JURI Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA JUSTICE ET DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, April 28, 1998

• 0907

[English]

The Chair (Ms. Shaughnessy Cohen (Windsor—St. Clair, Lib.)): We have a quorum. Today we have Ward Elcock, director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

Welcome. I know you know the drill, so we'll just relax and listen.

Mr. Ward P.D. Elcock (Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service): I don't have a statement to make, Madam Chair, so if you want to go straight to questions, I'd be happy to.

The Chair: Mr. Lee.

Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.): Thank you.

Welcome back—

The Chair: How did I know to go to you?

Mr. Derek Lee: I was bright-eyed, bushy-tailed, and ready to go.

Mr. Elcock, there are two issues I want to take up. The first has to do with the apparent utilization of resources within CSIS for the purpose of assisting—at least as I understand it, and you can correct me if I'm wrong... A person went to MOUs or other arrangements assisting the Government of Canada in focusing on organized crime, organized crime that presumably has an origin outside of Canada. That's my take on it.

Can you confirm that CSIS, by way of partnering, an MOU, or other arrangement with any other agencies of the Canadian government or any governments elsewhere in the world, is using its resources to target, investigate, or gather information on organized crime that's based outside of Canada?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Mr. Chairman, the question with respect to organized crime is simply whether it comes within our mandate. If it can be defined as a threat to the security of Canada within our mandate, we would have the authority to carry out investigations in respect of organized crime.

The next question of course is whether we can in fact make a contribution. There are lots of things in the world one can do if one looks at one's mandate, but one obviously does the things that are the highest priority and the things on which one can make a contribution. There are clearly some areas of organized crime where we probably can't add very much to what the police can do. There are other areas of organized crime, such as Russian organized crime, I suppose, where we think we probably could make a contribution.

Mr. Derek Lee: So speaking hypothetically, CSIS might be able to assist in that envelope—referring here to what you call Russian organized crime.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Our role may in some respects be to assist, but like any other area of the CSIS mandate, our job is to conduct investigations and provide information and advice to the Government of Canada. That is a different role from the one the police have. The police have an enforcement role.

If we are to make a contribution, it must be within the traditional context we normally make it. Simply to provide lead information to the police forces across the country is a useful thing, and we do that in many fronts—if we find information of importance to the police, we provide it to them. But our job is primarily to advise the government, not to go out and dig for leads for the police.

• 0910

Mr. Derek Lee: Okay. Rather than beat around the bush, let's just... The issue is organized crime. The issue is whether or not, within your mandate, CSIS is using resources that you believe are part of an initiative to target and investigate organized crime.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Madam Chair, if we decide that it's part of our mandate, and I think we've been clear that it is an area we have some interest in, some of our resources are targeted at certain kinds of organized crime.

Mr. Derek Lee: Okay.

That type of initiative, should it occur or have occurred, would fall within what I think of as counter-terrorism or counter-intelligence. It would be a different operational envelope, as I would think of it. Can you get me organized on that? What branch of the service would be likely to become involved in an information-gathering initiative like that?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I don't think it's particularly important which branch of the service; it would probably be part of CI, but the reality is that where you put it is not particularly relevant. From our point of view, the issue is simply whether it's a threat to national security. If we can come to the conclusion that it's a threat to national security, and in some areas we have, then it's something we can investigate and inquire into, if indeed we can make a contribution.

Mr. Derek Lee: Okay, that's helpful. Thank you.

The second item I wanted to address is the one that's currently in public view. This is the matter of allegations that the service has unduly pressured individuals who are refugee claimants, new Canadians waiting for some sort of immigration processing, to assist the service in answering questions about subjects the service would like to have answers to. The public record has seen a number of individuals come forward over the last few weeks, generally alleging that CSIS has been unfair, has overplayed its hand, has misled some of these individuals into believing the service could be helpful or unhelpful in the processing of their immigration papers. To your knowledge, has CSIS made any errors in dealing with these individuals?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Mr. Chairman, I don't know who the specific individuals are. Notwithstanding the fact that somebody has said the letter has been sent to me, I have seen no letter and received no names, so either it's apocryphal or it's on the pony express somewhere. I have no knowledge of the individual cases and can't really comment on them, except to the extent that the book mentioned in testimony before another committee of the House, when you read it, doesn't reveal any such evidence of what was alleged to be undue pressure on immigrants. That said, I'm sure those individuals, if they feel they have a case, ultimately will send in a notice and will be heard by SIRC.

From our point of view, we're an organization of human beings, so mistakes will from time to time be made. That's inevitable. Having said that, it is clear to our officers that they cannot promise immigrants or refugees assistance with their status.

Mr. Derek Lee: What about non-assistance?

• 0915

Mr. Ward Elcock: In point of fact, if one reads the book that was mentioned with respect to the CIC, what was in fact taking place in the interview that I believe a Ms. Leddy was talking about was an immigration interview in which Ms. Leddy participated. That was simply a case of a CSIS officer interviewing somebody who was claiming either refugee status or seeking some status in Canada.

It was a formal interview in which the individual may well be asked questions. If the individual doesn't answer any of the questions and doesn't provide any of the information in the immigration interview, then it may well be not of very much assistance to their case before immigration.

Mr. Derek Lee: In any event, as director, you haven't the kind of letter or introduction to these cases that the public has by way of the press conference, and I'm not in a position—

Mr. Ward Elcock: Certainly in the case of the Kurdish immigrants alleging that they were mistreated, I certainly haven't seen anything yet. It may well come in, and they'll have a chance to make their case.

Mr. Derek Lee: Okay.

Is there a ministerial direction governing the precise issue of questioning new Canadians or Canadians in the process of immigration processing? Is there a specific direction that governs that at this time?

Mr. Ward Elcock: There are a number of directions. There isn't a specific direction on that specific subject that I can recall. Having said that, there are a bunch of ministerial directions and a whole lot of policies that deal with all those issues in excruciating detail, some of which, certainly in the case of ministerial directions, are public, but much of that is, as you know, not available.

Mr. Derek Lee: Would you agree that persons in that circumstance, where first of all they are new Canadians who might not understand everything about Canadian law and the Canadian way of life and CSIS, individuals who are being processed for immigration, might feel vulnerable when CSIS, or another government agency for that matter, comes knocking? It might be something the service should specifically note as an area of more careful procedure, either internally or by way of a ministerial direction.

Mr. Ward Elcock: We do, Mr. Chairman. The policy of the service is that people may not promise immigration assistance, and secondly, that it should be clear to people they are interviewing that anything they provide is voluntary.

When you're doing a formal immigration interview—and that doesn't take place with every single immigrant, but it takes place not infrequently—then the individual may well be asked questions. The point of the interview is to determine whether indeed there is anything about that particular individual that would make them inadmissible to Canada. That's our job, and at the end of the day I don't think we can apologize for doing it. There are strict rules on how people are supposed to do it.

Mr. Derek Lee: By an immigration interview, you're talking about an interview by CSIS for purposes of the immigration processing that the immigrant's undergoing.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes.

Mr. Derek Lee: That's not an interview by the immigration department; that's an interview by CSIS.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Well, CSIS has a role in that immigration process.

Mr. Derek Lee: That's right.

Mr. Ward Elcock: As I understand it from Ms. Leddy's book, that's indeed what she was describing in her book and described to the committee as something else.

Mr. Derek Lee: Yes.

There's one element you didn't mention, and it evolves out of the way these interviews happen or the way CSIS gathers its information—and I'm setting this as a kind of no-fault perspective.

The job of CSIS, of course, is to gather information. It does it within the law, and there's no reason why a new Canadian should be any less likely or any more likely to be asked a question in a particular way than is a Canadian who has been here all his life.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Certainly somebody in the immigration process may well be asked questions—

Mr. Derek Lee: Definitely.

Mr. Ward Elcock: —about their background, and—

Mr. Derek Lee: So I approach the issue on a no-fault basis. What you didn't mention was a scenario where the individual being asked the question... And this isn't necessarily just an immigration interview. This could be another file where CSIS has gone to a person who happens to be a new Canadian who might know something about an issue on which CSIS is gathering information. The scenario involves the CSIS agent suggesting that the processing might be impaired, not helped; if the cooperation isn't forthcoming, maybe either the immigration aspect of the processing or some other element might not move so smoothly if the cooperation isn't there.

It's not a scenario where CSIS might hold out special treatment later. It's a case where the inference being drawn by the new Canadian is that he or she has a paper problem, because CSIS isn't going to cooperate later if the new Canadian doesn't cooperate now. You didn't hit the nail on the head on that one.

• 0920

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'm happy to hit the nail on the head. That shouldn't happen, and I doubt very much that it has happened. Quite clearly, if somebody isn't prepared to provide information in an immigration interview, that will hinder the processing of their application. There's no question about it. It's a fact of life.

Having said that, if I understood it, you're painting a different scenario.

Mr. Derek Lee: You've made another good point, and that is, the subject matter of the interview is the individual himself or herself, and the failure to provide frank answers would, by that very fact, delay or slow down or impair the clearance—if I can call it that—process.

Mr. Ward Elcock: That's right.

Mr. Derek Lee: I accept that as a good point.

Anyway, my perception is that it's an area that might well be addressed either by some further attention inside the service or, although this isn't your job, a ministerial direction that may not reset the goalposts but may fine-tune the sensitivities of the service on a no-fault basis.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lee.

Just to follow up on what Mr. Lee was asking, do you know whether SIRC has had a complaint or whether SIRC is investigating this particular issue?

Mr. Ward Elcock: On the part of the Kurdish immigrants?

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Ward Elcock: I don't know if they've had one directly. Normally people would be told to write to me—

The Chair: Yes.

Mr. Ward Elcock: —and then I would send it off to SIRC and they would begin the process.

The Chair: They sometimes act, though, if it comes from press reports.

Mr. Ward Elcock: They sometimes do. Whether they would in this case or not, I don't know. At this point, there's not very much information on the table.

The Chair: I see. Thanks.

Mr. Marceau.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau (Charlesbourg, BQ): You were here last week, Mr. Elcock, when I questioned the Solicitor General. Could you explain to the committee why you decided not to award a bilingualism bonus to CSIS employees?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Madam Chair, the decision on the bilingual bonus was taken in 1985, some considerable period before I was director of the service.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Have you ever considered overturning this decision which was taken before you became director of the service?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Madam Chair, the issue came up, there being, as I'm sure the member knows, a number of people in the service who feel they should have received the bilingual bonus or who feel they are entitled to it. We looked at the issue, but the reality is that even if we were to decide to change it—and that would be a significant policy change, given the way we manage the service—we simply couldn't afford it, in any case.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Do you think a francophone feels comfortable today working for your organization?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: I believe so, Madam Chair.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: If an employee feels somewhat at a disadvantage as a francophone, is there any recourse available to him? For example, is there a committee that he can address his grievance to?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Certainly, Madam Chair, the individual has access to the grievance process if they wish to utilize it. In some cases, they can also go to the PSSRB. In other cases, individuals can go to SIRC. In this case specifically, I haven't looked at whether they would be able to. They can also go to the official languages commissioner—and do, frequently.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: They do so quite regularly. They must have a good reason.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: It's not frequently in the sense that there are a large number of complaints. But if there are people who feel with respect to any particular issue that they have something to investigate, then they avail themselves of their rights, with which I have no problem. No institution is entirely perfect.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: No, but there are ways of making it better.

• 0925

I have here a letter received on February 2, 1998...

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: And we deal with those complaints and those recommendations when they come in from the language commissioner.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: I have here a letter dated February 2, 1998 or received on February 2, 1998 by one of my colleagues reporting how the Security Intelligence Review Committee or SIRC held a meeting in Quebec City in English only on May 8, 1997. No simultaneous interpretation was provided. In your opinion, is it normal for an organization like this to hold a meeting exclusively English in the capital of French Canada, in a supposedly bilingual country?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Madam Chair, I think you'd have to talk to SIRC about that issue. It's not a matter within my control. That was a SIRC interview.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: I have another letter, again dated February 2, 1998, from the office of the Commissioner of Official Languages following up on a complaint from one of your employees. Apparently, you posted an E-mail in English only on January 22, 1998. Again, given that this is supposed to be a bilingual country, don't you think the director of an organization like yours should at least make an effort to send messages to his employees in both French and English?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: We do, Madam Chair. Usually both messages would go out at the same time. In that case an error was made, as sometimes happens in life. A message in English and French went out an hour or so later.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Why is there one dated February 2, 1998, another dated December 23, 1997 and still another dated December 19, 1997? We're talking about more than one mistake. As the saying goes, if it happens once, it's a mistake, if it happens twice, it's a coincidence and if it happens three times, then it's habitual.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: I have no specific knowledge. The dates mean nothing to me, Madam Chair. I'm not sure what the member is referring to.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: I will be happy to send them along to you later. I'm confident that the office of the Commissioner of Official Languages has been in touch with you. I find it amazing that...

[English]

The Chair: Mr. Marceau, if you're going to cross-examine him on documents that you have in front of you, why don't you let him see what they are?

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Of course.

[English]

The Chair: Maybe that will help Mr. Elcock.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: I'm assuming, Madam Chair, that he has received a copy of these documents.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Madam Chair, these are all about different issues. As I said, from time to time issues will be raised with the official languages commissioner, but there's nothing in these that makes them, as I think the member was suggesting, all exactly of a piece. They're all of different issues and have been raised—

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: In any event, it's a language that I understand fairly well. These E-mail messages originate from your office and were sent to employees in English only.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Madam Chair, in terms of the number of messages that go out over our e-mail system in any day, they probably number in the hundreds or thousands. In some cases people make errors and translations aren't sent out at the same time. We deal with those issues when they come up and we deal with any issues that go to the official languages commissioner.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Hundreds or thousands of messages go out from your office every day. Is that correct?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Madam Chair, I don't think all of these were from my office.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: At least two out of the three were from your office.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'll read them more carefully, Madam Chair. If the member wants me to take the time to read them, I'm happy to do that.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: I'll give you a copy of these letters and let you get back to me on this.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Certainly.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Fine. Moving on to another topic, the number two person in your organization was Jean-Louis Gagnon and I understand that he has retired. Is that correct?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes, he did, after a long and very fruitful career.

• 0930

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Fine. Before retiring, as I understand it and according to your testimony before the committee last year, he embarked on a kind out round-the-world trip to meet with other similar services. Isn't that right?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: There was a question in that respect that I thought at the time made a rather insulting question.

Mr. Gagnon went on a trip to visit a number of other services. He took with him an individual who was going to work for him and replace him in his responsibilities, at the time, and to introduce him to his colleagues in a number of countries we deal with on a frequent basis. To suggest that there is something improper in that is, to me, insulting in the extreme.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Do you have any idea of what this trip cost Canadian taxpayers?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: I don't have the numbers off the top of my head at this point in time. The members should understand that dealing with foreign services is something we do on a frequent basis. Of necessity, because you are dealing on a personal basis with foreign services and you don't, as one of my colleagues in France once said to me, share information with people you don't know, we do expend a fair amount of money in terms of maintaining and building those relationships with foreign services.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Isn't it odd that a senior official would undertake a trip of this magnitude a few months before retirement?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: I don't find it odd in the least. As I said, Mr. Gagnon went accompanied with his successor, and to introduce him to a number of people around the world. Mr. Gagnon had had a long association with a number of those countries and a number of those people. To introduce your successor to the people he's going to deal with I would have thought would have been an extraordinary helpful thing to do, and I'm somewhat puzzled by the member's attitude to it.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Was Mr. Gagnon entitled to some severance pay upon retirement?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: I don't recall precisely what happened. I'd have to go back and check.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Could you possibly find that out for me?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Certainly.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Are any other members of Mr. Gagnon's family employed by CSIS?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: His wife works in the service.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: I see. And at what level is she employed?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: She's in the executive category. She's just joined the ML category, management level.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: At which level is she? The levels range from 1 to 15 or something like that. Am I correct?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes, roughly.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: At which level is she?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Off the top of my head, no. She's either a nine or a ten.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Is it possible for one of your employees to skip a level, that is to jump from the level 4 to level 6?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: In any organization, those kinds of promotions sometimes happen.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: I see.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: An organization that doesn't have the flexibility to do that in the appropriate situation is a pretty inflexible organization.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: How does someone go about skipping a level? Does this had anything to do with the director's discretionary power?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: It would certainly be within my power to do so.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: On what would you base your decision?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: It would be based on the quality of the individual and the qualifications and experience of the individual, among other things.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Can you tell us whether Mr. Gagnon's spouse skipped a level?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: I couldn't tell you off the top of my head.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Would be possible to verify that and to get back to me with that information?

[English]

The Chair: Could we hold for a minute? Do we have a Privacy Act problem here?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I was going to raise that question, Madam Chair. I don't know the answer off the top of my head whether it's a Privacy Act problem. If there isn't, I'd be happy to provide it; if there is, I won't.

The Chair: We'll come back to you, Mr. Marceau.

Mr. Derek Lee: On a point of order, I respect the intention of protecting elements of privacy of the individual whose name is being discussed here, but I don't accept that if this committee, as opposed to the members... The member has asked a question, but I don't accept that there would be a privacy bar to this committee obtaining any information about any employee. I wanted to make that point of order. However, in the context of this sequence, I don't have anything further to add.

• 0935

The Chair: Thanks, Mr. Lee. That's a fair point. But having said that, there's an employee who has an expectation of privacy, and I just wanted to make sure that we have something on the record about that.

Mr. Marceau, we'll come back to you.

Mr. Peter MacKay.

Mr. Peter MacKay (Pictou—Antigonish—Guysborough, PC): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Elcock, for being with us this morning.

It came to light last fall that the Federal Court of Canada, with the consent of the Solicitor General, had approved applications for warrants for CSIS wiretaps, and those warrants were fairly broad in their scope. They allowed CSIS agents not only to eavesdrop on their suspects, but it came to light during the investigation that they were fairly broad and encompassed the gathering of information on individuals not named in the warrants. It allowed your agents to do that without going back to court to broaden these warrants.

In her decision on this matter, Federal Court Justice Donna McGillis called this practice unconstitutional. The evidence that was gathered would therefore be open to a legal challenge.

Can you as director assure the committee that CSIS has stopped this practice? Can you tell us how many warrants of that nature were granted and exercised?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Madam Chair, I think the member is operating under a misapprehension, and it may be that he hasn't read the subsequent ruling issued by Madam Justice McGillis, which I think explains the situation somewhat. The power that he's talking about is in fact a very narrow power. It was a power simply to deal with visiting foreign intelligence officers from a particular country, so it was a very narrow power indeed.

The issue that was before the court was a question as to whether or not there was delegation from the court—it's a classic legal issue—whether there was delegation in the warrant or not. It was our view at the time that, indeed, there had not been delegation. It was the judge's view that the wording of the warrant was sufficient to be delegation. It was a narrow legal issue on a very narrow legal provision. It wasn't what was portrayed at the time in the media.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Thank you for enlightening us on that. Can you tell us if the practice has been discontinued?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Given that the court ruled that such a clause would be delegation, obviously it hasn't continued.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Thank you.

Can you tell us how many applications were made for that type of warrants in the 1996-97 year?

Mr. Ward Elcock: In those kinds of situations, it would not be unusual to have had that provision.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Can you tell us in numbers how many would be made?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Not off the top of my head, Madam Chair.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Is that information available or can it be made available?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'd have to look at whether we in fact have the information and whether we could collate it, because it may simply be a question of availability.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Can you give us a ballpark figure? How many applications for those types of warrants would have been made? Surely, they can't be that—

Mr. Ward Elcock: With those kinds of provisions in it, no. It wouldn't be something we would necessarily track individually.

Mr. Peter MacKay: So there wouldn't be a great number of them.

Mr. Ward Elcock: There would be a number. I can't tell you off the top of my head how many there would be, Madam Chair.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Surely you would keep statistics on how many. If it's not a great number—

Mr. Ward Elcock: No, it's not something on which we would keep statistics. It was simply a narrow provision in a warrant. As a consequence of the judge's ruling, those provisions are no longer in the warrant.

Mr. Peter MacKay: So if there were not a lot, you could put a number on them

Mr. Ward Elcock: There are a lot. Over the years there are a fair number of warrants, and in a number of warrants that may appear. It would require us to go back through every one of the pre-existing warrants and determine whether or not that clause was in the warrant.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I've asked you for one year.

Mr. Ward Elcock: We can do that. I don't have it off the top of my head.

Mr. Peter MacKay: So if I were to write to you, you could give us the answer to that.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Probably, Madam Chair.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Okay. Thank you.

When CSIS took over for the RCMP on a number of these files, I assume that all of those files were passed over to CSIS.

Mr. Ward Elcock: A large number of the files were passed over. Large numbers of those have been either reviewed and destroyed or have gone to archives.

Mr. Peter MacKay: When they're reviewed and destroyed—

Mr. Ward Elcock: I think in point of fact we have almost none of their files left at this juncture. In fact, I think we have gone through all of the files we have left, and the ones we haven't retained have either gone to archives or been destroyed.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Okay. And when they're destroyed, what's the process for doing that? How do you do it?

• 0940

Mr. Ward Elcock: There's a process put in place in agreement with the National Archives, because they would have had concerns about documents being destroyed. So that would have been done in the context of National Archives' position on what should be retained and what should be destroyed.

Mr. Peter MacKay: So CSIS has nothing to do with the destruction of the files? Do they simply hand them over?

Mr. Ward Elcock: We would have had something to do with the review of the files. We have to determine whether in fact there was anything in the files that was important for us to keep. Otherwise, we would have been doing the process, but we would have been doing it with National Archives.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Okay. What is the process then of the destruction of former RCMP files?

Mr. Ward Elcock: If you want a formal process, as I said, it's concluded. I'd have to write you a note and give you the formal process we used.

Mr. Jack Ramsay (Crowfoot, Ref.): I have a point of order. This information that Mr. MacKay is seeking, could he provide it to the committee, rather than just to an individual member of the committee?

The Chair: I'm sure that if the committee wants the information, yes. If you want it, we'll have Mr. Elcock write us instead of directly to Mr. MacKay.

Mr. Peter MacKay: When the RCMP was keeping files under the same guidelines as those under which CSIS would be collecting the information—

Mr. Ward Elcock: We could collect information and retain information under vastly different guidelines than those of the RCMP.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Okay. Can you outline the difference for us?

Mr. Ward Elcock: That's not a small task. If the member would like a description of what rules apply to the collection and retention of documents, I'd be happy to write the committee another note.

Mr. Peter MacKay: What are the basic criteria, off the top of your head?

The Chair: Do you mean for collection or saving, Peter?

Mr. Peter MacKay: I meant for the collection of information.

Mr. Ward Elcock: You have to go back to the legislation and review the provisions that tell you what we can collect and retain.

Mr. Peter MacKay: But what are the basic criteria? Surely you, as director, would be able to tell us what the basic criteria would be for opening a file on an individual.

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'm not quite sure what the member is getting at. If the member would like—

Mr. Peter MacKay: Would you keep files on people around this table? Would you open a file—

The Chair: I asked him if he had my computer password this morning, and he wouldn't tell me.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Not as people around this table. If there were any reason that any individual around this table came within our mandate because they were supporting a political cause that advocated the use of violence, then we might well have a file. But otherwise, I wouldn't have a file on anybody around this table.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Okay.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Nor would I have any interest in having a file on anybody around this table.

Some hon. members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Peter MacKay: It would be pretty dry stuff.

The ministerial directions that you receive, do they encompass you, at any time, while you're meeting with the minister or minister's staff?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I meet with the minister generally every week.

Mr. Peter MacKay: I know you can't reveal the subject matter of those discussions, but the general purpose of those meetings is what?

Mr. Elcock: The general purpose of those meeting is to deal with any issues that he has to approve and to advise him of any issues about which I, as director, should be telling him.

Mr. Peter MacKay: The 1995-96 annual report noted that there was an increase in the involvement of CSIS in investigating transnational crimes. How does the service avoid conflicts and duplication with the RCMP, Revenue Canada, or some of the other existing federal agencies? How do you ensure that you're not investigating the same matters?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I think the fundamental answer to the question, Madam Chair, is that we work very closely with the RCMP and the other agencies the member mentioned to ensure that we don't have any conflicts. In point of fact, our role, with respect to organized crime, or indeed anything else we do, is very different from the RCMP's role.

We can run up against the RCMP in the context of a terrorist issue, as well. After all, terrorism is a crime, and we can therefore conceivably be investigating the same people on some occasions for different purposes. The RCMP would be there for enforcement purposes, while CSIS would be providing advice and information to the Government of Canada, which allows it to do a bunch of different things.

On the organized crime front, clearly, our primary role is to provide advice to the government that would allow it to do things that are not necessarily enforcement. We may be able to give some information to the RCMP or large municipal police forces across the country about an individual or group, but our primary role is to give information to the government that allows it, say, to deal with somebody trying to get into the country or to deal with certain kinds of financial transactions in a different way that avoids a problem. That's what our role is in that area and in any other area.

Mr. Peter MacKay: So presumably there's a fair bit of information exchanged then between these federal agencies.

• 0945

Mr. Ward Elcock: There is a lot of information and a lot of discussion between all of the agencies.

Mr. Peter MacKay: All right. With respect to this report that I mentioned, 1995-96, where they talk about an increased involvement of CSIS in international or transnational crimes, I'm not looking for a precise figure, but what is the percentage of time that your agency spends in that area?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Relatively tiny.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Small.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes.

Mr. Peter MacKay: Thank you, Madam Chair.

The Chair: Thanks. Mr. Ramsay.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Yes, thank you, Madam Chair. And I wish to thank Mr. Elcock for fielding all these questions.

Under section 13 of the act, it authorizes you to conduct security screening investigations concerning those requiring security clearances who enter the country through our immigration laws. This is the most visible of the service's functions. It's performed in relation to government employee or contract or security clearances. The figures supplied by CSIS indicate that the immigration department asked for a check in less than 10% of applications for immigration and visas.

There are reports that indicate there are hundreds of modern-day war criminals residing in Canada. How is it that these criminals slip in undetected? Is it because they're not screened? Is CSIS not being used to its full extent to screen individuals coming into Canada, particularly where their origin is from war-torn countries where there are terrorist activities and so on? How is it that these people are entering this country?

Mr. Ward Elcock: To the extent that people enter the country, from our point of view and from the immigration department's point of view, to the extent that we can stop people at the border, obviously that's a good deal less expensive and a lot more productive than having to deal with them when they're here. We don't have to target them and nobody has to work to get them out of the country.

Having said that, in many cases it's very difficult to know. In some cases we have advance information that allows us to know that somebody is not who they claim to be, and that enables us to stop them or the immigration people to stop them. In many cases, we don't have that information and we or the RCMP can only determine after they arrive that they indeed are somebody else with a record. The information is not necessarily freely available, and some of the information that one might get in other places is not always trustworthy.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: If you're not asked to do a security clearance and no security clearance is done, to what extent are you asked to do a security clearance on new arrivals into Canada?

Mr. Ward Elcock: On new arrivals into Canada, immigrants or refugees, we do a significant number of checks. Depending on essentially what we're looking for, unless we have specific information on people, what we're looking for are people who match a profile.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Well is 10%—

Mr. Ward Elcock: In other words, they may ask us to specifically do an interview in some cases. But whether they ask us or not, because there's automatic transfer of the data, we review the data that's coming in and assess whether or not in regard to the individual we should provide a recommendation to CIC on their admissibility.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: There have been approximately 250,000 immigrants who came into Canada each year. Do you do a check on all of them?

Mr. Ward Elcock: In the sense that it all comes to us as a computerized list with whatever information is there and we run the list.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: If these figures are accurate, why is it that we have hundreds of suspected modern-day war criminals in this country?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I don't have any information about war criminals. I understand there is work going on in other ministries and other departments, in the RCMP and CIC in particular, and the Department of Justice. But it isn't something we focus on unless there is specific information we have that we can provide about an individual. The problem in many cases, I suspect, is the absence of information that allows one to know what an individual's background is.

• 0950

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Is CSIS the first line of defence against undesirables coming into Canada? In this context, “undesirables” are defined as people who have criminal records, particularly those who have committed what would be described as war crimes in other countries. Is CSIS the first line of defence against that?

Mr. Ward Elcock: The immigration process is the first line of defence. CSIS, the RCMP, and other organizations contribute. If there is information we're aware of—for example, that an individual has a criminal background—we would pass that on. It is largely the RCMP's responsibility to deal with the issue of criminality.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: What information would CSIS have with regard to people applying in other countries for applications to enter Canada? To follow up on what you've just said, isn't it almost impossible for CSIS to know about an individual who might have a criminal record, might have been involved in terrorist activity? Isn't it almost impossible for CSIS to have this information at the time of application?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I wouldn't say it's impossible. It's something that's difficult, and in some cases we may not have any information, and may not be able to get any information. In some countries in the world—and I think of Somalia, for example—it is very difficult to get information where there is not much in the way of record-keeping at this juncture.

So there are places where it is very difficult, but there are lots of ways in which we can and do obtain information. We work hard at it, and apply it as best we can to ensure that we pick off anybody coming in who shouldn't be coming in.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: I guess the problem we have is that it's alarming to hear that there are hundreds of modern-day war criminals in Canada. That's alarming. It seems to me, from the information you're providing here today, that your organization is not much of a defence against that. Why is that? Perhaps you can tell me, from your personal opinion, if these figures are true and the sources are reasonably reliable, why we have so many of these types of people coming into this country undetected.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Madam Chair, I think the figures were the figures provided by the member. I don't have any personal knowledge of the numbers, so I don't know whether they're accurate.

In terms of CSIS's job, we do it very well, I think. Indeed, when people look at how we process immigration, they're considerably impressed. We have had some success. So I don't think we're a problem. Indeed, I think we're part of the solution, and we do a good job of doing that. But it is an imperfect world, and we will not in all cases have all the information we need, particularly if somebody is trying to get into the country with falsified documents or has destroyed all their documents or there are no records. There may be cases where we will have to deal with them once they are in the country rather than before they get in here.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Do you challenge the figures? I think a year and a half ago it was reported that some 300 modern-day war criminals were residing in Canada.

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'm not challenging the figures. It's just that I'm not aware of the numbers of war criminals in the country.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Are you concerned about it?

Mr. Ward Elcock: If we have any information whatsoever that an individual is a war criminal, we will pass it on to the appropriate authorities. In this case, the RCMP largely would be dealing with that issue, not us.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: I thought you would be more aware of it than we on this committee would be.

Mr. Ward Elcock: I am certainly aware of the issue. All I said was that I am not aware of the numbers. In terms of the report in the newspaper, I am not aware of any specific numbers or of any confirmed numbers.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: I'll give you an example. A fellow by the name of Lai Shui Fong, the leader of a warring Macao triad gang, moved to Vancouver last year. This man originally applied for immigration status in Hong Kong in 1994, but his application was never approved. In March 1996 he reapplied and then mysteriously withdrew his application. In May of 1996, this man visited Los Angeles and reapplied at the consulate there. His application was approved in September and he landed in Vancouver on October 20.

• 0955

The immigration minister has never confirmed whether an RCMP or CSIS check was done or ordered on this man's application. Do you know whether a CSIS check was done on this particular individual?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Not off the top of my head. And whether or not we would have had... We're not a criminal enforcement agency. If we have information on issues of criminality in our files, it's because somebody has another reason for being on our files; they're either part of intelligence services or they're terrorists. So in our case, it would be accidental. In that case, you're talking about a member of a triad, a criminal. It would be accidental if there were something on our files—or for some other reason.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: All right. When an individual like this makes application to immigrate to Canada, what's the process that's followed? They make application—and in this case, it was through the Canadian consulate in Los Angeles—and what's the procedure from there?

Mr. Ward Elcock: If they're making application from there, then the immigration officer may or may not ask us to do an interview, depending on what they know about the individual and what the situation is.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Do you only do background or screening checks on immigrants if you're requested to do so by the immigration department?

Mr. Ward Elcock: In that case, we would be doing an interview on the basis of a request by CIC.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: But that's not my question. My question is do you do your screening only on those individuals for whom a request is made by the immigration department?

Mr. Ward Elcock: To do an interview? Yes, only when a request by CIC is made to us.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: So if no request is made by the immigration department, you do not do a screening check.

Mr. Ward Elcock: We don't do an interview, no.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: What's the difference between an interview and a screening check?

Mr. Ward Elcock: We have a process that essentially runs the applications through our files and we do a quick check, which may or may not turn up something.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Is that for all applications?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Virtually all; I wouldn't want to say all, but virtually all of them. It's largely electronic data transfer, so it's easier for us to do it that way now.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: So everyone applying for immigration or refugee status here is run through your computer check?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I think the answer to that would be most. Certainly virtually all would have gone through a computer check. Again, whether there's anything on our file is another matter.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: And then what is an interview?

Mr. Ward Elcock: An interview would be something we were asked to do at a post by CIC with respect to a particular applicant because there were some concerns about the applicant or there was some indication that caused them to want us to interview the individual.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: So that request would come from CIC?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: And if it doesn't come from CIC, then you don't...

Mr. Ward Elcock: No. We wouldn't do an interview.

Mr. Jack Ramsay: Okay. That's all I have for the time being. Thank you.

The Chair: Thanks, Mr. Ramsay.

Mrs. Finestone.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone (Mount Royal, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chairman.

You say CSIS doesn't act outside of Canada under the CSIS Act, which doesn't provide the service with a foreign intelligence mandate, only with a very limited one within Canada in relation to non-Canadians. You do, however, as I understand it, have security liaison officers within some Canadian countries and embassies. Is that accurate?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Not entirely, Madam Chair. Let me explain the situation a little. In the context of our foreign intelligence mandate, we are specifically limited to operating within Canada, and we only do operate in Canada in furtherance of foreign intelligence. Effectively, foreign intelligence means “those things it is nice to know”.

In the context of our national security mandate, we do operate both in Canada and outside of Canada.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: So you do act outside of Canada.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Fine. Do you collect information from authorities in the countries where you operate?

• 1000

Mr. Ward Elcock: In the context of our national security mandate, we have SLOs abroad who are there purely as liaison officers with foreign services to facilitate the exchange of information.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: This is with liaison officers who may not be part of CSIS but who are in the embassies?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No, all the liaison officers are officers of CSIS.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: I see. Does most of it relate to immigration and citizenship screening?

Mr. Ward Elcock: They do a lot of that work on post, but they also facilitate the movement of any information from foreign agencies to us that relates to a variety of issues within our mandate.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: How do you do some kind of training? Is there any special training you give your security liaison officers prior to their being posted?

Mr. Ward Elcock: All of our liaison officers are experienced intelligence officers to begin with, Madam Chair. We provide them with a five- to six-week course, before they go abroad, to deal with an embassy abroad in a foreign country. We also, in some cases, provide language training, since it's crucial to us they are able to speak the language, if they don't already speak it.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Would one criterion of hiring be a multiplicity of languages or skill in a number of languages?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Certainly in our intelligence officer category we do try to hire people who have languages. If people have languages, it's a bonus for us.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: I want to revisit an issue that caused serious concern by Canada. I'm referring specifically to the Mossad agents in September 1997 who made an attempt in Jordan on the life of a Hamas official. The Mossad agents were travelling in Jordan on what appeared to be Canadian passports, real or forged. I was alleged that they were provided by Canadian government sources either directly or indirectly. What role, if any, did CSIS employees or their agents play in this event?

Mr. Ward Elcock: As I said in the CTV interview at the time, CSIS played no role in any of those events. I can't imagine why we would be providing forged passports, because indeed, the documents were entirely forged. Why we would be providing forged documents to anybody, I can't imagine.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: I happened to be in Israel with the foreign affairs minister when this took place. Norman Spector, former ambassador of Canada to Israel, alleged that CSIS employees or agents have engaged in joint operations with Israeli intelligence services. Is that accurate?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I can't comment, Madam Chair, on any operations we would do with any foreign service, whether it's Mossad or any other. Let me just say generically that in the context of any operation we do with a foreign service on an area within our mandate, that operation would be something that ministers would have approved. Indeed, it would have been determined to be in the interests of Canada to do so. I can't comment further on the nature of any cooperation or operations that we might undertake with a foreign service.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: I found it very disconcerting, because he said this happened during his tenure as Canadian ambassador to that country. If this is so, as an ambassador, is he held to the same kind of thing as what you said in terms of not being able to comment, or is this within the norm of an ambassador's role to say that this is an activity that was carried out by CSIS employees in that country?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'd want to be careful in commenting on that, because to suggest that somebody has committed an offence is, given my background as a lawyer, always a dangerous thing to do. Having said that, I certainly would have appreciated him not saying what he said.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Therefore, can one assume the apologies given by the Government of Israel, particularly their Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and David Levy, at the time the foreign affairs minister, was accurate? They said they regretted this undertaking and that it would not happen again.

Mr. Ward Elcock: I would certainly hope it won't happen again, Madam Chair.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: So you can't tell me whether Mr. Normal Spector was right or wrong in his assertions. Is that what you're telling me?

• 1005

Mr. Ward Elcock: I can't recall the articles clearly enough to be sure exactly who said what to whom. But clearly, as for the implication that because of any cooperation or operational work we might have done with Mossad somebody could imply that we would provide documents to people trying to kill somebody on a downtown street in Jordan, that implication was entirely unwarranted, inaccurate, and inappropriate.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Outside of that particular incident, which I would say was regrettable on all sides, in general, it's not out of the norm for CSIS to have a special agent outside the country in specific areas of interest and with the approval of the minister of the day.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Our SLOs are abroad clearly to do only one thing, which is act as a liaison with foreign services. We normally cover a number of countries from one country. We haven't got people to put at every embassy abroad.

Having said that, if we were to undertake a joint operation abroad in the furtherance of our national security mandate, we would not do that with our liaison officers. We take the position in this country that any intelligence officers in Canada from another country are here purely as liaison and don't accept operations by them without our approval. Similarly, when we send our liaison officers abroad, we don't send them abroad to do anything except be liaison officers.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: So they would work specifically in let's say Britain or France with what we used to call the foreign legion. I know there's another name for them. I think I'm back to the movie days. Notwithstanding that, as for Mossad and other countries' secret services, it would not be unusual for them to work together in certain specific instances?

Mr. Ward Elcock: We do undertake operational activities with other services with which we have a relationship from time to time.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: And share information.

Mr. Ward Elcock: And share information.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: So it's not an unusual thing?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Thank you very much.

That's all, Madam Chair.

The Chair: Can I just piggy-back on that? Would an ambassador in any embassy know what the CSIS people are doing in the sense of whether they report to him? Do they tell him or her what they're up to? Or is there reporting back to you, and they just happen to have an office there?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No, clearly, it's somewhere in between. Clearly, our liaison officers are part of an embassy abroad and are there to, like any other member of that embassy, assist and participate in the embassy.

We do, however, run a somewhat more arcane program than those in most other government departments. As a consequence, there is probably somewhat less information available to ambassadors about what we do and what our program is then is normally the case.

Having said that, to the extent that we have information that we can provide and should provide to the ambassador, we do so.

The Chair: To your knowledge, has Mr. Spector ever made a complaint to you or CSIS about these activities?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No.

The Chair: How about these allegations, sir?

Mr. Ward Elcock: About these particular allegations? No.

The Chair: Has SIRC looked into it?

Mr. Ward Elcock: SIRC is in the course of doing a review at this juncture, Madam Chair.

The Chair: How were they prompted to do that? Was it by the coverage?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I think they got into it because of the coverage and the allegations.

The Chair: During the time that you've been the head of CSIS, did that overlap the time that Mr. Spector was ambassador?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No, I think he had departed from—

The Chair: When did you become head of CSIS?

Mr. Ward Elcock: In May 1993, I think.

The Chair: I was in Israel in 1994 and he was there, so he was the ambassador.

Mr. Ward Elcock: It was 1994. I'm sorry.

The Chair: Oh, it was 1994?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes, four years.

The Chair: How time flies when you're having fun, I know.

He was there in fall 1994, because I met him—

Mr. Ward Elcock: Then we may have briefly overlapped.

The Chair: Did he complain to you at all about any activities of CSIS in Israel?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No. Indeed, I think he was quite positive about encouraging any cooperation between us and the Israeli intelligence agency.

• 1010

The Chair: Oh, he was. Thank you.

Mr. Marceau.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Thank you. Mr. Elcock, how many former RCMP members are now with CSIS?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: It's somewhere between 30% and 40% of our cadre now who are former RCMP officers. I don't have an exact number.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: I see. Out of how many employees?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: About 2,060—2,000 and change.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Okay. As I recall, when your service was established in 1984, RCMP employees moving over to CSIS were told that they would keep the benefits they enjoyed while RCMP members. Isn't that right?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: That's right.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Do former RCMP members now with CSIS... excuse me, I'm getting ahead of myself. Since we discussed it last week, I assume you're familiar with the Gingras decision to award retroactive bilingualism bonuses for RCMP officers. You know of this decision.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes, I do.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Fine. Since a promise was made to maintain the same benefits for former RCMP members, do you agree that RCMP officers now working for the agency are entitled to receive the bonus retroactively, just like those people who remained with the RCMP?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Clearly, as a result of the Gingras decision there was an entitlement for a number of members of CSIS, for anybody, and Mr. Gingras in particular, up until the point in time when the decision was taken not to pay the bilingual bonus in the service in 1985, to receive the bilingual bonus. As a consequence of the Gingras decision, we paid the bilingual bonus to Mr. Gingras and anybody who was in a similar situation, as well as any interest on that, as the RCMP have also done. But after 1985, no.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Basically, you're telling me that former RCMP employees now working for CSIS do not enjoy the same benefits as current RCMP members.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: The benefit the member is describing is not a benefit in the context of the benefits he's talking about.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Just a minute. Suppose I work for the RCMP. I'm told that I'm being transferred over to CSIS and that I will keep the same benefits. That's fine with me. As an RCMP employee, I was entitled to receive the bilingualism bonus. Now, I work for CSIS. As the result of the Gingras decision, my former colleagues, the people I graduated with, who are still with the RCMP are about to receive the bonus retroactively, whereas I, who had been promised the same working conditions as my RCMP colleagues, am not entitled to this bonus retroactively. Is that what you're telling me?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: My legal advisers tell me that indeed the bilingual bonus is not a benefit within the defined benefits and therefore not payable as a benefit in that context.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: All right. That was a peculiar promise then. Occasionally, we hear the name Communications Security Establishment mentioned. I believe you're familiar with it.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: I am aware of the Communications Security Establishment. I was responsible for it for some years.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: What is the nature of the relationship between CSIS and the CES?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Very close.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: I understand, but isn't the CES a separate organization.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Where does the CES get its funding from?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: The CSE is part of the Department of National Defence.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: When you say that the two organizations have close ties with each other, are you talking about daily, weekly, or ongoing contacts?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Between people in CSIS and CSE? Of course.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: So you work together every day. It's truly a team effort.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: It depends on the issue. We work on specific things together. On other things we do our own, but there is continuous cooperation between us and CSE.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: In which areas are you involved with the CES?

• 1015

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: Most of the areas of cooperation would be operational cooperations between us and information they manage for us or they process for us. I'm not prepared to go further in terms of describing our relationship with CSE.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Why not?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: For security reasons, national security reasons.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: What you're saying then is that there is no way for an elected member of the House of Commons to find out the nature of your involvement with the CES.

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: No, I'm simply saying that I can't be at this juncture the vehicle for it, and my job is not to provide that.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Can you tell us who could give us that information? If you can't, who should we speak to or which organization should we contact to get that information?

[English]

Mr. Ward Elcock: It would ultimately be for the government to decide whether to provide that information or not.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Marceau: Fine then. Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Did you have a point of order, Mr. Lee?

Mr. Derek Lee: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Just for the record, this issue of disclosure to the justice committee and the subcommittee on national security and other committees of matters dealing with security and intelligence has come up before. The parliamentary law makes it very clear that this committee and the House are quite capable of obtaining whatever information they wish. Before doing that they must firm up and decide what they want and then proceed to get it. The law is very clear. Mr. Elcock's response here reflects the modern evolution of it, in that the agencies are understandably reluctant to make disclosures in public that would put at risk operations or other national security matters that shouldn't be public.

So while I accept that Mr. Elcock doesn't want to cross the line here today, as I had alluded to earlier, I wouldn't want the committee, at least I wouldn't want myself, to acquiesce in an assumption that we weren't capable of obtaining the information if we all wished to obtain it.

The Chair: Thank you.

Mr. Maloney.

Mr. John Maloney (Erie—Lincoln, Lib.): Thank you.

Mr. Elcock, are there threats to Canadian interests by foreign governments in the areas of economic espionage?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I think we've said in our annual report, on a number of occasions, that indeed there are threats in a number of areas. Canada is a country with a reputation for high technology in a number of different areas, such as nuclear techology, the oil and gas industry, or the information industry, the technology industries. There certainly is an interest on the part of a number of countries to collect information in Canada as well as elsewhere.

Mr. John Maloney: Would this fall within your mandate?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes.

Mr. John Maloney: And how do you approach that, then?

Mr. Ward Elcock: First, let me emphasize first that we're not involved in industrial espionage. In other words, if, for lack of any other example, Procter & Gamble wants to spy on Lever Brothers to find out what their new soap powder is made of, that's not really our business or our interest. Our involvement is driven by the involvement of a foreign government. To the extent that a foreign government either directly or indirectly seeks to obtain information in Canada in the area of economic security, we would regard that as a form of espionage. And we would deal with it as we deal with any other investigation of espionage: investigate it, and at the end of the day prevent it from happening.

We also have a program in which we deal with various industry groups and other public groups to provide not a specific advice on security, as that's really something for the private sector, but to provide a generic information to them about the nature of some of the threats out there.

• 1020

Mr. John Maloney: Is it a serious problem? Is it prevalent?

Mr. Ward Elcock: It happens more than it used to. It's one of those things that in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War seems to happen more often than it did before.

Mr. John Maloney: Are you in a position to advise us of what countries have been involved in economic espionage in Canada?

Mr. Ward Elcock: A number of countries are involved. I wouldn't be prepared to be specific, Madam Chair, but a number of countries are involved, some of them traditional, some not so traditional.

Mr. John Maloney: And in what sectors of the economy?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Their interest is fairly broad and eclectic. It depends on that particular country and what they're interested in and where they can find something of interest to them. It covers the gamut of industries, from oil and gas to technology to nuclear to whatever.

Mr. John Maloney: Can you advise us of what companies have been targeted?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No, I wouldn't want to do that, Madam Chair.

Mr. John Maloney: You mentioned private sector investigation units. Do you run parallel to that or complementary thereto? How do you interface with private sector investigative units?

Mr. Ward Elcock: On occasion we might well run up against the police, I suppose, but in terms of private sector investigations of industrial espionage, no, we don't. That would be something outside our mandate.

Mr. John Maloney: Thank you, Madam Chair.

The Chair: Thank you. Mr. McKay.

Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.): I just want to go back to an issue I raised with the minister last week with respect to Kurdish refugees.

At the time I made reference to a letter dated April 19, which was apparently sent to you, Mr. Elcock, and to Maurice Archdeacon, director of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, and to two witnesses who were here at the immigration committee, Suleyman Goven and Sami Durgun. Have you received this letter, by the way?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No.

Mr. John McKay: Really?

The Chair: Do you just want to let him see it?

Mr. John McKay: Sure.

The Chair: It's not been tabled.

A voice: It's not translated.

The Chair: Unless a letter is tabled, we don't provide it. Mr. McKay may provide you with a copy of it himself.

Mr. John McKay: So that letter is completely unfamiliar to you?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I haven't seen it before.

Mr. John McKay: It's been released to the press.

Mr. Ward Elcock: I assume if they said they sent it, they must have sent it, but they must have sent it by slow mail, because I so far haven't seen it.

Mr. John McKay: The minister seems to have seen it.

Mr. Ward Elcock: I haven't received it. Because I haven't received it, I haven't sent it to the minister. He may have had a copy from the press.

Mr. John McKay: The allegation contained in it—and I'll stay with the policy allegation rather than the personal issue here—is that as a matter of routine your investigators working on behalf of Immigration Canada basically tell the subject, the claimant, that he or she won't get landed unless they cooperate. What's your reaction to that?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Madam Chair, the member wasn't here when the issue came up before. Let me be clear. From the letter it's clear, and I hadn't appreciated that. Quite clearly, what the individuals are talking about is the immigration process, of which CSIS is a part. As part of the immigration process, we frequently do interview immigrants. The purpose of that interview is to determine whether or not the individuals are admissible to Canada.

As a consequence of whatever information we may have in a particular case... There are terrorist organizations in Canada and there are terrorists who seek to enter Canada. If we have information, then anybody who's being interviewed can expect to be asked about that information and will be expected to assist us.

If they're not going to assist us, then, by definition, since we're in the immigration process, it will interfere with the speed of their immigration process. If they don't provide any information about themselves and their associations in the context of the immigration interview, it's our job to deal with the issue of inadmissibility. If they don't provide any information, then our response to the immigration department is not going to speed up the process.

• 1025

Mr. John McKay: We have a similar problem here as well, Mr. Elcock, in that if we get no response from the department as to the veracity and validity of the allegation, we have to assume the allegation is a true allegation.

Mr. Ward Elcock: At this juncture, Madam Chair, since I haven't received any allegation, and I don't know whether SIRC has received it either... It hasn't investigated and hasn't heard from the individuals. Once all of that is received, SIRC will review the matter. They'll have access to all of our files and will be able to come to a conclusion as to whether there is any truth to the allegations or whether the allegations in fact indicate any wrongdoing whatsoever.

Mr. John McKay: This was also part of a publication, a book by Mary Jo Leddy, who sat in on one of these interviews for seven hours and made the same allegation there. Has there been any response to that allegation?

Mr. Ward Elcock: As for the allegation in the book, after the last hearing I did go back and look at the page in the book. The page in the book is about an immigration interview. At the end of the day, if an immigrant coming into Canada is seeking admission, they may or may not be admissible.

One of the things we do, as part of our work in this area to assist CIC, is interview specific immigrants, and part of that is to decide whether they're admissible or not, or to be able to allow us to assist CIC in determining whether they're admissible. If they won't answer questions, then it's awfully hard to come to the conclusion that there's no problem.

Mr. John McKay: So let's work with that for a minute. We have a person who's “uncooperative”, is not responding to the inquiries you make. Whether those inquiries should be made is another issue, but if they don't respond, what recommendation do you make back to the immigration department?

Mr. Ward Elcock: In that context, unless we have any specific information from other sources—and in many cases we do have information from other sources—then we obviously have nothing... We're in a position of having to say look, the individual is not cooperative.

Mr. John McKay: I see. And then is it the Department of Immigration's job to decide whether this person has or has not met the security check?

Mr. Ward Elcock: It's always the Department of Immigration's responsibility to decide. It's not our decision. We simply make recommendations on the basis of the information we have or can obtain.

Mr. John McKay: So in terms of these individuals, both of whom have been here apparently in the order of eight or ten years and have had several interviews with your department, the responsibility as to whether they do or don't clear CSIS's check, shall we say, is entirely that of the immigration department?

Mr. Ward Elcock: It's ultimately the immigration department's decision, and it depends on... Our job, if the individual is here, is to collect information and do an interview, and in some cases—

Mr. John McKay: At the end of each interview, do you report back to the immigration department?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Ultimately we provide advice to Immigration in respect of the individual.

Mr. John McKay: And is that advice accessible by access to information?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Probably not. In most cases it would contain, if you will, secret operational information.

Mr. John McKay: So it's a bit of a catch-22 for the individual. If you don't respond, then you'll get a negative view, and you can't access it to see whether the reasoning of CSIS is correct.

Mr. Ward Elcock: In the longer-term process, for individuals who go through the process and ultimately appeal to the courts, some information is provided. There is a process that the courts have approved under the charter to allow some information to be provided. The judge reviews what information can actually be provided to the individual and what information is not to be provided.

Mr. John McKay: So the only avenue left available to these particular people who claim they are aggrieved is to force CSIS and Immigration Canada to court to disclose?

Mr. Ward Elcock: They can also go to SIRC, as in this case these individuals appear to be intending to do. As I said the other day, SIRC reviews all of our files and has the opportunity to question all of our people and come to a conclusion on the basis of all of that information, and I suspect we probably do have some information. They'll come to a conclusion on whether the complaint is—

Mr. John McKay: When you see pools of refugees or immigrant claimants, are there particular pools of individuals you want to question?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'm not quite sure what you mean by “pools”.

• 1030

Mr. John McKay: In this particular instance there are Kurds from Iran, Kurds from Iraq, and Kurds from Turkey, and it's my understanding that there's really no interest on the part of CSIS with respect to the Iraqi Kurds or the Iranian Kurds, but there is some interest with respect to the Turkish Kurds. Is that a fair statement? Or is that not correct?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I think, Madam Chair, we're usually driven not so much by ethnic origin. We're driven more by the individual. If there's an individual who is of interest to us who comes to our attention because he or she comes within our mandate, if you will, wherever the individual comes from, whether he or she is Iraqi or Iranian or Turkish, we will have some interest in that individual.

Mr. John McKay: Are you also driven by the interests of what particular conflict is going on in that particular area of the world at the time?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No, Madam Chair. We're, if you will, governed by the sections of the legislation which deal, in terms of the immigration process, with the inadmissibility of specific individuals, and if individuals have associations with a terrorist group or are members of a terrorist group, then they may well be inadmissible.

Mr. John McKay: Do you initiate these interviews yourself?

Mr. Ward Elcock: As part of the immigration process, we interview a lot of immigrants. We don't interview every immigrant, but we interview a lot.

Mr. John McKay: This allegation, assuming it's true—or otherwise—says “Each one of us was asked to inform on our fellow Kurds and we've been told it would be easier for us to be landed if we did.” Is that a proper investigative technique? Is that something that would happen in a general sort of proposition? Or is that not proper?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I don't know precisely what they were asked. That stands for somebody's allegation as to precisely what they were asked. I would have to see more information before I'd want to come to a judgment one way or the other.

Mr. John McKay: But as a matter of policy, as a matter of direction to your investigators, would that kind of offer be held out to those who are asked to cooperate with CSIS?

Mr. Ward Elcock: An offer?

Mr. John McKay: An offer of being landed.

Mr. Ward Elcock: I don't know precisely what took place in that conversation, but clearly the individuals from the letter were participating in the normal immigration process if... I don't know whether the specific questions were asked that are alleged to have been asked, but in point of fact if they don't provide any information, if they're uncooperative about themselves and their associations, then indeed, they may find that the process doesn't proceed because we can't—

Mr. John McKay: Are there any policy directives on the part of your department to your investigators with respect to questions of that kind?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes, quite clearly, our investigators cannot promise assistance to people with their immigration process as a context of obtaining information. And secondly, it's clear to anybody that any answers they provide to us are entirely voluntary.

The Chair: I'm just going to ask—

Mr. John McKay: Are you going to cut me off?

The Chair: I'm going to cut you off and go over to our next questioner.

Don't they transcribe or tape these meetings?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I believe they do. There would be a transcript of the interview.

The Chair: So there will be a transcript of the interview at some point if this is looked into.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Any of the information that would be collected in the interviewer's report would certainly be available to SIRC.

Mr. John McKay: Just as a follow-up to that, because I don't intend to use up time, I would be very curious to see the guidelines and make those available to the committee, and also have those guidelines compared to the transcripts that might be available. Because if these allegations are anywhere close to having some truth in them, I think it's of some considerable interest to this committee that this activity be discussed.

The Chair: Okay.

Mr. Hilstrom.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom (Selkirk—Interlake, Ref.): First of all, how many of the members that joined up through the RCMP are still in the service?

Was this asked yet, Madam Chair?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes. I think it was asked by the member from the Bloc. It's somewhere between 30% and 40%.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: Between 30% and 40%

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes. They are still RCMP or former RCMP.

• 1035

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: Okay, and then when you get to a war-torn country over there, maybe a civil war of whatever kind, do you actively develop a list of individuals who are key in the conflict as to the fact that they may be committing atrocities, war crime-type things? Do you actively liaise—I'm not saying you're walking around and interviewing people, but are you liaising—with other intelligence agencies on that?

Mr. Ward Elcock: If we received information of that nature—and you're talking again about war criminals or war crimes—we would certainly pass that information on to the appropriate authority. But in this case, that's essentially the RCMP, not us.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: Do you actively compile such a list?

Mr. Ward Elcock: It's not our responsibility to do that. It's our responsibility to provide any information on those issues to the appropriate authority, which in this case is the RCMP.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: After the Second World War we ended up with a lot of Nazi war criminals in Canada. You know where the conflicts are in the world. My question precisely is, do you actively look at those conflicts and the major players involved and create a list and a profile of the key players involved in the killing?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: You do not create that. So it's just if by accident another intelligence agency tells you Mr. X has been digging big ditches and killing people, then you would take that information and maybe pass it on, but you wouldn't actively try to ask anybody if that happened.

Mr. Ward Elcock: In a sense you underplay our sources of information. We do come up with information like that on a not infrequent basis, and we would pass it on to the appropriate authorities—not “maybe” pass it on; we would pass it on.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: Well, you refuse to answer my question on whether you actively do that, so I won't bother asking it again, unless you—

The Chair: Mr. Hilstrom, I didn't hear Mr. Elcock refuse to answer anything.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: Oh, okay.

The Chair: Let's keep in mind, sir, that Mr. Elcock and others who come before this committee in the estimates process are public servants. Let's be as fair with them as they're trying to be with us, all right?

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: Okay.

The Chair: Why don't you reformulate your question and see if we can clarify this?

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: Okay.

Has CSIS ever looked at a civil war situation, a country in civil war, and created, by asking questions at a liaison meeting, a list of the top two generals and whoever else was involved in the conflict on both sides, if there are two sides? Have you ever done that?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Not specifically in that context. We come at those issues more from the point of view of, are there terrorist implications to Canada in the context of that civil conflict, and who are the individuals about whom we should be concerned? In some cases all those things may match, but not in the context specifically of war criminals.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: Okay, thank you.

I have just one thing on the domestic side of things here. We certainly have had concern in past years from the RCMP that there not be any undue domestic spying, I suppose, or whatever. While you were in charge in 1994 and onward, was CSIS ever consulted by any government department, any group, or any Canadian while the legislation for the Firearms Act was being created? Was CSIS ever consulted in regard to that, yes or no?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No, not as far as I'm aware.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: Okay. Was CSIS ever involved with any department in regard to the issue of assault-type rifles coming in from other countries, possibly to terrorist organizations in Canada? Have you been consulted in regard to that?

Mr. Ward Elcock: To the extent that... Our job is not so much to be consulted; our job is to provide information, and in some cases we may well have provided information on subjects such as that.

• 1040

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: The fact is I think that you would be consulted too. The Solicitor General of Canada can consult you and provide information to other portions of the government. So you weren't consulted?

Mr. Ward Elcock: It depends what you mean by consulted.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: Recommendations and such.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Our role is simply to provide information to the government. We don't provide advice on legislative issues, generally speaking, unless they are legislative issues precisely within our mandate. But clearly if we have information on terrorists in Canada and what they're doing and what they may be importing or what they may be exporting, then we provide it to the Government of Canada. We would be derelict in our duty were we not to do so.

Mr. Howard Hilstrom: I was thinking more along the lines of a proactive type of activity, again, whether you were proactively given an assignment as such or whatever to give an assessment on the problem of the U.S. border with firearms coming in. And of course we've seen that in Ontario here, assault-type weapons reported coming in. But you haven't been involved in that at CSIS?

Mr. Ward Elcock: To the extent that we would have any information on those issues, we would provide that regularly to the Government of Canada. I don't need a special assignment to go do that.

The Chair: Did you have a question, Mr. Reynolds?

Mr. John Reynolds (West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast, Ref.): Yes.

The Chair: Go ahead.

Mr. John Reynolds: I want to follow up on what Mr. McKay was talking about, that the Solicitor Ggeneral said that CSIS while screening refugee applicants does not try to recruit certain factions to spy on others. Would you agree with that statement?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I haven't seen the statement, and in the context of immigration interviews it's not the purpose of an immigration interview to recruit anybody. The purpose of an immigration interview is simply to interview the immigrant to determine whether he's admissible to Canada. We manage those processes as separate processes.

Mr. John Reynolds: So that's the purpose. Is what you're saying that none of your people have ever tried to recruit anyone they're interviewing in the immigration process to spy?

Mr. Ward Elcock: In the immigration process, no. That is a specific and separate process. If we're going to recruit somebody, we do it a lot more carefully than in the middle of an immigration interview.

Mr. John Reynolds: So what you're telling me is that if you wanted to do it, you would get them maybe before they went to the interview.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Pardon?

Mr. John Reynolds: You're saying you may recruit somebody who's in under a refugee status, but not during the interview.

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'm not going to comment on who we recruit or—

Mr. John Reynolds: I'm not asking you to, just asking about the process.

Mr. Ward Elcock: —how we recruit, but certainly the issue of immigration screening and immigration interviews is an entirely separate matter, and we manage very carefully the flow of information between that process and our investigative processes.

Mr. John Reynolds: So you're saying that you've never done it during the process of the screening interview for immigration, but it's possible it could happen at other times.

Mr. Ward Elcock: All I'm saying is that we don't do it in immigration interviews. That process is a very separate process.

Mr. John Reynolds: Do you do it at other times?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'm not going to comment on the nature of our investigative operations and how we carry them out.

Mr. John Reynolds: Do we recruit people who have refugee status of any kind?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'd rather not comment.

Mr. John Reynolds: I understand there's a secret government report prepared on this issue that substantiates the claim that CSIS has done this issue particularly, and I understand also that the Solicitor General has said that he had CSIS amend their screening procedure to ensure that they tell potential informants they cannot help them with their immigration status. Was there anything official ever done that said lay that procedure out in line?

Mr. Ward Elcock: It has always been the rule. Indeed it's clear to our officers that they cannot offer to immigrants assistance in processing their status. And secondly, anything they say to a CSIS officer is on a voluntary basis.

Mr. John Reynolds: Why was the screening procedure amended?

Mr. Ward Elcock: It wasn't amended. It's been that way for some considerable period of time.

Mr. John Reynolds: So you're saying that the screening procedure has never been amended since CSIS was set up?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'm not saying that it hasn't been amended. The implication in the comment was that it had somehow recently been amended to provide for an assurance that CSIS officers were not offering to people assistance with their status in immigration interviews. We don't offer immigrants or refugees assistance with their immigration status, and that's been a long-standing policy.

Mr. John Reynolds: Has the procedure ever been amended since CSIS was set up?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Off the top of my head, I can't say whether it's been amended, but the part I'm describing now has been a long-standing part of the policy dealing with immigration. Our policies are long and detailed and complicated, so I can't say that there's never been a change. That specific part of it has been in effect for some considerable period of time.

• 1045

Mr. John Reynolds: But we've got the Solicitor General saying that he had CSIS amend their screening procedure to ensure that they tell potential informants they can't help them with their immigration status. You're saying it has always been that way.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Well, it has certainly been that—

Mr. John Reynolds: Why does the Solicitor General feel that it had to be amended?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I think, Madam Chair, that he may be referring to the fact that he reiterated to us that this is the way it should be and that we should ensure, indeed in this case and others, that this had been followed and that the individuals mentioned earlier by the other member were going to raise an issue which SIRC will look at to determine whether in fact there was any violation of the policy.

Mr. John Reynolds: Since you can't remember off the top of your head, would it be possible for you to check your records and tell us if the procedure has ever been amended since CSIS has been set up?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'd certainly be happy to, Madam Chair.

Mr. John Reynolds: That's fine, thank you.

The Chair: I have a couple of questions I want to ask, but we're getting on in time. I'll go to Mrs. Finestone and then Mr. McKay. Did you have more questions?

Mr. John McKay: I have lots more questions, but that's fine, we'll leave them for another day.

The Chair: Mrs. Finestone.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Mr. Elcock, according to page 19 of the Solicitor General's ministry performance report, it participated in interdepartmental discussions for more effective laws and procedures to deal with the unauthorized disclosure and receipt of national security information. Do you know if CSIS participated in these discussions?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes, Madam Chair.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Do you know what other agencies and departments were involved?

Mr. Ward Elcock: The Department of Justice and a number of other ministries.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Would you be comfortable if I asked you whether the Official Secrets Act was part of these discussions?

Mr. Ward Elcock: You're getting beyond my pay grade, Madam Chair. I think that's a subject for the government and ministers, rather than me.

The Chair: If it's any help, I remember getting an amended Official Secrets Act.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: That's exactly what I want to know. Is there legislation that to your knowledge is being prepared to replace the act?

Mr. Ward Elcock: Certainly the issues associated with the Official Secrets Act have long been reviewed, and it would certainly be nice to see a new one.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Do you think it would be nice to see a new act?

The Chair: They've been asking for that for a long time.

Mr. Ward Elcock: Yes, I think it would be nice to see a new act.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Have you a wish list of the changes you'd like to see? I'll rephrase that. Have you shared your wish list with this committee of the changes that you would see as constructive and helpful?

Mr. Ward Elcock: No, Madam Chair, the issue has never come up.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: If we invited you back to discuss your wish list, would that be helpful?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I think that comes in the category of advice to ministers, Madam Chair, and it would be inappropriate for me to offer to anybody else the advice I have given essentially to my minister.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: I think I would have to defer to my colleague, Derek Lee, to ask him—

Some hon. members: Hear, hear.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: If he thinks it is, then we'll develop a quota of appropriate questions.

The Chair: We should have a signal so that we can see Derek's comments at the end of these—

Mr. Derek Lee: I'll pass, Madam Chair.

The Chair: For what it's worth, I heard by the grapevine that we're getting something on the Official Secrets Act, and that Mr. Gray is in charge of the file.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: What about the CSIS Act?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I don't know.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: You don't know about the CSIS Act either?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'm not aware of anything, Madam Chair.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: You're not at liberty to discuss this?

Mr. Ward Elcock: I'm not aware of anything.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Fine, thank you very much.

The Chair: He can tell you, but if he does, he'll have to shred you.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Today, it wouldn't be a bad idea.

The Chair: Are there any other questions?

Thank you, Mr. Elcock. You've been very helpful.

The meeting is adjourned.