:
I call the meeting to order.
Thank you for being here, ladies and gentlemen.
Before we start, committee members, I'd like to draw your attention to a notice that we sent out regarding the paperless project and the fact that on the 28th we will have an assistant here for those of you who want to participate in a paperless environment. The assistant from the House of Commons will be here to assist you, if you need help. But that's entirely voluntary. There will still be documents as we currently receive them. I just want to bring that to your attention.
Now we come to our witnesses.
Thank you for being here and good afternoon.
This is meeting number 51 of the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities. We're here to continue our current study exploring the potential of social finance in Canada.
We are pleased to have here with us for our first hour, Ms. Sharon Mayne Devine, chief executive officer, and Mr. Rob El-Sayed, manager of fund development and communications, from The Honourable William G. Davis Centre for Families. Also joining us from the Fédération des communautés francophones et acadienne du Canada are president Marie-France Kenny and Ms. Diane Côté, community and government liaison director.
Thank you all for being here.
We'll move into your presentations. Each of the organizations has up to 10 minutes. I'll give you a signal when you have approximately a minute left. Then we'll move into questioning by committee members.
We'll start with the first group, from The Honourable William G. Davis Centre for Families.
:
Mr. Chairman and committee members, good afternoon. We appreciate this opportunity to share our story from The Honourable William G. Davis Centre for Families located in Brampton, Ontario. Thank you very much for having us.
The Honourable William G. Davis Centre for Families is owned and operated by Catholic Family Services of Peel-Dufferin. We are a registered charity that has been providing individual, couple, and family counselling to those in need since 1981. Our mission is to strengthen and enrich individual, family, and community life. We serve the entire community in 12 different languages. Last year alone we served 30,000 clients.
In 2008 the board of directors and the senior leadership team of the agency envisioned the creation of the first family justice centre in Peel region in order to better serve those impacted by domestic violence. This centre would provide victims with all the services they required in one location, a one-stop shop. The planning of the centre included a discussion of whether we would rent a property, build on vacant land, or buy a building that would become the home for this family justice centre.
The board of directors and senior leadership team at that time recognized that owning was preferable to renting, and that the acquisition and renovation of an existing building in Brampton was more feasible than acquiring land and building our own centre. The estimated cost of building a small family justice centre would have exceeded $10 million. By acquiring and renovating an existing site, we paid $8.9 million for a building twice the size. With the acquisition of a larger property, we were able to expand our vision beyond a family justice centre to include other community partners addressing a range of social issues—poverty reduction, job creation, mental health services, child welfare services—providing coordinated service response under one roof.
A number of community stakeholders believed in our vision and were willing to invest in us. In 2010, through the generous support of the Province of Ontario, we secured the first $1 million. The Government of Canada, through the stimulus fund, provided another $1.6 million. We raised another million through corporate donors. Catholic charities and the Archdiocese of Toronto provided additional funds through grants and loans. In addition, the local regional government provided a revolving line of credit.
I'm pleased to report that three years after we took possession of the building, The Honourable William G. Davis Centre for Families was fully leased. We now have a short waiting list of organizations wishing to move into the centre.
The risk that the board of directors took paid off. They made a bold and brave decision that our elected representatives in the community supported. I'm delighted to be here talking to you about this today, as I understand today is National Take a Chance Day. People took a chance. People were pretty brave in stepping up and making this kind of an investment.
The Honourable William G. Davis Centre for Families provides a platform for social innovation. The building itself is growing into a social enterprise. Currently the gross annual rental income for the building is $940,000. After satisfying the debt obligations, the net annual income is $100,000. In 2017-18, after major portions of the loans are paid off, our cashflow balance will be $300,000. This will improve the following year to $400,000. CFSPD and the Davis centre for families will then be in a position to generate some of its own funds to support programming and enable us to respond to the expanding needs of our growing community in Peel, which is tremendous.
We are enterprising. In order to generate additional funds, we are renting out three rows of parking spaces at the back of the parking lot to neighbouring corporations. This rental agreement is currently generating $25,000 per year. We've also rented the southeast corner of our property to Bell Canada for a mobile tower. This is generating an additional $20,000 per year. These agreements provide additional building revenue and sometimes help offset some of our partners in the building when they can't make the rent because of funding cuts to their organizations.
We are now in the early stages of planning the renovation of the lower level of the centre. This will generate further income and meet the demand for additional programming space. We already have one organization located in the lower level. We look forward to the development of the entire area. In the future, we will have the ability to generate enough revenue through our rental operations to enhance our programming, help more clients, and become less reliant on funding sources—and, I think more importantly, we'd be able to fund programs that aren't currently being funded.
Today, The William G. Davis Centre for Families is home to 23 organizations, which include the Peel Children's Aid Society, the Canadian Mental Health Association, and OASIS Centre des Femmes, as well as the Safe Centre of Peel, our regional family justice centre. All organizations are either not for profit or registered charities. All are mission driven and respond to the needs of the community.
There are a number of benefits to this co-location. We know that those who seek help often need more than one service. Here clients can access a range of services, all in one location, ensuring they get the help they need when and where they need it, resulting in increases in client service engagement and better outcomes. This is particularly important when we talk about women who are leaving abusive relationships. Research indicates that they need to connect with 18 different organizations. So to be able to access all of them in one place makes a huge difference in women's follow-through for services, and then ensures the safety of their children.
Being in the same building has provided us with a platform for collaboration and social innovation. Living together provides opportunities for expanded partnerships and the development of creative synergies. We can do more together. We can be more together.
In closing, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chair and members of this committee, for inviting us and for giving us the opportunity to share with you our passion and the unique approach to social innovation and social enterprise.
I look forward to a discussion we can have this afternoon about the things we're doing and some of the things we're learning. I would like to personally extend to you a heartfelt invitation to join us for a tour of The Honourable William G. Davis Centre for Families in Brampton, Ontario, just down the road.
:
Mr. Chair and members of the committee, I'd like to thank you for inviting the Fédération des communautés francophones et acadienne, or FCFA, to appear before the committee today.
My name is Marie-France Kenny, and joining me is our director of community and government liaison, Diane Côté. We are here today on behalf of 2.6 million French-speaking Canadians living outside Quebec, across 9 provinces and 3 territories.
The FCFA wanted to contribute to the committee's study because we are rather concerned. Allow me to explain. As we see it, a push is currently on to adopt social finance in a slew of government programs and initiatives, without regard for a range of considerations that are of the utmost importance to our communities. I want to make clear that we aren't here to argue against new methods or approaches but, rather, to add a nuanced and vital perspective to the committee's study.
I referred to the push to adopt social finance, and now I'd like to explain what I mean by that. The perception is that the government is trialling the model in a very limited and exploratory manner through pilot projects. The reality, however, is quite different.
The fact of the matter is that Employment and Social Development Canada and other federal institutions have already changed how they deliver their grants and contributions programs, bringing them more in line with the social finance model. The federal budget, tabled the day before yesterday, even includes a social finance accelerator initiative. Social finance has gone from an exploratory measure to a virtual fait accompli.
I'll give you an example. The official-language minority communities literacy and essential skills initiative is part of the Roadmap for Canada's Official Languages 2013-2018. But when Employment and Social Development Canada incorporated the $7.5-million investment under the roadmap into its broader programming, things went awry.
On the one hand, in its request for proposals, the department stipulated that the project had to have a national scope and that 20% of the funding had to come from sources other than the federal government. On the other hand, the request for proposals shows that the department has lost sight of the relationship to the roadmap. The department found it perfectly acceptable to say that it would prioritize projects targeting under-represented groups, which included official language minority communities, as well as aboriginals and immigrants. We are talking about a program provided for under the roadmap for official language minority communities.
The problem, when you put the focus on large-scale projects, is that organizations serving francophone and Acadian communities are shut out because their target populations are too small to achieve impressive wide-reaching results. When you put the focus on working with a private sector partner, you fail to take into account the difference between majority and minority settings. Minority francophone and Acadian communities don't have access to as large of a funding pool as majority communities.
It's important to understand that a key condition to working with the private sector through social finance initiatives is the existence of a critical mass. Simply ask big telecom companies how they would benefit from extending cell phone coverage or high-speed Internet access to rural or remote areas, such as the Port au Port peninsula, in Newfoundland, or northern Alberta.
A private sector company will usually view a project that can make a meaningful difference to a French-speaking community of 2,000 residents as too local or not profitable enough.
If you want to talk about innovation, in our communities, we have seen francophones setting up social enterprises to fill the void left by the private sector. That was the case with Baudoux Communications, a business that opened up where I'm from, Saskatchewan, to provide Internet access in regions where service was lacking.
Official language minority communities will feel the impact of an approach where requests for proposals are based on major projects and private sector contributions. The government runs the risk of creating an environment where, instead of having access to French-language services that fit their needs, francophone communities will, at best, receive bilingual services delivered by majority language organizations, or even services delivered by Quebec-based organizations with little understanding of our communities' needs.
Those kinds of results will do nothing to meet federal institutions' obligation under Part VII of the Official Languages Act to take positive measures to enhance the vitality of English and French linguistic minority communities, and to assist their development.
That obligation seems to have been forgotten in the push to implement social finance.
[English]
But as the saying goes, we've seen this movie before. ln 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada issued a ruling in a case regarding support for francophone economic development in Ontario's Simcoe County. At issue was the fact that the government-run Economic Development Corporation of North Simcoe offered identical services in both languages to majority and minority alike, and the francophone community did not use those services because they didn't fit its specific needs. Rather, the francophone community had set up a community economic development corporation, CALDECH, which was having trouble getting funding from Industry Canada. ln its ruling, the Supreme Court stated that in the spirit of part IV of the Official Languages Act, the pursuit of substantive equality between both official languages could require, instead of a one-size-fits-all approach, distinct measures tailored to the needs and the specific reality of the minority.
ln the rush to implement social finance, these principles seem to have been forgotten. What seems to have prevailed is a one-size-fits-all approach, a may-the-strongest-win approach. There has been little attention to, and little interest in, how this was going to impact francophone minority communities.
[Translation]
As I said earlier, given the realities of French-speaking and Acadian communities, our social, cultural, economic and linguistic challenges are primarily being addressed by not-for-profit agencies and institutions that are run by and for community members. We do have some cooperatives and social enterprises, but they certainly aren't the norm.
The government may say to us that this is an excellent opportunity to innovate and try new approaches, and that may be true. If I may, though, I'd like to paraphrase a passage from a report by MC Consultants for Industry Canada regarding funding diversification and the entrepreneurial culture within community agencies. Basically, the passage says this:
In the movement to further integrate entrepreneurial culture in the partnership model, it's essential that organizations stay true to the mandate for which they were created.
We are, in no way, closed to all forms of social finance or innovation, on the contrary. Who could object to solutions that allow for optimal impact and outcomes? All we are asking for is tailored solutions that reflect our unique issues and needs, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach. For that very reason, we have been calling for an impact assessment on social finance and minority communities, for a year now.
At the very least, some crucial questions need to be asked. How can very large-scale projects, delivered by majority community organizations, take into account the specific needs of our communities, especially in areas where those minority language populations are very small? How were the unique needs of our communities taken into account before the programs delivered by federal institutions were overhauled, and how were our communities consulted about that overhaul? How can these social finance issues be fixed, so that French-speaking communities and the organizations that serve them can benefit under this approach?
In conclusion, I would like to recommend that the government conduct an impact assessment in order to (1) build an inventory of the approaches used in our communities; (2) assess community capacity for social partnerships and, where appropriate, establish a pool of prospective partners; (3) identify the conditions for success, as well as the obstacles and challenges around the successful use of social partnerships in francophone and Acadian minority communities; (4) determine the conditions in which social finance is compatible with the government's official languages obligations; and (5) consult with communities and local service organizations on how to build capacity, and make policy recommendations to guide the federal government and communities in implementing social finance.
Thank you. I would now be happy to answer your questions
[English]
in both official languages.
:
The solution best suited to the majority will not necessarily fit our needs, anymore than it will fit the needs of English-speaking communities in Quebec. So that's an important caveat. As for whether the funding model could work, I would say that it probably could. What we are saying is, together, let's look at all the possible repercussions of social-finance-based programs. We aren't opposed to innovation, on the contrary.
Ever since the Supreme Court's 2009 ruling in CALDECH, which I talked about, a number of departments seem to have taken a blanket approach that doesn't take into account the specific needs of the minority. And yet, the ruling stipulates that they must be taken into account. It's important not to adopt a cookie-cutter approach. It doesn't work that way. We have to look at the impact it will have on communities, and that's all we came here to tell you.
I live in Saskatchewan. I'm sure there are private investors who would like to invest in the francophone community. I, myself, am an employer in the private sector and I'd be interested in making that kind of investment. But I'm not so sure that my neighbour who owns the business next to me and doesn't speak French would want to invest in my francophone project, even though he knows me and accepts that I live part of my life in French. That's where it gets a bit tricky for our communities. We will have much more limited access to these types of private investors. And I don't necessarily mean in larger communities in Ontario or the Acadie region but, rather, in communities like mine, or those in the Yukon and other parts of the country. Finding private investors would even be hard in some Acadian communities.
Is it possible to measure the approach's potential? Are there other ways of going about it? Together, can we find other innovative approaches? We aren't saying to the government, do it and we'll sit and watch. We're perfectly willing to do it with you. Let's work on it together because we don't have the resources to do it on our own. We need help and we are prepared to work with the government to make sure that everyone comes out a winner.
I'd just like to add one last thing. The government's official languages obligations don't end with my organization or a private investor. If the government entrusts partners with money under the roadmap or makes other financial commitments to enhance the vitality of minority language communities, the government has an obligation to make sure that the money really goes to francophone programs.
:
Well, I really agree with my colleague. I would be very cautious about having a one-size-fits-all approach, too. I think the success is at that grassroots level. For me, it's really both levels working together. We do need the support of government. Our first million came from the provincial government, and $1.6 million came from the federal government. We got that, and then we could get the corporate sector on board. And it did come on board, and we had a $1-million campaign with the corporate sector, with banks and big corporations giving us other dollars.
I find that corporations are reluctant to give you money for programming, because the optics of not being able to continue a program in the community are really bad for a corporation. They give capital dollars, and then we can generate our own funds out of the capital dollars, and that's great. Being able to set things in place in such a way that we're not penalized for generating funds, that there are some tax incentives for corporations being able to provide those dollars.... Really, if you think about it, what we're going to be able to do over time will be tremendous in being able to fund our own programs and not having to put our hand out all the time.
What's happening for us right now is that we're just paying the bills. We're just paying off the loans at this point. In a couple of years from now, we will begin to collect some dollars. Now, that's going to all go into a reserve. If I could have had $1 million more, it would have made a huge difference in being able to fund those programs sooner than I can now. I think on the one hand, while we are a success story, we could be an even more successful story if we had more of those funds early on. We're having to grapple with things like property tax. It was very difficult to get the original mortgage; we're paying a higher mortgage rate than any other business would.
When I think about recommendations, I wonder if there is a way to insure those kinds of mortgages and loans for organizations that have proven track records. All of those things would help this be a more successful story than it is, though I think we're moving in the right direction now.
:
I just have a word of caution when it comes to funding that is transferred to a private investor to lead a large-scale project. Money is already transferred to provinces for education, health and another program whose name I can't remember right now. In fact, we appeared on the topic.
These are federal labour market agreements whereby the employer needs to do certain things. Will he or she take into account the fact that there are francophones in their community? Will employers offer specific services?
Then there is the issue of transfers. Even if there are language provisions attached to provincial transfer payments, the commissioner mentioned that certain education ministries had stated that when they receive a cheque for immersion or French-language education, they can use it elsewhere. They use it for priority needs as they see them, and these are not necessarily French-language schooling or immersion.
You have to make sure that you are not dealing with a majority organization. Linguistic duality is not the same thing as institutional bilingualism; in overall bilingualism, French gets lost. Linguistic duality means the coexistence of two peoples, some being unilingual French-speakers, others being unilingual English-speakers, and there are bilingual people in the middle of all that, people who understand the needs and reality of the other group.
If organizations from the majority-language group offer services, there is quite a likelihood, particularly in Saskatchewan, that I will in the end be offered services in English, and that the active offer of French services will also be lost. My particular needs will most probably not be met.
Recently there was a project managed by a Quebec organization. A project intended for our communities was granted to a Quebec organization that did not know us at all in the context of the Roadmap for Canada's Official Languages 2013-2018. My reality is totally different from that of a Quebec francophone. So we had to deal with someone who did not know us and in the end could not execute the project as they had intended to. Finally, the project was passed along in the form of contracts to organizations in our community. The original organization was reduced to simply handing out money for contracts. These results are for from positive.
Things have to be done for and by communities and we have organizations that do an enormous amount of work. I think that you should first and foremost work with those organizations who have the necessary expertise and are able to do the work.
:
It's crystal ball time. Well, I generally am a very optimistic person, and one of the things I do is invite people to come to the centre because a picture really paints a thousand words. There isn't a single person who comes through and doesn't say two things. They'll say, number one, “I had no idea”, meaning that they had no idea the level of need and the kind of needs for the services we have. Also they see that it makes such a big difference in the community and for the people who come. I think people also have a real sense of wanting to be part of something that builds hope and possibility in people's lives.
We're beginning another campaign to bring in more capital dollars to really develop that lower level in the building, so that we can provide space for other non-profit organizations that can't afford space. Again, it's the example of a space where people can come maybe when they want to do something but they don't even have revenue for rent. That's one of the things we're doing as well as having other areas where we can take in more tenants, because the more tenants I have paying rent increases the amount of revenue that comes into the building and then we can provide more service.
For me, that crystal ball is a combination of increasing those revenues for sustainability and having a good business model, on the one hand, but also making sure we're giving back to the community.
One of my visions for the agency in terms of social innovation is seeing how we can become a kind of backbone for other organizations. It's a very diverse community we live in. For example, I had a group of young people who call themselves Brampton's Multicultural Youth Council. This is a group started by a grade 10 student. By the time I met her, she was in grade 12 and had established quite a governance model for this group of growing young people, and we discovered they just happened to be using our space late on a Friday afternoon, in the early evening.
It was, like, who are these people and what program are they with? I found out they weren't with anyone. They were just a self-starting group, so I said, “Let's partner. Come and use the space”. I'd much rather they be in my space than at the mall. Let's give them some support. They don't have a charitable number. They can't do fundraising. Well, maybe I can do that fundraising and support that group for being able to innovate.
I think part of what we're doing as we strengthen our own organization is to be able to then provide for startup non-profits. We know how expensive the infrastructure for a non-profit organization is. You need a finance person, you need an ED, you have to get a charitable number, so how can we provide opportunities, especially for marginalized communities—and in this case, marginalized youth—to give them those kinds of opportunities? I think we can do so much more as non-profits when we are better resourced.
:
Absolutely. We're doing a joint presentation, so that works well. Of course, thank you for inviting us to be witnesses here today.
Our research in the area of social finance really focuses in on social impact bonds, or SIBs, which are a financial product or policy tool used to pool private sector investment to support social service projects with the attendant promise of a profit if the project meets pre-arranged outcome targets. I don't know if you've covered this already, but I'll briefly talk about how SIBs work.
Basically it begins with government identifying a social policy field where it would like to pay for particular outcomes. Internationally, SIBs have been popular in a variety of social policy domains. We've seen them in housing, employment, criminal justice, education, child care, and health care. Government then would typically contract an intermediary organization who manages the SIB project and actually prepares the bond instrument. It prepares the desired project results, the costs, the savings, as well as the rate of return to investors should the social project achieve those pre-arranged outcome targets. The intermediary would then issue the bond to private investors, who provide the upfront or the immediate project capital. This is where the social finance element, the impact investing element, comes in.
This capital would then be used by the intermediary to contract with social service agencies, who are then provided with that money up front to deliver a social service project over a relatively long timeframe, let's say three to seven years. If this service project meets the result target—if it's successful—government then pays the intermediary, who repays the bond to investors with the agreed rate of return. That's essentially how they work.
The first SIB project was implemented in the U.K. in 2010 in the area of criminal justice. This was called the Peterborough prison project. You may have heard of it. SIBs are now spreading very quickly across the globe. We're concerned that this is occurring in the absence of any real systematic evidence that SIBs actually save money, encourage socially innovative social projects, as well as enhance the quality of life for vulnerable individuals.
Our research thus far has really focused on or documented several reasons why we do need to be cautious about implementing SIBs or shifting to a wide-scale SIB model. What we'll do here today is just highlight what government should think about and be cautious about. There's more in our paper.
Primarily, and number one, SIBs are actually unlikely to reduce government administration and budgets even though they're claimed to do this. Government will have to pay for short-term overhead costs. That would include retraining for bureaucrats to gain new skills in market definition, program evaluation, partnership building, and payment-by-result or outcome contracting.
SIBs will also require the services of lawyers, accountants, as well as evaluators through project development, implementation, and payout. If not retained in-house, all of these components would be contracted off at an additional cost. There are democratic accountability implications there, as policy knowledge, expertise, and oversight are shifted away from the public sector. There are also concerns that details and cost information about services could be kept secret on the grounds of commercial interest. That's another concern. Governments, of course, are also going to have to pay in the long term for results, should they be achieved, but potentially at higher private sector interest rates than government would normally pay for its own financing. That's also another issue, that with SIBs, government will have to pay for more than just outcomes.
The second challenge is that to cover these extensive costs, financial experts have advised that a SIB contract would have to be worth about $20 million to $40 million to cover the costs. However, a study by Deloitte and MaRS has indicated that private investors in Canada are only willing to invest a total sum of $30 million to $40 million for SIB development, and would prefer a market rate of return between 5% and 15% on their investment. This sort of questions whether the private sector is willing to take on some of these risky socially innovative projects. It also merits further discussion on whether the expectation of a market rate of return should qualify as social finance.
Financial experts have also advised that governments will likely have to offer tax credits and capital guarantees to encourage more private sector investment. I think this is being looked at in the U.K. right now. Again, government will have to take on more risk, or share more risk with the private sector, with this SIB model.
A third challenge is that, given the financial risk associated with the SIB model, there is an incentive to focus on those service types and population groups most likely to succeed, which might not be the more complex cases. So there's a risk that with SIBs we might be ignoring the most vulnerable population groups, which also challenges the assumption that SIBs are about preventing complex kind of wicked policy problems.
A fourth challenge is that SIBs will likely require a new infrastructure of extensive government regulation. So SIBs do open up potential for collusive behaviour between project intermediaries, investors, and service providers. The Economist magazine, in an article in 2012 entitled “Playing with Fire”, claims that SIBs are not really all that different from the risky financial tools that precipitated the 2008 financial crisis. There are similar risks to private investors selling on their investments and sort of repackaging these assets. So we have to watch out for sort of overexposure, risk manufacturing, convolution, and a delay in government regulation and oversight.
These are all challenges, and John's going to continue with a few more.
:
A fifth area has to do with SIBs and program evaluation. The thing around program evaluation with SIBs is that it tends to be quite complex. This involves a lot of costs if it's going to be done right. In addition, there's often no guarantee that the results will be accurate.
Providing a meaningful evidence-based approach to results requires social experimentation methods in which at least 200 participants per year are randomly selected and are matched with an identical control group in order to try to determine what your actual results are and that they're accurate. SIBs required detailed population data on subject groups and control groups. Again, this is quite costly.
It's also difficult to know often whether the results that are attributed to the SIB approach itself are a result of what the SIB has done, whether it's the unique combination of the service interventions that are unique to the SIB, whether it's about more resources that are targeted to that particular service area, or whether it's due to another policy change that has occurred randomly in conjunction with the project.
It's interesting that, in the case of Peterborough Prison in the U.K., it turned out that the sample chosen there was not a random sample; it was actually volunteers. That had the effect of biasing the sample, so that one would expect more positive results from the way the sample was selected. In fact in the mid-term report, in terms of outcomes, what they found was that there had been very modest positive results, but this may have been due to sample bias, in large measure. Interestingly, in another case in the U.K., with a similar program around recidivism in the prison system, they actually came up with negative results. But that was also probably the result of other sorts of factors, because there was a tough-on-crime policy that was implemented around the same time in the U.K., which probably influenced the results of those outcomes. It's hard to sort of decipher what's going on with the results, which makes interpretation of the evaluation often very difficult.
The other thing I think that's worth noting here is that in the case of Peterborough, U.K., which is the first SIB project, as Meghan mentioned, it was cancelled and they moved towards a full sort of privatization model. There was never a full result in the case of that original SIB project, which is unfortunate.
A sixth area of concern is that SIB projects are risky for participating non-service providers to some degree as well. Non-profits do not have exclusive control over results, and a poor outcome could cause them the loss of their reputation. The reputation is the prime asset that a non-profit organization has, and that could cause them considerable problems if the project goes wrong for reasons out of their control. It could actually result in their going out of business and the loss of jobs and the loss of essential services they're providing to the communities they serve.
Non-profits are also at a disadvantage compared to private-sector competitors when bidding for an SIB contract, because they have limited access to capital and lack of financial track records of these kinds, because of some of the rules around their financing. The SIB tool is also quite biased towards the largest non-profits, as well as private social service providers. So probably, in the case of the non-profit sector, only the biggest non-profits could be involved with these. This, in part, is problematic because small non-profits are often the most innovative service providers because of their particularly close relationship to client groups, and especially vulnerable client groups in particular.
SIBs further distance the relationship between government and non-profit organizations because the relationship is now with the SIB intermediary. That limits the opportunity for non-profits to inform public policy based on their own grounded expertise. Some of that disconnect that might operate between SIBs and their connection to government and how it may inform policy and programming is another consideration one would want to take a look at.
In terms of concluding thoughts, SIBs are no panacea and should not be viewed as simply a replacement for public service provisions and grant-based program funding to the non-profit sector. Also, while there are potential advantages to SIBs, including a new emphasis on supporting non-profits design, quality of life outcome measures with their clients, as well as longer-term payments for non-profit service provisions that reduce some of the burden of the reporting requirements, these types of changes could also proceed without the transition to a SIB model. Some of the recommendations that were made by the blue ribbon commission on grants and contributions in 2006 point the way to some reforms here for the non-profit sector that don't involve a SIB model.
The non-profit sector has traditionally been run on principles and values of care that have served Canadians very well overall, and SIBs risk placing further pressure on the non-profit sector to market this type of provision, which as we've suggested has some dangers to it that one would want to be rather cautious with.
As a final comment, this is definitely a case of proceed with caution and let the evidence come in and see what the real costs and benefits of SIBs will be before jumping into it wholesale.
Thank you very much.
I thank our guests.
I come from the business sector, so I always believe that risk motivates results. I guess that's a little bit of the issue.
We got sidetracked here on the provision of social services, but there are all kinds of other things that are possible with social finance. I know of Lions Clubs that have put in seniors housing, and there are the Rotary Clubs, and there are the friendship centres, with training and education. There are those that have outcomes you can measure. It's difficult to measure the outcomes of a women's shelter, for instance, because what's the outcome? Is it that there are fewer women in the shelter or that they're adjusted to maybe getting back in the workforce? It's a lot more difficult.
I think we have to be careful that we don't put everything in the same package, because there are different opportunities, and they're not all measurable, which is a challenge. I totally agree. But there's another thing we have to look at too: does government have oversight in the provision of those services? Is there any really truly objective evaluation of the programming and what they do, and of sunset clauses and all that type of thing?
I said that risk motivates results. Quite often, maybe it's a good thing that you set out quantitative objectives that you want to have provided with the money supplied. Maybe the charitable organization or group could have a better handle on that, which maybe wouldn't be influenced by some of the outside influences in the public service.
In looking at a possible framework so that this could work, one thing we heard from several organizations is that in our tax rules, for instance, there's a barrier to any profit. Then there's the financial sector in terms of banks putting out money to finance various programs, because they have policies that might be a challenge.
Would you have any ideas about any sort of government policy that would have to be changed to accommodate this, or even any ideas about financial institutions that would have to somehow come on board?