: It's on the Internet.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: It's on the Internet, in fact?

All the donations to campaigns are available. I'm not sure why you would restrict people from participating in the election process.

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: Yes, we're aware that it's public. Our point wasn't that this information should be made available. It was just saying that lobbyists participating especially in key positions in political parties and then returning to their lobbyist roles muddies the waters and creates the perception of one being in a situation to collect on favours.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: You're actually suggesting that they couldn't do something because they.... You're restricting people from participating in one of their fundamental rights. People who could have worked on my campaign because they're interested in the political process, if they happen to have a job as a consultant in a—

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: If you're in a situation of conflict of interest, you can take a leave of absence if you wish to pursue the activity. I think for the public it really creates a perception if the same person who's working on your campaign is then the person who turns around tomorrow and tries to influence you on a particular issue. It does create a sense of undue influence.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: I do suggest that we increase the number of people, including police officers and others; we're trying to encourage people to participate in the political process rather than create impediments to their participation. So it just struck me as quite shocking that we would encourage people not to participate.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Torsney.

[Translation]

Mr. Brien, go ahead.

Mr. Pierre Brien (Témiscamingue, BQ): My question is for Mr. Moore.

In your presentation, you stated that we had to examine the situation in a very broad context. You listed a series of points, including the role of the legislative branch. We have already had some interesting discussion on this topic. It is often said that lobbyists focus their activities more on the executive branch and the bureaucratic apparatus, much more than on legislators, in other words members of Parliament. Does your experience confirm this practice? If so, would you say that there is an imbalance between these two branches, that is the executive branch and the legislative branch?

[English]

Mr. Sean Moore: That's exactly what my experience is, and I don't think you'll run into many people who are practising lobbyists or government relations consultants who would admit to anything else. But it's important to note that in terms of the sheer number of issues that come up, whether you're a consultant lobbyist like me who has clients, or whether you're working for your employers, whether you're working in-house, the vast majority of things that attract your attention are not related to legislation at all. They're related to regulatory change or to some policy matters long after anything has been established in legislation.

• 1620

I worked in Washington, D.C., as well, for four years, and at one point John and I worked together doing a newsletter on lobbying, called the Lobby Monitor.

What's the difference between the United States and Canada vis-à-vis the legislative role? I don't need to give you a lecture on that. You know very well the different role of legislators here versus there. We take it for granted until we try to explain to our American brothers and sisters the role of the legislative branch of government in this country versus that in the United States. That's when it reminds us that the relative role of legislators in this country is very modest.

That's not to say that when legislative matters come up you ignore MPs, but frankly, they are usually much farther down the list of people you need to deal with, because the genus of legislation in this country usually is two or three years prior to the date it hits the floor of the House of Commons. So if you're being an advocate or a lobbyist, you are trying to be active back when the policy-makers in the bowels of whatever department are starting to think about that legislation, and you're dealing with the various ministries in government.

So it is a fairly late stage when you get to dealing with legislators, and then, given the realities of party discipline, given the realities of majority government, you focus on the executive branch.

All that would change if you had a minority government situation, which I worked in very briefly in 1979, for that brief, wonderful, exciting period in which there was a different model, a different paradigm at play. It didn't last very long. But that's when you started to see, just by virtue of the way our system operates, that legislators can play a very different role.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: If I understand what you're saying, the small amount of lobbying done with members demonstrates in the end that the power resides elsewhere, even when it comes to decisions regarding the legislative branch. Is that correct?

[English]

Mr. Sean Moore: Yes.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: If you were in my place today, as a member of Parliament, what changes would you make in order to improve the situation?

[English]

Mr. Sean Moore: I'd be as frustrated as hell, but I wouldn't.... That would be a very long issue. I am not an authority on parliamentary reform. It's an issue I've been very interested in for a long time, and I've written a lot of stuff about it, but I wouldn't purport to act as an authority.

I just think there needs to be some fundamental review of the role of the legislative branch in Canada, if for no other reason than that there's such a disconnect between what many Canadians either believe or want to believe when they walk into the polling station on election day and what the reality is of the job that these people are being sent to do. I think that's such a chasm.

When we talk about the values we hold so dear—democratic government and sovereignty of Parliament—it's very hollow when you see what I perceive to be the role of MPs here. I think you all deserve a lot better, given the sacrifices that are made in terms of lifestyle, compensation, and everything else. This is a subject that goes beyond the Lobbyists Registration Act, so I won't take any more time on it, but I encourage you all to put more effort into this within each of your parties.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: Thank you.

There is a small link in this, a link that is sometimes a major link, in the sense that we become frustrated because now we must examine how to improve the guidelines for bureaucrats or decision-makers because they are perceived as having a greater role to play. Our efforts with respect to guidelines are now focussed on them.

Which leads to a more technical question for Ms. Montreuil.

• 1625

In your presentation, you suggested that members and their spouses disclose their assets and interests. I have two issues with respect to this point.

With respect to disclosing assets, it does not really bother me that much, but I find it difficult to tell my spouse that I have to disclose her assets. Let's say for example, that I am single and that I meet someone. I find it a bit much that if we marry, I have to say, by the way I have to disclose all of your assets.

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: My only comment is that this is already the rule in a number of jurisdictions within Canada and in the United States, and that it is required.

Mr. Pierre Brien: For spouses?

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: Yes, for spouses as well.

[English]

A voice: What did you say?

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: I said in other jurisdictions.

The Chair: Can you name those jurisdictions?

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: No, I can't name them.

[Translation]

Mr. Pierre Brien: If you could send us that information, that would be good.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Brien.

[English]

Mr. McTeague, please.

Mr. Dan McTeague (Pickering—Ajax—Uxbridge, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Moore, if I should live long enough to try to run for Speaker again, I certainly want to avail myself of your services on the issue of parliamentary reform. But I'm sure we're not here to discuss that. Yet, as you pointed out at the beginning of your statement, they are nevertheless connected intimately with the issue of the Lobbyists Registration Act.

I have a couple of issues that I wanted to raise with you, because I think it's extremely important for members of Parliament to understand how important it is to have an arm's-length relationship between the executive and those who have worked within the executive.

I'm wondering if you—or perhaps others at the table with you who have made presentations—could give to this committee an illustration of any ideas or examples of where we've had in the past, or we may currently have, individuals who have worked in the PCO or the PMO who will work for a period of time, or have a very influential role within that area within the executive, be able to influence policy after they leave, and of course be subject only to the two-year moratorium as opposed to the five-year moratorium, which I believe some have proposed here.

Mr. Sean Moore: The word I'm going to focus in on, Mr. McTeague, is influence. I don't think people in and of themselves, because of who they are or what job they have, have influence. I've been doing this for 30 years. I don't see it. They may have some contacts, and this is where contacts are important. They may be able to phone up an assistant deputy minister or an executive assistant to a minister and say: What is really happening on this issue? What is the politics of this issue? What's happening in caucus on this thing? What are you hearing? What's the justice department telling you about this? What's the Department of Foreign Affairs saying about this issue?

The reality is, in almost all issues of public policy, everyone has their finger in it. The notion that someone knows someone and a decision is going to be made in favour of someone else, to me shows an abhorrent ignorance of how government decisions are made in this country. You see this everyday.

I'm focusing on the influence thing, Mr. McTeague. How many people leave senior reaches of government and go into the private sector? Lots.

Mr. Dan McTeague: Mr. Moore, I guess maybe more specifically—some of us here have had experience where bills are amended, acted on by Parliament, and then are simply erased later on by a committee, with certainly some help from very powerful and very influential lobbyists.

I'm wondering if any of you could give some illustration of how, for instance, a group that might contend that it represents 70% of all the GDP in Canada in terms of its own weight, a Chamber of Commerce, a Canadian Bar Association, Business Council on National Issues.... There has been much discourse about the relative influence. We had a summit meeting that may have dealt with it on an international basis. I want to deal not so much with the role of the legislator in this context but the role and the ability to perhaps suggest directions that the government ought to take that may be different or at variance with an agreed set of principles by legislators.

Do you have experience in those areas? Are you concerned that that issue may exist today? Are there examples or good concrete suggestions or conclusions any one of you may want to give to ensure that the role of the legislator might be a little bit more pre-eminent than those who might be able to influence public policy?

• 1630

Mr. Sean Moore: I always have problems with the terms “powerful” and “influential”. To me, most of the people who are called powerful and influential lobbyists owe their currency to organizations that attribute to them power and influence. I frankly don't see it.

There are lots of people in this town who I compete with who are said to be powerful and influential. I don't necessarily see it.

In terms of the question about legislators, legislators are the only ones who can help themselves on this issue of having more influence in terms of how government makes decisions. It's nothing that lobbyists are going to do. It's nothing that other interest groups are going to do. This one, I'm afraid, is right up here along Wellington Street. That's the only thing that's going to change.

I may be missing the point of your question on that, but I do want to get back to this “powerful” and “influential”. I don't see it.

Mr. Dan McTeague: Recommendations have been made here, one of them by Madame Montreuil, of course, to increase the restriction for ministers and senior public officials from two years to five.

For someone who has a rather valuable role or has had a role of influence with respect to decision-making, would there not be a more appropriate way of ensuring there's a cooling-off period analogous to our competitors, our trade partners? Or do we accept in Canada things that are very different from standards they accept around the world?

Mr. Sean Moore: I think a cooling-off period in some situations probably makes sense. But let me turn it around. Let's say MPs were a lot more important in our legislative process than they are today. By the way, one of the indicators of how relatively unimportant they are—sorry, how modest the influence is—

Mr. Dan McTeague: We understand, Mr. Moore, intimately.

Mr. Sean Moore: —is there are practically no former MPs who are lobbyists. There are very few of them. There are a few former ministers, but former MPs or former staffers to MPs...there are practically none of them. To me, that is the most damning evidence of the influence on the system.

Mr. Dan McTeague: Are there comments from others?

Mr. John Chenier: I have a couple of comments.

Mr. McTeague, I think maybe you were alluding to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act last year, which was passed by the committee and then went to the House, where it was re-amended. Certainly the lobby campaign there was very evident. It was very powerful and very influential in changing the legislation back to its original intention.

While I would agree with the gist of what my former colleague and good friend Sean is saying, there is no doubt that there are certain people able to influence the political process more than others in this town. Some of them are inside government and some of them are outside government. I don't think that's really a debatable point. They won't win all the time, but they do have influence.

One of the key things here, again, is the ability to influence. You can take a broader definition and say if you don't know anything, you don't know what you want to influence or you don't know how to go about it. But if you can get all the information you need about where people are in a position, what the weak points are in their argument, and where your allies are, you have a much better chance at winning the argument in the end. This, in a sense, is what you can buy in the government relations community. I'm not saying you shouldn't be able to buy it, but certainly that is what you get. You get information and advice, which—

Mr. Dan McTeague: Are you saying it's a bad idea?

Mr. John Chenier: I'm not saying it's a bad idea, but I am saying it is available only to certain people. It's not anybody who can call up so and so and get through to them and get the information that these people can get. That's just a fact of life.

What was your last point?

The Chair: Quickly.

Mr. Dan McTeague: Simply put, where there's executive influence by someone who has worked in the PMO or PCO, that there be a two- to five-year cooling-off period.

Mr. John Chenier: When Bill Clinton was elected president, the revolving door was a very big part of his campaign. He wanted to stamp that out. He didn't wait to pass legislation; he had all his senior people sign civil contracts that would, in a sense, be enforceable. They could be fined or prosecuted for breaking the civil contract. The civil contract essentially set a time period during which they agreed not to go to work for outside interest. That lasted until the first guy left, and it just collapsed around them.

• 1635

It's a very difficult thing to deny a person their living. They're going to leave one career and go into another. How can you say “I'm sorry, you can't earn a living for 12 or 18 months or two years; go in this corner with a cup”? You can't do that. You just have to have rules that try to counter their ability to influence unduly or to use the information they have in a way that would be prejudicial to good decision-making.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. McTeague.

Mr. Lastewka, please.

Mr. Walt Lastewka (St. Catharines, Lib.): Thank you very much.

I guess I come from the school that we're making a really big mountain out of this and we're going to wrap it around and around. I want to take it down to what is really required to make it functional and separate the nice-to-know items, so that other organizations can have that stuff, and what is really required.

I used to work for a large corporation, and when I came to Ottawa, it was very evident to me that the automotive companies had not spent enough time in Ottawa educating or sharing their information about the field they're in. They do a better job now. More and more members of Parliament understand the automobile industry, so I do believe there's a differential between government relations and lobbying.

You're in the driver's seat now to improve our act, to get rid of what's not required and get down to basically what is required in our system. So I'd ask you to comment, what is really required?

Mr. John Chenier: I guess that's the three questions I started out with at the beginning in regard to the purpose of the act. These are political decisions, not technical decisions. These are questions that I think come to the root of what your constituents would expect in terms of openness in government and clarity. In a sense, these are political decisions, not sawed off right here and this is all we need, because it's your constituents, Canadian citizens, who are drawing the line as to what they feel is acceptable behaviour, acceptable clarity or lack thereof, information or lack thereof about how decisions are made and who influences them.

I don't think there's any real answer. If your constituents said tomorrow, we want the full thing, you would say if that's what they want, that's what we'll give them. So I would ask the question to you: What do you think your constituents feel they need to know about how government makes their decisions, about who influences them?

Mr. Walt Lastewka: I can tell you that a half hour out of Ottawa, there's very little discussion on lobbyists and registrations and all the stuff that is required to be done. Now that you've asked the question, I haven't heard one iota in eight years.

I can respond to Ms. Montreuil, when she used the summit as an example, that I had my door open for people to meet with me. Twice they cancelled out, but they went to Quebec City. I set time aside to meet with them; they never showed up, but they went to Quebec City. There is a chance to meet with members of Parliament.

But let's get down to the lobbyists. What do we need to know other than the person who's lobbying, what companies? What else is required?

Mr. Sean Moore: I don't think there's anything basically new that's required. I agree with you, but if you are interested in other means of realizing the principles of the Lobbyists Registration Act as contained in the preamble, transparency and openness, there are a lot of things that can be done that are beyond the purview of this particular committee right now, although I know there's lots of overlap—that is, changes not only to the Access to Information Act in Canada, but to the whole mindset of government about information in Canada.

One of the things that comes from the anxiety you hear from groups such as Democracy Watch and Ms. Montreuil's group is the sense that there's really not enough information out there about what government is doing. I think there's an enormous number of things that can be done, starting off with some general principles about how much information government should provide on an issue.

• 1640

I, for one, think that government would be far better off—it would help lobbyists, it would help people who can't afford lobbyists, it would help members of Parliament, it would help everyone—if the government on most issues, certainly the big ones, moved away from the model we've had forever in this country, which is what one person calls DAD: decide, announce, defend. That is the approach of parliamentary government, decide, announce, defend, rather than when big issues are coming up being much more open and saying this is the issue, these are the options, these are some of the pros and cons to each of these options, and these are some of the reasons why we're not following them.

The only organization that I see do this with any sort of discipline at all is the Department of Finance. When budget options come up, they do a pretty good job of saying this is what we heard and these are some of the reasons why we're not following up on it. That is a model for government explaining, government sharing with Canadians, the complexity of the issues they deal with. This isn't a candy store up here. A lot of people think it's a candy store.

There are reasons why you have to say no to certain things. There are trade-offs and compromises and combinations of solutions. I think if you had that it wouldn't solve all problems. If you're talking about meeting the objectives of the Lobbyists Registration Act, I think the objectives of the act as defined in the act are met for the most part with the current terms of the act, but if you want to transform that spirit of the act to government generally, there are other places you need to look as well.

The Chair: Ms. Montreuil, do you want to say something?

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: Yes.

I think the only thing that's probably not contained, that's not already required, would be the issue of how much I've spent on campaigns. The other things—who is actually lobbying and on what topics—are already covered in the act and don't really need to be expanded.

Mr. Walt Lastewka: The campaign expenses are publicized.

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: No. Sorry, I'm not talking about that.

Mr. Walt Lastewka: I'm just giving you an example. I've never heard one question in eight years, never.

Mr. John Chenier: Mr. Lastewka, it's not only the fact of whether you have questions, it's the fact that these are there. If they weren't there, if you took them away, if you didn't disclose this and left everything to the imagination, what would you have? Would it be better?

Mr. Walt Lastewka: No. And I understand that. What I'm getting at is when people ask us for information on bills, on discussions, on input, we provide that. We meet with people on an ongoing basis.

Monday I met with the teachers federation on many items. Probably 90% were provincial, but a couple were federal. They needed more information, and we provided it. I think all members of Parliament, whether they are in government or opposition, if there's information required do their best to provide that information.

I stand back and I say we wanted to see transparency and so forth, so we introduced cameras into the House of Commons. Has that benefited us? We now do everything for the cameras, unfortunately. So the transparency is there. Boy, I can say it's transparent: you can tune in any time you want. Has that been good for government, for democracy? It's who can get the best insult in the 30 seconds. So I say to myself, we have to be very careful we don't go overboard on these things and we start defeating the real purpose of trying to have good government.

I'm looking for concrete answers from you, but I'm not getting them. I'm getting that we should do this and go look here and do that. Give me your recommendations on what should be done.

Mr. Sean Moore: In answer to your question whether there is anything more that should be required in terms of information disclosure under the Lobbyists Registration Act, I say no.

Mr. Walt Lastewka: I appreciate that.

The Chair: Thank you.

• 1645

Mr. John Chenier: I would say that the one key bit of information that is missing is the intensity—in other words, how much is being spent. Right now it looks like they're all the same, and that isn't the case. I think that's the one bit of information that I would think would be beneficial.

[Translation]

The Chair: Mr. Brien, do you have any other questions? No?

Ms. Jennings.

Ms. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you for your presentations. My thoughts are really quite divided with respect to your presentations today. They were excellent presentations.

Ms. Montreuil, you mentioned that thirty-three American states require lobbyists to disclose how much they and their clients spend on their campaigns. Is that the case at the federal level, in the United States?

In the softwood industry, there is now a big conflict. On two occasions we have won in jurisdictions accepted by both governments, according to our treaties, etc., but American lobbyists, both at the State and federal levels, are still heading a campaign and have managed to influence American legislators and convinced them to pursue another conflict, which will likely last a number of years and threaten our own industry, jobs and the lives of many Canadians, from coast to coast.

I do not necessarily believe that disclosing the amounts will assure Canadians that legislators, ministers and senior officials are acting for the good of the population, on the one hand, and on the other hand, that they are acting based on reality, on the real facts. One only has to look at this situation in the United States. The reality and the facts have nothing to do with what is motivating the Americans in taking the decision that they're taking. It is only profits that are motivating them. That is one of the reasons why I am divided on this.

My thoughts are also divided with respect to the role that we legislators, play here in Canada. Mr. Moore, you were right in a way, when you stated that we do not truly take part in policy development, since the process has already been underway for a long time by the time legislation is tabled in the House, etc., so you are right.

However, in another way, that is not at all right, because each member—and when I think about the members around the table now, whether it would be their first, second or third term, each has their own topics of interest, political issues in often quite specific fields which interest them—each member tries to influence the minister or the Cabinet to reformulate, refer or review current policy. Good lobbyists have identified the interests of each member, if need be, and try to work with them when they have the opportunity, for example when they are on the same wavelength; sometimes, they try to work against members because they do not share the same opinion.

One of the recommendations that I have the most problems with is the idea of abolishing the position of ethics counsellor to simply replace it with an ethics commissioner. Let me explain why.

I used to work in the field of police ethics, in Quebec. I worked in both systems, namely the system where the commission had the right to regulate, administer, investigate and make recommendations following a public inquiry, and the civil system, fully autonomous from the police, and which is accorded executory powers. I observed that there are both good and bad aspects to both systems.

• 1650

If you only have an ethics commission with the power to investigate and punish parliamentarians, where will these parliamentarians obtain expert advice? Today, I can call the ethics counsellor and consult regarding a problem. For example, if I act in such and such a manner or if I behave in such and such a manner, does this behaviour constitute a violation of the ethics code, even if, in theory, the ethics code does not apply to me because I am not a member of the Cabinet or a parliamentary secretary, etc.? According to your recommendations, I will no longer have access to advice, because you are recommending abolishing the position of ethics counsellor.

Yes, each member can seek advice, but it will not be from the same counsellor, it would be from different people: I will see my lawyer, he will see his lawyer, etc. Thus, there will be not one single interpretation or standard. I find it hard to accept that an independent commission could sanction or even recommend sanctions. We are elected by voters and ultimately, we should be accountable for our actions and our behaviour to the Parliament.

[English]

The Chair: Does anyone have any response to Madam Jennings' comments?

Ms. Montreuil.

[Translation]

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: Thank you very much. I had a number of questions. You brought up a very good point.

The advisory function and the power to investigate should be separated, because they are two very important functions. I reread the recommendation and I agree. However, the intent is not to abolish the advisory function, because, as you stated, it is important and it is also important that everyone have access to the same advice. However we find it somewhat awkward that the same person is responsible for both of these functions. This makes that person less objective: Having already given advice, this person will not change their mind. As far as I understand—I am not completely in the loop—in seven years, apparently there has never been a conflict. That's remarkable.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: Let me interrupt with an example. The Quebec Police Commission, which was created in 1968, had the power to establish regulations regarding the ethical behaviour of police officers, establish administrative procedures for police forces, etc. Subsequently, the Commission was also given the power to investigate in response to a citizen's complaint or to a police chief regarding the actions of a police officer or a police force in general. Its objectivity was never questioned.

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: Was this one person?

Ms. Marlene Jennings: No, it was several people, a commission made up of several members, but let's not discuss this now because I know that the chair wants to pursue other things.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you, Madam Jennings. I have to stop you there. I have Mr. Moore and then I have other questioners.

Mr. Moore, you wanted to make a comment?

Mr. Sean Moore: We separate those two functions of someone you can go to for advice versus the B.C. model, for example.

Ms. Marlene Jennings: What happens if you follow the advice and you're still subject to an investigation and found guilty?

Mr. Sean Moore: It's part of your defence, I suppose.

I don't think it's credible any more to have an ethics counsellor with the terms of reference such as exist at the federal level in Ottawa right now. I don't think off Parliament Hill, and certainly for at least half of Parliament Hill, that's a credible option any more.

The argument, by the way, that was presented to me by a senior public official when the Chrétien government first established the ethics counsellor had nothing to do with any of these other things we're talking about. The argument at that point was that as the new government was in power, it was doing a number of things, including rationalizing a lot of existing departments and agencies.

• 1655

The argument that was presented to me was that the last thing we need in Canada right now is another out-of-control officer of Parliament. They had looked at the growth and size and budget of the Auditor General and the Commissioner of Official Languages, and you may recall that was the argument they gave internally—that we just don't need another one of those. Well, I think the political cost to pay for not having some office to look independently at things is probably much greater than any government should have to bear in the future.

The Chair: Thank you.

[Translation]

Mr. Brien.

Mr. Pierre Brien: No, that's fine. What I wanted to say has already been said.

[English]

The Chair: Ms. Torsney.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: On your last comment, the fact that there have been so many years and no conflicts, I can tell you as a parliamentary secretary that we are subject to all the conflict of interest guidelines, and when in doubt we called and asked. There were many times when I wasn't able to do something or I wasn't allowed to accept something or whatever, and I was never in conflict because I figured out.... I'd argue that many of my colleagues are just smart and take the advice and probably miss some opportunities rather than ever be placed in the context of being in a very public conflict.

The second thing I have to tell you is that it seems your presentation wasn't as intense as that of Democracy Watch, but this concept that some business could spend $500,000 and do something that all the members of Parliament were totally against is just preposterous—that people who have lots of money get what they want, when it's just....

Mr. Sean Moore: The bank lobby.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: The bank lobby is the classic one. God knows how much they spent. They spent hundreds of thousands of dollars, if not millions, and they didn't get what they wanted.

So I'd suggest that lots of money and big money and influential money with lots of very influential people doesn't always get what they want. So the system and the public accountability and the fact that there's lots of media attention to what goes on in fact does work. I think the system works a lot better than groups I see standing on the outside sometimes think it does.

The other thing is it doesn't have to be money. There are lots of times when a group will come to me as a member of Parliament and ask, how do you write a letter, how do you get things going, what do you do? The information we provide to them provides them everything I used to provide.... Well, maybe not everything, but it's cheaper to pay me than to pay the firm I used to work for. In fact there's more attention to pay to a non-profit organization than to a company.

I think some of the messages that come through in your presentation and in some of the stuff that I've seen and certainly that we heard from other organizations is really shocking, and completely not what's taking place from my perspective.

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: Then I would politely suggest that there's a PR campaign that needs to happen on the street, which is where I am, because that's the perception.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Yes, well obviously we all know where we're standing.

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: If I didn't believe in the system, I wouldn't have travelled ten hours on the plane yesterday to be here, so obviously I still have some amount of faith in the system.

Ms. Paddy Torsney: Absolutely. And as I say, there are lots more that I see in here that I like seeing than some of the other groups, so thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Torsney.

Mr. McTeague.

Mr. Dan McTeague: Thank you again, Madam Chair.

I can assure you, Ms. Montreuil and others, that not all members of Parliament have equal experiences. Some, depending on their area of expertise, as was suggested before, have had issues in the past where they have been somewhat concerned and indeed alarmed by the level of influence, for lack of a better term—the ability to perhaps determine outcomes of certain situations, especially when parliamentarians tend to be so transfixed with one or two or three most important issues. As evidenced or perhaps pursued by the media on any given day, a lot of stuff gets missed. Yet decisions take place. Many of them do not need to be taken by Parliament. They can be done, of course, by Order in Council or they can be done by regulation. This committee will be studying some of those in the next few days, and we'll probably be dealing with one that's extremely controversial.

I wanted to flesh something out, because I wanted to hear from each one of you. I've heard from you, Madam Montreuil, what your recommendations are. Mr. Chenier and Mr. Moore, I heard some words about intensity, and perhaps we should talk about how much money is involved here.

• 1700

I am coming back to the real and I believe evidenced view that there are people who have inordinate connections with those who make decisions. We also know there are people who currently work in the public sector who may ultimately wind up in the private sector. There are some concerns that go beyond the mandate of this committee as to the payment of public servants, that it may not be equal or analogous to what is being offered in the private sector.

I'm not going to mention departments, I'm not going to mention names, and I'm certainly not going to mention issues. I can discuss those with you afterwards. But for the purposes of what I think we all know and understand and where the public I think is at, what specific recommendations to help this act—because we're going to have other people, obviously, who are intimately involved as lobbyists who are going to be coming before this committee—would you see are necessary in order to ensure that we have the kind of transparency that members of Parliament can't always probe on their own?

The Chair: We keep asking this question in a number of different ways.

Mr. Dan McTeague: No, it's slightly different, this one; it was about probity.

The Chair: It's very similar to Mr. Lastewka's.

Mr. Chenier, do you want to give it a try again?

Mr. John Chenier: Give me a few seconds to think.

I'll turn it over to Sean.

The Chair: Mr. Moore.

Mr. Sean Moore: Are you talking about the act, or are you talking about generally in terms of—

Mr. Dan McTeague: No, we can't speak generally; we have to have to deal with the act. That's what's before the committee. It's been referred to the committee.

Your colleague, Madame Montreuil, has made several recommendations here. There's obviously one I like in regard to the cooling-off period of two to five years. But I've heard general comments about the concern as you see it, Mr. Moore, in your experience. Are there any specifics that you think would help this committee make some recommendations that would make this more than just simply a casual review of the act but would actually put some teeth into the act to ensure it meets the public's test that we're doing our job here?

Mr. Sean Moore: The only thing I could suggest on that, and I don't think this is what you're looking for, is I am troubled by the notion that there are people from the justice department who feel that the language of the current act hobbles the enforcement of it. And if that's the case, some attention should be paid to it.

Secondly, in terms of enforcement, I've heard and seen too many stillborn investigations under the Lobbyists Registration Act that go nowhere because of the enforcement period. We used to have six months in the first act, and now it's up to two years. Mind you, this all relates only to the summary offence side, but I think there should perhaps be a longer enforcement period, because it oftentimes does take so long for these things to surface and then be explored by whatever the enforcement authority is.

In terms of other information that can be provided through the Lobbyists Registration Act, I personally don't have any hang-up about the notion of a fee disclosure. My clients probably wouldn't be wild about it.

My own experience—and I know I'm ridiculed by my colleagues in the government relations business when I say this—is that the main objection to fee disclosure in the government relations business is that a lot of them don't want it known how little they charge certain clients. To get clients in the door they may only charge $2,000 or $3,000 a month, but they're charging someone else $9,000 a month for essentially the same thing. That's a powerful incentive not to have a financial disclosure, but for the exact opposite reasons from what you'd think.

So I don't know. On the financial stuff, I've gone back and forth on this notion of financial disclosure for years. When John and I were looking at what's happened when they got into financial disclosure in the United States, it got very silly very quickly because you had industry associations that had to calculate what percentage of their light and heat and parking was attributable to lobbying activity. The numbers very quickly became meaningless. And that's my problem with the notion of creating an expectation for a law, that it's going to tell you something you don't already know.

As Ms. Torsney pointed out, everyone knows the banks bet enormous amounts of money on the Bank Act, and it bought them squat at the end of the day. And there are many lobbies.

A successful lobbyist is successful in about 50% of the cases he takes on.

Mr. Dan McTeague: Big oil spent a lot of money on the Competition Act in 1986 and got the act they wanted.

The Chair: Mr. McTeague, thank you. We have two other people who wish to comment on your questions.

Mr. Chenier.

Mr. John Chenier: My problem with your question, Mr. McTeague, is that it goes again to something I said about the act. You're reviewing the mechanics of the act, and probably I would echo what my friend Sean just said. There are some problems with enforcement. And it would be good if on the third pass through we finally got an act that was enforceable and would be enforced.

• 1705

This leads me to my next concern, and that is the issue of the ethics counsellor. At the moment this person plays a key role in administering the act. There are problems with the way I see him performing his functions at the moment. It's possible that this person will become judge and jury. In other words, he will be looking at the conflict of interest code and determining whether a lobbyist has breached the code. He is responsible for acting on all complaints and instigating investigations but doesn't have an investigatory staff to begin with. I just think there are some things that have to be thought through as to how the act is implemented and enforced and with regard to the role of the ethics counsellor.

I also echo Sean's comments in saying that in my view—but that's been my view for a long time—the current mandate of the ethics counsellor is unsustainable.

The Chair: Mr. Chenier, I'm going to have to ask you to speed along, because we're going to run out of time. I think we're going to have bells at 5:15, and I have a number of questions I wanted to ask.

Mr. John Chenier: I think that the broader concerns go beyond just the mechanics of the act and go to the question, what is the purpose of the act, and is it meeting its purpose? It may look as if it's meeting its purpose today, but three headlines later we're up to here in doo-doo and we say, gee, if we had only done something different six months ago we wouldn't be here now. I think this is one of those acts that can quickly get you....

The Chair: Ms. Montreuil, did you wish to respond?

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: No.

The Chair: Okay.

I have a number of questions and a number of things I just want to clarify for the record. First, I want to assure everyone here we're not doing a casual review. Some members may not have been to all meetings, but we're not doing a casual review of this act.

Second, Mr. Chenier, you mentioned the ethics counsellor's position a couple of times. Should he be doing both functions, or should they be separate and distinct?

Mr. John Chenier: Yes.

The Chair: That's a yes? Everyone is in agreement with that? I got three nods for that.

I have another question. For government policy there was some talk earlier about how government policy is born. I think there are actually two types of government policy. I do believe there is the government policy that may start on the public service side, but I also do believe there's government policy that begins with from members of Parliament and evolves from there. I think there are a number of private member's bills, a number of ideas, and a number of caucus discussions that have changed things and put things into motion.

That being said, there are times when the public service or the government hires consultants and says that we'd like them to give us a report on that. Now, we know who the consultants are because they're out there and they're registered.

However, we don't know, for example, for a science review.... Consultants go out and talk to scientists. Who pays the scientists? They're going to come back and make recommendations. Do we know who pays the scientists? Do we have that information? Should the act cover more? Should it be a requirement that they divulge who they consult with? Should it go further, because when we get policy recommendations back from this consultant who's now registered, do we really know who's influencing that process?

Mr. Sean Moore: Are you talking about official government consultations, where they hire consultants to go out and conduct hearings? I don't know what you mean by registered consultants.

The Chair: Yes, that's what I'm talking about.

Mr. Sean Moore: Well, the science war.... The most complicated, difficult, and frustrating type of lobbying these days is anything that has to do with science and health. There are some rather interesting issues related to that. In fact, Professor Bill Stanbury at the University of British Columbia has talked before about some of the ethical problems associated with science wars, science lobbies, the fact that you can go out and buy almost any science you want these days, and how much transparency there is in that. Should we be requiring people who are providing what is supposed to be scientific evidence on something...should there be much more information about who paid them to do this?

The Chair: That was my question.

Mr. Sean Moore: If that's what you meant, okay.

I don't know where to begin on that one, because, boy, it's an awfully long food chain you follow after a while as to what sort of information is used and is provided to government. Do you have to catalogue how the human labour that went into producing that research was paid for at every point along the way? I don't know.

• 1710

The Chair: Mr. Chenier.

Mr. John Chenier: I agree with Sean that this process would be very laborious and perhaps not airtight. I think the important aspect is to ensure that your policy process is as open and transparent as possible. In this way people know who is involved, know who is giving the information and the advice, and know it is possible to challenge something on the basis of what they know. However, at the current time it may be that the people who are consulted, the people who are involved, are not generally known to anyone else because the consultative process is closed. Therein you would have your problem.

I don't think you should ask people whether they have ever worked for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco or whatever in order to make them say what they did 15 years ago, something that will taint all their evidence. I don't think you would necessarily want a process like that.

The Chair: Okay. I just want to follow up again with Ms. Montreuil as well.

In your brief, you talk about applying the code to all members of Parliament to prevent them from acting as lobbyists for private interests. I got elected to act for and to represent my constituents. My constituents have a number of interests. I'm not sure I really understand your statement there. I know it's been more or less discussed around here, but I just want to make sure there is some clarification here.

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: If you're considering the interests of all your constituents, then there's no problem.

The Chair: But—

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: But a code of conduct for MPs covers a lot more than just the lobbying aspect. I fail to see why, if it's present at the provincial level, it's not required at the federal level.

The Chair: I'm not familiar with all the different provincial requirements, but from a federal perspective and from my position I know why I was elected. For example, I have several different industries in my riding. I probably have one of the most diverse ridings in all of Canada, and there is hardly an industry I don't have. When I come here and talk about an industry that affects my constituents, am I lobbying on behalf of that industry to ensure that my constituents have jobs and to ensure that certain things happen? Is that offensive? I don't think so. I think that's my job. I think my job is to ensure that policy and legislation ensure that Canada continues to develop, that jobs are created, that my community grows, and that these opportunities are there. So—

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: If you're talking about all the interests in your riding.... In my own area of the world we have diamond mining, and we get the sense that this is the only and the most important issue, though it's certainly not the only thing that the constituents do. I'm not trying to talk about my MP in particular here, but I know our perception is that this is the issue that gets the most attention because it's the biggest, and there I would have a problem. If you've got several industries in your riding and you speak for what you feel is best for each and every one of them, then that's not a problem. The problem arises when it becomes skewed in one very narrow direction and toward one interest.

Mr. Walt Lastewka: Can you give us an example?

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: I just did: the diamond mining stuff in our area.

Mr. John Chenier: Well, there is the example in the U.K. with the mother Parliament where, in a sense, based on.... I believe it comes from when trade unions had what they called tied MPs elected for the Labour Party. Tied MPs were indeed union members who ran in safe seats. This subsequently led to a number of MPs accepting what were essentially retainers. There was the tobacco MP, who was paid a stipend beyond his MP salary by tobacco companies and who had signed a register as representing those companies.

The Chair: I think that's very different from what my question addressed. I'm trying to understand this. I understand what you're saying there, but the reality is that I represent a riding where, for example, the automobile industry is very important. I may talk more about the automobile industry than I do about fishing, but I have fishing in my riding as well. I also have some mining, but I don't talk about it as much as I talk about the automotive. Does that mean my efforts are skewed?

Mr. John Chenier: Madam Chair, I guess my point was that according to most definitions of lobbying you have to be paid to do it. Therefore, if you were accepting payment from certain constituents to put forward their point of view—

Ms. Paddy Torsney: But she gets her salary from it.

Mr. John Chenier: No. In a different.... When you look at definitions of lobbying, most of them say that you're doing something for pay or for money. If you prohibit MPs from lobbying, I would assume you're saying that they may not accept pay from other interests—

The Chair: So that's what you meant by your statement, Ms. Montreuil?

Ms. Suzette Montreuil: That would be the spirit of it, yes.

The Chair: Okay. I didn't understand it from the way it was put forward, so I just wanted to clarify that.

• 1715

Lastly, Mr. Moore, you mentioned that you don't see a lot of former MPs lobbying. I have to disagree with you on this from this point of view. If you look at the members of Parliament since 1993 who were elected—and obviously between governments you're going to see big changes in lobbyists—

Mr. Sean Moore: Yes.

The Chair: —because of the reality. But I have to tell you, as a member of Parliament, I have more time for a former member of Parliament I've worked with—probably regardless of party—than I do for a former minister's staff person, or someone I don't have a relationship with. I look at the people in Ontario who didn't run, the people who have not won in the past elections, I look at people from the east coast, and just from memory I can name four or five people....

Mr. Sean Moore: Sure.

The Chair: We haven't had a large turnover in Ontario since 1993, so I'm not sure I really understood the comment.

Mr. Sean Moore: I meant the demand side.

I'm not doubting for a minute that sitting MPs would have a far greater degree of comfort, ease, and credibility in dealing with a former member of any party, sitting down and talking to them about an issue. I'm saying I don't see a lot of demand for those services from former MPs. Former ministers and ministerial staff is a different matter.

I did a column in the Hill Times a while ago saying if you got into serious parliamentary reform in this country, it would create an explosion of work opportunities for former MPs and MPs' staff, because they would probably have a very hospitable reception on Parliament Hill among legislators. I don't think that's the case.

The Chair: I don't want to create this issue out there and have people go scurrying off to change the way they do business either, but I know from my own schedule and how it's booked that I would try to fit 15 minutes in if there was a former member of Parliament in town I had worked with. I'd fit them in. If there are people I don't know calling and asking to meet with me, and my schedule's booked for the day, it's not going to happen. They are going to have to give me more notice.

Mr. Sean Moore: Yes, absolutely.

The Chair: Different things happen. That's the way we all do business.

I do want to thank you and also to let you know that this committee has had a practice of being quite....

An hon. member: Straightforward.

The Chair: Straightforward is a good word.

We have changed legislation that's come before this committee—some would agree more to the benefits of this than others—but we have been very outspoken. This review is going to be very interesting when it's all done, and I have appreciated the diversity of comments today.

I can see not everyone agrees on what we should do. I'm sure we'll have some interesting discussions when we get to the report stage of this review.

If you have any other comments you wish to forward to us in the next few weeks, please do so in writing. We appreciate your taking the time to meet with us today.

The meeting is now adjourned.