:
Good morning, everyone, and welcome.
This is meeting number 12 of the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities. Today is Thursday, February 13, 2014 and we're continuing our consideration of private member's bill .
For our first hour today, we are once again joined by a robust panel of witnesses. From the Canada Industrial Relations Board we are joined by chairperson Ms. Elizabeth MacPherson and Ms. Ginette Brazeau, who is the executive director and general counsel.
We are also joined by Mr. Dick Heinen, executive director at the Christian Labour Association of Canada.
Joining us by video conference from Toronto is Mr. Satinder Chera, vice-president of communications for the Canadian Federation of Independent Business.
Also joining us by video conference from Paris, France, and appearing as an individual is Mr. Marcel Boyer, emeritus professor of Economics at the Université de Montréal and fellow at the Centre for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organizations.
I now turn the floor over to our witnesses for their opening presentations.
I ask that you please keep your remarks to seven minutes. I believe you've been advised of that by the clerk. We do have limited time. We will have limited for questions after that. We are still awaiting, I believe, the agenda for the day. I don't know whether you've received it, but we will proceed as per the introductions, beginning with Ms. Elizabeth MacPherson speaking on behalf of the Canada Industrial Relations Board.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We thank the committee for the opportunity to make a presentation to you this morning in your study of Bill C-525.
I intend this morning to speak a little bit about the board's responsibilities and then to cut right to the specifics regarding the conduct of representation votes.
I'll be making reference to the paper entitled Certification / Revocation Votes under the Canada Labour Code, which I believe was distributed to the members earlier.
The board is responsible for the interpretation and application of part I of the Canada Labour Code, which regulates labour-management relations in the federal private sector. This jurisdiction includes the key infrastructure industries that are critical to Canada's economy, for example railways, airlines, interprovincial trucking, shipping, longshoring, banking, broadcasting, telecommunications, grain handling, and uranium mining. To provide service to this widespread community the board has regional offices across Canada staffed by industrial relations officers and case management officers.
As you may know, labour relations in the federally regulated private sector are mature and relatively stable. The unionization rate is approximately 40%, much higher than the national average of 17%. However, the rate does vary by industry. It's very high in the railways and airlines, but significantly lower in the banking sector.
In an average year the board receives between 70 and 100 applications for certification of newly organized bargaining units. In addition to this number the board also deals with applications from unions that have been voluntarily recognized by the employer but that wish to have confirmation of this status from the board. We also have applications from unions seeking to displace another union as the bargaining agent for an existing unit and applications from individuals seeking to revoke their bargaining agent's accreditation.
In the paper, figure 1 on page 2 provides an indication of the number of each type of application the board has received in each of the past four and three-quarter years.
When the board receives any of these types of applications, a notice is sent to the employer and is posted in the workplace to ensure everyone affected by the application is aware of it. The notice provides the affected employees with contact information for the board's industrial relations officer, or IRO.
An IRO is assigned to each of the files as it comes in. It is their responsibility to investigate the application, to gather submissions from the employer, the union, and any employees who wish to comment. The IRO also reviews and tests the membership evidence supplied by the applicant. This involves personally contacting a representative sample of the individuals who have signed a membership card in order to verify they did, indeed, sign the card, and they personally paid the mandatory sign-up fee of five dollars.
The IRO also investigates any allegations of impropriety that may have been raised. He or she then prepares a report summarizing the positions of the parties, which is sent to the parties for comment and correction if necessary. Through this process the IRO is often able to resolve differences regarding the scope of the proposed bargaining unit.
The IRO also prepares a confidential report to the board regarding the membership evidence. This report is not provided to the parties because section 35 of the Canada Industrial Relations Board Regulations requires that employees' wishes be kept confidential.
The file is then referred to headquarters for the assignment of a panel. The panel consists of a vice-chair of the board, an employer side representative, and an employee side representative. The panel reviews the application and the membership evidence provided, decides on the scope of the appropriate bargaining unit, and determines whether the applicant has majority support in that unit. Section 29 of the code provides the board with the authority to order a representation vote if it deems one is necessary.
Figure 3 on page 4 of the paper provides you with the summary of the number of representation votes the board has conducted over the period from April 1, 2009, until December 31, 2013.
If the board decides a representation vote should be conducted, the IRO is appointed to act as the returning officer. He or she meets with the applicant and the employer to make the necessary arrangements for the conduct of the vote. Any unresolved issues, for example whether a particular person is eligible to vote, or whether the vote should be conducted electronically, by mail ballot, or in person, are referred to the panel for decision.
On pages 4 and 5 of the paper we describe the three types of mechanisms we use for votes, the in-person, the mail ballot, and more recently the electronic voting via Internet and telephone.
We also outline the relative cost of each of these types of votes on pages 6 and 7.
I'll be happy to take any questions that members of the committee may have.
Thank you.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair and honourable members of the committee, for the opportunity to speak to you today about this bill.
The Christian Labour Association of Canada, CLAC, is one of the largest independent unions in Canada and one of Canada's fastest-growing unions. Founded in 1952, we represent more than 60,000 people across the country. We have a very strong presence in oil and gas development projects in Alberta, natural resource development in British Columbia, as well as construction, mining, health care, and other industries throughout Canada. But particular to these proceedings, CLAC has a strong construction and mining presence north of 60, which is the jurisdiction of the CIRB, and we are very much affected by the changes, as well as the transportation industry across the country, interprovincial.
Now fundamentally, CLAC believes in competition in the labour relations environment in Canada. We think that workers should have the right and be free to make their own choices when it comes to which union represents them or whether they want to be represented by a union at all. The Canadian economy benefits from a more competitive labour environment, and CLAC supports efforts to improve the Canadian economy and at the same time to strengthen the democratic rights of workers.
Fundamentally, competition offers a fairer deal for Canadian workers and helps to create a better workplace through freedom of choice. Now Bill , on the surface, seems to support these objectives. Requiring a vote for both certification and decertification is, in many cases, a standard in provincial labour law, and moving federal law to a similar model makes sense. However, Bill C-525 makes significant errors that place it offside with labour standards across the country. Furthermore, because of the geographical reach of Bill C-525, there are some unique challenges in the application of the bill.
First, for a successful vote on either certification or decertification, Bill would require a majority of the entire bargaining unit. This standard of voting goes well beyond any other labour law in Canada and is beyond the requirements we see even in voting for federal and provincial general elections.
Requiring 50% plus one of the entire workforce is a standard that is unfair for a number of reasons. First, there may be many workers who simply prefer not to vote, and in some cases, be it sickness, injury, transportation, vacation, they are not able to vote. In such a case their decision or their situation not to cast a vote becomes a de facto vote against the union.
In effect, Bill would mandate that in a certification vote every worker would be counted as having voted no, unless they vote yes. Just let that sink in for a moment. If you choose not to vote or for some reason you're unable to vote, you're still counted as having voted. Now that's what the bill proposes to do. Can you imagine in your own ridings—
A voice: Oh, oh!
Mr. Dick Heinen: —if the number of voters who chose not to cast a ballot were automatically counted against you?
Second, no other labour law in Canada is based on this standard of voting. No other jurisdiction automatically counts non-voters as having voted against certification.
Bill , as written, would disadvantage workers in workplaces under federal jurisdiction over workers anywhere else in the country. It seems to me the federal government shouldn't be trying to set double standards in the area of labour laws.
We propose that it be amended that all sections of the bill concerning voting for certification or decertification that state “the majority of employees in the bargaining unit” be replaced with “the majority of votes cast”. This simple amendment to the bill would address the first issue that I've raised.
I would strongly encourage the committee to put forward such an amendment to this bill.
I also want to draw the committee's attention to one other aspect of the bill that I believe should be given consideration. That is how votes would be handled in remote workplaces and among workers in the federally regulated transportation sector who are often dispersed around the country.
Remote work sites, such as those often found in development projects in Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut pose their own sets of issues when it comes to fair voting practices. In most cases, workers at these remote sites are rotated in and out to work at the work site. It means that, should a vote for certification or decertification take place, it is likely that only a portion of the workers would ever be available at any one time to participate in a secret ballot vote.
Similar problems would be experienced by workers in the transportation industry who are rarely, if ever, in the same location together. The problems to fair voting in this case are obvious.
I understand that Elizabeth just mentioned that there are other ways of voting. There are mail-in ballots and now there is electronic balloting as well.
I understand that these are options, but they have not been viable options for us in the north, and we have experienced all of them.
I encourage the committee to consider this as you deliberate this legislation. I suggest that the legislation should incorporate provisions to deal with remote locations and transportation workers.
I have a lot of personal experience with this and I would be happy to address it further in questions from the committee.
Thank you for allowing me to make a presentation and to speak on behalf of CLAC. I look forward to your questions.
On behalf of the Canadian Federation of Independent Business and our 109,000 small and mid-sized members across the country, we thank the committee for allowing us to speak to Bill this morning.
Just by way of background, we at CFIB are a membership that is 100% voluntary. We represent all sectors in all regions of the country. We are strictly a non-partisan, not-for-profit organization. We are 100% funded by our membership. We accept no government dollars and, in terms of our policy agenda, we work through a democratic survey process that is one member equals one vote.
In terms of the issue at hand, I thought it would be helpful to provide some background material. On slide 3 there was a survey that was recently conducted by Leger Marketing for the Canadian LabourWatch Association that asked Canadians about their preferences for being unionized. On slide 3 those results are for Canadians who have never been unionized and, as it makes it very clear, 71% have no interest at all in being unionized going forward.
On slide 4, of those who were formerly unionized, interestingly enough, 69% also prefer not to be unionized.
I want to set this up because I think this issue really shouldn't be too controversial in that when you ask Canadians for their preferences when it comes to unions in general, it seems they have pretty strong opinions about not being part of a union, and more importantly, those who have been formerly unionized also don't think too highly of being unionized.
On slide 5, secret ballot votes are very much a cornerstone of our democracy. Our members, as well as working Canadians, very much support secret ballot votes. In fact, recently, CFIB submitted a letter to all MPs outlining our encouragement for a more democratic voting system in federally regulated workplaces.
On slide 6, we ask our members whether secret ballot votes should be mandatory prior to any union certification, and 76% were in favour of that outcome. Again, I would provide this background. Our members in provinces where there are card-based certifications in place often talk about the fear factor that is involved in union drives. So we think providing for a secret ballot vote would be one way to take out that fear factor so that workers, who should be the ones making the decision, can be free of intimidation, whether it's the union or the employer. They can do it with the comfort and the peace of mind that no one's going to know how they particularly voted.
On slide 7, there was also the question that was asked about in the Leger Marketing poll. Canadians were asked whether a secret ballot vote should be required when forming or removing a union from a workplace. We've broken it out here in terms of the result: those who are currently unionized and those who were formerly unionized. Again, there are fairly high levels of support for having a secret ballot system in place, so really it's non-controversial, I think, in that respect.
On slide 8, and concluding, Mr. Chair, we do very much believe that this committee should adopt Bill . We think it's really non-controversial in the sense that the principle of a secret ballot vote is supported by taxpayers and by a vast majority of Canadians. Even those who are unionized or formerly unionized agree strongly that this should be put in place. I would simply make the observation that if secret ballot votes are good enough to elect our representatives in government, they should very much be good enough to elect a union.
Thank you very much for your time, and I'd be happy to take any questions you may have.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
I will be speaking mainly in English, although I could entertain questions in French. My notes are in French, so I may at times hesitate in finding the proper English words.
Let me start by saying that these are challenging times for unions, not only in Canada but across the world. Over the last 30 years, the unionization rate has dropped from something like 22% in the U.S. to less than 12%. In the United Kingdom it dropped from 51% to less than 30%. Similar drops have been observed in Germany, Australia, Austria, South Korea, France, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland. Only in Belgium, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have we observed a relatively constant level of unionization, of the percentage of the workforce being represented by a union.
In Canada the rate was around 34% in the early 1980s and has dropped to less than 30%. So the drop in Canada has been much smaller than it has been elsewhere, in particular in the U.S. and in the United Kingdom.
That's why I say that these are challenging times for unions as they try to find a way to adapt to a new economic environment characterized by globalization, information and communication technologies, cultural change, and new management practices. The world today is very different from what it was 25 or 30 years ago.
As you well know, in Canada we have two basic systems of union certification, one through compulsory secret ballot and another one through the signing of union cards. Each province has a slightly different system. Although the split is between those two regimes, the application of the regime is somewhat different from one province to the next.
It's fair to say that the most populous provinces, except Quebec, all have a secret ballot system. These include B.C., Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, and also Nova Scotia. I'm not sure about Newfoundland. They were under a secret ballot system, but I remember that a couple of years ago, if not more recently than that, they were considering switching back to a card signing system.
It's clear that the arguments in favour of or against each of these systems are expressed in similar words, although they apply to different systems. For instance, if I take the access of the employer to the worker during the card registration or signing system, people who are favourable to the system of card signing argue that the employer may have privileged access to employees—much more than the unions or the union's organizers—when trying to get in touch with the employees and that therefore it is relatively unfair.
On the other hand, people who are in favour of a compulsory secret ballot argue that in the card signing system it is the union that has privileged access to workers, for workers hear only the point of view of the union, because the card signing procedure is relatively secret.
Maybe the major argument deals with intimidation.
People in favour of the secret ballot say that intimidation on the part of union organizers may be very important when workers are asked to sign cards, but union organizers or unions favourable to a card signing system argue that a secret ballot allows the employer to put pressure on its employees, to convince them to vote against the union, and that therefore this notion of intimidation is certainly one of the key aspects of the industrial relations board in terms of certification of unions.
Clearly intimidation has to be fought whether it comes from the union or from the employer. However, information provided by the union or by the employer is something that in a democratic system everyone should welcome.
In terms of timing, it is sometimes mentioned that the employer may pursue a strategy by which the industrial relations board or the organization responsible for conducting the vote would have a longer period of time between the accreditation demand and the formal vote. But in general, of course, the boards have been trying to hold those votes relatively close to the time at which the union can be certified.
As we all know, labour relations is not a very simple matter. It's a very complex issue, and because it is so complex, it's really important that we don't make willy-nilly changes. In other words, a little bit of a change here, a little bit of a change there, because once you make one change it begins to impact the whole.
I don't know how familiar you are with the ILO conventions, but possibly you could answer this. Is it possible that this bill may actually violate the ILO conventions we're signatories to?
One of the things we've heard a lot about and that I've heard about is how, if it's a card check, the employers are saying that there's opportunity for pressure on one element, and if there's a secret ballot vote, people are arguing in terms of the employer having more access and opportunity. I think in our hearts we all believe, certification or decertification, that there shouldn't be undue pressure.
I do fundamentally believe, personally, in the secret ballot. To me, the secret ballot is more about the peer-to-peer relationship within the unit, as opposed to the employer or the union, because I know that sometimes it's a very difficult personal choice. Also, I know that sometimes those choices can create real issues in the workplace peer to peer, depending on the decisions, which is why sometimes the secret ballot takes that element out of it.
Ms. MacPherson, you alluded to the fact that we have our officers who are there. They're there to investigate undue pressure and intimidation on either part. Could you speak a bit about that particular element?
:
Yes. As I mentioned earlier, the federal jurisdiction is relatively stable and the board has a robust jurisprudence regarding intimidation and coercion.
I took a look at the last 10 years. In the last 10 years, the board has issued over 4,000 decisions globally on all of the matters that come before us. Of those more than 4,000 decisions, only 23 cases involved allegations of intimidation or coercion during an organizing campaign. Of those 23 cases that the board heard and decided, we only found six cases of intimidation and coercion. Four of those cases were intimidation and coercion by an employer. Two of the cases were in a displacement situation where we had two unions vying to represent the same bargaining unit, and the allegations were against the other union.
So that's a total of six upheld in 10 years. It's not a huge problem. I think that's because our jurisprudence is so strong. Everybody knows the rules of the game. They stay within the confines of those rules, and the board has the ability to deal with those outlier cases where someone misbehaves.
:
We heard the same concerns from our constituency, labour and management, that this committee heard on Tuesday. So we've heard the same thing you have.
Currently the board uses secret ballot votes when it's appropriate. We use our discretion to do it when we need to.
One other thing I should point out in the bill that's of concern to us is the amendment to paragraph 28(c). Currently the board decides support for a union either on the date of the application or such other date as the board deems appropriate. A good of example of this would be in the many seasonal industries within our jurisdiction, for example, shipping on the Great Lakes. If we lose the discretion to decide the date on which to test support, we could have perverse results where someone makes the application on a date when there are very few people in the workplace, and that decision will bind even though once the season starts again and people come back, they may feel differently.
So we would like to have our discretion back, please.
My thanks to the witnesses for joining us for this important study.
I come from a union background myself. I was a consultant at the Canadian Union of Public Employees before being elected to the House. Before that, I was a journalist at TVA and sat on the executive board of my union, the Telecommunications Workers Union, which operates under federal legislation.
For me, joining a union by signing a card is the easiest and most effective way for workers to become organized. That is confirmed by most academic studies. It is effective because it can be done discreetly. There is no election campaign. The employer does not automatically have the means to threaten or intimidate workers who want to organize themselves in order to improve their working conditions.
When secret ballots were imposed in British Columbia and Ontario, the number of attempts at unionization went down. When there were attempts, the success rate dropped.
Ms. MacPherson, the figures you gave us earlier were eloquent, not to say astonishing. They show that the system of signing a card works relatively well. Sometimes it causes a vote, but not automatically.
There is an old expression that says:
[English]
If it's not broken, don't fix it.
[Translation]
My impression is that the current system is working rather well. Am I wrong to say that we do not need to fix a situation where the strengths of the employers and the union are adequately balanced?
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to my friend for passing this on to me.
I'm very interested, Ms. MacPherson, in the materials that you've given us because, as Mr. Cuzner has indicated, the mover of this bill has talked about the mountain of people or however we want to describe it, Mr. Chair, the huge number of people making demands for decertification and very clearly when you're under 50 that's not a very big mountain no matter how you look at it.
The concern I have here is.... What we're hearing from the testimony from a number of different people is that we have one of the best systems. We have a very democratic system in place now. You yourself have spoken of risks, some perversions included in this bill. Don't tempt me because I could go even further with statements on that.
But I'm concerned that this bill has the potential of putting at risk 70 years of balanced labour relations in this country. I raised it before that that will have an impact on capital investment in Canada. I'm not so sure people have considered that. What is your view on that?
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
And thank you all for being here today.
Actually, that was a good segue, Mr. Marston, into my line of questioning, which is that we have had evidence before the committee, particularly from the president of PSAC the other day, where she indicated that she was elected by secret ballot, that when there is a collective agreement that they vote on they vote by secret ballot, when they have a strike vote they vote by secret ballot. The only thing they don't vote on by secret ballot is certifying or decertifying a union.
I don't quite see how there's this big, major change, this huge difference that Bill is going to have when all the other times the members of the union vote, they do it by secret ballot, except certifying or decertifying a union.
Can someone explain to me how this is some revolutionary terrible change that's going to take place within federally regulated unionized workplaces, when every other time the members vote they vote by secret ballot?
Who wants to start?
That's the end of the questioning and the end of our first hour. On behalf of the committee, I want to thank all the witnesses for taking the time to be here and to share your thoughts on this very important private member's bill.
Mr. Rodger Cuzner: Chair?
The Chair: I'm going to excuse the witnesses, then I'll recognize you.
So thank you for being here, and thank you as well, gentlemen, who've been video conferenced in.
Mr. Cuzner.
:
Just to be clear, this is an amendment, not a subamendment. It is new, as proposed by Madam Sims.
Is there discussion on this newly proposed amendment?
Seeing none, I'll call the question on this amendment.
(Amendment negatived)
The Chair: The amendment fails.
We'll now move on to amendment G-4, and I must advise the committee that the line conflict here is with amendment NDP-6, so if government amendment G-4 is adopted, amendment NDP-6 cannot be proceeded with.
Is there discussion?
Ms. McLeod.
This motion is going to ensure that the certification and decertification processes under the code mirror each other and, of course, both would require the support of 40% of employees so that the supporters and the opponents of union representation are placed on a level playing field.
Of course, I again want to note that Alberta, Ontario, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland have adopted a similar approach.
This also ensures that the ballots of those in favour and those against the revocation of the union certification are given equal weight to a representation vote. As currently worded, Bill could lead to a revocation of a union certification even if a strong majority of the employees casting a ballot are in favour of remaining unionized, so, for example, if a decertification vote were held under the code for a bargaining unit with 100 employees, and if 35 employees did not participate, it would be decertified. Again, we are addressing what was a significant concern by our witnesses. They think this is a very important amendment to the bill.
:
Okay. That's dilatory, and so we'll move to a vote on challenging the chair's ruling on this—before I get to describe the whole thing. But let's move to the vote.
All against sustaining the chair's decision, so those opposing the chair's decision? Do you understand what I mean?
An hon. member: That's us.
The Chair: That's you guys.
An hon. member: Okay.
Voices: Oh, oh!
The Chair: Now all those who wish to sustain the chair's decision.
(Ruling of the chair sustained)
The Chair: The chair remains in place and the decision remains in place. There will be no further discussion of that particular item at this time.
(On clause 6)
The Chair: We move on, then. We move on to amendment G-5.
I would say on this that there's a line conflict with amendment NDP-8 and amendment Green Party-3. If amendment G-5 is adopted, amendments NDP-8 and Green Party-3 cannot be proceeded with. Amendment G-5 also removes any reference to proposed paragraphs 25(c) and 25(c.1) while creating a new similar paragraph. As both amendments NDP-9 and NDP-10 refer to proposed paragraphs 25(c) and 25(c.1), if amendment G-5 is adopted, amendments NDP-9 and NDP-10 cannot be proceeded with.
Ms. McLeod.
My comment is rather a question to the legislative clerk. I just want to be sure that there is no contradiction between the English version and the French version. In the English version, point 3 of the government's amendment says:
[English]
“If the Board directs that a representation vote be taken...”
[Translation]
The French version says: “La commission doit, lorsqu'elle ordonne...” To me, “lorsqu'elle” means “when”. So it is “when”, not “if”.
The sense of “if” in the English version is not in the French version. Is there a problem there, or not?
:
I will tread here carefully, but as a matter of statutory interpretation, I can't see how the English or the French would have different results. I'm sorry to have to support—
An hon. member: Don't be sorry.
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
[Translation]
Ms. Elizabeth May: The word “lorsque” implies that it is not possible to imagine a circumstance. It is different too. It is the same event whether it is “si” or “lorsque”.
[English]
If there's going to be a vote, then the key difference would be if it wasn't mandatory. “Shall” and “doit” are much more important to the sense of the paragraph. But I'm not a linguist either, and I think the objections can.... But as a matter of statutory interpretation, I don't see how there's a different result.
I'm going to move to the vote on this government amendment, G-6.
(Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings])
(Clause 7 as amended agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings])
(On clause 8)
The Chair: We're on to clause 8 and the amendments to clause 8.
We have government amendment G-7. It has a line conflict with NDP-13, so if the G-7 amendment is adopted, NDP-13 cannot be proceeded with.
Mrs. McLeod.
:
Shall the G-7 amendment pass?
(Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings])
(Clause 8 as amended agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings])
(On clause 9)
The Chair: Now we move on to the amendments to clause 9.
On G-8, this one is again, I must point out, in conflict with NDP-14 and Green Party-4. If G-8 is adopted, NDP-14 and Green Party-4 cannot be proceeded with. G-8 also removes any reference to paragraphs 64(1)(a) and (a.1), while creating a new similar paragraph. As both NDP-15 and NDP-16 refer to paragraphs 64(1)(a) and (a.1), if G-8 is adopted, NDP-15 and NDP-16 cannot be proceeded with.
Are there any comments?
Ms. McLeod.
:
We're going to call the question on Government-11.
(Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings])
Now we move to the vote on clause 12, as amended.
(Clause 12 as amended agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings])
Moving on to a new clause, I believe this is one that Madam Sims mentioned, which is amendment NDP-20.
I'm told by the legal advisor that you also have another motion, but first we're going to deal with your amendment NDP-20.
Has everyone received a copy of NDP-20?
Some hon. members: Yes.
We have listened carefully to the comments made by Ms. MacPherson, from the Canada Industrial Relations Board. She said that, if a vote has to be held, it is important for the process to be quite short and for things not to drag on for a long time.
With the voting process spread over a short time, if the employer uses any illegal, unfair or underhanded tactics and someone complains, the complaint has to be dealt with quickly.
That is why the New Democratic Party is putting forward this amendment. If the voting process lasts from 7 to 10 days, and it takes a month for a complaint to be heard, there is a kind of inconsistency and the rights of the workers are not respected. That is why amendment NDP-20 establishes a period of 48 hours.
:
We will vote on Madam Sims'—we can call it a subamendment if you like, or amendment, to the new clause, number 13, as proposed by the government.
Those in support of the amendment? Those in the nay?
(Amendment negatived)
The Chair: That amendment or subamendment is defeated.
We will now deal with the new clause 13 as proposed by G-12. Those in favour? Those opposed?
(Amendment agreed to on division)
The Chair: I do recognize, committee members, that the time is....
Mr. Armstrong.
:
Just one second, this is dealing with clause 5? So we're moving back to clause 5, and that's different than what I was thinking we were receiving from you.
(On clause 5)
The Chair: Committee members, if you go back to clause 5, this is the one we had deferred and we stood on it because it dealt with a new amendment that was being proposed. That was defeated, by the way. I'll just refer to this because we're coming back now to revisit this. It's Government-4, and it is in line conflict with NDP-6. If G-4 is adopted, NDP-6 cannot be proceeded with.
Also, we will then move on to the amendment by the Green Party.
Let's discuss this amendment, which is G-4.
Ms. McLeod.
:
There was an error in giving me a time that I was supposed to have and I appreciate that the clerk accommodated us, but that's why this particular....I mean it was a real scramble because we didn't get the 48 hours notice. I do think that this process isn't fair to me or to the committee, and that's the only point I wanted to make.
Now, going on to the substantive motion that I'm putting forward. GP-2 is a substantive change to clause 5 which does one simple thing, I can explain it very briefly.
Subsection 39.(2) of the Canada Labour Code makes a lot of sense. It's being repealed by the way this act is currently worded and if you earn a situation of decertification, if there's no collective agreement in place, but there is ongoing negotiation, and the bargaining agent is bargaining in good faith, you shouldn't actually create chaos in collective bargaining and labour relations.
Just to quote from the Canadian Labour Congress' brief to the committee, “that failure to improve this act”—as my amendment proposes—“will only serve to destabilize labour relations and undermine collective bargaining”.
I know this bill is a private member's bill, it's bill. I'm not calling it the government bill. He's a diligent private member, but this is one of those examples of taking something....There is the old adage, “If it ain't broke, don't fix it”. This is one of a number of private members' bills, and some government bills, that aim directly at collective bargaining, as they have to other sectors, and say, “We're going to keep fixing it 'til it's broken”.
This little amendment would at least address this one gap in Bill .
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
:
Any other speakers to this amendment?
Seeing none, I'll call the question on amendment GP-2.
(Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings])
(Clause 5 as amended agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings])
The Chair: Shall the title carry?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
Some hon. members: On division.
(Clause 1 agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings])
The Chair: Shall the bill carry as amended?
An hon. member: A recorded vote please.
(Bill as amended agreed to: yeas 5; nays 4)
The Chair: Shall I report the bill?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
Some hon. members: On division.
The Chair: Shall the committee order a reprint of the bill?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: Thank you committee members for hanging in here to complete this today. Have a good constituency week.
The meeting is adjourned.